1 • The Quest for an

Internal Administrative Law

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WHY THIS CRUSADE? \\\ i' :
The search for a law within administration d~at aspires to so~~.tlting
called "bureaucratic [ustice" may seem a do9med enterprise. Itj\"~. fegal
culture largely oriented toward court enforcfment of individu:al, l(!gal
rights. "administration·' has always seemed l\S antithetical to ·ti:.l,'.:' as
"bureaucracy" is to "justice." Law focuses on\ri~hts. administ,~~-~p on
policy. Rights. if enforced. mu}J limit polic.y.~hereby stifling aff[ipinis·
uati~n. When policy.is wanted. the law's ~y ica~ c<.-sponse is c_9\~rf
all'
no-ncht. no-law policy e~d:n·cs where dis reuon can floun~h- 1But
permitting uncontrolled discretion generates demand Ior law. t hc ~1~:
competitive cycle of law and ~olicy begins a~cw. Moreover. di~','.t•":ual
image of routinized hure1.ucr:1tic dccisionm~king~ based on l)';t'f~i or
modal cases, seems to P.liminate precisely ~he indi\·idual jud~f,1~nts
essential to a sense of justice. TI1e suggestion that posit ive :idn~\~~i~l ra-
I j ti~~· bur'!aucratical!y orga~i~ed. ca~ be ~um incd with law in a\~•'.:1\f 1(',l
v1S1on-perhaps even a visron of 1ust1ce-appears both l11st~~1~·.!lh
:'-I .; implausible and conr;eptually muddled. \ l.:J \: : 1
There is certainly force to these objections. For. to be blu i:llt.: t hr
htscorv of American admin[smnivc law is
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hisrorv of f:likd:l·i'(ii-:1~ '
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Administrative law's basic technique for furm).llat ing and 1mrk~i~·11t in):
guiding legal norms-laws•Jits asserting private rights and d1a)l,A1~1n,:
the legality of offic:ial action-seems to hi\'c forced it to ~ls1 ~tll:m
continuously between irrelevance and imper~inence.
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The early fault was impertinence. The Sup,rcmcI

Court attcn1(ll ,Iii;. i
('d t,,
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1. See generally, Stewart, The llt(,,rmation •Jf .America .~dminiS1rt1111·t /.111<·.\f8 Ill"
L. Rev. 166q (1975). . I \d
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:} • Perspeaives
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• ·~\..; The~uestforanlniernalAdministrac111eLaw · 3
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.use the due process clause and the notion that only Congress could
\ ,:.'.j:'legislate" to protect private property and private markets from the; the fragility of the concept~al underpinning~ for participatory righcs.6
, emergence of posi~ive government," That attempt was crushed in the: The first is that partidpatiqn. whether in agency decision processes or
\ : :~ew Deal. 3 Accepqing the bloodless revolution. the Court heat a hasty! in courts, is to be granteq to persons who are the beneficiaries (or
l ::l~etreat. Indeed, it was routed. The history of administrative Jaw from:• disbeneficiaries) of substantive statutory rightc;. But, as Justice Rehn-
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; ·;i(he thirties to the sixties is the history of the judici~J development of.
: :! :~chnical defenses ~hat prevented private plaintiffs from reaching the .
·.1erits of their claitns against government officials."
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: , !( But this phase t~o has passed. As the brave new agencies of the New ·
tf[)eal became creaky bureaucracies, the body politic and the courts
i.;~ .:; gan to lose faith jin the administrative state. The civil rights move·
'lment and the war o"' poverty.joined later by the environ men cat cons um-
\. 1;~:r_ and women 's rights movements. disclosed that minorities. the poor,
, :'i~oecd "people .. inj general. were being lefr. out of the processes of
! gpvernance. As the ~dy politic embraced participatory governance. the
i rechnical barriers tci> judicial review came tumbling down/ The judi-
i ciary, assisted by congressional conferrals of broader and broader juris-
, diction, became a Hospic.ablc forum for reform-minded bureaucracy
fighters of every persuasion.v-
' ;.This revival of j1ldicial review was not. however, a revival of an
quist enjoys asking,7 how can the courts Sa}' that statute:. creating
substantive rights include :rights to participation that arc nowhere
provided by the statute? To' do so must be co redefine the subsLantivc
statutory right. For if thei participatory right is a function of the
ii substantive right, in Rehnquist's view the beneficiary shou Id be re·
::! quired to .. take the bitter [the absence of desired forms of pan ici p.1 tion J
:( with the sweet [the substantive legislative benefit]."
:l The appropriate respons,;:\to Rehnquist might be that the participa-
1 toryrightcomesoutof thedl!leprocess clau:;eof the Constitution. That,
It indeed. is the second answ~r to the question of how to ground and
l) develop a general right of participation. But. alas. the due procC'ss clause
!! is an answer in the form of1a question: What process is "'Jue ·? lhc
:; answer to that question lea~ back to the previous quandary: The due
1\ process clause protects claims to life. liberty/~f property. In statutory
\i claims what is "'due .. is pre{Cnnably a pro~s·appropriate to the type of
:; .. prop;rty .. or ..liberty tha~ the legislation provides. If so. then the
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an:tigcver(\mrnt, property-rights jurisprudence. Instead the rights as-

,, process that is due should emerge by close attention to the statutory
serted were those embodied in welfare state legislation plus the inchoate 1
text. Where. then. could the G:ourt be looking when it finds a process to
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, bur rapidly developing right to pasticipate-e-the latter forged in part
,J be due that is different from iche one provided b)! the statute?
• from traditional notions of open judicial process and ir. part from the
The uncharitabl~ answer that emerges from the due process cases of
I · open government ideology and statutory victories of the politics of
I I thelatei:ixties and carlysev~nties is that it is looking into a mirror. The
protest. Yet again. things did not work out very well. The notion oi
process that is due is one that roughly conforms to. or at least l,or:ows
participation as a rig~t subject to judicial enforcement turned out to be
its decisional techniques from.judicial proceJs. But why shouk this be
unmanageable, i~ not incoherent. Does everyone have this right? To
so? Are agenc:es doing the same things as cc,urts? Arc they opcr~u_ng
participate how and with what effects? On what basis can a claim to
with similar legal powers, politic:.tl demands, and fiscal rcsou recs~ I he
participation be e'lal~ated?
. answers are obvious-so obvious that the Supreme Court seems 1r1 full
To the last question the courts have given two answers. Each reveals
! ' retreatfrom its landmark "give 'em more process .. administrativc-due-
2. Su. t.g .. Corwin. The .. High-:r ui ~..-· BaclcP,ro11rrJ of American Co.nstitutiorral L11w. process cases.• Along the way. it has stamped out the_peculiarly activist,
42 Harv. L Rev. \.49(1928): McCloskty, Economic Due Prouuand the SuprerneC.1,i,rc;
Arr Exhumation a11d Reburial, )962 Sup. Ct. Rt'V. H.
3. Set L. TllllE. AMERICA N Coss·nrunoN,,l LAw 466-';5 (1978). 6. Fora moretxtended trtatmtntsee Mashaw. Administraci;e Due Pr:~ess: The Q_ues<
fora Dignitary Tlicory, 61 Boston Univ. L. Rev. 885 (1981). and authorities there cited.
4. TI1t classic commentary basC'<i prcdominattly on the jurisprudence of this period is
L JAFFF.,Jvo1:1.-... REVIEW OF,AOMINISTIIAT!VE ACTION (l %5). 7. Arnett v. Kennedy. '416 U.S. 134 (1974). .. .. · . . .
5. Sec Stewart, supra note I at 1711-•17. 8. See. e.g., Van Alstyne. Cracks in '"The New: Property : J\d1'!~1cot1v, Due P~oass in
, the Administrative State, 62 Cornell L Rev. 445 (1977). ·
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 + · Perspectives

participation-enhancing efforts of the

Appeals in an opinion that reads lik
o·
t . f
is net o Columbia Court of .
. healthful environment, to a reasonab\y safe c:ar or work place. to
low-cost housing or hospital care-are imbedded in statutes of awe·
Retreat from enforcing a~ vagu.e r'. ·geh tathtemper
at req tantrum."
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' some complexity, sometimes. but not always. drafted to reflect the
administrative processes in tt . .
,. rne image o
f th uires JU lcial redesign of ..
e judicia , . subtle politics of making haste slowly in a pluralist and federal political
ustice Black warned the court in Goldber ~1seems sensi.ble.10
Jchat started the wholesale atta k d g "· Kelly. the welfare case
system. Determining under these statutory texts whether adminiscra·
tive action represen~s an appropriate understanding of congressional
judiciary would be unable. to ~o~~ al ~~i~trativ~ procedures, that the
intent and. i.f not; forcing protection of che putative beneficiary's rights
adjustment to its proceduraf 'ruli ro ti ed ydnam1cs of adrninlstrative
· . mgs. n ce his predi · h has often turned out to be a much more difficult task tharii'saying
costs o f giving hearings to ineF ible • . tenon f a~ the "stop"' to administrators or .. no standing'" tt> plaintiffs-the r~media\
ben~fits would be taken out of ~lae hr~:007 p~1?r to terminatirg fheir
(by increasing barriers to q at·'· . ) ~hg:ble welfare appHC?nts and evasive techniques respectively of the conservative coUlt~ of the
problems with due process u l~ncaoon rapidly materialized. $ut the twenties and their progressive brethrer. inj the post-New Qeal er.a.
Court also seems to hav nisund are more general. In Goldberg the Indeed. the Supreme Court's attempts to find a secure footing +a basis
u · e rmsuu erstood what dd i· for affirming or denying dght.c;--in the d.:1uge of statutes that has
roes and vasdy cverestlmatedithe ca aci cause ecisi~,iaJ er·
run a hearing system l) The :. k pf . ~ of welfare bureaucracies to flooaed the contemporary legal landscape make it an easy dbJect of
. · ns s o Jud · I · ,,
include both new dysfunctional· icia intervention may ~taus ridicule. Consider the folk,wing p:i.ir of cases. ; ·
and the ultimate irrelevance of ;enjssii~;~ces for ~he sup~o~ed w.in~ers . In the first1' a group of environmentali sts sought an inj~~.clion
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nence and irrelevance may comb· llremed1es provided. Irpperci- ag"'linst an almost completed wat~r project of great expense arid enor·
1 do not. of course wanr rn me as we as alternate. i:' rnous econornic consequence. The claim was that the dam w61:1ld de·
_,_ , :1. t

. • ~u.i.sserc that judicial . f stroy the habitat of a rare perch. the snail darter. contrar)!c lhl' :to
rive procedure is always a botch t B h . review o adin~~istra-
~ion seem to be high. Nor do thos~t ~ e nsks of irrelevance or dy~fu:11c- Endangered Species Act·s irisuuctions to \federal officials t'o, avuid
issue for review is one of sub t nskhs decrease materially when the actions harmful to the habitats of rare flora and fauna. Did ~lw en,·1·
I di s ance rat er than d ·, ronmentalists have a .. right .. to sto(l the danf "No.·· said the d~fi;:ndant
ea mg modern Supreme Court case . . proce ure. Perhaps the
for the courts co take when th . i d~fmmg the appropriate p<>sture officials. Congress could not have meant i to protect spcci6;1 '. u·{ d1L'
administrative, action c·c. ey engage IO substantive judicial revjew of mind-boggling insignificance of the snail darter-a fish thal 1~:1~ ,._\, <fo·
\'o lpe, u is bo~h a~ I . , izen~ to Preserve 01•erton Park ,·· : covered only after t.his water project was( ,,,:ell under "·ay. iJ\t·~idL'"·
~ n e egant essav on ·ud· · 1
simpleminded interpretation ~{
highway program. H
t .
1c1a restraint and an atrociou~ly
: t e statutt."~ ~vverning the f~deral
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Congress repeatedly appropriate<l money for the proi~(l afltrl il ".1,
weil aware of the snail darter 'problem. The aa>propriat ions co,~1rnil I c,·,
:''I consis~ently expressed the view thal the kcr did nol prolcill ~nd·.
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Th couru are not nt>cessaril)· to bl..mc. Suhstantive rights ~'. 1co\: a 1
discovered species from nearly completed p~ojccts ... \\ rong:t!s:iiJ lh,·
9. Vermont rankec Nuclear i'o,..rr C ,; I Court. The answr.r is .. yes:· The aet. is clear: and ,onl,un, nn l:}~'11'' , .. ,.
4.\5 U.S. 519(19i8).
10 Th ..
'"i', ~•.lluul!-n.,,,,,r,P.. tt-ni...•Co
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unci. nc relevant co this c:..$e. , }I ·
· e words Goldbug , •. ~ ,1 .··.
rrnduced citations co 1 • 900 rrponedt', c;,se,
~ plui:.:,·,l '"'" • In;• ,·,·1111 ,n.i I ,n J unc ,:I 'J~.'
, Three years later a class of mentally rctankd p~r~,,n~ ~ul·,1 uJ nd, ,1,,
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the Developmentally Disabled Assis1ance\ and Bill 1.1f R1~h~~ ',\, 1
1 1 397 U.S. 254 ( l 9i0). . ,
1 2· Cooper, Goldberg's Forgoctc F i : included in the '"bill of rights .. section d{ the act wa-,; a \;''"~ , .. ,":'
1 .l. Sa Masha"'• The Manaocm " "ooJ l"ut<'. f>~ 1'1,nn. I.. kc,. I IU;" ( I ~80) ' : declaring that the devcloprncntally disabled! ha,·c .a right to h3ii)i~1f :i .1or~
H · 401 U .S. 402(!971). " ""1"'' t'.u{D
' .. ,1• rucm. s 9Co111l"III..Re,·.ii.:?(1't>7-4~
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l 5 . .:,cc Mashaw. The Le l ' : ' '·
(i•>;·.,). ga 5 uur.turco(Frustru1io" . p,
-- l! . p a. LR ,, I4
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16.TVAv.Hill.437U.S.l'i3il<>i8}. ! 1i):(
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17. Ptnnhursl Seate. School an.J Hospital v. Halderman. 4 51 U.S. I I J '.18 lli.! '
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 , .i 6 · PerspectiveJ The Q1iest for an Internal Administratirc L,iw · 7

accident .... [L)itigation ob~cures as much as it instructs."'b And in a

! ., and to appnp~ate treatmenr in least-restrictive environments. T~e
study of hearings and judicial review in the Social Security disabilit~
s~ate a~d local Institutional defendants argued rhat the so-called bill ~f
rights _m the fed~rnl statute was Just a suggestion. They pointed to the prograrn my colleagues and. I found that the ten~ of thousand~ _ot
judicial review proceedings .that have been held srnce the d_1sab1hty
!· undeniable facts that (1) the compliance would be very expensive and
program's inception have either had no perceptible impact on its func-
(2) Congress had not appropriated sufficient money to facilitate irn-
~lementatio~ ... ~ight," said the Court. When adopting legislation that tioning or have made it worse. . .
Again. I do not want LO ·protest too much. Martin Shapiro._ f~r
imposes obligations on states and localities receiving federal funds,
example. has described judidal review as a court-agen~y _p_a rtn ers h Ip in
• Congress must say expli~itl~ not only that the beneficiaries have rights
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implementation, and that d~scription has some plaus1b1hty. From ~h_c
.. : a_nd th.~ states have obligacions, but also that the funds are "condi-
political scientist's perspective-an interest in how.the s~stcm of _pol1t1·
.' tioned on acceptance by the states of the new legal relationship. Snail
cal accommodation functions over time-adminis~rat1ve law 1s cer·
' darters- I; developmentally disabled persons-0. :
tainly not a disaster. The government. the econo~y. an~ the social order
. :. Ca~ it be. that' Congress and the Court regard three-inch perch as
ar~ still functioning with a relatively low level of phys1ca~ v1olenc:: Yee
·.' · more important than the developmentally disableJ? Do they think the
this important perception does not alter the fact.. as Shapuo s:iys. that
·.. for~er is dcservi~g of legal protection from administrative depredation 19
courts typically let the agency do what it pleases." Nor ~oes it suggest
· ';\ while the latter is not? Surely there is some other explanation. Indeed. I
that courts. whether patting the agency on the head or k1ck1 ng 1c In the
1 ,i~~ink .~here is. The snail darter case requires only that the Court say
Ji shins. have any very good ide~ what has gone on in the concexr. offered
. stop : the developmental disabilities case asked that administrators be'
"' co them for review or how their actions will affect the dy11:1m1cs of
directed to take affirma.tlve .-~ion under statutory language that would
.then have to be given substantive content. In that latter process the' :i litigation congressional actf<fl'\. or bureaucratic functioning.
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\\ What after all. should we Jxpect when the Supreme Court notes, in a
''::ourt sees the fed eral judiciary being dragged inexorably into further ,. routine ;ecitation of the facts\in a 1980 case. tpat the rule it is reviewing
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. '.:msputes, perha'.ps into continuous monitoring of administrative actlvlty :
I' is based on an administrative tecord containiti'g~1os.OOO pages?zo And a
: · and ultitnately mt~ some broad structural injunction through which the
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written· record. even (or especially) of that length. cannot provide a
· courts would attempt to take over administration.
:', sharpandtruepictureofthdiealicyofadministration. T~e D.~. Circuit
. There are.of course. ways oftranslating many claims for affirmative
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. protection into a negative, and therefore judicially more manageable.
'l, Court of Appeals has recentl)f, provided candid testimonial _ev1denc_e _for
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'i !l1 this conclusion. In Sierra Club v. Costle.11 reviewing the EPA dec1s1on
I ' form. "Give me a healthful environmenc" can thus become "Do nm
·:: Ackermart. and Hassleru d~scribe as a colossal boner, the court
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~.roceed without at:tending to my legislatively validated demand for a I •

h,ealthful environment." Enforcing such a right might involve courts in concludes: · :

~'o more than enjolning administrative action that fails to take appro-
priate account of the interests the Congress meant to further or protect.
~,pt even this reinterpretation of rights will not suffice r.o gu:mrn1 ee
surefooted or effective judicial surveillance of administrative act ivitv.
For example, Ack~r1man and Hassler. reviewing in Clean CoaUnir~v
1ir, what seems to\be 2. mulribillion dollar congressional-EPA .. mi;.
t~ke," d~cribe judip3l review in tht: following terms: "Noc only did
EPA r::ad1ly evade the Court of Appeal.,' effort to prompt policy recon·
~i:~cration, but the fl~w of litigation ?nly directed attention away from
the need for long-range planning. Nor was this distortion an unha;>py
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Since the issues in th.is proceedink were joined in 1973 when che Na\'ajc Indians
first complained about sulfur dioxide fumes over their Southwest homes. we
have had several lawsuits. almost four years of subscamive and piOcn:lur:i!
18. B. ACKERMAN & w. HASS LE!l. CLEAN COAi /D1RTV AIP 25 ( t 981 ). , ,
19. M. SHAPIRO. THE SUPREME Cou,RT AND ADMINISTRA'nVl Act:--CIES 26 5 ( I ?t:>8). _
20. lndu$trial Union Dept., AFL~CIO v. American Petroleum lnsl., 448 U.S. 60,
(l 9RO). :
21. 657 F.2d 298 (D.C. Cir. l 961).
22. Op. cit. supra note 18.

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 ~> On all public institutions. ll ,,,e denund pe<jistentlY ,nough th>' ,he
S · Perspectives ,;.,· judg" pull our che,;<nuu out of the fi«. th<Y will sometimes u,y.
· ' If. then. by ...d,ninistr,tive law .. we mOan that set u! docuincs
"""'u,·«iOg before the EPA. and no" this exiend<d co urt challenge.
· · i concetniOi the tightS of .citizens to hold administratO" accountable in
. . Congress has amended the Cl ean A",r A ct once and
interim. may be r d In t~,e
d ·•.
so ,g,m .. Th• stand,td we uphold i..,· al<WIY been I ff f ·'~ y to ~?·, court. administtacive taW h<.s a simple lesson\ th• citizen has a r\ght to
Y""·'nd cpuld be "'""d within anoth« two yea" n e ect or almo<t two ,, keep officials from ,tr,ying beyond some lar&• and toosc requirem""'
o! clear stAtuto()' language. procc<lural ,egularity. and substanti•• •a·
Wesearching)
soul f eeard1n
We ha~eart
rcachourdecisio ·· thte~m1nad
· b. lewit
~ehcord · I k(and considerable
searching · . ·
· e recor as hard tionalitY- Within those boundaries tbere Ii~ a gigantic polie)'.11P•"·
can probably gi,e iu thousand< of ' "· W a oo " mo~I Judges invisible to the legal order because devoid ol justiciable rightsii~b«·
moightfo,watd ,tandatd of ,.,;,w ~,!
d h e hm adopted ' s,mpl<. and
over. as th• administtativ< state has grown. J mo« .. tights" hJi< been
"f«en, es (andtho,eofappell•nui •pd e t; agency·, ,ationale. ,tudied '"
" '" in«lligible (pa«s were ,i;.p1y'i:' ea,oreb to undmtand them w~<',th<Y generated and defined by a combination of t>gislati,e1 and adn\lrti;u,.
, ne ,g,ncy the beu,fit of the doub 1 pen(~'; !,). and on dose qu«tiof'
1 gi,en
tive action. this externally oriented adminis~n.tive law. that it\r1\.ia w
cl its job. We are not . ~ out o e erence for the terrible corriplexity oriented toward justiciable dghts enforceab\ . again·.st adrninistrf_,b_ rs. in
engineers. computer model · •
c i an ,.
,!though many ofth, doc . ' .. . . . hl "'· ,co~om"u oc ~<at~ti· court. has bceome increasingly '"elevant o the realizadoni!ol\,ou<
,nd mo«.. . umi'"'"" t "motd «qutrt such ""1"\- colleeti•.• id":'ls. Con~ider one final ,xamP!" wag~ ,nd price re~~\~!ion
Casestolike tins high!ight the enormous ibili . l\ en- I
as practtced ,nth• N«on and Carter admuu,uauons. iTh\, I
t r usted the courts in proc•cd1 i o f sue hrelspons1
.. ·n ; a ,uei,;I Congress
ength co · d t'la~\
,, · The Economic Stabiliution A ct of t 970 e1po,;.,..i Presiden~l"i ,on
Confliedng ln««ou play fie«ely , . • mp e,nty an d~ttk<, to "issue such ord"s an,\ reeulations as h,,may,deem approt .. tc to
and agile. obfusca<lon run• hi • . ,nonnous "'""· ad,oeata "' prolif~
poblic inten< i• ofcen obscuttd- gn. \"'n,mon sense co,rt<pondingly t~W. \th, stabilize prices. rents. wages~'.md sa\aries:·t Th«• was little 1\\1,Ce to
th• •ct than that. ft went on iner~ly to p,ovi~• th3t the ptcside~\\k~uld 1
1
Wecannotrcdotheagency·s·ob·~on
under this Act that it w1·11 ~t1,h· kg r ess h as told us. at least in proce~dings
. : de\eg:ite his power to any -igency or offic~r o[ the govcrnnx,ii1t: \O
• no r o reversal fo · II ' ,
Vermont Yanlteereinforcesthead ;... . . . ther end
sma . procedural 1 ~rrC\)rs; esu.bli•h penalties fot ,io!adons o-f regulatim s ;,sued und" ,he ·_.c·_·:;.t (,<1nd
'~
. mvn1uon. So 10 , .
este orttounderstand tosen·ft I ~ecanonymakeour t.o etnpower the federal Oimic< eou<ts to issue injunctions \oil;~'""
ff u nb wful
bno ching
., , . • "· 1
od«a<ional has"
e resu l
I t'" """· ,nd to murt that viol,tions. Th• statute pro,ideci ro, ese-:u,i •e and. on rcde!e~~,lidn o!
a
while to come to short co I . , enh pace .. n tlus case. we have taken a long the powers. ,dminis«•ri" governance pu« ,,nd simple.
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nc us1ont t e i-ule is rcasonable.1'
~ pres•"dent exer«sc. d th." powers con>f'.''J~ 11'
by ;;suin~ ' ' o,dcc
For goodrestraint.
«c«ising
raised
reason. Why
beingsho
'"juJcious·· ,s
in episodic litigation bu
. 1J . al"'.ost synonymous; with
l an)onc ~d1c,c _Lhat particular
. Th
[reeung wa&•'.• '."'"· and pnces as o! a W\"" date and Jd,~~\<'~ h,s
pow« to admtntstcr the ac> to a Cost of 1.1v1ne Cuundl head<jl\~; th,
. Ct\\\CCfl p3rtll... h;i,·ano n4' I" t· • issues secrera()' of<?• «easu()'- Under th• p,esi'.\•.nt's .xecuttv< o/ ~\1\. th<
1
interests should pro"i
Y ·dc th•.
,. JU d.1013r)'
. . h · ff" · .. ,.._cu
Wit. ' f ,ar 1llgating
. I
1 .
to understand th• administtath·~ · . . ,u '.c«nt'" ormation'fo~it ., ,ounc<l was g,ven th• pow" to adopt subs,~,an· ,uk> and «•o\aliun,
fie reality of a congressional· a di~runi:.trauvc
ti .d ~0~1.nc:il: S\11.1al. t:1:onomic. or scir:n·
nroora hl , 1
i
I
and to grant w•'"" fr?"'. and m•k• ;nt«P•ftatiun, u! ,he ... ~~,i,O,, .. ,
"' , an oppottunity to take efkcti,·c . ,. • m. mu, css,pm· ' the f m2< order. /. plomul! u111on ,cp«scnun~ «nploy<<> "t,,,,e ""
desirable forms;,z•
. Tl1at
- the c ourc..-.:i(·nerall
:icnnn
• i to mold
h I that reali~\', . InI \ p\oyer re!usod. b«ause of the fr«ze. to fi/'y ba,gained-!o, j(a~' ,.,
tescament
l to their wisdom • n ·,. h •.. ~co nn1 o
1al \ (\ ,1111H·t1••1 ..... l d ·r I ct i~\a
such a bcli~f I creases haled the rec,.lcitr•nt en• p\oyer and ti"- ,e mt at)' n! tl«', (icl"' n
pw,a ps ares ult of ou, g,nera I ten'd en,,. · · to em<" " ·' " • ' >C)'
u n "·»unable p«~u .1 J \•,
I into court.'' Th• p\ainti£! had n.any ,onjplaints. bot " ,We: """"
I
I

M<:~t Cutters v. Connally. 337 F. iSupp. 71,7 (1 q7\ \

25.
26. 84 Stat. 799 ll9:C).
AIT'a\gamated
I .
"· ••7f.2d., ""· \1 I ·\ I
'·•.•.l fo,,n
::,uu (1977). a,gomm< ol •h" g '"
POLICY"""""' \ t,r.ll lurm
I
:t·,· P. Hu1<u,~11.i:. l11tCoUK1•(I I /\~O\
I \!
\ I

i'1\. \

\\ 1.
~ '. 1
 !
10 · Perspectives
TheQ~estforan Internal Administratirc: Law· 11
!
' !
! :: recognized 'they\ came down to this: the Economic Stabilization Act "rule of law" has been mai~tained. In its emphasis on informal.proc~ss
: : ':' institutes a' form of administrative governance-sfree from leglslatlve the Cost of Living Council\was typical, not atypical, of admm1st'.at1ve
·. 1' direction. 1>,ubli9 participation. and judicial control-that challenges behavior. . ,
'iii\ directly the tradiµon:d conception of the rule of law. : ~
1 '
' ! t The court w~ sympar:hctic but ultimately unmoved. The union, it THE CHALLENGE OF LEGAL REALISM
' , ;1 suggested. had failed to appreciate the legal constraints within which
' { the president and the council would operate. First. the Congress had We begin, therefore; by conf eding the legal realists· insight. The legally
\ j exercised its basid lawmaking task by providing a lower boundary on the
required means of agency irplementation. as developed by.c~urts ~nd
.\ E ::\: stabilized level of wages. prices, and rents (that existing on May 25~ legislatures. may sometimes inform but cannot control ad~1ms_tradt10~.
· dby l eg1s
· I ac1·0_ n and by 1ud1c1al ec1-_
:i
i · 1: 1970), by prohibiting .. gross inequity," and by conferring th~ authority The normative structures ~reate
sionmaking are often, if no~ usually. removed .ro~ the ~oncret: e~te l
; E '\\only for short tirite periods, subject to congressional ;review prior f~
: ,p::reauthorization. Second. tlw administrators would cperate with the rience of bureaucratic implementation. The law 10 action is. 1~ a.r

~=·
Llewellyn's famous line. developed by .. people who have the doing m
, ; l.usual constraints! of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act and'.
h nza \
1 ;: .,,subject to judici~ review. TI1ac is, the council was subject to the:
c oint was long ago ~nunciated in Thurman Arnold's trenc~ant
1, !'.\!tonventional constraints of administrative law concerning ·public par-:
;i i:ficipation in rulernaking, hearings in contested cases. and judicial re-: observations on 1 aw m
p. • gene:ra
I I .. ·Law" is primarily a great reservoir of
· Id
,l.c1 ~ym
• b o I s. . . . The observer s 1.1ou con·
! :n;view of the lcgali~ of rules and orders. . ! emotionally important soc1a1
I k . mind that·the function of law is not so muct1 co gu1 e
, .d
; i.T All of this seems quite comforting-until one asks some simple;
·•
., sta~t '/ eep tn f 1,
... -'nd Arnold explained the coun-centered
: •; ,~uestion:;. such as:\Does the council have to make any rules elaborating ; society as to com art it. ..,p . . , 1·r •
nature ~f American administrative law. its tendency to .equ:ite .cg3 L)f
i \\ iits interpretation of the order and the grounds upon which waivers are :
I
•. 1 \
· .l~vailable? If so. docs it have co allow public participation? Are hearings either with the opportunity for judicial review or with.. the u.:e od
courtlike processes, in ter~s of the symbolic content of court an
I ,; • ir~quired before wai,vers are denied or interpretations gi.ven? Is judicial ·
I
'
; ;)review to
likely have any substantfa.! bite in this context? The answers \, .I
!~
.. bureau":
· arc no. no. no,' and lno.11 r . body ofJ·udges whose decisions are eit~. er: (a) right. (b) caused by t'hdc
A court1sa 1 • ) , ) '-\fortunacebutunavo1 ·
H\i Without getting ~nto legal rechnlcalittes, the basic reason for these fault of someone else (usually the leg1s1 ature • Ot \O u. b erfcct.
'aitswers is to be found in our prior historical excursion. Administrative able accidents due to the circumstance that n<; human syst~":1 can _e P
Jaw, whether. judici~lly created or statutorily imposed. contains. a pleth- . · A bureau is a body which, if it happens to make a wrong de~1~1on ha~ no une ~~
ora of devices to preserve agency discretion thought essential to effcc- blame but itself, and if it happens to make a right decJS1on. offers us
1
tive administration.llf that law is nor to be aptly characterized by Mr. assurance that it will do so again.JO
Bumble's aphorisml it must fo the wage and price control context But what are we to do when symbolic legality wears thin? when ~he
· permit expansive br~athing space. The council had to respond to 50.000 idea that bureaus are subject to review by courts and may be rl'.'.q u;rt:u ~c;
· complaints, 6.000 requests for waiver. and 7SO.OOO requests for inter- se courtlike procedure no longer consoles us? when not on:y rno (1
pretation in its first ninety days. Most cf this work must be done ~utmost of the observen; of the rule of law on parade are shouting thal
"informally." tl.at is, outside whatever transparent procedures. open the emperor has no clothes?
hearings. and judicial review proceedings usually satisfy us char the

2g K LLEWELLYN. THE BRA MB Lio BUSH 3 (1960). . .

27. For
noN TO TifE
asomewhat more extended discussion see M,o.SHAW AND
AMERICAN PUBLIC LAW S\STOI J..07-1 J.. ( 1975).
MERRILL INTROOUC· 29: T: I\RNOLD. THE S\'MBOLS OF GOVERNMENT H (1935).
30. Id. at 205-06.
---·
l l · Perspectives n·· tdealism seems to have passed through reali~m to cynicism without
. ,J '
M_urray Ed,elman summed up the chants of the crowd in the following •1 even a pause at skept\cism. . .
. i. · Skeptics have, however. begun to emefge. In The Pohttcs of R~g~~a·
ss rerrns: 1·. i,r,· 1- tion. Jarnes Q. Wils.on and hir, associates argue;that regulatory a.cuv1t1<·s
ve Administraciv~ agencies are to be understood as economic and political instru· Jl' und the politiCS that produce regulator)' legislation are t~O vaned lO be
rnents of the parties they regulate and benefit not of a reified "society," "general explained satisfactorily by a parsimonious set of h~pocheses.~' Indeed.
will," or "public interest." At the same time they perform this instrumental : so varied and cor,flicting are the political. ecoporn1c, professional. and
function. they perform an equally important expressive function for the polity in~titutional factors th:at affect ea~h b~reau:~ ~ehavior ch~t n~;;single
,1!, a whole: to create and sustain an impression that induces acquiescenceJn the
illy public in the face of private tactics that mifht ochr.rwise be expected to produce :··influence has decisive effo:ts. Wilsen s pmpary conclusion. ~~?r.,, a
ind rt~entment, protest and resistance. ;The instrumental function ... has ibeen ,. summary of nine studies of sc~1te and federal regulatory agencies ~1~n·
I i

on. observed. demonstrated and documented by every careful observer of rcgul,a· lights ··che largely unsupecviscd nature of most regul~t?ry a~c.~v1ty ·
eci- t ory agencies .... The expressive function has received less attentionlfro:m .. Whoever first wished to see regulation carried\on by quas1-mdepffn~~t
i,pe· scholars, though the quiescence of masses in the face of 11 demonstrable de~ial of ·· agencies and commissions has had his boldesf dreams c~me_ t~u~. .
~arl what is promised them dearly calls fur I explanation.J ·\.·,. ,. The Wilson findings arc to some degree c~nsoling. Admm1s~rauon
gin · may operate within a set of legitimating cor.straint_s that are ;l~rgely
Edelman's explanation is rern'iniscent of Arnold's. Agencies ~llay
symbolic. but ~t least administration is ."~t alw_ays a s1mple powe,~_.gr~b.
public fears through the symbols of administrative law. The agency
hant Further exploration of wage-price admimstrat:1on can p_r~duce a ~lm11ar
"inevitably n1anipu!ates and evo~es the myths, rituals, and other syni·
,ir of moral. On reading Robert Kagan'sl~ excellbnt paruc1pant·oijscrver
bols attached to the state in our fulture."u But Edelman·s critiq~~e ls
con· study of the implementation ot'the Nixon freetc order. for cxa~~:~o. one
more troublesomf. In 1935 A£nol~ was concerned with explaining\why
iuidc comes away With the sense tha.l the counci\ Sl\llff Sl.rUg.g)ed \?\tartly lO
bureau• were vllilied and therefore required both to take on the ineffi·
tercd cicnt trapplilJI of Judicial due process and to appear subservient tq:che d<!velop coherent and seosib\e po\idcs and to do 3usuce 1n 111d1\'1dual
1
gality rule of law II embodied in a m,eddlesome and often inappropriate cases within the constraints of those policies~I 11,: . · l
SC of Judicial review. Edelman, thirty years later. sees these symbols as cam· Moreover. in the next experiment ,,·ith ~av.~~price contro.,!-,. 1t 1~
"and ounaalna. seizure of state powe~ by already successful private inter,· Career "voluntary" \... age-price control progr~m. ·Jne discO\·crs ~j~11ili·
1•,1 s. I neHicient but comforting s~·mbolism has become a fraud. Th~ cant attention paid to clr.2r policy staiemenf and rep.ulari1ed 1 tt\Cl'·
f, ,r ms 0£ legislation mask substanti\'e injustice. . ' durcs. notwithstanding the facts P) th:n the ~rov.ra111 wa!"-_:in l''t} f '' L'
ibythc
The emptiness of .. public inrer est ·· and most other legislative fm·mu'· c,,~ation-Congress had gi\'cn no in:.uuction~-:rnd thu:' ( 21 tit[ ~1:'.·
,avoid·
l,H' and the "discretionary .. or "poljtic::il" nature of administration ~av~ uificant judicial review of irnplemcntini O~CJ~ion~ W:I!- not io::ne'l' ,-
erfcct.
1 one to · .nce rhe 1960s become the converlti('nal wi$dom of stud~nts of admin~ pected. except co enforce the agency's rc~ubtions :rnJ 0\''1 l\11tr :·
;·us no 1st ration. And if administrative behavior is not ~uided by law. it is rher, a dures.J7 By adopting detailed sratement of pn~icil'' :ind pcuct·d11~:t:~-:,i'H'
puzz.lc to be explained in terms of s;lrn<' hidden interest of the burea~ oi i
I
'·,'1:'
\L ;, i
ics public and private clientdc. PoP,ular '-·xplanations include econop,it
ren the ( 1971 ;: M. f101t1i<A. Cor-c'-L~~- i,;.H"\10:--1 1u 1111 ,,· ,~, "'·": 1 "'· I · : v.: ,. , :···• -. , , '.]'·:. "\:
d1cories of pri\'att acquisition of ·,q:ul.1uo11 or of bureau bud~cli An"-01 o Coi,.c.1trss ,.:,,;o 1·111 Bt:1t1 J.l'CR.u ·, ( J 97')); Sui:ks l J Ii,· 1 lt,·,,n .. r I , · ,.,, ·•i:H ~ • , ··
Ji r cd tu
Arnold
maximizing (or s~a.bilizing). as ~el1 al'-. micropolicical cheorie~1 o( 1 lotion.i Hell J. of Econ. & M~mL Science 3 I I '171 l: :cl~zma•,. I o .. ·JrJ" ,i .. ·t i:· f' · "·
111tcrcsc,group pohucs and of clln)!r1:$S1unal·bureau organization . 1 Theory o( Rtgw/ation. 19 J. of Law & Econ. ! 11 n<>, hl \
1ng chat ! . l I
111,·, }<)t I I ')l'l,01.
1\·. I- ,

~ ~- M. EoELMAf;4, THf SYMBOi i<' Usr< or ,Ji"'l 1~1 , 'i6 ( I %4). r\ H.J. Q. Wn.soN.
35. Id. at J91.
TIii· i'oLITl•:s or
lO ..

,
Rt.,;1:1 .\

\
\\,;: \
i\l ti i
J~. Id. ,t S7. , I :
\ \. Stt. l!.g .• G. KoLKO. THE TRIL'\ll'H oi Co:--~t.K\'ATl!>M (1963); A. OowNs. JN!me'
fl, MHUCRACY (1967); W. N1SMl"EN. BURtf-1..'\.R:\~\' A!':0 REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMfl-,'T\
36. R. KAG'1-i, it.t:Glil!l"iOI\Y j\)STl\'.I. ( 1978\.
11. Cf. American Fe<lmtion of Labor\'. Kahn. 618 ~1 2d 784 {D.C. Cir. :. ll\,i _
Ii, 'i

l I I
I \\;:I\'\
1! i: \.
: \ I \
. \ I ,
\ t !
 ,i
.· 14 · Perspectives
1j i.'.ii
::a~en_c~ was_ tying Irs own hands, presumably in the interest of open
;a~m1msrrat1on. Admrnistrarivc law may be almost irrelevant to what
h;appens inside the ~dministr~tiv,e black box. but it is not necessarily a
cover for pure Fraud, The bankruptcy of an external .administrative law
~sjnor necessarily a ~1gn of moral decay, of the depravity of public life in
the administrative state.
Yet I prefer solvency. As we have observed, the problem with an
externally oriented ~dministrative law is not mere irrelevance. Arnold
'; ~id not seek to dernonsrrare the symbolic quality of law merely to
describe the wisdom of inefficacy. Symbols have effects, and fr.om his
perspective and the: perspectives of many sinceH the court-centered
, syr;nbols of the rule of law were getting in the way of meaningful action.
An,d while Wilson's,findings may convince us that Edelman's rather
:cy~ical view is not tr!ue generally, the Iatrer's descnpnon has a ring of
occasional truth. If :Conventional legal symbols arc inappropriate to
serve as the model for administrative behavior, then what r:an c:akc their
place? Where arc the horrns that guide administrative aspirations. if not
administrative behavior?
, The answers to Amold's legaJ realist challenge cannot lie in either the
cynicism of an Edelman {for that is defeat) or in Wilson's description of
a dense complexity. The challengP. is to adrnir the limitations of an
externally oriented administrative law and yer to affirm 2 vision of·
administration that is subject to the normative evaluation and irn-
provemcnt that is the promise of legal discourse: to view the adminis-
trative process, like th~ judicial and legislative processes, as somehow in
pursuit of justice and the general welfare: to see "adminlstrauon," like
"democracy .. and "che rule of law," as a motivating ideal.
In part the dlsposicion to construct such a vision is a pragmatic
response to my personal inability to move ficm:y into the camp of the
cynics, But even if the ~ffort is in some sense a working out of individual
~~:r.~ric need, the exploration seems to have a broader utility. Thar
society has collective needs, at least collective wants, seems inescapable.
. I
38'. Sec e.g .• Wright. T1t~;Co11rts 111,d iii~ Rulcmolcing Proces«; Tis, Limus of )ii,du,a/
Rcvic"1. 59 Cornell L Rev, 3fS (197'4). The question of how much admi11is1rali\'l" .1c1ion
has :t9 look like court action could be proposed. unch2riubly. u tht singl.- topic of
I
admir'iistrati~ la.w--on~ th.,t has somehow riveted th~ an .. n,ion of th<" bench .and b.ir for
gweracions. Cf.. for :a: recrnt insunee." Gellho1 n .ant:! Robir,!,on, Rulemalcing .. Dru Prc,-
cns··: An Inconclusive Diplog:u. <18 U. Chi. I.. Rl·v. lOJ (l 981).
\: ' !
I!
V TheQuest.foran/nterna[Administratii:cLaw · 15
!
A d since we Jack the altruistic genetic programming of ,ii<. svu.::
i~:e~t. these needs and wants can be satisfied only through a bu rcau·
cratized application of collective authority. We need somehow to come
,, to terms with our constant demand for institutions-bureaucrac1,:s-
that once created we then·cxcoriate.
. If a set of external controls called administrative la~ no. lon~er
1 comforts us ai: we seek to manage our love-hate relat1onsh1p with
:i bureaucracy, perhaps we can sJe more clearly what needs t~ be done by
. i turning to look inside the bureau~ while retainin? ~ nor~at1ve pers~ec-
:i tive. Might there not be an.in~ernal law of adm,nastrat1on that guides
the conduct of administrators? And might not that la"". be c.apable of
generalization, critique, improvement: even of prod~cmg a sense of
satisfaction. acceptance. and justice quite apart from lt~ connec_t10n to
external leg:il institutions? Might there be in bure~ucr~t1c operation not
merely the pure play of ambitior. self-interest. or tnerua_that confounds
i our collective ideals but alsoi a striving for nor~at1ve_ good~css-
, complex and compromised pe~haps. but only some-tun_es ~bsenL .
:\ The search for such a vision:inside the bureaucracy is. mdeed. rem1-
:: nis~ent of the realist techniq1!~. The purpose ofthis quest. however, 1s
:: not co describe power but to structure responsibili_ty. Fo: the task of
'.if improving the quality of administrative justice is ~ne tnal musl be
:,: carried forward primarily by administrators. The task 1s too c.ompl~x. for
, : the noncxpert. too time and rbourcc consuming for o~ts,dc ins_c,t~·
:/ tions with competing intcrestJ. Moreover, the task requires a pos1m e
!1: commitment to maintaining a~d IY.dandng the full range of values t.hat
;l impinge on the system's funcdoning. The twists ~nd turns of po!:ucal
ii das the episodic and ran~om interests of courts and of outside
Ii, agen , , . 1 ·,
commentators provide information on soc1a lt~eptions an c
· d xpecta·
.
d h d. light ot
1
the ultimat'! effects of bureaucrauc
i ttons an s e some . . . . f h . I
i... · ·
I · · But the ,·ob of e\'alu · ting the s1g01fic:ance o t esed' extern.· ah
.1 routines.
:i communications and, having !thus evaluated them. res~on ing '' n
:Jt appropriate action can reside ~nly with the burea~cra~y itself. ,· ,,
J The central position of the! bureaucracy th~s _1mpl~es ~ correlac1, c
1:: central responsibility for thej quality of adm1~1s.~rauve Justice. Th~
; bureau is not a mere receptacJle for the perspective and prleffercncest o
''· other institutions. a vector sum o f con ten d'~~g e~ t ~r. na . , orC('S . ·:1 .tnat '
. . ..
. ,mp10geon1ts en. f· cu·oning · Itisafocusforpohttcal1nltlatl\CCO,.
; . b : l,1JlnCd
" .
. with technical competence, for the assertion of values eyorn1 tile [Jmt
 16 · Perspectires

~. > •
I
TJtn Out(tfor1mJ11lr.rnof A_dmi~i~trnl1\1r Low. 1 ,,
horizon·of most other political actors. An externally oriente<!,adminis- .
trative Iaw may be adequate when defined in terms of constraints an~,:·.~· d I .. f ·ustice is . Ill
. part. empm '. ·cal and
. in part intuitive . f
abstract ideals; an ir:ternal perspective would be inadequate ~ithoutiit . c1·ons · or "mo e s, o·J· auerns o f en- ·c·o·sm
1
of the perform_,anc.· c o
more in~.trumental vision of the particuJar system of administraa,vei and analytic. By exam1mng p ·11 Jbser~e the types of claims for
justice that is sought to be produced. the disability decision p_rocess ~ve w1 . < These claims seem to imply
For the line administc·ator this should be obvious. He or sheconcinu- leuitimation that are made on
"' . f hc,w disab1hty eos10 .
?~
sydsce~: dma. ki. ng ought to b....e orga-
..
ally faces decisions for which exten1aJ -standards provide no' binding.' distinctive vi!.1ons c, . d cur~ of the prQgram supr,on.
h t the history an struc .. . s
perhaps no relc\'ant, guidelines. Administration goes on, nc;,t just in i nized. visions t a . . . nd the rel~vant statutory pro,v1s10n
}: lthough the patterns of clums a , . ages we can d~efop a
terms of technical rules an4 bureaucratic routines but wi1fo :some!
structure of guiding norms o salient images of the appropri 'e ,peans i ;roject .t~ese visions as rel~tiv. el~ ~nfo~me~ fm:node! of justic~ .: ~::~."hat
for wi~Jdins JegaJ power. Andilike the actors in the externalJe al order, i
. 0 f the charactensucs o · ea
clearer p1cture . • • . • d ·usti icatory appea · 11~!I l(i1: •
' I ii
gives each its d1stmcuve stlU~ture an ~ 1
t the models o~, ~1 usucc 1
the administrator confronts onflicting modes of conceptual~rig the !
normative ..goodness" of thtdministrative system that is be·con- 1 ~q Third, we will be forced:: t~:c~~~::: 0t :he pr~gram are ~~ f11pe~i-
scructed. What are the ima of ..good administration" th';lt1 ,uide · suggestcd by th~ St~UC~":te ~ "I} at critical ~int.S exalt one vis~.*.1.1 r~1le 1'1
.,

bureaucrat~ qeha\'ior, that p mit evaluation and hierarchical gontrol} tive. lmp!cmentmg eo11>10~;:~istrative system must choosF, 1h1ch
How can this tiriternaJ iaw be qonceptualized in terms of its ide;tl types, suppressing others. The a . iore th~ dominant appro~~~;--the
and to whatdeg~ee do these idfals conflict? What are the technf,1u~s by model of justice to employ. I w1.u ex~ . I theoretical and ~mpirical
which administrative ideals are concretely realized. reinforced,: and model of bureaucratic rationahtod y-lm sfo1·tms f tr"'n.gths weakne~'sbs, and
sanctioned? How are they co+ected to or influenced by the norms of .
detail.
11
1 bo ·
Thee a . r~non o fchatm f the dis a~'"
e.o ·
ility program w1·j''b'
~ :,. fCU P) .
. mpcratives, w1thm the context o ~I'. '
the external law of administr.acron? If one could answer these qu~stions;
at least a partial description r· f administrative law from an ~nterna( man,, of the pages that o ow. .
ru-,- ibalanccd ,·icw o :· 's}'Stcrn
Ii·'
perspective would emerge. . • ·11 mpt to come tc a . ·1· d.
Finally. I w1 atte h 1· f burJaucr:uic justice iQ,(~he ts·
1 to asses"' t c qua 1ty O , . 11. . , .
perform:ance- • " . . n~•s an app,eciataon!not onl}
I
THE TASK AHEAD j;. I ability program.
S -h an assessment ,m: 1 uT
t~ \
h J . ic of a bureauqaticaJly r:ttional
i:-. L h
S~fi~er .
as
The pages that follow make bpt a necessary beginning. My a~cerhpt, ' . of thedegreetowh1c. t e og h wa !the tensions bec,~fl'~ that
been concretely re~hz~d, b~t al.so t c a\~ been mana~t"d. T~~ ~efini·
obviously. is to reorient discus1$ion. I will concer,trate on a padtic~lar
model and competmg ideals of 1ust1ce hf i l'le anal,si:. is n-0.•1:. ,~·holly
adminiscraciv~ system -the adJudicacion of claims for social s~culrity · 1us
· c·"·e. that emerges
disability benefits. Oescriptiveh•. I will C',cpfain the administrative rtiis- tion of bureaucratic ,. f dr9m • r::it ,w· im pll'menu
.. nist 1 r · 1 .
uon
· f When one steps bac.-, rom a ma ,:. · , . .
sion: how the systern is scructjred and managC'd; what the ef)'ct~ of sat1s actory.. . ' . from it. and/ forward mtt1 tht" :f•J1p1r1ca 1
structure and ma,nagemC'nt ar on t he definition and r~defini Ori of to ask what at is that we "ant . b
. I 5ystem ll ecomc~ c ..
! ·le~.r th.tl strucd.i'nn.g and
·1 ..
goals and on the output of imp! 'JT1C"n1111~ decisions. lnste:id of d ~c ib- realities of a part!CU ar . . : . •• { lhJr. .1b1.; (Jri!-·(l.1im to
ry,
ing and analyzing the top of the r JH11d uf adminiscrath-e cecisio_
;ng, judkial ,~,·ie~:, or «en •d'r';"'""<h·c _"h••rings," I will b; cf•·
,mt,. controlling a system ot adm,rnstrall\ c ac .1u 0
._. "·ustice"
prov1•.ie J is a very subtle cnlcrpris~.1 !;
11.
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cerned primarily wuh the systerp for manag,ng routine adminisd.fatf •,e THE DISABILITY PROGRAM Mi AN/EXEMPLARY l:'\'.J.L~,IF:Y
action by low-level administratqrs. For it is here that 100 perci1nc of
bu,eau«atic implomentation ~ins, and most of i, ends. I , I . I . . ns for St~d\'in~ wli~u i~~np,t·~
There are always mu tip e ieasol I h d app~aiscJ udll·r d thl' a,p,k:,~
111w t11

Second. l will generate and el~borate some conceptions of ad inis- study. Some reason_s arc persona: h" a about it· I h;1J cum~ns; J11J I
''."_;v, juS<ice and e.·alua,e my S><empla,y bureaucra~·s pe.lor'l'•~« disability program:'' I knew somet mg ! · i/; 1 •
a,.ainsc those conceptions. The technique for developmg these cohce • I .
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3~. St'C' M.~"'H-~\\" CT At.. SOOAL S [UIRll\
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;I 2 8 · Puspeccives ,
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,[1 Tht: Questf<?ran Internal Admin1strati1Je Law. 19
; 'iiknew the Social Security Adminimation (SSA) to be a remarkably
. ,:Open
. •I
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and coopemive bureaucracy. Bu, tne« is a radonale
:".,autobiography. h<yond i I
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ual benefits, which in fiscal year 1982 tnta,e,
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;)epende.n\s draw ann e Medicaid and Medkace payments f~, "h,ch

I; 'i: First, the disability system is a part of the apparatus of the 1~odern *21.2 bilho~ .. V:'hen th L lly eligible are included. ttk toui
; rweJfare State thar ~ouches most Americans. '0 It is important and it is I tllese benef1c1anes are automatica h t m is massive .
. . 1
b"U· By any measure t e sys e
': r-epreser.tative of qur increasingly prevalent systems of mass justice. ' ' figure 1s $32.4 ion. ., . h t decide most of the
! S d h levels of the dec1S1on process t a
, : SSA operates the IACgest system of administrative adjudication in the j
' 'W estern world. lt makes well over J million determinations per year on 1
' . dairns for benefits Jnder the Old.Age, Survivors. Disability, and Health '
;•hJ,,,:::~, ;;it;al
and reconside_ra~ion stag;~~ ':t::a~e :::;;.,~::' :~\ i
·:i, all but · invisible in the !1te~afort
I 'ssureinstmcCI tureh.ec apl 1·11ary • the debate about the
: '.rl\surance (OASDf/1) p,-ograms. The pornoa of the Soda! S.cudty j. "°ministrat1ve a~ . h , f don ALJ he:irings and judicia
'system considered here. the disability program. is itself massive. Since
1,974, initial claims for dis.ability benefits (under both Title II [Disability
I, SSA diiability dec1s1on process lfkocuse edures. While administrative1
ttview, that is, on court and courtp1 e~ro;h fine oints of the Supreme
, ,i~suranceJ and Title:XVI [Supplement.al Security Income] oft.he Social i i,wy.... harangue each oth~ conrrmng t p':-oc..i ~ral ruling billions of
, S<:curity Act) have ~ver~gcd nc.ar.ly 1.250.000 annually.
! "-J..Morcovcr,
I•· a substantial
I number of these claims are decided more
I.
·1 :. .'ourt's or the D.C. Circuits mof/ redce~
e being trans erre , ,or g
ood or ilJ by ~n invisible
'
i a. my of burc3ucratic adJud1c..atotsI to. w om court decisions
liars per year ar . . i h ·- may have
: ~h:~n once. In a typical year In the 1970s. for example. approximat.ely
'250.000 deni.-Js 'at ~e initial st.1ge were appealed for a reconsideration I ~bsolutely no relevance. . r· f olitical .and economic stresses
; debsion. Denials at the r«.onsideration stage yromptcd about 150,000 I 't' Third, the system contains as~ i~s o _P seem ccrtafn to generate ar:
:r~~uescs for hearings bcfoi'e" administrative law judges. Twenty-five , riat. when combined with its~ 11 s1ve s1Jze •. t The basic purpose of the
I ~T · ti managena comp ex1 y. .
icbousand
1 of these he*ing cases went on to a fin~ administrative appeal interesting norma . ve· . fi~s lalwa
1 s been a benevolence comb1 ncu
program is benevolent. yet it
bcfore the appcais Council. and there Were approximardy 10,00() .~ . o· bTt 'insurance was ypropos cd but not included in the
f~i~gs for judicial retiew of so-;faJ securiey disability decisions in the with cauuon. I · I isa r ·t" , ) leg1sl:mort.
. . I .A ttern pts to enact such a Pro gr Ji 11
rdi~ral district courtsl
origina . s6c1a
d f 1935 to 1950 bFLf ore t h e frst
secun J • •
1
legislative st<'ps v,cre•
; ;'°[:here are perhaps 1,600 state· agency persor111.d (supported by S.000 '. taken.
c:ontmue It was romnot until. I 9 o·o t hJ, t a benefits program was prP,,1 ... ·:.,
morie) whose sole funb:ion is to adjudic.ite disability claims. Over 62~
.· . . h one we have t<1>day. . . . . t .
fedJraJ administrativ~ law judr,es hear administrative app,e:1ls frorn . approx1mat1ng t e . . . ' d of the fifties and early s1xt1t·~ iau
s't~f:~ agency deni:rJs. This total of more than 6.000 adjudicators ap- Yet
. by. 1967h the. hberalmng the politics trebnf soc1a. I secun.t}' ' and particul:irJ\· th_,·
pro_·. a."ches the size of ~e combined judicial systems of the stare and . enaed.. .Smee t at time has moved r m retrenc hmenc to occasional d i~J
f ~ .. t.
fedd~al government.s 4£
the United Stat<.-s. And the dajms th.at these . O;is:1b1hcy pro~ram, I •ment. economic shocks. anG an
c,ffi~als adjudicate arf not small. The average, present. discounrt-d i fection. As sticky strucwral une po~- ation rat($ ,,.,hile shrinking the
vil~e of the stream of ittcorne front a successful disability application 1~ ; nging population have acce~erar.ed
. pt:oportion of the popul.auon p.a~ g_
~!p ~~CA taxel~ 't:ongrcss has been
astimc of raising taxes anJ
oy~(!$ 30,000. Oisabilify claims, on the a v·erage, thus have :a ~·;ilue thrt>c
tin/C, that required by ftatute for the puBuit of many civil 'CfJon, ;." ; for,;ed into th~ political!~i~;ew:.~t~:f :onsdousness, the "h,·1 p th\·
fr ~era! district couns. More than 4. 3 miJlion disabled workers and their lir,1iting benefits. The di P ta1· h t has alwa,•s been a pan of
P, · h h hlselcrs .. men tty t a · d. b"J
'di . o_orbutpums f bl. welfare programs. as beguntoafflictthc
.t ec ' h .. isa.1- ·
the,· politics o pu IC
I d d the sacred cow status o . , f the whole social secu r1 t \
. '40.iFor a basic ~tau,tory history of the: prognm up to 197-4 SU COMMITTEE ON w A YS
AND MEANS. 9snt CONG~ 1ST SES!. •• CoM~tnlF.E STAFF REl'ORT ON nu: 01.SAIIUTY INSURANCi
ity program. h dn. ee •
. ·shed .
ma .. .
Congress s tarved for fiscal. protein. r
P!!OGkAJ.f 107-25 (l 97'4j
program as imm1 f
sl·ould not assume rom this sketchy history . t,1:it
.
ivforeover,
"cautious one • •• represents
benevolence . me rely an adjectiv 1-nom1n2r11 c
2
 20 · Perspectives

linkag~ .of distinct programmatic periods. The story is not just benevo-
lence in good times and cautio., in bad. The countervailing tendencies
are built into the program and are represented by the political history
and accrecing statutory ma:ndat.es of each period. The Congress has
continuously believed the proaram to be both C$SentiaJ t.o a basic system
of income security and an ope,1 invitatfon to drop out of the work force.
2 • Justice Models for
It has just as contfnuausJy attempted to mediate this tensi.on by the a Disability Program
device Tom Wolfe ca1Jed ..Mau-Mauing the Flak-Catchers. "t' ll't over-
aiaht, bud1tt, and JesisJative ~eatings. Congress has alternat~>' berated ILi
:L
SSA for lu unresponsiveness to.claimants and for its laxity/in Jetting ;.
them on the rolls. Indeed, it tas had the chutzpah to criticiz9'adrninis., 11
tratlon whilc~saddling SSA w~th a contracted-out state agcncy ad~inis- f
tranve sysf~l(l. that is burdened with aJJ the delkate federal-s;1tate reJa-. THE DEMAND FORJ~STlCE , ·,
tions issues that such systems necessarily entail.'2 ) , ·
. . .. . hi administration of'~isabil-
The disability program thus roots our.general normative inq~frt in an There is asubscant1a~ cm11;a~l~:r;~t:~:~e!Social Security A~~, One
appropr-iate factual c-ontext., For when we ask how administration itv benefits under Titles II d ·h t c• he disability program fails
:;hould respond to normative ~mbiguity and administrative co,raplc:xify, - f h . ltary is concerne t a . : ...
strand o t e cornrnei . . . d'beneficiaries.' This vrew at
we can hilrdly define shou1d without attending to could. Critic:is,n and "d adequate service- to cl21mants an ! . ,1 . 1· .
to prov, e . , · purposes as pate.rr;ia 1scic
th" rtformlar lnaclnct muse bt harnessed to an appreci,.rion of reality. least impJidtly charactert7.e~ the rP.quire majo(ro}e pr}~gr:;:)to a for
We chua turn ~o che task of b111J11:Un1 normative models of adminlstra- llnd therapeutic, purposes t_ ~~ wo~ ~ s d bcher professional~;! pro-
h c·onal soc:1;il serv1-.e, an r,,. ,
in
' ton in tht conti,xt of the aoclal atcurlcy disability pro1ram-111r.ohcexc
, h111acc"r11td by cautlou, ben~volence and repeated criticism.. hea.lt car~, .voca .1 Th .I
f. ilure of the burea1.Jc(atic decision Pr,°:c~ss_ to
1 gram admm1stratton. c af . I . d Jnt and to adopt a; ~en-tee
emphasize the role of pro ess1on~ JU ~mdi r· ~· ' ;; ; i
,, · . . · the program s rna1or e 11:1enq. ·, ; .
orsenca.taon ,s seen as . . .. . • ~oncerned prima,r/ Y;1 with
•
·i
,,,,
I A second more "lcgalist1c persp('Cll\e '· I.: • '" lilts to
1
j' the capacity. of indi\~d~al claim.in'.~ to as;:i:;~,~:ie::~~h;;~~tJ,,s :is
ii disability benefits ' , his ltter:it ur,. is con i :/ ;
..",
! ~i I ~ t '·
i' H.(Cll-4 ''· I \~l-1 l~::~, 1<1:-c,&Su1~'p.lll l9791. Thernuc~tl~prrn.<':·
I

I i'l/ I. .J2 U.S.C. ,.,

lllC)' is arrang"J lwrr
111 11 ,.,oc ·u .1tinn<. Id<. not mt'a"l,0. ~U(J!<'. t
rt·rm, ,.f ~ rn· • ·l'~I i' _ I '. ·~ti~·c: Jo<~ not resp<i?4 ~I -.II to
I I . that thr- htc:rarurc: CHl'd as cxcrnphh-m1: om: u1L1-.a pcrl1> !I, i i:
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1; '. thcccnualconcc-rn,
s" of •hrmh .. ,,
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11111111 11
A~n Mr,~l'll "1 '.1 I! Q 111. ( If I ,r. t. . .. I , '- A"l '~"1 :-.: "' SS ..1q()1~ "111,
''-.\L ~t 1.,,._. "•• ••• • ltal\•Mji '• ·· .,,,! h
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(19-8) S
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P110GRAMS
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D,s,.,u,nrAoi ·01CA't1~11S1R1·,
4 ~. Sr c , (' g .• M. 0~11n11ci.. THE INFU.:~:-ce Of FlOERAL GRANTS ( 1970); Tomlin~pn and · .. coc1.-.tSrct•~1TYnrn1rC1"""n11 "' <I•,,,,. ·1·· . 1 lj'!'i'. i
·'."l.1<ha"·· Tiu [,aforumcnt of Federal S'4ndards in Grant-In-Aid Programs:

I
Suggtscib
:,;, R,cn<f,ciary ln1•0/1•cmcn1. 58 Va. L. Rev, 600 ( 197,~) (and authorities there citi-dH 11
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,.,,iuu 5_2-92.. 95t
f ..,,,' 3. .)Ct', e.g., ·
~::~··s~~~:'~;
' ·
ET AL THE SOCIAL. S~Cl'IU1' A1"11,1s1 R.1,TION, m1m , .
·
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~Lfl;;, D1~""11 ;n A~:, M.-.s,-JurnCE (197 3J!i~1 r;ou, n,
. t ·
co GeNl(t' Washl~$((>n nt
•/..,•
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vcrsicy National Law Ccmu, 19,1 .JJ. Pop",n,of R(prcsencauon ccc r
on a lf~,'1unan1
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