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Falklands Logistics
Ivar Hellberg
Published online: 18 Jun 2007.

To cite this article: Ivar Hellberg (2007) Falklands Logistics, The RUSI Journal, 152:3, 60-65, DOI: 10.1080/03071840701470590

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 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 60
Falklands Logistics
Have We Learnt the Lessons and Could
We Do it Again Today?
Ivar Hellberg
Colonel Ivar Hellberg (Retd.) was
Commanding Officer of the
Downloaded by [New York University] at 11:33 10 October 2014
Commando Logistics Regiment Royal
Marines at the time of the Falklands
War and was responsible for the
logistics of the Land Battle. He now
works at the Defence Academy,
Cranfield University.
© RUSI JUNE 2007 VOL. 152 NO. 3 pp. 60–65
Introduction
Twenty-five years ago, my Regiment, the
Commando Logistics Regiment Royal
Marines, was responsible for the
Logistics of the land battle in support of
both 3 Commando Brigade and 5
Infantry Brigade. It was a short conflict
lasting only two and a half months from
the start of the out loading in the UK on
2 April 1982 until the surrender on 14
June. However, from a logistic point of
view it was the ultimate challenge:
would we be able to support a
reinforced Brigade 8000 miles away
from home with only a sea line of
communication, as there was no
available airfield in the Falklands to
provide an air bridge? To add to the
challenge we knew that there were no
roads across the Falklands, so helicopters
and landing craft would have to be used
as the primary means of re-supply. The
other constraint was that the out-load
and mobilization had to be done at
great speed and because of the distance
involved we had to ensure that we took
everything we needed with us. Although
the campaign was both a military and
logistical success, we also learnt many
lessons and important logistic
recommendations were made. The
purpose of this article is to revisit the
logistical challenges of the Falklands
campaign and to see what became of
the recommendations made all those
years ago. The question remains: ‘could
we do it again today’ assuming, of
course, that we were not fully tied up in
Iraq and Afghanistan. This article will re-
examine the logistic lessons of the
Falklands War and compare them
against our present capability. To do this,
advice has been taken from current
experts in the Ministry of Defence and
from the Commando Logistic Regiment
Royal Marines, that has just returned
from Afghanistan. First we need to
examine the key logistic phases of the
Land operation: the mobilization, the
re-stow at Ascension Island, the logistical
plan and the lessons from the campaign
itself.
Mobilization
At the end of April 1982, 3 Commando
Brigade had only just returned from
three months winter training in Norway
and were about to go on Easter leave.
Much of the support shipping was still
en-route back from Norway, including
the echelons and the unit's combat
supplies and G1098 equipment. On
Thursday 1 April strong elements of the
Argentinean fleet and Marine Corps had
been reported at sea and it was clear to
most people that an invasion of the
Falklands was imminent. At 0400 hours
on Friday 2 April we were told that,
following an emergency meeting of the
Cabinet, a complete Naval Task Force,
including the majority of 3 Commando
Brigade, was to be sent with the greatest
possible speed to the Falklands.
The recall system within the Logistic
Regiment worked well and by 0700
hours the whole Regiment was in camp
and the first packet of 10 × 4 ton
vehicles was heading for the
ammunition depots. The problem of out-
loading the entire thirty days War
Maintenance Reserve (WMR) of a
brigade at short notice should not be
underestimated. Firstly, a weekend was
approaching and British Rail was unable
to reposition the rolling stock in time
to meet any of the deadlines, which
meant that all the 9000 tons of WMR
stocks from the depots had to be
DOI 10.1080/03071840701470590
 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 61
out-loaded by road rather than rail. In
consequence, a massive fleet of Army
16-ton vehicles and over one hundred
civilian freight vehicles had to be
requisitioned. Another difficulty, which
took days to unravel, was that unit first-
line stocks were mixed in with formation
second line stocks within the same
depots. Also, some of the critical fuses
and detonators were held in other
locations, including Germany. But
despite these difficulties, the terrific
willingness of all the agencies involved,
including the notorious dockyard
workers, enabled us to successfully out-
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load within the four-day deadline. The
loading of the entire WMR into the
assigned Landing Ships Logistic (LSLs)
and Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFAs) actually
took only eighty hours to complete and
we were ready to sail by noon on
Monday 5 April.
The question remains
‘could we do it again
today’?
The Commando Logistic Regiment Royal
Marines was designed to support the
Commando Brigade at light scales in
almost any environment from the arctic
to the tropics. The Regiment (which is 80
per cent Royal Marine cap badge) had
always been under-established for the
job it has to do, the Squadrons
(Headquarters, Medical, Transport,
Workshops and Ordnance) relied heavily
on reinforcements to bring it up to war
establishment. The peacetime strength
of the Regiment numbered about 600
men, and for the Falklands we were
joined by other key elements, including
three Surgical Support Teams (SSTs) to
provide the vital surgical capability to
the Medical Squadron.
The Journey to The Falklands
The journey to the Ascension Islands was
spent in rigorous training and planning
for an opposed landing in the Falklands.
We were convinced that, provided that
we had air supremacy above the landing
force, the logistic re-supply should be
direct from the LSLs by helicopter,
landing craft or mexifloats, with SS
Canberra providing the immediate
medical support. The Beach Support
Area (BSA) ashore would be set up as
soon as possible after ‘H’ hour. This
concept provided flexibility and could
easily be adjusted to support two
possible options, as well as dividing
our assets in case one of the LSLs
should be sunk. Option one involved
a full Brigade assault with two
parachute battalions. This would be
supported by two LSLs, the first held
close inshore to support the land battle
and the second to be held in reserve
outside the Total Exclusion Zone (TEZ).
Each LSL would carry two days combat
'Many of the logistical problems identified during the Falklands campaign have not been remedied.'
Photo by Susan Schulman
supplies (DCSR) with separate
Command and Control Teams together
with Workshops and Ordnance
detachments. Empty LSLs would
replenish from the dedicated stores ships
the MV Elk and the RFA Stromness.
Option two would be to support two
separate operations in different areas. In
this case one LSL could be allocated to
each operation, with each carrying an
additional Dressing Station onboard.
This logistic concept led to a complete
ship re-stow in Ascension Island in order
to achieve the correct split of stocks,
men and machinery between the two
LSLs (destined to be LSLs Sir Galahad
British and European
Defence
and Sir Percivale). The ship re-stow
was a hot and exhausting process
and took eleven days to complete
(19–30 April).
The very lengthy journey to the
Falklands enabled the Navy to establish
complete domination of the seas, but air
superiority was a different matter (as we
saw with the sinking of HMS Sheffield).
Eventually the Amphibious Landing Force
Fleet rendezvoused with the Naval Task
Force outside the TEZ on 16 May. We
were given our final orders by our
Brigade Commander (Brigadier Julian
Thompson) aboard HMS Fearless on
17 May, including all the details for the
Amphibious Landings and our first
choice of Ajax Bay as the BSA. On 18
May at 1600 hours final Regimental
Orders were given: ‘H’ Hour was
confirmed to be 210630Z May 1982.
Operation Sutton
The initial landings were very successful.
Complete surprise was achieved and the
amphibious landing plan worked like
clockwork. All the main objectives were
achieved by first light on 21 May and
the fighting troops were ashore within
four hours of ‘H’ Hour. However, the
Argentinean Air Force soon made its
presence felt. The whole fleet, now at
anchor in San Carlos water, was
61
 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 62
subjected to a great number of air
attacks. HMS Antrim and Argonaut were
hit and HMS Ardent sunk; in return the
enemy were seen to have lost nine
Mirage, five Sky Hawks and three
Puccara. The inevitable decision of the
day was that all non-essential ships
were ordered outside the TEZ as soon
as possible under cover of darkness to
avoid risk of air attack. The LSL support
plan was abandoned and LSLs Sir
Percivale and Galahad were ordered to
run their stocks ashore into the BSA at
Red Beach (Ajax Bay) and depart out
of danger. MV Elk, our ammunition
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supply ship, was ordered to sail well
outside Argentinean aircraft range,
as the detonation of 2000 tons of
high explosives might take all the other
ships with it! The effect was that our
logistic planning had to become land
based, with supply ships coming in at
night when needed. Another serious
effect was that key elements of Medical
Squadron, including one complete
dressing station and a surgical team,
were left onboard Canberra and not seen
again until 1 June. We were therefore
forced to get all our men, equipment
and stocks ashore into Ajax Bay (and the
old sheep refrigeration plant) as soon as
possible.
From a logistic point of view our
main problem ashore was the lack of
dedicated movement assets. Normally
the Regiment could depend on its own
4-ton trucks to carry supplies forward to
the fighting units; however, on this
operation we were entirely dependent
upon the availability of helicopters and
landing craft as there were no roads or
hard-core tracks that we could use.
Regrettably the logistic system broke
down because of the operational
pressure on the small number of
support helicopters available. In
consequence our requests (being of a
logistic nature) were usually placed fairly
low on the priority table and few
supplies got through to the fighting
units in the first few days.
We found the demand for packed
fuel extraordinarily high; in particular the
Rapier posts on the top of the hills, unit
generators and Volvos and Rigid Raiders
consumed a vast number of jerry cans.
RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2007
The problem was not so much a
shortage of bulk fuel as enough was
available on the ships; the real difficulty
was getting the fuel ashore (mostly
achieved by fuel pods floated on the
Mexefloats), and then transferring the
fuel by hand pumps into a very limited
number of jerry cans. The principle of
exchanging a full can for an empty one is
good, but in a fast moving battle you
cannot deny someone a full can simply
because they cannot produce an empty!
Our experience with large flexible tanks
showed them to be extremely
vulnerable to aircraft strafing, hence the
only bulk fuel carried ashore were in the
pods and Air Portable Fuel Containers
(APFCs). The only large towed flexible
fuel tanks established was for aviation
fuel (AVCAT) used for the Harriers and
Helicopters based at Green Beach (Port
San Carlos), but even here the problem
of setting up such a system without air
superiority was both lengthy and
dangerous.
From a logistic point of
view our main problem
ashore was the lack of
dedicated movement
assets
During 26 and 27 May the Argentinean
air attacks continued despite the
horrifying losses their aircraft were
taking. On 26 May the container ship
Atlantic Conveyor was hit and sunk by
Exocet missiles. She was about to arrive
carrying a vast amount of much needed
logistic supplies, including tentage and
stores for our Prisoner of War (PoW)
camp, some Chinooks and other
support helicopters. Then on 27 May at
1930 hours Argentinean Sky Hawk and
Mirage attacked the BSA at Ajax Bay
with virtually no warning, 12 × 400kg
retard bombs were dropped, only four of
which exploded. One of the bombs
exploded in the area of the Regimental
Galley and the echelon of 45
Commando, killing six men and seriously
wounding twenty-six others. Had this
happened half an hour earlier the Galley
would have been full and there would
have been far more casualties. Another
bomb exploded amongst the
ammunition stacks causing a chain of
huge explosions throughout the night.
Three unexploded bombs hit the Main
Dressing Station in the Refrigeration
factory, one going straight through and
two lodging in the building itself. Had
these bombs exploded half the Regiment
would have been killed. Throughout the
raid there were actual operations being
performed on the wounded in the
Dressing Station and the daily (AQ)
logistic conference was dispersing from
the old factory.
The BSA was a very obvious target
and we needed better air defence. What
we really needed was a few 20mm AA
guns, preferably with radar control
guidance and firing tracer. Rapier proved
effective, but it usually strikes the
attacking aircraft after it has attacked its
target. Another matter which saved
many lives was the infantry training of
all the men in the Regiment. Not only
can they fight as part of a rifle company
should the need arise, they also knew
how to dig in effectively with a good
two feet of overheard cover – without
this skill our casualty toll would have
been much higher.
On 28 May, 2 Para unleashed their
attack on Goose Green and Darwin. It
was a vicious and hard fought battle,
which set the tone of things to come,
and undoubtedly had a terrifying effect
on the Argentineans. The Argentinean
forces in the area surrendered on the
morning of 29 May, approximately 1200
prisoners were taken and over forty
Argentinean lay dead on the battlefield.
2 Para lost eighteen dead with fifty-
three wounded. For the wounded the
helicopters provided a marvellous
ambulance service. Of course the
Dressing Station was exceptionally
busy catering for the wounded, but we
also had to make arrangements for the
burial of our own dead, including the
digging of the graves and conducting
committal services. From a logistic point
of view the ammunition rates of fire
were incredibly high, for example
105mm high explosives actually ran out
 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 63

British and European

Defence

at one point. Generally speaking,
approximately four days supply of
ammunition (DAER) was expended in
24 hours at limited user rates – five days
supply in the case of 105mm high
explosives and 81mm MOR. Clearly we
would have had great resupply problems
had battle continued at that intensity
for any further length of time. The
Regiment also had to set up a PoW
camp for the bulk of the prisoners
taken at Goose Green. We were not
trained or scaled for this task. Although
we treated them well, they did not have
adequate tentage or sleeping equipment,
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aboard HMS Fearless together with
5 Infantry Brigade (1 Scots Guards,
1 Welsh Guards and 7 Gurkha Rifles).
Regrettably, 5 Brigade brought very little
logistic support with them and the
Commando Logistic Regiment was
directed to take on logistic resupply for
the whole division including 5 Brigade.
To help us we were given elements of
81 and 91 Ordnance Company under
operational command. However,
although they came with enough
combat supplies, they brought with
them virtually no extra movement
assets, in particular no support
mechanical handling equipment (MHE)
or landing craft. In order to support 5
Brigade (who were ordered to move
forward to Fitzroy) we established a
forward BMA at Fitzroy with a
distribution point at Bluff Cove to
support their Echelons. The support of
this 5 Brigade did not go well as their
logistic communications and procedures
were not as well tested as within 3
Commando Brigade.
Just as we were setting up the BMA
at Fitzroy (on 8 June) the two LSLs
(Galahad and Tristan) were attacked by
Sky Hawks and set on fire, resulting in

let alone the extra galley facilities helicopters, fuel pods or tanks, tragic loss of life on Galahad (forty-two
needed.
Summary of Logistics Statistics: Falklands War 1982
Combat Supplies
The lessons about ● Total stocks outloaded from UK – 17,000 tons
● Total Ammo stocks outloaded from UK – 8,600 tons
packed fuel and ● Stocks movements on Falklands 9,080 tons
relevant equipment Ammo
have not been ● Ajax Bay off-loaded from shipping – 3,500 tons
● To Teal from Ajax Bay – 1,200 tons
learnt ● To Fitzroy from Ajax Bay – 1,000 tons
● To DP (Estancia House) from Teal – 36 tons
Rations
As the Brigade moved forward into the
● Total rations moved – 1,200 tons
area of Mount Kent, we followed up by
● Hexemine – 300 tons
creating a forward Brigade Maintenance
● Biscuits – 90 tons
Area (BMA) at Teal settlement with a
Distribution Point (DP) near Estancia POL
House. The plan was once again to ● APFC/J Cans – 1,414 tons
move large quantities of supplies ● Defence Stores – 280 tons
(particularly 105mm and 81mm) ● Tech Gen Stores – 60 tons
forward to Teal by LSL and supplies from ● Grand Total 9,080 tons
Teal could then be moved forward to
Casualties – wounded
Estancia either by boat (LCVP landing
● Minor casualties treated at Ajax Bay 710
craft or the Rigid Raider patrol boat), by
● Minor casualties treated at Fitzroy/Teal 307
BV202 vehicles or helicopter. Unit
Total 1,017
Echelons would then draw supplies
● Major Surgical Operations at Ajax Bay 202
direct from the DP. The system worked
● Major Surgical Operations at Teal/Fitzroy/
well, although once again the shortage
SS UGANDA 108
of helicopter availability caused long
Total 310
delay. Our own logistic communications
(HF) worked well throughout the ● Only 3 died of wounds after care (on SS UGANDA)
operation, however many difficulties ● Casualties in the Beach Support Area at Ajax Bay – 6 killed
were encountered with some of the 26 seriously wounded
VHF Clansman sets. 10 minor wounds
Casualties – dead
The Main Battle
● British Navy 88 killed
The two days between 1 and 2 June
● British Army 167 killed
saw the arrival of Major General Jeremy
● Argentinean 655 killed
Moore MC* and his Headquarters

63
 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 64

killed and over 200 injured – mostly
from the Welsh Guards). Our Main
Dressing Station at Ajax Bay in the
old meat packing shed, was inundated
with the injured (mostly burns and in
great pain). Fortunately by this time
the hospital ship Uganda was permitted
to come in daily to Grantham Sound
and was soon able to absorb the
overcrowding. The teamwork achieved
by the ‘Red and Green Life Machine’
was fantastic and a great many friends
and foes alike owe their lives to the skill
and dedication of our surgeons and
medical attendants. Out of just over
Downloaded by [New York University] at 11:33 10 October 2014
casualties treated were Argentinean. Of
those who reached the Dressing Station
alive, only one subsequently died of his
wounds.
Victory and Recovery
The final plan for the capture of Port
Stanley involved a three-phase assault.
3 Commando Brigade was to take
Mount Longdon, Harriet and Two Sisters
early in the morning of Saturday 11
June, followed by a 5 Infantry Brigade
attack on Mount William and
Tumbledown. Wireless Ridge was then to
be taken by 2 Para as a preliminary to
lines prior to each phase, with the
ability to resupply a further 500 rounds
straight from the Brigade Maintenance
Areas at Teal and Fitzroy. Although 500
rounds per gun a day sounds a lot of
ammunition it should be noted that
many of the guns and mortars actually
run out. Other ammunition natures,
which were used far in excess of their
theoretical scales, were .5 Browning,
7.62 link and tracer, L2 grenades,
66mm HEAT, 84mm HEAT and MILAN.
Another item constantly asked for, but
not held was 2 inch mortar high
explosives. Following the surrender of

1,000 casualties received in our Main
and Forward Dressing Stations, only
three subsequently died. In all 202
major operations were performed at
Ajax Bay and another 108 operations
were performed at Teal, Fitzroy and
SS Uganda. Of these figures
approximately 30 per cent of the
the final assault on Sapper Hill and Port
Stanley by 3 Commando Brigade. From a
logistic point of view it meant that at
first line every man would have to carry
two days’ supply of ammunition and
food and all vehicle fuel tanks had to
be full. Guns and mortars were to have
500 rounds per gun actually on the gun
Argentinean forces on 14 June, the
Logistic Regiment moved to Port Stanley
to cater for the two Brigades, assist the
locals to restore essential services and to
look after some 11,000 PoWs. Although
we did our best, we were neither scaled
nor experienced in the handling of so
many prisoners.

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RUSI JOURNAL JUNE 2007

 RUSI_A_246938.qxp 6/13/07 4:28 PM Page 65

British and European

Defence

Summary and Reflection
Twenty-five Years On
This short account of the logistical
support of the Falklands’ war provides a
useful check for future planning.
Many lessons were learned at the
time and the basic logistical statistics
may be found in the table. From a
logistic point of view it was a close run
thing; if the Argentineans had really
targeted our logistic installations and
equipments then things might have
been very different. It is also clear that
without adequate support shipping,
helicopters and air power the operation
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decreased. Although there are more
Chinooks, their inability to quickly fold
their rotors would present many
difficulties.
The medical support is also worrying
should we ever take a serious number of
military casualties. Our amphibious ships
have a limited number of casualty beds,
but the situation would quickly become
critical in the absence of a proper
hospital ship and dedicated hospitals at
home.
The lessons about packed fuel and
relevant equipment have not been
learnt. Although bulk fuel supply is more
purposes. We have largely lost our ability
to manufacture our own ammunition,
which now comes from such countries
as India, Israel, Belgium, Norway and
Greece. It would take some time for us
to re-tool and start producing our own
ammunition again should overseas
supplies become unavailable. In an
emergency, such as the Falklands, our
ships would have to wait a long time for
ammunition to become available: either
to be manufactured or imported.
Although air re-supply was not a
factor in the Falklands war because of
the distances involved, it is interesting to

could not have been mounted or
sustained. Twenty-five years have now
passed and it is pertinent to re-examine
those lessons and to see to what extent
things have improved. An examination of
analyses from Jane’s and The Military
Balance shows that our amphibious
shipping capability has improved, but
the new LSLs have no beach off-loading
capability, which would have presented
huge problems. The number of effective
support helicopters has considerably
efficient, these installations are difficult
to move and remain very vulnerable
from both air and ground attack. This
vulnerability will be further aggravated
by the lack of effective air-defence
weapons, especially AA guns.
Since the Falklands, we have
outsourced much of our UK-based
logistical support. Depots and combat
supplies are now run as a ‘just-in-time’
business, and only the minimum level of
stocks are actually held for emergency
note that the number of available C-
130’s has markedly declined since 1982.
In conclusion, it is reasonable to assume
that if the political will was there, our
excellent military machine would be
willing to do it again provided that our
Strategic Reserve was not committed
elsewhere. However, many of the
logistical problems identified during the
Falklands campaign have not been
remedied and this time the
consequences could prove fatal. ■

www.rusi.org/trenchgascoigne

Trench Gascoigne Essay Prize

This Competition aims to encourage original writing on contemporary issues of defence and
international and national security. It is open to authors of any nationality and entries are particularly
welcome from members of the Armed Forces. One or more prizes within a total of £1,000 may be
awarded. The closing date for the 2007 Prize is 26 October 2007.

Awards will be made on the basis of originality, logical argument, sound analysis, style,
clarity and conciseness.
Rules and requirements are as follows:
• Authors may be of any nationality, but must present their work in English. They need not be members of the Institute.
• Work originating in Staff and War Colleges is eligible.
• The first prize is not generally awarded to the same author in successive years.
• Essays should not be more than 3,500 words in length, but will not be penalized if they are briefer.
• Essays must be type-written and double spaced. The author’s name should not be included on the actual essay (The author's name will not be made available to
the judges until after the judging).
• Essays must be received by 26 October 2007:
a. By e-mail attachment in Microsoft Word. The covering message should contain full rank
(where applicable), name, address and age on the closing if wishing to be considered for the special prize for authors under 30.
b. By post accompanied by a separate sealed envelope containing full rank (where applicable), name, address and age if under 30 and wishing to be considered for
the special prize for authors under 30.

Essays should be sent either by email (preferred) or recorded delivery to: The Director of Military Sciences (codner@rusi.org) , Royal United Services Institute,
Whitehall, London SW1A 2ET, United Kingdom

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