INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY: THE UNITED NATIONS

AND THE CONFLICT IN THE KIVUS

By Stean A. N. Tshiband, LL.B, MA
Abstract
The degrading security situation in the Kivus has become a major
international concern for peace and stability. This article examines the
possibilities for decisive action to curb the cycle of violence costing lives of
45,000 people and driving into exile other hundreds of thousands per month. It
explores legal bases and circumstantial arguments for stronger UN engagement
into the Kivus to pacify the last pocket violence stopping peace building
efforts of the international community in the DRC.
Introduction
The new developments of conflicts in Georgia, Darfur and the Kivus1, and the
old situations in Myanmar have raised questions of the pertinence of the UN action
in the maintenance of international peace and security. On one side, the UN was
reduced to simple spectator watching, powerless, the deterioration of international
peace. It is to be noted that UN Security Council composition is a major crippling
factor to its action 2in world politics. Important decisions depend on
interests of the five permanent members. In this context, is the UN still
credible in maintenance of international peace and security? While the UN
remained particularly silent on the conflict in Georgia, millions of Congolese
citizens from the Kivus manage to survive under the pressure of armed groups‟
instrumental zed by governments and politics within the Great Lakes in the very
presence of the UN mission. According the International Rescue Committee,
45,000 people die every month directly and indirectly from conflicts (IRC
2008), and tens of thousands flee their homes to escape from the
atrocities. At this point many are those who ask questions on the use of the
presence of UN peacekeeping forces in the region with full military capacity
and the right mandate to protect populations.

1. The legal base of the United Nations Mission in the DRC (MONUC)
MONUC was created under resolution S/Res/1279 of 30 November 1999 after
the signature of the Lusaka Agreements with the following mandate
(S/Res/1279/1999):
•To monitor the implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and investigate
violations of the ceasefire;
•To establish and maintain continuous liaison with the headquarters off all the
parties‟ military forces;
•To develop, within 45 days of adoption of resolution 1291, an action plan for the
overall implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement by all concerned with
particular emphasis on the following key objectives: the collection and
verification of military information on the parties forces, the maintenance of the
cessation of hostilities and the disengagement and redeployment of the
parties' forces, the comprehensive disarmament, demobilization, resettlement and
reintegration of all members of all armed groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter
9.1 of the Ceasefire Agreement, and the orderly withdrawal of all foreign
forces;
To work with the parties to obtain the release of all prisoners of war, military
captives and remains in cooperation with international humanitarian agencies;
•To supervise and verify the disengagement and redeployment of the parties'
forces.
•Within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to monitor compliance with the
provision of the Ceasefire Agreement on the supply of ammunition,
weaponry and other war-related materiel to the field, including to all armed
groups referred to in Annex A, Chapter 9.1;
•To facilitate humanitarian assistance and human rights monitoring, with
particular attention to vulnerable groups including women, children and
demobilized child soldiers, as MONUC deems within its capabilities and
under acceptable security conditions, in close cooperation with other United
Nations agencies, related organizations and non-governmental organizations;
 •To cooperate closely with the Facilitator of the National Dialogue, provide
support and technical assistance to him, and coordinate other United Nations
agencies' activities to this effect;
•To deploy mine action experts to assess the scope of the mine and unexploded
ordnance problems, coordinate the initiation of the mine action activities,
develop a mine action plan, and carry out emergency mine action activities as
required to support of its mandate.
2
who crossed the Zairian border with their weapons and combat capacity along
with 3
territory led to the invasion of foreign troops along with local allies (ADFL )
which
2. Impartiality
Impartiality is one of the fundamental principles on which UN
peacekeeping operations are based (Findlay 2002:4). This principle implies that
UN peacekeeping forces should not take sides while carrying out their task, i.e. not
act in favor of one of the parties to the conflict. It was even referred to as the
“oxygen” of peacekeeping (ibid). Impartiality is essential to peacekeepers‟ success
in their mission and prevents them from being dragged into and become party to
the conflict. However one should ask a question of knowing how far this principle
should go. And in which cases it should be preserved? Or else, in which cases
should impartiality of peacekeepers be ignored? Collective measures referred to in
article 1.1 of the UN charter would imply that the UN (or its members) would
assist a member state under a threat to peace in order to prevent or remove the
threat. In the present case, the member state under the threat to peace is the
DRC, represented by its government in Kinshasa. Actually, the
government of Kinshasa is struggling with the restructuration of its
army and is apparently not in a position to face a structured military aggression
or insurgency. As mentioned above, the government of Congo is struggles
against an insurgency, threatening both national and regional (and international)
peace and security; UN‟s action should be to assist it in restoring law and order, by
implementing its mandate. The UN partner in this process is the DRC
government, thus the question of impartiality should not apply under any
circumstances, given the fact that the mandate and the UN charter legitimize
any of MONUC‟s move in support of the DRC government.
3. The FDLR question
The presence of the FDLR in eastern DRC is the major reason for the engagement
of Rwanda in the Congo, first with the ADFL and later on with the RCD. Rwanda
has been particularly good at creating rebel groups out of nowhere. These so-called
rebel groups are only an emanation or rather puppets of the Rwandan Patriotic
Front in the DRC. Before fall 1996, the FDLR were planning an
invasion of Rwanda to re-conquer power. They represented a real threat to the
new RPF authority in Rwanda, with their genocide ideology. Not only the FDLR
were a threat to Rwanda, but were a lot more within the DRC, blowing away the
barrages holding the social cohesion in the Kivus. Their presence along with other
refugees altered the ethnic balance within the region (Salehyan & Gleditsch 2007),
exacerbating the existing tensions between the Tutsi Banyamulenge10 to other
local groups. The complicated the difficult cohabitation of these groups.
4. The “genocide” business
The year 1994 witnessed the abandonment of people to their own fate.
The international community refused to consider call for distress launched from
Rwanda; General Dallaire, UNAMIR‟s15 Force Commander„s alerts for imminent
large scale violence was ignored, worse, produced opposite effects
(Melvern 1995:3). While Dallaire was asking for a robust mandate and more
troops to prevent the situation from degenerating into open conflict, seizing
weapons, arresting those suspected of preparing acts of violence (Findlay 2002;
Dallaire & Beardsley 2004). In contrary, the UNAMIR‟s mandate was downgraded
to an observation mission, brokering ceasefire between the RPF and the FAR16,
and his troops were reduced to a couple of hundreds, unable to defend their own
lives. The large scale massacre that followed was not recognized as
genocide, to avoid the obligation to intervene as per the Genocide
Convention of 1948. The US was more critical in the ignorance of the Rwandan
genocide by the International Community. It was until the conflict escalated
to uncontrollable levels reducing scope for peaceful settlement that it received
the attention of the Security Council (Peck 1998:68-75). International assistance
belatedly reached Rwanda with a bit of “moral debt” towards the new RPF
leadership which defeated the Habiarimana regime. Rwanda could
manipulate the international community through the wave of sympathy and
the moral debt that rose on the aftermath of the genocide.
Conclusion
Facts in the Kivus require more action from the international community than what
has been done up to now. It is true MONUC is doing its best to help settle the
conflict in the DRC which is not only affecting eastern DRC, but the
entire Great Lakes Region and the international Community. The increase
of insecurity in Kenya, sustainment of the conflict in Burundi and Uganda, and a
hinder to peacebuilding and reconstruction in the Congo would decrease, would
the Congo conflict settle.
Finally, while transitional measures of UN buffer zone would be in
place, a community cohesion work should be conducted at the grassroots‟
level using the Lederach pyramid model to build trust among them, using
traditional, social and cultural structures to bring them together
(Ramsbotham et Al. 2005: 22-25). This colossal work would not be of use or
possible in the absence of government‟s capacity 13building in the delivery of its
services protecting and ensuring the social minimum for its citizens. Congo should
not be left alone in the complex process building social cohesion, peacebuilding
(on one side) and peacekeeping (in the East).
Source:
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/228151320_International_Peace_and_Se
curity_The_United_Nations_and_the_Conflict_in_the_Kivus.