DAVAO SAWMILL CO. VS CASTILLO
Both mortgage
Machinery which is movable by nature becomes
immobilized when placed by the owner of the tenement,
property or plant, but not so when placed by tenant,
usufructuary, or any other person having only a
temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent
of the owner.
If the machineries, receptacles, instrument or
implements are not placed by the owner of the tenement
or by his agent, these properties remain as movables
and are not converted into real properties.
BERKENKOTTER VS UNJIENG e HIJOS
Installation of the machinery and equipment in the
central of the Mabalacat Sugar Co., Inc for the use in
connection with the industry carried by that company,
converted the said machinery and equipment into real
property by reason of purpose.
It cannot be said that their incorporation therewith was
not permanent in character because, as essential and
principal elements of a sugar central, without them sugar
central would be unable to function or carry on the
industrial purpose for which it was established.
Inasmuch as the central is permanent in character, the
necessary machinery and equipment installed for
carrying on the sugar industry for which it has been
established must necessarily be permanent.
LOPEZ VS OROSA
Material Man’s Lien – Refectionary
Material Man’s lien could be charged only to the building
for which the credit was made or which received the
benefit of refection.
Holding at the interest of mortagagee over the land is
superior and cannot be made subject to material man’s
lien.
In the absence of specific provision to the contrary, the
building is an immovable property irrespective of whether
or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered
to belong to the same owner.
Lien in favor of the appellant for the unpaid value of the
lumber used in the construction of the building attaches
only to the structure and to no other property of the
obligors.
ASSOCIATED INSURANCE & SURETY CO. INC., VS
IYA
Debtor-mortgagor executed two mortagges in favor of
different mortgagees. First, chattel mortgage in favor of
the petitioner covering the house. Second, real estate
mortage over the same house and lot which the house
was situated in favor of the respondent.
obligations were not paid.
Petitioner foreclosed the chattel mortgage over the
house and eventually purchased it during the auction.
When the real estate mortgage was about to be
foreclosed, petitioner sought for the exclusion of the
house claiming a preferential right over it by virtue of
chattel mortgage.
Respondent, in turn, questioned its validity contending
that since the subject matter thereof was real property,
the same was not valid.
In resolving the issue, court must pass upon the
character of the house – whether it is real property or
personal property.
If the house is a real property, chattel mortgage is not
valid and petitioner does not acquire a preferential right
over the houses.
But if the house is a personal property, then the
petitioner acquires such right.
The court applied Art 415 (1) – there is no other
conclusion except that the house is a real property – it is
so whether it is erected on a land belonging to another.
MAKATI LEASING AND FINANCE CORP VS
WEAREVER TEXTILE MILL, INC.
If a house of strong materials, like what was involved in
tumalad case, may be considered as personal property
for purposes of executing a chattel mortgage thereon as
long as the parties to the contract so agree and no
innocent third party wil be prejudiced thereby, there is
absolutely no reason why a machinery, which is movable
in nature and becomes immobilized only by destination
or purpose, may not likewise be treated as such.
Seized drive motor can be a subject of chattel mortgage.
BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS VS MERALCO
40 steel towers – do not come within the objects
mentioned in paragraph 1, because they do not
constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil.
Steel towers – removable and merely attaché to a
square metal frame by means of bolts, which when
unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from
one place to another.
They do not fall under paragraph 3 for they can be
separated without breaking the material or causing
deterioration upon the object to which they are attached.
Each of these steel towers or supports consists of steel
bars or metal strips, joined together by means of bolts,
which can be disassembled by unscrewing the bolts and
reassembled by screwing the same.
These do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are
not machineries, receptacles, instruments of implements.
MERALCO SECURITIES VS CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS
The court affirmed the propriety of the imposition of
realty tax on the pipeline system of the petitioners on the
ground that the same was considered a construction
adhering to the soil, hence, real property under par 1 of
art 415.
MERALCO VS CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS
Two storage tanks – imposition of real property tax was
proper even if the storage tanks were not embedded in
the land. They may still be considered as improvements
on the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to
the oil industry. Tanks were installed with some degree
of permanence.
The tanks rest or sit on their foundation, the foundation
itself and the walls, dikes, and steps, which are integral
parts of the tanks, are affixed to the land while the
pipelines are attached to the tanks.
CALTEX VS CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT
APPEALS
Machineries shall embrace machines, instruments,
appliances, and apparatus attached to the real estate. It
includes physical facilities available for production, as
well as the installations and appurtenant service
facilities, together with all other equipment designed for
or essential to its manufacturing.
The equipment and machinery, are considered as
appurtenances to the gas station owned by Caltex. Such
fixtures are necessary to the operation of the gas station
and they have been attached or affixed permanently.
Such machineries and equipment are taxable
improvements and within the meaning of assessment
law and real property tax code.
Improvements on land are commonly taxed as realty
even though for some purposes they might be
considered as personalty.
BENGUET CORPORATION VS CENTRAL BOARD OF
ASSESSMENT APPEALS
Real property tax code does not define the “real
property” but simply says that the realty tax is imposed
on real property, such as lands, buildings, machinery
and other improvements affixed or attached to real
property.
Petitioner questioned the imposition of real estate taxes
on the tailing dam it constructed. The court ruled that
“dam” falls within the definition of an “improvement”
because it is permanent in character and it enhances
both the value and utility of petitioner’s mine.
TUMALAD VS VICENCIO
Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in
favor of Tumalad over their house of strong materials
built on a lot rented from Madrigal and Company, Inc.
They defaulted in the payment of their obligation, the
mortgage ws extrajudicially foreclosed and the house
was sold at public auction, the petitioner being the
highest bidder.
Tumalad filed an action for ejectment. Respondents
impugned the legality of the chattel mortgage and its
subsequent foreclosure on the ground that the house,
being an immovable, could only be subject of a real
estate mortgage and not chattel mortgage.
The court applied the principle of estoppel since the
parties treated the subject house as personalty.
Although there is no specific statement referring to the
subject house as personal property, yet by ceding,
selloing or transferring a property by way of chattel
mortgage could only have meant to convey the house as
chattel, or at least, intended to be treated as such, so
that they should not be allowed to make an inconsistent
stand by claiming otherwise.
LA BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASSOCIATION VS
RAMOS (jan 2004)
FTAAs with WMCP are unconstitutionsl. Allowing WMCP
to have control over its management and operation of
mineral resources contravenes the constitution, which
stipulates that “ecxploration, development, and
uutilization of natural resources shall be under the
control and supervision of state.
FTAAs provided beneficial ownership of the State-owned
resources to corporations, which effectively leaves the
State with nothing but a bare title.
(December 2004)
It is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of
discretion to the Chief Executive, given the nature and
complexity of such agreements, humongous amounts of
capital and financing and intricacies of trade, coupled
with state’s need to maintain flexibility in dealings in
order to preserve and enhance our country’s
competitiveness in world markets.
CHAVES VS PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY
Sub-merged lands are part of the State’s inalienable
natural resources and classified as property of public
domain.
Sub-merged lands, like waters (sea or bay) above them,
are part of the State’s inalienable natural resources.
Submerged lands are property of public dominion,
absolutely inalienable and outside the commerce of man.
This is also true to foreshore lands. Any sale of
submerged or foreshore lands is void being contrary to
the constitution.
USERO VS COURT OF APPEALS
Existence of a creek between the properties of the
parties, Petitioner cannot law claim of lawful ownership
of that portion because the same forms part of public
dominion.
Petitioner cannot legally stop the private respondents
from rip-rapping the bank of the creek to protect the
latter’s property from soil erosion.
Par 1 of Art 420 includes creeks which is a property
belonging to the public domain and is not susceptible to
private ownership. Being a public water, it cannot be
registered under Torrens system in the name of an
individual.
LAUREL VS GARCIA (prevailing rule)
All properties of the State are devoted or intended for
some public service are likewise part of public dominion.
These properties cannot be used indiscriminately by
anyone but only those that are authorized by proper
authority.
Example: Roponggi property
Abandonment of the intention to use Roponggi property
for public service and to make it a patrimonial property
cannot be inferred from the non-use alone specially if the
non-use was attributable not to the government’s own
will but to a lack of financial support to repair and
improve the property.
TANTOCO VS MUNICIPAL COUNCIL OF ILOILO
Municipal properties necessary for the governmental
purposes are public in nature. Auto trucks used by the
municipality for street sprinkling, police automobile,
police stations and concrete structure with the
corresponding lots used as markets were declared
exempt from execution and attachment since they were
not patrimonial properties.
CEBU OXYGEN ACETYLENE VS BARCILLES (old
rule)
City council of Cebu declared certain portion of an
existing street as an abandoned road “ the same not
bein included in the city development plan”
subsequently, by another resolution, it authorized the
acting mayor to sell the land through public bidding.
There was no explicit conversion of said property for
public use into patrimonial property, SC declared the
withdrawal of the property in question from public use
and such sale is valid.
MUNICIPALITY OF SAN MIGUEL VS FERNANDEZ
Public funds are not subject to levy and execution. They
are held in trust for the people, intended and used for the
accomplishment of the purposes for which municipal
corporations are created.
Not only public property, but also the taxes and public
revenue of such corporations cannot be seized under the
execution against them, either in treasury or when in
transit.
GOVERNMENT VS CABANGIS
The government owns the reclaimed land in the sense
that it has become the property of public dominion,
because in letting it remain submerged, the previous
owner may be said to have abandoned the same.
Having become part of the sea or seashore, it became
the property for public use.
The land, having disappeared on account of the gradual
erosion to the ebb and flow of the tide, and having
remained in such a state until they were reclaimed from
the sea by the filling done by the government, are public
land.
Lands reclaimed from sea in consequence of works
constructed by the State, or by the provinces, pueblos or
private persons, with proper permission, shall become
the property of the property constructing such works,
UNLESS otherwise provided by terms and conditions of
the grant of authority.
HILARIO VS SALVADOR
An accion reinvindicatoria is a suit which ahs for its
object the recovery of the possession over the real
property as owner.
It involves recovery of ownership and possession based
on said ownership.
Accion publiciana on the other hand, is one for the
recovery of possession of the right to possess. An
ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after
the occurrence of the cause of action or from the
unlawful withholding possession of the realty.
SAMPAYAN VS COURT OF APPEALS
Not all oppositors in cadastral cases are actual
possessors.
SANTOS VS AYON
It is not necessary that the petitioner had prior
possession of the questioned property before he could
file an action for unlawful detainer.
When a possession which was originally lawful becomes
unlawful afterward, it becomes a cause f action for
unlawful detainer.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but becomes unlawful
when the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon
demand by the owner.
LUNOD VS MENESES
Respondent is an owner of a fishpond and a strip of
land. The land was converted into a fishpond and by
means of a dam and a bamboo net, prevented the
passage of water through Paraanan into the Taliptip
River.
Consequently, the lands of lunod became flooded and
damaged by stagnant waters.
Court declared that respondent was under the obligation
to respect the statutory easement of waters charged
upon the property and had no right to close the passage
and outlet of waters flowing from the lands of plaintiffs
through his lands.
It is true that the code authorizes every owner to enclose
his estate or fence it, but such is not absolute. Such right
is limited by easement imposed upon the estate.
BERNARDO VS BATACLAN
Although it is true it was declared therein that in the
event of the failure of the builder to pay the land, after
the owner thereof has chosen this alternative, the
builder’s right of retention provided in Art 546 is lost,
nevertheless there was nothing said that as a
consequence thereof, the builder loses entirely all rights
over his own building.
The court approved the sale of the land and
improvement in a public auction applying the proceeds
hereof first to the payment of the value of the land and
the excess, if any, was ordered to be delivered to the
owner of the house in payment thereof.
IGNACIO VS HILARIO
Should the parties do not agree to leave things as they
are and to assume the relation of lessor and lessee,
another remedy is suggested in this case.
Owneer of the land is entitled to have the improvement
removed when after having chosen to sell his land to the
other party (i.e. builder in good faith, fails to pay the
same). In this situation, builder’s right to retention
provided in art 456 is lost.
DEPRA VS DUMLAO
Right to choose between appropriating the improvement
or selling the land on which the improvement of the bps
stands, is given to the owner of the land.
The owner of the land is the one who is authorized to
exercise the option, because his right Is older and cause
of the principle of accession, he is entitled to the
accessory thing.
TECHNOGAS PHILIPPINES MANUFACTURING
CORPORATION VS COURT OF APPEALS
Technogas was allowed to invoke the benefits of art 448
of ncc (to compel the landowner to make choice between
two options) 1. To appropriate the building by paying
indemnity required by law or 2. Sell land to builder
although it is not the builder of the building and.
Improvements but merely acquire the same by sale from
the builder in good faith.
ORTIZ VS KAYANAN
Possession in good faith ceases from the moment
defects in the title are made known to the possessors, by
extraneous evidence or by suit for recovery of the
property by the true owner.
All frutis from the time he is summoned in court or when
he answers must be delivered to the owner and paid by
him to the owner.
But even if GF ceases, he is still entitled to retention
under art 456 until full reimbursement for all necessary
and useful expenses.
Right of retention is analogous to contract of antichresis
and may be considered as means of extinguishing
obligation, inasmuch as the right to retain only last for a
period necessary to enable the creditor to be reimbursed
from the fruits for necessary and useful expenses.
GEMINIANO VS COURT OF APPEALS
Art 448 and 456 does not apply to lessees for their
occupation would continue only during the lifetime of the
lease. Geminiano refused to appropriate the
improvements, they can’t compel them to reimburse.
Neither can they retain the premises until reimbursement
is made. Their sole right is to remove the improvements
without causing impairments upon the property leased.
PLEASANTVILLE VS COURT OF APPEALS
Good faith consists in the belief of the builder that the
land he is building on is his and his ignorance of any
defect or flaw in his title. And as good faith is presumed,
petitioner has the burden of proving bad faith on the part
of Kee.
At that time he built improvements on lot 8, Kee believed
that said lot was what he bought from petitioner. He was
not aware that he lot delivered to him was not lot 8.
COLEONGCO VS REGALADO
Art 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the
land is the bpd who then later loses ownership of the
land by sale or donation.
Art 361 of civil code is not applicable in this case, for
regalado constructed the house on his own land before
the sold said land to Coleongco.
Art 361 applies only in cases where the persons
constructs a building on the land of another in good or
bad faith.
True owner is the bps on his own land, issue of gf or bf is
irrelevant.
PECSON VS COURT OF APPEALS
The court applied by analogy the provision of art 448 on
indemnity to a builder who loses ownership of his land
when the same was auctioned off by a local government
unit for failure of the landowner to pay real estate taxes.
Art 448 refers to a land whos ownership is claimed by 2
or more parties, one of whom has built some works, or
sown or planted something. The building, sowing or
planting may have been in GF or in BF.
Rule in GF laid down in art 526 shall be applied in
determining whether a bps had acted GF.
Art 448 does not apply to a case where the owner of the
land is the bps who then loses ownership of the land by
sale or donation.
MERCADO VS COURT OF APPEALS
To be deemed a builder in GF, it is essential that a
person asserts title to the land on which he builds (it is
essentials that he be a possessor in concept of owner
and that he be unaware that there exists in his title or
mode of acquisition any flaw which invalidates it.
REPUBLIC VS COURT OF APPEALS
It ordered that the lower court cannot order the
registration of two lots in the names of private
respondents since these lots were portions of the bed of
the meycauayan river and are therefore classified as
property of the public domain under art 420 (1)and art
502 par 2.
Elements of accretion are: 1) deposit must be gradual
and imperceptible 2) that it be made through the effects
of the current of the water and 3) that the land where
accretion takes place is adjacent to the banks or rivers.
The requirement is that the deposit must be due to the
effect of the current state if the river is indispensible.
Alluvion must the exclusive work of nature.
In this case, there is no evidence that the addition to the
said property was made gradually to through the effects
of the current of the meycauayan and bocaue rivers.
GRANDE VS COURT OF APPEALS
Accretion does not automatically become registered land
just because the lot which receives the same is covered
by Torrens title, thus the accretion to registered land
does not preclude acquisition of additional area by
another persons through prescription.
Ownership of a piece of land is one thing; registration
under Torrens system of that ownership is another.
Ownership over the accretion received by the land
adjoining a river is governed by the civil code.
Imprescritibility of registered land is provided in the
registration law.
Registration under Land registration and cadastral act
does not vest or give title to the land, but merely
confirms and thereafter, protects the tile already
possessed by the owner, making it imprescriptible by
occupation of thirs parties. But to obtain this protection,
the land must be placed under the operation of
registration law, wherein certain judicial procedures have
been provided.
In the same vein, registration under Torrens system
does not protect the riparian owner against diminution of
the area of his registered land through gradual changes
in the course of an adjoining stream.
HEIRS OF EMILIANO NAVARRO VS IAC
Third requisite of accretion that the alluvion is deposited
on the portion of claimant’s land which is adjacent to the
river bank is lacking. Claimant’s own tract of land where
the accretion has taken place adjoins the Manila bay,
which is not a river, but a sea. Disputed land is not an
accretion on a river bank, but one that is on a sea bank.
Art 457 is not the applicable law but art 4 of Spanish law
of water of 1866 – lands added to the shores by
accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of
the sea, form part of the public dominion.
BAES VS COURT OF APPEALS
If the riparian owner is entitled to compensation for the
damage loss or to loss of his property due to natural
causes, there’s still all the more reason to compensate
him when the changes in the course of the river is
effected through artificial means.