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DIFFEREN CE BETWEEN IN TERPRETATION AN D CON STRUCTION
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The definition of a statute is a, w(irien expression of the direction or intent of a
legislature. The law can be inte½,~eted 9r cons,trued to determine its intended
meaning. The judicial authoritie~ ~an ;define th~ meaning and objectives of the
legislation with the aid of this pro~ess o,f interpretation and construction.
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Construction
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Interpretation 1
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Interpretation is the process 9f i Construction is the process of

asce1taining the true me~r'ling of the 1
usii:1g the legal text to draw
words and the purpose of:tn,e I : '. ' I '
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legislation. ·1 , : 1 ;; • 1 · ·
2 It may be perfonned when a c9riafn It may occur when the language
term or phrase in law has ,an I :' ' ·: and the meaning of phrases in the
unambiguous meaning, : .!,·: · , laws are unclear and ambiguous.
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3 It identifies the methods that cah be :, · It intends to bring it to a

used to interpret any statute. : . ',' ·cor clusion.
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4 It is used to detennine the !Jngµist.ic, The legal impact of the legislative

meaning of a legal text. 'i i ::· : · ij - · t.e~t can be ascertained through
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·:: ,l 11 cq:~?ruction .
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5 !he ambi~uity is remov~cl j' ?YJ! . . i ' ,It- Works to create standards to
mterpretat10n. , I i:. : J ' oy'.~rcome ambiguity
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6 The legal text can be partially ' ltjs necessary to complete
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interpreted.
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7 The interpretation can be. · ' seen,*
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a It is almost like an interpretation
broad fonn of construction ·: , · '.I· ·· }~}vhich the words are considered
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Interpretation and constructionj'kf~ 'tie~~s:sarx ~~ }hsure to receive fair justice. The
court must be ~uick to appl~ t~e.ll~fi }o ~he ~i{~~f:t}on. By using interpretation, the
~ourt can exam_me the mearnng,offHe ,~tatutes'!words, while construction supports
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m the explanation of the laws. ; ; :;,i- . I • ,' .,,
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Concept of Interpretation 1 ,

The concept .0 f interpretation of:a St, tu~e c~nnot be static one._ ~nterpreta_tion of
statutes becomes an ongoing e~ercise 'as newer facts and cond1t1ons continue to
arise. Interpretation of Statutes 1fr r¢qyired for t~ o basic reasons:
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I. Legislative Language: Legisl~tive :1:angyage may be complicated for a
layman and hence may require· interp:retation; and
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2. Legislative Intent: Tne int~nt\on of l~g1slature or Legislative intent 1

assimilates two aspects: I !

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The concept of 'meaning' , i.e. i wnat the word means; and the concept of
'purpose' and 'object' or the 'r~a~on' or 'spfrit' pervading through the statute.
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Necessity of interpretation wotil,d adse only where the language of a statutory

provision is ambiguous, not clear or wbete 'two views are possible or where the
provision gives a different meaning :defeating<the object of the statute. If the
language is clear and unambiguol!ls; ?:o t)e'ed·ofii!iterpretation would arise.
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District Mining Officer and other~ v [ ~ta !ro,ri & :steel Co. and another, (2001) 7
sec 358 Supreme Court has 01:lserve9: ''' ' ;i ' ;: 11
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" It is also a cardinal principle o( t o~~!W~~io~·tl\~t external aids are brought in by

widening the concept of context :~si,inq\µding not only other enacting provisions
of the same statute, but its preal}?bf~i ~9e ·ei isting state of law, other statutes in
pari materia (of the same subject) :ar,9'.t~~ m'i'~chiefwhich the statute was intended
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to remedy." (para 18) .:.:::: · I ; · .· ; · :

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Power of Interpretation '. i .: c ,1 ·J1 /
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The _responsibi_lity of interpre~iTT~ ~~:~.!9??,~tit~iii n rests on the Supreme Court.
The interpretation of t~e const\~~t19t i~.t;~J,rq:t~ei~upreme Court shall make, must
be accepted by all. It mterpre \s thf: c,qnst1tyt!on ,and preserves it. Where a case
involves a substantial questioh.of. lft\\' ;as to:thtr i~terpretation of the constitution
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either certified by the High C6btt.~t ~~fog' sa~isfj~d by the Supreme Court itself,
an_apdpeal shall lie to the Suprwe:~9?V,J~( int~~retation of the question of law
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One of the most important cortdepibai t nndvatibhs within modem original ism is
the distinction between a zone:pf iiite~ r~tatiohi~rld a zone of construction. When
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const'.tutional provisions have det~rm\i;iat~1' lmeaning, decisions find that
meanmg occurs within the int~ : tl'~~ _zdne.: when the original meaning of ~r
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a constitutional provision is indet~nninat<r, decisions are based on something

other than the original meaning _arn:t:p6~ur ';Vithin the construction zone.
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It argues that a variety of techniques enhance the power of interpretation to
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resolve uncertainties and thus gre,;1tly reduce the size of the construction zone.
These techniques are principally su'ppli~d by the language of the law in which the
Constitution is written. The languag~ of the· law's technical legal terms and legal
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interpretative rules provide a precisiori that ordinary language does not. When
these techniques are correctly employed, the construction zone ends up being
small. Under a small construction zone, \ssues that cannot be resolved based on
the original meaning-principally the application of vague terms-rarely arise 1

and, when they do, they of secoli.dary impo'rtance.

We make our case in three "'•f3Yi~:-:1 w;~.,
firs,t oJf~r a conceptual framework for
resolving indeterminacy. We s~9f h<?:'f a\11bigµity can always be resolved by
choosing the attested meeting- ·I
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An interpretive direction thace~i,ste~ ~\:tli~} ou~ding. We also show that many

terms that seem vague are in fact .arnbigµities ·ohelated meaning, as for instance
when the tenn property maY: ,·}11_e~? 1)l~~e;_li~alyropert~ 0~ _real property and
personal property. These amb1F1.pr1es(c;1n,J1k,~ 9ther amb1guit1es, be resolved by
following the better attested me~pipg 1. -:~: . ••.
We then consider constitutiortal• is:s\:i'e!s; ptothi&ntly proffered as examples of
vagueness or other indetermiriad'es anq ·i .h~W:how they can be resolved under our
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framework. :c: )Ci . " )i ·r:::-· y~rc,: '.

We finally show that mod~rri' ' :ofj~i'~~r;-:: ,:schb1arship interpreting important
constitutional provisions makes (mp;Uc\~use'otou'r techniques to find determinate

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meanings rather than the indet~rm,iq~cy:r~guiring construction.
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