On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology:

the Problem of ‘Mental Images’

by Eduard Marbach *

Summary
The theory of so-called ‘mental images’, which is put forward again in contemporary cogni-
tive psychology, is criticized by way of elaborating the distinctly different intentional structures
of the mental activities of ‘remembering something’ and ‘representing something pictorially’ (by
means of a painting, photo, sculpture, etc.). It is suggested that psychology in its concept and
theory formation could use profitably phenomenological-descriptive analyses of the different
forms of intentionality as exemplified in the paper.

Resume
La thkorie des ((images mentales D reprise par la psychologie cognitive contemporaine est cri-
tiquee et opposee aux structures intentionnelles ctse souvenir de quelque chosea ou (( se represen-
ter quelque chose A l’aide d’une image)) (peinture, photographie, sculpture, etc.). L’auteur mon-
tre que la formation des concepts et des theories en psychologie peut aussi tirer parti des analyses
ph6nomCnologiques descriptives des differents modes d’intentionnalit6, telles que celles qu’il pre-
sente ici.

Zusammenfassung
In Gegeniiberstellung der intentionalen Strukturen von ‘sich an etwas erinnern’ bzw. ‘sich
etwas mittels eines Bildes vorstellen’ (Gemlilde, Photo, Skulptur, etc.) wird die Theorie der sog.
‘geistigen Bilder’, wie sie in der zeitgenossischen kognitiven Psychologie wieder auflebt, kritisiert.
Es wird nahegelegt, dass phlnomenologisch-deskriptive Analysen verschiedener Weisen der
Intentionalitat, wie sie hier vorgefilhrt werden, auch der psychologischen Begriffs- und Theorie-
bildung zugute kommen konnten.

As the title of this presentation suggests, I would like to talk about an

application of the phenomenological theory of intentionality. To be sure,
there is a Husserlian theory of intentionality independent of its possible
applications to empirical findings. In a first approximation, I call “empirical
phenomenology” the theoretical enterprise that goes beyond the merely re-

* Philosophisches Institut, Falkenplatz 16, CH-3012 Bern.

Dialectica Vol. 38,N02-3(1984)

210 Eduard Marbach

flective analysis of consciousness by taking into account results of empirical

investigations, with the aim of interpreting them from the phenomenological
point of view. And I take this point of view to consist in a specifically subjec-
tive study of mental activities, namely in an analysis of the intentional struc-
tures of consciousness.
Concretely, I would like to propose an application of the theory of inten-
tionality to some of the findings of contemporary cognitive psychology, and
of cognitive science in general, concerning the problem of ‘mental images’.
In my situation, I am reminded of the little schoolmaster Maria Wutz in
Auenthal. No doubt, few among you have ever heard of him. Well, he is the
main character in an early tale by the German Romantic writer Jean Paul.
Wutz did not have enough money to buy the books that were advertised in the
book-fair catalogs. So he undertook the literary labor (literarische Geburtsar-
beit) of writing with his own hand those works, such as Kant’s Kritik der
reinen Vernunft, whose titles in the catalog had struck him as worthy addi-
tions to his home library (cf. Hanser Werkausgabe, Bd. I, S. 425 ff.). Some-
what similarly, I was struck about a year ago by the title Husserl, Zntentional-
ity and Cognitive Science (edited by Hubert Dreyfus, 1982) in an advertise-
ment for forthcoming publications. This title neatly combines both the dis-
ciplines - Husserl’s phenomenology and cognitive science - and the specific
point of view - intentionality - from which, over the last few years, I have
been working in an effort to relate the two domains of investigation. Now,
since Z have actually read the anthology when it was published, I can merely
pretend to take a ‘Wutzean attitude’ and submit to you bits and pieces of the
text which, in my view, fit that title, and which I am able to produce with my
own hand! Those among you who are familiar with this anthology, and espe-
cially with Hubert Dreyfus’ Introduction, will notice that, like the little
schoolmaster Wutz, I am not producing a pirated edition, although, unlike
Wutz, I did take the original in my hands. A look at the main reason for the
difference in the two products leads us straightforwardly to the heart of the
matter.
Instead of emphasizing the noema and the noemutically oriented part in
the account of intentionality - as does Dreyfus, when he presents Husserl as
“an important precursor of cognitive science” (p. 9) - I will discuss some
aspects of the noetically or subjectively oriented part, that is, of the phenome-
nological act-analysis proper. At the end of the paper, an attempt will be
made to indicate the sort of relationship between Husserl and cognitive
science that might be established on the basis of the present account.
In my approach, one gets the best hunch of what the phenomenological
theory of intentionality is about from the deceptively simple expression “con-
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 21 1

sciousness is always consciousness of something in one way or another”, Thus

in order to understand the achievement (Leistung) of consciousness, rather
than to be focussing on the directedness towards objects, events, states of
affairs, etc., which leads naturally to a primarily noematically-oriented
account of intentionality, I will be emphasizing the structural analysis of those
complex multiplicities of consciousness (Bewusstseinsmannigfaltigkeiten)that
are contained, but anonymously functioning, in the experiences, in which we
are directed towards objects, etc.
The central notion to be elaborated will be what Husserl called “this most
’.
remarkable intentionality of the cmodification~J7’The same phenomenon is
often also termed “intentional implication”, and Husserl refers to the whole
cluster of problems that are here involved as “the theory of the impfica-
tion(s)” 2. The titles of ‘intentionality of the modifications’ and of ‘inten-
tional implication’ cover very broad problem spaces, involving, as Husserl
notes, “infinite, open horizons” (Hu VIII, 153). Here it can only be men-
tioned that this is so because, in Husserl’s view, “each individual experience
‘mirrors’ (‘reflects’, ‘spiegelt’) the entire connection of experiences”. For the
sake of analysis, however, one can separate the genuine, real (reelle) implica-
tions belonging to certain types of individual intentional experiences, from the
horizonal implications regarding inner and outer horizons as they are neces-
sarily involved in every intentional experience concretely viewed. For present
purposes, it is sufficient to concentrate on the genuine intentional implications
and the corresponding modifications. The phenomenological elucidation of
the mental representations under study in the present paper crucially involves
an account of intentionality, i.e. the intentional structures, in terms of inten-
tional implications and modifications.
As regards the cognitivist’s perspective, on the other hand, the following
distinction has to be kept in mind: for one thing, we have experiences or pro-
cesses by which we actually are taking cognizance (Kenntnisnehmen) of some-
thing for the first time; for another, we can later remember that and/or what
we were taking cognizance of, or we later realize that we have forgotten what
it was or how we learnt about it. For the phenomenoiogist, there is here a non-
trivial problem concerning the fact - as Husserl, in a text from 1928, put it in
surprisingly ‘contemporary sounding’ language -

Husserliana XXIII, Einl. d. Hrsg., p. LXIII: “diese h6chst merkwiirdige Intentionalittit

der ‘Modifikationen’”.
“Lehre von der (den) Irnplikation(en)”, see, e.g., HusserlianaVIII, 44. Vorlesung and fol-
lowing; see Beilage 11, the corresponding amendments; Husserliana XIII, Nr. 10; Husserliana
XXIII, Nr. 14 and 15; ZdeasZ(1913),esp. $5 99ff.
HusserlianaVI11,p. 318; 146ff.
212 Eduard Marbach

that out of actual taking cognizance comes habitual knowledge (Kenntnis), as perma-
nent mental possession (fortdauernder geistiger Besitz) which, even when no actual
experience is directed towards it, is nevertheless available (verfugbar) and can be
retrieved again (herausgeholt) like from a storage room (Vorratskammer) and be pro-
cessed into a network (verarbeitet zur Verknilpfung) with other such acquisitions
(Erwerben).

What Husserl is referring to as being for phenomenology a “new topic on a

much higher level” over against the elementary noetico-noematic act-
analysis seems to be akin to (if not identical with) the question of how
information is stored in human memory, which cognitive psychologists
attempt to answer with the theoretical construct of “representation of knowl-
edge ”.
For example, introducing the problem of “how is information stored in
human memory?”, D. A. Norman (1976) writes:
In remembering a novel, do we remember the visual appearance or the sounds of the
words, or some abstraction of the meaning, or perhaps a mental image of the things
described by that book? When we remember some event that we have experienced, do
we do so by a mental image of that event, complete with the images of the sights,
sounds, feelings, smells? Questions like these get at the heart oftheprobfem of mental
processing. If we knew how information was represented in the mind, we would have
overcome one of the major stumbling blocks to our understanding. Not only do we not
know, we are still stumbling over the appropriate ways to ask the questions.

As might be guessed at this point, part of the present preoccupation with the
relationship between phenomenology and cognitive psychology is simply this:
Cannot phenomenological analysis of intentional implications and modifica-
tions help clear the way to asking the appropriate questions concerning mental
processing? In any case, Norman’s questions just quoted are questions a phe-
nomenologist may ask as well.
Within the limits of this paper, the question of the so-called representation
by mental images as a form of internal representation of information about
the world shall be examined. It is my impression that a number of cognitive
psychologists are more or less explicitly assuming some similarity between
“ordinary images” or “physical images”, such as reflections, photographs,
television displays, realistic paintings etc., on the one hand, and so-called
“mental images” or “mental pictures” on the other (see, e.g., Rey, 1981,

Husserliana IX, p , 434; see also p. 637: “gleichsam in der Vorratskammer beiseite
gestellt. . .”.
Husserliana IX, p. 434: “neues und vie1 hiiheres Thema”.
E.g., Norman, 1976, pp. 157ff.; Lindsay and Norman, 1977, pp. 381ff.; Kosslyn, 1980;
Schank, 1982; etc.
LOC.cit., p. 157, emphasismine.
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 21 3

p. 118; Dennett, 1981, p. 129). For example, Kosslyn (1980), who is much
aware of the fact that images are not simply perceived in the way pictures are
perceived, likes to talk, nevertheless, of mental images as “quasi-pictorial
representations” or as “spatial, picture-like images most people report expe-
riencing” (e.g., p. 29). Accordingly, he discusses “the ‘privileged properties’
that images possess by virtue of the way they depict information” (p. 33).
More precisely, then, I would like to proceed as follows: First, I will make
a few remarks on using a ‘notation’ in order to present concisely descriptive
results of the phenomenological act-analysis. My argument then consists in
showing (1) that the mental activities of remembering something and of
picturing something, i.e. of making use of some ‘image’, exhibit distinctly dif-
ferent intentional structures; (2) that when picturing something does play a
role in the activity of remembering, the basic intentional structure of
remembering is presupposed anyway. My goal, thus, is to propose an alterna-
tive possibility of interpreting the phenomena of representation by means of
so-called ‘mental images’; namely to give an account that saves what the
construct of the ‘mental image’ is presumably meant to achieve, but ‘explains’
the function attributed to it in such a way that there is no need to assume any-
thing like mental images ‘to do the job’. (Maybe it should be added that, on
this view, this does not mean that a so-called propositional or abstract repre-
sentation alone would do.)
*
Regarding the phenomenological analysis of the mental workings of
remembering and picturing, I propose to rely on a ‘notation’. By so doing, I
hope to ease somewhat the notorious difficulty of communicating phenome-
nological results in precise language. After having worked out a few ele-
mentary notations concerning the ‘phenomenologicalform ’ of mental activi-
ties, I suddenly remembered that there was Frege’s Begriffsschrift(1879) and I
anticipated that, perhaps, some clues regarding the usage of notations could
be found there. Well, fully aware of the different goals of Frege’s work mod-
elled after arithmetics, and convinced, with Husserl (cf. e.g., Ideas I, § 71),
that “something like establishing a mathematics of the phenomena”, i.e. the
activities of consciousness, would be a mistaken enterprise, I nevertheless
hope to be entitled to say in the sense of Frege that the notations I am propos-
ing will help “avoid misunderstandings by others and at the same time mis-
takes in one’s own thinking”. * Using the notations, I also aim at “expressing

Frege, 1882b, quoted from Angelelli (Ed.), 1964, p. 106: “Missverstandnisse bei Andern
und zugleich Fehler im eignen Denken zu vermeiden” (English translation mine).
214 Eduard Marbach

a content by means of written signs in a way that is more precise and easier to
survey than it would be possible by means of words”. In the particular con-
text of analyzing the intricacies of intentional implications and modifications,
as they occur in mental representations, the notations help to separate clearly
the individual moments and yet to make their phenomenological, i.e. inten-
tional, relations readily visible. lo
Taking as the basic indication of the meaning of intentionality the expres-
sion “consciousness of something”, it can easily be seen that there is the pos-
sibility to say, in a first approximation, things like the following, with respect
to intentional implications and modifications: the intentionality of some
consciousness may be characterized as “consciousness of consciousness of
something”, or as “consciousness of consciousness of consciousness of some-
thing”, e.g., in remembering a picture that was described in a novel I have
read.
In the notations for such complex activities, on the one hand, letters will
be used to stand for the activities of consciousness, and other letters for the
corresponding intentional correlate(s). As regards the correlates whose par-
ticular content can be left indeterminate, basically the letters x, y, z will serve.
For the notation of the activities themselves, ‘English-bound’ abbreviations
shall be used, namely strings of letters (triplets) based on the English verbs
corresponding to the activities in question: thus, e.g., PER for perceiving,
REM for remembering, IMA for imagining, PIC for picturing (imaging), etc.
Such triplets, once chosen, must retain their meaning in the same context.
They stand for a real or imagined individual example belonging to the kind of
activity that is subjected to the analysis.
On the other hand, different types of parentheses and brackets wilI be
used. In order to establish the theme of the reflective analysis which, at first, is
introduced by an ordinary language expression, a pair of curly brackets { }
will serve, indicating that the question ‘what is it?’ is asked with respect to the
expression contained within these brackets. In the course of the reflective
analysis proper, the following conventions will be observed: (1) In order to
indicate the fundamental intentional relation to something that is inherent to
an activity of consciousness qua “consciousness of something”, a pair of ( )-
parentheses will be used: thus, e.g., (PER)x, (REM)x, etc. (2) In order to
indicate modifications of the performance of an activity of consciousness as

9 Frege, I882a, quoted from Angelelli (Ed.), 1964, p. 97: “einen Inhalt durch geschriebene
Zeichen in genauerer und iibersichtlicherer Weise zum Ausdruck bringen, als es durch Worte
mdglich ist” (English translation mine). - See also, e.g., Kung, 1967, pp. 180ff.
lo Cf. Frege, 1882a, p. 104: “So werden die einzelnen Inhalte von einander deutlich getrennt
und doch in ihren logischen Beziehungenleicht ubersehbar” (English translation mine).
 On Using Intentionalityin Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental images’ 2 15

they occur in the phenomena of intentional implication, pairs of square-

brackets [ ] shall serve. These types of parentheses and brackets together
with a few other signs, such as t- and - standing for ‘positionality’ (belief)
and ‘neutrality’ (mere representation without belief), respectively, do all have
a precisely determined meaning, regardless of the kind of mental activity sub-
jected to the analysis. As a consequence, it is the job of the reflective analysis
to determine for each kind of mental activity the types of parentheses and
brackets to be used as well as their sequential arrangement.
Despite the somewhat formal manner of presenting the phenomena of
intentional implication and modification to be used, there does not seem to be
any meaningful ‘calculus’ to be carried out with the symbols without const-
antly bringing reflectively to mind the involved activities of consciousness.
And doing so, it is crucial to understand that, in terms of intentionality, some-
thing of the form:
(consciousness of [(consciousness of)x] )x
is a novel u n i t y of intentionality over against the intentional unity of (cons-
ciousness of)x. l1
Another way of saying the same thing is that one has to realize that the
consciousness that is [intentionally implied] in the (encompassing unity) could
not be without the act indicated by the outer ( )-parentheses. E.g., in my
stream of consciousness, there is no [past perception] or [possible perception]
by itsev, independently of my activity of (remembering) or (imagining), as a
possibly independent component to be ‘deduced’ or to be said to be a ‘con-
sequence’. On the contrary, qua intentional moment it is inextricably cont-
ained within the intentionally complex activity. Thus, in the present context of
phenomenological reflective analysis, the term ‘implication’ - qua inten-
tional implication - does not refer to, i.e. does not mean the same as, so-
called ‘logical implication’. l2 Still another way of approaching the pheno-
mena in question would be to say, with Husserl, that consciousness has no
partes-extra-partes structures. ’
*
Let me now proceed to the presentation of a few aspects of the phenome-
nological reflective analysis regarding the mental activities of remembering
and picturing something. As mentioned already, we will be focussing espe-

See,e.g.,Husse~liunuXXIII,Nr.14(1911 or 1912);Kern(1975),@48ff.
l2 See Kern (1975), especially 5 48, for a presentation of such ‘intentional correlations’. in
Husserl’stexts they are time and again at stake and forcefully brought to the fore, but not always
explained with sufficient clarity. - Regarding the notion of ‘logicalimplication’, see, e.g., Quine
& Ullian (1978).
l 3 E.g., Husserliunu IX, S. 8, S. 36 f., et passim.
216 Eduard Marbach

cially on the question of the functional role of the mental image. First of all,
notice the following point concerning the method of reflection itself. Gener-
ally speaking, I can reflect only on a mental activity that is not now per-
formed but which I now represent to myself in order to investigate what it
consists in. In ordinary language, it makes sense to say, in more or less embel-
lished ways according to the circumstances, something like, e.g., ‘I remember
having read the novel’, ‘I remember having seen x’, ‘I remember having
remembered x’, ‘1imagine seeing x’, etc., etc. Expressions such as these which
contain two verbs (at least), in such a way that one is stating by what mental
activity (e.g., remembering) the speaker is referring to another mental activity
(e.g., seeing), are indicative of the very fact of intentional implication and
modification that provides us with the basis for asking the reflectively-
oriented question proper. l 4
For example, on the basis of REM REM x, i.e. I remember having re-
membered x, I establish the theme of the reflective analysis: REM { REM x} ,
i.e. what is it to remember x? or: what does remembering x consist in ? or:
what does it mean to remember x? Generally speaking, the analysis aims at
making explicit what is ‘anonymously functioning’ in the performance of
mental activities.
Thus: {REM x}: what is it?
(1) (REM)x. This first step simply indicates explicitly the fact of being
intentionally directed towards, or being conscious of, x.
Now, on the basis of any example of remembering, the reflective analysis
points out that remembering x is not an immediate awareness of x, such as
perceiving x; rather, in the most simple case already, involving only a past per-
ceiving of something (seeing, hearing, touching, etc.; thus excluding language
and other activities of signifying something), we get the following form:
(2a) (REM )x
i.e.: I remember x: the act consisting in, more concretely:
(2b) (REM [(PER)x])x
i.e.: I remember x by means of representing, or reproducing, a past
perceiving of x.
This notation can be said to stand for the most elementary kind of thepheno-
menological form of remembering x (2b).
This basic notation could be amplified by a number of indices referring to
phenomena such as the time-consciousness involved in remembering, the

l4 Kern (1975) points out the shortcomings of the traditional view of ‘reflection qua inner
perception’ and makes available a new account of reflection on acts of consciousness that was
much needed for a phenomenological philosophy (cf. in particular $0 44-46; $0 7-9; $ 5 23-24;
$9 48-50; 00 5.5-58).
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental images’ 217

background of x, the context of activities in which I am remembering and/or

have been perceiving, implying therefore also my present surroundings
(horizon), etc. All of these aspects, and a series of others, could be described
as belonging to this elementary mental activity of (REM)x. Within the scope
of this paper, I must limit myself to the following point already visible in the
form appearing under (2b). The double notation of x must not be taken as
indicating that there are two objects at stake. On the contrary, the notation
should help make the fundamental point of the very constitution of an objec-
tive identity of x over against a multiplicity of activities referring to it, as to
the same x. Thus, the notation must be read as indicating that by the very
activity of remembering x, I am intending, i.e. I mean, the x that I have been
perceiving in the past, not merely one like it. On a higher level of reflection
concerning the double notation of x, I can always discursively point out that
the x I am remembering at present is the same x that I perceived, thus
explicitly identifying the one with the other as being the same. Is Errors, of
course, are in principle always possible.
Prior to such an explicit identification, however, there is the awareness of
seeing-as-it-were x again that is contained, or intentionally implied, in
remembering x. In the notation it is precisely the function of the [ ]-brackets
to indicate this modification of being conscious of x in referring to x by means
of an act of remembering x - (REM)x - as against the more basic, i.e. un-
modified, act of perceiving x - (PER)x. ‘To be intentionally implied’, or
‘contained’, in the activity of remembering, and ‘to be modified with regard
to the very performance’ (Vollzug), are expressions referring to the same
result of the phenomenological analysis of (REM)x, indicated by means of the
[ ]-brackets. These brackets are inseparably contained within the encom-
passing ( )-parentheses (see p. 215, above).
To sum up, the intentionality of REM x in its basic form appears to be one
that cannot be said to be directly (immediately) turned towards x, but rather
to be mediated, i.e. to be directed towards x by way of another mental activity
through which I was conscious of x in the past. Now, it is important to notice
that in this basic form of REM x, even though I am not aware of x in any di-
rect, immediate, way, as in perceiving x, I am nevertheless aware of x ifself.
What about the mental image, then, that is so often said, or assumed, to
play a functional role in the account of REM x? Is REM x not, precisely,
mediated by an image in the absence of x itself? In order to elucidate this
issue, as far as this can be done within the scope of this paper, let us first
consider in what the intentionality of a mental activity consists, in which I am

l5 SeeKern (1979, 5 20.

218 Eduard Marbach

directed towards x by means of an image, or a picture, standing for, i.e. repre-

senting, x in its absence. In what does ‘consciousness of x’ consist in the case
of PIC x (picturing x)?
{PIC x}, what is it?
(1) (PIC )x
(2a) (PIC [(PER)-x])x
i.e. I am picturing x
by means of representing a quasi-perceiving of an irreal x
(2b) (PIC [(PER)-x])x
(PER) Y
i.e.: I am picturing x
by means of representing a quasi-perceiving of an irreal x
as it appears in the picture y that I perceive.

This statement requires some comment. The notation should help indicate the
following points in particular. In picturing x, I am not ‘simply’ directed
towards the absent x by means of representing, or reproducing, a past
experience of x, the whole experience being thereby caught up in the temporal
flux of my awarenesses. Instead, in picturing x, something stable that I can
perceive is involved: (PER)y. I am not interested, however, in the thing y that
is given to me in the present, here and now, e.g., hanging on the wall. Rather,
this thing y only serves to represent x. It only lends itself to be the ‘carrier’, or
the vehicle, for the appearance of x. But the y alone that I perceive is not
itself the representation of x. It is just, in our example, a physical thing, a
piece of canvas or of marble, say. As such it could be put to any service for
which a physical thing of the sort could be used. In order to make it useful for
picturing x, however, it must be bound to an activity of representing x:
(PIC ). In the notation, the horizontal line is meant to indicate just
(PER) Y
this function of ‘being carrier’. The thing y considered in its function of being
the ‘carrier’, or vehicle, can thus be noted as 7. As this ‘binding’ happens
(logically, not temporally speaking, though in the activity of creating some-
thing pictorial the transition from, e.g., a ‘mere stroke of pencil’ on a sheet of
paper to a line representing some outline of an object can sometimes be iden-
tified empirically), a new object, % I 6 , or to talk with the necessary precision, a
Y
double objectivity (doppelte Gegenstandlichkeit, Husserl, e.g., 1905) becomes
at once the correlate of this activity: x, and -5, that is, x as it appears in the pic-
Y

l6 At the Conference in Biel, I used the letter z in order to designate this ‘new object’. At
present, I prefer to use the expression -5 instead. Its main advantage is to make more readily
< ..
visible’ the necessary connection of the &real ‘z’ with the vehicle y.
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 219

ture y. It is as though y were bestowed with an appearance ‘rented’ from x.

Thus, the anonymously functioning intentionality of PIC x turns out to cont-
ain quite a complexity of moments that can be separated analytically, but
which function all at once while I am performing an activity of PIC x (see (2b)
above).
In radical contrast to the basic form of REM x (or, mutatis mutandis,
IMA x), the phenomenological form of PICx thus makes it clear that there is
a double objectivity involved when I am picturing x. This state of affairs
would, however, be unintelligible if the two objects had the same value of
actuality (Wirklichkeitswert). But this, however, is not the case. Instead, x as
it appears in the picture (Bildding) y - i.e.: the image (Bildobjekt) -% - is not
Y
taken f o r real. The image, -3 , is the depicted object xprovided that it appears
Y
in the (physical) picture y, and this is only possible in so far as it is unreal. For
this reason, in the notation the sign - must be added to the expression stand-
ing for the image. The thing ‘picture y’ itself is, however, real, and I can turn
my attention to it: e.g., I can touch it, put it straight, remove it from the wall,
etc. Yet, when I am picturing x, I do not mean this thing y instead of the
absent x, x being a depicted landscape, for instance. Again, when I say some-
thing like ‘This is a good picture’, I do not talk about the physical thing here
on the wall as such, nor do I talk about the depicted x as such. Rather, I am
making a statement with respect to what mere& appears ‘on the wall’ but is
not really seen as being there - there is no landscape on the wall which I could
see or walk into. Thus, in saying ‘This is a good picture’, I am talking about
-;
the -3 of the notation. The looks more or less successfully or adequately the
Y
way x would look if it were present and actually seen from the point of view
from which, in picturing x, I only seex as it were, qua - E . Hence, some similar-
Y
ity between the image -& (i.e. what appears as it were) and x (i.e. what is
Y
depicted but does not appear itself) along with the inactuality value of the
image -& is required in PIC x. The x and the -E are ‘two objectivities’ merged in
Y Y
a double intentionality. That there emerges an image -$ with its inactuality
value is an event occuring within the intentionality of the mental activity itself,
bestowing a suitable object y with the representative function.
As a result, there does not seem to be a way to get around the unreal -3
Y’
except when shifting from PIC x to REM x. If that were done, the functional
role of the image -;
would coincide with that of the correlate x of the

See, e.g., Rock (1975), p. 149: “The picture takes on the appearance of the object it repre-
sents”.
220 Eduard Marbach

reproduced mental activity implied in the intentionality of REM x. That is

to say, instead of being conscious of x by means of some representational ent-
ity -5, being more or less like the x, in cases of REM x, as has been discussed
Y
earlier, I would be conscious of the x that I have been experiencing itseZf.
From a PIC x qua
(PIC [(PER)-x])x
(PER) 7
a shift among the possibilities of mental activities would take place towards a
REM x qua
(REM [(PER)xl)x,
i.e.: I remember x by means of representing a past perceiving of x.
The -5 drops off and, by the same token, there is no need for any vehicle y to
Y
be perceived and to carry the representative function qua -;instead a reference
Y
to x in its own identity is restored, or established in the first place. In such
cases, I can thus transfer or switch, so to speak, in my mind from actually
being present here and seeing as it were x as it appears in y that I perceive to be
present here and seeing as it were the thing x itself ‘in person’, there and then.
Let us now take up again the question of the alleged functional role of the
mental image in the activity of REM x. As it has just been developed, in the
intentionality of PIC x there is something that stands for something else, i.e. a
representational entity, the image -5 depicting x, to be found and accounted
Y
-;
for. Properly interpreted, in the case of PIC x, this entity could even be said
to be a ‘mental image’, namely to be nothing but the unreal correlate of the
mental activity of PIC x, existing neither ‘within’ nor ‘without’ the conscious-
ness of (P1C)x. However, how could an intentional form such as that of PIC
x, which implies as one of its moments an activity of perceiving something
present, namely the vehicle y, underlie the activity of REM x which in its
intentional form of establishing the reference to x, as we have seen, does not
imply an activity of perceiving something present (except with regard to the
present ambient world on the basis of which I now represent something absent
- a point which cannot be pursued in this paper)? Now, there undeniably are
cases in which REM x consists in an activity that is not simply a remembering
of the x that I have been perceiving, but a remembering of x by means of some
picturing of x (not to mention more involved forms of REM x such as, e.g., by
means of linguistic activities). In other words, there are cases in which REM x
makes use of ‘mental images’, i.e. consists in some form of ‘imaging’ (produc-
ing an ‘image’ of) something absent; in short, there are cases of REM PIC x.

l8 Another kind of ‘dropping out’ of the -5 is given in so-called ‘trompe l’oeil’ art, the
essence of which consists precisely in inviting thz viewer to take what appears for real, i.e. to
create an illusion of reality (see, e.g., Gombrich, 1977).
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 221

As I see it, a plausible account of such cases would be to show that their
more complex phenomenological form is in fact a possible variation of the
basic form of REM x, presupposing this very form for the establishment of
the objective reference to the x in question. Let me briefly elaborate on this
point. It is essential to notice that when I am seeing as it were again not x
itseK but an image of it, -X, I nevertheless see it as it were again, with or with-
Y
out belief, from some point of view, in some orientation to me, at some dis-
tance, etc. In my mind I establish a point of view from which the component
(PER)y is functioning, i.e. the perceiving-as-it-were of the vehicle y which
‘carries’ the appearance of the image -$.Thus, in REM PIC x the basic form
of remembering qua representing a past perceiving of something must be at
work with regard to the vehicle of the image:

{REM PIC X}: (REM (PIC[(PER)-x])x

[
(PER) 7

i.e.: I remember x by means of representing a past picturing of x,

which was by means of representing a quasi-perceiving of an unreal
x (-x) as it appears in the picture y that I remember by means of re-
presenting a past perceiving of y.

In this form the intentional moment of (PER)y is modified such that, analyti-
cally separated from the concrete activity of REM PIC x, it can be noted as
follows:

(REM [(PER)Yl)Y
i.e., the basic form of REM x (see p. 218 above).

At any moment, then, in REM PIC x I can focus my attention onto the picture
y which is, e.g., hanging on a wall that I am seeing again as it were as well. Or,
in other instances, the ‘locus’ of the vehicle y may be indeterminate, the -$
may merely be ‘hovering’ somewhere ahead of me, so that I could not say
‘where’ it is located. I would only know that it is surely not ‘inside my head’
since, in the original experience of PIC x, the intentional moment of (PER)y
had as its correlate some physical object (a piece of canvas, paper, marble, or
the like) in the outside world, and there is no reason to assume that this object
somehow sneaked inside my head in the meantime. Instead, in the case of
indeterminacy as to the location of the appearing image -$, it would be ‘hover-
ing’ in a space-time of its own which I could not (perhaps only momentarily
not) bring into a coherent connection with the real world (past, present, or
future), so that it would be given merely as the correlate of the activity of
REM PIC x, etc.
222 Eduard Marbach

In summary, the two main results can be stated as follows:

(1) {REM x} # (PIC)x (mutatis mutandis, (IMA x} # (PIC)x ), i.e. the two
activities are two distinct ways of establishing the objective reference to x,
thus mutually irreducible to each other.
( 2 ) The basic form of representing x can not consist in (REM PIC)x, because
the representation of (P1C)x that is implied in (REM PIC)x does itself require
a nonpictorial representation with regard to the vehicle y (see above); or else
an infinite regress regarding the way of representing the vehicle would seem to
follow in an account consistently based on the analysis of mental activities.
This much must suffice within the scope of this paper in order to convey a
flavor of the way phenomenological questions are asked with regard to mental
processing. A few aspects only have been illustrated concerning the mental
activities of remembering and picturing. The alternative interpretation (see p.
213, above) of the cognitive function of the mental image can now be presented
as follows. It is suggested to view the role of ‘mental imagery’ in connection
with the way the objective reference to x in its absence is established. As I see
it, the essential point concerning ‘imagery’ consists in referring to x such that
something of the way of its appearing is preserved, with its limit of ‘empti-
ness’ or ‘darkness’. As a result, the reference to the x in question would seem
to be one to something individual, i.e. something singular - a single object or
a whole single scene -, entailing a corresponding point of view, or a mul-
tiplicity of points of view, from which it is perceived-as-it-were. Several possi-
bilities are then given: either the reference is to the x itsev, in individuo (e.g.,
to my living room, where I am standing-as-it-were in order to count the
windows, etc.), or the reference is to a depiction of x. In this case, the ref-
-;
erence to the x is mediated by the appearing image that is individuated by
the vehicle y, ‘carrying’ the x-depicting -;.
Since there are a great number of
ways of depicting x, e.g., preserving more or less naturalistic or schematic
relations between the representation (-5) and the represented (x), the mental
Y
activities of REM PIC x would require more careful elucidation beyond the
scope of this paper. l9 Still another way of establishing a reference to an indi-
vidual x would be by means of imaginatively producing a second object of the
same kind, thus some analogue of x, that could, in given circumstances, be
compared with the original x, whether the original itself be a real individual in
the world or itself already some form of depiction of an actually or possibly
real, or an imaginary, individual x.

l9 Elsewhere, in the context of a detailed discussion of Kosslyn’s work, 1 am currently

working on this point.
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 223

In all of these cases, the very way of appearing of x is at stake in contrast

to reference to x by means of, for example, linguistic signs. But it should be
clear from the preceding discussion on the intentional structures of mental
activities and, particularly, on their distinct ways of bringing about the objec-
tive reference by way of intentional implications and modifications, that
talking of a mental image as a representational entity turns out either simply
to be false or, when it can be interpreted as an appropriate way of talking
about the intentional relation to x, to be itself presupposing, for its
functioning, the mental establishment of the reference to the so-called ‘mental
image’, i.e. the -5 as ‘carried’ by some vehicle y, as indicated in the notation of
Y
REM PIC x (see p. 221).
Nowhere in the phenomenological analysis qua descriptive analysis of our
subjective experiences of the world, of others and of ourselves, do we
introduce a substitute for the object, event, etc., generally to be called a
‘representation’ of that object, event, etc., ‘in the mind‘ to be acted upon or
to be mentally processed. 2o It is true, however, that phenomenology qua ref-
lective analysis does not deal with the object, event, in short the world,
‘straightforwardly’, so to speak. Instead, phenomenology is addressing the
world as intentional correlate of corresponding subjective and intersubjective
mental activities - be it the simplest object I am grasping or looking at in a
perceptual activity, or be it, for example, a highly complex physico-chemical
process taking place in some molecule which a scientist is abstractly account-
ing for.
The idea of what “mentalprocessing” consists in that emerges from such
descriptive phenomenological analyses of the subjective experiences is pri-
marily one of (conscious) activities intentionally intertwined with activities,
affecting consciousness through and through and, by the same token, since
consciousness is always ‘consciousness of something in one way or another’,
affecting the ways of givenness of the inseparable intentional correlates. In
sum, it is the idea of a multiplication of intentional implications and modifica-
tions of a consciousness of something within another consciousness of some-
thing, centered in the subjective unity of ‘I’ who am always co-present (Dabei-
sein des Ich) with my mental activities in the temporal flux.
*
In turning now to cognitive psychology, I must obviously be highly selec-
tive. I would like to address immediately the point that puzzles me and where I

2o The noemata, clearly, are not such representations. Consciousness is not ‘directed
towards’ or ‘consciousness of’ noemata, but of the objects, events, etc. themselves (see, e.g., also
Fallesddl(l982)).
224 Eduard Marbach

sense that the question of the relationship between phenomenology and a cog-
nitivist theory of the mind should be ‘revisited’. To focus the attention, let me
put it bluntly: whereas in the phenomenological account of mental ‘process-
ing’ a case was made for a multiplication of activities of consciousness, in cog-
nitivists’ theoretical accounts I sense a multiplication of contents, i.e. of
representationalentities, calling for Ockham’s razor.
Let us stick to the example of representation by mental images. One imme-
diately gets a feeling for what I am aiming at from a statement by St. M. Koss-
lyn, no doubt one of the leading cognitive scientists in the field of imagery
research. In a short section of his important ‘summa’, Image and Mind
(1980)21, entitled “On Pretheoretical and Metatheoretical Commitments”,
Kosslyn writes:
After all, what could be more of a ‘re-presentation’ than a mental image? And to the
extent that our results indicate that mental images are bona fide psychological entities,
they also vindicate the entire representational approach in the broader sweep of things
(p. 472).
And in concluding the central chapter in which “The Core Theory” itself is
outlined, Kosslyn remarks:
It seems clear that there is nothing mystical or unscientific about the concept of a ‘men-
tal image’, given that we can model image processing on a computer (p. 173).
The plausibility of the view that takes mental images qua representational
entities or contents into account in theorizing about mental processing seems
thus to rest, first, on the common sense notion as it is expressed in ordinary
language (Frege’s “language of life”) and, no doubt, often transpires in
people’s reports about their internal events, their so-called “experience of
imagery”; second, and more importantly, it rests on the quite successful mod-
elling of such processing involving representational images. In Kosslyn’s case,
as he reports, “the catalyst that truly launched” his project
was the idea that images are like displays a computer can generate on a cathode-ray
tube. On this view, images are ‘surface representations’ that are generated from more
abstract underlying representations (loc. cit., p. viii, et passim).
Obviously, the attitude of investigating the mental phenomena is very dif-
ferent from the phenomenological stance. It can be said to be an objective
study in the sense of any other objective science. In this attitude, quite natur-
ally, and legitimately, the cognizing subject is turned itself into an object
among others. Cognition, cognitive activities such as perceiving, remember-
ing, imaging, picturing, thinking, etc., become mental processes whose func-
tional capacities will be investigated, using methods of the empirical theory
formation. Furthermore, they will, if possible, be modelled because of the

21 See also, e.g., Kosslyn and Pornerantz (1977); Kosslyn (1981).

 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 225

obvious advantages a model of some processes has for the understanding and
further investigation. 22 So far, so good.
Trouble, though, originates from the following consideration. Unlike
other objective sciences (such as physics, chemistry, etc.) that deal with
objects and events (the x-side in the notations used earlier in this paper) with-
out thereby making claims about the subjective activities involved in the very
fact of having an objective world ‘in front of us’ to begin with, unlike such
sciences, cognitive psychology and science deal with an object of a very par-
ticular kind. The object they study is one that, in the pre-scientific attitude, or
in real life, is always also the subject, having and taking initiatives in its activi-
ties, cognitive ones and others. And phenomenology, qua analysis of
consciousness, i.e. mental activities, is precisely the discipline that attempts to
establish sufficiently firm insights into these mental activities as such. It is
forming concepts of ‘what it is’, i.e. what the subjective experience consists
in, to remember something, to imagine something, etc., etc. (see p. 213ff.). It
therefore seems to me that despite the partly differently oriented questions
cognitive psychologists and phenomenologists are asking, relying thereby on
different methods of investigation, there should arise no conflict between
models and phenomenological accounts regarding the ‘mental’ qua mental
activity, or subjective experience - or else something, somewhere, has gone
wrong.
Briefly indicating this point concretely, the following can be said. In the
cognitivist’s theoretical perspective, the subjective experience of imagery is
something to be explained in terms of underlying psychological processing. As
Kosslyn puts it:
This experience must arise as a consequence of some psychological processes (op. cit.,
p. 21, emphasis mine).
Rightly, I think, Kosslyn holds that phenomenology is the discipline in charge
of studying subjective experience. And, from the point of view of his
approach, consistently so, the relationship between cognitive psychology and
phenomenology goes as follows:
The study of phenomenology is a legitimate enterprise in its own right, and any theory
that serves to illuminate phenomenological issues achieves added value (p. 2 1).
If so, his cognitive theory, bringing about the construct of mental imagery,
would illuminate the phenomenological issue of people’s “experience of
imagery” which is said to be “undeniable” by advocates as much as by
detractors of mental imagery as an explanatory construct within a cognitive

22 See, e.g., Kosslyn (1980), pp. 136ff.: “TheTheory and the General Model”.
226 Eduard Marbach

theory of the mind.23 In Kosslyn’s theory, images have two major compo-
nents. There is the “surface representation” which he specifies in the follow-
ing terms:
(It) is a quasi-pictorial representation that occurs in a spatial medium: this representa-
tion depicts an object or scene and underlies the experience of imagery.
And there is the “deep representation”, that is:
the information in long-term memory that is used to generate a surface representa-
tion.
Re-enters the phenomenologist who thinks he knows ‘what subjective
experience consists in’. Personally, I have always sympathized with Kosslyn’s
attempt to establish the right, and even the indispensability, of mental repre-
sentations that have to do with the phenomenon of so-called imagery. In phe-
nomenology, however, as discussed earlier in this paper, the representational
contents that seem unavoidable with the hypothetical construct inspired by the
CRT-metaphor, simply disappear from the functional account of what we
experience in so-called imagery. Thus, I am inclined to apply phenomenology
to empirical cognitive psychology and to give a bona fide phenomenological
interpretation of the so-called mental images (the “bona fide psychological
entities”) in terms of the intentionality which is anonymously functioning in
such experiences of mentally representing something that is not itself present.
As we have seen, no ‘images’ qua ‘depicting’, ‘ethereal’, ‘internal’, ‘repre-
sentational’, etc., ‘entities’, or contents, play a functional role in such a
descriptive phenomenological account. Instead, the analysis describes mental
activities that are intentionally structured as such and such, establishing clear-
cut differences between our subjective experiences of, say, mentally represent-
ing some object or scene in their absence, and mentally representing these
things by means of some depicting ‘format’, be it ‘internal’ or external.
In short, then, I believe phenomenologists have reason to suspect results
about mental processing, brought about in cognitive psychology and science,
as scientifically unsound, i f and to the extent that they are in conflict with
well-established results about the intentional structures of mental activities. A
good research strategy would thus seem to be one of knowing, as precisely as
possible, what a particular mental activity consists in, before undertaking
research and model-building concerning the highly complex problems of
storage aspects of knowledge in long-term memory, and the ways of generat-
ing representations of knowledge for use in active memory.

23 E.g., Pylyshyn(l973; 1981a), Kosslyn(1980).

Cf. Kosslyn (1981), p. 213, Kosslyn (1980). p. 139.
 On Using Intentionality in Empirical Phenomenology: the Problem of ‘Mental Images’ 227

In conclusion, my proposal “on using intentionality in empirical pheno-

menology” can then be stated in two ways: boldly, or more traditionally. The
‘traditional’ way would be to say something like ‘das eine ist das eine, und das
andere ist das andere’. In other words, it could basically be said that phenome-
nology qua analysis of the intentionality of consciousness brings to bear a
point of view that, given the objective methodology of science, can simply not
be ‘used’ within cognitive psychology and science. Phenomenology would
then still be free to interpret the empirical findings from that point of view and
thus to integrate empirical findings into its philosophical theory of ‘the human
mind’, regardless of what cognitive psychologists would think of such an
enterprise. The bold way to make my proposal, on the other hand, would be
to take certain cognitive scientists at their word when they say, as, for
example, Pylyshyn (1981b) does, “we can use help from all quarters”. He
says so rega.rding the crucial point of getting at aprincipled theory and model
of mental functioning. The proposal would then be to use the phenome-
nological descriptive theory of the intentionality of mental activities as a guide
in pursuing
the goal of establishing the correct functional architecture or medium in order to prop-
erly constrain our models (p. 206),
thus as a guide with regard to “the appropriate ways to ask the questions”
concerning mental processing (see p. 212, above). If the proposal were taken
seriously, it would be intriguing to try to imagine what computer simulations
then would look like. “Recall”, says, e.g., Schank (1982),
that we are interested in more than just good understanding systems. We want systems
that learn as well. Further, and perhaps most important, we want to understand how
the human mind processes experiences (p. 4).
Finally, I hope the reader still remembers little Schoolmaster Wutz. I
simply want to add that unlike him, who came to believe that his hand written
products were, in fact, the genuine canonical documents, whereas the pub-
lished ones were merely reprints of his writings - albeit distorted ones as he,
to his dismay, had to realize - I am not claiming to produce the canonical
text fitting the title Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science. Therefore,
unlike Wutz, I will readily be prepared to acknowledge that the published text
and the text written by me do have different authors (cf. op. cit., S. 426). As a
consequence, I cherish the hope that readers who are attracted to titles such as
“Husserl, Intentionality and Cognitive Science” will one day come across
some announcement of a text with a title similar enough to ring a bell in their
minds. Since in that text it will be proposed that - pace H. Dreyfus - for
Husserl “consciousness plays some crucial role in the organization of
experience and in the production of intentionality” (op. cit., p. 1 l), readers
228 Eduard Marbach

will be reminded that there is more than one way of looking at the exciting
relationship between Husserlian phenomenology and present-day cognitive
science. 25 26

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Dialectica Vol. 38,N02-3(1984)