JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 18, 56-67 (1982)

The Self-Serving Attributional Bias: Beyond Self-Presentation

JEFF GREENBERG

University of Kansas

TOM PYSZCZYNSKI

Montana State University

AND

SHELDON SOLOMON

Skidmore College

Received September II, 1980

An experiment was conducted to provide empirical support for the notion that
asymmetrical causal attributions for favorable and unfavorable outcomes result
from a self-serving attributional bias that occurs independently of self-presen-
tational concerns. Subjects did either well or poorly on an ego-involving test for
which their performance, attributions, and evaluations of the test were either
public or private. A pattern of self-serving responses for subjects’ attributions
and evaluations of the test was found in the private conditions, thus providing
evidence of the influence of outcome favorability on individuals’ perceptions of
causality. Theoretical and practical implications of these finding are discussed
and suggestions for future research are offered.

A number of theorists (e.g., Adler, 1956; Allport, 1937; Heider, 1958)

have suggested that there may be a self-serving bias in causal attribution
for personal outcomes that results from a motive to protect and/or en-
hance one’s private self-image. Miller and Ross (1975) have also sug-
gested a number of information processing mechanisms that may lead
to a self-serving pattern of private attributions for favorable and unfa-
vorable outcomes. Many studies have supported the notion of a self-
serving bias in causal attribution for positive and negative outcomes by

The authors wish to thank Jack Brehm, Ray Petty, and Lynne Steinberg for their helpful
comments on an earlier version of this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to the
first author at the Department of Psychology. University of Kansas, Lawrence, KS 66045.

56
0022-1031/82/010056-12$02.00/O
Copyright @ 1982 by Academic Press, Inc.
All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
 SELF-SERVING PRIVATE ATTRIBUTIONS 57

demonstrating that individuals tend to attribute more responsibility to

the self for favorable outcomes than for unfavorable outcomes (e.g.,
Miller, 1976; Snyder, Stephan, & Rosenfield, 1976).
However, all demonstrations of the self-serving bias to date have in-
volved public knowledge of both the participants’ performance outcomes
and their attributions (Bradley, 1978). Consequently, Bradley (1978),
Miller (1978), and Weary (1979) have suggested that the findings of the
self-serving attributional bias may reflect a desire to protect or enhance
one’s public image rather than a distortion in private causal attribution.
Subsequent investigations (Weary, 1980; Arkin, Appelmen, & Burger,
1980; House, 1980) have found that a self-presentational motive may
indeed influence participants’ descriptions of the factors responsible for
successful and unsuccessful outcomes. Thus, although recent research
on an attributional bias due to self-presentational concerns has been
fruitful, the hypothesis that there is a self-serving attributional bias in
the absence of such self-presentational concerns remains untested. The
purpose of the present study is to demonstrate such a bias.
Since many of the attributions individuals make (especially for im-
portant personal outcomes) may be private and not expressed to others,
it is important to determine if the asymmetry in causal attribution for
positive and negative outcomes occurs independent of self-presentational
concerns. Indeed, because of such concerns, the attributions individuals
express to others for public outcomes may differ from the causal attri-
butions that are truly believed (cf. Miller, 1978). Thus, all previous studies
demonstrating an asymmetry in causal attribution may reflect a self-
presentational bias in descriptions of causality rather than an intrapsychic
bias in perceptions of causality. Differentiating between these two phe-
nomena may have both theoretical and practical implications.
Most major theoretical models of the attribution process (e.g., Heider,
1958; Jones & Davis, 1965; Kelley, 1967) are concerned with one’s private
perceptions of causality. Although most attribution theorists characterize
attribution as a rational inferential process, the possibility of self-serving
biases has also been suggested. Thus a demonstration of a self-serving
bias in private perceptions of causality would be quite pertinent to such
models of the attribution process.
The existence of a self-serving bias in perceptions of causality would
also have important practical implications. It has recently been suggested
that the nature of an individual’s private self-referent attributions may
play an important role in depression (Abramson, Seligman, & Teasdale,
1978; Beck, 1967) and achievement motivation deficits in females (Dweck,
Goetz, & Straus, 1980). In addition, if individuals make self-serving
attributions that are truly believed and not merely public descriptions,
such distorted perceptions of causality may hamper an individual’s future
achievement strivings and social relationships (Bowerman, 1978). It may
58 GREENBERG, PYSZCZYNSKI, AND SOLOMON

be adaptive to one to use clever external attributions for public failure

when talking with others; however, the attainment for future success
requires an accurate assessment of the causes of failure, especially pos-
sible internal causes. If individuals tend to attribute failures to external
causes, they may overlook plausible internal factors and thus not have
the knowledge necessary to improve performance in the future.
The present study was designed to investigate the possibility that the
asymmetry in causal attribution for favorable and unfavorable outcomes
occurs independently of any bias resulting from self-presentational con-
cerns. Thus, participants did either better or worse than average on an
ego-involving task for which both their performance and their attributions
were either public or private. A pattern of self-serving attributions in the
private conditions would provide evidence that the asymmetry in causal
attribution for favorable and unfavorable outcomes occurs independent
of self-presentational concerns.
METHOD
Subjects
Fifty-six male undergraduates participated in partial fulfillment of an introductory psy-
chology course requirement. Subjects participated in groups ranging in size from two to
six individuals and were randomly assigned to conditions in a 2 (performance outcome:
favorable vs unfavorable) x 2 (performance publicity: public vs private) factorial design.
Two participants guessed our hypothesis and were dropped. Eight other participants were
dropped because they expressed suspicion with regard to the veracity of the performance
feedback.’ These subjects were distributed approximately equally among conditions.

Procedure
Upon arriving for the study, subjects were told that they would be participating in one
of a series of studies investigating students’ evaluations of standardized personality and
intelligence tests. They were told that in this particular study they would be given a sample
of a standardized intelligence test, known as the “Culture Fair Test of g,” and then be

’ Two of these eight participants finished the test early, looked at the back of the answer
sheets and saw that all the responses for a given problem were marked either correct or
incorrect; three participants finished the test early and while searching for the correct
answers to problems they had answered incorrectly found out that all the choices for a
given problem were marked either correct or incorrect; the other three suspicious partic-
ipants chose more than one answer as they proceeded through the problems and so also
found out that all the choices for a given problem were marked either correct or incorrect.
No other participants expressed any suspicion with regard to the veracity of the perfor-
mance feedback. Although the suspicion rate was rather high, the major determinant of
suspicion was quite simply whether or not a participant found out that all the responses
for a given problem were marked either correct or incorrect. Individuals who did find this
out were quite willing to express their knowledge; individuals who did not find out tended
to evince obvious surprise when the false nature of the feedback was revealed and even
after the deception had been revealed reported no prior doubts about the performance
feedback. Thus we believe that the participants we included in our analyses accepted the
feedback as veridical.
 SELF-SERVING PRIVATE ATTRIBUTIONS 59

asked to give their reactions to an evaluation of the test. It was explained that in order
to standardize testing conditions, all instructions for the test would be written (the use of
written instructions allowed the experimenter to remain blind to conditions). The exper-
imenter then handed subjects a booklet containing the test, an answer sheet, instructions
for the test, a test evaluation questionnaire, and a Psychology Department Survey of
students’ reactions to various aspects of psychology studies. Subjects were then given 10
min to read through the instructions.
The written instructions gave a brief description of the background and use of the test
in order to insure that subjects would become actively involved in taking the test. Spe-
cifically, subjects read that (1) the test was designed by the Institute for Personality and
Ability Testing and had been used extensively in business and educational settings; (2)
because the test utilized abstract symbols rather than words, it measured pure intelligence
and reasoning abilities; (3) these abilities are basic to complex problem solving and creative
thinking; and (4) the test had been found to be an excellent predictor of both academic
and financial success.
The actual test used in the study consisted of 20 multiple-choice problems for the Test
of “g”: Culture Fair (Cattell & Catell, 1960) that required subjects to perceive a relationship
among abstract symbols. Each of four pages consisted of an example followed by five
problems. Subjects were to use the relationship demonstrated in the example at the top
of each page to answer the questions on that page. Although subjects were told that they
would have 10 min to work on the test, they were allowed as much time as necessary to
complete all of the problems. The longest time required by any subject was 14 min.

Publicity Manipulation
The manipulation of performance publicity, or the experimenter’s knowledge of subjects’
scores on the test, was made possible through the use of self-scoring answer sheets that
gave subjects immediate feedback regarding their performance. Subjects responded to the
test questions by peeling off one of five dots from an answer sheet corresponding to one
of five response choice in the test booklet. Subjects were told that if they answered an
item correctly, they would find a “c” beneath the dot. If they answered incorrectly,
however, they would find an “x” beneath the dot. In fact, all responses for each question
were keyed either correct or incorrect, and all subjects consequently found that they had
answered 12 of the 20 questions “correctly.“’
In the private performance condition, subjects were told that the experimenter was not
interested in their performance on the test, and that he would therefore not collect their
answer sheets or record their scores. Subjects in this condition were explicitly instructed
not to put their names on their answer sheets and to fold them and put them somewhere
out of the experimenter’s sight when they were finished with the test. Subjects in the
public performance condition were told to put their names on their answer sheets and
questionnaires, which would subsequently be collected and scored by the experimenter.
Furthermore, in the private performance condition the test evaluation questionnaire (which
contained most of the dependent measures) was accompanied by a cover sheet that asked
subjects to count the number of problems they answered correctly and assured them that
their responses would be anonymous. In the public performance condition, subjects were
asked to write down the number of problems they answered correctly and to write their
names on the test evaluation questionnaire.
’ The test questions were sufficiently ambiguous to allow this type of false feedback.
Additionally, subjects who did well on the test experienced the same pattern of correct
and incorrect responses as the participants who did poorly. A pattern of self-serving
attributions would therefore rule out a plausible nonmotivational explanation for these
findings in similar studies, which is that perceived response-outcome covariation is more
likely for increasing success than for constant failure.
60 GREENBERG, PYSZCZYNSKI, AND SOLOMON

Outcome Manipulation
The manipulation of performance outcome was contained in the cover sheet for the test
evaluation questionnaire. Subjects read that the average performance for college students
was either 8 (success) or 16 (failure) correct responses for 20 problems. Since all subjects
obtained 12 correct answers on the test, their scores were 4 points above or below average.
The test evaluation questionnaire contained all but one of the primary dependent mea-
sures for the study. Subjects were asked to indicate on 9-point scales (1 = not at all, 9
= extremely) the extent to which their ability, the amount of effort they put into taking
the test, the ease or difficulty of the test, and luck were responsible for their performance.
Subjects were also asked to indicate how difficult, fair, and valid they perceived the test
to be, and how clear the instructions for the test were.
After completing this questionnaire, subjects filled out a Department of Psychology
Survey of students’ reactions to tests. This contained checks on the performance publicity
and outcome manipulations. In order to maintain the experimenter’s ignorance of subjects’
performance in the private condition, subjects were told that this questionnaire was for
the purpose of obtaining information on students’ feelings about psychology experiments
(and tests they may entail) and that the experimenter would not see their responses. To
reinforce this point, subjects were instructed to fold their departmental questionnaires
when they had finished them and to put them in a large psychology department box which
contained other such questionnaires. Only by placing a small unique mark on the back of
all of each subject’s forms were we able to match the latter questionnaire with the other
materials.
As a check on the publicity manipulation, subjects were asked whether or not the
experimenter would have knowledge of their performance on the test. This was a dichot-
omous measure that subjects responded to by circling either yes or no. The performance
outcome manipulation was checked by a question that asked subjects to indicate on a 9-
point scale (1 = not at all well, 9 = extremely well) how well they did on the test. This
questionnaire also contained questions concerning subjects’ affective reactions to the study,
i.e., how enjoyable and interesting the study was for them; and the final dependent measure,
how important it was for them to do well on the test. These questions. and the questions
concerning the clarity of the test instructions, and the fairness and the validity of the test.
were included because they, as well as the typical attribution measures, may be subject
to distortions resulting from self-serving motives.
At this point the experiment was concluded. Subjects were completely debriefed and
thanked for their participation.

RESULTS
Manipulation Checks
Performance publicity. Subjects responded yes or no to the question,
“Will the experimenter have knowledge of your performance on the
test?” Twenty-one of twenty-three subjects answered yes in the public
conditions, and 17 of 23 subjects answered no in the private conditions.
In order to provide a more stringent examination of public and private
attributions, subsequent analyses were performed using only those sub-
jects who responded appropriately to this question. However, it should
be noted that the identical pattern of significant main effects would be
obtained if all of the subjects were included in the analyses.
Performance outcome. Subjects responded to a question about how
well they did on the test on a 9-point scale (1 = not at all well, 9 =
 SELF-SERVING PRIVATE ATTRIBUTIONS 61

extremely well). A 2 (favorable outcome, unfavorable outcome) x 2

(public, private) analysis of variance subsequently revealed only a main
effect for performance outcome (F(1, 34) = 62.86, p < .OOOl). Subjects
in the favorable outcome conditions reported doing better on the test
than subjects in the unfavorable outcome conditions (M’s = 7.00 and
3.89, respectively). Participants who did well also found the study more
enjoyable and more interesting than did participants who did poorly,
means of 6.58 and 4.89, respectively, F(1, 34) = 6.21, p < .02, for
enjoyable and means of 6.84 and 5.1 I, respectively, F(1, 34) = 6.98,
p < .02, for interesting. Thus, the outcome manipulation clearly had
affective significance for the participants.
Dependent Measures
A 2 (favorable outcome, unfavorable outcome) x 2 (public, private)
multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was performed using nine
of the questionnaire items as dependent measures. A significant multi-
variate effect was found for performance outcome (F(9, 26) = 2.41, p
< .04). The group means for each of the individuals items, along with
their respective univariate F’s and significance levels, are reported in
Table 1. Significant univariate effects for performance outcome were
found for seven of the measures. The results for each of these measures
supported the hypothesis that a self-serving bias affects attributions and
perceptions for private as well as public performances. Greater ability
and effort attributions were made in the positive outcome conditions,
while greater attributions to luck were made in the negative outcome
conditions. Additionally, the instructions were rated as clearer, and the
test as fairer and more valid in the success conditions. Finally, subjects
reported that it was more important to do well when they did well than
when they did poorly.3
Planned comparisons using pairwise t tests (utilizing the overall error
term from the appropriate univariate analysis of variance) comparing the

3 Contrary to expectations, no differences were found between positive and negative

outcome conditions for task difficulty attributions and subjects' ratings of how difficult the
test was. Two characteristics of this particular study may help to explain the lack of
differences on these measures. First, all subjects got 8 of the 20 problems wrong; con-
sequently, those in the favorable outcome conditions may have invoked task difficulty as
an explanation for those mistakes. Second, given that subjects in the unfavorable outcome
conditions were told that the average student got 16 of the problems correct, it may have
been implausible for them to use the difficulty of the test as an explanation for their poor
performance. Furthermore, admitting that the difficulty of an intelligence test (which others
did well on) caused a poor performance may not be particularly soothing to one’s ego.
Alternatively, the nearly identical ratings by positive and negative outcome subjects may
reflect different egotistical perceptions. While rating the test as difficult may provide a
partial excuse for unfavorable outcome subjects, it may also provide favorable outcome
subjects with an opportunity to feel particularly good about their performance.
 TABLE I
GROUP MEANS OF DEPENDENT MEASURES”

Private Public
2
Unfavorable Favorable Unfavorable Favorable
outcome outcome outcome outcome 3
Question (N = 9) (N = 8) (N = 10) (N = 11) F(1, 34) MS, p < E
6
To what extent was your ability responsible for
your performance on the test? 4.33 7.50 5.90 6.82 12.18 2.96 .0014 3
To what extent was the amount of effort you R
put into taking the test responsible for your
performance? 4.56 7.25 5.90 6.82 9.35 3.07 .0044 2z
To what extent was the ease or dimculty of the
test responsible for your performance? 6.00 6.63 6.30 6.73 0.81 3.24 .3738 E
To what extent was luck responsible for your
%
performance on the test? 4.33 2.25 3.60 2.54 5.13 4.31 .0300 tJ
How difficult was the test? 6.11 6.00 6.50 6.18 0.20 2.09 .6564
8.25 6.91 4.60 “0
How clear were the instructions for the test? 5.33 6.00 6.61 .0147
How fair was the test? 4.89 7.13 5.70 6.55 4.99 4.14 .0322 5
How valid do you believe the test to be? 2.44 5.63 4.10 5.91 14.98 3.88 .0005
If tests were used, how important was it for
you to do well? 2.56 6.63 5.90 6.00 6.77 5.32 .0137
--
’ F values are reported for the performance outcome main effect for each measure.
 SELF-SERVING PRIVATE ATTRIBUTIONS 63

means for positive and negative outcomes within the public and private
conditions found significant (p < .05) differences between favorable and
unfavorable outcomes on all of the measures in the private condition,
but only for the validity of the test in the public condition. This suggests
that subjects’ judgments were more self-serving in the private than in
the public conditions. Significant interactions reflecting this tendency
were found for ability attributions (F(1, 34) = 4.00, p < .02), and for
the importance of doing well on the test (F(1, 34) = 6.93, p < 0.02).
DISCUSSION
The present investigation demonstrated asymmetrical causal attribu-
tions for favorable and unfavorable outcomes even when there was no
public knowledge of participants’ performance. These findings are par-
ticularly important because they cannot be explained by a self-presen-
tational motive and thus, provide empirical support for the notion that
there is a self-serving bias in individuals’ perceptions of causality.
One important question concerns whether a motivational model or an
information-processing model best accounts for the results of this study.
While this experiment certainly does not provide a definitive test between
these two types of explanation, certain aspects of our procedure reduce
the likelihood of an information-processing explanation of these findings.
In the study private favorable and unfavorable outcome experiences were
identical; the favorability was varied merely by providing normative
information after performance that suggested either a performance above
average or a performance below average. Therefore the most plausible
of Miller and Ross’ (1975) nonmotivational explanations of self-serving
attributions, that response-outcome covariation is more likely for in-
creasing success than for constant failure, is untenable. As Bradley (1978)
and Zuckerman (1979) have persuasively argued, the nonmotivational
explanation that success is expected and that expected events are at-
tributed to internal factors lacks both empirical support and theoretical
rationale. Miller and Ross also suggested that since favorable outcomes
are intended and individuals are most likely to perceive contingency
between their actions and intended outcome, such outcomes are partic-
ularly likely to be attributed to internal factors. However, this idea may
not pertain to our results since, in the absence of normative data or a
criterion for success prior to performance, all of the participants must
have intended simply to answer as many of the 20 problems correctly
as possible; thus, all participants perceived attaining the outcome they
intended, i.e., answering the problems correctly, for 12 out of the 20
problems. It is possible, however, that after participants found that they
had done relatively well, when confronted by the attribution questions,
they retrospectively focused on the problems they had answered cor-
rectly more so than did participants who found out they had done rather
poorly. This recall bias, combined with the Miller and Ross notion that
64 GREENBERG, PYSZCZYNSKI, AND SOLOMON

individuals tend to perceive contingency between their actions and in-

tended outcomes, could explain the greater internal attribution by fa-
vorable outcome participants.4 The plausibility of this explanation de-
pends in part on the extent to which participants had already made
attributions as they proceeded through the test, before they were given
normative information. Also, it is not clear why differential recall of such
a recent experience (the questionnaire directly followed the test perfor-
mance) would occur. Clearly the notion of a motive to protect and/or
enhance private self-image provides the most parsimonious explanation
of our results for the attribution questions. Furthermore, our findings for
ratings of the clarity of the test instruction, the validity and fairness of
the test, and the importance of doing well on the test are also most easily
explained by such a motivational bias. Thus, although all plausible non-
motivational explanations cannot be ruled out, we believe that by con-
fronting participants with their scores on an intelligence test, the present
study elicited a pervasive motivated distortion of causal perceptions that
provided an intrapsychic service independent of an impression manage-
ment function.
Of course, the assertion that we have demonstrated the self-serving
pattern of attributions in the absence of self-presentational concerns is
based on the belief that the participants in the private conditions truly
believed their performances were private. We are particularly confident
that these participants did indeed believe that only they could know how
they did on the test because of the procedure used in the present study.
Each participant scored his own test and then put his answer sheets
away in a pocket or notebook. Thus, by having participants actively
ensure the privacy of their own performances, the study allowed no
plausible way for anyone else to know how they did on the test. The
manipulation check and debriefings support our belief that this procedure
effectively convinced the private participants that their performances
were private.
The small effect public scrutiny did have on participants’ responses
was to reduce the self-flattering nature of individuals’ attributions, an
effect that has been suggested by Bradley (1978) and Arkin et al. (1980).
Indeed a number of studies that involved public performances have ac-
tually found counterdefensive attributions (e.g., Beckman, 1970; Feather
& Simon, 1971; Ross, Bierbrauer, & Polly, 1974). Tetlock (Note 1) has
recently demonstrated that individuals who make self-serving attributions
may be evaluated more negatively by others than people who make
counterdefensive (i.e., modest) attributions. Thus, for public perfor-
mances and attributions, individuals may sometimes decide that to pre-
sent a good public image they should be modest in their public self-

a This explanation was brought to our attention by an anonymous reviewer.

 SELF-SERVING PRIVATE ATTRIBUTIONS 65

referent attributions. In the present context, people in the public failure

condition may have refrained from denying responsibility for failure and
derogating the test because they did not want to appear to be simply
“making excuses” for their poor performance. While this explanation
is admittedly speculative, the pattern of cell means for the dependent
measures does suggest that public unfavorable outcome participants en-
gaged in less denial of responsibility and derogation of the test than
private unfavorable outcome participants did. Clearly public scrutiny
may have important effects on public and/or private judgments of caus-
ality; hopefully future research will better our understanding of the de-
terminants of when public scrutiny inhibits or facilitates self-flattering
attributions. Subsequent study may also distinguish between the effects
of public scrutiny on public descriptions of causality and its potential
influence on private perceptions of causality. For example, given a finding
of less self-flattering attributions in public, it is possible that rather than
simply self-presenting in a humble manner, individuals may actually be
more self-critical in their attributions.
We believe that the findings of this study reflect a pervasive phenom-
enon and that many of the previous studies that entailed ego-involving
outcomes and found the self-serving pattern of attributions (e.g., Miller,
1976; Snyder et al., 1976) may have also elicited this bias. The general
effects of this bias may be best understood within the framework provided
by Bowerman’s theory of subjective competence (Bowerman, 1978).
Bowerman posits that subjective competence consists of a configuration
of self-referent causal attributions and affective reactions that reflect the
individual’s perception of his/her competence with respect to a given
behavior. Thus, ego enhancement or defense can be accomplished not
only by altering perceptions of responsibility for outcomes, but also by
altering perceptions of the affective significance of such outcomes. In-
deed, in the present study, participants not only altered their causal
attributions, but also altered their judgments of the validity of the test
and the importance of doing well on the test.
The present results suggest that one’s private self-referent causal at-
tributions may vary as a function of the favorability of one’s outcomes.
Thus, individuals may not accurately assess important characteristics of
their social and physical world. Inaccurate appraisals of one’s environ-
ment (e.g., the fairness of the test) are likely to inhibit one’s attempts
to maximize the favorability of future outcomes by obscuring the true
causes of past failures. For example, a person who has trouble making
friends may perceive that other people are uncaring, strange, “stuck
UP,” or not worthy of him/her, and thus develop negative feelings toward
others, which will further hamper his/her social interactions. Such ex-
ternal attributions may preclude the individual from considering the pos-
sibility that something about him/herself may be responsible for the prob-
66 GREENBERG, PYSZCZYNSKI, AND SOLOMON

lem, which may be the first step toward remedying it. A similar type of
exacerbation cycle may also inhibit improvement in achievement settings.
Besides blocking an individual’s path to future improvement, asym-
metrical private attributions may also seriously undermine social under-
standing. In social relationships such as marriages, each partner may
make causal attributions that are not expressed to each other concerning
a variety of problems (e.g., why things aren’t going well sexually or
socially, why the children are spoiled, why they never have any money,
etc.). The present findings suggest that the partners will make quite
different private attributions for these problems. Eventually the partner’s
perceptions of the relationship may become so divergent that an insur-
mountable rift develops by the time the couple begins talking openly
about the causes of their problems. This process could inhibit under-
standing between team members, co-workers, and ethnic groups as well.
Given the implications of this asymmetry in private self-referent at-
tribution, it is important that we progress toward understanding the
causes of this phenomenon. Although researchers have examined some
personality variables that may affect the occurrence of the self-serving
bias, for example, self-esteem (Fitch, 1970; Levine & Uleman, 1979) and
depression (Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978), these studies involved public
performances and attributions. Hopefully future research that is careful
in distinguishing between public and private attributions will further our
understanding of the determinants and consequences of this subtle mode
of self-aggrandizement.

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REFERENCE NOTE
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