1st MEMO PUNDITS MEMORIAL FORMATTING COMPETITION, 2020

Important instructions:

1. It is to be assumed that all content of this memorial is accurate. No part of the content of this memorial should be
changed. This includes, the issues, arguments, content of the citations, spellings of words etc.
2. ONLY the formatting of this memorial needs to be changed along. You must also make the citations uniform.
3. Please go through the Rules for this competition in detail before attempting to format this memorial.
4. Please remove this page before submitting the memorial.
5. In case of questions, please email us at contact@memopundits.com
 Title of the competition: 1ST Memo Pundits Memorial Formatting Competition, 2020
Subject matter of the case– lifting of corporate veil vis-à-vis absolute liability

court: District Court of Memo Pundits

Civil Petition No. 77 of 2013 filed by Govt. of Indie Islands
under Sections 9, 15 & 20 of
The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908
And
Plaintiff = In the Matter Between Govt. of Indie Islands...……………...…………………………………………..
v.
Defendant 1 - CBO Private Limited …………..………………..…………..…....
Defendant 2 – Popat Lal Sharma…………..………………..…………..…....
APRIL 2020

Memorandum on Behalf of The [INSERT Side]

tABLE OF CONtENTs
Table of Abbreviations
Table of Authorities
statement of jurisdiction

The Defendants have been brought before this Hon’ble District Court under Ss. 9, 15 and 20 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.
The present memorandum sets forth the facts, contentions and arguments in the present case.
synopsis of facts

1. Background of AML Company Limited (ACL)

ACL is a company registered under the Companies Act, 2006 of the Zaniland, having its registered office is at Swenska Islands. It
had incorporated about 20 companies in various countries of the world with presence in power generation, chemicals, dies,
pesticides and pharmaceuticals sectors.
2. Background of CBO Power Limited (CPL)
CPL is registered under the Companies Act, 1956, for generating electricity using new technology developed by ACL. The
registered office of CPL is at SOZA Plaza, Kodagu, the Indie Islands.
3. Relationship between ACL and CBO
CPL is a wholly owned subsidiary (750 Crores of investment) of ACL. CPL and ACL had a technology transfer agreement, which
contained a profit sharing agreement between them
4. Ensuing Events
The Meterology Department of Moziland cautions all the coastal states about the possibility of heavy wind and huge rainfall.
Many states including the Indie Islands evacuated people to safe places.
However, due to leak of materials from the facility of CPL at the time of heavy wind, private and public property worth tens and
thousands of crores was damaged.
5. Suit for Damages
Since, the laws of Moziland impose absolute liability on corporations for such losses, the Government of Indie Islands files a suit
for damages from CPL. ACL, parent company of CPL, is also included as one of the Defendants. The Government of Indie Islands
pleaded for piercing the veil of incorporation. The matter is listed for final hearing.
issues raised
The following questions are presented before this hon’ble court in the instant matter:
Whether or not suit for damages filed by Govt. of Indie Islands is maintainable.
Whether Or Not The Corporate Veil So Unfurled Should Be Pierced In Order To Make ACL Absolutely Liable For The Loss.
Whether cyber attacks against the computer systems of The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland,
and constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation?
summary of arguments

1. THE A PPEAL F ILED BY GOVT . OF INDIE I SLAND IS NOT MAINTAINABLE.

The present suit for damages is maintainable for two reasons.
First, ACL has been wrongfully impleaded as a Defendant as it is not a necessary party.
Lastly, ACL is a company with its registered office outside Moziland and thus Courts of Moziland lack jurisdiction.

2. The Corporate Veil So Unfurled Should not Be Pierced and ACL and CPL are not Absolutely Liable For The Loss.
The Corporate Veil should not be pierced for three reasons.
First, ACL and CPL are not one single economic unit and CPL is not ACL’s agent.
Secondly, ACL and CPL are two separate legal entities and the situation does not demand piercing of corporate veil.
Lastly, ACL and CPL are not absolutely liable as there is non-fulfillment of the essentials of absolute liability principle.

3. Whether cyber attacks against the computer systems of The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to
Riesland, and constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation?
First, The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland
Secondly, Riesland should be held responsible for failing to prevent attacks originating from its territory
Thirdyly, The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham constitutes an
internationally wrongful act.
arguments advanced
1. The Suit filed by the Govt. of Indie Islands is not Maintainable.
The Govt. of Indie Islands has filed a suit for damages against CPL in which ACL is impleaded along as one of the Defendants. 1 It is
contended that this suit is not maintainable on the grounds that ACL is firstly, wrongfully impleaded as a Defendant and
secondly, a company with its registered office outside Moziland 2 and thus, conferring no jurisdiction upon Courts of Moziland to
file a suit against ACL.
1.1.Issue of Maintainability is a subject matter in the Final Hearing.
The present suit is in its final stage of hearing.3 It is submitted that even though the present hearing is final, the issue of
maintainability can be raised. Furthermore, in absence of any express statutory provision prohibiting or limiting the court’s
power to entertain such preliminary objection, it would be a gross miscarriage of justice if the same were not entertained.
1.1.1.Preliminary objections Can be raised in the Final Hearing of a Suit.
For final hearing, if the question regarding maintainability of the suit is raised, 4 it has been held that it becomes the duty of the
Court to consider the same.5 In addition, it is the obligation of this Court to apply the law notwithstanding whether any such
objection is raised by any of the parties or not. 6 The High Courts of the country in umpteen cases have entertained preliminary
objections7 even when the hearing was in its final stage. 8
1.1.2.Emphasis must be supplied on Principals of Natural Justice.
It has long been held that it is sine qua non for procedures of law to sub serve Principles of Natural Justice. 9 If in the present
case, the Defendants are not given a fair opportunity to raise preliminary objection on the suit, which might have been wrongly
instituted against them, then it will be a prima facie abrogation of Audi Alteram Partem, or the first principle of Natural Justice
which says that the person concerned must be heard before a decision is taken 10 by giving a ‘full and fair opportunity’ 11
1.2. ACL has been wrongfully impleaded in the Present Suit.
ACL in the present suit has been impleaded as a Defendant. 12 In the instant case, ACL has been impleaded as a necessary party. 13
A necessary party is one in the absence of which, no order can be made effectively, 14 and thus the party is vitally affected by the
case. 15
In arguendo, assuming that if ACL were to be a necessary party, then the decision of the present suit should have direct
ramifications on the ACL. However, it is submitted that the ACL and CPL are two different and separate legal entities sharing
profit,16 a contention which has been elaborated in the later stages of this submission. Whatever be the order of the case, ACL
will not be vitally affected and thereby ceases to be necessary party as it had no role to play in creation of the law whose
constitutional validity stands questioned.
1.3. Company with registered office located not in Moziland cannot be sued in a Moziland Court.
The Companies Act, 1956 provides for institution of a suit in the High Court at the place where the registered office of the
company concerned is situated.17 In the present case, ACL, which is the Defendant, has its registered office at Swenska Islands,
which is itself a part of Zaniland. Since S. 10 of the Companies Act, 1956 lays down imperatives for institution of a suit, such
imperatives must be necessarily adhered. Since the requirement regarding registered office is not satisfied, the suit is not
maintainable.
Merits
2. the corporate veil so unfurled should not be pierced and ACl should not be Absolutely liable for the loss.

1
¶ 6, MOOT PROPOSITION,...
2
Ibid, ¶ 1.
3
Ibid, ¶ 7.
4
J.S. OCEAN LINER V. M.V. GOLDEN PROGRESS, 2007 (2) ARBLR 104 {Bom}.
5
Smt. Shanti Devi (Dead) v. Gian Chand, (2008) 2 PLR 393
6
Ibid
7
R. Maria Thangam V. U. Murugan & Ors, [1979] 2 LLJ29.
8
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd v. State Of Bihar & Ors, 1986 AIR 1780, 1986 SCR (3) 553
9
Ridge v. Baldwin, (1963) 2 AER 66 (HL).
10
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248.
11
GENERAL COUNCIL OF MEDICAL EDUCATION & REGISTRATION OF U.K. V. SANCKMAN, (1943 AC 627).
12
Supra note 1, ¶ 6.
13
Ranganatha VS MohanLal AIR 1989 22
14
Udit Narain Singh v. Board of Revenue, 1963 Supp. (1) SCR 676; BANERJEE, WRIT REMEDIES, P. 702 (4TH ED., 2007)
15
Ibid.
16
Supra note 1, ¶ 3.
17
The Companies Act, S. 10(1)(a) [1956].
CPL, the company responsible for the present loss, is a subsidiary of ACL. 18 To make ACL liable for the loss, the corporate veil
must be lifted, without which ACL will not be liable for the loss absolutely. The Soloman principle stands locus classicus on
matters relating to separate legal entities. 19 It is contended that by applying the same, ACL and CPL should be rendered to be
two separate legal entities and thus, ACL should not be liable for any loss in any way.

2.1. The Corporate Veil should not be pierced.

2.1.1.CPL and APL are not one Single Economic Unit.

2.1.1.1.Inapplicability of the DHN principle to the Present case.

The concept of Single Economic Unit was found in the DHN case20 and it seems that it is only this authority, which supports the
contention on behalf of the Plaintiff that two corporations may be taken as one single economic unit. However, it is submitted
that in Woolfson vs Strathclyde Regional Council Lord Keith, said in relation to DHN:

“I have some doubts whether in this respect the Court of Appeal properly applied the principle that it is appropriate to pierce
the corporate veil only where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts.” 21

Thus, the articulated characterization of the applicable principle, namely that “it is appropriate to pierce the corporate veil only
where special circumstances exist indicating that it is a mere façade concealing the true facts” was narrowed. 22 The courts will
not lift the veil merely because it would be in the interests of justice. 23

2.1.1.2.Other Judicial Pronouncements against the Single Economic Unit principle.

In Adams vs Cape Industries, where Cape was the English parent company of an international group,
which mined asbestos in South Africa that it sold to various countries and its workers sued Cape for
damages for disease alleged to have been caused by the asbestos. 24 It was found that the DHN and
other cases all involved the interpretation of a statute or a document and so did not apply here 25 and
rejecting the argument that Cape Group should be treated as one, and said: “…save in cases which turn
on the wording of particular statutes or contracts, the court is not free to disregard the principle of
Salomon vs A Salomon & Co Limited26 merely because it considers that justice so requires. Our law, will
nevertheless under the general law fall to be treated as separate legal entities with all the rights and
liabilities which would normally attach to separate legal entities. …” 27

The court said that the motives of those behind the alleged façade could be very important. 28 In the
present case, there is firstly, no particular statute or contract in existence to hold them as single
economic unit and secondly, the motive behind the alleged façade was nothing but to expand its
business to become one of the largest corporates of the world. 29 Furthermore, lifting the corporate veil
merely on the basis of the existence of a single economic entity could not be reconciled with the
principle of independent legal capacity. 30

2.1.2. CPL is not ACL’s agent.

It is well-settled that the mere fact that a man holds all the shares in a company does not make the business carried on by that
company his business, nor does it make the company his agent for the carrying on the business, this proposition is just as true if
the shareholder is itself a limited company.31
18
Supra note 1, ¶ 3.
19
Salomon v. A Salomon & Co Ltd, [1897] AC 22.
20
DHN Food Distributors Ltd. v. Tower Hamlets London Borough Council, (1976) 1 WLR 852.
21
Woolfson v. Strathclyde Regional Council, [1978] UKHL 5.
22
Ibid.
23
Trustor AB v. Smallbone, [2001] 2 BCLC 436.
24
Adams v. Cape Industries, [1990] Ch 433.
25
Creasey v. Breachwood Motors Ltd, [1993] BCLC 480.
26
Supra note 19.
27
Supra note 24.
28
Ibid.
29
Supra note 1, ¶ 1.
30
Marcus Lutte, Legal Capital In Europe, p 200.
31
smith, stone & knight V. Birmingham Corp., [1939] 4 All. E.R. 116 (KB).
Merely because ACL held all the shares in CPL, it cannot be inferred that CPL was acting as an agent of APL. It is therefore
submitted that there are no facts available at hand, for instance, the board of directors were same or the management of CPL
was dominated by ACL, to manifest that CPL was truly an agent of APL.

2.1.3.ACL and CPL are two Separate Legal Entities.

It is contended that ACL and CPL are two separate legal entities. While CPL is a company formed and incorporated under the
Companies Act, 1956 in Moziland, ACL is a foreign corporation incorporated under the Companies Act, 2006 in Zaniland. 32 It is
submitted that ACL was only a shareholder in the CPL, holding its equity ownership during the relevant period. It is also denied
that ACL could exercise control over any action or conduct of the CPL or that the CPL could be treated as the agent or alter ego
of the ACL.
On the legal question relating to lifting of veil, it is submitted that the concept of piercing a corporate veil cannot and does not
arise between two-established and duly registered corporate bodies save when the corporation has been set up to evade or
defraud government revenue or share holders.33
The role of the ACL in the Indie Island project of CPL was to the extent manifest by the ‘technology transfer’ Agreement. 34 It is
contended that these agreements were agreements between the two separate corporate entities and that the role of the ACL in
the design of the project was only that of a provider of new technology by ACL to CPL.
In arguendo, even if ACL authorized, ratified, or directed the actions of the CPL, it would still be the basic rule of the corporate
form that shareholders are not liable for the acts of a corporation. 35 Even the “direct participation” theory of liability is limited to
situations in which the parent corporation’s control over particular transactions is exercised in disregard of the separate
corporate identity of the subsidiary. 36
2.1.4. The situation does not demand Piercing the Corporate veil.
Plaintiff may pierce the corporate veil where there is evidence showing “(i) that the owner exercised complete domination over
the corporation with respect to the transaction at issue; and (ii) that such domination was used to commit a fraud or wrong that
injured the party seeking to pierce the veil.”37 There seems to be no single fact to support any of the above-mentioned criteria
and thus it is submitted that piercing the corporate veil in this case is not required.
In arguendo, while complete domination of the corporation is the key to piercing the corporate veil, such domination, standing
alone, is not enough; existence of a wrongful or an unjust act towards Plaintiff is required. 38 In other words, Plaintiff must
establish that the owners, through their domination, abused the privilege of doing business in the corporate form to perpetrate
a wrong or injustice against that party such that a court in equity will intervene, 39 which the Plaintiff in the present case has
failed to establish as there is no fact to aid the contention that the domination was mala fide.
2.2. There is no Absolute Liability arising in the Present case.
2.2.1. Inapplicability of the M.C. Mehta case to the present facts and circumstances.
In M.C. Mehta vs Union of India, the court set out a rule of absolute liability for an “enterprise” engaged in hazardous or
inherently dangerous industry.40 The M.C. Mehta case involved an oleum gas leak at a plant operated by Shriram Food and
Fertilisers Industries, and nothing therein suggests that Shriram was a subsidiary or owned a subsidiary or was in any way a
member of a corporate group.41
2.2.2.In Arguendo, there is Non-fulfilment of essentials of the Principle of Absolute Liability.
The principle of absolute liability has under its ambit, the ‘enterprises engaged in hazardous activities’. 42 In the present case CPL
is involved in generating electricity. It is contended that generating electricity is not a ‘hazardous activity’. Our civilization could
not exist without electricity, and those who supply it are benefactors to mankind. 43 Therefore, the high degree of care required
may be said to be reasonable care in view of the great potential danger involved, but the same cannot be regarded as a
‘hazardous activity’.44 Moreover, the U.S. Court in Hedges vs Public Service Co. of Indiana accepted that ‘it seems quite clear that
we have not in the past, nor will we now, impose absolute liability upon the power companies.’ 45 Thus, it is submitted that CPL is
not absolutely liable for the loss so caused, as generating electricity is not a hazardous activity.

32
Supra note 1, ¶¶ 1and 2.
33
LIC vs. Escorts, 1986 AIR 1370.
34
Supra note 1, ¶ 2.
35
gunther v. Capital One, N.A., 703 F. Supp. 2d 264, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2010).
36
Esmark, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 887 F.2d 739, 759 (7th Cir. 1989).
37
Am. Fuel Corp. v. Utah Energy Dev. Co., 122 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 1997)
38
Morris VS Dorris, 623 N.E.2d at 1161.
39
MAG Portfolio, GMBH v. Merlin Biomed Grp. LLC, 268 F.3d 58, 64 (2d Cir. 2001).
40
M.C. Mehta vs. Union of India, A.I.R. 1987 SC 1086 .
41
Ibid.
42
Ibid.
43
Brigham versus. moon lake elec. Assn., 470 P.2d 393, 395 (Utah 1970).
44
Supra 43.
45
HEDGES V. PUBLIC SERVICE CO. OF INDIANA, 396 N.E.2D 933, 937 (IND. APP. 1979).
 3. WHETHER CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER & WALSINGHAM ARE

ATTRIBUTABLE TO RIESLAND, AND CONSTITUTE AN INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT FOR WHICH AMESTONIA IS ENTITLED

TO COMPENSATION?

The cyber attacks against the computer systems of The Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are (I) attributable to Riesland,

and (II) constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.

3.1. THE CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER & WALSINGHAM ARE ATTRIBUTABLE TO

RIESLAND.

Under International law, a State can be held responsible for the acts of even non-state actors (A) directly if the State exercises

effective or overall control over the actors and (B) indirectly if the State failed to prevent attacks originating from its territory.

3.1.1. Riesland should be held directly responsible for having control over the actors.

As per Article 2 on State Responsibility there are two conditions which need to be fulfilled for any act to qualify as an

internationally wrongful act; i.e. that the given act should be adequately associated to conduct, attributable to a State and there

must be a breach of an international obligation which the State owes to the other state. 46 This responsibility under deliberation

can be extrapolated from the applicable international customs 47 that foresee that the non-fulfillment of a responsibility to avoid

damage, even in the lack of such intent, breaches a state responsibility. 48

3.1.2. “EFFECTIVE CONTROL” TEST SATISFIED

An effective control over the non-state actors would mean that the State was responsible for financing and supporting of the

non-state actors in course of which alleged violations were committed. 49 Thus, as the test evolved by the ICJ, State participation

46
Crawford, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBILITY 81 (2002); New Zealand vs
France, 20 R.I.A.A. 217, 251 (1990) ¶ 75.
47
Modi Spg & Wvg Mills v. ITO, (1975) 101 ITR 637; See also Mukhtiar Singh Sandhu v. ITO, (1986) 160 ITR 526 (P&H);
Nagrath Chemicals Works (Pvt) Ltd v CIT (2004) 265 ITR 401 (All); AMID DHANDHA, NS BINDRA'S
INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 250 (11th Ed. 2010)

48
Supra Note 118 , at 84 .
49
Nicargua vs United States of America, I.C.J Reports 1986 , p.14 (June 27).
to the extent of planning, direction, support and execution of the operations are required for a successful attribution. 50 In a

cyber context, use of State cyber expertise during planning of specific cyber attack would establish State responsibility for an

internationally wrongful crime.51 Moreover motive is one of the guiding factors for attributing a cyber attack. 52

In this case the malware which was used in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses within Riesland’s

territory that are associated with Riesland’s computer infrastructures. 53 Moreover it is evident that Riesland supported the

attack from the fact that significant segments of code in the malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’

program which are otherwise not known use or available to the general public. 54 Moreover motive of harm can be ascertained

from the fact that Riesland had requested Amestonia to recover the information Frost had downloaded, believed to be held by

either Chester & Walsingham or The Ames Post, and return it to Riesland.55 In light of Nicargua case, providing of malware and

necessary training can be likened to arming and training. 56 It is thus submitted that as per ICJ’s preponderance of evidentiary

standard,57 Riesland can be held liable for cyber attacks as it had ‘effective control’ over the attackers.

3.2. RIESLAND SHOULD BE HELD RESPONSIBLE FOR FAILING TO PREVENT ATTACKS ORIGINATING FROM ITS TERRITORY.

The principle of indirect responsibility has evolved from the principle that host state has a duty to prevent terrorist attacks

emanating from its territory. 58 A state’s apathy or disregard for terrorist activity within its territory triggers its responsibility as

though it had directly participated in the attack. 59 Expansion of the State responsibility is based upon the omission of a State to

50
Rene Vark, ‘State Responsibility for Private Armed Groups in the Context of Terrorism’, Juridica Int'l XI 189 (2006); See also
Vincent-Joel Proulx, ‘Babysitting Terrorists: Should States Be Strictly Liable for Failing to Prevent Transborder Attacks?’, 23
BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 621 (2005).
51
Michael N. Schmitt, TALINN MANUAL ON THE INTERNATIONAL LAW APPLICABLE TO CYBER WARFARE 15-16, ¶ 10
(2013).
52
Susan W. Brenner, ‘At Light Speed: Attribution and Response to Cybercrime/Terrorism/Warfare’, 97 J. Crim. L. & Criminology
435 (2007)
53
¶ 38, The MOOT Problem.
54
Ibid.
55
¶ 24, The Moot Problem.
56
Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Zee News Ltd., 27 ITR 240 (Mum) (2013)
57
Rüdiger Wolfrum, ‘INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS, EVIDENCE’, in THE MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW
556 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2012).
58
Vincent-Joel Proulx, ‘BABYSITTING TERRORISTS: SHOULD STATES BE STRICTLY LIABLE FOR FAILING TO PREVENT TRANSBORDER
ATTACKS?’, 23 Berkeley J. Int'l L. 624 (2005).
59
Ibid.
prevent acts which were traditionally not attributable to them. 60 In this case,

malware used in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses within Riesland’s territory that are associated

with Riesland’s computer infrastructures. Its is thus submitted that Riesland should be held for failing to prevent attacks

originating from its territory.

3.3. THE CYBER ATTACKS AGAINST THE COMPUTER SYSTEMS OF THE AMES POST AND CHESTER & WALSINGHAM CONSTITUTES AN

INTERNATIONALLY WRONGFUL ACT.

3.3.1. THE CYBER ATTACK ON AMESTONIA RISES TO THE LEVEL OF USE OF FORCE.

The ICJ in the Nicargua case,61 held that the ambit of Article 2(4) is wide enough to include any use of ‘force’, 62 regardless of the

weapons employed.63 In the absence of any watertight definition to determine what amounts to use of force, ICJ in the Nicargua

case, further observed that ‘scale and effects’ are to be taken into account to ascertain whether a particular act amounts to

force.64 In other words the quantitative and the qualitative factors are to be taken into consideration for ascertaining whether an

act amounts to force.65 The application of the following tests further establishes quantitative and the qualitative factors required

to prove that the cyber attack amounts to force66:

3.3.2. TEST OF SEVERITY SATISFIED

If it is established that an act has cause physical harm to individuals or property, then such act would amount to force under Art.

2(4) subject to the de minimis rule. Now in this case the cyber attack has caused a damages related to infrastructure and

unrecoverable data amounting to €45-50 million. 67

60
Berglind Halldorsdottir Birkland, ‘Reining in Non-State Actors: State Responsibility and Attribution in Cases of GenocIbide’,
84 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1626 (2009).
61
NICARGUA. V. UNITED STATES, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 202 (June 27).
62
Art 2(4) , The Charter on United Nations 1945, 1 UNTS XVI.
63
See International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, advisory opinion, 1996 and Ian
Brownlie, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 362, 431 (1963).
64
Nicargua vs United States of America ,I.C.J Reports 1986 , (June 27) p.14, ¶ 195.
65
Avinder Singh Vs. State of Punjab, (1979) AIR 321 (SC). 7
.
66
See Michael N. Schmitt, ‘Computer Network and the Use of Force in International Law: Thought on a Normative
Framework’, 37 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 885, 914 (1999).
67
¶ 38, The Moot Proposition.
 3.3.3. TEST OF IMMEDIACY SATISFIED

A cyber attack is considered as force because of their immediate consequences as it gives the states a limited time and

opportunity to react. In this case the malware corrupted the master boot records, to the extent that nearly 90% of the

information was “non-recoverable”.68

3.3.4. TEST OF DIRECTNESS SATISFIED

If the nexus between the initial act and its outcome is directly linked, then the attack would amount to force. In this case the

malware’s was directed to only destroy the boot drive and the information. 69

3.3.5. TEST OF INVASIVENESS SATISFIED

Invasiveness refers to the extent to which an attack invades into the cyber systems contrary to the interests of the State. In this

case the malware was directed intentionally to two specific locations in order to destroy the information as against the host

state.70

3.3.6. TEST OF ‘STATE INVOLVEMENT’ SATISFIED

[ ¶ 1 ] If a nexus between the state and the attack is established then the cyber attack is characterized as force. In this case the

malware which was used in the hacking of the computers has been traced to IP addresses within Riesland’s territory that are

associated with Riesland’s computer infrastructures.71 Moreover it is evident that Riesland supported the attack from the fact

that significant segments of code in the malware are exact replicas of those used in the Bureau’s ‘Blaster’ program which are

otherwise not known use or available to the general public.

Thus the cyber attacks against the computer systems of the Ames Post and Chester & Walsingham are attributable to Riesland ,
and constitute an internationally wrongful act for which Amestonia is entitled to compensation.

68
¶ 37, The Moot Problem.
69
Ibid.
70
Ibid.
71
¶ 38, The Moot Problem.
prayer

In light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, the Defendants humbly prays before this Hon’ble to
adjudge and declare that:
The appeal filed by Govt. of Indie Island is not maintainable.
The corporate veil in the present case should not be lifted.
CPL and ACL should not be made absolutely liable for the loss cause.
The Hon’ble Court may also be pleased to pass any other order, which the Court may deem fit in the light of justice, equity and
good conscience.

All of which is most humbly prayed.

Sd./-
Counsel for Defendants