The New Great Game at Sea - War On The Rocks

22/2/23, 8:18 The New Great Game at Sea - War on the Rocks
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The New Great Game at Sea
Geoffrey F. Gresh December 8, 2020
Commentary
Last month, India included Australia in its annual Malabar naval exercise
for the first time since 2007. The exercise was held in the Bay of Bengal
and the Arabian Sea and also included the United States and Japan,
which only joined as a permanent member in 2015. Australia’s newly
announced inclusion represents the growing concerns about China’s
maritime rise across Eurasia, from the Mediterranean and Indian Ocean to
East Asia and the Arctic. Malabar comes in juxtaposition to the annual
exercise China hosts with Russia entitled Joint Sea. Since 2012, Russia
and China have conducted the Joint Sea naval exercises as a way to
bolster their relationship, while also gaining a greater understanding of
their respective naval technologies and platforms. For the first several
years, the Joint Sea drills primarily took place across East Asia, including
the Yellow Sea, Sea of Japan, East China Sea, and South China Sea. But
for the last several years, the two countries have expanded their exercises
first to the Mediterranean in 2015 and then to the Baltic in 2017. The
exercises have also tied into a more permanent regional naval presence:
Last month Russia announced a 25-year basing agreement in Port Sudan
for four warships and 300 military personnel. This comes on top of
solidifying its Black Sea naval dominance following its takeover of Crimea
in 2014, in addition to upgrading and establishing a more permanent
presence at the naval base in Tartus, Syria, shortly thereafter. At the same
time, China constructed its first overseas naval base, in Djibouti, in 2017
amid further speculation that it is seeking other basing access points.
These ever-expanding exercises and basing locations represent the
emergence of a new “Great Game” at sea, where rising navalism
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threatens to further destabilize the broader Indo-Pacific and beyond. But

the United States, India, Japan, and Australia, among others, can help
balance these troubling trends through greater maritime cooperation and
investment in naval modernization and expansion efforts, along with
supporting new partnerships with like-minded regional powers.
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Eurasia’s main continental rivals — China, Russia, and India — are

leading this emerging dynamic of maritime great-power competition as
they seek enhanced global prestige and great-power status. This drive for
increased international prestige has resulted in growing investments in
strategic instruments of national power, namely navies. This in turn has
resulted in a dynamic of heightened navalism and naval competition
across maritime Eurasia. Navalism is a concept that has long been in our
lexicon but is infrequently applied today. As the historian Craig Symonds
writes, “Navalists were generally concerned with image, honor, prestige,
and diplomatic clout. … To them a naval fleet was physical evidence of
national adulthood.” During the late 19th and early 20th centuries,
“navalism became a sort of ideology in which patriotism, economics, and
self-interest embellished legitimate defense and security concerns.” As a
country grew its economy internationally, there was a need to protect
overseas markets, along with the sea lanes of communication that
transported a nation’s commercial goods and treasures. As the maritime
strategist Julian Corbett once wrote in defense of British navalism at the
beginning of the 20th century:
[W]e had the power to close the oceans. … Instead of closing the
seas we threw them open to all the world, and not only that: for
during the long years of our peaceful domination the British Navy
was set to work charting their remotest recesses, finding new
paths, and clearing them of the dangers that beset honest trade
from Algiers to the furthest East. And all this was a gift to the
world for which no return was asked.
Since the end of the World War II, and certainly since the end of the Cold
War, the U.S. Navy has taken on this similar role akin to the ancestral
British navy, defending a free and open global commons for the benefit of
world order and stability.
Today, navalism has morphed in part from what it was more than a century
ago and can be broken down further into broadening investments in naval
development (ships and personnel), naval or coastal defense technologies
(weapons and cyber capacities), and general naval activities (naval
diplomacy and exercises) in both regional and foreign seas. But at its core,
historical navalism and enthusiasm for a nation’s navy still resonate today.
The world’s great powers yearn for the creation and projection of a blue-
water navy that will display global reach, power, and national heroism for
all to see and admire. Navalism similarly ties into a larger historical
trajectory of great-power status and naval mastery.
Since China launched its Maritime Silk Road initiative in 2013, it has faced
mounting pressure to secure and protect its growing investments across
Eurasia’s rimlands and waterways. Eurasia’s vast maritime regions include
some of the world’s most important strategic maritime chokepoints, in
addition to possessing 27 of 30 of the world’s largest container ports.
Trade between Asia and Northern Europe, the Mediterranean, or the
Middle East combined amounted to an estimated 27.7 million twenty-foot
equivalent units on an annual basis in recent years, making the east-west
and west-east trade routes some of the largest and busiest in the world.
Some estimates predict that China will dominate 17 of the world’s top 25
trade avenues in future years. China was recently named as the world’s
largest trading partner, surpassing the United States with about $4 billion
in annual trade volume.
Even though China still lags behind the United States in defense spending
according to some estimates, China’s current defense budget exceeds its
primary regional neighbors combined, including Japan, South Korea, the
Philippines, and Vietnam. Much of China’s increased defense spending
has translated into more focus on maritime security, defending its
geoeconomic investments, and power projection capabilities along
Eurasia’s sea lanes of communication and other vital waterways. In the
next several years, the People’s Liberation Army Navy, for example, will
likely have more than 330 warships, with this number possibly ballooning
to around 430 surface ships and 100 submarines by 2030 if current
production rates continue. China’s navy currently has more than 300
ships, submarines, and advanced missile boats. China has succeeded in
its naval modernization and expansion efforts in part by its purchase of
advanced Russian destroyers, submarines, and anti-ship cruise missiles,
which provide the People’s Liberation Army Navy with experience in
operating sophisticated platforms. China’s first aircraft carrier was a
retrofitted Soviet-carrier called Liaoning, entering the navy formally in
2012. In May 2018, the service began sea trials for its first indigenous
aircraft carrier, the Shandong. The Shandong was quickly commissioned
into service 18 months later at the end of 2019. Some scholars argue that
China’s naval rise should be viewed more as a desire to be a “responsible
great power,” upholding good order at sea through collaborative means
such as those combating piracy or terrorism. But the growing consensus in
the United States and elsewhere is that China has gravitated increasingly
toward realpolitik, particularly as it grows its naval force projection and
succeeds in using Russia to project a further sense of strength and unity
across Eurasia.
By comparison, India is listed as the world’s seventh most powerful navy

with 137 ships, including one commissioned aircraft carrier and another
one currently undergoing basin trials. India’s defense budget expanded
5.5 percent to $63.9 billion in 2017, placing it in the top five worldwide,
directly behind Russia. In 2018, India’s defense budget rose to $66.5
billion, while increasing another 6.6 percent in 2019. Naval development

and weapons advancement have remained a priority despite fluctuations
in the naval budget allocation over the years. India, for example, has
successfully unveiled its supersonic BrahMos missile (part of a joint
Indian-Russian venture) that can be used effectively in a multi-domain
(land-air-sea) battle. Though India remains mired in bureaucratic red tape,
in addition to maintaining a landward focus on its northern boundaries with
China, some analysts believe that India will continue to make naval
development and modernization an important future priority in the nation’s
pursuit of great-power status.
As India, along with China and Russia, increasingly embrace naval power,
it has resulted in a growing securitization of Eurasia’s many contested
seas. Each power has similarly invested in increased public naval
maneuvers and growing power projection capabilities — together with
rising numbers of foreign military bases or strategic port access — tying
into larger trends of emerging navalism. This intensified focus on
demonstrating naval power in increasingly contested waters along with the
adoption of enhanced naval weapons and coastal defense technologies
will result in a greater likelihood of tense encounters between the United
States, Russia, China, and/or India across Eurasia’s regional and territorial
seas. Moreover, it is likely that Russia and China will become more overtly
aggressive on the high seas amid rising tensions with the United States
and its allies and partners. These factors raise the risk of the possibility of
a collision between rival powers — inadvertent or otherwise — somewhere
along Eurasia’s disputed waterways. In 2018, for example, a Chinese and
U.S. warship almost collided while the United States was performing a
freedom of navigation operation in the contested waters of the South
China Sea. Last year, a Russian warship, sailing 1,180 miles (1,900
kilometers) from the Pacific Fleet’s home port in Vladivostok, maneuvered
aggressively toward a U.S. warship in the Philippine Sea, almost resulting
in a ship collision. It is a likely sign of what is to come.
This new maritime era has arrived in earnest and will necessitate deft
policy prescriptions for the United States and its partners and allies as
they manage the expanding — and at times aggressive — blue-water
presence and naval capabilities of China and Russia across maritime
Eurasia. With its economy under duress and the projection of a mounting
federal deficit due to COVID-19, the United States will face significant
domestic and financial challenges in the near term that will result in a need
for greater U.S. foreign policy prioritization. Certainly, the United States
continues to maintain strong relationships with South Korea, Taiwan,
Australia, and other Association of Southeast Asian Nations member
states. But the United States should do more to continue promoting
interoperability with these key partners and allies through additional joint
multilateral exercises, weapons sales, advanced technological transfers,
and greater intelligence sharing with critical partners such as India and
other southeast Asian powers. Promoting more interoperability between
the United States and its Asian allies will ensure better preparedness in
the event of a major conflict. Furthermore, the United States should begin
to think more strategically about expanding the scope and purview of the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) between the United States, Japan,
India, and Australia. Some officials have suggested to me that the Quad’s
membership should be expanded to include other strategic allies, such as
Great Britain and France, which also have strong interests across the
Indo-Pacific. Some analysts have similarly called for the creation, albeit
unlikely, of an “Asian NATO” that emerges from the Quad.
Aside from the Quad, the United States should encourage and support
Japan above and beyond its current engagements. The United States, for
example, should assist in promoting Japan’s economic development
initiatives and broadening naval engagements across the Indo-Pacific.
From Djibouti to India and Sri Lanka, Japan’s burgeoning presence is
emerging as an important counterbalance to China’s expanding footprint.
Since the Cold War, Japan’s imperial legacy has shaped and influenced its
Maritime Self-Defense Force and its modernization efforts, along with
providing the military with a clearer sense of mission and purpose. Today,
the Maritime Self-Defense Force has largely prioritized East Asian security
associated with protecting Japan’s archipelago and disputed maritime
territories. The service has also placed growing emphasis on protecting
the sea lanes of communication to ensure good order at sea across the
global commons.
As Japan pushes deeper into the Indian Ocean, however, it has been
more actively engaged in issues of international maritime security
compared to its imperial naval predecessor. Some have argued that
Japan’s navy has been constrained from further naval development or
expansion by Article 9 of Japan’s Constitution, while others have argued
that Japan has always adopted a maritime strategic approach and posture
that is inherently adaptable and flexible to maintain regional sea control as
a core competency. Despite that, Japan still relies on the United States to
fill certain naval warfare capability gaps. Moving forward, the challenge for
both the United States and Japan will be how they envision Japan’s
maritime posture and power projection capabilities across the Indo-Pacific.
Japan has historically never pushed significantly beyond the Strait of
Malacca except for a brief period during the height of World War II.
Japan’s East Asian legacy contributes to the diplomatic delicacy of the
overall situation as well. Nevertheless, owing to the deeply historical and
increasingly institutionalized U.S.-Japanese naval relationship, it will make
it harder for Japan, if it so desires, to take a more independent strategic
approach to maritime security in the Indo-Pacific. (For greater perspective,
the U.S. Department of Defense currently maintains 121 sites in Japan,
per official reporting.)
Aside from Japan, India should similarly do more to defend its territorial
regions from the sea. India has historically oriented its national security
priorities inward along its disputed Himalayan frontier with both China and
Pakistan in Kashmir. Despite these sustained tensions, India should
continue to think strategically about its future maritime security and coastal
defense. China has already deployed significant reinforcements along its
contested territorial borders, but in recent years China has begun to place
greater emphasis on its maritime presence in the Indian Ocean, whether
through naval power projection or through its geoeconomic investments in
countries such as the Maldives or Pakistan. In other words, India is largely
limited in how much more pressure it can exert on China along their
contested border. Be that as it may, the maritime space offers India a
geostrategic arena to craft new ways to place pressure or the threat of
pressure on China, since China is inherently vulnerable operating far from
its shores. Indeed, India relies on the sea lanes of communication for its
survival just as much as China and other nations, and so India should be
strategic in how it might respond to China on the high seas in the future.
However, India should still continue to focus on building up its maritime
defenses, joint readiness, and other regional and global partnerships,
including regional institutions such as the Indian Ocean Rim Association, if
it wants to properly manage the growing maritime competition with China.
Moreover, India should be prepared for a worst-case scenario that sees
the possibility of a two-front siege (on land and at sea). Some speculate
that China might be able to lob missiles from Tibet at Indian warships
traversing the Bay of Bengal. This is why India’s joint air-land-sea
responses will be critical. Or worse, China might use Pakistan as a further
means of threatening India with action — some Indians openly speculate
that China is possibly plotting to assist Pakistan in developing its own anti-
access/area denial capabilities that could deter India at sea in a future
conflict.
Though investing more in India’s navy only feeds additional regional

navalism, India is correct to be concerned about China’s maritime rise and
how China uses Pakistan against India. The People’s Liberation Army or
Chinese-backed private military corporations will likely become more
active and aggressive in protecting Chinese investments and interests
along the Belt and Road Initiative and Maritime Silk Road as they blossom
into a robust development and trade network. In terms of structuring a
future maritime force that meets India’s growing needs at sea, India should
be careful not to fall entirely into the trap of investing solely in conventional
ships and other related platforms. The bureaucracy should also be
enabled to support India’s future naval modernization efforts. Though
investing in conventional warships sends a message to China and others,
the Indian Navy should invest more heavily in both its marine force and
amphibious capabilities and its subsurface or undersea assets and
platforms. India’s submarine arm, for example, could be larger and
therefore more effective if more resources were allocated. India has
already invested in anti-submarine warfare, but it could similarly invest in
more anti-access/area denial technologies across the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands as one way to prepare for future challenges on the high
seas. Additionally, India should be investing more in the modernization of
its naval force structure, with a focus on subsurface and other capabilities
such as underwater drones to protect its maritime territories and coastlines
and to gather better intelligence and maritime domain awareness. If India
does not continue to support a more adaptive and innovative force
structure, it risks being unable to effectively compete with China on the
high seas.
Aside from strategic investments in its force structure, India should do

more to promote joint exercises and capacity-building efforts with partner
nations across the Indo-Pacific. India, for example, has smartly cultivated
stronger ties with Indonesia, as demonstrated by Prime Minister Narendra
Modi’s first official visit to Jakarta in May 2018. During the visit, the two
heads of state laid out a joint maritime vision for the Indo-Pacific, in
addition to announcing the elevation of the bilateral relationship to a
“comprehensive strategic partnership,” which included the signing of a
defense cooperation agreement. Beyond Indonesia, India should continue
its outreach and diplomatic efforts across Southeast Asia, including more
partner capacity building with Vietnam and the Philippines. India could
also act as a diplomatic intermediary for Japan in Southeast Asia, where
Japan, owing to its fraught regional history, should take a more delicate
and nuanced approach to its diplomatic engagement and outreach efforts.
Last, India should think strategically about how it addresses the ongoing
military outpost versus basing debate across the Indian Ocean. India has
been wise to conclude several basing access agreements with strategic
partners such as the United States, France, and Oman. Modi and his
cabinet have been astute in placing greater emphasis on building up the
military’s and navy’s capabilities to operate from the Andaman and
Nicobar Islands, including the allocation of more resources for
infrastructure projects and the conduct of nearby military exercises. Even if
housing a more permanent force in the form of a base on the Andaman
and Nicobar Islands proves more difficult and costly in the short term — at
Port Blair, for example, no proper cover exists for ships, and it still lacks
some basic infrastructure needs — it will be important that India bolsters
its other capabilities, including maritime domain awareness and signals
intelligence outposts. India has already begun to work more closely with
the United States to interoperationalize communications and security, in
addition to other basic information cooperation. Information sharing and
gathering will be critical for India, the United States and regional powers
alike. Similar programs should be financed and expanded to other Indian
Ocean partners as well.
Though promoting the spread of navalism for allies and partners comes
with certain risks, larger and more capable regional navies will help offset
some of the global burden that the U.S. military faces as it continues to
adapt to a new global strategy, especially in a financially constrained
environment. Greater multilateral maritime cooperation among like-minded
powers will do much to help manage China and Russia’s growing maritime
presence amid the arrival of the new Great Game at sea.
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Geoffrey F. Gresh is a professor of international security studies at

National Defense University and the author of To Rule Eurasia’s Waves:
The New Great Power Competition at Sea. The views expressed here are
his own and do not represent those of his employer.
Image: U.S. Navy (Photo by Mass Communication Spc. 2nd Class Logan
C. Kellums)
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22/2/23, 8:18 The New Great Game at Sea - War on the Rocks

threatens to further destabilize the broader Indo-Pacific and beyond. But

Eurasia’s main continental rivals — China, Russia, and India — are

By comparison, India is listed as the world’s seventh most powerful navy

billion, while increasing another 6.6 percent in 2019. Naval development

Though investing more in India’s navy only feeds additional regional

Aside from strategic investments in its force structure, India should do

Geoffrey F. Gresh is a professor of international security studies at

Obama’s Non-Nuclear Memoir

Crypto-Controls: Harnessing Cryptocurrency to Strengthen Sanctions

GET MORE WAR ON THE ROCKS

SUPPORT OUR MISSION AND GET EXCLUSIVE CONTENT

Twitter Facebook LinkedIn RSS

Type your email SUBSCRIBE

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