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Revolution

Uri Gordon

Unlike axial core concepts such as freedom or direct action, revolution does not name a value or a
principle. In all its different decontestations by anarchists, Marxists, feminists and fascists, it is a
descriptive concept applying to a manner of social change. The term thus occupies a location in its
host ideologies’ conceptual arrangements equivalent to that of reform in social democracy and
stability in conservatism. Although not by itself axial, revolution nevertheless retains the value-
orientation characteristic of ideological language, since its decontestation depends on co-
interpretation with the other concepts which make up the host ideology. As we shall see throughout
this chapter, anarchists’ visions of revolution have indeed been expressed in explicit engagement
with other core concepts such as direct action, prefiguration, freedom and equality, as well as with
adjacent and peripheral ones such as power, reform and attack.

Revolution clearly fits the description of an essentially contested concept. The endless and
irresolvable struggle over its meaning is integral to real-world political contention, as competing
ideologies shape and place it coherently within their own conceptual arrangements. This happens
whether these ideologies are proponents of revolution (and thus employ it as a core concept) or
ones that employ the term peripherally as a foil to their own programmes. Despite such struggles,
however, essentially contested concepts do contain an ineliminable component, not in the sense of a
philosophically sound definition but “in the sense that an empirically ascertainable cultural
commonality ascribes to [it] some minimal element … a generally shared and therefore de facto
conventionally constant or stable feature” (Freeden 1996, 63). This ineliminable component cannot,
however, by itself sustain the concept in the richness and specificity necessary for its deployment in
an ideological structure. To this end, concepts rely on the specification of quasi-contingent meanings,
generated in the concept’s contextualisation among other logically and culturally adjacent ones, also
decontested in ways specific to the ideology.

I would like to argue that one ineliminable component of the concept of revolution, captured in the
metaphor of revolving motion, is that of deep social and/or political change – a thing replaced by its
opposite. One military junta taking over from another amid street-fighting between their loyalist
forces is not normally considered a revolution; the term indicates significant change in the nature of
power arrangements, not only in the positions occupied within them. Another ineliminable
component, at least in terms of political ideology, is that of rapid change. While the agricultural and
industrial revolutions are commonly (and thus “legitimately”) referred to as such, the term as it
concerns us here clearly refers to a much briefer period of more or less violent mass mobilisation.
The archetypical revolutions informing common usage remain the English, American, and various
French and Russian revolutions, each of which peaked over a decade or two. Both of these
ineliminable components appear to extend beyond political usage to revolutions in science and art.

What the ineliminable component cannot account for, however, is (a) the nature of the change
achieved; and (b) the circumstances of revolution itself – its participants, undertakings, duration and
aftermath. This is where the abovementioned co-interpretation comes into play, as strategies for
social change are articulated within conceptual configurations that are mostly made up of values and
principles. These attach revolution to particular goals, as well as informing every ideology’s account
of what revolution should involve as an undertaking. Anarchist accounts are distinctive in rejecting
mediation between mass grassroots action and revolutionary goals through vertical institutions, and
thus the seizure of state power – whether by elections or a coup d’état. Articulated during mass
uprisings and through transnational political agitation and mutual aid projects, such accounts have
instead called for abolishing the state along with social classes and all regimes of domination and
inequality.

Note that with the concept of revolution, its binding to a wider conceptual configuration does not
mean that competing accounts become alien to the ideology’s vocabulary. Neither anarchists nor
proponents of any other ideology featuring revolution as a core concept are likely to think that the
Cuban or Iranian revolutions simply do not merit the designation. Decontestation here does not
function in the same way as with axial concepts such as equality, whose meanings are fixed to the
exclusion of other ideologies’ accounts. Instead, what is decontested is the concept of successful
revolution in terms of achieving the ideology’s aims. Each revolutionary ideology thus contains, not
an exclusive concept of revolution, but a nomenclature, in which the preferred account is placed in
the core while others continue to be employed peripherally, often for the purpose of distinction and
demarcation.

This is especially pronounced with anarchist ideology, where the core concept of revolution
developed from the start in explicit opposition to statist forms of socialism. . In this context, two
distinctions have been perennial: between revolution and reform, and between political revolution
and social revolution. The first distinction decontests revolution in terms of the circumstances of
social change (rapid rather than gradual), its location (outside and as-against dominant institutions,
rather than from within them), and its radical depth (abolition rather than amelioration of systemic
inequalities). The second distinction continues to regard the depth of social change – a
transformation of social structures (with abolition of the state, class, race, gender etc. as its
asymptote) rather than a revolution merely in the political structures of the state. Furthermore, the
distinction between political and social revolution orients anarchism towards certain accounts of
revolutionary agency, specifically to the exclusion of vanguardist programmes for the seizure of state
power. The archetypical “political revolution” in anarchist discourse remains the October Revolution.
The term thus hyperlinks to the entire substance of opposition between anarchism and Leninism,
and stands at the background of intra-anarchist tensions around the role of the anarchist minority
ahead of and during revolutions.

While these distinctions, explored in the following two sections, mark anarchism off from its
competitors on the left, the concept of revolution has also been significantly “re-contested” within
anarchist ideology in past decades. The rising influence of post-structuralist, intersectional, and
queer analyses, with their emphasis on the dislocation of oppressive power, has moved the concept
away from associations with finality and beyond circumscription within the abolition of formal
institutions. These themes, and some of the debates they have raised, are discussed in the final
section.

Revolution vs. Reform

First-order decontestations of revolution emerge most sharply in juxtaposition to reform: revolution


is radical rather than moderate, rapid rather than gradual, and emerges from without and as-against
dominant social arrangements rather than from within and in cooperation with them. In this context
reform tends to be decontested as incremental change brought about through the provisions of
existing power structures, typically the state. It involves anything from constitutional to regulatory
change driven by one or more branches of government. In modern capitalist democracies, reformist
measures can include petitions for legislation or court action, the promotion of electoral candidates,
and engagement between organised labour and employers.

If the metaphor of revolving motion points to the extent of social change, then revolution signals the
undoing of a social order rather than its incremental alteration. Pyotr Kropotkin (1886, 2) thus
decontests revolution as “a rapid modification of outgrown economic and political institutions, an
overthrow of the injustices accumulated by centuries past, a displacement of wealth and political
power.” For anarchists, the radical depth of social revolution points beyond an amelioration of
classed, racialised, gendered and other hierarchies – typically through the state – and towards their
abolition along with it.

The rapid rather than gradual nature of revolution is also taken for granted in most anarchist political
language. Mikhail Bakunin (1866) wrote of “a universal, worldwide revolution” involving “the
simultaneous revolutionary alliance and action of all the people of the civilized world;” whereas
Kropotkin (1886), while warning that revolution “is not the work of one day”, also clearly has a
limited time-frame in mind:

It means a whole period, mostly lasting for several years, during which the country is in
a state of effervescence; when thousands of formerly indifferent spectators take a lively
part in public affairs; when the public mind, throwing off the bonds that restrained it,
freely discusses, criticises and repudiates the institutions which are a hindrance to free
development; when it boldly enters upon problems which formerly seemed insoluble.
(2)

We will return to the question of revolution-as-event later on. For now, note that in addition to
circumscribing revolution within a discrete period, Kropotkin's formulation also locates social change
outside of dominant institutions. This can again be placed in opposition to reform, which moves to
change such institutions from within through participation rather than repudiation. In this context,
two distinct rationales for the rejection of reform are at work. The first is a strategical logic, which
maintains that reform is impossible because the ruling classes will never assent to basic changes in
the social structure, and will thus inevitably subvert, absorb and/or suppress any effort to alter them
through gradual and legal means. As Alexander Berkman (1929, ch. 24) put it, no “great social evil”
was ever “eliminated without a bitter struggle with the powers that be. … There is no record of any
government or authority, of any group or class in power having given up its mastery voluntarily. In
every instance it required the use of force, or at least the threat of it.” Errico Malatesta similarly
argued that reforms “tend to distract the masses from the struggle against authority and capitalism;
they serve to paralyse their actions and make them hope that something can be attained through the
kindness of the exploiters and governments” (Malatesta 1899). Instead, anarchists expect any
meaningful social change to involve the actualisation of alternatives outside of hierarchical
institutions, and conflict between the two.

The second rationale for rejecting reform is ethical: reform involves mediation of social change by
vertical institutions – that is, the same means that anarchists reject as a matter of principle. On an
early formulation by Bellegarrigue (1850, §VIII), “to fight politics with politics, to fight government
with government, is to do politics and government, it is to confirm of guardianship rather than
abolishing it and to stop the revolution instead of accomplishing it.” This ties closely to the anarchist
ethos of identity between means and ends, and points to direct action and prefiguration as
alternative core concepts defining the site and circumstances revolution as anarchists desire it.

Direct action in its anarchist decontestation refers to the widest sense of action without
intermediaries, whereby an individual or a group uses their own power and resources to change
reality, by intervening directly in a situation rather than appealing to an external agent (Gordon 2008,
34-40). While more often used today in reference to disruptive tactics, the logic of direct action
extends to constructive projects to realise alternative economies and social relations, as well as,
importantly, to acts of expropriation during mass uprisings. By taking over productive resources and
infrastructures, and placing them under the same alternative relations, revolutionary goals are
directly realised.

Kropotkin (1988, 32-33) thus called upon the workers to “avail themselves of the first opportunity of
taking possession of land and mines, of railways and factories … expropriation on a vast scale, carried
out by the workmen themselves, can be the first step towards a reorganisation of our production on
Socialist principles.” Expropriation is viewed here as the primary material dimension of revolution, an
“immediate solution…as soon as [the social movement] applies its crowbar to the first stones of the
capitalist edifice…the satisfaction of the wants of all must be the first consideration of the
revolutionist” (Kropotkin 1988, 59, original emphasis). Workers’ seizure of the means of production
wins space for alternative economic relationships, constructed in tandem with the destruction of the
dominant institutions – not afterwards. What remains is to defend them from repression.

Taken together, the disruptive, constructive, and expropriative aspects of direct action go beyond
tactics to inform a strategical approach, in which material and organisational alternatives develop in
the process of ongoing political confrontation, and can be expanded through expropriation during
social uprisings to become a base for sustained revolution.

Social vs. Political Revolution

While the juxtaposition to reform is helpful in identifying the ineliminable components of revolution,
the one between political and social revolution most strongly brings out its distinctively anarchist
inflection. Berkman (1929, ch. 24) famously defines a social revolution as one that “seeks to alter the
whole character of society”, specifically the abolition of wage slavery and class oppression, as
opposed to a political revolution which involves a mere change of rulers or of “governmental form.”
While Kropotkin's (1988) formulation also distinguishes between (social) revolution and “a violent
change of government [which] may be the result of a simple insurrection,” his concept of revolution
is historical and modelled on the French and English revolutions. It thus offers a broader notion of
social revolution than Berkman's, which is already decontested in terms of a desired anarchist one.
The distinction, in any event, continues to point to the radical depth of revolution as anarchists
desire it, with contemporary activists likely to emphasise the abolition of manifold intersecting
systems of domination as its object.

The terminology of this distinction appears to date back to very early anarchist expression. Pierre-
Joseph Proudhon (2004 [1845], 98), in an entry in his first notebook probably written between
March and May 1845, remarks that “the social revolution is seriously compromised if it comes
through political revolution.” The remark is isolated, and may or may not have drawn on wider
parlance. The distinction may have been driven by confrontation which ensued following the 1848
revolution in France, between bourgeois Republicans who viewed universal suffrage and the election
of the Assembly as the final word of the revolution, and Parisian workers who expected it to result in
universal access to the means of production (Hayat 2015). The terminology does seem well
established by the aftermath of the Paris Commune, with Bakunin making plain use of these two
“diametrically opposite” ideas of revolution to distinguish between centralist socialist programmes
for the seizure of state power, and decentralist ones for the abolition of the state power and social
reorganisation “from the bottom up, by the free association or federation of workers”:

Contrary to the belief of authoritarian communists – which I deem completely wrong –


that a social revolution must be decreed and organized either by a dictatorship or by a
constituent assembly emerging from a political revolution, our friends, the Paris
socialists, believed that revolution could neither be made nor brought to its full
development except by the spontaneous and continued action of the masses, the
groups and the associations of the people…the Social Revolution should end…by
destroying once and for all the historic cause of all violence, which is the power and
indeed the mere existence of the State. (Bakunin 1871)

By “spontaneous” Bakunin does not mean impulsive, improvised and undirected activity, but instead
activity that is self-directed, voluntary, and therefore antagonistic to the imposition of artificial, pre-
ordained structures. Elsewhere Bakunin writes that only bourgeois impostors propose a socialist
revolution that is merely political, and leaves “economic transformation” to a later stage. Instead, a
revolution worthy of its name should be “nothing but the immediate and direct actuation of full and
complete social liquidation” – that is, the replacement of the entire system of society with federated
associations (Bakunin 1869). Using similar language, Kropotkin (1886) reasons for an understanding
of social revolution as inevitably “the result of the numberless spontaneous actions of millions of
individuals” rather than second-stage governmental decree:

A revolution is not a mere change of government, because a government, however


powerful, cannot overthrow institutions by mere decrees. Its decrees would remain
dead letters if in each part of the territory a demolition of decaying institutions ... were
not going on spontaneously. (2)

This conception retains the notion of revolution as a rapid affair, but its emphasis on spontaneity also
attests to the above-mentioned rejection of mediation between mass action and revolutionary goals.
Choices made about the organization of the revolutionary movement (top-down or bottom-up)
effectively determine the form of the revolution (seizure of state power or abolition of the state) as
well as its end result – free communism or new forms of oppression. In other words, a revolutionary
movement that models an authoritarian and bureaucratic state will inevitably create one, hindering
rather than promoting the liquidation of social domination. Diachronically, anarchists would see the
experiences of numerous revolutions in which this scenario actually transpired as reaffirming their
decontestations of social revolution in its oppositional relationship to strategies for winning or
seizing state power. Above all, the lethal suppression of anarchism during and after the October
Revolution has hardwired this opposition into its central place in the anarchist imaginary, as a tragic
monument to vindicated foresight (Volin 1954).

The rejection of vanguardism raises the question of how anarchists can act as a minority without
imposing their ideas on the rest of society. Malatesta attempts to work through this problem in two
articles in Umanità Nova, published in 1922 – ironically, on the eve of the Fascists’ March on Rome.
He concludes that since the masses' exploitation works to prevent them from embracing anarchist
communism, a revolution to end it would have to be the work of a conscious minority. However,
since anarchy cannot be imposed, this could at best “create the conditions that make a rapid
evolution towards anarchy possible” (Malatesta 1922b). Anarchists' role in a revolutionary context
remains therefore to resist imposition itself – and thus all top-down political and class power – while
“claiming and requiring, even by force if possible, the right to organize and live as we like, and
experiment [with] the forms of society that seem best to us” (Malatesta 1922a). Malatesta avoids
decontesting revolution as anarchist or not at all, and instead assumes that anarchists will remain a
minority, not only in society at large, but also among the revolutionary forces that might successfully
topple a government. Anarchists are therefore unlikely to prevent a new government from arising, in
which case,

at least we must struggle to prevent the new government from being exclusive and
concentrating all social power in its hands; it must remain weak and unsteady ... we
anarchist [sic] should never take part in it, never acknowledge it, and always fight
against it ...
We must stay with the masses, encourage them to act directly, to take possession of the
production means ... to occupy housing, to perform public services without waiting for
resolutions or commands from higher-ranking authorities. (Malatesta 1922b)

Malatesta’s sober minoritarian strategy combines resistance and constructive direct action, seeking
to bring the latter's lived experience of free association and mutual aid into conflict with social logics
of command at every feasible opportunity. Its attachment to indefinite struggle and a “politics
without promises” even in revolutionary circumstances may resonate with anarchists who couple
prefigurative practice with anti-utopian orientations (Gordon 2009), informing their projection of
revolutionary strategies onto scenarios of industrial and ecological collapse.

Two further approaches to minoritarian action have been ascendant in recent decades. One
approach emerges from groups inspired by Nestor Makhno's Organisational Platform of the
Libertarian Communists, which emphasises the role of the specific anarchist organisation – hence the
term especifismo used to describe this tendency in Latin America (Common Struggle 2003). While
the Platform does call for anarchists to spread their ideas as participants in mass workers'
organisations and social movements, it also states that they should form their own groups based on
theoretical unity, tactical unity, collective responsibility, and federalism. On one account (FdCA 1985),
the role of the specific organisation prior to any revolutionary transitional period is to create the full
possible extent of communistic alternatives (cooperatives, schools, cultural activities, etc.) and to
fight to keep self-management at the centre of every political struggle, while clearly identifying allies,
adversaries, and enemies. In the transitional period, the specific organisation's “first task is to
foresee and organise a retreat and defeat” and it should participate in armed resistance to any new
state. As long as revolutionary forces are successful, however, it should “act as a centre of debate ...
and clearly indicate and propagate the tactic it recommends, and also denounce and combat errors”
(FdCA 1985). Platformist advocates stress the need for a coherent anarchist response to volatile
social circumstances, and the need to move beyond single-issue campaigns and local struggles, if
anarchists are to find a common voice and coordinate their actions.

An almost polar opposite of especifismo, at least organisationally, is the minoritarian approach


expressed by insurrectionary anarchist cells. Inspired by writers such as Alfredo Bonanno and The
Invisible Committee, insurrectionary anarchists argue that hyper-technological capitalism has
rendered federations and syndicalism obsolete, and that meaningful intervention in the ubiquitous
“social war” requires a strategy of informal and temporary organization in affinity groups and base
nuclei for “immediate, destructive attack on the structures, individuals and organizations of Capital
and the State” (Bonanno 1998). This approach, typically found in communiques that follow attacks
on police stations, banks, and similar targets, abandons specialized activism and counter-hegemonic
movement-building, views “civil” and legal means with contempt, and allies itself with urban riots
and clandestine action. Some insurrectionary discourses also draw on anarcho-primitivist critiques of
domestication and technology, articulating their motivations for action in terms of a wild egoist
individualism (Loadenthal 2017).

Recontesting revolution

In this final section, I would like to briefly examine some re-contestations of revolution in
contemporary anarchist discourse. While much of early anarchist expression did unmistakably point
to revolution as a discrete period of social upheaval potentially leading to a stateless and classless
society, newer ideological constructs within anarchism point away from this conception. One context
in which revolution is thus re-contested is anarchists' growing affinity with intersectional, queer, and
post-structuralist analyses, which eschew essentialist foundations and view regimes of domination as
decentralised and dislocated. From this point of view “there is no centre within which power is to be
located” and no “central problematic within the purview of which all injustices can be accounted for”
(May 1994, 11). While this approach is mainly articulated in opposition to orthodox Marxist notions
of revolution as a final confrontation between two classes, it also destabilises the status of revolution
as an event, since the abolition of formal institutions does not alone revolutionise social relations. As
Tadzio Mueller (2003) puts it,

One cannot continue to think revolution as a one-off event, since that implies the
existence of one or only a small number of centres of power. If power is also embedded
in value structures as the example of patriarchy on [a protest] site demonstrates, then
‘revolution’ must be seen as a process, since it is clearly impossible to ‘revolutionise’
values and attitudes from one day to the next. (130)

In similar terms, Tiqqun authors (2011, 67) argue that since “Empire...has expanded its colonization
over the whole of existence...it is on this total terrain, the ethical terrain of forms-of-life, that the war
against empire [should be] played out.” Such an analysis leads Simon Springer (2014, 264) to endorse
a micropolitical approach to anarchism which rejects “end-state politics,” opposes “permanent
insurrection” to “final revolution,” and “abandons any pretext of achieving a completely free and
harmonious society in the future and instead focuses on the immediacies of anarchist praxis and a
prefigurative politics of direct action in the present.”

Tied to this turning away from finality are expressions that seek to entirely absorb revolution into the
present tense, asserting e.g. that it is “not a grand apocalyptic moment” but “exists in every moment
of our lives. ... in the present, not in some mythic possible future” (Monkey n.d.). The term
“revolutionary” is mobilised here to characterise anarchist politics that are intrinsically valuable,
rather than premised on self-sacrifice for a distant cause. For Torrance Hodgson (n.d.):

The revolution is now, and we must let the desires we have about the future manifest
themselves in the here and now as best as we can. When we start doing that, we stop
fighting for some abstract condition for the future and instead start fighting to see those
desires realized in the present ... as a part of the life one is striving to create, as a
flowering of one's self-determined existence.

These approaches hold, with Gustav Landauer (1978 [1911], 107), that anarchism is “not a thing of
the future, but the present, not a matter of demands, but of living,” and echo Colin Ward's (1982, 14)
emphasis on the ubiquity of self-determining, co-operative and non-hierarchical forms of
organization in everyday life, operating “side by side with, and in spite of the dominant trends of our
society.” This move to normalise forms of social organisation underpinned by co-operation,
reciprocity, mutual aid, and inclusion turns against their instrumental subordination to an anticipated
revolutionary moment. Direct action, communisation, and the cultivation of non-hierarchical
relations are endorsed not only because they are instrumentally useful to revolutionary strategy, but
also because they are sites of personal and collective liberation and lived ethical practice.

The turn to immediacy and lived practice has raised concerns that experimental efforts at a
“revolution in everyday life” may become depoliticised, inward-looking and detached from any
project for wider social transformation. Thus Joel Olson's (2009, 41) critique of the American
anarchist movement as one in which “building free spaces and/or creating disorder are regarded as
the movement itself” and “the necessary, difficult, slow, and inspiring process of building movements
falls through the cracks between sabotage and the autonomous zone.” Proponents argue, however,
that the emphasis on present-tense liberation does not mean that political contention is abandoned,
or that it cannot be attached to support for social movements' struggles; indeed, alternative social
relations emerge more sharply and develop more rapidly in periods of political mobilisation and
during popular uprisings. In recent years, American anarchists have proven far from inward-looking in
their solidarity with grassroots movements of African- and Native Americans, without losing their
ability to maintain and spread their political culture, as have their European counterparts in their
support of self-organising refugees from Calais to Lesbos. This terrain of solidarity may remain on the
social periphery, but it is far from an inward-looking lifestylism.

Revolution, to conclude, remains a core concept in anarchist ideology, and continues to play an
essential role in differentiating its accounts of social change from those of both social democracy and
authoritarian Marxism. While the rejection of vanguardism has led anarchists to articulate diverse
alternative accounts of minoritarian intervention, there has been of late less clarity on the precise
role of moments of mass confrontation and social effervescence within a project to both abolish
hierarchical institutions and regimes of domination in everyday life. The recent cycle of contention
has proven all too bitterly that the channelling of movements' energies into electoral politics is a lost
cause. While the present period of reaction may force anarchists into retreating battles, the question
of revolution must remain at the center of attention if more advanced perspectives are to
accompany the inevitable resurgence of global struggles that will follow.

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