The Infamous Lex Renato Notes 2019

Para lang sa mga naniniwala at sumasalampalataya;

Walang kayabang-yabang, low-key lang sa gedli.

POLITICAL LAW LAST MINUTE TIPS

1. Internal Waters
Internal Waters include littoral areas such as ports, rivers, inlets and other marine spaces
landward of the baseline (low-water line) where the port state has jurisdiction to enforce
domestic regulations. Enforcement measures can be taken for violations of static standards
while in port as well as for violations that occurred within the coastal state’s maritime zones
and beyond. However, foreign vessels are not usually held to non-maritime or security port
state laws so long as the activities conducted are not detrimental to the peace and security of
the locale.

In the maritime security context, however, a coastal state can prevent privately contracted
armed security personnel (PCASP) from entering its ports and internal waters if carriage of
weapons is forbidden in national legislation. Moreover, once entering a port PCASP (and
the vessel which they are aboard) can be held accountable for other violations that took
place at sea if (a) they in some way impacted the port state or (b) for other reasons with the
permission of the flag state.

  Territorial Sea
In the Territorial Sea, a coastal state has unlimited jurisdiction over all (including foreign)
activities unless restrictions are imposed by law. All coastal states have the right to a
territorial sea extending 12 nautical miles from the baseline.

In the maritime security context, it remains debated as to whether the coastal state can set
and enforce laws to restrict movement of PCASP, forbid maritime security operations
(including making illegal the carriage or discharge of weapons) within the territorial sea, or
if enacting such legislation would be prejudicial to general freedom of navigation and the
regime of innocent passage.

Contiguous Zone
The Contiguous Zone is an intermediary zone between the territorial sea and the high seas
extending enforcement jurisdiction of the coastal state to a maximum of 24 nautical miles
from baselines for the purposes of  preventing or punishing violations of customs, fiscal,
immigration or sanitary (and thus residual national security) legislation.

In the maritime security context, this can certainly include monitoring any activities which
can result in armed violence or weapons import into the state. Therefore the coastal state can
take measures to prevent or regulate armed maritime security activities out to 24 nautical
miles under the reasoning that it is undertaking customs enforcement operations to prevent
movement of arms into its waters/ports.

Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)

The EEZ is another intermediary zone, lying between the territorial sea (12 nautical miles)
and the high seas to the maximum extent of 200 nautical miles. Although high seas
freedoms concerning general navigation principles remain in place, in this zone the coastal
state retains exclusive sovereignty over exploring, exploiting and conserving all natural
resources. The coastal state therefore can take action to prevent infringement by third
parties of its economic assets in this area including, inter alia, fishing, bio-prospecting and
wind-farming.

In order to safeguard these rights, the coastal state may take necessary measures including
boarding, inspection, arrest and judicial proceedings, as may be necessary to ensure
compliance with the international laws and regulations.
 High Seas
The High Seas, which lie beyond 200 nautical miles from shore, are to be open and freely
available to everyone, governed by the principle of equal rights for all. In agreeing to
UNCLOS, all state parties acknowledged that the oceans are for peaceful purposes as the
Convention’s aim was to maintain peace, justice and progress for all people of the world. On
the High Seas, no state can act or interfere with justified and equal interests of other states.

The Convention establishes freedom of activity in six

spheres: Navigation, Overflight, Laying of cables and pipelines, Artificial islands and
installations, Fishing, Marine scientific research.
Freedom of navigation is of utmost importance for all, and maritime security activities can
be considered part of navigational activities as they protect vessels from interference by
third parties.

(NOTE: Hindi na itatanong yung distance diyan, very basic. Ang itatanong diyan ano ano
mga pwedeng gawin to each zones)

2. Arigo vs. Swift

Provisions on UNCLOS

Article 30: Non-compliance by warships with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
If any warship does not comply with the laws and regulations of the coastal State
concerning passage through the territorial sea and disregards any request for compliance
therewith which is made to it, the coastal State may require it to leave the territorial sea
immediately.

Article 31: Responsibility of the flag State for damage caused by a warship or other
government ship operated for non-commercial purposes
The flag State shall bear international responsibility for any loss or damage to the coastal
State resulting from the non-compliance by a warship or other government ship operated
for non-commercial purposes with the laws and regulations of the coastal State concerning
passage through the territorial sea or with the provisions of this Convention or other rules
of international law.

Article 32: Immunities of warships and other government ships operated for non-
commercial purposes

With such exceptions as are contained in subsection A and in articles 30 and 31, nothing in
this Convention affects the immunities of warships and other government ships operated
for non-commercial purposes. A foreign warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal
waters with resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which the above
provisions may apply.

But what if the offending warship is a non-party to the UNCLOS, as in this case, the US?

According to Justice Carpio, although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a

matter of long-standing policy the US considers itself bound by customary international
rules on the “traditional uses of the oceans” as codified in UNCLOS.

On State Immunity:

 The waiver of State immunity under the VF A pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as the present petition for issuance of a writ of Kalikasan. In fact,
it can be inferred from Section 17, Rule 7 of the Rules that a criminal case against a person
charged with a violation of an environmental law is to be filed separately.

3. Principle of Postliminy
 “The judicial acts and proceedings of the court were good and valid. The governments by
the Philippine Executive Commission
and the Republic of the Philippines during the Japanese military occupation being de
facto governments, it necessarily follows that the judicial acts and proceedings of the court of
justice of those governments, which are not of a political complexion, were good and valid.
Those not only judicial but also legislative acts of de facto government, which are not of a
political complexion, remained good and valid after the liberation or reoccupation of the
Philippines by the American and Filipino forces under the leadership of General Douglas
MacArthur.”

(Note: Ano ba ang suspended during occupation? Polical law lang. Pero yung civil law and
rights still binding.)

Although in theory the authority of the local civil and judicial administration is suspended
as a matter of course as soon as military occupation takes place, in practice the invader does
not usually take the administration of justice into his own hands, but continues the ordinary
courts or tribunals to administer the laws of the country which he is enjoined, unless
absolutely prevented, to respect. An Executive Order of President McKinley to the Secretary
of War states that “in practice, they (the municipal laws) are not usually abrogated but are
allowed to remain in force and to be administered by the ordinary tribunals substantially as
they were before the occupation. This enlightened practice is, so far as possible, to be
adhered to on the present occasion.”

4. RIGHT TO PRIVACY

*Use key word: Reasonable expectation of privacy

“The petitioner had no reasonable expectation of privacy in his office and computer files for
he failed to prove that he had an actual expectation of privacy either in his office or
government-issued computer which contained his personal files.  He did not allege that he
had a separate enclosed office which he did not share with anyone, or that his office was
always locked and not open to other employees or visitors.  He did not use passwords nor
adopted any means to prevent access by others of his computer files. The CSC also
implemented a policy which implies on-the-spot inspections may be done to ensure that the
computer resources were used only for such legitimate business purposes.

The search authorized by the respondent CSC Chair was reasonable since it was conducted
in connection with investigation of work-related misconduct. A search by a government
employer of an employee’s office is justified when there are reasonable grounds for
suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct”

(Note: Pano kung may separate enclosed office na siya? Magiiba ba sagot mo?)

5. Automobile Exception; Moving Search

Keyword: PROBABLE CAUSE

That became known as the Carroll doctrine: a vehicle could be searched without

a search warrant if there was probable cause to believe that evidence is present in
the vehicle, coupled with exigent circumstances to believe that the vehicle could be
removed from the area before a warrant could be obtained.

(Note: There must still be probable cause. Bawal indiscriminate. Last year ang tanong is ang
humahabol dalawang patrol car, so dahil may constant communication, mayroon padding
probable cause and personal knowledge kahit yung patrol car na hindi original na
humahabol yung nakahuli.)

The Court held, however,

 It would be intolerable and unreasonable if a prohibition agent were authorized to stop
every automobile on the chance of finding liquor, and thus subject all persons lawfully
using the highways to the inconvenience and indignity of such a search.... [T]hose lawfully
within the country, entitled to use the public highways, have a right to free passage without
interruption or search unless there is known to a competent official, authorized to search,
probable cause for believing that their vehicles are carrying contraband or illegal
merchandise.

6. DUE PROCESS IN DEPORATATION PROCEEDINGS

KEYWORD: DUE PROCESS, POLICE POWER,

Section 37 of the Immigration Act states:

SEC. 37. (a)          The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the
Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer designated by him for the purpose and
deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by
the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged
against the alien:

(1)          Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act by means of
false and misleading statements or without inspection and admission by the immigration
authorities at a designated port of entry or at any place other than at a designated port of
entry. (As amended by Sec. 13, Rep. Act No. 503.) ...
There must be a determination of the existence of the ground charged, particularly illegal
entry into the country. Only after the hearing can the alien be deported. Also, there must be
appositive finding from the CID that they are aliens before compelling them to register as
such. This power is the police power to protect the state from undesirable aliens injurious to
the public good.
Since the deportation is a harsh process, due process must be observed. In the same law, it is
provided that:

No alien shall be deported without being informed of the specific grounds for deportation
nor without being given a hearing under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the
Commissioner of Immigration.

The acts or omissions that they are charged of must be in ordinary language for the person
to be informed and for the CID to make a proper judgment. Also, the warrants of arrewst
must be in accordance with the rules on criminal procedure.

On the information of a private prosecutor in the case: Deportation is the sole concern of

the state. There is no justification for a private party to intervene.

7. RELIANCE OF PROSECUTOR’S CERTIFICATION

(Note: The difference between search warrants and arrest warrants then connect to this)

Issues: Whether the certification of the investigating fiscal in the information as to the

existence of probable cause obligates respondent City Judge to issue a warrant of arrest.

Whether or not the respondent city judge may, for the purpose of issuing a warrant of
arrest, compel the fiscal to submit to the court the supporting affidavits and other
documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation.

Held: 1. No.  2. Yes.

The issuance of a warrant is not a mere ministerial function; it calls for the exercise of
judicial discretion on the part of the issuing magistrate.  This is clear from the following
provisions of Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:
 “Warrant of arrest, when issued. – If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary
examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of
has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has
committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest.”

Under this section, the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause
before issuing a warrant or order of arrest.  If on the face of the information the judge
finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal’s certification and require the
submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the
existence of a probable cause.  This has been the rule
since U.S. vs. Ocampo and Amarga vs. Abbas.  And this evidently is the reason for the
issuance by respondent of the questioned orders of April 13, 15, 16, 19, 1982 and July 13,
1982.  Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a
matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala,
respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable
cause.  For as the ensuing events would show, after petitioners had submitted the required
affidavits, respondent wasted no time in issuing the warrants of arrest in the cases where he
was satisfied that probable cause existed.
The obvious purpose of requiring the submission of affidavits of the complainant and of his
witnesses is to enable the court to determine whether to dismiss the case outright or to
require
further proceedings.

8. SJS vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD; RIGHT TO PRIVACY; SUSPINSCIONLESS DRUG

TESTING

Note: Dito ang pinaguusapan saan lang pwede may on the spot drug testing, ang key word
ulet – REASONABLE EXPECTATION OF PRIVACY.

Student – wala
Government employee – meron, pero justifiable
Charged criminals – merong reasonable expectation of privacy

In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutor’s office, a mandatory drug
testing can never be random or suspicionless.  The ideas of randomness and being
suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint.  They
are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion.  When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their
will.  The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutor’s office
and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily
consent to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug
testing on the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal
prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165.  Drug testing in this case would
violate a persons’ right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution.
Worse still, the accused persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.

9. IN RE PRODUCTION OF COURT RECORDS

Deliberative process privilege is one kind of privileged information, which is within the
exceptions of the constitutional right to information. In In Re: Production of Court Records and
Documents and the Attendance of Court Officials and Employees as Witnesses,  36 we held that:

Court deliberations are traditionally recognized as privileged communication. Section 2, Rule

10 of the IRSC provides:

Section 2. Confidentiality of court sessions. - Court sessions are executive in character, with only
the Members of the Court present. Court deliberations are confidential and shall not be
disclosed to outside parties, except as may be provided herein or as authorized by the Court.
Justice Abad discussed the rationale for the rule in his concurring opinion to the Court
Resolution in Arroyo v. De Lima (TRO on Watch List Order case): the rules on confidentiality
will enable the Members of the Court to "freely discuss the issues without fear of criticism for
holding unpopular positions" or fear of humiliation for one's comments. The privilege against
disclosure of these kinds of information/communication is known as deliberative process
privilege, involving as it does the deliberative process of reaching a decision. "Written advice
from a variety of individuals is an important element of the government's decision-making
process and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to
disclose those recommendations;" the privilege is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of
deliberative communications."

The privilege is not exclusive to the Judiciary. We have in passing recognized the claim of this
privilege by the two other branches of government in Chavez v. Public Estates
Authority  (speaking through J. Carpio) when the Court declared that -

[t]he information x x x like internal deliberations of the Supreme Court and other collegiate
courts, or executive sessions of either house of Congress, are recognized as confidential. This
kind of information cannot be pried open by a co-equal branch of government. A frank
exchange of exploratory ideas and assessments, free from the glare of publicity and pressure by
interested parties, is essential to protect the independence of decision-making of those tasked to
exercise Presidential, Legislative and Judicial power. (Emphasis supplied)

In Akbayan v. Aquino,  37 we adopted the ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court in NLRB v. Sears,
Roebuck & Co,38 which stated that the deliberative process privilege protects from disclosure
"advisory opinions, recommendations, and deliberations comprising part of a process by which
governmental decisions and policies are formulated." We explained that "[w]ritten advice from
a variety of individuals is an important element of the government's decision-making process
and that the interchange of advice could be stifled if courts forced the government to disclose
those recommendations"; thus, the privilege is intended "to prevent the 'chilling' of deliberative
communications."39

The privileged character of the information does not end when an agency has adopted a definite
proposition or when a contract has been perfected or consummated; otherwise, the purpose of
the privilege will be defeated.

10. Post enactment measure by Congress violates the Principle of Separation of Powers

The Legislative branch of government should not cross over the field of implementing the
national budget since the same is properly the domain of the Executive. Again, the Court
stated that “Congress enters the picture [when it] deliberates or acts on the budget
proposals of the President. Thereafter, Congress, “in the exercise of its own judgment and
wisdom, formulates an appropriation act precisely following the process established by the
Constitution, which specifies that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in
accordance with an appropriation made by law.” Upon approval and passage of the General
Appropriations Act, Congress’ law-making role necessarily comes to an end and from there
the Executive’s role of implementing the national budget begins. So as not to blur the
constitutional boundaries between them, Congress must “not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive.” It must be clarified, however, that since the restriction
only pertains to “any role in the implementation or enforcement of the law,” Congress may
still exercise its oversight function which is a mechanism of checks and balances that the
Constitution itself allows. But it must be made clear that Congress’ role must be confined to
mere oversight. Any post-enactment-measure allowing legislator participation beyond
oversight is bereft of any constitutional basis and hence, tantamount to impermissible
interference and/or assumption of executive functions. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1,
G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013
Post-Enactment Authority of Individual Legislators Violates the Principle of Non-
Delegability

The 2013 PDAF Article, insofar as it confers post-enactment identification authority to

individual legislators, violates the principle of non-delegability since said legislators are
effectively allowed to individually exercise the power of appropriation, which is lodged in
 Congress. That the power to appropriate must be exercised only through legislation is clear
from Section 29(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that: “No money shall be
paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an appropriation made by law.” The power
of appropriation involves (a) the setting apart by law of a certain sum from the public
revenue for (b) a specified purpose. Essentially, under the 2013 PDAF Article, individual
legislators are given a personal lump-sum fund from which they are able to dictate (a) how
much from such fund would go to (b) a specific project or beneficiary that they themselves
also determine. As these two (2) acts comprise the exercise of the power of appropriation,
and given that the 2013 PDAF Article authorizes individual legislators to perform the same,
undoubtedly, said legislators have been conferred the power to legislate which the
Constitution does not, however, allow. Thus, keeping with the principle of non-delegability
of legislative power, the 2013 PDAF Article, as well as all other forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel which contain the similar legislative identification feature, is unconstitutional.
Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566 November 19, 2013

The 2013 PDAF Article Denies the President the Power to Veto Items

What beckons constitutional infirmity are appropriations which merely provide for a
singular lump-sum amount to be tapped as a source of funding for multiple purposes. Since
such appropriation type necessitates the further determination of both the actual amount to
be expended and the actual purpose of the appropriation which must still be chosen from
the multiple purposes stated in the law, it cannot be said that the appropriation law already
indicates a “specific appropriation of money” and hence, without a proper line-item which
the President may veto. As a practical result, the President would then be faced with the
predicament of either vetoing the entire appropriation if he finds some of its purposes
wasteful or undesirable, or approving the entire appropriation so as not to hinder some of
its legitimate purposes. Belgica vs. Ochoa, Jr., 710 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 208566 November 19,
2013

11. The HRET Has Jurisdiction to Resolve Questions on the Qualifications of Members of
Congress

In the case of party-list representatives, the HRET acquires jurisdiction over a

disqualification case upon proclamation of the winning party-list group, oath of the
nominee, and assumption of office as member of the House of Representatives. In this case,
the COMELEC proclaimed Ating Koop as a winning party-list group; petitioner Lico took
his oath; and he assumed office in the House of Representatives. Thus, it is the HRET, and
not the COMELEC, that has jurisdiction over the disqualification case. Lico vs. Commission
on Elections En Banc, 771 SCRA 596, G.R. No. 205505 September 29, 2015

12. The Doctrine of Operative Fact Applies to the Disbursement Acceleration Program

The doctrine of operative fact recognizes the existence of the law or executive act prior to the
determination of its unconstitutionality as an operative fact that produced consequences
that cannot always be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the void law or
executive act but sustains its effects. It provides an exception to the general rule that a void
or unconstitutional law produces no effect. But its use must be subjected to great scrutiny
and circumspection, and it cannot be invoked to validate an unconstitutional law or
executive act, but is resorted to only as a matter of equity and fair play. It applies only to
cases where extraordinary circumstances exist, and only when the extraordinary
circumstances have met the stringent conditions that will permit its application. The
doctrine of operative fact is applicable to the adoption and implementation of the DAP. Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play. The consequences resulting from
the DAP and its related issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be undone.
Araullo vs. Aquino III, 728 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 209569 July 1, 2014

13. Probable Cause is the Allowable Standard of Proof for the President to Declare Martial Law
 The parameters for determining the sufficiency of factual basis are as follows: 1) actual
rebellion or invasion; 2) public safety requires it; the first two requirements must concur;
and 3) there is probable cause for the President to believe that there is actual rebellion or
invasion. The President needs only to satisfy probable cause as the standard of proof in
determining the existence of either invasion or rebellion for purposes of declaring martial
law, and that probable cause is the most reasonable, most practical and most expedient
standard by which the President can fully ascertain the existence or non-existence of
rebellion necessary for a declaration of martial law or suspension of the writ. This is because
unlike other standards of proof, which, in order to be met, would require much from the
President and therefore unduly restrain his exercise of emergency powers, the requirement
of probable cause is much simpler. It merely necessitates an "average man to weigh the facts
and circumstances without resorting to the calibration of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He merely relies on common sense and needs only to rest on
evidence showing that, more likely than not, a crime has been committed by the accused."
Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

Territorial Scope of Martial Law is NOT Limited to the Place where there is Actual Rebellion

It is difficult, if not impossible, to fix the territorial scope of martial law in direct proportion
to the "range" of actual rebellion and public safety simply because rebellion and public
safety have no fixed physical dimensions. Their transitory and abstract nature defies precise
measurements; hence, the determination of the territorial scope of martial law could only be
drawn from arbitrary, not fixed, variables. The Constitution must have considered these
limitations when it granted the President wide leeway and flexibility in determining the
territorial scope of martial law. Moreover, the President's duty to maintain peace and public
safety is not limited only to the place where there is actual rebellion; it extends to other areas
where the present hostilities are in danger of spilling over. It is not intended merely to
prevent the escape of lawless elements from Marawi City, but also to avoid enemy
reinforcements and to cut their supply lines coming from different parts of Mindanao. Thus,
limiting the proclamation and/or suspension to the place where there is actual rebellion
would not only defeat the purpose of declaring martial law, it will make the exercise thereof
ineffective and useless. Lagman vs. Medialdea, G.R. No. 231658, July 4, 2017

14. The President Should Personally Sign the Service Contract for Petroleum Exploration

Paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution requires that the President
himself enter into any service contract for the exploration of petroleum. SC-46 appeared to
have been entered into and signed only by the DOE through its then Secretary, Vicente S.
Perez, Jr., contrary to the said constitutional requirement. Moreover, public respondents
have neither shown nor alleged that Congress was subsequently notified of the execution of
such contract. Public respondents’ implied argument that based on the “alter ego principle,”
their acts are also that of then President Macapagal-Arroyo’s, cannot apply in this case. This
is a case where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person or
the exigencies of the situation demand that she act personally. Resident Marine Mammals
of the Protected Seascape Tañon Strait vs. Reyes, 756 SCRA 513, G.R. No. 181527 April 21,
2015

15. An Executive Agreement Implementing an Existing Treaty Does NOT Need Senate
Concurrence

The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of the foreign military bases,
troops, or facilities. Once entry is authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only
to the limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine law, and not to the
Section 25 requirement of validity through a treaty. The admission and presence of U.S.
military and civilian personnel in Philippine territory are already allowed under the Visiting
Forces Agreement (VFA), the treaty supposedly being implemented by Enhance Defense
Cooperation Agreement (EDCA).

What EDCA has effectively done is merely provide the mechanism to identify the locations
in which U.S. personnel may perform allowed activities pursuant to the VFA. As the
 implementing agreement, it regulates and limits the presence of U.S. personnel in the
country. Saguisag vs. Ochoa, Jr., 779 SCRA 241, G.R. No. 212426, G.R. No. 212444 January
12, 2016

16. Political Questions Cannot be Entertained by the Court

President Duterte’s decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at the LNMB involves a
political question that is not a justiciable controversy. In the exercise of his powers under the
Constitution and the Executive Order (E.O.) No. 292 (otherwise known as the
Administrative Code of 1987) to allow the interment of Marcos at the LNMB, which is a land
of the public domain devoted for national military cemetery and military shrine purposes,
President Duterte decided a question of policy based on his wisdom that it shall promote
national healing and forgiveness. Ocampo vs. Enriquez, 807 SCRA 223, G.R. No. 225973,
G.R. No. 225984, G.R. No. 226097, G.R. No. 226116, G.R. No. 226117, G.R. No. 226120, G.R.
No. 226294 November 8, 2016

17. Allowing Religion to Flourish is NOT contrary to the Principle of Separation of Church and
State

PHRASE PAMPALANDI: The true essence of freedom is accommodation

In fact, these two principles are in perfect harmony with each other. The State is aware of the
existence of religious movements whose members believe in the divinity of Jose Rizal. Yet, it
does not implement measures to suppress the said religious sects. Such inaction or
indifference on the part of the State gives meaning to the separation of Church and State,
and at the same time, recognizes the religious freedom of the members of these sects to
worship their own Supreme Being. As pointed out by Judge Lutero, “the Roman Catholics
express their worship through the holy mass and to stop these would be tantamount to
repressing the right to the free exercise of their religion. Our Muslim brethren, who are
government employees, are allowed to worship their Allah even during office hours inside
their own offices. The Seventh Day Adventists are exempted from rendering Saturday duty
because their religion prohibits them from working on a Saturday. Even Christians have
been allowed to conduct their own bible studies in their own offices. All these have been
allowed in respect of the workers’ right to the free exercise of their religion.” Re: Letter of
Tony Q. Valenciano, Holding of Religious Rituals at the Hall of Justice Building in Quezon
City, 819 SCRA 313, A.M. No. 10-4-19-SC March 7, 2017

18. Establishment Clause vs. Free Exercise Clause

The Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses were not designed to serve contradictory
purposes. They have a single goal—to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and
practices. In simplest terms, the Free Exercise Clause prohibits government from inhibiting
religious beliefs with penalties for religious beliefs and practice, while the Establishment
Clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief with rewards for religious
beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended to deny
government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious
beliefs and practices. Estrada vs. Escritor, 492 SCRA 1, A.M. No. P-02-1651 June 22, 2006

19. Instances when Absence of Notice and Hearing are NOT Necessarily a Denial of Due
Process

Among the instances are the cancellation of the passport of a person being sought for the
commission of a crime, the preventive suspension of a civil servant facing administrative
charges, the distraint of properties to answer for tax delinquencies, the padlocking of
restaurants found to be unsanitary or of theaters showing obscene movies, and the
abatement of nuisance per se. Add to them the arrest of a person in flagrante delicto. The
clamping of the petitioners’ vehicles was of the same character as the aforecited established
exceptions dispensing with notice and hearing. The immobilization of illegally parked
vehicles by clamping the tires was necessary because the transgressors were not around at
the time of apprehension. Under such circumstance, notice and hearing would be
 superfluous. Nor should the lack of a trial-type hearing prior to the clamping constitute a
breach of procedural due process, for giving the transgressors the chance to reverse the
apprehensions through a timely protest could equally satisfy the need for a hearing. In other
words, the prior intervention of a court of law was not indispensable to ensure a compliance
with the guaranty of due process. Legaspi vs. City of Cebu, 711 SCRA 771, G.R. No. 159110,
G.R. No. 159692 December 10, 2013

20. Size Regulation when Related to Suppression of Speech Violates Freedom of Expression

Limiting the maximum size of the tarpaulin would render ineffective petitioners’ message
and violate their right to exercise freedom of expression. The COMELEC’s act of requiring
the removal of the tarpaulin has the effect of dissuading expressions with political
consequences. These should be encouraged, more so when exercised to make more
meaningful the equally important right to suffrage. The Diocese of Bacolod vs. Commission
on Elections, 747 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 205728 January 21, 2015

21. The School’s Power to Discipline is Subsumed in their Academic Freedom

The “four essential freedoms” of a school - To determine for itself on academic grounds (1)
who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall be taught, and (4) who may be
admitted to study. An educational institution has the power to adopt and enforce such rules
as may be deemed expedient for its government, this being incident to the very object of
incorporation, and indispensable to the successful management of the college. It can decide
for itself its aims and objectives and how best to attain them, free from outside coercion or
interference except when there is an overriding public welfare which would call for some
restraint. The schools’ power to instill discipline in their students is subsumed in their
academic freedom and that “the establishment of rules governing university-student
relations, particularly those pertaining to student discipline, may be regarded as vital, not
merely to the smooth and efficient operation of the institution, but to its very survival.”
Cudia vs. The Superintendent of the Philippine Military Academy (PMA), 751 SCRA 469,
G.R. No. 211362 February 24, 2015

22. Overbreadth Doctrine only Applies to Free Speech Cases

Petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours. However, the application of
the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge and, owing to the given
rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech cases. Considering that
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition
of speech-related conduct., the Court rejects their invocation of the overbreadth doctrine.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK) vs. Quezon City, 835 SCRA 350, G.R. No.
225442 August 8, 2017

23. Violation of Miranda Rights Renders Inadmissible the Extrajudicial Confession or

Admission

Only While there is no dispute that petitioner was subjected to all the rituals of a custodial
questioning by the customs authorities and the NBI in violation of his constitutional right
under Section 12 of Article III of the Constitution, we must not, however, lose sight of the
fact that what said constitutional provision prohibits as evidence are only confessions and
admissions of the accused as against himself. Thus, in Aquino v. Paiste, 555 SCRA 255
(2008), the Court categorically ruled that “the infractions of the so-called Miranda rights
render inadmissible ‘only the extrajudicial confession or admission made during custodial
investigation.’ The admissibility of other evidence, provided they are relevant to the issue
and are not otherwise excluded by law or rules, are not affected even if obtained or taken in
the course of custodial investigation.” Ho Wai Pang vs. People, 659 SCRA 624, G.R. No.
176229 October 19, 2011

24. Questioning by an Internal Affairs Manager of a Bank is NOT a Custodial Investigation

 The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt
obtained in violation of Section 12, Article III of the Constitution is applicable only in
custodial interrogation. Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law
enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his
freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation
is guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz.: (1) to
remain silent, (2) to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice,
and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. In the present case, while it is
undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly
discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not
initiated by a law enforcement authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the
bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of his liberty in any significant
manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking
of his written statement. Tanenggee vs. People, 699 SCRA 639, G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

25. There is Bail in Extradition Cases

If bail can be granted in deportation cases, it should also be allowed in extradition cases.
Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all,
both are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is
not in issue. Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction
must be viewed in the light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning
respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Government of Hong Kong
Special Administrative Region vs. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007

26. Habeas Data Requires a Nexus between Right to Privacy and Right to Life, Liberty, and
Security

The Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that his right to privacy in life,
liberty or security was or would be violated through the supposed reproduction and
threatened dissemination of the subject sex video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest
in the suppression of this video — which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or
be uploaded in the internet for public consumption — he failed to explain the connection
between such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed, courts
cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the rules and existing
jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually proving the nexus between
one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life, liberty or security are crucial in habeas data
cases, so much so that a failure on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition
dismissible, as in this case. Lee vs. Ilagan, 738 SCRA 59, G.R. No. 203254 October 8, 2014

27. A Foundling is Presumed to have the Nationality of the Country of Birth

The common thread of the UDHR, UNCRC and ICCPR is to obligate the Philippines to
grant nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless. This grant of nationality
must be at the time of birth, and it cannot be accomplished by the application of our present
naturalization laws. The principles found in two conventions, while yet unratified by the
Philippines, are generally accepted principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of
the 1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the Conflict of Nationality
Laws under which a foundling is presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,”
to wit: Article 14 - A child whose parents are both unknown shall have the nationality of the
country of birth. If the child’s parentage is established, its nationality shall be determined by
the rules applicable in cases where the parentage is known. A foundling is, until the
contrary is proved, presumed to have been born on the territory of the State in which it was
found. The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born of citizens of the
country where he is found, contained in Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on
the Reduction of Statelessness: Article 2 - A foundling found in the territory of a Contracting
State shall, in the absence of proof to the contrary, be considered to have been born within
 the territory of parents possessing the nationality of that State. PoeLlamanzares vs.
Commission on Elections, 786 SCRA 1, G.R. No. 221697, G.R. Nos. 221698-700 March 8, 2016

28. Condonation Doctrine is Bereft of Constitutional or Statutory Basis

The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary requirement of accountability
to the people at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official’s administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second
term of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected for a different term is fully absolved
of any administrative liability arising from an offense done during a prior term. In this
jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative offenses may be condoned by the President
in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v.
Orbos, 202 SCRA 844 (1991), to apply to administrative offenses.

Abandonment of Condonation Doctrine is Prospective The abandonment of the

condonation doctrine should be prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall form
part of the legal system of the Philippines. Unto this Court devolves the sole authority to
interpret what the Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. Carpio-Morales vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R.
Nos. 217126-27 November 10, 2015

29. Suspension as Preventive Measure vs. Suspension as Penalty

The distinction, by considering the purpose aspect of the suspensions, is readily cognizable
as they have different ends sought to be achieved. Preventive suspension is merely a
preventive measure, a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. The purpose of
the suspension order is to prevent the accused from using his position and the powers and
prerogatives of his office to influence potential witnesses or tamper with records which may
be vital in the prosecution of the case against him. If after such investigation, the charge is
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his suspension or
removal, then he is suspended, removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. Carpio-Morales
vs. Court of Appeals (Sixth Division), 774 SCRA 431, G.R. Nos. 217126-27 November 10,
2015

30. Second-Placer Rule Applies when the Winning Candidate is Disqualified due to Ineligibility

A void COC cannot produce any legal effect. Thus, the votes cast in favor of the ineligible
candidate are not considered at all in determining the winner of an election. Even when the
votes for the ineligible candidate are disregarded, the will of the electorate is still respected,
and even more so. The votes cast in favor of an ineligible candidate do not constitute the
sole and total expression of the sovereign voice. The votes cast in favor of eligible and
legitimate candidates form part of that voice and must also be respected. As in any contest,
elections are governed by rules that determine the qualifications and disqualifications of
those who are allowed to participate as players. When there are participants who turn out to
be ineligible, their victory is voided and the laurel is awarded to the next in rank who does
not possess any of the disqualifications nor lacks any of the qualifications set in the rules to
be eligible as candidates. Maquiling vs. Commission on Elections, 696 SCRA 420, G.R. No.
195649 April 16, 2013

31. Philippine Courts Can Assume Jurisdiction Over Acts Penalized under the Rome Statute

Persons who may have committed acts penalized under the Rome Statute can be prosecuted
and punished in the Philippines or in the US; or with the consent of the RP or the US, before
the International Criminal Court (ICC), assuming that all the formalities necessary to bind
both countries to the Rome Statute have been met. For perspective, what the Agreement
contextually prohibits is the surrender by either party of individuals to international
 tribunals, like the ICC, without the consent of the other party, which may desire to
prosecute the crime under its existing laws. There is nothing immoral or violative of
international law concepts in the act of the Philippines of assuming criminal jurisdiction
pursuant to the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement over an offense considered criminal by
both Philippine laws and the Rome Statute. Bayan Muna vs. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244, G.R.
No. 159618 February 1, 2011

32. Permanent Court Arbitration, South China Sea (SCS) Dispute Between Philippines and
People's Republic of China, October 29, 2015 and July 12, 2016.

On Jurisdiction:

1. China's non-participation does not deprive the Tribunal of jurisdiction.

2. The matters submitted to arbitration by the Philippines do not concern sovereignty.
3. The claims presented by the Philippines do not concern maritime delimitation, and,
therefore, not subject to the exception to the dispute settlement provisions of the
Convention. 4. None of the existing instruments to which Philippines and China are parties
to, which provide for other means of dispute settlement, prevent the Philippines from
bringing the present claims to arbitration.

On the Merits:

1. China's historic right claim (nine-dash line) has no legal basis. Maritime entitlements are
to be claimed only from baselines along the coast of continental land, island or rock above
water at high tide. All historic rights in Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Continental Shelf
(CS), and high seas were extinguished upon effectivity of UNCLOS. There is no evidence
existed that China historically exercised exclusive control over the waters of the SCS or their
resources.

2. None of the geologic figures (rocks and islands) in the Spratlys is capable of human
habitation or economic life of its own so as to be entitled to a 200 nautical miles (NM) EEZ;
therefore, there could be no overlap of EEZ with Palawan, so, the Tribunal hasjurisdiction to
rule on the maritime dispute. Spratlys cannot be taken as a single unit to determine
capability to sustain human habitation or economic life.

3. Mischief is within Philippine EEZ and part of CS. Thus, only Philippines can erect
structures or artificial islands on Mischief. China's structures are illegal. A rock above water
at high tide is land territory that generates a 12 NM territorial sea and territorial airspace
above the land and its territorial sea.

4. Scarborough Shoal is entitled to a 12 NM territorial sea only. It is a traditional fishing

ground of various fishermen from the region and China cannot prevent Filipino fishermen
from fishing.

5. China violated its obligations under UNCLOS for having dredged and built islands on
reefs and for failing to prevent its fishermen from harvesting endangered species like sea
turtles, corals and giant clams in the Spratlys and Scarborough Shoal causing permanent
and irreparable harm to the coral reef system.

33. The period of detention under the Senate's inherent power of contempt is not indefinite; BALAG vs.
SENATE

The Court finds that the period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only last until the termination
of the legislative inquiry under which the said power is invoked. In Arnault, it was stated
that obedience to its process may be enforced by the Senate Committee if the subject of
investigation before it was within the range of legitimate legislative inquiry and the
proposed testimony called relates to that subject. 52 Accordingly, as long as there is a
legitimate legislative inquiry, then the inherent power of contempt by the Senate may be
properly exercised. Conversely, once the said legislative inquiry concludes, the exercise of
 the inherent power of contempt ceases and there is no more genuine necessity to penalize
the detained witness.

When does legislative inquiry ends?

Further, the Court rules that the legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two
instances:

First, upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee Report. Sections 22 and 23 of
Senate Rules state:

Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days after the conclusion of the inquiry,
the Committee shall meet to begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its members. Concurring and
dissenting reports may likewise be made by the members who do not sign the majority
report within seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The number of
members who sign reports concurring in the conclusions of the Committee Report shall be
taken into account in determining whether the Report has been approved by a majority of
the members: Provided, That the vote of a member who submits both a concurring and
dissenting opinion shall not be considered as part of the majority unless he expressly
indicates his vote for the majority position.

The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting opinions, shall be filed with the
Secretary of the Senate, who shall include the same in the next Order of Business.

Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the Order of Business, shall be
referred to the Committee on Rules for assignment in the Calendar. (emphases supplied)

As gleaned above, the Senate Committee is required to issue a Committee Report after the
conduct of the legislative inquiry. The importance of the Committee Report is highlighted in
the Senate Rules because it mandates that the committee begin the consideration of its
Report within fifteen (15) days from the conclusion of the inquiry. The said Committee
Report shall then be approved by a majority vote of all its members; otherwise, it is
disapproved. The said Report shall be the subject matter of the next order of business, and it
shall be acted upon by the Senate. Evidently, the Committee Report is the culmination of the
legislative inquiry. Its approval or disapproval signifies the end of such legislative inquiry
and it is now up to the Senate whether or not to act upon the said Committee Report in the
succeeding order of business. At that point, the power of contempt simultaneously ceases
and the detained witness should be released. As the legislative inquiry ends, the basis for
the detention of the recalcitrant witness likewise ends.

Second, the legislative inquiry of the Senate also terminates upon the expiration of one
(1) Congress. As stated in Neri, all pending matters and proceedings, such as unpassed bills
and even legislative investigations, of the Senate are considered terminated upon the
expiration of that Congress and it is merely optional on the Senate of the succeeding
Congress to take up such unfinished matters, not in the same status, but as if presented for
the first time. Again, while the Senate is a continuing institution, its proceedings are
terminated upon the expiration of that Congress at the final adjournment of its last session.
Hence, as the legislative inquiry ends upon that expiration, the imprisonment of the
detained witnesses likewise ends.

34. Rational Relationship Test; Strict Scrutiny Test; To successfully invoke the exercise of
police power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the
imputation of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court―the rational
relationship test and the strict scrutiny test.—To successfully invoke the exercise of police
power as the rationale for the enactment of an ordinance and to free it from the imputation
of constitutional infirmity, two tests have been used by the Court―the rational relationship
test and the strict scrutiny test: We ourselves have often applied the rational basis test
 mainly in analysis of equal protection challenges. Using the rational basis examination, laws
or ordinances are upheld if they rationally further a legitimate governmental interest. Under
intermediate review, governmental interest is extensively examined and the availability of
less restrictive measures is considered. Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence
of compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on the absence of less
restrictive means for achieving that interest

35. Just Compensation; Just compensation has been defined as “the full and fair equivalent of
the property taken from its owner by the expropriator,” and that the gauge for computation
is not the taker’s gain but the owner’s loss.—Another vital requisite for a valid
condemnation is the payment of just compensation to the property owner. In the recent case
of APO Fruits Corporation v. The Honorable Court of Appeals, 514 SCRA 000 (2007), just
compensation has been defined as ―the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from
its owner by the expropriator,‖ and that the gauge for computation is not the taker‘s gain but
the owner‘s loss. In order for the payment to be ―just,‖ it must be real, substantial, full, and
ample. Not only must the payment be fair and correctly determined, but also, the Court in
Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Philippine Export Processing Zone, 349 SCRA 240 (2001), stressed that
the payment should be made within a ―reasonable time‖ from the taking of the property. It
succinctly explained that without prompt payment, compensation cannot be considered
―just‖ inasmuch as the property owner is being made to suffer the consequences of being
immediately deprived of the land while being made to wait for a decade or more before
actually receiving the amount necessary to cope with the loss. Thus, once just compensation
is finally determined, the expropriator must immediately pay the amount to the lot owner.
In Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 462 SCRA 265 (2005), it was ruled that 12% interest
per annum shall be imposed on the final compensation until paid. Thus, any further delay
in the payment will result in the imposition of 12% interest per annum. However, in the
recent case of Republic v. Lim, 462 SCRA 265 (2005), the Court enunciated the rule that
―where the government failed to pay just compensation within five (5) years from the
finality of the judgment in the expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to
recover possession of their property. (Barangay Sindalan, San Fernando, Pampanga vs. Court of
Appeals, 518 SCRA 649, G.R. No. 150640 March 22, 2007)

36. The true measure of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at
the time of the taking, when the loss resulted.—Just compensation due respondents-
movants in this case should, therefore, be fixed not as of the time of payment but at the time
of taking in 1940 which is Seventy Centavos (P0.70) per square meter, and not One
Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P1,500.00) per square meter, as valued by the RTC and CA.
While disparity in the above amounts is obvious and may appear inequitable to
respondents-movants as they would be receiving such outdated valuation after a very long
period, it should be noted that the purpose of just compensation is not to reward the owner
for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss thereof. As such, the true measure
of the property, as upheld by a plethora of cases, is the market value at the time of the
taking, when the loss resulted. Secretary of the Department of Public Works and Highways vs.
Tecson, 756 SCRA 389, G.R. No. 179334 April 21, 2015

[Nota Bene: Just compensation is to be ascertained as of the time of the taking, which usually
coincides with the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. Where the institution
of the action precedes entry into the property, the just compensation is to be ascertained as
of the time of the filing of the complaint . (City of Iloilo vs. Contreras-Besana, 612 SCRA 458
[2010]) cited in National Power Corporation vs. Saludares, 671 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 189127 April
25, 2012]

37. May prescription and laches be used to defeat an action for just compensation which was
filed 50 years after the date of taking? Sec. Of the DPWH vs. Sps. Tecson [Altho Atty. Buko
cited the case of Sps. Tecson, prescription was better discussed in the case of NPC vs. Sps.
Bernardo, 2012, Also, this is a ponencia of Chief Justice Sereno*wink*]
 The right to recover just compensation is enshrined in no less than our Bill of Rights,
which states in clear and categorical language that “[p]rivate property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation.” This constitutional mandate cannot be
defeated by statutory prescription. Thus, we have ruled that the prescriptive period under
Section 3 (i) of R.A. No. 6395 does not extend to an action to recover just compensation. It
would be a confiscatory act on the part of the government to take the property of
respondent spouses for a public purpose and deprive them of their right to just
compensation, solely because they failed to institute inverse condemnation proceedings
within five years from the time the transmission lines were constructed. To begin with, it
was not the duty of respondent spouses to demand for just compensation. Rather, it was the
duty of NAPOCOR to institute eminent domain proceedings before occupying their
property. In the normal course of events, before the expropriating power enters a private
property, it must first file an action for eminent domain and deposit with the authorized
government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property. Due to
its omission, however, respondents were constrained to file inverse condemnation
proceedings to demand the payment of just compensation before the trial court. We
therefore rule that NAPOCOR cannot invoke the statutory prescriptive period to defeat
respondent spouses‘ constitutional right to just compensation.

We have ruled that “when petitioner takes private property to construct transmission
lines, it is liable to pay the full market value upon proper determination by the courts.”
In National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1 (1991), the petitioner likewise
argued that it should only be made to pay easement fees instead of the full market value of
the land traversed by its transmission lines. In striking down its argument and ruling that
the property owners were entitled to the full market value of the land in question, we ruled:
x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only after a right-of-way easement, it nevertheless
perpetually deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as manifested by the imposition
by the plaintiff upon defendants that below said transmission lines no plant higher than
three (3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-tension current conveyed
through said transmission lines, danger to life and limbs that may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff only pays the fee to
defendants once, while the latter shall continually pay the taxes due on said affected portion
of their property. (National Power Corporation vs. Saludares, 671 SCRA 266, G.R. No. 189127
April 25, 2012)

38. Depreciated Replacement Cost Method; In the present case, we adopted the depreciated
replacement cost method as a guideline in the computation of just compensation; at the
same time, we reconciled this method with our duty to award just compensation as a
constitutional mandate to compensate the owner with his actual loss.—In the present case,
we adopted the depreciated replacement cost method as a guideline in the computation of
just compensation; at the same time, we reconciled this method with our duty to award just
compensation as a constitutional mandate to compensate the owner with his actual loss. In
our Decision, we compared the different replacement cost methods, such as the replacement
cost new method and the depreciated replacement cost method. Notably, these are
recognized methods in appraising properties. As we clearly explained, we did not adopt the
new replacement cost method because in doing so, PIATCO would be compensated for
more than it actually lost. We emphasize our ruling that “[i]njustice would result if we award
PIATCO just compensation based on the new replacement cost of the NAIA-IPT III, and disregard
the fact that the Republic expropriated a terminal that is not brand new; the NAIA-IPT III simply
does not have the full economic and functional utility of a brand new airport.” (Republic vs. Mupas,
790 SCRA 217, G.R. No. 181892, G.R. No. 209917, G.R. No. 209696, G.R. No. 209731 April 19,
2016)

39. Garbage Fee; The garbage fee is not a tax.—Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the
garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications, Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,
716 SCRA 677 (2014), the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts: In
Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that ―if the
generating of revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the
imposition is a tax; but if regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally
revenue is also obtained does not make the imposition a tax.‖ In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
 Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect of the imposition
determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such imposition
gives the presumption that the same is a tax. We accordingly say that the designation given
by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the imposition is properly a license
tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect of the imposition as
may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, ―[w]hen no police inspection,
supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or
that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business
designated, without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the
stipulated sum will issue, to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under
no guardian eye, but according to the unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and
licensee, the presumption is strong that the power of taxation, and not the police power, is being
exercised.

For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between
an occupant of a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized
housing project or apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by
these types of occupants is uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar
schedule of fee is both just and equitable. The rates being charged by the ordinance are
unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a condominium or socialized
housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in size; unlike
unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the
resident is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project. (Ferrer, Jr. vs. Bautista,
760 SCRA 652, G.R. No. 210551 June 30, 2015)

40. Just share of the LGU in the national revenues include ALL the taxes enumerated in the NIRC,
not merely, internal revenues. Although the power of Congress to make laws is plenary in
nature, congressional lawmaking remains subject to the limitations stated in the 1987
Constitution. The phrase national internal revenue taxes engrafted in Section 284 is
undoubtedly more restrictive than the term national taxes written in Section 6. As such,
Congress has actually departed from the letter of the 1987 Constitution stating that national
taxes should be the base from which the just share of the LGU comes. Such departure is
impermissible. Verba legis non est recedendum (from the words of a statute there should beno
departure). Equally impermissible is that Congress has also thereby curtailed the guarantee of
fiscal autonomy in favor of the LGUs under the 1987 Constitution. Taxes are the enforced
proportional contributions exacted by the State from persons and properties pursuant to its
sovereignty in order to support the Gove1nment and to defray all the public needs. Every tax
has three elements, namely: (a) it is an enforced proportional contribution from persons and
properties; (b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and (c) it is levied for the
support of the Government. Taxes are classified into national and local. National taxes are those
levied by the National Government, while local taxes are those levied by the LGUs. What the
phrase national internal revenue taxes as used in Section 284 included are all the taxes
enumerated in Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC), as amended by R.A.
No. 8424. (Mandanas, Governor of Batangas vs. Executive Secretary, 2018)

41. Constitutional Law; Criminal Procedure; Arrests; Land Transportation and Traffic Code
(R.A. No. 4136); Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general
procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the
confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter

42. In Knowles v. Iowa, the U.S. Supreme Court held that when a police officer stops a person for
speeding and correspondingly issues a citation instead of arresting the latter, this procedure
does not authorize the officer to conduct a full search of the car. The Court therein held that
there was no justification for a full-blown search when the officer does not arrest the
motorist. Instead, police officers may only conduct minimal intrusions, such as ordering the
motorist to alight from the car or doing a patdown.
43. Is a regulation mandating the opening of mail or correspondence of
prionsers/detainees violative of the constitutional right to privacy? Alejano vs. Cabuay,
Aug 25, 2005; XPN: Correspondences by counsel

Privacy of Communications and Correspondence; While letters containing confidential

communication between detainees and their lawyers enjoy a limited protection in that
prison officials can open and inspect the mail for contraband but could not read the
contents thereof without violating the inmates’ right to correspondence, letters that are
not of that nature could be read by prison officials.

44. Rule on Precautionary Hold Departure Order dated August 07 2018, Sec. 1, Sec. 4 Grounds
for issuance. - A precautionary hold departure order shall not issue except upon
determination by the judge, in whose court the application is filed, that probable cause
exists, and there is a high probability that respondent will depart from the Philippines to
evade arrest and prosecution of the crime against him or her. The judge shall personally
examine under oath or affirmation, in the form of searching questions and answers in
writing, the applicant and the witnesses he or she may produce on facts personally known
to them and attaching to the record their sworn statements.

If the judge finds that probable cause exists and there is high probability that respondent
will depart, he or she shall issue the PHDO and direct the Bureau of Immigration to hold
and prevent the departure of the respondent at any Philippine airport or ports. Otherwise,
the judge shall order the dismissal of the application.

45. A.M No 09-6-9-SC August 19 2009

The clear intent and precise language of the aforequoted provisions of the Rules of Court
indicate that only a natural party litigant may be regarded as an indigent litigant. The Good
Shepherd Foundation, Inc., being a corporation invested by the State with a juridical
personality separate and distinct from that of its members, is a juridical person. Among
others, it has the power to acquire and possess property of all kinds as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations
of their organization. As a juridical person, therefore, it cannot be accorded the exemption
from legal and filing fees granted to indigent litigants. That the Good Shepherd Foundation,
Inc. is working for indigent and underprivileged people is of no moment. Clearly, the
Constitution has explicitly premised the free access clause on a persons poverty, a condition
that only a natural person can suffer.

There are other reasons that warrant the rejection of the request for exemption in favor of a
juridical person. For one, extending the exemption to a juridical person on the ground that it
works for indigent and underprivileged people may be prone to abuse (even with the
imposition of rigid documentation requirements), particularly by corporations and entities
bent on circumventing the rule on payment of the fees. Also, the scrutiny of compliance
with the documentation requirements may prove too time-consuming and wasteful for the
courts.

46. How can a General Conference be called in the UN?

a GENERAL CONFERENCE may be called by majority vote of the general assembly and
any nine members of the security council for the purpose of reviewing the charter.
Amendments may be proposed by the vote of 2/3 of the members of the general assembly
and ratified accordance with their respective constitutional processes by the 2/3 of the
members of the U.N., including all the permanent members of the Security Council.

47. Admission in the UN?

Decision of 2/3 of those present and voting in the general assembly upon the
recommendation of at least nine (including all the permanent) members of the Security
Council

48. How about suspension?

 Effected by 2/3 of those present and voting in the general assembly upon favourable
recommendation of at least nine members of the Security Council including the permanent
members

The suspension may be lifted alone by the Security Council, also by a qualified majority
vote.

Suspended members will prevent it from participating in the meeting of the general
assembly or from being elected to or continuing to serve in the Security Council, the
economic and social council of the trusteeship council. National of the suspended members,
may however, continue serving in the Secretariat and the ICJ as they regarded as
international officials or civil servants acting for the Organization itself.

49. Expulsion?

2/3 vote of those present and voting in the general assembly, upon recommendation of a
qualified majority of the security Council, on grounds of persistently violating the principles
contained in the Charter.

50. Withdrawal? (Ito malakas. Current events?)

No provision on withdrawal from membership was includes in the Charter because of the fear
that it might encourage successive withdrawals that would weaken the organization.

A member might withdraw from the U.N if:

1. The organization was revealed to be unable to maintain peace or could do so only at the
expense of law and justice

2. The member’s right and obligations as such were changed by a charter amendment in
which it had not concurred or which it finds itself unable to accept

3. An amendment duly accepted by the necessary majority either in the general assembly
or in a general conference is not ratified

51. SUCCESSION OF GOVERNMENT

- Where the government replaces another either peacefully or by violent methods. In both
instances, the integrity of the state is not affected; the state continues as the same
international person except only that its lawful representative is changed.

- The rights of the predecessor government are concerned; they are inherited in too by the
successor government.

- Where the new government was organized by virtue of a constitutional reform duly
ratified in plebiscite, the obligations of the replaced government are completely by the
former.

- Where the new government was established through violence as by a revolution, it may
lawfully reject the purely personal or political obligations of the predecessor
government but not contracted by it in the ordinary course of official business.

52. 2 REQUISITES OF A VALID DISCOVERY AND OCCUPATION

1. Possession
2. Administration

➢ Possession must be claimed on behalf of the state. Be effected through a formal

proclamation and the symbolic act of raising the national flag in the territory.
 ➢ Mere possession will not suffice

53. ISLAND OF PALMAS CASE

➢ Discovery alone, without any subsequent act, cannot at the present time suffice to prove
sovereignty of Island of Palmas.
➢ An inchoate title could not prevail over the continuous and peaceful display of authority
by another state for such display may prevail even over a prior, definitive title put forward
by another state.

54. SUBJUGATION – Territory is deemed acquired by subjugation when, having been previously
conquered or occupied in the course of war by the enemy, it is formally annexed to it at the end
of that war.

Conquest alone confers only an inchoate right on the occupying state; it is the formal act of
annexation that completes the acquisition.

55. DOCTRINE OF INDELIBLE ALLEGIANCE – an individual may be compelled to retain his

original nationality notwithstanding that he has already renounced or forfeited it under the
laws of a second state whose nationality he has acquired

a state may allow any of its nationals to remain as such even if he may have acquired another
nationality as where he is conferred an honorary citizenship by a foreign government

56. THE DOCTRINE OF STATE RESPONSIBILITY

* instances when an alien can claim a more favored position than the national of the local
state and hold the state liable for injuries committed against him while within its territory

* a state may be held responsible for:

a. international deliquency

b. directly or indirectly imputable to it

c. which causes injury to the natonal of another state

57.

DEPORTATION EXTRADITION

Unilateral act if the Effected at the request

local state of the state of origin

Based on causes arising Based on offenses

in the local state generally committed in
the state of origin

Undesirable alien may Calls for the return of

be deported to a state the fugitive to the
other than his own or state of origin
the state of origin
ALL THE BEST ATTORNEYS!

PATAY KUNG PATAY!