CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept
(Promulgated June 21, 1988)
  engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had
CHAPTER I. THE LAWYER AND SOCIETY
intervened while in said service.
CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF
THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL PROCESSES.
CHAPTER II. THE LAWYER AND THE LEGAL PROFESSION
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY
conduct.
OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED
Rule 1.02 - A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the
BAR.
law or at lessening confidence in the legal system.
 
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement
suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.
or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
the bar.
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of
CANON 2 - A LAWYER SHALL MAKE HIS LEGAL SERVICES AVAILABLE IN AN
any person known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or
EFFICIENT AND CONVENIENT MANNER COMPATIBLE WITH THE INDEPENDENCE,
other relevant attribute.
INTEGRITY AND EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PROFESSION.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his
Rule 2.01 - A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid reasons, the cause of the
fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a
defenseless or the oppressed.
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 2.02 - In such cases, even if the lawyer does not accept a case, he shall not
refuse to render legal advice to the person concerned if only to the extent
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
necessary to safeguard the latter's rights.
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
Rule 2.03 - A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
to solicit legal business.
 
Rule 2.04 - A lawyer shall not charge rates lower than those customarily
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
prescribed unless the circumstances so warrant.
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
CANON 3 - A LAWYER IN MAKING KNOWN HIS LEGAL SERVICES SHALL USE ONLY
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the
TRUE, HONEST, FAIR, DIGNIFIED AND OBJECTIVE INFORMATION OR STATEMENT
professional employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any
OF FACTS.
lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and assistance to those
Rule 3.01 - A lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY, ASSIST IN THE
Rule 3.02 - In the choice of a firm name, no false, misleading or assumed name
UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
shall be used. The continued use of the name of a deceased partner is permissible
 
provided that the firm indicates in all its communications that said partner is
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
deceased.
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the bar in good
Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdrawal from the
standing.
firm and his name shall be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to divide a fee for legal services
to practice law currently.
with persons not licensed to practice law, except:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Rule 3.04 - A lawyer shall not pay or give anything of value to representatives of
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement with a partner or associate that, upon
the mass media in anticipation of, or in return for, publicity to attract legal
the latter's death, money shall be paid over a reasonable period of time to his
business.
estate or to persons specified in the agreement; or
CANON 4 - A LAWYER SHALL PARTICIPATE IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE LEGAL
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete unfinished legal business of a
SYSTEM BY INITIATING OR SUPPORTING EFFORTS IN LAW REFORM AND IN THE
deceased lawyer; or
IMPROVEMENT OF THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes non-lawyer employees in a retirement
CANON 5 - A LAWYER SHALL KEEP ABREAST OF LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS,
plan even if the plan is based in whole or in part, on a profit sharing agreement.
PARTICIPATE IN CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION PROGRAMS, SUPPORT EFFORTS
TO ACHIEVE HIGH STANDARDS IN LAW SCHOOLS AS WELL AS IN THE PRACTICAL
CHAPTER III. THE LAWYER AND THE COURTS
TRAINING OF LAW STUDENTS AND ASSIST IN DISSEMINATING THE LAW AND
CANON 10 - A LAWYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE
JURISPRUDENCE.
COURT.
CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES
 
IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS.
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to
in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
convict but to see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the
Rule 10.02 - A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents
concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is
of a paper, the language or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a
highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.
decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law a provision already rendered
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to
inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has not been
promote or advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his
proved.
public duties.

1
Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice.
CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE
COURTS AND TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT
BY OTHERS.
 
Rule 11.01 - A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 11.03 - A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing
language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04 - A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the
record or have no materiality to the case.
Rule 11.05 - A lawyer shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper
authorities only.
CANON 12 - A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY
TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE.
 
Rule 12.01 - A lawyer shall not appear for trial unless he has adequately prepared
himself on the law and the facts of his case, the evidence he will adduce and the
order of its proferrence. He should also be ready with the original documents for
comparison with the copies.
Rule 12.02 - A lawyer shall not file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
Rule 12.03 - A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings,
memoranda or briefs, let the period lapse without submitting the same or offering
an explanation for his failure to do so.
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a
judgment or misuse Court processes.
Rule 12.05 - A lawyer shall refrain from talking to his witness during a break or
recess in the trial, while the witness is still under examination.
Rule 12.06 - A lawyer shall not knowingly assist a witness to misrepresent himself
or to impersonate another.
Rule 12.07 - A lawyer shall not abuse, browbeat or harass a witness nor needlessly
inconvenience him.
Rule 12.08 - A lawyer shall avoid testifying in behalf of his client,
except:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) on formal matters, such as the mailing, authentication or custody of an
instrument, and the like; or
(b) on substantial matters, in cases where his testimony is essential to the ends of
justice, in which event he must, during his testimony, entrust the trial of the case
to another counsel.
CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND
REFRAIN FROM ANY IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE
APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE COURT.
 
Rule 13.01 - A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to,
nor seek opportunity for cultivating familiarity with Judges.
Rule 13.02 - A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a
pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party.
Rule 13.03 - A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or
agency of the government in the normal course of judicial proceedings.
CHAPTER IV. THE LAWYER AND THE CLIENT
CANON 14 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT REFUSE HIS SERVICES TO THE NEEDY.
Rule 14.01 - A lawyer shall not decline to represent a person solely on account of
2
the latter's race, sex. creed or status of life, or because of his own opinion
regarding the guilt of said person.
Rule 14.02 - A lawyer shall not decline, except for serious and sufficient cause, an
appointment as counsel de officio or as amicus curiae, or a request from the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines or any of its chapters for rendition of free legal
aid.
Rule 14.03 - A lawyer may not refuse to accept representation of an indigent client
if:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) he is not in a position to carry out the work effectively or competently;
(b) he labors under a conflict of interest between him and the prospective client
or between a present client and the prospective client.
Rule 14.04 - A lawyer who accepts the cause of a person unable to pay his
professional fees shall observe the same standard of conduct governing his
relations with paying clients.
CANON 15 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND LOYALTY IN ALL
HIS DEALINGS AND TRANSACTIONS WITH HIS CLIENTS.
 
Rule 15.01. - A lawyer, in conferring with a prospective client, shall ascertain as
soon as practicable whether the matter would involve a conflict with another
client or his own interest, and if so, shall forthwith inform the prospective client.
Rule 15.02.- A lawyer shall be bound by the rule on privilege communication in
respect of matters disclosed to him by a prospective client.
Rule 15.03. - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
Rule 15.04. - A lawyer may, with the written consent of all concerned, act as
mediator, conciliator or arbitrator in settling disputes.
Rule 15.05. - A lawyer when advising his client, shall give a candid and honest
opinion on the merits and probable results of the client's case, neither overstating
nor understating the prospects of the case.
Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any
public official, tribunal or legislative body.
Rule 15.07. - A lawyer shall impress upon his client compliance with the laws and
the principles of fairness.
Rule 15.08. - A lawyer who is engaged in another profession or occupation
concurrently with the practice of law shall make clear to his client whether he is
acting as a lawyer or in another capacity.
CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF
HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS PROFESSION.
 
Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received
for or from the client.
Rule 16.02 - A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from
his own and those of others kept by him.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due
or upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so
much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements,
giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the
same extent on all judgments and executions he has secured for his client as
provided for in the Rules of Court.
Rule 16.04 - A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client's
interest are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of
justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for
the client.
 CANON 17 - A LAWYER OWES FIDELITY TO THE CAUSE OF HIS CLIENT AND HE
SHALL BE MINDFUL OF THE TRUST AND CONFIDENCE REPOSED IN HIM.
CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
 
Rules 18.01 - A lawyer shall not undertake a legal service which he knows or
should know that he is not qualified to render. However, he may render such
service if, with the consent of his client, he can obtain as collaborating counsel a
lawyer who is competent on the matter.
Rule 18.02 - A lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information.
CANON 19 - A LAWYER SHALL REPRESENT HIS CLIENT WITH ZEAL WITHIN THE
BOUNDS OF THE LAW.
 
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten
to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any
case or proceeding.
Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the
course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall
promptly call upon the client to rectify the same, and failing which he shall
terminate the relationship with such client in accordance with the Rules of Court.
Rule 19.03 - A lawyer shall not allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling
the case.
CANON 20 - A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE FEES.
 
Rule 20.01 - A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his
fees:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) the time spent and the extent of the service rendered or required;
(b) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;
(c) The importance of the subject matter;
(d) The skill demanded;
(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the
proffered case;
(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP
chapter to which he belongs;
(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client
from the service;
(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;
(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and
(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.
Rule 20.02 - A lawyer shall, in case of referral, with the consent of the client, be
entitled to a division of fees in proportion to the work performed and
responsibility assumed.
Rule 20.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the full knowledge and consent of the
client, accept any fee, reward, costs, commission, interest, rebate or forwarding
allowance or other compensation whatsoever related to his professional
employment from anyone other than the client.
Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his
compensation and shall resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition,
injustice or fraud.
3
CANON 21 - A LAWYER SHALL PRESERVE THE CONFIDENCE AND SECRETS OF HIS
CLIENT EVEN AFTER THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATION IS TERMINATED.
 
Rule 21.01 - A lawyer shall not reveal the confidences or secrets of his client
except;
(a) When authorized by the client after acquainting him of the consequences of
the disclosure;
(b) When required by law;
(c) When necessary to collect his fees or to defend himself, his employees or
associates or by judicial action.
Rule 21.02 - A lawyer shall not, to the disadvantage of his client, use information
acquired in the course of employment, nor shall he use the same to his own
advantage or that of a third person, unless the client with full knowledge of the
circumstances consents thereto.
Rule 21.03 - A lawyer shall not, without the written consent of his client, give
information from his files to an outside agency seeking such information for
auditing, statistical, bookkeeping, accounting, data processing, or any similar
purpose.
Rule 21.04 - A lawyer may disclose the affairs of a client of the firm to partners or
associates thereof unless prohibited by the client.
Rule 21.05 - A lawyer shall adopt such measures as may be required to prevent
those whose services are utilized by him, from disclosing or using confidences or
secrets of the clients.
Rule 21.06 - A lawyer shall avoid indiscreet conversation about a client's affairs
even with members of his family.
Rule 21.07 - A lawyer shall not reveal that he has been consulted about a
particular case except to avoid possible conflict of interest.
CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE
AND UPON NOTICE APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.
 
Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following
case:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection
with the matter he is handling;
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these
canons and rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest
of the client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him
to carry out the employment effectively;
(e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to
comply with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office; and
(g) Other similar cases.
Rule 22.02 - A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer
lien, immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled,
and shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter,
including all information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
[A.C. No. 2343. July 30, 1982.]
FACUNDO LUBIANO, Complainant, v. JOEL G. GORDOLLA, Respondent.
SYNOPSIS
Complainant Lubiano charged respondent Gordolla for his failure to observe the
standard expected of him as a member of the Bar, imposed by the Canons of
Professional Ethics, when, in a motion for reconsideration filed by him as counsel
for Robina Farms, Inc., he described the award of separation pay to the complainant
as "ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission as
an "unknowing" one, and the sheriff’s office as "a partner in ‘crime’." Respondent
attributed said statements to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his
 duty to uphold his client’s case and argued that they are covered by the mantle of For what is claimed as a failure of Atty. Joel G. Gordolla to observe this standard, his
absolute privileged communication, being relevant and pertinent to the subject of disbarment is sought by complainant Facundo Lubiano.
inquiry in the NLRC case.
Complainant describes the following statements contained in a motion for
The Supreme Court held that, although the insouciant language used by respondent reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed by respondent Gordolla, as
Gordolla does not constitute sufficient cause for his disbarment, it falls short of the counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-22635-78-T:cralawnad
criterion mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
Canons of Professional Ethics; that respondent became unmindful of the fact that in "Meanwhile, the complainant, very eager to get hold of the ill-gotten wealth (thru
addressing the National Labor Relations Commission he remained a member of the unknowing award by the Hon. Commission) has used the Sheriff’s Office as his
Bar whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and partner in ‘crime’ and the latter thru Sheriff Juanito Atienza, is now and about to
whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics; enforce the terror (sic) of the award thru Writ of Execution."cralaw virtua1aw
and that, despite the fact that the rule of absolute privileged communication library
absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal liability based on the
statements made in the pleadings, he remains subject to the Court’s supervisory While the aforequoted paragraph does not constitute sufficient cause for
and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the disbarment of respondent, We are not inclined to disregard the insouciant language
legal profession. used by respondent as merely trivial and innocuous. The language of a lawyer, oral
or written, must be respectful and restrained, in keeping with the dignity of the
Respondent Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of P200.00, with subsidiary legal profession. It is through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and warned that a repetition of a similar act lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial
would be dealt with more severely. officers, as mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of
this criterion. In describing the award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as
SYLLABUS "ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, an
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, as an "unknowing" one, and
the sheriff’s office as a "partner in ‘crime’", respondent precariously ventured
beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.
1. LEGAL ETHICS; CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; IMPOSES A STANDARD TO BE
OBSERVED BY LAWYERS. — The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the
Respondent’s attempt to escape responsibility by attributing said statements to his
lawyer the duty of maintaining a respectful attitude towards the court. He is
zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his duty to uphold his client’s cause, is
likewise expected to treat adverse witnesses and suitors with fairness and due
unavailing. As this Court said in Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer 2
consideration. As such, he should never minister to the malevolence or prejudice of
:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
a client in a trial or conduct of a cause (Section 18, Canons of Professional Ethics).
He should be temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
"It is but to repeat an old idea when we say that enthusiasm, or even excess of it, is
not really bad. In fact, the one or the other is no less a virtue, if channeled in the
2. ID.; SECTION 20(b) OF RULE 138 OF THE RULES OF COURT AND THE CANONS OF
right direction. However, it must be circumscribed within the bounds of propriety
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS; STATEMENTS USED BY RESPONDENT IN HIS MOTION
and with due regard for the proper place of courts in our system of
VIOLATED CRITERION PROVIDED THEREIN. — Complainant decries the statements
government."cralaw virtua1aw library
contained in the motion for reconsideration with prayer for restraining order filed
by respondent Gordolla, as counsel for Robina Farms, Inc., in NLRC Case No. RB-IV-
Respondent became unmindful of the fact that in addressing the National Labor
22635-78-T. It is through a scrupulous preference for respectful language that a
Relations Commission, he nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-
lawyer best demonstrates his observance or respect due to the courts and judicial
bound servant of the law, whose first duty is not to his client but to the
officers, as mandated by Section 20(b) of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court and the
administration of justice and whose conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously
Canons of Professional Ethics. Respondent’s choice of words manifestly falls short of
observant of law and ethics 3 .
this criterion. In describing the award of separation pay to complainant Lubiano as
"ill-gotten wealth", the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission, an
Respondent would argue that the statements in question, being relevant and
administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, as an "unknowing" one, and
pertinent to the subject of inquiry in said case, are covered by the mantle of
the sheriff’s office as a "partner in ‘crime’", respondent precariously ventured
absolute privileged communication; and that, as such, they cannot be used as basis
beyond the bounds of propriety and civility.
for any action, however false and malicious the statements may be. We find no
necessity to dwell at length on the issue as to whether or not the statements in
3. ID.; ID.; LAWYERS REMAIN SUBJECT TO COURT’S DISCIPLINARY POWERS;
question are relevant, for in either case this Court will not be inhibited from
ALTHOUGH STATEMENTS MADE IN PLEADINGS ARE PRIVILEGED. — Respondent’s
exercising its supervisory authority over lawyers who misbehave or fail to live up to
attempt to escape responsibility by attributing the insouciant language used in his
that standard expected of them as members of the Bar. Indeed, the rule of absolute
motion for reconsideration to his zeal and enthusiasm in the performance of his
privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil and criminal
duty to uphold his client’s cause, is unavailing. Respondent became unmindful of
liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the member of the
the fact that, in addressing the National Labor Relations Commission, he
legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability arising from any
nonetheless remained a member of the Bar, an oath-bound servant of the law,
speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee thereof 4 , but
whose first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice and whose
nevertheless remains subject to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said
conduct ought to be and must be scrupulously observant of law and ethics. The rule
speech or debate 5 , a lawyer equally remains subject to this Court’s supervisory
of absolute privileged communication absolves beforehand the lawyer from civil
and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a member of the
and criminal liability based on the statements made in the pleadings. But like the
legal profession.cralawnad
member of the legislature who enjoys immunity from civil and criminal liability
arising from any speech or debate delivered in the Batasan or in any committee
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is hereby ordered to pay
thereof (Article VIII, Section 9 of the Constitution), but nevertheless remains subject
a fine of P200.00, payable to the Clerk of this Court within ten (10) days from notice
to the disciplinary authority of the legislature for said speech or debate (Osmeña v.
of this decision, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. He is further
Pendatum, 109 Phil, 863), a lawyer equally remains subject to the Court’s
warned that a repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely.
supervisory and disciplinary powers for lapses in the observance of his duty as a
member of the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
4. ID.; ID.; RESPONDENT NOT DISBARRED FOR INSOUCIANT LANGUAGE USED IN HIS
MOTION, BUT ORDERED TO PAY FINE AND WARNED; CASE AT BAR. — While the A.M. No. P-06-2177             June 27, 2006
insouciant language used in his motion does not constitute sufficient cause for (Formerly A.M. No. 06-4-268-RTC)
disbarment of respondent, the Court is not inclined to disregard them as merely
trivial and innocuous. Respondent Atty. Joel G. Gordolla is ordered to pay a fine of RE: REPORT ON THE FINANCIAL AUDIT CONDUCTED ON THE BOOKS OF ACCOUNTS
P200.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and is warned that a OF ATTY. RAQUEL G. KHO, CLERK OF COURT IV, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, ORAS,
repetition of a similar act would be dealt with more severely. EASTERN SAMAR .

RESOLUTION
DECISION

ESCOLIN, J.:
The Canons of Professional Ethics imposes upon the lawyer the duty of maintaining
a respectful attitude towards the court. He is likewise expected to treat adverse
witnesses and suitors with fairness and due consideration. As such, he should never
minister to the malevolence or prejudice of a client in a trial or conduct of a cause
1 . He should be temperate in acts and words, a paragon in civility.
CORONA, J.:
This administrative case is a result of the audit conducted by the Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) of the books of accounts of Atty. Raquel G. Kho, former clerk of
court of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Oras, Eastern Samar. The audit covered
the period March 1985 to October 31, 2005.
The OCA, in its memorandum dated April 18, 2006, had the following findings: (1)
there was a shortage of P545.00 in remittances to the General Fund; (2) a cash
shortage of P24.00 in the Sheriff’s General Fund; and (3) Atty. Kho did not deposit

4
on time in the authorized depository bank the collections for the Fiduciary Fund
(P60,000) and Special Allowance for the Judiciary Fund (P5,000). It also noted that
Atty. Kho had already restituted the P545.00 and P24.00 cash shortages.
Regarding the delayed remittance of the amount of P60,000 representing the
amount of a confiscated cash bond, Kho explained that the Land Bank of the
Philippines (the authorized depository bank) had no branch in their locality. The
nearest Land Bank branch was approximately 95 kilometers away so it was his
practice to keep his collections in the court’s safety vault.
On the other hand, the amount of P5,000 was collected as filing fee for an election
protest. According to Kho, this was collected under Rule 40 of the Commission on
Elections (COMELEC) Rules of Procedure. In defense, he presented a letter
addressed to Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N. Elepaño inquiring
where to remit said amount. The OCA, through Deputy Court Administrator Jose P.
Perez, responded that pending official instructions on how to manage the money
collected under Rule 40 of the COMELEC Rules, it was to be treated as trust deposits
and temporarily deposited in the Fiduciary Fund.1 However, Kho failed to do this.
Consequently, the audit team advised him to deposit the P5,000 in the Special
Allowance for the Judiciary Fund as provided under Sec. 21 (g) of the amended
Administrative Circular No. 35-2004.2 He was also advised to deposit the
confiscated P60,000 cash bond in the Judicial Development Fund account. He
complied with both directives on November 15, 2005.
On January 26, 2006, the OCA received a letter-complaint with the information that
Kho, along with his alleged common-law-wife, stenographer Riza Amor L. Libanan,
was engaged in lending out to court employees money in his possession as clerk of
court, personally deriving profit from the interest earned.
The OCA found Kho liable for violating OCA Circular No. 8A-933 dated April 21, 1993
when he kept the funds in a safety vault for more than a year. All clerks of lower
courts are supposed to deposit all collections from bail bonds, rental deposits and
other fiduciary collections with the Land Bank upon receipt thereof. Thus, it
recommended that (1) the audit report be docketed as a regular administrative
complaint against Kho and (2) a fine in the amount of P10,000 be imposed on him.
We agree with the OCA’s recommendations.
Public office is a public trust.4 Those charged with the dispensation of justice, from
the justices and judges to the lowliest clerks, should be circumscribed with the
heavy burden of responsibility.5 Not only must their conduct at all times be
characterized by propriety and decorum but, above all else, it must be beyond
suspicion.6
A clerk of court, aside from being the custodian of the court’s funds, revenues,
property and premises, is also entrusted with the primary responsibility of correctly
and effectively implementing regulations regarding fiduciary funds.7 Safekeeping of
funds and collections is essential to an orderly administration of justice and no
protestation of good faith can override the mandatory nature of the circulars
designed to promote full accountability for government funds.8 Clerks of court have
always been reminded of their duty to immediately deposit the various funds
received by them to the authorized government depositories for they are not
supposed to keep funds in their custody.9
Kho failed to make a timely turn-over of cash deposited with him. This was
inexcusable because he could have purchased postal money orders from the local
post office payable to the chief accountant, Accounting Division, FMO-OCA. The
money could have earned interest had he not kept them in the vault for over a
year.10 As found by the OCA, although Kho had restituted all his cash
accountabilities, he was nevertheless liable for failing to immediately deposit the
collections for the judiciary funds.
The failure to remit the funds in due time constitutes gross dishonesty and gross
misconduct. It diminishes the faith of the people in the Judiciary.11 Dishonesty,
being in the nature of a grave offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from
the service even if committed for the first time. However, Kho showed remorse by
immediately restituting the cash shortages and complying with the directives of the
audit team. And considering that this is his first offense, we find that the penalty
of P10,000 fine is sufficient.
We note that Kho has already transferred to the Department of Justice. However, it
neither renders this matter moot nor frees him from liability.
Moreover, his misconduct reflects on his fitness as a member of the bar. His
malfeasance prima facie contravenes Canon 1,12 Rule 1.0113 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he should explain why no further disciplinary
sanction should be imposed on him.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Raquel G. Kho is hereby found GUILTY of gross misconduct for
his failure to make timely remittance of judiciary funds in his custody. He is ordered
to pay a FINE of P10,000 within ten (10) days from receipt of this resolution.
5
Atty. Kho is further ordered to SHOW CAUSE within the same period why he should
not be disciplined for such misconduct as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court.
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
A.C. No. 3452               June 23, 2014
HENRY SAMONTE, Petitioner,
vs.
ATTY. GINES ABELLANA, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
A lawyer who willfully resorts to any falsehood in order to mislead the courts or his
clients on the status of their causes exhibits his unworthiness to remain a member
of the Law Profession. This is because he is always expected to be honest and
forthright in his dealings with them. He thereby merits the condign sanction of
suspension from the practice of law, if not disbarment.
Antecedents
On February 16, 1990, complainant Henry E. Samonte brought this administrative
complaint against respondent Atty. Gines N. Abellana who had represented him as
the plaintiff in Civil Case No. CEB-6970 entitled Capt. Henry E. Samonte v.
Authographics, Inc., and Nelson Yu of the Regional Trial Court in Cebu City.1 In the
administrative complaint, Samonte enumerated the serious acts of professional
misconduct by Atty. Abellana, to wit:
1. Falsification of documents, when Atty. Abellana made it appear that
he had filed Civil Case No. CEB-6970 on June 10, 1988, conformably with
their agreement, although the complaint was actually filed on June 14,
1988;
2. Dereliction of duty, when Atty. Abellana failed to: (a) file the reply vis-
à-vis the answer with counterclaim, with his omission having delayed the
pre-trial of the case; (b) inform the trial court beforehand that Samonte
could not be available on a scheduled hearing, thereby incurring for the
plaintiff’s side an unexplained absence detrimental to Samonte as the
plaintiff; and (c) submit an exhibit required by the trial judge, only to
eventually submit it three months later;
3. Gross negligence and tardiness in attending the scheduled hearings;
and
4. Dishonesty for not issuing official receipts for every cash payments
made by Samonte for his court appearances and his acceptance of the
case.
To support his administrative complaint, Samonte attached the following annexes,
namely:
1. Comparative photocopies of the cover page of the complaint on file in
the RTC and of the cover page of the complaint Atty. Abellana furnished
him;2
2. A photocopy of the order issued on January 16, 1989, and a photocopy
of the order issued on January 19, 1990 in which the RTC observed that
"[t]he formal offer of plaintiff’s exhibits is rather very late;"3 and
3. The motion to change counsel, in which Samonte stated that Atty.
Abellana had failed to promptly attend court hearings and to do other
legal services required of him as the counsel. In the lower left portion of
the motion, Atty. Abellana noted the motion subject to the reservation
that his attorneys fees should still be paid.4
On March 12, 1990, the Court required Atty. Abellana to comment on the
administrative complaint.
In his comment dated April 6, 1990,5 Atty. Abellana denied the charge of falsification
of documents, clarifying that the actual filing of the complaint could be made only
on June 14, 1988 instead of on June 10, 1988 because Samonte had not given
enough money to cover the filing fees and other charges totaling ₱5,027.76; and
that Samonte shelled out only ₱5,000.00, contrary to their agreement in April 1988
on paying to him ₱10,000.00 as the acceptance fee in addition to the filing fees. He
asserted that the charge of dereliction of duty was baseless, because he had filed
the reply on December 2, 1988 after receiving the answer with counterclaim of the
defendants on August 2, 1988, attaching as proof the copies of the reply (Annex 8
and Annex 9 of his comment);6 and that it was the RTC, not him, who had scheduled
the pre-trial on January 16, 1989.7 Anent his nonattendance at the hearings in Civil
Case No. CEB-6970, he explained that although he had informed the RTC of his
having been either stranded in another province, or having attended the
arraignment of another client in another court, the presiding judge had opted not to
await his arrival in the courtroom. He blamed Samonte for his inability to submit the
formal offer of exhibits on time, pointing out that Samonte had failed to give the
duplicate originals of the documentary exhibits despite his request because of the
latter’s absence from the country. He countered that it was Samonte who had been
dishonest, because Samonte had given only the filing fees plus at least ₱2,000.00 in
contravention of their agreement on the amount of ₱10,000.00 being his
acceptance fees in addition to the filing fees; that the filing fees paid were covered
by receipts issued by the Clerk of Court; that no receipts were issued for the
₱200.00/appearance fee conformably with the practice of most lawyers; and that
Samonte had not also demanded any receipts.
Atty. Abellana branded as unethical Samonte’s submission of a motion to change
counsel,8 stating that the latter did not thereby exhibit the courtesy of informing
him beforehand on the intention of not meeting his obligation to him as the
counsel; that Samonte had been forced to issue to him a check after the Branch
Clerk of Court had told him that his motion to change counsel would not be acted
upon unless it carried Atty. Abellana’s conformity as the counsel; and that he had
duly acknowledged the check.9
On May 23, 1990, the Court received Samonte’s letter dated May 8,
199010 embodying additional charges of falsification of documents, dereliction of
duty and dishonesty based on the reply and the annexes Atty. Abellana had filed.
Samonte noted in the letter that the reply attached to the comment of Atty.
Abellana was not authentic based on the categorical statement of the Branch Clerk
of Court of Branch 5 of the RTC in Cebu City to the effect that no such reply had
been filed in behalf of Samonte; and that the rubber stamp affixed on the reply
supposedly filed by Atty. Abellana in Samonte’s behalf was not also the official
rubber stamp of Branch 5.11 Samonte denied being the cause of delay in the
submission of the formal offer of exhibits, and reminded that the documentary
exhibits concerned had been shown to the trial court during his testimony, with the
opposing party not even objecting to their authenticity.
Samonte declared that his agreement with Atty. Abellana on the fees for all his legal
services stipulated the equivalent of 20% of the awarded damages; that the amount
demanded was ₱1.12 Million;12 that he paid Atty. Abellana a total of ₱7,027.00 for
filing expenses, plus ₱5,000.00 that he gave as a token payment for Atty. Abellana’s
services after discovering the latter’s inefficiency and fraudulent practices.
On May 30, 199013 and July 30, 1990,14 the Court referred the administrative
complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation.
Proceedings in the IBP
On November 3, 1994, the IBP notified the parties to appear and present their
evidence at 10:00 am on November 18, 1994.15 However, the parties sought
postponements.16 The hearing was reset several times more for various reasons,
namely: on December 9, 1994 due to the IBP Commissioner being out of town, but
telegrams were sent to the parties on December 6, 1994;17 on April 12, 2002, with
the hearing being cancelled;18 and on March 7, 2003, with the hearing being
cancelled until further notice.19
On February 7, 2005, the IBP received a motion to quash dated January 7, 2005
from Atty. Abellana,20 seeking the dismissal of the administrative complaint because
of the lack of interest on the part of Samonte. Atty. Abellana observed therein that
Samonte had always sought the postponement of the hearings.
Reacting to the motion to quash, Samonte requested an early hearing by motion
filed on February 9, 2005,21 declaring his interest in pursuing the administrative
complaint against Atty. Abellana.
22
On March 22, 2005,  IBP Commissioner Victoria Gonzalez-De Los Reyes set the
mandatory conference on June 22, 2005. In that conference, only Samonte
appeared;23 hence, the IBP just required the parties to submit their verified position
papers within 30 days from notice. Nonetheless, the IBP scheduled the clarificatory
hearing on August 18, 2005.24
Samonte submitted his position paper on August 2, 2005.25 On August 9, 2005, Atty.
Abellana requested an extension of his period to submit his own position paper
allegedly to allow him to secure relevant documents from the trial court.26
On August 18, 2005, the parties appeared for the clarificatory hearing. The case was
thereafter deemed submitted for resolution.
On August 29, 2005, Samonte presented a verified amended position paper,
reiterating his allegations against Atty. Abellana.27
Also on August 29, 2005, Atty. Abellana submitted his verified position paper dated
August 17, 2005,28 in which he represented that although he had been at times late
for the hearings he had nonetheless efficiently discharged his duties as the counsel
6
for Samonte; that he had not caused any delay in the case; that it was Samonte who
had been unavailable at times because of his work as an airline pilot; that the
complainant had discharged him as his counsel in order to avoid paying his
obligation to him; and that the complainant filed this disbarment case after he lost
his own civil case in the RTC. He attached all the pleadings he had filed on behalf of
the complainant, except the above-stated replies.
On May 1, 2008,29 the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline found Atty. Abellana
negligent in handling certain aspects of his client’s case, like not filing a reply to the
defendants’ answer with counterclaims in order to deny the new matters raised in
the answer; resorting to falsehood to make it appear that he had filed the reply; and
being considerably late in submitting the formal offer of exhibits for Samonte, as
noted even by the trial judge in the order dated January 19, 1990. It observed that
although the negligence of Atty. Abellana did not necessarily prejudice his client’s
case, his lack of honesty and trustworthiness as an attorney, and his resort to
falsehood and deceitful practices were a different matter;30 noted that he had twice
resorted to falsehood, the first being when he tried to make it appear that the
complaint had been filed on June 10, 1988 despite the court records showing that
the complaint had been actually filed only on June 14, 1988; and the second being
when he had attempted to deceive his client about his having filed the reply by
producing a document bearing a rubber stamp marking distinctively different from
that of the trial court’s; that he did not dispute the pieces of material evidence
adduced against him; that he had explained that the reason for his delay in the filing
of the complaint had been the complainant’s failure to pay the agreed fees on time;
and that he had only stated that he had filed a reply, without presenting proof of his
having actually filed such in court.
The IBP Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the disbarment of Atty.
Abellana, observing as follows:
x x x Apart from his negligent handling of portions of the civil case, said respondent
has shown a facility for utilizing false and deceitful practices as a means to cover-up
his delay and lack of diligence in pursuing the case of his client. Taken together as a
whole, the respondent’s acts are nothing short of deplorable.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is respectfully recommended that respondent
Atty. Gines Abellana be disbarred from the practice of law for resorting to false
and/or deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trusthworthiness
as befits a member of the bar.(Bold emphasis supplied)
On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors, albeit adopting the findings of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, suspended Atty. Abellana from the practice of law for
one year, to wit:
RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and
APPROVED, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner of the above entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as
Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, and for resorting to falsehood and/or
deceitful practices, and for failure to exercise honesty and trustworthiness as befits
member of the Bar, Atty. Gines N. Abellana is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice
of law for one (1) year.31 (Bold emphasis supplied)
On September 25, 2008, Atty. Abellana moved for reconsideration based on the
following grounds:32
A. That the imposition of sanction for the suspension of the undersigned
from the practice of law for one (1) year is too stiff in relation to the
alleged unethical conduct committed by the respondent;
B. That the findings of the investigating commissioner is not fully
supported with evidence;
C. That the complaint of the complainant is not corroborated by
testimonial evidence so that it is hearsay and self-serving.
In support of his motion, Atty. Abellana rehashed most of his previous arguments,
and stated that the "enumerations of failures are belied by the existence of Reply to
counterclaims, which were attached as Annexes "8" and "9" of the Position Paper of
respondent."33 It is noted, however, that Annex 8 and Annex 9 of Atty. Abellana’s
position paper were different documents, namely: Annex 834 (Manifestation and
Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion to Change Counsel); and Annex 935 (Manifestation).
Nonetheless, he argued that both documents were already part of the records of
the case, and that anyway Atty. Geronimo V. Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court,
did not execute any affidavit or certification tothe effect that both documents were
inexistent. He reminded that Samonte had only said that both documents "seemed
to be falsified documents" based on the certification of Atty. Nazareth on the official
rubber stamp of the court.
The IBP required Samonte to comment on Atty. Abellana’s motion for
reconsideration.36
In his comment dated October 21, 2008,37 Samonte reiterated his allegations
against Atty. Abellana; insisted that Atty. Abellana did not refute the charges against
him; and noted thatthe reply that Atty. Abellana had supposedly filed in the case
was not even annexed either to his position paper and motion for reconsideration.
On December 16, 2008, Atty. Abellana filed a motion requesting to be allowed to
submit certified true copies of his exhibits, i.e., the pleadings he had submitted in
the RTC.38
On April 2, 2009, Samonte filed a motion for early resolution.39
On September 15, 2009, Atty. Abellana filed a supplemental motion for
reconsideration.40
On June 22, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors denied the motion for
reconsideration of Atty. Abellana.41
Ruling
We adopt and approve the findings of the IBP Board of Governors by virtue of their
being substantiated by the records.
In his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high
and demanding, are the professional and ethical burdens of every member of the
Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in the Lawyer’s Oath that
every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of
the Law Profession, thus:
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well
as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I
will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer
according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well
to the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation
without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God. (Emphasis
supplied)
By the Lawyer’s Oath is every lawyer enjoined not only to obey the laws of the land
but also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to
the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his
knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his clients.
Every lawyer is a servant of the Law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of
law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation by others.42 It is by no means a
coincidence, therefore, that honesty, integrity and trustworthiness are emphatically
reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
Rule 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in
Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.
Rule 11.02 - A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
Atty. Abellana abjectly failed the expectations of honesty, integrity and
trustworthiness in his dealings with Samonte as the client, and with the RTC as the
trial court. He resorted to outright falsification by superimposing "0" on "4" in order
to mislead Samonte into believing that he had already filed the complaint in court
on June 10,1988 as promised, instead of on June 14, 1988, the date when he had
actually done so. His explanation that Samonte was himself the cause of the belated
filing on account of his inability to remit the correct amount of filing fees and his
acceptance fees by June 10, 1988, as agreed upon, did not excuse the falsification,
because his falsification was not rendered less dishonest and less corrupt by
whatever reasons for filing at the later date. He ought to remember that honesty
and integrity were of far greater value for him as a member of the Law Profession
than his transactions with his client.
Atty. Abellana’s perfidy towards Samonte did not stop there. He continued
misleading Samonte in explaining his mishandling of the latter’s civil case. Worse, he
also foisted his dishonesty on the Court no less. To counter Samonte’s accusation
about his not filing the reply in the civil case, he knowingly submitted two
documents as annexes of his comment during the investigation by the IBP, and
represented said documents to have been part of the records of the case in the
RTC. His intention in doing so was to enhance his defense against the administrative
charge. But the two documents turned out to be forged and spurious, and his
forgery came to be exposed because the rubber stamp marks the documents bore
were not the official marks of the RTC’s, as borne out by the specimens of the
official rubber stamp of Branch 5 of the RTC duly certified by Atty. Geronimo V.
Nazareth, the Branch Clerk of Court.43 He defended his dishonesty by lamely
claiming that "court personnel were authorized to accept filing of pleadings even
without the usual rubber stamp."44 In these acts, he manifested his great disrespect
towards both the Court and his client.
7
The finding on Atty. Abellana’s neglect in the handling of Samonte’s case was
entirely warranted. He admitted being tardy in attending the hearings of the civil
case. He filed the formal offer of evidence in behalf of his client way beyond the
period to do so, a fact that he could not deny because the RTC Judge had himself
expressly noted the belated filing in the order issued in the case. Atty. Abellana was
fortunate that the RTC Judge exhibited some tolerance and liberality by still
admitting the belated offer of evidence in the interest of justice.
In the motion for reconsideration that he filed in the IBP Board of Governors, Atty.
Abellana challenged the sufficiency of the proof presented against him by Samonte,
contending that such proof had consisted of merely hearsay and self-serving
evidence.
The contention of Atty. Abellana is bereft of substance. In disciplinary proceedings
against lawyers, clearly preponderant evidence is required to overcome the
presumption of innocence in favor of the respondent lawyers. Preponderant
evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or
has greater weight than that of the other.45 In order to determine if the evidence of
one party is greater than that of the other, Section 1, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court
instructs that the court may consider the following, namely: (a) all the facts and
circumstances of the case; (b) the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence,
their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the
nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their
testimony; (c) the witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal
credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in the trial; and (d) the number
of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
The complainant’s evidence preponderantly established the administrative sins of
Atty. Abellana. To start with, Atty. Abellana admitted superimposing the "0" on "4"
but justified himself by claiming that he had done so only because the complainant
had not given to him the correct amount of filing fees required. Secondly, Atty.
Abellana filed a spurious document by making it appear as one actually filed in court
by using a fake rubber stamp. His misdeed was exposed because the rubber stamp
imprint on his document was different from that of the official rubber stamp of the
trial court. He defended himself by stating that court personnel accepted papers
filed in the court without necessarily using the official rubber stamp of the court. He
well knew, of course, that such statement did not fully justify his misdeed. Thirdly,
Atty. Abellana did not present any proof of his alleged filings, like certified copies of
the papers supposedly filed in court. His omission to prove his allegation on the
filings conceded that he did not really file them. And, lastly, Atty. Abellana
misrepresented the papers he had supposedly filed by stating that he was attaching
them as Annex 8 and Annex 9 of his comment, but Annex 8 and Annex 9 turned out
to be papers different from those he represented them to be.
Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is
granted the privilege to practice law in this country should remain faithful to the
Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to remain as
members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including
adopting artifices to cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest
of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to continue enjoying the privilege to
practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law Profession.
It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions.
The falsehoods committed by Atty. Abellana, being aimed at misleading his client
and the Court to bolster his unworthy denial of his neglect in the handling of the
client's case, were unmitigated. Still, the Court must not close its eyes to the fact
that Atty. Abellana actually finished presenting his client's case; and that the latter
initiated the termination of Atty. Abellana's engagement as his counsel only after
their relationship had been tainted with mistrust. Thus, we determine the proper
sanction. In Maligaya v. Doronilla, Jr., 46 the respondent lawyer was suspended for
two months from the practice of law for representing in court that the complainant
had agreed to withdraw the lawsuit when in truth the complainant had made no
such agreement. The respondent admitted the falsity of his representation, but
gave as an excuse his intention to amicably settle the case. In Molina v. Magat,47 the
respondent had invoked double jeopardy in behalf of his client by stating that the
complainant had filed a similar case of slight physical injuries in another court, but
his invocation was false because no other case had been actually filed. He was
suspended from the practice of law for six months for making the false and
untruthful statement in court. For Atty. Abellana, therefore, suspension from the
practice of law for six months with warning of a more severe sanction upon a
repetition suffices.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the Resolution dated June 22, 2013 of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors subject to the MODIFICATION
that Atty. Gines N. Abellana is SUSPENDED FOR SIX (6) MONTHS FROM THE
PRACTICE OF LAW effective upon receipt of this decision, with the stern warning
that any repetition by him of the same or similar acts will be punished more
severely.
Let a copy of this decision be entered in the personal records of Atty. Gines N.
Abellana as a member of the Philippine Bar, and copies furnished to the Office of
the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and the Office of the Court
Administrator for proper dissemination to all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 3405
JULIETA B. NARAG, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. DOMINADOR M. NARAG, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
PER CURIAM:
Before this Court is a "Petition for Readmission" to the practice of law filed by
Dominador M. Narag (Respondent).
On November 13, 1989, Julieta B. Narag (Julieta) filed an administrative complaint
for disbarment against her husband, herein respondent, whom she accused of
having violated Rule 1.011 in relation to Canons 12 and 63 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. She claimed that the respondent, who was then a college instructor
in St. Louis College of Tuguegarao and a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
of Cagayan, maintained an amorous relationship with a certain Gina Espita (Gina) –
a 17-year old first year college student. Julieta further claimed that the respondent
had already abandoned her and their children to live with Gina. The respondent
denied the charge against him, claiming that the allegations set forth by Julieta
were mere fabrications; that Julieta was just extremely jealous, which made her
concoct stories against him.
On June 29, 1998, the Court rendered a Decision, which directed the disbarment of
the respondent. The Court opined that the respondent committed an act of gross
immorality when he abandoned his family in order to live with Gina. The Court
pointed out that the respondent had breached the high and exacting moral
standards set for members of the legal profession.
A Motion for the Re-opening of the Administrative Investigation, or in the
Alternative, Reconsideration of the Decision was filed by the respondent on August
25, 1998. He averred that he was denied due process of law during the
administrative investigation as he was allegedly unjustly disallowed to testify in his
behalf and adduce additional vital documentary evidence. Finding no substantial
arguments to warrant the reversal of the questioned decision, the Court denied the
motion with finality in the Resolution dated September 22, 1998.
On November 29, 2013, the respondent filed the instant petition for reinstatement
to the Bar. The respondent alleged that he has expressed extreme repentance and
remorse to his wife and their children for his misgivings. He claimed that his wife
Julieta and their children had already forgiven him on June 10, 2010 at their
residence in Tuguegarao City. The respondent presented an undated affidavit
prepared by his son, Dominador, Jr., purportedly attesting to the truth of the
respondent’s claim.
The respondent averred that he has been disbarred for 15 years already and that he
has been punished enough. He alleged that he is already 80 years old, weak and
wracked with debilitating osteo-arthritic pains. That he has very limited mobility
due to his arthritis and his right knee injury.
He further claimed that he enlisted in the Philippine Air Force Reserve Command
where he now holds the rank of Lieutenant Colonel; that as member of the Reserve
Command, he enlisted in various rescue, relief and recovery missions. The
respondent likewise submitted the various recommendations, testimonials and
affidavits in support of his petition for readmission.4
"Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great
extent on the sound discretion of the Court. The action will depend on whether or
not the Court decides that the public interest in the orderly and impartial
administration of justice will continue to be preserved even with the applicant’s
reentry as a counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to
the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character, a fit and
proper person to practice law. The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s
character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the
charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for
reinstatement."5
The extreme penalty of disbarment was meted on the respondent on account of his
having committed a grossly immoral conduct, i.e., abandoning his wife and children
to live with his much younger paramour. Indeed, nothing could be more
reprehensible than betraying one’s own family in order to satisfy an irrational and
insatiable desire to be with another woman. The respondent’s act was plainly selfish
and clearly evinces his inappropriateness to be part of the noble legal profession.
More than 15 years after being disbarred, the respondent now professes that he
had already repented and expressed remorse over the perfidy that he had brought
upon his wife and their children. That such repentance and remorse, the
respondent asserts, together with the long years that he had endured his penalty, is
now sufficient to enable him to be readmitted to the practice of law.
8
The respondent's pleas, however, are mere words that are hollow and bereft of any
substance. The Court, in deciding whether the respondent should indeed be
readmitted to the practice of law, must be convinced that he had indeed been
reformed; that he had already rid himself of any grossly immoral act which would
make him inept for the practice of law. However, it appears that the respondent,
while still legally married to Julieta, is still living with his paramour - the woman for
whose sake he abandoned his family. This only proves to show that the respondent
has not yet learned from his prior misgivings.
That he was supposedly forgiven by his wife and their children would likewise not
be sufficient ground to grant respondent's plea.1âwphi1 It is noted that only his
son, Dominador, Jr., signed the affidavit which was supposed to evidence the
forgiveness bestowed upon the respondent. Thus, with regard to Julieta and the six
other children of the respondent, the claim that they had likewise forgiven the
respondent is hearsay. In any case, that the family of the respondent had forgiven
him does not discount the fact that he is still committing a grossly immoral conduct;
he is still living with a woman other than his wife.
Likewise, that the respondent executed a holographic will wherein he bequeaths all
his properties to his wife and their children is quite immaterial and would not be
demonstrative that he had indeed changed his ways. Verily, nothing would stop the
respondent from later on executing another last will and testament of a different
tenor once he had been readmitted to the legal profession.
In fine, the Court is not convinced that the respondent had shown remorse over his
transgressions and that he had already changed his ways as would merit his
reinstatement to the legal, profession. Time and again the Court has stressed that
the practice of law is not a right but a privilege. It is enjoyed only by those who
continue to display unassailable character.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Petition for Reinstatement to
the Bar filed by Dominador M. Narag is hereby DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. NO. 10525, September 01, 2015
INTESTATE ESTATE OF JOSE UY, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY ITS ADMINISTRATOR
WILSON UY, Complainant, v. ATTY. PACIFICO M. MAGHARI III, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
LEONEN, J.:
This resolves a Complaint1 for disbarment directly filed before this court by
complainant Wilson Uy, the designated administrator of the estate of Jose Uy. This
Complaint charges respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III (Maghari) with
engaging in deceitful conduct and violating the Lawyer's Oath. Specifically, Maghari
is charged with the use of information that is false and/or appropriated from other
lawyers in signing certain pleadings.2
On February 18, 1997, Lilia Hofileña (Hofileña) filed a Petition before the Bacolod
City Regional Trial Court praying that she be designated administratrix of the estate
of her common-law partner, the deceased Jose Uy. This was docketed as Spec. Proc.
No. 97-241.3
Hofileña was initially designated administratrix.4 However, a Motion for
Reconsideration of the Order designating Hofileña as administratix was filed by
Wilson Uy, one of Jose Uy's children, on behalf of Jose Uy's spouse and other
children.5 In its Order6 dated June 9, 1998, the Regional Trial Court designated
Wilson Uy as administrator of Jose Uy's estate.
Subsequently, Hofileña's claims in the settlement of Jose Uy's estate were
granted.7 Hence, she filed a Motion for Execution8 dated September 14, 2007.
In Spec. Proc No. 97-241 and in other proceedings arising from the conflicting claims
to Jose Uy's estate, Hofileña was represented by her counsel, Atty. Mariano L. Natu-
El (Atty. Natu-el). In a pleading filed in the course of these proceedings (i.e., in the
Comment dated May 27, 2009 filed before the Court of Appeals9), Atty. Natu-El
indicated the following details:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597010 (Emphasis supplied)
There appears to have been conflicts between Wilson Uy and the other heirs of Jose
Uy.11 In the course of the proceedings, Wilson Uy prayed that a subpoena ad
testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy as she was alleged to have been the
treasurer of several businesses owned by Jose Uy.12 In its Order13 dated April 20,
2010, the Regional Trial Court granted Wilson Uy's Motion that a Subpoena ad
Testificandum be issued to Magdalena Uy. I

Thereafter, Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, her counsel, filed a Motion to Quash Respondent does not deny the existence of the errant entries indicated by
Subpoena ad Testificandum with Alternative Motion to Cite the Appearance of complainant. However, he insists that he did not incur disciplinary liability. He
Johnny K.H. Uy.14 In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the following details: claims that these entries were mere overlooked errors:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III For true indeed that after the draft of a particular motion or pleading had been
Counsel for Magdalena Uy printed and ready for signature, all what [sic] he did after cursorily going over it was
590 Ylac St., Villamonte to affix his signature thereon, specifically, atop his printed name, without giving any
Bacolod City special or particular attention to details as the "IBP, PTR, and MCLE Numbers",
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C. considering that these are matters of record and are easily verifiable, thus he gains
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C. nothing by "the usurpation of professional details of another lawyer" and has no
ROLL NO. 20865 sinister motive or ill-purpose in so doing[.]32
MCLECompl. 0015970 1/14/0915 (Emphasis supplied)
He attempts to diminish the significance of the dubious entries and instead ascribes
On November 9, 2010, Wilson Uy filed his Opposition to Magdalena Uy's Motion to ill motive to complainant. He faults complainant for "nitpicking"33 and calls him a
Quash.16 "sore loser"34 and a "disgruntled litigant"35 who is merely "making a mountain out of
a molehill"36 and is predisposed to "fault-finding."
Magdalena Uy, through Maghari, filed her Reply17 to Wilson Uy's Opposition. This
Reply was dated December 8, 2010. In signing this Reply, Maghari indicated the He adds that "for the satisfaction of complainant,"37 he has provided what are
following details: supposedly his correct professional details:

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III

Counsel for Magdalena Uy 2009
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City IBP OR No. 765868 - Dec. 22, 2008 - Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C. PTR No. 3408746 - Jan. 5, 2009 -Bacolod City
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C. MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
ROLL NO. 20865 III-0000762-Jan. 14, 2009
MCLE Compl. 0015970 1/14/0918 (Emphasis supplied)
2010
The Regional Trial Court subsequently denied Magdalena Uy's Motion to
Quash.19 Thereafter, Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a Motion for IBP OR No. 766304 - Dec. 9, 2009 - Bacolod City
Reconsideration20 dated July 15, 2011. In signing this Motion, Maghari indicated the PTR No. 3793872 - Jan. 4, 2010 -Bacolod City
following details: MCLE Compl. II-0012507 - Jan. 14, 2009 and
III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy 2011
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City IBP OR No. 815530 -Jan. 4, 2011 -Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C. PTRNo. 4190929 - Jan. 4, 2011 - Bacolod City
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C. MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 2009
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. IH-0000762 1/14/0921(Emphasis supplied) 2012

As the Motion for Reconsideration was denied,22 Maghari filed for Magdalena Uy a IBP OR No. 848630-Dec. 27, 2011 - Bacolod City
Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum23 dated March 8, 2012. In signing this PTR No. 4631737 - Jan. 2, 2012 -Bacolod City
Motion, Maghari indicated the following details: MCLE Compl. III-0000762 - Jan. 14, 200938ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III II

Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B.C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/0924 (Emphasis supplied)
At this point, Wilson Uy's counsel noticed that based on the details indicated in the
March 8, 2012 Motion, Maghari appeared to have only recently passed the bar
examinations. This prompted Wilson Uy to check the records of Spec. Proc No. 97-
241. Upon doing so, he learned that since 2010, Maghari had been changing the
professional details indicated in the pleadings he has signed and has been copying
the professional details of Atty. Natu-El.25cralawred
Wilson Uy then filed a Motion26 to declare Magdalena Uy in indirect contempt (as by
then she had still not complied with the Subpoena ad Testificandum) and to require
Maghari to explain why he had been usurping the professional details of another
lawyer.
In its Order27 dated February 16, 2012, the Regional Trial Court declined from citing
Magdalena Uy in contempt as no verified petition asking that she be so cited had
been filed.28
On July 31, 2014, Wilson Uy filed before this court the present Complaint for
disbarment.29 Pointing to Maghari's act of repeatedly a changing and using another
lawyer's professional details, Wilson Uy asserts that Maghari violated the Lawyer's
Oath and acted in a deceitful manner.
In the Resolution30 dated November 12, 2014, this court directed Maghari to file his
Comment on Wilson Uy's Complaint.
This court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, received Maghari's
Comment31 on March 2, 2015.
For resolution are the issues of whether respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III
engaged in unethical conduct and of what proper penalty may be meted on him.
9
Respondent's avowals, protestations, and ad hominem attacks on complainant fail
to impress.
The duplicitous entries speak for themselves. The errors are manifest and
respondent admits their existence. This court would perhaps be well counseled to
absolve respondent of liability or let him get away with a proverbial slap on the
wrist if all that was involved were a typographical error, or otherwise, an error or a
handful of errors made in an isolated instance or a few isolated instances. So too, if
the error pertained to only ' one of the several pieces of information that lawyers
are required to indicate when signing pleadings.
None of these can be said of this case. Respondent did not merely commit errors in
good faith. The truth is far from it. First, respondent violated clear legal
requirements, and indicated patently false information. Second, the way he did so
demonstrates that he did so knowingly. Third, he did so repeatedly. Before our eyes
is a pattern of deceit. Fourth, the information he used was shown to have been
appropriated from another lawyer. Not only was he deceitful; he was also
larcenous. Fifth, his act not only of usurping another lawyer's details but also of his
repeatedly changing information from one pleading to another demonstrates the
intent to mock and ridicule courts and legal processes.  Respondent toyed with the
standards of legal practice.
Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court provides for deceit as a ground for
disbarment. The Lawyer's Oath entails commitment to, among others, obeying laws
and legal orders, doing no falsehood, conducting one's self as a lawyer to the best of
one's capacity, and acting with fidelity to both court and client:
I, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, I will support the Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal
orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood, nor
consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue
any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same; I will
delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to
the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these voluntary obligations without any
mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So help me God.
No amount of feigned ignorance and ad hominem attacks on complainant can
negate the gravity of respondent's actions. His insolent and mocking violation of
statutory and regulatory requirements is a violation of his duties to society and to
courts. His swiping of another lawyer's information is a violation of his duties to the
legal profession. The unnecessary risks that he foiled on his client as a possible
result of deficiently signed pleadings violate his duties to his client. Thus,
respondent did not only act in a deceitful manner and violate the solemn oath he
took to be admitted into the legal profession; he also violated every single chapter
of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
It is as clear as the entries themselves that respondent acted in a manner that is
woefully unworthy of an officer of the court. He was not even a good citizen. As
respondent has fallen short of the ethical standards apropos to members of the
legal profession, we find it proper to suspend respondent from the practice of law
for two (2) years.
III
The requirement of a counsel's signature in pleadings, the significance of this
requirement, and the consequences of non-compliance are spelled out in Rule 7,
Section 3 of the Rules of Court:
Section 3. Signature and address. — Every pleading must be signed by the party or
counsel representing him, stating in either case his address which should not be a
post office box.
The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the
pleading; that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay.
An unsigned pleading produces no legal effect. However, the court may, in its
discretion, allow such deficiency to be remedied if it shall appear that the same was
due to mere inadvertence and not intended for delay. Counsel who deliberately files
an unsigned pleading, or signs a pleading in violation of this Rule, or alleges
scandalous or indecent matter therein, or fails promptly report to the court a
change of his address, shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action. (Emphasis
supplied)
A counsel's signature on a pleading is neither an empty formality nor even a mere
means for identification. Through his or her signature, a party's counsel makes a
positive declaration. In certifying through his or her signature that he or she has
read the pleading, that there is ground to support it, and that it is not interposed for
delay, a lawyer asserts his or her competence, credibility, and ethics. Signing a
pleading is such a solemn component of legal practice that this court has taken
occasion to decry the delegation of this task to non-lawyers as a violation of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:
The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the
pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good
ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. Under the Rules of
Court, it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.
The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of
law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel
may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor
of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility
provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Rule 9.01 — A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance
of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good
standing.ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified
persons, something the law strongly proscribes.39 (Citations omitted)
A counsel's signature is such an integral part of a pleading that failure to comply
with this requirement reduces a pleading to a mere scrap of paper totally bereft of
legal effect. Thus, faithful compliance with this requirement is not only a matter of
satisfying a duty to a court but is as much a matter of fidelity to one's client. A
deficiency in this respect can be fatal to a client's cause.
Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as
part of a counsel's signature:
(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel's address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132,40 this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287,41 this court required the inclusion of the "number and
date of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership
dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year"; in lieu of
this, a lawyer may indicate his or her lifetime membership number;
(4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code,42 a lawyer must
indicate his professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel's Mandatory
Continuing Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption; and
(6) This court's Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a
counsel's contact details.
As with the signature itself, these requirements are not vain formalities.
The inclusion of a counsel's Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt
10
number, and Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership)
number is intended to preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek
to ensure that only those who have satisfied the requisites for legal practice are
able to engage in it. With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a
person purporting to be a lawyer has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine
bar.45 With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is
qualified to engage in a profession in the place where he or she principally
discharges his or her functions. With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if
the same person remains in good standing as a lawyer. These pieces of information,
in the words of Galicto v. Aquino III, "protect the public from bogus
lawyers."46 Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is
likewise compliance with a revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved
to local government units.
The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from)
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is
reserved only for those who have complied with the recognized mechanism for
"keep[ing] abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintaining] the ethics of the
profession[,] and enhancing] the standards of the practice of law."47
Lastly, the inclusion of a counsel's address and contact details is designed to
facilitate the dispensation of justice. These pieces of information aid in the service
of court processes, enhance compliance with the requisites of due process, and
facilitate better representation of a client's cause. In Juane v. Garcia,48 this court
took occasion to expound on the significance of putting on record a counsel's
address:
The time has come, we believe, for this Court to remind the members of the Bar
that it is their inescapable duty to make of record their correct address in all cases
in which they are counsel for a suitor. For, instances there have been in the past
when, because of failure to inform the court of the change of address, litigations
were delayed. And this, not to speak of inconvenience caused the other parties and
the court. Worse still, litigants have lost their cases in court because of such
negligence on the part of their counsel. It is painful enough for a litigant to surfer a
setback in a legal battle. It is doubly painful if defeat is occasioned by his attorney's
failure to receive notice because the latter has changed the place of his law office
without giving the proper notice therefor. It is only when some such situation
comes about that the negligent lawyer comes to realize the grave responsibility that
he has incurred both to his client and to the cause of justice. It is then that the
lawyer is reminded that in his oath of office he solemnly declared that he "will
conduct" himself "as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion." Too late. Experience indeed is a good teacher. To a lawyer, though, it
could prove very expensive.49
These requirements are not mere frivolities. They are not mere markings on a piece
of paper. To willfully disregard them is, thus, to willfully disregard mechanisms put
in place to facilitate integrity, competence, and credibility in legal practice; it is to
betray apathy for the ideals of the legal profession and demonstrates how one is
wanting of the standards for admission to and continuing inclusion in the bar.
Worse, to not only willfully disregard them but to feign compliance only, in truth, to
make a mockery of them reveals a dire, wretched, and utter lack of respect for the
profession that one brandishes.
IV
We underscore several facts. These demonstrate that respondent acted in manifest
bad faith, thereby exhibiting a pattern of insubordination, dishonesty, deceit, and
intent to make a mockery of courts and legal processes.
In signing the Motion to Quash Subpoena ad Testificandum with Altenative Motion
to Cite the Appearance of Johnny K.H. Uy, respondent appropriated four of the five
details (i.e., IBP official receipt number, professional tax receipt number, Roll of
Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number) that Atty. Natu-el indicated in
the Comment dated May 27, 2009, which the latter signed and filed before the
Court of Appeals. Atty. Natu-el's details are reproduced as follows:
MARIANO L. NATU-EL
Counsel for Private-Respondent
Rm. 14, J.S. Building
Lacson-Galo Sts., Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 731938 11/24/08
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLENO. 001597050 [Emphasis supplied]ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The details that respondent indicated are reproduced as follows:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBPO.R. No. 731938 11/24/08 B.C.
PTR NO. 0223568 1/5/09 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0951 (Emphasis supplied)
In signing the Reply dated December 8, 2010, respondent used what was
supposedly his correct IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt
number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 766304 11/27/09 B.C.
PTR NO. 3793872 1/4/10 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. 00159701/14/0952 (Emphasis supplied)
The same pleading, however, still bore Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and
MCLE compliance number, which respondent previously appropriated for himself.
In signing the Motion for Reconsideration dated July 15, 2011, respondent used
what was supposedly his correct IBP official receipt number and professional tax
receipt number. However, he still used Atty. Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 815530 1/4/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4190929 1/4/11 B.C.
ROLL NO. 20865
MCLE Compl. III-0000762 1/14/09 53(Emphasis supplied)
It was only in signing the Motion to Recall Subpoena ad Testificandum54 dated
March 8, 2012, that all the professional details that respondent indicated are
supposedly his own:
PACIFICO M. MAGHARI, III
Counsel for Magdalena Uy
590 Ylac St., Villamonte
Bacolod City
IBP O.R. No. 848630 12/27/11 B.C.
PTR NO. 4631737 1/2/12 B. C.
ROLL NO. 44869
MCLE Compl. 111-0000762 1/14/09 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent acted deliberately. It is impossible that the erroneous details he
indicated on his pleadings are products of mere inadvertence.
To begin with, details were copied from a pleading submitted by another lawyer.
These details somehow found their way into respondent's own pleadings. Certainly,
these details could not have written themselves, let alone transfer themselves from
a pleading prepared by one lawyer to those prepared by another. Someone must
have actually performed the act of copying and transferring; that is, someone must
have intended to copy and transfer them. Moreover, the person responsible for this
could have only been respondent or someone acting under his instructions; the
pleadings on which they were transferred are, after all, respondent's pleadings.
Second, these details were not merely copied, they were modified. "B.C." was
added to the IBP official receipt and professional tax receipt numbers copied from
Atty. Natu-el. The facts of modification and addition show active human
intervention to make something more out of markings that could otherwise have
simply been reproduced.
Third, in subsequent pleadings, some details copied from Atty. Natu-el were
discarded while some were retained. The December 8, 2010 Reply still bore Atty.
Natu-el's Roll of Attorneys number and MCLE compliance number, but no longer his
IBP official receipt number and professional tax receipt number. The July 15, 2011
Motion for Reconsideration only bore Atty. Natu-el's MCLE compliance number.
This gradual act of segregating information—discarding some while retaining
others, and retaining less over time—reveals that the author of these markings
must have engaged in a willful exercise that filtered those that were to be discarded
from those that were to be retained.
Respondent is rightly considered the author of these acts. Any claim that the error
was committed by a secretary is inconsequential. As this court has stated
in Gutierrez v. Zulueta:55
The explanation given by the respondent lawyer to the effect that the failure is
attributable to the negligence of his secretary is devoid of merit. A responsible
lawyer is expected to supervise the work in his office with respect to all the
pleadings to be filed in court and he should not delegate this responsibility, lock,
stock and barrel, to his office secretary. If it were otherwise, irresponsible members
of the legal profession can avoid appropriate disciplinary action by simply
disavowing liability and attributing the problem to the fault or negligence of the
office secretary. Such situation will not be countenanced by this Court.56
V
In the first place, it is doubtful that respondent has complied with the requirements
of paying his dues to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, paying his annual
professional tax, and completing the necessary units for Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education in the periods concerned. To put it plainly, there would be no need
for him to use incorrect information if he had complied with all pertinent
regulations.
In his Comment, respondent provided what are supposedly his correct professional
11
details. We emphasize, however, that he failed to attach to his Comment copies of
the pertinent official receipts, certifications, and other supporting documents. All
that he relies on is a self-serving recital of numbers and dates. None but
respondent, himself, was in a better position to produce the documents that could
prove his claims. His failure to do so is, at the very least, suspicious. It can very well
mean that they do not exist, or that he willfully desisted from producing them. The
latter would be more damaging to respondent, as it calls into operation the basic
presumption "[t]hat evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced."57
Even assuming that the details provided by respondent in his Comment are correct,
it still remains that he (1) used a false IBP official receipt number, professional tax
receipt number, Roll of Attorneys number, and MCLE compliance number a total of
seven (7) times; and (2) used another lawyer's details seven (7) times.
In failing to accurately state his professional details, respondent already committed
punishable violations. An isolated inaccuracy, regardless of the concerned lawyer's
lack of bad faith, already merits a penalty of relative severity. In Bumactao v.
Fano,58 respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano was suspended from the practice of law for
the singular violation of indicating wrong MCLE compliance details:
Here, it is established that respondent Atty. Restito F. Fano falsely indicated "MCLE
Compliance No. III-0018308". . . . . The admitted falsity notwithstanding, respondent
endeavors to douse his culpability by shifting the blame to the MCLE providers -
PLM and IBP Quezon City Chapter — and insisting that he acted in good faith. He
likewise attributes the indication of "MCLE Compliance No. III-0018308" to his
secretary / liaison, an "honest mistake . . . because of the pressure of his many
duties."
We are not impressed.
Bar Matter No. 1922, dated June 3, 2008, requires "practicing members of the bar
to indicate in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable. . . ." It further provides that "[f]ailure to disclose
the required information would cause the dismissal of the case and the expunction
of the pleadings from the records."
At the very least, respondent was negligent in failing to monitor his own MCLE
compliance. This is a sort of negligence that is hardly excusable. As a member of the
legal profession, respondent ought to have known that non-compliance would have
resulted in the rendering inutile of any pleading he may file before any tribunal. The
grave consequence of non-compliance notwithstanding, respondent (by his own
account) admits to having complacently relied on the statements of MCLE
providers. His negligence, therefore risked harm not only upon himself - he being
now burdened with the present complaint as a direct consequence - but worse,
upon his clients, the reliefs they seek through their pleadings being possibly
rendered inoperative.59
This court has never shied away from disciplining lawyers who have willfully
engaged in acts of deceit and falsehood.
In Flores v. Chua,60 respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua was disbarred on this court's
finding of "a habit, attitude, and mindset not only to abuse one's legal knowledge or
training, but also to deliberately defy or ignore known virtues and values which the
legal profession demands from its members."61 Atty. Enrique S. Chua was found to
have notarized a document that he knew to have been falsified so as to make it
appear that a person had personally appeared before him; this was part of a bigger
design to defraud another.
In Nunga v. Viray,62 respondent Atty. Venancio Viray was suspended from the
practice of law for three (3) years after having been found to have notarized a
document despite the lapse of his commission as a notary public.
In Benguet Electric Cooperative v. Flores,63 respondent Atty. Ernesto B. Flores was
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years after being found to have
falsely stated that he did not pursue an appeal so as to absolve himself of the
charge of forum shopping when, in fact, he had perfected an appeal.
Here, respondent violated Bar Matter No. 287, Section 139(e) of the Local
Government Code, Bar Matter No. 1132, and Bar Matter No. 1922, a total of seven
(7) times. The sheer multiplicity of instances belies any claim that we are only
dealing with isolated errors. Regardless whether isolated or manifold, these
inaccuracies alone already warrant disciplinary sanctions. However, as shall be
discussed, respondent also acted with dishonest, deceitful, and even larcenous
intent.
Respondent is not only accountable for inaccuracies. This case is far from being a
matter of clerical errors. He willfully used false information. In so doing, he misled
courts, litigants—his own client included— professional colleagues, and all others
who may have relied on the records and documents on which these false details
appear.
Respondent's act of filing pleadings that he fully knew to contain false information is
a mockery of courts, chief of which is this court, considering that this court is the
author of all but one of the regulations that respondent violated. It is this court that
requires respondent to indicate his Roll of Attorneys number, IBP official receipt
number, and MCLE compliance number.
Having also violated a requirement spelled out in the Local Government Code,
respondent similarly made a mockery of an act of the legislature.

Respondent's profligacy does not stop here. He also appropriated for himself
another lawyer's professional details in seven (7) separate instances.
In seven distinct instances, respondent is accountable for three constituent acts of
larceny, taking, use, and profiting.
Seven times, respondent took for himself professional details that belonged to
another. In these seven instances, he used the same swiped details in his own
pleadings. So too, in these seven instances he personally benefited. In these
instances, respondent succeeded in making it appear that he filed valid pleadings
and avoided the fatal consequences of a deficiently signed pleading. He was able to
pursue reliefs in court and carry on litigation that could have been terminated as
soon as his deficient pleadings were recognized.
All these instances of falsity, dishonesty, and professional larceny are similarly acts
of deceit. In using false information taken from another, respondent misled courts,
parties, and colleagues into believing that he was faithfully, truthfully, and decently
discharging his functions.
Respondent's acts reek of malicious intent to deceive courts. He was not only
insubordinate and disobedient of regulations; he was also dishonest, deceitful and
duplicitous. Worse, he was mocking and contemptuous.
VI
The totality of respondent's actions demonstrates a degree of gravity that warrants
suspension from the practice of law for an extended period.
This case involves anything but trivial non-compliance. It is much graver. The
confluence of: (1) respondent's many violations; (2) the sheer multiplicity of rules
violated; (3) the frequency—nay, pattern—of falsity and deceit; and (4) his manifest
intent to bring courts, legal processes, and professional standards to disrepute
brings to light a degree of depravity that proves respondent worthy of being
sanctioned. Having flagrantly disobeyed, deceived, and ridiculed courts, respondent
rightly stands to be at the receiving end of disciplinary action.
Respondent's circumstances are well within the grounds for disciplining lawyers as
specified by Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. His deception is well
demonstrated. He ran afoul of every single word, save perhaps his name, in the
Lawyer's Oath. Then again, it was his own signature, his own name, that respondent
Pacifico M. Maghari, III had disgraced.
Respondent's acts also demonstrate a violation of every single chapter of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pronounces a lawyer's foremost
duty "to uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land  V and promote respect
for law and legal processes" Rule 1.01 of the same  Code requires lawyers to "not
engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
Per Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, "[a] lawyer owes candor,
fairness and good faith to the court" Rule 10.01 requires lawyers to "not do any
falsehood . . . or allow the court to be misled by any artifice." Rule 10.03 imposes
upon lawyers the duty of faithfully "observ[ing] the rules of procedure [and] not
misusing] them to defeat the ends of justice." Canon 11 exhorts lawyers to "observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts."
Respondent did not merely violate a statute and the many issuances of this court as
regards the information that members of the bar must indicate when they sign
pleadings. He did so in a manner that betrays intent to make a mockery of courts,
legal processes, and professional standards. By his actions, respondent ridiculed and
toyed with the requirements imposed by statute and by this court. He trampled
upon professional standards established not only by this court, in its capacity as
overseer of the legal profession, but by the Republic itself, through a duly enacted
statute. In so doing, he violated his duty to society and to the courts.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires a lawyer to "conduct
himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues."
In appropriating information pertaining to his opposing counsel, respondent did not
only fail to observe common courtesy. He encroached upon matters that,
ultimately, are personal to another. This encroachment is, therefore, not only an act
of trickery; it is also act of larceny. In so doing, he violated his duty to the legal
profession.
Canon 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility imposes upon a lawyer "fidelity
to the cause of his client," while Canon 18 requires a lawyer to "serve his client with
competence and diligence."
In using false information in his pleadings, respondent unnecessarily put his own
client at risk. Deficiencies in how pleadings are signed can be fatal to a party's cause
as unsigned pleadings produce no legal effect. In so doing, respondent violated his
duty to his clients.
It is tempting to think that the only thing respondent did was to deviate from
required formalities. Respondent was, himself, quite dismissive, stating that he did
nothing more than "cursorily [go] over . . . without giving any ... attention to details .
. . that. . . are matters of record and are easily verifiable."64 It is equally tempting to
think it would be excessive of this court to engage in an overly rigid, pedantic
12
emphasis on formalistic niceties.
However, we have demonstrated that what can otherwise be dismissed as empty
formalities are, in fact, necessary solemnities. They are not ends in themselves but
crucial means to enhance the integrity, competence and credibility of the legal
profession. They are vital to the dispensation of justice. The significance of these
solemnities, along with the legal profession's "high standard of legal proficiency, . . .
morality, honesty, integrity[,] and fair dealing[,]"65 put in contrast with how
respondent has fallen dismally and disturbingly short of the high standards that his
profession demands, demonstrates the propriety of momentarily suspending
respondent from engaging in legal practice.
It is unsettling that respondent engaged in the mockery and ridicule that he did of
the very same badges—his place in the Roll of Attorneys, his membership in the
Integrated Bar, his recognition as a practicing professional, his continuing training
and competence—that are emblematic of his being a lawyer. Seeing as how he
manifested such contempt for these badges, we find that there is every reason for
preventing him, at least temporarily, from engaging in the profession these badges
signify.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Pacifico M. Maghari, III, having clearly violated his
Lawyer's Oath and the Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Resolution.
Let copies of this Resolution be served on the Office of the Bar Confidant, the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the country for their information
and guidance. Let a copy of this Resolution be attached to respondent Atty. Pacifico
M. Maghari, III's personal record as attorney.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A.C. No. 5439             January 22, 2007
CLARITA J. SAMALA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. LUCIANO D. VALENCIA, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before us is a complaint1 dated May 2, 2001 filed by Clarita J. Samala (complainant)
against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia (respondent) for Disbarment on the following
grounds: (a) serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;
(b) knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence; (c)
initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees; and (d) having
a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
After respondent filed his Comment, the Court, in its Resolution of October 24,
2001, referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 2
The investigation was conducted by Commissioner Demaree Jesus B. Raval. After a
series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda 3 and the case was
deemed submitted for resolution.
Commissioner Wilfredo E.J.E. Reyes prepared the Report and
Recommendation 4 dated January 12, 2006. He found respondent guilty of violating
Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the
penalty of suspension for six months.
In a minute Resolution 5 passed on May 26, 2006, the IBP Board of Governors
adopted and approved the report and recommendation of Commissioner Reyes but
increased the penalty of suspension from six months to one year.
We adopt the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Records show that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, filed in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 272, Marikina City, entitled "Leonora M. Aville v. Editha Valdez" for
nonpayment of rentals, herein respondent, while being the counsel for defendant
Valdez, also acted as counsel for the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and
Bayuga 6 by filing an Explanation and Compliance before the RTC. 7
In Civil Case No. 98-6804 filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC), Branch 75,
Marikina City, entitled "Editha S. Valdez and Joseph J. Alba, Jr. v. Salve Bustamante
and her husband" for ejectment, respondent represented Valdez against
Bustamante - one of the tenants in the property subject of the controversy.
Defendants appealed to the RTC, Branch 272, Marikina City docketed as SCA Case
No. 99-341-MK. In his decision dated May 2, 2000, 8 Presiding Judge Reuben P. dela
Cruz 9 warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being counsel of
record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.
But in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK, filed in the RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City,
entitled "Editha S. Valdez v. Joseph J. Alba, Jr. and Register of Deeds of Marikina
City," respondent, as counsel for Valdez, filed a Complaint for Rescission of Contract
with Damages and Cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 275500 against
Alba, respondent's former client in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-
MK.
Records further reveal that at the hearing of November 14, 2003, respondent
admitted that in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK, he was the lawyer for Lagmay (one of
the tenants) but not for Bustamante and Bayuga 10 albeit he filed the Explanation
and Compliance for and in behalf of the tenants. 11 Respondent also admitted that
he represented Valdez in Civil Case No. 98-6804 and SCA Case No. 99-341-MK
against Bustamante and her husband but denied being the counsel for Alba
although the case is entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and her husband,"
because Valdez told him to include Alba as the two were the owners of the
property 12 and it was only Valdez who signed the complaint for ejectment. 13 But,
while claiming that respondent did not represent Alba, respondent, however, avers
that he already severed his representation for Alba when the latter charged
respondent with estafa. 14 Thus, the filing of Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK against
Alba.
Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. 15 He
may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may
represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. 16 It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice. 17
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty. 18
The stern rule against representation of conflicting interests is founded on
principles of public policy and good taste. It springs from the attorney's duty to
represent his client with undivided fidelity and to maintain inviolate the client's
confidence as well as from the injunction forbidding the examination of an attorney
as to any of the privileged communications of his client. 19
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in the case in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated. 20 The bare attorney-client relationship with a client precludes an
attorney from accepting professional employment from the client's adversary either
in the same case 21 or in a different but related action. 22 A lawyer is forbidden from
representing a subsequent client against a former client when the subject matter of
the present controversy is related, directly or indirectly, to the subject matter of the
previous litigation in which he appeared for the former client. 23
24
We held in Nombrado v. Hernandez   that the termination of the relation of
attorney and client provides no justification for a lawyer to represent an interest
adverse to or in conflict with that of the former client. The reason for the rule is that
the client's confidence once reposed cannot be divested by the expiration of the
professional employment. 25 Consequently, a lawyer should not, even after the
severance of the relation with his client, do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he previously represented him nor should he
disclose or use any of the client's confidences acquired in the previous relation. 26
In this case, respondent's averment that his relationship with Alba has long been
severed by the act of the latter of not turning over the proceeds collected in Civil
Case No. 98-6804, in connivance with the complainant, is unavailing. Termination of
the attorney-client relationship precludes an attorney from representing a new
client whose interest is adverse to his former client. Alba may not be his original
client but the fact that he filed a case entitled "Valdez and Alba v. Bustamante and
her husband," is a clear indication that respondent is protecting the interests of
both Valdez and Alba in the said case. Respondent cannot just claim that the
lawyer-client relationship between him and Alba has long been severed without
observing Section 26, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court wherein the written consent of
his client is required.
In Gonzales v. Cabucana, Jr., 27 citing the case of Quiambao v. Bamba, 28 we held
that:
The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a situation
where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or in an unrelated
action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called upon to contend for
13
one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there
would be no occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the
disadvantage of the other as the two actions are wholly unrelated. It is enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer's respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both
clients. 29
Respondent is bound to comply with Canon 21 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states that "a lawyer shall preserve the confidences and
secrets of his client even after the attorney-client relation is terminated."
The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client, which
is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes familiar with
all the facts connected with his client's case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered
sacred and guarded with care. 30
From the foregoing, it is evident that respondent's representation of Valdez and
Alba against Bustamante and her husband, in one case, and Valdez against Alba, in
another case, is a clear case of conflict of interests which merits a corresponding
sanction from this Court. Respondent may have withdrawn his representation in
Civil Case No. 95-105-MK upon being warned by the court, 31 but the same will not
exculpate him from the charge of representing conflicting interests in his
representation in Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK.
Respondent is reminded to be more cautious in accepting professional
employments, to refrain from all appearances and acts of impropriety including
circumstances indicating conflict of interests, and to behave at all times with
circumspection and dedication befitting a member of the Bar, especially observing
candor, fairness and loyalty in all transactions with his clients. 32
On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for
ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's
ownership despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the
name of Alba on February 2, 1995.
Records reveal that respondent filed Civil Case No. 00-7137 on November 27, 2000
and presented TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership of the subject
property. 33 During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that
when the Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know
that the title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
complaint, he did not do anything anymore. 34 Respondent further avers that Valdez
did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for
rescission was filed in 2002.
Upon examination of the record, it was noted that Civil Case No. 2000-657-MK for
rescission of contract and cancellation of TCT No. 275500 was also filed on
November 27, 2000, 35 before RTC, Branch 273, Marikina City, thus belying the
averment of respondent that he came to know of Alba's title only in 2002 when the
case for rescission was filed. It was revealed during the hearing before
Commissioner Raval that Civil Case Nos. 00-7137 and 2000-657-MK were filed on
the same date, although in different courts and at different times.
Hence, respondent cannot feign ignorance of the fact that the title he submitted
was already cancelled in lieu of a new title issued in the name of Alba in 1995 yet, as
proof of the latter's ownership.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead
by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's
submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated
January 8, 2002 36 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this
case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT No.
275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
In Young v. Batuegas,37 we held that a lawyer must be a disciple of truth. He swore
upon his admission to the Bar that he will "do no falsehood nor consent to the
doing of any in court" and he shall "conduct himself as a lawyer according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to
his clients." 38 He should bear in mind that as an officer of the court his high
vocation is to correctly inform the court upon the law and the facts of the case and
to aid it in doing justice and arriving at correct conclusion. 39 The courts, on the
other hand, are entitled to expect only complete honesty from lawyers appearing
and pleading before them. While a lawyer has the solemn duty to defend his client's
rights and is expected to display the utmost zeal in defense of his client's cause, his
conduct must never be at the expense of truth.
A lawyer is the servant of the law and belongs to a profession to which society has
entrusted the administration of law and the dispensation of justice. 40 As such, he
should make himself more an exemplar for others to emulate. 41
>On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees. CORONA, J.:

Complainant alleges that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No. This is a complaint for disbarment1 filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan
2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch Linsangan & Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation
75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for of clients and encroachment of professional services.
estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor.
Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases
Complainant alleged that respondent, with the help of paralegal Fe Marie Labiano,
she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 00-4318
convinced his clients2 to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
financial assistance3 and expeditious collection on their claims.4 To induce them to
hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for
To support his allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit5 of James
free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement. 42
Gregorio attesting that Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client
relations with complainant and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for
Respondent filed I.S. Nos. 00-4439 43 and 01-036162 44 both entitled "Valencia v. a loan of ₱50,000. Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card:6
Samala" for estafa and grave coercion, respectively, to protect his client's rights
against complainant who filed I.S. No. 00-4306 45 for estafa against Lagmay, and I.S.
Front
No. 00-4318 46 against Alvin Valencia 47 for trespass to dwelling.

We find the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of filing the
aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his own
interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge unless NICOMEDES TOLENTINO
it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial processes to
commit injustice.
LAW OFFFICE

The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of
CONSULTANCY & MARITIME SERVICES
his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is
W/ FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.

Fe Marie L. Labiano
On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
Paralegal

We find respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

Tel: 362-
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita 1st MIJI Mansion, 2nd Flr. 7820
Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, 48 while his first wife was still alive. He also Rm. M-01 Fax: (632)
admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over 6th Ave., cor M.H. Del Pilar 362-7821
20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in Grace Park, Caloocan City Cel.: (0926)
1998. 49 Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the 2701719
apartments being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair
with Lagmay as a relationship 50 and does not consider the latter as his second
family. 51 He reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two Back
houses, one in Muntinlupa and another in Marikina. 52

In this case, the admissions made by respondent are more than enough to hold him
liable on the charge of immorality. During the hearing, respondent did not show any
remorse. He even justified his transgression by saying that he does not have any
relationship with Lagmay and despite the fact that he sired three children by the SERVICES OFFERED:
latter, he does not consider them as his second family. It is noted that during the
hearing, respondent boasts in telling the commissioner that he has two houses - in
Muntinlupa, where his first wife lived, and in Marikina, where Lagmay lives. 53 It is of CONSULTATION AND ASSISTANCE
no moment that respondent eventually married Lagmay after the death of his first TO OVERSEAS SEAMEN
wife. The fact still remains that respondent did not live up to the exacting standard REPATRIATED DUE TO ACCIDENT,
of morality and decorum required of the legal profession. INJURY, ILLNESS, SICKNESS, DEATH
AND INSURANCE BENEFIT CLAIMS
ABROAD.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult
to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet, 1avvphi1
for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that
"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community. 54 Thus, in
several cases, the Court did not hesitate to discipline a lawyer for keeping a mistress
in defiance of the mores and sense of morality of the community. 55 That
respondent subsequently married Lagmay in 1998 after the death of his wife and (emphasis supplied)
that this is his first infraction as regards immorality serve to mitigate his liability.
Hence, this complaint.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Respondent, in his defense, denied knowing Labiano and authorizing the printing
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
and circulation of the said calling card.7
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

The complaint was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land, the Integrated Bar
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and
of the Philippines as well as the Office of the Bar Confidant for their information and
recommendation.8
guidance, and let it be entered in respondent's personal records.

Based on testimonial and documentary evidence, the CBD, in its report and
SO ORDERED.
recommendation,9 found that respondent had encroached on the professional
practice of complainant, violating Rule 8.0210 and other canons11 of the Code of
A.C. No. 6672               September 4, 2009 Professional Responsibility (CPR). Moreover, he contravened the rule against
soliciting cases for gain, personally or through paid agents or brokers as stated in
PEDRO L. LINSANGAN, Complainant, Section 27, Rule 13812 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the CBD recommended that
vs. respondent be reprimanded with a stern warning that any repetition would merit a
ATTY. NICOMEDES TOLENTINO, Respondent. heavier penalty.

RESOLUTION

14
We adopt the findings of the IBP on the unethical conduct of respondent but we
modify the recommended penalty.
The complaint before us is rooted on the alleged intrusion by respondent into
complainant’s professional practice in violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR. And the
means employed by respondent in furtherance of the said misconduct themselves
constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.
fidelity to the client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection
with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter
of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.23 Either of these circumstances
may lead the lawyer to consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to
accept a settlement which may take care of his interest in the verdict to the
prejudice of the client in violation of his duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s
cause.24

As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice25 which calls

Canons of the CPR are rules of conduct all lawyers must adhere to, including the
manner by which a lawyer’s services are to be made known. Thus, Canon 3 of the
CPR provides:
CANON 3 - A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest,
fair, dignified and objective information or statement of facts.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession
and not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants
advertise their wares.13 To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to
commercialize the practice of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation
and impair its ability to efficiently render that high character of service to which
every member of the bar is called.14
Rule 2.03 of the CPR provides:
RULE 2.03. A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed primarily to
solicit legal business.
for the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation
statutes warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client
for the purpose of obtaining employment.26 Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to
the rule to protect the public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous
lawyers and to uphold the nobility of the legal profession.
Considering the myriad infractions of respondent (including violation of the
prohibition on lending money to clients), the sanction recommended by the IBP, a
mere reprimand, is a wimpy slap on the wrist. The proposed penalty is grossly
incommensurate to its findings.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A
lawyer’s best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity
and fidelity to trust based on his character and conduct.27 For this reason, lawyers
are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:

Hence, lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either (a) lawyer’s name;
personally or through paid agents or brokers.15 Such actuation constitutes
malpractice, a ground for disbarment.16
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;

Rule 2.03 should be read in connection with Rule 1.03 of the CPR which provides:
(c) address;

RULE 1.03. A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit
(d) telephone number and
or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.

(e) special branch of law practiced.28

This rule proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any kind of legal
business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment)17 as a measure to protect the community from barratry and
champerty.18
Complainant presented substantial evidence19 (consisting of the sworn statements
of the very same persons coaxed by Labiano and referred to respondent’s office) to
prove that respondent indeed solicited legal business as well as profited from
referrals’ suits.
Although respondent initially denied knowing Labiano in his answer, he later
admitted it during the mandatory hearing.
Through Labiano’s actions, respondent’s law practice was benefited. Hapless
seamen were enticed to transfer representation on the strength of Labiano’s word
that respondent could produce a more favorable result.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule
2.03, and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of
Court.1avvphi1
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that
a lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him
by a promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services.20 Again
the Court notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client
list nor receiving benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied
Labiano’s connection to his office.21 Respondent committed an unethical, predatory
overstep into another’s legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of
the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04:
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase
was clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change
counsels with a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled
to lure clients away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their
financial distress and emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded
the integrity of the bar and deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in
the absence of substantial evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not
prepared to rule that respondent was personally and directly responsible for the
printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling cards.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for violating Rules 1.03, 2.03,
8.02 and 16.04 and Canon 3 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section
27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law
for a period of one year effective immediately from receipt of this resolution. He
is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall
be dealt with more severely.
Let a copy of this Resolution be made part of his records in the Office of the Bar
Confidant, Supreme Court of the Philippines, and be furnished to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator to be circulated to all
courts.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 104599 March 11, 1994
JON DE YSASI III, petitioner,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION (FOURTH DIVISION), CEBU CITY, and
JON DE YSASI, respondents.

F.B. Santiago, Nalus & Associates for petitioner.

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s
interests are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice.
Neither shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, Ismael A. Serfino for private respondent.
he has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is,
when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing
REGALADO, J.:
fees, stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or
premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
The adage that blood is thicker than water obviously stood for naught in this case,
notwithstanding the vinculum of paternity and filiation between the parties. It
The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the
would indeed have been the better part of reason if herein petitioner and private
free exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected.22 It seeks to ensure his
respondent had reconciled their differences in an extrajudicial atmosphere of
undivided attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and
15
familial amity and with the grace of reciprocal concessions. Father and son opted
instead for judicial intervention despite the inevitable acrimony and negative
publicity. Albeit with distaste, the Court cannot proceed elsewise but to resolve
their dispute with the same reasoned detachment accorded any judicial proceeding
before it.
The records of this case reveal that petitioner was employed by his father, herein
private respondent, as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao in Hinigaran,
Negros Occidental sometime in April, 1980. Prior thereto, he was successively
employed as sales manager of Triumph International (Phil.), Inc. and later as
operations manager of Top Form Manufacturing (Phil.), Inc. His employment as
farm administrator was on a fixed salary, with other allowances covering housing,
food, light, power, telephone, gasoline, medical and dental expenses.
As farm administrator, petitioner was responsible for the supervision of daily
activities and operations of the sugarcane farm such as land preparation, planting,
weeding, fertilizing, harvesting, dealing with third persons in all matters relating to
the hacienda and attending to such other tasks as may be assigned to him by
private respondent. For this purpose, he lived on the farm, occupying the upper
floor of the house there.
Following his marriage on June 6, 1982, petitioner moved to Bacolod City with his
wife and commuted to work daily. He suffered various ailments and was
hospitalized on two separate occasions in June and August, 1982. In November,
1982, he underwent fistulectomy, or the surgical removal of the fistula, a deep
sinuous ulcer. During his recuperation which lasted over four months, he was under
the care of Dr. Patricio Tan. In June, 1983, he was confined for acute gastroenteritis
and, thereafter, for infectious hepatitis from December, 1983 to January, 1984.
During the entire periods of petitioner's illnesses, private respondent took care of
his medical expenses and petitioner continued to receive compensation. However,
in April, 1984, without due notice, private respondent ceased to pay the latter's
salary. Petitioner made oral and written demands for an explanation for the sudden
withholding of his salary from Atty. Apolonio Sumbingco, private respondent's
auditor and legal adviser, as well as for the remittance of his salary. Both demands,
however, were not acted upon.
Petitioner then filed an action with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC,
for brevity), Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI, Bacolod City, on October 17, 1984,
docketed therein as RAB Case No. 0452-84, against private respondent for illegal
dismissal with prayer for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and payment
of full back wages, thirteenth month pay for 1983, consequential, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees.
On July 31, 1991, said complaint for illegal dismissal was dismissed by the
NLRC,1 holding that petitioner abandoned his work and that the termination of his
employment was for a valid cause, but ordering private respondent to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as penalty for his failure to serve notice of said
termination of employment to the Department of Labor and Employment as
required by Batas Pambansa Blg. 130 and consonant with this Court's ruling
in Wenphil Corporation vs. National Labor Relations Commission, et al.2 On appeal
to the Fourth Division of the NLRC, Cebu City, said decision was affirmed in toto.3
His motion for reconsideration4 of said decision having been denied for lack of
merit,5 petitioner filed this petition presenting the following issues for resolution:
(1) whether or not the petitioner was illegally dismissed; (2) whether or not he is
entitled to reinstatement, payment of back wages, thirteenth month pay and other
benefits; and (3) whether or not he is entitled to payment of moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees because of illegal dismissal. The discussion of these
issues will necessarily subsume the corollary questions presented by private
respondent, such as the exact date when petitioner ceased to function as farm
administrator, the character of the pecuniary amounts received by petitioner from
private respondent, that is, whether the same are in the nature of salaries or
pensions, and whether or not there was abandonment by petitioner of his functions
as farm administrator.
In his manifestation dated September 14, 1992, the Solicitor General recommended
a modification of the decision of herein public respondent sustaining the findings
and conclusions of the Executive Labor Arbiter in RAB Case No. 0452-84,6 for which
reason the NLRC was required to submit its own comment on the petition. In
compliance with the Court's resolution of November 16, 1992,7 NLRC filed its
comment on February 12, 1992 largely reiterating its earlier position in support of
the findings of the Executive Labor Arbiter.8
Before proceeding with a discussion of the issues, the observation of the labor
arbiter is worth noting:
This case is truly unique. What makes this case unique is the
fact that because of the special relationship of the parties and
the nature of the action involved, this case could very well go
down (in) the annals of the Commission as perhaps the first of
its kind. For this case is an action filed by an only son, his
father's namesake, the only child and therefore the only heir
against his own father.9
16
Additionally, the Solicitor General remarked:
. . . After an exhaustive reading of the records, two (2)
observations were noted that may justify why this labor case
deserves special considerations. First, most of the complaints
that petitioner and private respondent had with each other,
were personal matters affecting father and son relationship.
And secondly, if any of the complaints pertain to their work,
they allow their personal relationship to come in the way.10
I. Petitioner maintains that his dismissal from employment was illegal because of
want of just cause therefor and non-observance of the requirements of due
process. He also charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion in relying upon the
findings of the executive labor arbiter who decided the case but did not conduct the
hearings thereof.
Private respondent, in refutation, avers that there was abandonment by petitioner
of his functions as farm administrator, thereby arming private respondent with a
ground to terminate his employment at Hacienda Manucao. It is also contended
that it is wrong for petitioner to question the factual findings of the executive labor
arbiter and the NLRC as only questions of law may be appealed for resolution by
this Court. Furthermore, in seeking the dismissal of the instant petition, private
respondent faults herein petitioner for failure to refer to the corresponding pages
of the transcripts of stenographic notes, erroneously citing Sections 15(d) and 16(d),
Rule 44 (should be Section 16[c] and [d],
Rule 46 and Section 1[g], Rule 50) of the Rules of Court, which provide that want of
page references to the records is a ground for dismissal of an appeal.
Prefatorily, we take advertence of the provisions of Article 221 of the Labor Code
that technical rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be
controlling, and that every and all reasonable means to speedily and objectively
ascertain the facts in each case shall be availed of, without regard to technicalities
of law or procedure in the interest of due process.
It is settled that it is not procedurally objectionable for the decision in a case to be
rendered by a judge, or a labor arbiter for that matter, other than the one who
conducted the hearing. The fact that the judge who heard the case was not the
judge who penned the decision does not impair the validity of the
judgment,11 provided that he draws up his decision and resolution with due care
and makes certain that they truly and accurately reflect conclusions and final
dispositions on the bases of the facts of and evidence submitted in the case.12
Thus, the mere fact that the case was initially assigned to Labor Arbiter Ricardo T.
Octavio, who conducted the hearings therein from December 5, 1984 to July 11,
1985, and was later transferred to Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar S. Uy, who
eventually decided the case, presents no procedural infirmity, especially considering
that there is a presumption of regularity in the performance of a public officer's
functions,13 which petitioner has not successfully rebutted.
We are constrained to heed the underlying policy in the Labor Code relaxing the
application of technical rules of procedure in labor cases in the interest of due
process, ever mindful of the long-standing legal precept that rules of procedure
must be interpreted to help secure, not defeat, justice. For this reason, we cannot
indulge private respondent in his tendency to nitpick on trivial technicalities to
boost his arguments. The strength of one's position cannot be hinged on mere
procedural niceties but on solid bases in law and jurisprudence.
The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no
worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and
after due process.14 Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the causes for which
an employer may validly terminate an employment, to wit:
(a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work; (b) gross and
habitual neglect by the employee of his duties; (c) fraud or willful breach by the
employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized
representative; (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly
authorized representative; and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing.
The employer may also terminate the services of any employee due to the
installation of labor saving devices, redundancy, retrenchment to prevent losses or
the closing or cessation of operation of the establishment or undertaking, unless the
closing is for the purpose of circumventing the pertinent provisions of the Labor
Code, by serving a written notice on the workers and the Department of Labor and
Employment at least one (1) month before the intended date thereof, with due
entitlement to the corresponding separation pay rates provided by law.15 Suffering
from a disease by reason whereof the continued employment of the employee is
prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his and his co-employee's health, is also a
ground for termination of his services provided he receives the prescribed
separation pay.16 On the other hand, it is well-settled that abandonment by an
employee of his work authorizes the employer to effect the former's dismissal from
employment.17
After a careful review of the records of this case, we find that public respondent
gravely erred in affirming the decision of the executive labor arbiter holding that
petitioner abandoned his employment and was not illegally dismissed from such
employment. For want of substantial bases, in fact or
in law, we cannot give the stamp of finality and conclusiveness normally accorded
to the factual findings of an administrative agency, such as herein public respondent
NLRC,18 as even decisions of administrative agencies which are declared "final" by
law are not exempt from judicial review when so warranted. 19
The following perceptive disquisitions of the Solicitor General on this point deserve
acceptance:
It is submitted that the absences of petitioner in his work
from October 1982 to December 1982, cannot be construed
as abandonment of work because he has a justifiable excuse.
Petitioner was suffering from perennial abscess in the peri-
anal around the anus and fistula under the medical attention
of Dr. Patricio Tan of Riverside Medical Center, Inc., Bacolod
City (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan, February 19, 1986 at 20-44).
This fact (was) duly communicated to private respondent by
medical bills sent to Hacienda Manucao (Tsn, Vol. III, Dr. Tan,
January 22, 1987 at 49-50).
During the period of his illness and recovery, petitioner
stayed in Bacolod City upon the instruction(s) of private
respondent to recuperate thereat and to handle only
administrative matters of the hacienda in that city. As a
manager, petitioner is not really obliged to live and stay 24
hours a day inside Hacienda Manucao.
xxx xxx xxx
After evaluating the evidence within the context of the special
circumstances involved and basic human experience,
petitioner's illness and strained family relation with
respondent Jon de Ysasi II may be considered as justifiable
reason for petitioner Jon de Ysasi III's absence from work
during the period of October 1982 to December 1982. In any
event, such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing.
xxx xxx xxx
The elements of abandonment as a ground for dismissal of an
employee are as follows:
(1) failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason; and
(2) clear intention to sever the
employer-employee tie (Samson
Alcantara, Reviewer in Labor and Social
Legislation, 1989 edition, p. 133).
This Honorable Court, in several cases, illustrates what
constitute abandonment. In Dagupan Bus Company
v. NLRC (191 SCRA 328), the Court rules that for
abandonment to arise, there must be a concurrence of the
intention to abandon and some overt act from which it may
be inferred that the employee has no more interest to work.
Similarly, in Nueva Ecija I Electric Cooperative,
Inc. v. NLRC (184 SCRA 25), for abandonment to constitute a
valid cause for termination of employment, there must be a
deliberate, unjustified refusal of the employee to resume his
employment. . . Mere absence is not sufficient; it must be
accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that
the employee simply does not want to work anymore.
There are significant indications in this case, that there is no
abandonment. First, petitioner's absence and his decision to
leave his residence inside Hacienda Manucao, is justified by
his illness and strained family relations. Second he has some
medical certificates to show his frail health. Third, once able
to work, petitioner wrote a letter (Annex "J") informing
private respondent of his intention to assume again his
employment. Last, but not the least, he at once instituted a
complaint for illegal dismissal when he realized he was
unjustly dismissed. All these are indications that petitioner
had no intention to abandon his employment.20
The records show that the parties herein do not dispute the fact of petitioner's
confinement in the hospital for his various afflictions which required medical
treatment. Neither can it be denied that private respondent was well aware of
petitioner's state of health as the former admittedly shouldered part of the medical
and hospital bills and even advised the latter to stay in Bacolod City until he was fit
to work again. The disagreement as to whether or not petitioner's ailments were so
serious as to necessitate hospitalization and corresponding periods for recuperation
17
is beside the point. The fact remains that on account of said illnesses, the details of
which were amply substantiated by the attending physician,21 and as the records are
bereft of any suggestion of malingering on the part of petitioner, there was
justifiable cause for petitioner's absence from work. We repeat, it is clear,
deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume employment and not mere absence
that is required to constitute abandonment as a valid ground for termination of
employment.22
With his position as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao, petitioner
unmistakably may be classified as a managerial employee23 to whom the law grants
an amount of discretion in the discharge of his duties. This is why when petitioner
stated that "I assigned myself where I want to go,"24 he was simply being candid
about what he could do within the sphere of his authority. His duties as farm
administrator did not strictly require him to keep regular hours or to be at the office
premises at all times, or to be subjected to specific control from his employer in
every aspect of his work. What is essential only is that he runs the farm as efficiently
and effectively as possible and, while petitioner may definitely not qualify as a
model employee, in this regard he proved to be quite successful, as there was at
least a showing of increased production during the time that petitioner was in
charge of farm operations.
If, as private respondent contends, he had no control over petitioner during the
years 1983 to 1984, this is because that was the period when petitioner was
recuperating from illness and on account of which his attendance and direct
involvement in farm operations were irregular and minimal, hence the supervision
and control exercisable by private respondent as employer was necessarily limited.
It goes without saying that the control contemplated refers only to matters relating
to his functions as farm administrator and could not extend to petitioner's personal
affairs and activities.
While it was taken for granted that for purposes of discharging his duties as farm
administrator, petitioner would be staying at the house in the farm, there really was
no explicit contractual stipulation (as there was no formal employment contract to
begin with) requiring him to stay therein for the duration of his employment or that
any transfer of residence would justify the termination of his employment. That
petitioner changed his residence should not be taken against him, as this is
undeniably among his basic rights, nor can such fact of transfer of residence per
se be a valid ground to terminate an employer-employee relationship.
Private respondent, in his pleadings, asserted that as he was yet uncertain of his
son's intention of returning to work after his confinement in the hospital, he kept
petitioner on the payroll, reported him as an employee of the hacienda for social
security purposes, and paid his salaries and benefits with the mandated deductions
therefrom until the end of December, 1982. It was only in January, 1983 when he
became convinced that petitioner would no longer return to work that he
considered the latter to have abandoned his work and, for this reason, no longer
listed him as an employee. According to private respondent, whatever amount of
money was given to petitioner from that time until
April, 1984 was in the nature of a pension or an allowance or mere gratuitous doles
from a father to a son, and not salaries as, in fact, none of the usual deductions
were made therefrom. It was only in April, 1984 that private respondent completely
stopped giving said pension or allowance when he was angered by what he heard
petitioner had been saying about sending him to jail.
Private respondent capitalizes on the testimony of one Manolo Gomez taken on
oral deposition regarding petitioner's alleged statement to him, "(h)e quemado los
(p)ue(n)tes de Manucao" ("I have burned my bridges with Manucao") as expressive
of petitioner's intention to abandon his job. In addition to insinuations of sinister
motives on the part of petitioner in working at the farm and thereafter abandoning
the job upon accomplishment of his objectives, private respondent takes the novel
position that the agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned the
administration of the farm legally converts the initial abandonment to implied
voluntary resignation.25
As earlier mentioned, petitioner ripostes that private respondent undoubtedly knew
about petitioner's illness and even paid for his hospital and other medical bills. The
assertion regarding abandonment of work, petitioner argues, is further belied by his
continued performance of various services related to the operations of the farm
from May to the last quarter of 1983, his persistent inquiries from his father's
accountant and legal adviser about the reason why his pension or allowance was
discontinued since April, 1984, and his indication of having recovered and his
willingness and capability to resume his work at the farm as expressed in a letter
dated September 14, 1984.26 With these, petitioner contends that it is immaterial
how the monthly pecuniary amounts are designated, whether as salary, pension or
allowance, with or without deductions, as he was entitled thereto in view of his
continued service as farm administrator.27
To stress what was earlier mentioned, in order that a finding of abandonment may
justly be made there must be a concurrence of two elements, viz.: (1) the failure to
report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason, and (2) a clear
intention to sever the employer-employee relationship, with the second element as
the more determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. Such
intent we find dismally wanting in this case.
It will be recalled that private respondent himself admitted being unsure of his son's
plans of returning to work. The absence of petitioner from work since mid-1982,
prolonged though it may have been, was not without valid causes of which private
respondent had full knowledge. As to what convinced or led him to believe that
petitioner was no longer returning to work, private respondent neither explains nor
substantiates by any reasonable basis how he arrived at such a conclusion.
Moreover, private respondent's claim of abandonment cannot be given credence as
even after January, 1983, when private respondent supposedly "became convinced"
that petitioner would no longer work at the farm, the latter continued to perform
services directly required by his position as farm administrator. These are duly and
correspondingly evidenced by such acts as picking up some farm
machinery/equipment from G.A. Machineries, Inc.,28 claiming and paying for
additional farm equipment and machinery shipped by said firm from Manila to
Bacolod through Zip Forwarders,29 getting the payment of the additional cash
advances for molasses for crop year 1983-1984 from Agrotex Commodities,
Inc.,30 and remitting to private respondent through
Atty. Sumbingco the sums collected along with receipts for medicine and oil.31
It will be observed that all of these chores, which petitioner took care of, relate to
the normal activities and operations of the farm. True, it is a father's prerogative to
request or even command his child to run errands for him. In the present case,
however, considering the nature of these transactions, as well as the property
values and monetary sums involved, it is unlikely that private respondent would
leave the matter to just anyone. Prudence dictates that these matters be handled
by someone who can be trusted or at least be held accountable therefor, and who is
familiar with the terms, specifications and other details relative thereto, such as an
employee. If indeed petitioner had abandoned his job or was considered to have
done so by private respondent, it would be awkward, or even out of place, to
expect or to oblige petitioner to concern himself with matters relating to or
expected of him with respect to what would then be his past and terminated
employment. It is hard to imagine what further authority an employer can have
over a dismissed employee so as to compel him to continue to perform work-
related tasks:
It is also significant that the special power of attorney32 executed
by private respondent on June 26, 1980 in favor of petitioner, specifically stating —
xxx xxx xxx
That I, JON de YSASI, Filipino, of legal age, married, and a
resident of Hda. Manucao, hereinafter called and referred to
as PRINCIPAL, am a sugarcane planter, BISCOM Mill District,
and a duly accredited planter-member of the BINALBAGAN-
ISABELA PLANTERS' ASSOCIATION, INC.;
That as such planter-member of BIPA, I have check/checks
with BIPA representing payment for all checks and papers to
which I am entitled to (sic) as such planter-member;
That I have named, appointed and constituted as by these
presents
I HEREBY NAME, APPOINT AND CONSTITUTE as my true and
lawful ATTORNEY-IN-FACT
JON de YSASI III
whose specimen signature is hereunder affixed, TO GET FOR
ME and in my name, place and stead, my check/checks
aforementioned, said ATTORNEY-IN-FACT being herein given
the power and authority to sign for me and in my name, place
and stead, the receipt or receipts or payroll for the said
check/checks. PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that my said
ATTORNEY-IN-FACT cannot cash the said check/checks, but to
turn the same over to me for my proper disposition.
That I HEREBY RATIFY AND CONFIRM the acts of my
Attorney-in-Fact in getting the said check/checks and signing
the receipts therefor.
That I further request that my said check/checks be made a
"CROSSED CHECK".
xxx xxx xxx
remained in force even after petitioner's employment was supposed to have been
terminated by reason of abandonment. Furthermore, petitioner's numerous
requests for an explanation regarding the stoppage of his salaries and benefits,33 the
issuance of withholding tax reports,34 as well as correspondence reporting his full
recovery and readiness to go back to work,35 and, specifically, his filing of the
complaint for illegal dismissal are hardly the acts of one who has abandoned his
work.
We are likewise not impressed by the deposition of Manolo Gomez, as witness for
private respondent, ascribing statements to petitioner supposedly indicative of the
latter's intention to abandon his work. We perceive the irregularity in the taking of
18
such deposition without the presence of petitioner's counsel, and the failure of
private respondent to serve reasonably advance notice of its taking to said counsel,
thereby foreclosing his opportunity to
cross-examine the deponent. Private respondent also failed to serve notice thereof
on the Regional Arbitration Branch No. VI of the NLRC, as certified to by
Administrative Assistant Celestina G. Ovejera of said office.36 Fair play dictates that
at such an important stage of the proceedings, which involves the taking of
testimony, both parties must be afforded equal opportunity to examine and cross-
examine a witness.
As to the monthly monetary amounts given to petitioner, whether denominated as
salary, pension, allowance or ex gratia handout, there is no question as to
petitioner's entitlement thereto inasmuch as he continued to perform services in his
capacity as farm administrator. The change in description of said amounts
contained in the pay slips or in the receipts prepared by private respondent cannot
be deemed to be determinative of petitioner's employment status in view of the
peculiar circumstances above set out. Besides, if such amounts were truly in the
nature of allowances given by a parent out of concern for his child's welfare, it is
rather unusual that receipts therefor37 should be necessary and required as if they
were ordinary business expenditures.
Neither can we subscribe to private respondent's theory that petitioner's alleged
abandonment was converted into an implied voluntary resignation on account of
the father's agreement to support his son after the latter abandoned his work. As
we have determined that no abandonment took place in this case, the monthly
sums received by petitioner, regardless of designation, were in consideration for
services rendered emanating from an employer-employee relationship and were
not of a character that can qualify them as mere civil support given out of parental
duty and solicitude. We are also hard put to imagine how abandonment can be
impliedly converted into a voluntary resignation without any positive act on the part
of the employee conveying a desire to terminate his employment. The very concept
of resignation as a ground for termination by the employee of his
employment38 does not square with the elements constitutive of abandonment.
On procedural considerations, petitioner posits that there was a violation by private
respondent of the due process requirements under the Labor Code for want of
notice and hearing.39 Private respondent, in opposition, argues that Section 2, Rule
XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code applies only to
cases where the employer seeks to terminate the services of an employee on any of
the grounds enumerated under Article 282 of the Labor Code, but not to the
situation obtaining in this case where private respondent did not dismiss petitioner
on any ground since it was petitioner who allegedly abandoned his employment.40
The due process requirements of notice and hearing applicable to labor cases are
set out in Rule XIV, Book V of the Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code in
this wise:
Sec. 2. Notice of Dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to
dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written notice stating the
particular acts or omission(s) constituting the grounds for his
dismissal. In cases of abandonment of work, notice shall be
served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the
allegations as stated against him in the notice of dismissal
within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The
employer shall afford the worker ample opportunity to be
heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his
representative, if he so desires.
Sec. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately
notify a worker in writing of a decision to dismiss him stating
clearly the reasons therefor.
Sec. 7. Right to contest dismissal. — Any decision taken by the
employer shall be without prejudice to the right of the worker
to contest the validity or legality of his dismissal by filing a
complaint with the Regional Branch of the Commission.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 11. Report of dismissal. — The employer shall submit a
monthly report to the Regional Office having jurisdiction over
the place of work at all dismissals effected by him during the
month, specifying therein the names of the dismissed
workers, the reasons for their dismissal, the dates of
commencement and termination of employment, the
positions last held by them and such other information as
may be required by the Ministry for policy guidance and
statistical purposes.
Private respondent's argument is without merit as there can be no question that
petitioner was denied his right to due process since he was never given any notice
about his impending dismissal and the grounds therefor, much less a chance to be
heard. Even as private respondent controverts the applicability of the mandatory
twin requirements of procedural due process in this particular case, he in effect
admits that no notice was served by him on petitioner. This fact is corroborated by
the certification issued on September 5, 1984 by the Regional Director for Region VI
of the Department of Labor that no notice of termination of the employment of
petitioner was submitted thereto.41
Granting arguendo that there was abandonment in this case, it nonetheless cannot
be denied that notice still had to be served upon the employee sought to be
dismissed, as the second sentence of Section 2 of the pertinent implementing rules
explicitly requires service thereof at the employee's last known address, by way of
substantial compliance. While it is conceded that it is the employer's prerogative to
terminate an employee, especially when there is just cause therefor, the
requirements of due process cannot be lightly taken. The law does not countenance
the arbitrary exercise of such a power or prerogative when it has the effect of
undermining the fundamental guarantee of security of tenure in favor of the
employee.42
On the executive labor arbiter's misplaced reliance on the Wenphil case, the
Solicitor General rejoins as follows:
The Labor Arbiter held thus:
While we are in full agreement with the
respondent as to his defense of implied
resignation and/or abandonment,
records somehow showed that he
failed to notify the Department of
Labor and Employment for his sons'
(sic)/complainants' (sic) aba(n)donment
as required by BP 130. And for this
failure, the other requisite for a valid
termination by an employer was not
complied with. This however, would
not work to invalidate the otherwise
(sic) existence of a valid cause for
dismissal. The validity of the cause of
dismissal must be upheld at all times
provided however that sanctions must
be imposed on the respondent for his
failure to observe the notice on due
process requirement. (Wenphil Corp. v.
NLRC, G.R. No. 80587). (Decision Labor
Arbiter, at 11-12, Annex "C" Petition), . .
.
This is thus a very different case from Wenphil Corporation
v. NLRC, 170 SCRA 69. In Wenphil, the rule applied to the
facts is: once an employee is dismissed for just cause, he must
not be rewarded
re-employment and backwages for failure of his employer to
observe procedural due process. The public policy behind this
is that, it may encourage the employee to do even worse and
render a mockery of the rules of discipline required to be
observed. However, the employer must be penalized for his
infraction of due process. In the present case, however, not
only was petitioner dismissed without due process, but his
dismissal is without just cause. Petitioner did not abandon his
employment because he has a justifiable excuse.43
II. Petitioner avers that the executive labor arbiter erred in disregarding the
mandatory provisions of Article 279 of the Labor Code which entitles an illegally
dismissed employee to reinstatement and back wages and, instead, affirmed the
imposition of the penalty of P5,000.00 on private respondent for violation of the
due process requirements. Private respondent, for his part, maintains that there
was error in imposing the fine because that penalty contemplates the failure to
submit the employer's report on dismissed employees to the DOLE regional office,
as required under Section 5 (now, Section 11), Rule XIV of the implementing rules,
and not the failure to serve notice upon the employee sought to be dismissed by
the employer.
Both the Constitution and the Labor Code enunciate in no uncertain terms the right
of every worker to security of tenure.44 To give teeth to this constitutional and
statutory mandates, the Labor Code spells out the relief available to an employee in
case of its denial:
Art. 279. Security of Tenure. — In cases of regular
employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of
an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by
this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority
rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances, and to his other benefits of their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was
withheld from him up to the time of actual reinstatement.
19
Clearly, therefore, an employee is entitled to reinstatement with full back wages in
the absence of just cause for dismissal.45 The Court, however, on numerous
occasions has tempered the rigid application of said provision of the Labor Code,
recognizing that in some cases certain events may have transpired as would militate
against the practicability of granting the relief thereunder provided, and declares
that where there are strained relations between the employer and the employee,
payment of back wages and severance pay may be awarded instead of
reinstatement,46 and more particularly when managerial employees are
concerned.47 Thus, where reinstatement is no longer possible, it is therefore
appropriate that the dismissed employee be given his fair and just share of what the
law accords him.48
We note with favor and give our imprimatur to the Solicitor General's ratiocination,
to wit:
As a general rule, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from
work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of
seniority rights and to his backwages computed from the time
his compensation was withheld up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Morales vs. NLRC, 188 SCRA 295). But
in Pacific Cement Company, Inc. vs. NLRC, 173 SCRA 192, this
Honorable Court held that when it comes to reinstatement,
differences should be made between managers and the
ordinary workingmen. The Court concluded that a company
which no longer trusts its managers cannot operate freely in a
competitive and profitable manner. The NLRC should know
the difference between managers and ordinary workingmen.
It cannot imprudently order the reinstatement of managers
with the same ease and liberality as that of rank and file
workers who had been terminated. Similarly, a reinstatement
may not be appropriate or feasible in case of antipathy or
antagonism between the parties (Morales, vs. NLRC, 188
SCRA 295).
In the present case, it is submitted that petitioner should not
be reinstated as farm administrator of Hacienda Manucao.
The present relationship of petitioner and private respondent
(is) so strained that a harmonious and peaceful employee-
employer relationship is hardly possible.49
III. Finally, petitioner insists on an award of moral damages, arguing that his
dismissal from employment was attended by bad faith or fraud, or constituted
oppression, or was contrary to morals, good customs or public policy. He further
prays for exemplary damages to serve as a deterrent against similar acts of unjust
dismissal by other employers.
Moral damages, under Article 2217 of the Civil Code, may be awarded to
compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish, besmirched reputation,
wounded feelings, and social humiliation, provided that such injuries spring from a
wrongful act or omission of the defendant which was the proximate cause
thereof.50 Exemplary damages, under Article 2229, are imposed by way of example
or correction for the public good, in addition to moral, temperate, liquidated or
compensatory damages. They are not recoverable as a matter of right, it being left
to the court to decide whether or not they should be adjudicated.51
We are well aware of the Court's rulings in a number of cases in the past allowing
recovery of moral damages where the dismissal of the employee was attended by
bad faith or fraud, or constituted an act oppressive to labor, or was done in a
manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy,52 and of exemplary
damages if the dismissal was effected in a wanton, oppressive or malevolent
manner.53 We do not feel, however, that an award of the damages prayed for in this
petition would be proper even if, seemingly, the facts of the case justify their
allowance. In the aforestated cases of illegal dismissal where moral and exemplary
damages were awarded, the dismissed employees were genuinely without fault and
were undoubtedly victims of the erring employers' capricious exercise of power.
In the present case, we find that both petitioner and private respondent can equally
be faulted for fanning the flames which gave rise to and ultimately aggravated this
controversy, instead of sincerely negotiating a peaceful settlement of their
disparate claims. The records reveal how their actuations seethed with mutual
antagonism and the undeniable enmity between them negates the likelihood that
either of them acted in good faith. It is apparent that each one has a cause for
damages against the other. For this reason, we hold that no moral or exemplary
damages can rightfully be awarded to petitioner.
On this score, we are once again persuaded by the validity of the following
recommendation of the Solicitor General:
The Labor Arbiter's decision in RAB Case No. 0452-84 should
be modified. There was no voluntary abandonment in this
case because petitioner has a justifiable excuse for his
absence, or such absence does not warrant outright dismissal
without notice and hearing. Private respondent, therefore, is
guilty of illegal dismissal. He should be ordered to pay
backwages for a period not exceeding three years from date
of dismissal. And in lieu of reinstatement, petitioner may be
 paid separation pay equivalent to one (1) month('s) salary for
every year of service, a fraction of six months being
considered as one (1) year in accordance with recent
jurisprudence (Tan, Jr. vs. NLRC, 183 SCRA 651). But all claims
for damages should be dismissed, for both parties are equally
at fault.54
The conduct of the respective counsel of the parties, as revealed by the records,
sorely disappoints the Court and invites reproof. Both counsel may well be
reminded that their ethical duty as lawyers to represent their clients with
zeal55 goes beyond merely presenting their clients' respective causes in court. It is
just as much their responsibility, if not more importantly, to exert all reasonable
efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of court and especially in
consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous ties between their
clients. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or
withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for
wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation.56
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that "(a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement." On this point, we find that both counsel herein fell short
of what was expected of them, despite their avowed duties as officers of the court.
The records do not show that they took pains to initiate steps geared toward
effecting a rapprochement between their clients. On the contrary, their acerbic and
protracted exchanges could not but have exacerbated the situation even as they
may have found favor in the equally hostile eyes of their respective clients.
In the same manner, we find that the labor arbiter who handled this regrettable
case has been less than faithful to the letter and spirit of the Labor Code mandating
that a labor arbiter "shall exert all efforts towards the amicable settlement of a
labor dispute within his jurisdiction."57 If he ever did so, or at least entertained the
thought, the copious records of the proceedings in this controversy are barren of
any reflection of the same.
One final word. This is one decision we do not particularly relish having been
obliged to make. The task of resolving cases involving disputes among members of a
family leaves a bad taste in the mouth and an aversion in the mind, for no truly
meaningful and enduring resolution is really achieved in such situations. While we
are convinced that we have adjudicated the legal issues herein squarely on the
bases of law and jurisprudence, sans sentimentality, we are saddened by the
thought that we may have failed to bring about the reconciliation of the father and
son who figured as parties to this dispute, and that our adherence here to law and
duty may unwittingly contribute to the breaking, instead of the strengthening, of
familial bonds. In fine, neither of the parties herein actually emerges victorious. It is
the Court's earnest hope, therefore, that with the impartial exposition and
extended explanation of their respective rights in this decision, the parties may
eventually see their way clear to an ultimate resolution of their differences on more
convivial terms.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is
hereby SET ASIDE. Private respondent is ORDERED to pay petitioner back wages for
a period not exceeding three (3) years, without qualification or deduction,58 and, in
lieu of reinstatement, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month for every year of
service, a fraction of six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 7360               July 24,2012
ATTY. POLICARIO I. CATALAN, JR., Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JOSELITO M. SILVOSA, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
This is a complaint filed by Atty. Policarpio I. Catalan, Jr. (Atty. Catalan) against Atty.
Joselito M. Silvosa (Atty. Silvosa). Atty. Catalan has three causes of action against
Atty. Silvosa; (1) Atty. Silvosa appeared as counsel for the accused in the same case
for which he previously appeared as prosecutor; (2) Atty. Silvosa bribed his then
colleague Prosecutor Phoebe Toribio (Pros.Toribio) for P30,000; and (3) the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa in Criminal Case No. 27776 for direct bribery.
Integrated Bar of the Philippines’ (IBP) Commissioner for Bar Discipline Dennis A.B.
Funa (Comm. Funa) held Atty. Silvosa liable only for the first cause of action and
recommended the penalty of reprimand. The Board of Governors of the IBP twice
modified Comm. Funa’s recommendation: first, to a suspension of six months, then
to a suspension of two years.
Atty. Silvosa was an Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Bukidnon and a Prosecutor in
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 10, Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. Atty. Silvosa
appeared as public prosecutor in Criminal Case No. 10256-00, "People of the
20
Philippines v. SPO2 Elmor Esperon y Murillo, et al." (Esperon case), for the complex
crime of double frustrated murder, in which case Atty. Catalan was one of the
private complainants. Atty. Catalan took issue with Atty. Silvosa’s manner of
prosecuting the case, and requested the Provincial Prosecutor to relieve Atty.
Silvosa.
In his first cause of action, Atty. Catalan accused Atty. Silvosa of appearing as private
counsel in a case where he previously appeared as public prosecutor, hence
violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.1 Atty. Catalan also
alleged that, apart from the fact that Atty. Silvosa and the accused are relatives and
have the same middle name, Atty. Silvosa displayed manifest bias in the accused’s
favor. Atty. Silvosa caused numerous delays in the trial of the Esperon case by
arguing against the position of the private prosecutor. In 2000, Provincial
Prosecutor Guillermo Ching granted Atty. Catalan’s request to relieve Atty. Silvosa
from handling the Esperon case. The RTC rendered judgment convicting the accused
on 16 November 2005. On 23 November 2005, Atty. Silvosa, as private lawyer and
as counsel for the accused, filed a motion to reinstate bail pending finality of
judgment of the Esperon case.
In his second cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the affidavit of Pros. Toribio.
In a case for frustrated murder where Atty. Catalan’s brother was a respondent,
Pros. Toribio reviewed the findings of the investigating judge and downgraded the
offense from frustrated murder to less serious physical injuries. During the hearing
before Comm. Funa, Pros. Toribio testified that, while still a public prosecutor at the
time, Atty. Silvosa offered her P30,000 to reconsider her findings and uphold the
charge of frustrated murder.
Finally, in the third cause of action, Atty. Catalan presented the Sandiganbayan’s
decision in Criminal Case No. 27776, convicting Atty. Silvosa of direct bribery on 18
May 2006. Nilo Lanticse (Lanticse) filed a complaint against Atty. Silvosa before the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Despite the execution of an affidavit of
desistance by the complainant in a homicide case in favor of Lanticse’s father-in-
law, Arsenio Cadinas (Cadinas), Cadinas still remained in detention for more than
two years. Atty. Silvosa demanded P15,000 from Lanticse for the dismissal of the
case and for the release of Cadinas. The NBI set up an entrapment operation for
Atty. Silvosa. GMA 7’s television program Imbestigador videotaped and aired the
actual entrapment operation. The footage was offered and admitted as evidence,
and viewed by the Sandiganbayan. Despite Atty. Silvosa’s defense of instigation, the
Sandiganbayan convicted Atty. Silvosa. The dispositive portion of Criminal Case No.
27776 reads:
WHEREFORE, this court finds JOSELITO M. SILVOSA GUILTY, beyond reasonable
doubt, of the crime of direct bribery and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty
of:
(A) Imprisonment of, after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
one year, one month and eleven days of prision correccional, as
minimum, up to three years, six months and twenty days of prision
correccional, as maximum;
(B) Fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (Php 10,000.00), with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(C) All other accessory penalties provided for under the law.
SO ORDERED.2
In his defense, on the first cause of action, Atty. Silvosa states that he resigned as
prosecutor from the Esperon case on 18 October 2002. The trial court released its
decision in the Esperon case on 16 November 2005 and cancelled the accused’s bail.
Atty. Silvosa claims that his appearance was only for the purpose of the
reinstatement of bail. Atty. Silvosa also denies any relationship between himself and
the accused.
On the second cause of action, Atty. Silvosa dismisses Pros. Toribio’s allegations as
"self-serving" and "purposely dug by [Atty. Catalan] and his puppeteer to pursue
persecution."
On the third cause of action, while Atty. Silvosa admits his conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and is under probation, he asserts that "conviction under the 2nd
paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, do [sic] not involve moral
turpitude since the act involved ‘do [sic] not amount to a crime.’" He further claims
that "it is not the lawyer in respondent that was convicted, but his capacity as a
public officer, the charge against respondent for which he was convicted falling
under the category of crimes against public officers x x x."
In a Report and Recommendation dated 15 September 2008, Comm. Funa found
that:
As for the first charge, the wordings and prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility [are] quite clear. [Atty. Silvosa] did intervene in Criminal
Case No. 10246-00. [Atty. Silvosa’s] attempt to minimize his role in said case would
be unavailing. The fact is that he is presumed to have acquainted himself with the
facts of said case and has made himself familiar with the parties of the case. Such
would constitute sufficient intervention in the case. The fact that, subsequently,
[Atty. Silvosa] entered his appearance in said case only to file a Motion to
Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal would still constitute a violation of Rule 6.03 as such
act is sufficient to establish a lawyer-client relation.
As for the second charge, there is certain difficulty to dissect a claim of bribery that
occurred more than seven (7) years ago. In this instance, the conflicting allegations
are merely based on the word of one person against the word of another. With
[Atty. Silvosa’s] vehement denial, the accusation of witness [Pros.] Toribio stands
alone unsubstantiated. Moreover, we take note that the alleged incident occurred
more than seven (7) years ago or in 1999, [l]ong before this disbarment case was
filed on November 2006. Such a long period of time would undoubtedly cast doubt
on the veracity of the allegation. Even the existence of the bribe money could not
be ascertained and verified with certainty anymore.
As to the third charge, [Atty. Silvosa] correctly points out that herein complainant
has no personal knowledge about the charge of extortion for which [Atty. Silvosa]
was convicted by the Sandiganbayan. [Atty. Catalan] was not a party in said case nor
was he ever involved in said case. The findings of the Sandiganbayan are not binding
upon this Commission. The findings in a criminal proceeding are not binding in a
disbarment proceeding. No evidence has been presented relating to the alleged
extortion case.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is submitted that [Atty. Silvosa] is GUILTY only of the First
Charge in violating Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should
be given the penalty of REPRIMAND.
Respectfully submitted.3
In a Resolution dated 9 October 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and
approved with modification the Report and Recommendation of Comm. Funa and
suspended Atty. Silvosa from the practice of law for six months. In another
Resolution dated 28 October 2011, the IBP Board of Governors increased the
penalty of Atty. Silvosa’s suspension from the practice of law to two years. The
Office of the Bar Confidant received the notice of the Resolution and the records of
the case on 1 March 2012.
We sustain the findings of the IBP only in the first cause of action and modify its
recommendations in the second and third causes of action.
Atty. Catalan relies on Rule 6.03 which states that "A lawyer shall not, after leaving
government service, accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service." Atty. Silvosa, on the hand,
relies on Rule 2.01 which provides that "A lawyer shall not reject, except for valid
reasons the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed" and on Canon 14 which
provides that "A lawyer shall not refuse his services to the needy."
We agree with Comm. Funa’s finding that Atty. Silvosa violated Rule 6.03. When he
entered his appearance on the Motion to Post Bail Bond Pending Appeal, Atty.
Silvosa conveniently forgot Rule 15.03 which provides that "A lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after
a full disclosure of facts."
Atty. Silvosa’s attempts to minimize his involvement in the same case on two
occasions can only be described as desperate. He claims his participation as public
prosecutor was only to appear in the arraignment and in the pre-trial conference.
He likewise claims his subsequent participation as collaborating counsel was limited
only to the reinstatement of the original bail. Atty. Silvosa will do well to take heed
of our ruling in Hilado v. David:4
An attorney is employed — that is, he is engaged in his professional capacity as a
lawyer or counselor — when he is listening to his client’s preliminary statement of
his case, or when he is giving advice thereon, just as truly as when he is drawing his
client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s pleadings, or advocating his client’s
cause in open court.
xxxx
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the bare relationship of
attorney and client as the yardstick for testing incompatibility of interests. This stern
rule is designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent
conduct, but as well to protect the honest lawyer from unfounded suspicion of
unprofessional practice. It is founded on principles of public policy, on good taste.
As has been said in another case, the question is not necessarily one of the rights of
the parties, but as to whether the attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves attorneys, like Caesar’s wife,
not only to keep inviolate the client’s confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double-dealing. Only thus can litigants be encouraged to entrust
their secrets to their attorneys which is of paramount importance in the
administration of justice.
Indeed, the prohibition against representation of conflicting interests applies
although the attorney’s intentions were honest and he acted in good faith.5
21
Atty. Silvosa denies Pros. Toribio’s accusation of bribery and casts doubt on its
veracity by emphasizing the delay in presenting a complaint before the IBP. Comm.
Funa, by stating that there is difficulty in ascertaining the veracity of the facts with
certainty, in effect agreed with Atty. Silvosa. Contrary to Comm. Funa’s ruling,
however, the records show that Atty. Silvosa made an attempt to bribe Pros. Toribio
and failed. Pros. Toribio executed her affidavit on 14 June 1999, a day after the
failed bribery attempt, and had it notarized by Atty. Nemesio Beltran, then
President of the IBP-Bukidnon Chapter. There was no reason for Pros. Toribio to
make false testimonies against Atty. Silvosa. Atty. Silvosa, on the other hand, merely
denied the accusation and dismissed it as persecution. When the integrity of a
member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the charges against
him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all
times is expected of him.6 Atty. Silvosa failed in this respect.
Unfortunately for Atty. Silvosa, mere delay in the filing of an administrative
complaint against a member of the bar does not automatically exonerate a
respondent. Administrative offenses do not prescribe. No matter how much time
has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of and the time
of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot
escape the disciplining arm of the Court.7
We disagree with Comm. Funa’s ruling that the findings in a criminal proceeding are
not binding in a disbarment proceeding.
First, disbarment proceedings may be initiated by any interested person. There can
be no doubt of the right of a citizen to bring to the attention of the proper authority
acts and doings of public officers which a citizen feels are incompatible with the
duties of the office and from which conduct the public might or does suffer
undesirable consequences.8 Section 1, Rule 139-B reads:
Section 1. How Instituted. – Proceedings for the disbarment, suspension, or
discipline of attorneys may be taken by the Supreme Court motu proprio, or by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) upon the verified complaint of any person.
The complaint shall state clearly and concisely the facts complained of and shall be
supported by affidavits of persons having personal knowledge of the facts therein
alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts.
The IBP Board of Governors may, motu proprio or upon referral by the Supreme
Court or by a Chapter Board of Officers, or at the instance of any person, initiate
and prosecute proper charges against erring attorneys including those in
government service.
xxxx
It is of no moment that Atty. Catalan is not the complainant in Criminal Case No.
27776, and that Lanticse, the complainant therein, was not presented as a witness
in the present case. There is no doubt that the Sandiganbayan’s judgment in
Criminal Case No. 27776 is a matter of public record and is already final. Atty.
Catalan supported his allegation by submitting documentary evidence of the
Sandiganbayan’s decision in Criminal Case No. 27776. Atty. Silvosa himself admitted,
against his interest, that he is under probation.
Second, conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private
duties which a man owes to his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.9 Section 27, Rule 138 provides:
Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds
therefor. – A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is
required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any
lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney
for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at
law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers,
constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In a disbarment case, this Court will no longer review a final judgment of
conviction.10
Third, the crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. In Magno v.
COMELEC,11
we ruled:
By applying for probation, petitioner in effect admitted all the elements of the crime
of direct bribery:
1. the offender is a public officer;
 2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by
himself or through another;
3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the
public officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration
of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act
must be unjust, or to refrain from doing something which it is his official
duty to do; and
4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is
connected with the performance of his official duties.
Moral turpitude can be inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender
agrees to accept a promise or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains
from performing an official duty in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious
intent on the part of the offender to renege on the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general. Also, the fact that the offender takes advantage
of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust reposed on him by the public. It is
a conduct clearly contrary to the accepted rules of right and duty, justice, honesty
and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude.
(Italicization in the original)
Atty. Silvosa’s representation of conflicting interests and his failed attempt at
bribing Pros. Toribio merit at least the penalty of suspension.1âwphi1 Atty. Silvosa’s
final conviction of the crime of direct bribery clearly falls under one of the grounds
for disbarment under Section 27 of Rule 138. Disbarment follows as a consequence
of Atty. Silvosa’s conviction of the crime. We are constrained to impose a penalty
more severe than suspension because we find that Atty. Silvosa is predisposed to
flout the exacting standards of morality and decency required of a member of the
Bar. His excuse that his conviction was not in his capacity as a lawyer, but as a public
officer, is unacceptable and betrays the unmistakable lack of integrity in his
character. The practice of law is a privilege, and Atty. Silvosa has proved himself
unfit to exercise this privilege.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Joselito M. Silvosa is hereby DISBARRED and his
name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be
furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s
personal record as attorney. Likewise, copies shall be furnished to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines and to the Office of the Court Administration for circulation to
all courts in the country.
SO ORDERED.
A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460             March 31, 2006
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
x--------------x
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC             March 31, 2006
Re: RESOLUTION DATED 11 MAY 1999 OF JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR.
x--------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988             March 31, 2006
(Formerly A.M. OCA IPI No. 99-812-RTJ)
LUZ ARRIEGO, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE FLORENTINO V. FLORO, JR., Respondent.
DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
"Equity does not demand that its suitors shall have led blameless lives." Justice
Brandeis, Loughran v. Loughran 1
THE CASES
The First Case: A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 (Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
It was in 1995 that Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr. first applied for judgeship. A pre-
requisite psychological evaluation on him then by the Supreme Court Clinic Services
(SC Clinic) revealed "(e)vidence of ego disintegration" and "developing psychotic
process." Judge Floro later voluntarily withdrew his application. In June 1998, when
he applied anew, the required psychological evaluation exposed problems with self-
22
esteem, mood swings, confusion, social/interpersonal deficits, paranoid ideations,
suspiciousness, and perceptual distortions. Both 1995 and 1998 reports concluded
that Atty. Floro was unfit to be a judge.
Because of his impressive academic background, however, the Judicial and Bar
Council (JBC) allowed Atty. Floro to seek a second opinion from private
practitioners. The second opinion appeared favorable thus paving the way to Atty.
Floro’s appointment as Regional Trial Court (RTC) Judge of Branch 73, Malabon City,
on 4 November 1998.
Upon Judge Floro’s personal request, an audit on his sala was conducted by the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) from 2 to 3 March 1999.2
After conducting the audit, the audit team, led by Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, reported its findings to erstwhile Court Administrator, Alfredo L.
Benipayo, who submitted his own report/memorandum 3 to then Chief Justice
Hilario G. Davide, Jr. dated 13 July 1999 recommending, among other things, that
his report be considered as an administrative complaint against Judge Floro and
that Judge Floro be subjected to an appropriate psychological or mental
examination. Court Administrator Benipayo recommended as well that Judge Floro
be placed under preventive suspension for the duration of the investigation against
him.
In a Resolution4 dated 20 July 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA, docketing the complaint as A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460, in
view of the commission of the following acts or omissions as reported by the audit
team:
(a) The act of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory
statements regarding qualifications and for announcing in open court
during court session his qualification in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02,
Canons of Judicial Conduct;
(b) For allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters;
(c) For rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule
36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedures;
(d) For his alleged partiality in criminal cases where he declares that he is
pro-accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial
Conduct;
(e) For appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98
pending before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in
violation of Canon 5, Rule 5.07, Canons of Judicial Conduct which
prohibits a judge from engaging in the private practice of law;
(f) For appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for
leaves of absence on the scheduled dates of hearing;
(g) For proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial
prosecutor and propounding questions in the form of examination of the
custodian of the accused;
(h) For using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide)
in the guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the
private complainant and the accused to sign the settlement even
without the presence of the trial prosecutor;
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor,
ordering the mental and physical examination of the accused based on
the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
(j) For issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide;
(k) For violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct when he
openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice system;
(l) For the use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings;
(m) For violation of Circular No. 135 dated 1 July 1987.
Per the same resolution of the Court, the matter was referred to Retired Court of
Appeals Justice Pedro Ramirez (consultant, OCA) for investigation, report and
recommendation within 60 days from receipt. Judge Floro was directed to comment
within ten days from receipt of the resolution and to subject himself to an
appropriate psychological or mental examination to be conducted "by the proper
office of the Supreme Court or any duly authorized medical and/or mental
institution." In the same breath, the Court resolved to place Judge Floro under
preventive suspension "for the duration of the investigation of the administrative
charges against him." He was barely eight months into his position.
On 20 August 1999, Judge Floro submitted a Verified Comment where he set forth
both affirmative and negative defenses6 while he filed his "Answer/Compliance" on
26 August 1999.
On 3 March 2000, Judge Floro moved for the provisional/final dismissal of his case
for failure to prosecute.7 However, on 21 March 2000, he presented himself as his
first witness in the hearing conducted by Justice Ramirez.8 Subsequently, on 7 July
2000, Judge Floro filed a "Petition for Inhibition/Disqualification" against Justice
Ramirez as investigator9 which was denied by Justice Ramirez in an Order dated 11
July 2000. 10 Judge Floro’s motion for reconsideration 11 suffered the same fate. 12 On
27 July 2000, Judge Floro submitted the question of Justice Ramirez’s
inhibition/disqualification to this Court. 13 On 8 August 2000, the Court ruled against
the inhibition of Justice Ramirez. 13
On 11 September 2000, the OCA, after having been ordered by the Court to
comment on Judge Floro’s motion to dismiss, 15 recommended that the same should
be denied.
Judge Floro presented his last witness on 6 March 2001. 16 The day after, Justice
Ramirez came out with a "Partial Report" recommending the dismissal of Judge
Floro from office "by reason of insanity which renders him incapable and unfit to
perform the duties and functions of Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73." 17
In the meantime, throughout the investigation of the 13 charges against him and
even after Justice Ramirez came out with his report and recommendation on 7
March 2001, Judge Floro had been indiscriminately filing cases against those he
perceived to have connived to boot him out of office.
A list of the cases Judge Floro filed in the wake of his 20 July 1999 preventive
suspension follows:
1. OCA IPI No. 00-07-OCA – against Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-
Buenaventura, Team Leader, Judicial Audit Team, Office of the Court
Administrator 18
2. OCA IPI No. 00-933-RTJ – against Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr., Regional
Trial Court, Branch 72, Malabon City 19
3. AC No. 5286 – against Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo and
Judge Benjamin Aquino, Jr.20
4. AC No. CBD-00-740 – against Thelma C. Bahia, Court Management
Office, Atty. Mary Jane Dacarra-Buenaventura, Atty. II, Court
Management Office, both of the Office of the Court Administrator and
Atty. Esmeralda G. Dizon, Branch Clerk of Court, Branch 73, Malabon21
5. AC No. 6282 (CPL No. C-02-0278) – against former Court Administrator
Justice Alfredo L. Benipayo and (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez,
Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator22
6. A.M. No. 03-8-03-0 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez23
7. A.C. No. 6050 – against (Ret.) Justice Pedro A. Ramirez24
On 1 February 2006, Judge Floro moved that the cases he filed, now totaling seven,
be dismissed.25 On 14 February 2006, the Court granted the motion to dismiss.26
The Second Case: A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988(Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
This charge is likewise the subject matter of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460:
"(f)or using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and eventually
dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the guise of
settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant and the
accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial prosecutor."
The complainant Luz Arriego is the mother of the private complainant in Criminal
Case No. 20385-MN.
On 28 June 2001, Arriego testified, while court stenographer Jocelyn Japitenga
testified on 16 July 2001. On 31 July 2001, Arriego filed her Formal Offer of Evidence
which was opposed by Judge Floro on 21 August 2001. On 5 September 2001, Judge
Floro testified on his behalf while Atty. Galang testified against him on 4 October
2001. On 16 October 2001, Judge Floro filed a Memorandum in this case.27
The Third Case: A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 of Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.)
23
As can be gathered from the title, this case concerns a resolution issued by Judge
Floro on 11 May 1999 in Special Proceeding Case No. 315-MN "In Re: Petition To Be
Admitted A Citizen Of The Philippines, Mary Ng Nei, Petitioner." The resolution
disposed of the motions for voluntary inhibition of Judge Floro and the
reconsideration of the order denying the petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner in that case, Mary Ng Nei.
This resolution found its way to the OCA through a letter written by Atty. David S.
Narvasa, the petitioner’s counsel.28 The OCA, through Court Administrator
Benipayo, made the following evaluation:
In the subject resolution, Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition
and declared it as null and void. However, he ordered the raffling of the
case anew (not re-raffle due to inhibition) so that the petitioner, Mary
Ng Nei, will have a chance to have the case be assigned to other judges
through an impartial raffle.
When Judge Floro, Jr. denied the motion for inhibition, he should have
continued hearing and taking cognizance of the case. It is improper for
him to order the raffle of the case "anew" as this violates Administrative
Circular No. 1 (Implementation of Sec. 12, Art. XVIII of the 1987
Constitution) dated January 28, 1988 which provides to wit:
"8. Raffle of Cases:
xxxx
8.3 Special raffles should not be permitted except on verified application
of the interested party who seeks issuance of a provisional remedy and
only upon a finding by the Executive Judge that unless the special raffle is
conducted, irreparable damage shall be suffered by the applicant. The
special raffle shall be conducted by at least two judges in a multiple-sala
station.
x x x x"
Based on the foregoing, a judge may not motu proprio order the special raffle of a
case since such is only allowed upon a verified application of the interested party
seeking a provisional remedy and only upon the Executive Judge’s finding that if a
special raffle is not conducted, the applicant will suffer irreparable damage.
Therefore, Judge Floro, Jr.’s order is contrary to the above-mentioned
Administrative Circular.
Moreover, it is highly inappropriate for Judge Floro, Jr. to even mention in his
resolution that Justice Regino C. Hermosisima, Jr. is his benefactor in his nomination
for judgeship. It is not unusual to hear a judge who speaks highly of a "padrino"
(who helped him get his position). Such remark even if made as an expression of
deep gratitude makes the judge guilty of creating a dubious impression about his
integrity and independence. Such flaunting and expression of feelings must be
suppressed by the judges concerned. A judge shall not allow family, social, or other
relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment (Canon 2, Rule 2.03, Code of
Judicial Conduct).
The merits of the denial of the motion for inhibition and the ruling on the motion
for reconsideration are judicial matters which this Office has no authority to review.
The remedy is judicial, not administrative.29
The OCA thus recommended that Judge Floro comment on (a) his act of ordering
the raffle of the case in violation of Administrative Circular No. 1; and (b) his remark
on page 5 of the subject resolution that "Justice Hermosisima, Jr. x x x helped
undersigned so much, in the JBC, regarding his nomination x x x."
In a Resolution dated 17 August 1999, the Court en banc adopted the
recommendations of the OCA.30 Judge Floro, through his counsel, filed his Comment
on 22 October 199931 which was noted by this Court on 7 December 1999. On 11
January 2000, Judge Floro filed a Formal Offer of Evidence which this Court, in a
resolution dated 25 January 2000, referred to Justice Ramirez for inclusion in his
report and recommendation.
For the record, the OCA is yet to come up with its report and recommendation in
this case as well as in the second case (i.e., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988). Thus, in a
resolution dated 14 February 2006, the Court directed Judge Floro as well as the
other parties in these two cases to inform the Court whether or not they are willing
to submit A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for decision on the basis of
the pleadings filed and the evidence so far submitted by them or to have the
decision in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 decided ahead of the two. On 20 February 2006,
the OCA, thru Court Administrator Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr., manifested its
willingness to submit A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC for resolution based on the pleadings
and the evidence submitted therein. Complainant Luz Arriego in A.M. No. RTJ-06-
1988 likewise informed this Court, in a Letter dated 28 February 2006, her
willingness to submit her case for decision based on the pleadings already
submitted and on the evidence previously offered and marked. On the other hand,
on 3 March 2006, Judge Floro manifested his preference to have A.M. No. RTJ-99-
1460 decided ahead of A.M. RTJ-06-1988 and A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC.
In the interest of orderly administration of justice, considering that these are
consolidated cases, we resolve to render as well a consolidated decision.
But first, the ground rules: Much has been said across all fronts regarding Judge
Floro’s alleged mental illness and its effects on his duties as Judge of a Regional Trial
Court. For our part, figuring out whether Judge Floro is indeed psychologically
impaired and/or disabled as concluded by the investigator appointed by this Court
is frankly beyond our sphere of competence, involving as it does a purely medical
issue; hence, we will have to depend on the findings of the mental health
professionals who interviewed/analyzed Judge Floro. Our job is simply to wade
through the evidence, filter out the irrelevant and the irreverent in order to
determine once and for all if Judge Floro is indeed guilty of the charges against him.
If the evidence makes out a case against Judge Floro, the next issue is to determine
the appropriate penalty to be imposed.
Finally, we will have to determine whether Judge Floro acted with an evil mind or
because of a psychological or mental incapacity. Upon the resolution of this
question hinges the applicability of equity.
As an aside, it bears pointing out that some of the charges ("c" and "g", "h" and "j",
"e" and "f") will be jointly discussed as they had likewise been jointly discussed by
the OCA. These charges involve common facts and to treat them separately will be
superfluous.
DISCUSSION
As alleged and as proven, the 13 specified charges do not warrant the supreme
penalty of dismissal against Judge Floro
(a) Re: Charge of circulating calling cards containing self-laudatory statements
regarding qualifications AND for announcing in open court during court session his
qualifications in violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02, Canons of Judicial Conduct
As narrated by the audit team, Judge Floro was circulating calling cards bearing his
name as the Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City, and indicating therein
that he is a "bar exams topnotcher (87.55%)" and with "full second honors" from
the Ateneo de Manila University, A.B. and LL.B.32 The audit team likewise reported
that: "(b)efore the start of court session, Judge Floro is introduced as a private law
practitioner, a graduate of Ateneo de Manila University with second honors, and a
bar topnotcher during the 1983 Bar Examinations with an average score of 87.55%.
Afterwards, a reading of the Holy Bible, particularly the Book of Revelation
according to Saint John, was made. The people in the courtroom were given the
opportunity to ask Judge Floro questions on the matter read. No questions were
asked; hence the session commenced."33
Judge Floro argues that, per commentary of Justice Ruperto G. Martin, 34 "the use of
professional cards containing the name of the lawyer, his title, his office and
residence is not improper" and that the word "title" should be broad enough to
include a Judge’s legal standing in the bar, his honors duly earned or even his Law
School. Moreover, other lawyers do include in their calling cards their
former/present titles/positions like President of the Jaycees, Rotary Club, etc., so
where then does one draw the line? Finally, Judge Floro argues that his cards were
not being circulated but were given merely as tokens to close friends or by
reciprocity to other callers considering that common sense dictates that he is not
allowed by law to seek other professional employment.
As to the charge that he had been announcing in open court his qualifications,
Judge Floro counters that it was his branch clerk of court, Atty. Esmeralda Galang-
Dizon, who suggested that during his initial court session, she would briefly
announce his appointment with an introduction of his school, honors, bar rating and
law practice. Naively, Judge Floro agreed as the introduction was done only during
the first week of his assumption into office.
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct says in no uncertain terms that
"a judge should not seek publicity for personal vainglory." A parallel proscription,
this time for lawyers in general, is found in Rule 3.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility: "a lawyer shall not use or permit the use of any false, fraudulent,
misleading, deceptive, undignified, self-laudatory or unfair statement or claim
regarding his qualifications or legal services." This means that lawyers and judges
alike, being limited by the exacting standards of their profession, cannot debase the
same by acting as if ordinary merchants hawking their wares. As succinctly put by a
leading authority in legal and judicial ethics, "(i)f lawyers are prohibited from x x x
using or permitting the use of any undignified or self-laudatory statement regarding
their qualifications or legal services (Rule 3.01, Code of Professional Responsibility),
with more reasons should judges be prohibited from seeking publicity for vanity or
self-glorification. Judges are not actors or actresses or politicians, who thrive by
publicity." 35
The question, therefore, is: By including self-laudatory details in his professional
card, did Judge Floro violate Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct?
In Ulep v. Legal Clinic, Inc., 36 we explained that the use of an ordinary and simple
professional card by lawyers is permitted and that the card "may contain only a
statement of his name, the name of the law firm which he is connected with,
address, telephone number and special branch of law practiced." In herein case,
24
Judge Floro’s calling cards cannot be considered as simple and ordinary. By
including therein the honors he received from his law school with a claim of being a
bar topnotcher, Judge Floro breached the norms of simplicity and modesty required
of judges.
Judge Floro insists, however, that he never circulated his cards as these were just
given by him as tokens and/or only to a few who requested the same. 37 The
investigation by Justice Ramirez into the matter reveals otherwise. An eye-witness
from the OCA categorically stated that Judge Floro circulated these cards. 38 Worse,
Judge Floro’s very own witness, a researcher from an adjoining branch, testified
that Judge Floro gave her one of these cards. 39
As this charge involves a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, it should be
measured against Rule 140 of the Rules of Court as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-
SC being more favorable to respondent Judge Floro. Rule 140, before its
amendment, automatically classified violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct as
serious charges. As amended, a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct may
amount to gross misconduct, which is a serious charge, or it may amount to simple
misconduct, which is a less serious charge or it may simply be a case of vulgar
and/or unbecoming conduct which is a light charge.
"Misconduct" is defined as wrong or improper conduct while "gross" connotes
something "out of all measure; beyond allowance; not to be excused; flagrant;
shameful." 40 For serious misconduct to exist, the judicial act complained of should
be corrupt or inspired by an intention to violate the law or a persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules. 41
With the foregoing as yardstick, we find the act of Judge Floro in circulating calling
cards containing self-laudatory statements constitutive of simple misconduct in
violation of Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it appears that
Judge Floro was not motivated by any corrupt motive but, from what we can see
from the evidence, a persistent and unquenchable thirst for recognition.
Concededly, the need for recognition is an all too human flaw and judges do not
cease to be human upon donning the judicial robe. Considering, however, the
proscription against judges seeking publicity for personal vainglory, they are held to
a higher standard as they must act within the confines of the code they swore to
observe.
As to the charge that Judge Floro, through his branch clerk of court, had been
announcing in open court his qualifications, we find that this is likewise violative of
Canon 2, Rule 2.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as it smacks of unnecessary
publicity. Judges should not use the courtroom as platform for announcing their
qualifications especially to an audience of lawyers and litigants who very well might
interpret such publicity as a sign of insecurity. Verily, the public looks upon judges
as the bastion of justice – confident, competent and true. And to discover that this
is not so, as the judge appears so unsure of his capabilities that he has to court the
litigants and their lawyers’ approval, definitely erodes public confidence in the
judiciary.
As it is not disputed, however, that these announcements went on for only a week,
Judge Floro is guilty of simple misconduct only.
(b)Re: Charge of allowing the use of his chambers as sleeping quarters
The audit team observed that "inside Judge Floro’s chamber[s], there is a folding
bed with cushion located at the right corner of the room. A man, who was later
identified as Judge Floro’s driver, was sleeping. However, upon seeing the audit
team, the driver immediately went out of the room." 42
Judge Floro contends that this charge is without legal or factual basis. The man the
audit team saw "sleeping" on his folding bed, J. Torralba, was Judge Floro’s aide or
"alalay" whom he allows to rest from time to time (in between periods and
especially during court sessions) for humanitarian reasons. J. Torralba was not
sleeping during that time that the audit team was in Branch 73 as he immediately
left when he saw the members thereof.
This charge must fail as there is nothing inherently improper or deplorable in Judge
Floro having allowed another person to use his folding bed for short periods of time
during office hours and while there is no one else in the room. The situation would
have been different if there had been any allegation of misuse or abuse of
government funds and/or facilities such as in the case of Presado v.
Genova 43 wherein Judge Genova was found guilty of serious misconduct and
conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service when he and his family used
his chambers as residential quarters, with the provincial government paying for the
electrical bills.
Be that as it may, it does not augur well for a new judge to allow such familiarity
from his aide as this becomes fodder for gossip as what had apparently happened in
this case. Judge Floro should have been aware of and attuned to the sensibilities of
his staff who were understandably uncomfortable with the uncommon
arrangement of a judge allowing his aide easy access to his folding bed.
(c) Re: Charge of rendering resolutions without written orders in violation of Rule
36, Section 1, 1997 Rules of Procedure
(g) Re: Charge of proceeding with the hearing on the Motion for Release on
Recognizance filed by the accused without the presence of the trial prosecutor and
propounding questions in the form of examination of the custodian of the accused
The memorandum report reads:
c. It was reported by the staff of Branch 73 that regardless of the absence of the
trial prosecutor, Judge Floro, Jr. still proceeded with the hearing of the following
matters:
(c-1) "Motion for Release on Recognizance" filed by the accused, in Criminal Cases
Nos. 20384, 20371, 20246 and 20442 entitled "People vs. Luisito Beltran", "People
vs. Emma Alvarez, et al.", "People vs. Rowena Camino", and "People vs. John Richie
Villaluz", respectively. In the hearing of these motions, Judge Floro, Jr. propounded
questions (in a form of direct examination) to the custodian of the accused without
the accused being sworn by the administering officer. (Note: initially, Judge Floro, Jr.
ordered the Branch Clerk of Court Dizon to place the accused under oath prior to
the start of his questions. However, COC Dizon refused). The hearing on the
aforesaid motions is an offshoot of a previous hearing wherein the accused had
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense. After the reading of the sentence, Judge Floro, Jr.
would automatically inform the accused that they are qualified to apply for
probation. In fact, Judge Floro, Jr. would even instruct his staff to draft the
application in behalf of the accused so that a motion for release on recognizance
will immediately be heard and be consequently granted. As appearing in the
minutes of the hearing (attached herewith as Annexes "3" to "6"), the custodians of
the accused are either a barangay kagawad, barangay tanod or a member of the
lupong tagapamayapa. Likewise, no written order granting the motion for release
on recognizance is being issued by Judge Floro, Jr. since according to him neither
rules nor circular mandates the issuance of a written order. Instead, after granting
the motion, Judge Floro, Jr. just requires the parties to sign the minutes of the
session. Photocopies of the minutes dated March 4, 1999 in Criminal Cases Nos.
20384-MN; 20373-MN; and 20371-MN are hereto attached as Annexes "3" to "5".
On March 11, 1999, in Criminal Cases Nos. 20426-MN and 20442-MN, Judge Floro,
Jr. granted a similar motion without issuing a written order. Copies of the minutes
are hereto attached as annexes "6" to "7." 44
In his Verified Comment, Judge Floro argues that he never violated any rule of
procedure with respect to the cases mentioned by the Audit Team, asserting that –
Contrary to the stance of the TEAM, Sec. 1 of Rule 36, Rules of Court refers only to
final and not interlocutory orders. Only final orders and judgments are
promulgated, rendered and entered.
xxxx
Applying the foregoing well-settled doctrines of law to the case at bar, herein
respondent faithfully complied with the requirements of Sec. 7 of P.D. 968 as
amended, regarding the applications for release on recognizance, thus:
a. The application for release on recognizance, although captioned as
MOTION FOR RELEASE ON RECOGNIZANCE, is primarily governed by Sec.
7 of P.D. 968, a Special Law on Probation.
b. Any Application for Release on Recognizance, is given due
course/taken cognizance of by respondent, if on its face, the same bears
the rubber stamp mark/receipt by the Office of the City/Public
Prosecutor.
c. The consistent practice both in RTC, METRO MANILA (all courts),
especially in RTC, MALABON, and in Malolos, Bulacan (where respondent
practiced from 1985-1998 – almost 14 years), [and especially the
practice of former Judge A. V. Cabigao, Br. 73, RTC, Malabon, Metro
Manila], is to interview the custodian, in the chambers, regarding his
being a responsible member of the community where the accused
reside/resides; the questions propounded are in the form of direct and
even cross examination questions.
d. The accused is not required to be placed on the witness stand, since
there is no such requirement. All that is required, is to inform the
accused regarding some matters of probation (optional) such as whether
he was sentenced previously by a Court, whether or not he has had
previous cases, etc.
e. Even if RTC Judges in Malabon do not conduct Court hearings on
application for release on recognizance, respondent, for caution in most
of the applications, included the interview/hearing on the applications
for release on recognizance, during criminal trial dates, where a
fiscal/trial prosecutor is available; at other times, the hearing is held in
the chambers.45
The explanation given by Judge Floro betrays his liability for ignorance of the rules
on probation under Presidential Decree No. 968 (Probation Law), as amended.
Contrary to his remonstrations, the release of an accused on recognizance entails
25
more than a cursory interview of the custodian and the applicant. Under the
Probation Law,46 and as we explained in Poso v. Judge Mijares,47 it is incumbent
upon the Judge hearing the application to ascertain first that the applicant is not a
"disqualified offender" as "(p)utting the discharge of the accused on hold would
have allowed [the judge] more time to pass upon the request for provisional
liberty."
Moreover, from Judge Floro’s explanations, it would seem that he completely did
away with the requirement for an investigation report by the probation officer.
Under the Probation Law, the accused’s temporary liberty is warranted only during
the period for awaiting the submission of the investigation report on the application
for probation and the resolution thereon.48 As we explained in Poso v. Judge
Mijares49 :
It must be stressed that the statutory sequence of actions, i.e., order to conduct
case study prior to action on application for release on recognizance, was
prescribed precisely to underscore the interim character of the provisional liberty
envisioned under the Probation Law. Stated differently, the temporary liberty of an
applicant for probation is effective no longer than the period for awaiting the
submission of the investigation report and the resolution of the petition, which the
law mandates as no more than sixty (60) days to finish the case study and report
and a maximum of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the report for the trial judge to
resolve the application for probation. By allowing the temporary liberty of the
accused even before the order to submit the case study and report, respondent
Judge unceremoniously extended the pro tem discharge of the accused to the
detriment of the prosecution and the private complainants. (Emphasis supplied)
As to the argument of Judge Floro that his Orders for the release of an accused on
recognizance need not be in writing as these are duly reflected in the transcript of
stenographic notes, we refer to Echaus v. Court of Appeals 50 wherein we held that
"no judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence until
and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by the
Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation."
Obviously, then, Judge Floro was remiss in his duties as judge when he did not
reduce into writing his orders for the release on recognizance of the accused in
Criminal Cases No. 20384, 20371, 202426 and 20442 entitled, "People v. Luisito
Beltran," "People v. Emma Alvarez, et al.," "People v. Rowena Camino," and "People
v. John Richie Villaluz." 51 From his explanation that such written orders are not
necessary, we can surmise that Judge Floro’s failure was not due to inadvertence or
negligence on his part but to ignorance of a procedural rule.
In fine, we perceive three fundamental errors in Judge Floro’s handling of probation
cases. First, he ordered the release on recognizance of the accused without the
presence of the prosecutor thus depriving the latter of any opportunity to oppose
said release. Second, Judge Floro ordered the release without first requiring the
probation officer to render a case study and investigation report on the accused.
Finally, the order granting the release of the accused on recognizance was not
reduced into writing.
It would seem from the foregoing that the release of the accused on recognizance,
as well as his eventual probation, was already a done deal even before the hearing
on his application as Judge Floro took up the cudgels for the accused by instructing
his staff to draft the application for probation. This, Judge Floro did not deny. Thus,
we agree in the observation of the audit team that Judge Floro, as a matter of
policy, had been approving applications for release on recognizance hastily and
without observing the requirements of the law for said purpose. Verily, we having
nothing against courts leaning backward in favor of the accused; in fact, this is a
salutary endeavor, but only when the situation so warrants. In herein case,
however, we cannot countenance what Judge Floro did as "the unsolicited fervor to
release the accused significantly deprived the prosecution and the private
complainants of their right to due process." 52
Judge Floro’s insistence that orders made in open court need not be reduced in
writing constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Likewise, his failure to follow the
basic rules on probation, constitutes gross ignorance of the law. 53
Verily, one of the fundamental obligations of a judge is to understand the law fully
and uphold it conscientiously. 54 When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owes it to
his office to know and simply apply it for anything less is constitutive of gross
ignorance of the law. 55 True, not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the law
and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative
sanctions. 56 To hold otherwise "would be nothing short of harassing judges to take
the fantastic and impossible oath of rendering infallible judgments." 57 This rule,
however, admits of an exception as "good faith in situations of fallible discretion
inheres only within the parameters of tolerable judgment and does not apply where
the issues are so simple and the applicable legal principle evident and as to be
beyond permissible margins of error." 58 Thus, even if a judge acted in good faith but
his ignorance is so gross, he should be held administratively liable. 59
(d) RE: Charge of partiality in criminal cases where he declared that he is pro-
accused which is contrary to Canon 2, Rule 2.01, Canons of Judicial Conduct
The audit team reported that Judge Floro relayed to the members thereof that in
criminal cases, he is always "pro-accused" particularly concerning detention
prisoners and bonded accused who have to continually pay for the premiums on
their bonds during the pendency of their cases.
Judge Floro denies the foregoing charge. He claims that what he did impart upon
Atty. Buenaventura was the need for the OCA to remedy his predicament of having
40 detention prisoners and other bonded accused whose cases could not be tried
due to the lack of a permanent prosecutor assigned to his sala. He narrated as well
to Atty. Buenaventura the sufferings of detention prisoners languishing in the
Malabon/Navotas jail whose cases had not been tried during the vacancy of his sala
from February 1997 to 5 November 1998. At any rate, Judge Floro submits that
there is no single evidence or proof submitted by any litigant or private complainant
that he sided with the accused.
Atty. Dizon, Judge Floro’s Clerk of Court, on the other hand, categorically stated
under oath that Judge Floro, during a staff meeting, admitted to her and the staff of
Branch 73 and in the presence of his Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer that he is
pro-accused for the reason that he commiserated with them especially those under
detention as he, himself, had been accused by his brother and sister-in-law of so
many unfounded offenses. 60
Between the two versions, the testimony of Atty. Dizon is more credible especially
since it is corroborated by independent evidence, 61 e.g., Judge Floro’s unwarranted
eagerness in approving application for release on recognizance as previously
discussed.
Canon 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states: "A judge should so behave at all
times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary." This means that a judge whose duty is to apply the law and dispense
justice "should not only be impartial, independent and honest but should be
believed and perceived to be impartial, independent and honest" as well. 62 Like
Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but above suspicion. 63 Judge Floro, by
broadcasting to his staff and the PAO lawyer that he is pro-accused, opened himself
up to suspicion regarding his impartiality. Prudence and judicial restraint dictate
that a judge should reserve personal views and predilections to himself so as not to
stir up suspicions of bias and unfairness. Irresponsible speech or improper conduct
of a judge erodes public confidence in the judiciary. 64 "His language, both written
and spoken, must be guarded and measured, lest the best of intentions be
misconstrued." 65
On a more fundamental level, what is required of judges is objectivity if an
independent judiciary is to be realized. And by professing his bias for the accused,
Judge Floro is guilty of unbecoming conduct as his capacity for objectivity is put in
serious doubt, necessarily eroding the public’s trust in his ability to render justice.
As we held in Castillo v. Juan 66 :
In every litigation, x x x, the manner and attitude of a trial judge are crucial to
everyone concerned, the offended party, no less than the accused. It is not for him
to indulge or even to give the appearance of catering to the at-times human failing
of yielding to first impressions. He is to refrain from reaching hasty conclusions or
prejudging matters. It would be deplorable if he lays himself open to the suspicion
of reacting to feelings rather than to facts, of being imprisoned in the net of his own
sympathies and predilections. It must be obvious to the parties as well as the public
that he follows the traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he hear both
sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an unjust
decision at a minimum. It is not necessary that he should possess marked
proficiency in law, but it is essential that he is to hold the balance true. What is
equally important is that he should avoid any conduct that casts doubt on his
impartiality. What has been said is not merely a matter of judicial ethics. It is
impressed with constitutional significance.
(h) Re: Charge of using/taking advantage of his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the
guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor.
(j) Re: Charge of issuing an Order on 8 March 1999 which varies from that which he
issued in open court in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated homicide.
The memorandum report states:
During the arraignment and pre-trial of Criminal Case No. 20385-MN entitled:
"People vs. Nenita Salvador", Judge Floro, Jr., in the absence of the public
prosecutor and considering that the private complainant was not being represented
by a private prosecutor, used his moral ascendancy and influence to convince the
private complainant to settle and eventually cause the dismissal of the case in the
guise of settling its civil aspect by making the private complainants and the accused
sign the settlement. (Copy of the signed stenographic notes is hereto attached as
Annex "8").
xxxx
In an Order dated March 8, 1999 in Criminal Case No. 20385-MN, for frustrated
homicide, Judge Floro, Jr. put on record the "manifestations" of the private
complainant and the accused relative to their willingness to settle the civil aspect of
the case. In the same order, Judge Floro, Jr. reserved his ruling on the said
settlement until after the public prosecutor has given his comment. However, per
report of the court employees in Branch 73, the aforesaid order was actually a
26
revised one or a deviation from the original order given in open court. Actually, the
said criminal case was already settled even without the presence of the public
prosecutor. The settlement was in the nature of absolving not only the civil liability
of the accused but the criminal liability as well. It was further reported that the
private complainants signed the compromise agreement due to the insistence or
persuasion of Judge Floro, Jr. The audit team was furnished a copy of the
stenographic notes (unsigned draft order) and the revised order (signed). Copies of
the stenographic notes and the revised order are hereto attached as Annexes "8",
"13", and "14". (Note: the stenographic notes were signed by the parties to the
case).
In the meantime, the mother of the private complainant in Criminal Case No.
20385-MN, Luz Arriego, filed an administrative case against Judge Floro docketed as
A.M. OCA-I.P.I. No. 99-812-RTJ. In her Affidavit Complaint 67 dated 9 August 1999,
she alleged that on 8 March 1999, Judge Floro forced them to settle her daughter’s
case against the accused therein despite the absence of the trial prosecutor. When
the parties could not agree on the amount to be paid by the accused for the medical
expenses incurred by complaining witness, they requested respondent that they be
given time to study the matter and consult a lawyer to which Judge Floro replied
that the case be settled immediately, uttering, "ngayon na! ngayon na!" Moreover,
Judge Floro allegedly made them believe that the counter-charges filed by the
accused against the complaining witness would likewise be dismissed, so they
agreed to settle the case. However, the written Order issued by respondent Judge
did not reflect the agreement entered into by the parties in open court.
Judge Floro takes exception to the foregoing OCA report and the complaint filed by
Mrs. Arriego, maintaining that the hearing on said case was not only in accordance
with the Rules of Court but was also beneficial to the litigants concerned as they
openly manifested their willingness to patch up their differences in the spirit of
reconciliation. Then, considering that the parties suggested that they would file the
necessary pleadings in due course, Judge Floro waited for such pleadings before the
TSN-dictated Order could be reduced to writing. Meanwhile, in the course of a
conversation between Judge Floro and Court Administrator Benipayo, the latter
opined that under Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, an offer of
compromise in criminal cases is tantamount to an admission of guilt except in some
cases. With this in mind, the 8 March 1999 Order of the hearing on even date was
superseded by the revised written Order likewise dated 8 March 1999.
Judge Floro asserts that contrary to Atty. Buenaventura’s stance that he has no
power to revise an Order, courts have plenary power to recall and amend or revise
any orally dictated order in substance and in form even motu proprio.
The rule on the matter finds expression in Echaus v. Court of Appeals 68 wherein we
declared:
x x x [N]o judgment, or order whether final or interlocutory, has juridical existence
until and unless it is set down in writing, signed and promulgated, i.e., delivered by
the Judge to the Clerk of Court for filing, release to the parties and implementation,
and that indeed, even after promulgation, it does not bind the parties until and
unless notice thereof is duly served on them by any of the modes prescribed by law.
This is so even if the order or judgment has in fact been orally pronounced in the
presence of the parties, or a draft thereof drawn up and signed and/or copy thereof
somehow read or acquired by any party. In truth, even after promulgation (i.e.,
filing with the clerk of court), and even after service on the parties of notice of an
order or judgment, the Court rendering it indisputably has plenary power to recall
and amend or revise it in substance or form on motion of any party or even motu
proprio, provided that in the case of a final order or judgment, the same has not
attained finality. (Emphasis supplied)
In herein case, what was involved was an interlocutory order made in open court –
ostensibly a judicial approval of a compromise agreement – which was amended or
revised by removing the stamp of judicial approval, the written order merely stating
that Judge Floro was reserving its ruling regarding the manifestations of the parties
to enter into a compromise agreement after the public prosecutor shall have
submitted its comments thereto. 69
Considering then that it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to revise his
oral order per the Echaus ruling and factoring in his explanation for resorting to
such an amendment, we find no basis for the charge of dishonesty (under
paragraph "j" of the complaint).
Anent the charge that Judge Floro used his moral ascendancy to settle and
eventually dismiss Criminal Case No. 20385-MN (for frustrated homicide) in the
guise of settling the civil aspect of the case, by persuading the private complainant
and the accused to sign the settlement even without the presence of the trial
prosecutor, the same must likewise fail for lack of basis. The controversial
settlement never came to pass. It was not judicially approved as reflected in the
revised Order of 8 March 1999, thus, Mrs. Arriego actually had no cause for
complaint. She cannot, on one hand, complain that the written order did not reflect
the agreement reached during the hearing and, on the other hand, claim that this
agreement was reached under duress at the instance of Judge Floro.
(i) For motu proprio and over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor, ordering
the mental and physical examination of the accused based on the ground that the
accused is "mahina ang pick-up"
The audit team reported that in an Order dated 8 February 1999 in Criminal Case
No. 20347-MN, Judge Floro "motu proprio ordered the physical and mental
examination of the accused by any physician, over the strong objection of the trial
prosecutor, on the ground that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up." 70
In refutation, Judge Floro argues --
In the case at bar, respondent/Court carefully observed the demeanor of the
accused NESTOR ESCARLAN and noted the manifestations of his counsel de oficio,
Atty. E. Gallevo, PAO lawyer, and the comment/objections of the trial prosecutor,
Prosecutor J. Diaz, thus:
a. Atty. Gallevo manifested to the Court that the accused opted to enter
a plea of not guilty;
b. But upon query of the Court, the accused approached the bench and
he appeared trembling and stammering;
c. Atty. Gallevo, upon questions by respondent, readily admitted that
accused is "nauutal", has difficulty of reasoning, of speaking, and very
nervous;
d. Atty. Gallevo also manifested that the accused often changed his mind
regarding the plea, from not guilty to guilty and to not guilty, and so
forth;
e. Considering the grave situation, Atty. Gallevo, upon citation by the
Court/respondent of the pertinent provisions of the Rules, namely Rule
28 (Mental Examination of Persons), Sec. 12 of Rule 116, and Sec. 5(g) of
Rule 135, Rules of Court (plenary powers to issue orders to conform to
justice), manifested orally that the accused is "mahina ang pick-up";
f. Hence, respondent exercised his sound discretion in issuing the ORDER
OF MENTAL EXAMINATION.
The MENTAL examination ORDER finds legal support, since it is well-settled that
"the court may order a physical or MENTAL examination of a party where his
physical or mental condition is material to the issues involved." (27 C.J.S. p. 119, cf.
MARTIN, p. 107, id.). 71
PAO lawyer Erwin Joy B. Gallevo took the witness stand for Judge Floro. He testified
that he moved for the suspension of the arraignment of the accused Nestor
Escarlan Escancilla in order to assess his mental fitness for trial. 72 As reflected in the
Order for suspension, however, and as admitted by Judge Floro himself in his
Comment, Atty. Gallevo merely manifested that accused is "mahina ang pick-up."
Be that as it may, we cannot fault Judge Floro for suspending the arraignment motu
proprio and "over the strong objection of the trial prosecutor." It must be
remembered that the scheduled arraignment took place in February 1999 when the
applicable rule was still Section 12(a) of Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 12. Suspension of arraignment. – The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the
time thereof:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to
plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental
examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.
The above-cited rule does not require that the suspension be made pursuant to a
motion filed by the accused unlike Section 11(a), Rule 116 of the present 2000 Rules
of Criminal Procedure which decrees that the suspension be made "upon motion by
the proper party." 73 Thus, it was well within the discretion of Judge Floro to order
the suspension of the arraignment motu proprio based on his own assessment of
the situation. In fact, jurisprudence imposes upon the Judge the duty to suspend the
proceedings if it is found that the accused, even with the aid of counsel, cannot
make a proper defense. 74 As we underscored in People v. Alcalde 75 :
Settled is the rule that when a judge is informed or discovers that an accused is
apparently in a present condition of insanity or imbecility, it is within his discretion
to investigate the matter. If it be found that by reason of such affliction the accused
could not, with the aid of counsel, make a proper defense, it is the duty of the court
to suspend the proceedings and commit the accused to a proper place of detention
until his faculties are recovered. x x x.
xxxx
The constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him under the Bill of Rights carries with it the correlative obligation to
effectively convey to the accused the information to enable him to effectively
prepare for his defense. At the bottom is the issue of fair trial. While not every
27
aberration of the mind or exhibition of mental deficiency on the part of the accused
is sufficient to justify suspension of the proceedings, the trial court must be fully
satisfied that the accused would have a fair trial with the assistance the law secures
or gives. x x x.
Whether or not Judge Floro was indeed correct in his assessment of the accused’s
mental fitness for trial is already beside the point. If ever he erred, he erred in the
side of caution which, under the circumstances of the case, is not an actionable
wrong.
(e)Re: Charge of appearing and signing pleadings in Civil Case No. 46-M-98 pending
before Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan in violation of Canon 5,
Rule 5.07, Code of Judicial Conduct which prohibits a judge from engaging in the
private practice of law
(f)Re: Charge of appearing in personal cases without prior authority from the
Supreme Court and without filing the corresponding applications for leaves of
absence on the scheduled dates of hearing
In support of the above charges, the memorandum report states:
i.Judge Floro, Jr. informed the audit team that he has personal cases pending before
the lower courts in Bulacan. He admitted that Atty. Bordador, the counsel of record
in some of these cases, is just signing the pleadings for him while he (Judge Floro,
Jr.) acts as collaborating counsel. When attending the hearing of the cases, Judge
Floro, Jr. admitted that he does not file an application for leave of absence.
Based on the reports gathered by the audit team, Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending civil
case in the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan and a criminal case in Municipal
Trial Court, Meycauayan, Bulacan. It is reported that in these cases, he is appearing
and filing pleadings in his capacity as party and counsel for himself and even
indicating in the pleadings that he is the Presiding Judge of Branch 73, RTC,
Malabon.
Upon verification by the audit team, it was found out that Judge Floro, Jr. indeed
has a pending case before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan
docketed as Civil Case No. 46-M-98, entitled: "In Re: In the Matter of the Petition for
Habeas Corpus of Robert V. Floro, Atty. Florentino V. Floro, Jr., Petitioner - versus –
Jesie V. Floro and Benjamin V. Floro". In this case Judge Floro, Jr. filed an "Ex-Parte
Motion for Issuance of Entry of Judgment with Manifestation and/or Judicial
Admission" wherein he signed as the petitioner and at the same time indicated that
he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon, Metro Manila. Court
stenographer Marissa Garcia, RTC, Branch 83, Malolos, Bulacan confirmed this
information. Judge Floro, Jr. even attached a copy of his oath taking and his picture
together with President Joseph Estrada to the aforesaid pleading. Photocopy of the
said Motion is hereto attached as Annex "9".
Judge Floro, Jr. has a pending request with the Court Management Office, Office of
the Court Administrator, to appear as counsel or collaborating counsel in several
civil cases (except the above-mentioned case) pending before lower courts. 76
Well ensconced is the rule that judges are prohibited from engaging in the private
practice of law. Section 35, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court unequivocally states that:
"No judge or other official or employee of the superior courts or of the Office of the
Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as member of the bar or give
professional advice to client." Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, on
the other hand, provides that: "A judge shall not engage in the private practice of
law."
Judge Floro vehemently denies the foregoing charge claiming that he hired lawyers
to attend to his personal cases. 77
A scrutiny of the voluminous records in this case does not reveal any concrete proof
of Judge Floro having appeared as counsel in his personal cases after he had already
been appointed Judge except that he prepared a pleading ("Ex Parte Motion For
Issuance of Entry of Judgment With Manifestation and/or Judicial Admission")
jointly with his counsel of record in connection with a habeas corpus case he filed
against his brothers for the custody of their "mild, mentally-retarded" brother. He
explained, however, that he prepared the said pleading in the heat of anger as he
could not accept the judgment of dismissal in that case.78 He likewise explained that
the pleading was signed by him alone due to inadvertence and that he had rectified
the same by filing an Amended Manifestation with Affidavit of Merit. 79 Finally,
during the hearing of this case, Judge Floro argued that he filed the subject pleading
as petitioner and not as counsel. 80
The proscription against the private practice of law by judges is based on sound
public policy, thus:
[T]he rights, duties, privileges and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are
inherently incompatible with the high official functions, duties, powers, discretion
and privileges of a judge. It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and
attention to their judicial duties, prevent them from extending special favors to
their own private interests and assure the public of their impartiality in the
performance of their functions. These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral
decency and desire to promote the public interest. 81
Based on the above rationale, it becomes quite evident that what is envisioned by
"private practice" is more than an isolated court appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same nature habitually or
customarily holding one’s self to the public as a lawyer. 82 In herein case, save for
the "Motion for Entry of Judgment," it does not appear from the records that Judge
Floro filed other pleadings or appeared in any other court proceedings in
connection with his personal cases. It is safe to conclude, therefore, that Judge
Floro’s act of filing the motion for entry of judgment is but an isolated case and
does not in any wise constitute private practice of law. Moreover, we cannot ignore
the fact that Judge Floro is obviously not lawyering for any person in this case as he
himself is the petitioner.
Be that as it may, though Judge Floro might not be guilty of unauthorized practice of
law as defined, he is guilty of unbecoming conduct for signing a pleading wherein he
indicated that he is the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 73, Malabon City and for
appending to the pleading a copy of his oath with a picture of his oath-taking. The
only logical explanation we can reach for such acts is that Judge Floro was obviously
trying to influence or put pressure on a fellow judge by emphasizing that he himself
is a judge and is thus in the right. 83 Verily, Canon 2, Rule 2.04 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct mandates that a "judge shall refrain from influencing in any manner the
outcome of litigation or dispute pending before another court or administrative
agency." By doing what he did, Judge Floro, to say the least, put a fellow judge in a
very awkward position.
As to charge (f), the OCA has failed to substantiate its claim that Judge Floro has
been attending the hearing of his personal cases without filing for leave of absence.
As Judge Floro vehemently protests the charge as untrue, it was incumbent upon
the OCA to prove its case. Time and again we have held that although
administrative proceedings are not strictly bound by formal rules on evidence, the
liberality of procedure in administrative actions is still subject to limitations imposed
by the fundamental requirement of due process. 84
(k) Re: Charge of openly criticizing the Rules of Court and the Philippine justice
system
(l) Re: Charge of use of highly improper and intemperate language during court
proceedings
The memorandum report reads:
In the course of the judicial audit, the audit team was able to observe the way Judge
Floro, Jr. conducts court proceedings. With the assistance of the court staff, the
team was able to obtain a tape-recorded proceeding conducted by Judge Floro, Jr.
Attached is the transcript of the proceedings (Annex "15"). The tape record of the
court proceedings is also submitted along with this report as Exhibit "A".
xxxx
The case for hearing that day was Civil Case No. 1256 MM. A certain Atty. Abelarde
was appearing for the plaintiff while Atty. Emmanuel Basa was appearing for the
defendant. During the hearing, it seems that the counsels for both parties were
guiding Judge Floro, Jr. on how to proceed with the trial.
There was one instance when Judge Floro, Jr. criticized the Rules of Court, to wit:
"Judge Floro, Jr.: Kasi nga ang may plano nito ay ang Rules of Court, hindi nila
maayos ang Rules of Court natin, hindi realistic kinopya lang sa law of California on
Civil Procedure; pagdating dito eh … dahil sa kanila maraming nagkakaproblema,
masyadong maraming … eh ako wala akong pinagkopyahan yan … but ginawa ko
lang yon … Sabi ko si Judge nagko-complain kasi, sabi ko nga pagka ang lawyer hindi
alam yan talo na sa akin … except … na hindi papayag … kasi marami diyang …"
In another proceeding conducted on a different day, Judge Floro, Jr., instead of
holding trial, discussed, in open court, the case involving his brother. He even
condemned the Philippine justice system and manifested his disgust on the
unfairness of the system. Thus, he said:
"Sabi ko paano ko matatagpuan ang katarungan dito sa korteng eto bulok ang
hustisya. Ang kapatid ko napakayaman, ako walang pera."
He continued:
"Yung kapatid ko. Hindi ko makuha kundi makita ko lang. Bawal kasi; yung kapatid
ko retarded, bawal. In memory of my brother, Robert Floro. So, ngayon nag-file ako.
Sabi ni Judge Agloro senermonan pa ako, ganun … ganun … Sabi ko paano ko
makikita ang katarungan. Tapos ngayon ang nangyari di Judge na ako, hindi ko pa
nakita ang kapatid ko. Di ngayon, ang ginawa ko na-dismiss na yung case, hindi ko
inano kasi wala akong nakikitang katarungan dahil ang kapatid ko ay napakaraming
pera. Alam ko naman kung ang isang court eh parehas o may kiling eh. Yung
28
abogado niya malakas na malakas doon. Sana hindi naka-record eto (laughs) baka
ako ma-contempt dito." 85
Judge Floro denies the foregoing accusations, emphatically arguing that these are all
hearsay fabrications supplied by his Clerk of Court, Atty. Dizon, and by disgruntled
RTC personnel due to ill or ulterior motives (i.e., to allegedly cover-up their
consistent tardiness, habitual absenteeism and gross neglect of duties which were
all unearthed by Judge Floro).
As to the tape recording of an alleged court hearing wherein he criticized the
Philippine judicial system, Judge Floro contends that this recording was done
clandestinely by his staff in violation of the Anti-Wire Tapping Law (Republic Act No.
4200) and, to suit their plans, they twisted the facts by cutting portions thereof.
They also made it appear that the conversation took place in a court proceeding
when, in fact, this was inside his chambers.
During the investigation, it was established that the two tapes in question were
submitted to the OCA sans the "yellow notes" and the official transcribed copy
thereof. 86 This means that the transcribed copy that was submitted by the audit
team as Annex "15" is but an unofficial copy and does not, by itself, prove that what
was being recorded was a court proceeding. This being the case, the two tapes,
without concrete proof that they were taken officially during a court proceeding,
cannot be used against Judge Floro as the unauthorized recording of a private
conversation is inadmissible under Rep. Act No. 4200. 87
Without the tape and transcribed copies of the contents thereof, we are thus left
with only Judge Floro’s word against that of Atty. Dizon, his Clerk of Court who
testified under oath as to Judge Floro’s alleged propensity to criticize the judiciary
and to use intemperate language. Resolving these particular charges would
therefore depend upon which party is more credible.
Atty. Dizon stated on the witness stand that:
Q: Is Judge Floro guilty of Violation of Canon 1 Rule 1.01 Code of Judicial Conduct
when he openly criticized the Rules of Court and the Philippine Justice System?
A: Yes. Judge Floro has mentioned to each and everyone of us in branch 73 the
alleged "kabulukan ng hustisya". Time and again he said the Rules of Court is of no
use. He said that since theory and the practice of law are very different, the Rules of
Court does not always apply to different cases. Not only the justice system did he
criticize but likewise Judges and Justices. He told us . . . and I quote "D’yan sa
Malolos sangkatutak ang corrupt na Judges . . . Sa Court of Appeals P25,000.00 ang
pinakamababang lagayan diyan."
To our mind, how can a Judge like him openly criticize the very institution he is now
serving? Where is his respect to the court, to the bar and to the bench? How can he
uphold courts as temples of justice if he himself did not believe in the justice
system?
xxxx
Q What can you say about charge letter "L" which reads for the use of highly
improper and intemperate language during court proceedings?
A Judge Floro, if in the presence of all his staff, during the presence of me, the Court
Interpreter, the Legal Researcher, maybe a Clerk, he always discuss matters
regarding practitioners in our court. There is one time one Atty. Feliciano a lady
lawyer, he said, "Luka-luka, talaga yang babaing yan" and then he would call even
not during court session, but during office hours our Court Interpreter "malandi,
luka-luka, may fruit of the sun". So, it did not surprise us one time when during a
pre-trial conference in a Civil Case, for Civil Case No. 25-86-MN "Lopez v. Reyes and
Mercado", he uttered offensive language against his fellow judge. Take the
transcription of this court proceeding is already adapted by the Court Administrator.
It was the content of the tape he sent the Court Administrator. Actually, for
consultation and advise after hearing what Judge Floro discussed in open Court,
before all of us, the court staff present in the hearing and before the lawyer and the
defendants in the case, we were in quandary whether or not to attach in the record
the stenographic notes or even the actual transcription of the proceedings because
it contained offensive languages against the justice system, against a certain judge,
against a certain Clerk of Court named Jude Assanda, against people he is disgusted
with. In fact, instead of discussing the merit of the case or the possibility of the
amicable settlement between the parties, he integrated this kind of discussion. So,
as a Clerk of Court, I may not use my discretion whether or not to advise the
stenographer to indeed present the same or attach the same in the record because
it contained offensive languages highly improper and intemperate languages like for
example, "putang ina", words like "ako ang anghel ng kamatayan, etcetera,
etcetera". 88
The denials of Judge Floro are insufficient to discredit the straightforward and
candid declarations of Atty. Dizon especially in the light of confirming proofs from
Judge Floro himself.
The Court finds the version of Atty. Dizon more credible because subject utterances
are consistent with Judge Floro’s claims of intellectual superiority for having
graduated with several honors from the Ateneo School of Law and having placed
13th in the bar examinations. Moreover, his utterances against the judicial system
on account of his perception of injustice in the disposition of his brother’s case are
not far removed from his reactions to what he perceived were injustices committed
against him by the OCA and by the persons who were either in charge of the cases
against him or had some sort of participation therein. Consequently, although there
is no direct proof that Judge Floro said what he is claimed to have said, nonetheless,
evidence that he sees himself as intellectually superior as well as evidence of his
habit of crying foul when things do not go his way, show that it is more likely that he
actually criticized the Rules of Court and the judicial system and is thus guilty of
unbecoming conduct. Verily, in administrative cases, the quantum of proof
necessary for a finding of guilt is substantial evidence or such relevant evidence as
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 89 In this case,
there is ample and competent proof of violation on Judge Floro’s part.
(m) Re: Charge of violating Circular No. 13-87 dated 1 July 1987
The memorandum report stated that Judge Floro –
[D]eviat[ed] from the regular course of trial when he discusses matters involving his
personal life and beliefs. Canon 3, Rule 3.03 provides that "[a] judge shall maintain
order and proper decorum in the court." A disorderly judge generates disorderly
work. An indecorous judge invites indecorous reactions. Hence, the need to
maintain order and proper decorum in court. When the judge respects himself,
others will respect him too. When he is orderly, others will follow suit. Proceedings
in court must be conducted formally and solemnly. The atmosphere must be
characterized with honor and dignity befitting the seriousness and importance of a
judicial trial called to ascertain the truth. Anything which tends to detract from this
atmosphere must be avoided. And the judge is supposed to be in control and is
therefore responsible for any detraction therefrom.
Circular No. 13 (Guidelines in the Administration of Justice) dated July 1, 1987
provides that trial of cases should be conducted efficiently and expeditiously. Judges
should plan the course and direction of trials so that waste of time is avoided.
Moreover, a judge should avoid being queer in his behavior, appearance and
movements. He must always keep in mind that he is the visible representative of
the law. Judge Floro, Jr.’s claims that he is endowed with psychic powers, that he
can inflict pain and sickness to people, that he is the angel of death and that he has
unseen "little friends" are manifestations of his psychological instability and
therefore casts doubt on his capacity to carry out the functions and responsibilities
of a judge. Hence, it is best to subject Judge Floro, Jr. once again to psychiatric or
mental examination to ascertain his fitness to remain in the judiciary. 90
Circular No. 13-87, by itself, does not define nor punish an offense but, as its title
would suggest, it merely sets the guidelines in the administration of justice
following the ratification of the 1987 Constitution.
The arguments forwarded by the OCA, however, best exemplify the fact that the 13
charges are inextricably linked to the charge of mental/psychological illness which
allegedly renders Judge Floro unfit to continue discharging the functions of his
office. This being the case, we will consider the allegation that Judge Floro proclaims
himself to be endowed with psychic powers, that he can inflict pain and sickness to
people, that he is the angel of death and that he has unseen "little friends" in
determining the transcendental issue of his mental/psychological fitness to remain
in office.
But before we even go into that, we must determine the appropriate penalty to be
imposed for the seven of the 13 charges discussed above. To recapitulate, we have
found Judge Floro guilty, in one way or another, of seven of the 13 charges against
him. Thus:
1) Charge "a" - simple misconduct
2) Charges "c" and "g" – gross ignorance of the law
3) Charge "d" – unbecoming conduct
4) Charge "e" – unbecoming conduct
5) Charges "k" and "l" – unbecoming conduct
Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is a serious charge. Under Rule 140 as
amended, a judge guilty of a serious charge may be dismissed from the service,
suspended from office without salary and other benefits for more than three but
not exceeding six months or fined in the amount of P 20,000.00 but not exceeding P
40,000.00 depending on the circumstances of the case. In herein case, considering
that Judge Floro had barely warmed his seat when he was slammed with these
charges, his relative inexperience is to be taken in his favor. And, considering
further that there is no allegation or proof that he acted in bad faith or with corrupt
motives, we hold that a fine is the appropriate penalty. The fine is to be imposed in
the maximum, i.e. P 40,000.00, as we will treat the findings of simple misconduct
and unbecoming conduct as aggravating circumstances. 91
29
Judge Floro must be relieved of his position as Judge of RTC Malabon Branch due to
a medically disabling condition of the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the
functions of his office
As we have explained, the common thread which binds the 13 seemingly unrelated
accusations in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 is the charge of mental illness against Judge
Floro embodied in the requirement for him to undergo an appropriate mental or
psychological examination and which necessitated his suspension pending
investigation. This charge of mental illness, if true, renders him unfit to perform the
functions of his office notwithstanding the fact that, in disposing of the 13 charges,
there had been no finding of dismissal from the service against Judge Floro.
The Supreme Court Clinic first had occasion to interview Judge Floro when the latter
applied for judgeship (which application he later voluntarily withdrew) way back in
September 1995. The psychological report, as prepared by Cecilia C. Villegas, M.D.
(Director III, Chief SC Clinic Services) and Melinda C. Grio (Psychologist), stated in
part:
PSYCHIATRIC EVALUATION:
There are evidences of developing psychotic process at present.
REMARKS:
Atty. Floro was observed to be restless and very anxious during the interview. He
was argumentative and over solicitous of questions asked, giving the impressions of
marked suspiciousness. He centered on his academic excellence, an Ateneo de
Manila graduate of the College of Law, rated top 13th place in the bar examination.
He emphasized his obsessive and compulsive method of studying, at least 15 hours
per day regardless of whether it was school days or vacation time. Vying for honors
all the time and graduated Law as second honor, he calls this self-discipline and self-
organization. He expressed dissatisfaction of his achievements, tend to be a
perfectionist and cannot accept failures. To emphasize his ultra bright mind and
analytical system, he related that, for the past 3 to 5 years, he has been
experiencing "Psychic vision" every morning and that the biggest secret of the
universe are the "unseen things." He can predict future events because of "power in
psychic phenomenon" as when his bar results was to be released, he saw lights in
the sky "no. 13-1," and he got the 13th place. He has been practicing
"parapsychology" – seeing plenty of "dwendes" around him.
He can talk on and on of bizarre ideas, that tends (sic) to be irrelevant.
Intellectually, he has high assets, however, evidence of ego disintegration are
prominent findings, both in the interview (conscious) and psychological test results.
(unconscious level). 92
Approximately three years later, in June 1998, Judge Floro again presented himself
to the Supreme Court Clinic when he applied anew for judgeship, this time of RTC
Malabon. Psychologist Beatriz O. Cruz and Celeste P. Vista, M.D. (Psychiatrist and
Medical Officer IV) did the interview and evaluation. Dr. Vista observed:
Atty. Floro has an impressive academic achievements (sic), and he takes pride in
this. During the interview, he was quite reluctant to reveal information about his
family background and would rather talk about his work and academic
achievements. However, he failed to integrate his knowledge into a cohesive unit
which he can utilize to cope with the various tasks that he undertakes. This renders
him confused and ambivalent with a tendency to vacillate with decision-making. He
also has a low self-esteem and prone to mood swings with the slightest
provocation.
From the interview, there seems to have been no drastic change in his personality
and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice. However, he showed a
pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits. He has poor social skills and
showed discomfort with close social contacts. Paranoid ideations, suspiciousness of
others’ motives as well as perceptual distortions were evident during the interview.
Atty. Floro’s current intelligence function is along the mild mental retardation (68)
which is below the expected cognitive efficiency of a judge. Despite his impressive
academic background and achievements, he has lapses in judgment and may have
problems with decision-making. His character traits such as suspiciousness and
seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic phenomena though
not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment, and hamper his
primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. Furthermore, he is at present not
intellectually and emotionally equipped to hurdle the responsibilities of a judge and
he may decompensate when exposed to anxiety-provoking and stress-laden
situation. 93
It would seem that the JBC disregarded the above-quoted report as it allowed Judge
Floro to seek a second opinion from private practitioners. A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460,
however, resurrected the issue of his mental and psychological capacity to preside
over a regional trial court. Thus, the Resolution of 20 July 1999 specifically ordered
Judge Floro to submit to "appropriate psychological or mental examination."
On 1 February 2000, per recommendation of Justice Ramirez, 94 the Court clarified
that the "appropriate psychological or mental examination" being adverted to in the
Resolution of 20 July 1999 is to be conducted by the SC Clinic. The Court thereby
directed Judge Floro to "submit himself to the SC Clinic for psychological or mental
examination, within ten (10) days from notice." 95 Judge Floro sought
reconsideration which was denied by the Court on 22 February 2000. 96
The order to submit to the appropriate psychological examination by the SC Clinic
was reiterated by the Court on 17 October 2000 with the admonition that Judge
Floro’s failure to do so would result in appropriate disciplinary sanctions. 97
On 24 October 2000, Judge Floro sought reconsideration of the 17 October 2000
Resolution with a conjunctive special motion for him to undergo psychiatric
examination by any duly authorized medical and/or mental institution. 98 This was
denied by the Court on 14 November 2000. 99
On 10 November 2000, Judge Floro moved, among other things, for the inhibition or
disqualification of Supreme Court Clinic doctors 100 and psychologist 101 with a
manifestation that he filed cases against them for revocation of licenses before the
Professional Regulatory Commission (PRC), the Philippine Medical Association
(PMA) and the PAP 102 for alleged gross incompetence and dishonorable conduct
under Sec. 24 of Rep. Act No. 2382/1959 Medical Act/Code of Medical Ethics. 103
On 16 November 2000, Justice Ramirez, with the approval of Court Administrator
Benipayo, moved that Judge Floro be sanctioned for obvious contempt in refusing
to comply with the 1 February 2000 and 17 October 2000 resolutions. According to
Justice Ramirez, Judge Floro’s filing of administrative cases with the PRC against Dr.
Mendoza, et al., is an indication of the latter’s intention to disregard and disobey
the legal orders of the Court. 104 The Court en banc agreed in the report of Justice
Ramirez, thus Judge Floro was ordered to submit to psychological and mental
examination within 10 days from receipt, otherwise, he "shall be ordered arrested
and detained at the jail of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) x x x." 105
concrete and abstract requirements of tasks. Alert to details,
he has a logical approach in evaluating the relationship
between things and ideas.
2. He thrives in predictable and structured situations, where
he can consider solid facts to arrived (sic)at concrete, tangible
outcomes. Task-oriented, he can organize procedures and
details so as to get things done correctly and on schedule. He
uses conventional standards to determine personal progress.
Set in his views, he may not readily accept others’ ideas and
contributions especially if these oppose his own.
3. A serious and thorough approach to his commitments is
expected of FFJ. Generally, he prefers to control his emotions
and does not let this get in the way of his judgment and
decisions.
II. EMOTIONAL/INTERPERSONAL CHARACTERISTICS
FFJ is motivated by the need to be recognized and respected for his
undertakings. Achievement-oriented, he sets high personal standards
and tends to judge himself and others according to these standards.
When things do not develop along desired lines, he may become restless
and impatient. Nevertheless, he is careful of his social stature and can be
expected to comply with conventional social demands. 109
Testifying as one of Judge Floro’s witnesses, Rowena A. Reyes opined on cross-
examination that "psychologically speaking," Judge Floro was not fit to be a judge.
Thus:
JUDGE AQUINO:

Judge Floro finally complied with the directive on 13 and 15 December 2000. 106 He
likewise sought the services of a private practitioner, Dr. Eduardo T. Maaba, who
came out with his own evaluation of Judge Floro on 3 January 2001. 107
Thus, Judge Floro trooped to the Supreme Court Clinic for the third time in
December 2000, this time in connection with A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460. Francianina G.
Sanchez, Clinical Psychologist and Chief Judicial Staff Officer reported that "(o)ver all
data strongly suggest a delusional disorder with movement in the paranoid
direction." Dr. Celeste Vista, for her part, stated that:
Q: Now, that we are telling you that Judge Floro based on his testimony here and on
every available records of the proceedings, has been claiming that he [is] possessed
with Psychic Powers and he did not tell you that in the interview. Would you
consider his failure to tell you about his Psychic Powers to be a fatal [flaw]?
xxxx
A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Very grave one, because it will affect the psychological outlook of the patient?
Based on the clinical data gathered, it appears that Judge Floro is basically a
cautious, and suspicious individual with a compulsion to analyze and observe
motives in his milieu. Despite his status, cognitive assets and impressive educational A: Yes, Sir.
background, his current functioning is gauged along the LOW AVERAGE intelligence.
xxxx
He can function and apply his skills in everyday and routine situations. However, his
test protocol is characterized by disabling indicators. There is impairment in reality Q: I tell you now, Judge Floro has been claiming in [these] proceedings and you
testing which is an indicator of a psychotic process. He is unable to make an were here when we were cross-examining Mr. Licaoco and you heard that we
objective assessment and judgment of his milieu. Hence, he is apt to misconstrue mentioned in the course of our cross-examination. Would you consider his failure to
signals from his environment resulting to perceptual distortions, disturbed tell you about his power of by location to be a fatal [flaw] and your assessment of
associations, and lapses in judgment. Such that, cultural beliefs in dwarfs, psychic his psychological outlook?
and paranormal phenomena and divine gifts of healing have become incorporated
in a delusional (false and unshakable beliefs) system, that it has interfered and
tainted his occupational and social functioning. Hence, he is found to be unfit in xxxx
performing his court duties as a judge. 108
A: Yes, Sir.
Pursuant to the aforecited December 2000 interview of Judge Floro, Supreme Court
Senior Chief Staff Officer Rosa J. Mendoza, M.D., reported to Chief Justice Hilario G. Q: Fatal [flaw]?
Davide, Jr. in March 2001 that –
A: Yes, Sir.
The findings of mental and psychological incapacity is thus substantially supported
by evidence. Based on the three[3] psychological tests and evaluation of the two[2]
Q: Did Judge Floro tell you also in the course of the interview that he is capable of
psychiatrists, the undersigned has no other recourse but to recommend that Judge
being in a trance?
Florentino Floro be declared unfit to discharge his duties as a Judge, effective
immediately.
A: He did not.
Not one to take this last recommendation sitting down, Judge Floro submitted
earlier psychological evaluations conducted by several mental health professionals Q: So, he did not tell you that while in a trance he could type letters?
which were all favorable to him. The first three evaluations were in connection with
his application as RTC Judge of Malabon City in 1998 brought about by him having A: He did not.
"failed" the examination given by the Supreme Court Clinic. The report dated 04
September 1998 by staff psychologist, Rowena A. Reyes as noted by clinical
Psychologist, Ma. Teresa Gustilo-Villasor of the Metropolitan Psychological xxxx
Corporation (MPC), states in part:
Q: And reality oriented and a reality oriented person is one who will not be
I. INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS pronouncing or making pronouncement concerning his psychic powers. Is this not
correct?

SUMMARY OF INTELLECTUAL/COGNITIVE CHARACTERISTICS

xxxx

1. FFJ can draw from above average intellectual resources to

cope with everyday demands. He is able to handle both A: Yes sir.

30
Q: A reality oriented person is also one who will not claim that he is capable of Q: He did not tell you also that in [traveling] from one place to another, at least four
having trances in the course of his private activities and even in the course of the (4) kilometers apart, he used to ride on a big white or whatever it is, horse?
performance of his official duty as a Judge. Will you not agree with that?
A: Not during our interview.
A: I agree with you, Sir.
xxxx
Q: And if he will do so, he will not be actually a reality oriented person. Meaning
tatagalugin ko na po nakukuha naman "na ako ay psychic, na ako ay pwedeng
A: It is possible like any other psychiatrist or mental health doctor you might have
ipower ng by location, na kaya kong mag trance. Gumawa pa ng iba’t iba pang
missed some information or it is possible that our clients or patients might not
bagay at the same time." Yan ay hindi compatible sa pagiging reality oriented?
[have] told us everything.

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: And if your clients or patients did not tell you things such as those that Judge
Floro did not admittedly tell you in the course of the interview, your opinion of the
Q: And a person who is not reality oriented is not fit to sit as a Judge. patient would be altered a little?

xxxx xxxx

Q: I will add the phrase Psychologically speaking. A: The answer has something to do whether my evaluation may be altered. Yes,
Your Honor in the absence of any corroborative contradiction.
xxxx
Q: More so, if the presence of confirming events that transpired after the interview,
110 would that be correct?
A: Yes, Sir. 

A: The interview has its limitations.

Another psychiatrist, Pacita Ramos-Salceda, M.D., Senior Consultant Psychiatrist of
the Makati Medical Center, stated in her report dated 3 September 1998 that at the
time of the interview Judge Floro – Q: Let us say, what Judge Floro did [not] tell you during the interview are confirmed
by events that transpired after the interview, would you not say you have more
reason to have your evaluation altered?
[W]as enthusiastic and confident. He is well informed about current issues, able to
discuss a wide variety of topics intelligently without hesitation. His thinking is lucid,
rational, logical and reality based. He is well oriented, intelligent, emotionally A: Yes.
stable, with very good judgment. There is no previous history of any psychological
disturbances. 111
Q: Especially so if you will now know that after that interview Judge Floro has been
proclaiming himself as the number five psychic in the country [where] no one has
This was followed by the evaluation of Eduardo L. Jurilla, M.D., dated September called him as a psychic at all?
1998, who stated in his report that –
xxxx
Atty. Floro is an asthenic, medium height, fairly groomed, be-spectacled person with
graying hair. When interviewed he was somewhat anxious, elaborative and at times
Q: Would it be really more altered?
approximate in his answers. He was alert, oriented, conscious, cooperative and
articulate in Pilipino and English. He denied any perceptual disturbances. Stream of
thought was logical and goal-directed. There was pressure of speech with tendency A: I would say so.
to be argumentative or defensive but there were no flight of ideas, thought
blocking, looseness of associations or neologisms. Delusions were not elicited. xxxx
Affect was broad and appropriate but mood was anxious. There were no abnormal
involuntary movements or tics. Impulse control is good. Cognition is intact.
Judgment, insight, and other test for higher cortical functions did not reveal Q: Returning to the confirming proofs, meaning after the interview, which are
abnormal results. confirmations of what Judge Floro did not tell you during the interview, would your
finding of [J]udge Floro be drastically altered if he will tell you that he is capable or
possessed of the power of bilocation?
Comments: The over-all results of this psychiatric evaluation of Atty. Florentino V.
Floro, Jr. do not contradict his nomination and appointment to the post he is
seeking. 112 xxxx

On the witness stand, however, and testifying as Judge Floro’s witness, Dr. Jurilla A: I would probably try to for a diagnosis.
clarified that the interview had its limitations 113 and he might have missed out
certain information left out by his patient. 114 The following exchange is thus Q: Which may make a drastic alteration of your evaluation of Judge Floro’s mental
instructive: and psychological x x x?

JUDGE AQUINO: x x x. Did Judge Floro tell you in the interview that he has little A: My diagnosis I will be seeking for an abnormal condition.
unseen, unheard friends known as duwendes?
Q: When you said abnormal something would have made you suspect that there
DR. JURILLA: He did not. was abnormality in the person of Judge Floro?

xxxx A: Given the data.

Q: Did you interview Judge Floro or did he [volunteer] to you information about his Q: We will give you the data or additional information. Would you also have your
claim to be the number five psychic in the country? evaluation favorable to Judge Floro drastically altered if I tell you that based on
record Judge Floro has claimed that while in a trance he is capable of typing a
xxxx letter?

A: No, Your Honor. xxxx

Q: He did not tell you also that he is gifted also with this so called, psychic A: If there is data toward that effect prior to September 1998, probably drastically
phenomena? altered. 115

A: He did not. Lastly, Judge Floro presented the psychiatric evaluation of Eduardo T. Maaba,
M.D., 116 dated 3 January 2001, the relevant portions of which state:

xxxx
Affect was adequate and no mood incongruity was observed. Content of thought
did not reveal delusional thought. He was proud of his achievements in line with his
profession and expressed his frustration and dissatisfaction with the way his

31
colleagues are handling his pending administrative cases. He was observed to be
reality-oriented and was not suffering from hallucinations or abnormal perceptual
distortions. Orientation, with respect to time, place and person, was unimpaired.
Judgment and decision-making capacity were adequately functioning.
xxxx
An open-ended clinical interview was conducted at our clinic on December 26,
2000. He talked about his family and academic achievements. He claimed to possess
a divine gift for prophecy and a gift of healing. He also talked about a "covenant"
made during a dream between him and 3 dwarf friends named Luis, Armand and
Angel. He reported that the first part of his ministry is to cast illness and/or disease
and the second part is to heal and alleviate sufferings/pain from disease.
A series of psychological test was administered to Judge Floro on December 28,
2000. The battery of test consisted of the following: (1) Otis-Lennon Mental Ability
Test (2) SRA Language Test (3) Purdue Non-Language Test (4) Sack’s Sentence
Completion Test and (5) Draw A Person Test. Test results and evaluation showed an
individual with an Above Average Intelligence. Projective data, showed an
obsessive-compulsive person who is meticulous to details and strive for perfection
in tasks assigned to him. He is reality-oriented and is deemed capable of making
day-to-day decisions in his personal as well as professional decisions. Confusion
with regard to sexual identification, was further observed.
Based on the clinical observation and the results of the psychological tests,
respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr., was found to be a highly intelligent person
who is reality-oriented and is not suffering from any major psychotic disorder. He is
not deluded nor hallucinated and is capable of utilizing his superior intellect in
making sound decisions. His belief in supernatural abilities is culture-bound and
needs further studies/work-ups.
On cross-examination by Judge Aquino, however, Dr. Maaba also stated that Judge
Floro was unfit to be a judge. 117 The relevant exchanges between Dr. Maaba and
Judge Aquino are hereunder reproduced:
JUDGE AQUINO: And would you say that something is wrong with a judge who shall
claim that he is possessed with power of [bi-location]?
xxxx
DR. MAABA: A reality-oriented individual would not claim to be in two (2) places at
one time.
Q: And that something must be wrong?
A: Yes.
Q: Okay. Would you say that something is wrong also with a judge claiming in the
course of his testimony and in this very case that while [he] was so testifying there
is another spirit, another person, another character unseen who is with him at the
same time or in tagalog "sumapi sa kanya".
xxxx
A: The observation that Judge Floro had unseen companion "sumapi" to me is
unbelievable.
Q: Unbelievable. And anyone claiming it might be suffering from some delusion?
xxxx
A: It could be and it could not be considered as perceptual distortion, your Honor.
Q: No, Delusion.
A: Delusions, no, but Hallucinations, maybe yes.
Q: Ah, Hallucination, and which maybe worse?
A: Both are on the same footing.
Q: Okay. Would you say that the person declaring in a proceeding as a witness
about hallucinatory matters would turn out to be fit to become a judge?
xxxx
A. If these delusions or hallucinations are part and parcel of a major psychiatric
disorder like schizophrenia or an organic mental disorder, this individual suffering
from hallucinations or delusions is unfit to sit as a judge, however, there is, this
32
symptom might also exi[s]t in a non-psychotic illness and the hallucinations and
delusions could be transient and short in duration.
Q: But of doubtful capacity to sit as a judge?
A: Yes, doubtful capacity.
Q: Now, trance is something covered by the field of which you are practicing with
psychiatry.
A: Yes.
Q: Would you consider a person claiming in the course of a judicial, quasi-judicial or
administrative proceedings particularly in the course of his testimony that while he
was doing so, he was under trance normal.
xxxx
A: Let me explain the phenomenon of trance it is usually considered in the
Philippines as part of a culture bound syndrome and it could also be an indication …
Basically the phenomenon of trance are often seen in cases of organic mental
disorder. It is also common in culture bound syndrome and the effect of person is
usually loss of concentration in a particular settings or situations so that a person or
a judge hearing a case in court would [lose] concentration and would not be able to
follow up testimony of witnesses as well as arguments given by the counsel for the
defense and also for the prosecution, so I would say that there is this difficulty in
manners of attention span and concentration if that person sitting as a judge
experience trance as in the case of Judge Floro, this trance is manifested by flashing
of lights and he might not be able to rationalize or to control expressions or as well
as physical when he is in a trance.
Q: Have you heard of a judge claiming that in the course of a proceeding, he was in
a trance?
A: No, I have not encountered any.
Q: And if you hear one and will be shown records of one maybe such claim you will
call that person not a normal person.
A: Maybe weird.
Q: I will now show to you portions of the stenographic notes of the proceedings in
these cases held on October 10, 2000, afternoon session, page 30 we start with the
question of Atty. Dizon. "Atty. Dizon: Mr. witness, can you tell us? Are you in trance
at this very precise moment? JUDGE FLORO, JR.: "Nakalakip sila". I call it a trance,
but I distinguished not the trance that you see the – nag-sa-Sto., Nino, naninigas.
That’s a trance that is created by the so called… Because Fr. Jaime Bulatao, multi
awarded Jesuit priest, considered that as mind projection. He is correct in a sense
that those nagta-trance na yan, naninigas, the mind projection or the hypnosis do
come, and there is a change in the psychological aspect of the person. But in my
case I never was changed physically or mentally. Only the lights and heat will
penetrate that person. ATTY. DIZON: That will do. So at this very moment, Mr.
witness, "meron kayong kalakip ngayon?"" "Ngayong oras na ito?" JUDGE FLORO:
Yes, they are here. Atty. DIZON: Where are they? Judge Floro, Jr.: They cannot be
seen but… ATTY. DIZON: No, can you see them?" To point to us where are they in
this room?", Now that you have read and seen this portion wherein Judge Floro
himself admitted that in the course of his testimony in these cases he was in a
trance, would you still consider him at least insofar as this claim of his to be a
normal person?
A: No.
Q: No, okay, so he is not normal. Now, Judge Floro in these proceedings also and I
will show to you the transcript of stenographic notes later have claimed that he
had, always had and still had a so–called counter part, his other side, other self,
what can you say to that claim, would that be the claim of a normal, mental sound
person?
A: No.
Q: And one who is not normal and mentally sound is of course not fit to sit as
judge?
xxxx
A: Yes. 118
Based on the foregoing, the OCA, thru Justice Ramirez, reported that:
Upon the testimony of his own witnesses, Drs. Eduardo T. Maaba, Ma. Nieves
Celeste and Eduardo L. Jurilla, respondent Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. is unfit
because of insanity to remain in office as Judge of the Regional Trial Court, National
Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 73.
It is weird for respondent Judge to state in one of his pleadings in this case that
President Estrada would not finish his term as President. It is unusual and queer of
him to state in his calling card that he is a graduate of Ateneo de Manila, second
honors, bar topnotcher with a grade of 87.55% and include in his address the name
Colonel Reynaldo Cabauatan who was involved in a coup d’etat attempt. So is it
strange of him to make use of his alleged psychic powers in writing decisions in the
cases assigned to his court. It is improper and grandiose of him to express
superiority over other judges in the course of hearings he is conducting and for him
to say that he is very successful over many other applicants for the position he has
been appointed. It is abnormal for a Judge to distribute self-serving propaganda.
One who distributes such self-serving propaganda is odd, queer, amusing,
irresponsible and abnormal. A judge suffering from delusion or hallucination is unfit
to be one. So is he who gets into a trance while presiding at the hearing of a case in
court. One need not be a doctor of medicine, a psychiatrist and a psychologist to
determine and conclude that a person in such circumstances is mentally unfit or
insane and should not be allowed to continue discharging the duties and functions
of a judge. The life, liberty and property of the litigants in the court presided by such
judge are in his hands. Hence, it is imperative that he is free from doubt as to his
mental capacity and condition to continue discharging the functions of his office.
RECOMMENDATION
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully recommended that by reason of insanity which
renders him incapable and unfit to perform the duties and functions of Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Malabon, Metro Manila,
Branch 73, respondent Florentino V. Floro, Jr. be REMOVED and DISMISSED from
such office. 119
We are in agreement with the OCA that Judge Floro cannot remain as RTC Judge
because of the findings of mental impairment that renders him unfit to perform the
functions of his office. We hasten to add, however, that neither the OCA nor this
Court is qualified to conclude that Judge Floro is "insane" as, in fact, the
psychologists and psychiatrists on his case have never said so.
When Justice Ramirez recommended that Judge Floro be dismissed from the service
due to "insanity," he was apparently using the term in its loose sense. Insanity is a
general layman’s term, a catch–all word referring to various mental disorders.
Psychosis is perhaps the appropriate medical term 120 as this is the one used by Drs.
Vista and Villegas of the Supreme Court Clinic. It is of note that the 1995, 1998 and
2000 psychological evaluations all reported signs and symptoms of psychosis.
Courts exist to promote justice; thus aiding to secure the contentment and
happiness of the people. 121 An honorable, competent and independent judiciary
exists to administer justice in order to promote the stability of government, and the
well-being of the people. 122 Carrying much of the weight in this daunting task of
administering justice are our front liners, the judges who preside over courts of law
and in whose hands are entrusted the destinies of individuals and institutions. As it
has been said, courts will only succeed in their tasks if the judges presiding over
them are truly honorable men, competent and independent. 123
There is no indication that Judge Floro is anything but an honorable man. And, in
fact, in our disposition of the 13 charges against him, we have not found him guilty
of gross misconduct or acts or corruption. However, the findings of psychosis by the
mental health professionals assigned to his case indicate gross deficiency in
competence and independence.
Moreover, Judge Floro himself admitted that he believes in "psychic visions," of
foreseeing the future because of his power in "psychic phenomenon." He believes
in "duwendes" and of a covenant with his "dwarf friends Luis, Armand and Angel."
He believes that he can write while on trance and that he had been seen by several
people to have been in two places at the same time. He has likened himself to the
"angel of death" who can inflict pains on people, especially upon those he perceived
as corrupt officials of the RTCs of Malabon. He took to wearing blue robes during
court sessions, switching only to black on Fridays. His own witness testified that
Judge Floro explained that he wore black from head to foot on Fridays to recharge
his psychic powers. Finally, Judge Floro conducted healing sessions in his chambers
during his break time. All these things validate the findings of the Supreme Court
Clinic about Judge Floro’s uncommon beliefs and that such beliefs have spilled over
to action.
Lest we be misconstrued, we do not denigrate such belief system. However, such
beliefs, especially since Judge Floro acted on them, are so at odds with the critical
and impartial thinking required of a judge under our judicial system.
Psychic phenomena, even assuming such exist, have no place in a judiciary duty
bound to apply only positive law and, in its absence, equitable rules and principles
in resolving controversies. Thus, Judge Floro’s reference to psychic phenomena in
the decision he rendered in the case of People v. Francisco, Jr. 124 sticks out like a
sore thumb. In said decision, Judge Floro discredited the testimony of the
prosecution’s principal witness by concluding that the testimony was a "fairytale" or
a "fantastic story." 125 He then went to state that "psychic phenomena" was
33
destined to cooperate with the stenographer who transcribed the testimony of the
witness. The pertinent portion of Judge Floro’s decision is quoted hereunder:
3. The testimony of the prosecution’s PRINCIPAL witness (sole eyewitness of the
incident) NORMANDY is INCREDIBLE, is full of inconsistencies (major and not
regarding minor points), ergo, the court concludes that due to several indicia of
fraud/perjury (flagrant/palpable deception of the Court), his testimony is not
worthy of belief, assuming ex-gratia argumenti, that the same may be admissible,
and his Court narrative is hereby declared a FAIRY TALE or a FANTASTIC STORY of a
crime scene that is acceptable only for SCREEN/cinematic viewing. The following
details, are proof of the foregoing conclusion:
a.) NORMANDY swore that he, Ponciano Ineria and Raul Ineria were
"sinalubong" by Lando/accused on June 21, 1987 at 2:30 a.m. at alley
Wesleyan/Tangos, Navotas, and that he saw the "nagpambuno"
between Raul and Ando, and that HE SAW P. INERIA dead, but HE WAS
NO LONGER THERE, but he still saw the "nagpambuno"; MORE
IMPORTANTLY, he SWORE that HE NOTICED the ACCUSED P. Francisco
THE FOLLOWING DAY;
b.) The foregoing verily demonstrate his 11th HOUR CONCOCTION (Big
Lie, having been asked to submit false testimony); for how could have he
witnessed the stabbing by accused when he NOTICED him the following
day? (TSN dated May 2, 1995, pp. 1-2); assuming arguendo that the TSN
was incorrect due to typographical error, or maybe the Court
Stenographer III Eloisa B. Domingo might have been SLEEPING during the
testimony, so that the word DAY should have been corrected to another
word SUITABLE to Normandy’s FAIRY TALE, still, the Court had
synthesized the entire NARRATIVE of Normandy, but the Court found no
reason that the seeming error ‘DAY’ should be corrected; the Court’s
sole/remaining conclusion is that EVEN the STENOGRAPHIC NOTES
cooperated by PSYCHIC PHENOMENA perhaps of FOR SURE, in having
BEEN DESTINED to be FATEFULLY INSCRIBED WITH THE WORDS
FOLLOWING DAY (line 3, p. 3 TSN, id.) 126 (Emphasis supplied)
In State Prosecutors v. Muro 127 we held that –
What is required on the part of judges is objectivity. An independent judiciary does
not mean that judges can resolve specific disputes entirely as they please. There are
both implicit and explicit limits on the way judges perform their role. Implicit limits
include accepted legal values and the explicit limits are substantive and procedural
rules of law. 128
The judge, even when he is free, is still not wholly free. He is not to innovate at
pleasure. He is not a knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of
beauty or goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated principles. He is
not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and unregulated benevolence. He is
to exercise a discretion informed by tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by
system, and subordinate to the "primordial necessity of order in the social life." 129
Judge Floro does not meet such requirement of objectivity and his competence for
judicial tasks leaves much to be desired. As reported by the Supreme Court Clinic:
Despite his impressive academic background and achievements, he has lapses in
judgment and may have problems with decision-making. His character traits such as
suspiciousness and seclusiveness and preoccupation with paranormal and psychic
phenomena though not detrimental to his role as a lawyer, may cloud his judgment,
and hamper his primary role as a judge in dispensing justice. x x x 130
Judge Floro’s belief system, as well as his actuations in the eight months that he
served as RTC judge, indubitably shows his inability to function with the cold
neutrality of an impartial judge.
Verily, Judge Floro holds an exalted position in our system of government. Thus:
Long before a man dons the judicial robes, he has accepted and identified himself
with large components of the judge’s role. Especially if he has aspired to a judge’s
status, he is likely to have conducted himself, more or less unconsciously, in the
fashion of one who is said to have "the judicial temperament." He is likely to have
displayed the kinds of behavior that the judge’s role demands. A large proportion of
his experiences on the bench develop and reinforce such conformity, moreover. The
ritualistic elements of investiture and of court procedure, the honorific forms of
address, and even the imposing appearance of some court buildings serve to
emphasize the demands upon his behavior. Even the most unscrupulous former
ambulance chaser who owes his position to a thoroughly corrupt political
organization must conform at least in part to the behaviors expected of him as a
judge. 131
The expectations concerning judicial behavior are more than those expected of
other public officials. Judges are seen as guardians of the law and they must thus
identify themselves with the law to an even greater degree than legislators or
executives. 132
As it has been said, "[j]udges administer justice judicially, i.e., not according to some
abstract ideas of right and justice, but according to the rules laid down by society in
its Code of Laws to which it gives its sanctions. The function of the judge is primarily
adjudication. This is not a mechanical craft but the exercise of a creative art,
whether we call it legislative or not, which requires great ability and
objectivity." 133 We, thus, quote Justice Frankfurter, in speaking of the functions of
the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States:
To practice the requisite detachment and to achieve sufficient objectivity no doubt
demands of judges the habit of self-discipline and self-criticism, incertitude that
one’s own views are incontestable and alert tolerance toward views not shared. But
these are precisely the presuppositions of our judicial process. They are precisely
the qualities society has a right to expect from those entrusted with … judicial
power.
xxxx
The judicial judgment … must move within the limits of accepted notions of justice
and is not to be based upon the idiosyncrasies of a merely personal judgment. 134
In fine, Judge Floro lacks the judicial temperament and the fundamental
requirements of competence and objectivity expected of all judges. He cannot thus
be allowed to continue as judge for to do so might result in a serious challenge to
the existence of a critical and impartial judiciary.
Equitable considerations entitle Judge Floro backwages and other economic
benefits for a period of three (3) years.
In retrospect, we are forced to say that Judge Floro should not have joined the
judiciary as RTC judge. However, we have assiduously reviewed the history of this
case and we cannot hold anyone legally responsible for such major and unfortunate
faux pas.
Judge Floro did not breach any rule of procedure relative to his application for
judgeship. He went through the entire gamut of tests and interviews and he was
nominated by the JBC on the strength of his scholastic achievements. As to having
failed the psychological examinations given by the SC Clinic, it must be pointed out
that this was disregarded by the JBC upon Judge Floro’s submission of psychiatric
evaluations conducted by mental health professionals from the private sector and
which were favorable to him. Nowhere is it alleged that Judge Floro acted less than
honorably in procuring these evaluations.
The JBC in 1999 had all the discretion to refer Judge Floro to a private clinic for a
second opinion of his mental and psychological fitness. In performing its functions,
the JBC had been guided primarily by the Constitution which prescribes that
members of the Judiciary must be, in addition to other requirements, persons of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence. 135 It was only on 18
October 2000 when it promulgated JBC-009, the "Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council," that the JBC put down in writing guidelines or criteria it had previously
used in ascertaining "if one seeking such office meets the minimum constitutional
qualifications and possesses qualities of mind and heart expected of the
Judiciary." 136 Rule 6 thereof states:
SECTION 1. Good health. – Good physical health and sound mental/psychological
and emotional condition of the applicant play a critical role in his capacity and
capability to perform the delicate task of administering justice. x x x
SEC. 2. Psychological/psychiatric tests. – The applicant shall submit to
psychological/psychiatric tests to be conducted by the Supreme Court Medical Clinic
or by a psychologist and/or psychiatrist duly accredited by the Council.
It would seem that as things stood then, the JBC could very well rely on the
evaluation of a private psychologist or psychiatrist not accredited by the JBC. Thus,
the JBC cannot be faulted for accepting the psychological evaluations of mental
health professionals not affiliated with the Supreme Court Clinic.
It goes without saying that Judge Floro’s appointment as RTC judge is fait accompli.
What awaits us now is the seemingly overwhelming task of finding the PROPER,
JUST AND EQUITABLE solution to Judge Floro’s almost seven years of suspension in
the light of the fact that the penalty imposed herein does not merit a suspension of
seven years.
Verily, the Supreme Court is vested with the power to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 137 The Constitution limits this power
through the admonition that such rules "shall provide a simplified and inexpensive
procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the
same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights." 138
Rule 140 of the Rules of Court outlines the procedure to be followed in
administrative cases against judges. Glaringly, Rule 140 does not detail the steps to
be taken in cases when the judge is preventively suspended pending investigation.
This is the state of things even after its amendment by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC which
took effect on 1 October 2001.
34
The Supreme Court’s power to suspend a judge, however, is inherent in its power of
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof. 139 This power
-- consistent with the power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and
procedure in all courts -- is hemmed in only by the Constitution which prescribes
that an adjective law cannot, among other things, diminish, increase or modify
substantive rights.
The resolution of 20 July 1999 which put Judge Floro under preventive suspension
resolved to:
(1) DIRECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. to answer the foregoing charges against
him within ten (10) days from notice; (2) REFER this case to Retired Justice Pedro
Ramirez, Consultant, Office of the Court Administrator for investigation, report and
recommendation, within sixty (60) days from receipt of the records thereof; (3)
SUBJECT Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. for appropriate psychological or mental
examination to be conducted by the proper office of the Supreme Court or any duly
authorized medical and/or mental institution.
Moreover, the Court RESOLVED to place Judge Florentino Floro, effective
immediately under PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION for the duration of the investigation
of the administrative charges against him. 140
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted resolution, Judge Floro’s suspension,
albeit indefinite, was for the duration of the investigation of the 13 charges against
him which the Court pegged at 60 days from the time of receipt by the investigator
of the records of the case. Rule 140, as amended, now states that "(t)he
investigating Justice or Judge shall terminate the investigation within ninety (90)
days from the date of its commencement or within such extension as the Supreme
Court may grant" 141 and, "(w)ithin thirty (30) days from the termination of the
investigation, the investigating Justice or Judge shall submit to the Supreme Court a
report containing findings of fact and recommendation." 142
From the foregoing, the rule now is that a Judge can be preventively suspended not
only for the entire period of his investigation which would be 90 days (unless
extended by the Supreme Court) but also for the 30 days that it would take the
investigating judge or justice to come up with his report. Moreover, the Court may
preventively suspend a judge until such time that a final decision is reached in the
administrative case against him or her. 143 This is because –
[U]nlike ordinary civil service officials and employees, judges who are charged with
a serious offense warranting preventive suspension are not automatically reinstated
upon expiration of the ninety (90)-day period, as mandated above. The Court may
preventively suspend a judge until a final decision is reached in the administrative
case especially where there is a strong likelihood of his guilt or complicity in the
offense charged. Indeed, the measure is intended to shield the public from any
further damage or wrongdoing that may be caused by the continued assumption of
office by the erring judge. It is also intended to protect the courts’ image as temples
of justice where litigants are heard, rights and conflicts settled and justice solemnly
dispensed.
This is a necessary consequence that a judge must bear for the privilege of
occupying an exalted position. Among civil servants, a judge is indeed in a class all
its own. After all, in the vast government bureaucracy, judges are beacon lights
looked upon as the embodiment of all what is right, just and proper, the ultimate
weapons against justice and oppression. 144
In the case of Judge Floro, he is under preventive suspension up to the present
because of the serious charge of mental unfitness aggravated by the fact that the
actual investigation into his cases dragged on for a much longer period than 90
days. And the reasons for the delay, for the most part, can be directly ascribed to
Judge Floro himself. From the records, it would seem that not only did Judge Floro
move for several re-settings of the hearings of his cases; he likewise dragged his feet
with respect to the order to submit himself to the appropriate psychological/mental
examination. Worse, what started out as single case against him ballooned into 10
cases which were consolidated into one due to common questions of fact and
law. 145 All in all, Judge Floro filed seven cases against those he perceived had
connived to remove and/or suspend him from office, the last of which he filed on 19
May 2003 against Justice Ramirez. 146
Be that as it may, EQUITY demands that we exercise utmost compassion in this case
considering that the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been
expressly included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. We have ruled
similarly in the case of Judge Philbert Iturralde, thus:
Be that as it may, we cannot in conscience hold that a judge who was placed under
preventive suspension pending investigation is not entitled to the payment of back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for the entire duration of the
preventive suspension. The inequity of the doctrine as applied to judges is clearly
apparent, given the peculiar circumstance in which a judge finds himself
preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders".
In this case, Judge Iturralde was preventively suspended for 13½ months, during
which period he was not paid his salaries, allowances and other benefits. Except for
a teaching job that the Court permitted him to undertake pending resolution of the
administrative case, Judge Iturralde had no other source of income. He thus
incurred several loans to provide for his family’s basic needs.
It would thus be unjust to deprive Judge Iturralde of his back salaries, allowances
and other economic benefits for the entire period that he was preventively
suspended. As we have said in Gloria v. Court of Appeals, preventive suspension
pending investigation is not a penalty but only a measure intended to enable the
disciplining authority to conduct an unhampered formal investigation. We held that
ninety (90) days is ample time to conclude the investigation of an administrative
case. Beyond ninety (90) days, the preventive suspension is no longer justified.
Hence, for purposes of determining the extent of back salaries, allowances and
other benefits that a judge may receive during the period of his preventive
suspension, we hold that the ninety-day maximum period set in Gloria v. Court of
Appeals, should likewise be applied.
Concededly, there may be instances when an investigation would extend beyond
ninety (90) days and such may not be entirely unjustified. Nevertheless, we believe
that in such a situation, it would be unfair to withhold his salaries and other
economic benefits for the entire duration of the preventive suspension, moreso if
the delay in the resolution of the case was not due to his fault. Upon being found
innocent of the administrative charge, his preventive suspension exceeding the
ninety-day (90) period actually becomes without basis and would indeed be nothing
short of punitive. It must be emphasized that his subsequent acquittal completely
removed the cause for his preventive suspension in the first place. Necessarily,
therefore, we must rectify its effects on just and equitable grounds. 147
Taking off from the case of Judge Iturralde, we hold that Judge Floro is likewise
entitled to the payment of back salaries, allowances and other economic benefits
being at the receiving end of a rule peculiar to judges who find themselves
preventively suspended by the Court "until further orders" or, as this case, "for the
duration of the investigation." Judge Iturralde’s suspension of 13 ½ months even
pales in comparison to Judge Floro’s suspension of 81 months, more or less. During
this entire excruciating period of waiting, Judge Floro could not practice his
profession, thus putting him solely at the mercy of his brother’s largesse. And,
though he was given donations by those who came to him for healing, obviously,
these could not compensate for his loss of income as Judge.
Unlike the case of Judge Iturralde, however, wherein we held that the period of
suspension exceeding 90 days should be the basis for the payment of back salaries,
we hold that, as a matter of equity, Judge Floro is entitled to back salaries,
allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to three of his
almost seven years suspension. We cannot apply the ruling in Gloria that any
suspension served beyond 90 days must be compensated as we would be, in effect,
rewarding Judge Floro’s propensity to delay the resolution of his case through the
indiscriminate filing of administrative cases against those he perceived connived to
oust him out of office. In Judge Iturralde’s case, the investigation was not delayed
through any fault of his. More importantly, Judge Iturralde was ultimately held
innocent, thus, using by analogy Gloria v. Court of Appeals, his suspension in excess
of 90 days was already in the nature of a penalty which cannot be countenanced
precisely because, being innocent, he cannot be penalized. Judge Floro, on the
other hand, and as already discussed, contributed to the delay in the investigation
of his cases. Moreover, unlike Judge Iturralde, Judge Floro has not been adjudged
innocent of all the 13 charges against him.
These facts, however, as we have already discussed, do not put Judge Floro beyond
the reach of equity. To paraphrase Justice Brandeis, equity does not demand that its
suitors are free of blame. As we are wont to say:
Equity as the complement of legal jurisdiction seeks to reach and do complete
justice where courts of law, through the inflexibility of their rules and want of
power to adapt their judgments to the special circumstances of cases, are
incompetent so to do. Equity regards the spirit of and not the letter, the intent and
not the form, the substance rather than the circumstance, as it is variously
expressed by different courts. 148
In fine, notwithstanding the fact that Judge Floro is much to blame for the delay in
the resolution of his case, equitable considerations constrain us to award him back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits for a period corresponding to
three years. This is because Judge Floro’s separation from the service is not a
penalty as we ordinarily understand the word to mean. It is imposed instead upon
Judge Floro out of necessity due to a medically disabling condition of the mind
which renders him unfit, at least at present, to continue discharging the functions of
his office.
The period of three years seems to us the most equitable under the circumstances.
As discussed, if we were to give him more than three years of back salaries, etc.,
then it would seem that we are rewarding him for his role in delaying the resolution
of these cases (as well as the seven cases he filed which were only dismissed on 14
February 2006 at his own bidding). On the other hand, if we were to peg the period
at less than three years then the same would only be a pittance compared to the
seven years suspension he had to live through with Damocles’ sword hanging over
his head and with his hands bound as he could not practice his profession.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service moots the case against him docketed as
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated 11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V.
35
Floro, Jr.) A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.), on the
other hand, is dismissed for lack of merit.
A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC
It cannot be gainsaid that Judge Floro’s separation from the service renders moot
the complaint in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC. As it is, even the most favorable of
resolutions in this case will not cause a ripple on the Court’s decision to separate
Judge Floro from the service. Thus, this charge is dismissed for being moot and
academic.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988
Considering that this case is a replica of charge "h" in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460 and
considering that charge "h" is without basis, this particular complaint filed by Luz
Arriego must necessarily be dismissed for lack of merit.
Judge Floro’s separation from the service does not carry with it forfeiture of all or
part of his accrued benefits nor disqualification from appointment to any other
public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.
As Judge Floro’s separation from the service cannot be considered a penalty, such
separation does not carry with it the forfeiture of all or part of his accrued benefits
nor disqualification from appointment to any other public office including
government-owned or controlled corporations.
In fact, the psychological and psychiatric reports, considered as the bedrock of the
finding of mental impairment against Judge Floro, cannot be used to disqualify him
from re-entering government service for positions that do not require him to
dispense justice. The reports contain statements/findings in Judge Floro’s favor that
the Court cannot overlook in all fairness as they deserve equal consideration. They
mention Judge Floro’s assets and strengths and capacity for functionality, with
minor modification of work environment. Thus:
a. High intellectual assets as a result of "self-discipline and self-
organization." 149
b. "(I)mpressive academic achievements" with "no drastic change in his
personality and level of functioning as a lawyer in private practice." 150
c. "(C)haracter traits of suspiciousness, seclusiveness, pre-occupation
with paranormal and psychic phenomena … not detrimental to his role
as a lawyer." 151
d. "Everyday situations can be comprehended and dealt with in
moderate proficiency …. His concern for the details that make up a total
field represents his attempts at being systematic and cautious." 152
e. "(E)quipped with analytical power." 153
Consequently, while Judge Floro may be dysfunctional as a judge because of the
sensitive nature of said position, he may still be successful in other areas of
endeavor.
Putting all of the above in perspective, it could very well be that Judge Floro’s
current administrative and medical problems are not totally of his making. He was
duly appointed to judgeship and his mental problems, for now, appear to render
him unfit with the delicate task of dispensing justice not because of any acts of
corruption and debasement on his part but clearly due to a medically disabling
condition.
Finally, if Judge Floro’s mental impairment is secondary to genetics 154 and/or
adverse environmental factors (and, unfortunately, such essential information is not
available), we cannot condemn people for their faulty genes and/or adverse
environment – factors they have no control over.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to:
1) FINE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. in the total amount of FORTY
THOUSAND (P40,000.00) PESOS for seven of the 13 charges against him
in A.M. No. RTJ-99-1460;
2) RELIEVE Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. of his functions as Judge of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City and consider him
SEPARATED from the service due to a medically disabling condition of
the mind that renders him unfit to discharge the functions of his office,
effective immediately;
3) As a matter of equity, AWARD Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr. back
salaries, allowances and other economic benefits corresponding to three
(3) years;
 4) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. RTJ-06-1988 (Luz Arriego v. Judge
Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for LACK OF MERIT; and
5) DISMISS the charge in A.M. No. 99-7-273-RTC (Re: Resolution Dated
11 May 1999 Of Judge Florentino V. Floro, Jr.) for MOOTNESS.
SO ORDERED.
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME "SYCIP,
SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO." LUCIANO E. SALAZAR,
FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G. HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO.
ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN, JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ, ANGELITO C.
IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A. CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and
ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE
FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA & REYES." RICARDO J.
ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS
S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by the surviving partners of
Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February 14, 1976, praying that they be allowed
to continue using, in the names of their firms, the names of partners who had
passed away. In the Court's Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were
ordered consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its business under
a firm name which includes the name of a deceased partner; in fact, Article 1840 of
the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the practice when it provides in the last paragraph
that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the business
of the partnership name, or the name of a deceased partner
as part thereof, shall not of itself make the individual property
of the deceased partner liable for any debts contracted by
such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering, the
legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any restriction as to
the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased partner; 2 the legislative
authorization given to those engaged in the practice of accountancy — a profession
requiring the same degree of trust and confidence in respect of clients as that
implicit in the relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade
name, strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by the
continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which includes the name of
a deceased partner, at least where such firm name has acquired the characteristics
of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the continued use of
the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a law partnership because
Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics adopted by the American Bar
Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner when permissible by local custom, is not unethical
but care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of their
respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all newspapers of general
circulation for several days; the stationeries now being used by them carry new
letterheads indicating the years when their respective deceased partners were
connected with the firm; petitioners will notify all leading national and international
law directories of the fact of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's name in a
professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the Philippines, or at least
in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that the name of a law firm
necessarily Identifies the individual members of the firm. 7
36
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an accepted
practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration by this
Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued its practice of
including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D. Johnston. The matter was
resolved with this Court advising the firm to desist from including in their firm
designation the name of C. D. Johnston, who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G. R. No. L-
11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking Corporation. The law
firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene as amicus curiae. Before acting
thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be
informed why the name of Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is
already dead." In a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and
Ponce Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being raised by
petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name "Perkins & Ponce
Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued use of
the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court found no
reason to depart from the policy it adopted in June 1953
when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and Eddy A. Deen
of Cebu City to desist from including in their firm designation,
the name of C. D. Johnston, deceased. The Court believes
that, in view of the personal and confidential nature of the
relations between attorney and client, and the high standards
demanded in the canons of professional ethics, no practice
should be allowed which even in a remote degree could give
rise to the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from their
firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far enunciated by
the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and "Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the use in their
partnership names of the names of deceased partners will run counter to Article
1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm name,
which may or may not include the name of one or more of
the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership, include
their names in the firm name, shall be subject to the liability,
of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a partnership
must either be those of living partners and. in the case of non-partners, should be
living persons who can be subjected to liability. In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code
prohibits a third person from including his name in the firm name under pain of
assuming the liability of a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm
cannot be held liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly
where they are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a deceased
lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees received from the future
business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both because the recipients of such
division are not lawyers and because such payments will not represent service or
responsibility on the part of the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the
heirs can be held liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no corresponding
liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the use by law
firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations value of the use of an
old firm name can tend to create undue advantages and disadvantages in the
practice of the profession. An able lawyer without connections will have to make a
name for himself starting from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old
firm, can initially ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased
partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited by
petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter 3 of Title IX
of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The Article primarily deals with
the exemption from liability in cases of a dissolved partnership, of the individual
property of the deceased partner for debts contracted by the person or partnership
which continues the business using the partnership name or the name of the
deceased partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over
situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a good will to
protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no saleable good will but
whose reputation depends on the personal qualifications of its individual members.
Thus, it has been held that a saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial
partnership and cannot arise in a professional partnership consisting of
lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the right
to carry on the business under the old name, in the absence
of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of a
commercial partnership is a partnership asset inseparable
from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur 2d, s 204, p. 115)
(Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which depends
or; the individual skill of the members, such as partnerships of
attorneys or physicians, has no good win to be distributed as
a firm asset on its dissolution, however intrinsically valuable
such skill and reputation may be, especially where there is no
provision in the partnership agreement relating to good will
as an asset. ... (ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships formed by
other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on accountancy
specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection with the practice of
accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It is a
mere relationship or association for a particular purpose. ... It
is not a partnership formed for the purpose of carrying on
trade or business or of holding property." 11 Thus, it has been
stated that "the use of a nom de plume, assumed or trade
name in law practice is improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those pertaining
to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from Antiquity to
Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as "a group of men
pursuing a learned art as a common calling in the spirit of
public service, — no less a public service because it may
incidentally be a means of livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession
from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest eminence
without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration of
justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by candor,
fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their practice,
or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in the nature
of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good moral character with
special qualifications duly ascertained and certified. 15 The right does not only
presuppose in its possessor integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also the
exercise of a special privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a
public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the American
Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use of the
name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law partnership when
37
such a practice is permissible by local custom but the Canon warns that care should
be taken that no imposition or deception is practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or allows the
continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the firm names of law
partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify the more active and/or more
senior members or partners of the law firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of
petitioners and of other law firms in this country would show how their firm names
have evolved and changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one or
more of the partners designated by it is proper only where
sustained by local custom and not where by custom this
purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of the
Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a new
partner and at the same time retaining that of a deceased
partner who was never a partner with the new one. (H.S.
Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208) (Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where the name
of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled out. A person in search
of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar ring of a distinguished name
appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the continued use of
a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law partnerships. But that is so
because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33 N.Y.S. 2d 733)
which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their memorandum, the New York
Supreme Court sustained the use of the firm name Alexander & Green even if none
of the present ten partners of the firm bears either name because the practice was
sanctioned by custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy
and was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated therein: têñ.
£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of both
the American Bar Association and the New York State Bar
Association provides in part as follows: "The continued use of
the name of a deceased or former partner, when permissible
by local custom is not unethical, but care should be taken that
no imposition or deception is practiced through this
use." There is no question as to local custom. Many firms in
the city use the names of deceased members with the
approval of other attorneys, bar associations and the
courts. The Appellate Division of the First Department has
considered the matter and reached The conclusion that such
practice should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits the
practice in question. The use of the firm name herein is also
sustainable by reason of agreement between the partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions the practice.
Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts,
uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and
obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A custom must be proved as a
fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A local custom as a source of right cannot
be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by
competent evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same, wanting herein.
Merely because something is done as a matter of practice does not mean that
Courts can rely on the same for purposes of adjudication as a juridical custom.
Juridical custom must be differentiated from social custom. The former can
supplement statutory law or be applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with
the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of the legal
system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins cases issued its
Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the names of deceased
partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal rule against which no custom
or practice to the contrary, even if proven, can prevail. This is not to speak of our
civil law which clearly ordains that a partnership is dissolved by the death of any
partner. 23 Custom which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not
be countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the administration of
justice and should not be considered like an ordinary "money-making trade." têñ.
£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in a
spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at personal
gain; a profession at the exercise of powers beneficial to
mankind. If, as in the era of wide free opportunity, we think
of free competitive self assertion as the highest good, lawyer
and grocer and farmer may seem to be freely competing with
their fellows in their calling in order each to acquire as much
of the world's good as he may within the allowed him by law.
But the member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat or
corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or
physicians' strike. The best service of the professional man is
often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling equivalent
and it is his pride to do what he does in a way worthy of his
profession even if done with no expectation of reward, This
spirit of public service in which the profession of law is and
ought to be exercised is a prerequisite of sound
administration of justice according to law. The other two
elements of a profession, namely, organization and pursuit of
a learned art have their justification in that they secure and
maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes of the
public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners advised to drop
the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective firm names. Those names
may, however, be included in the listing of individuals who have been partners in
their firms indicating the years during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did
not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing
of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the
firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be
allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two
partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and
February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office
which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said
law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the
name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the
38
petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as
long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal
services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to
the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before
the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was
retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them, seven of
the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the plurality opinion of
Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of delicadeza that the undersigned did
not participate in the disposition of these petitions, as the law office of Sycip,
Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo started with the partnership of
Quisumbing, Sycip, and Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon
Quisumbing, being the father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior
partner then, Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only of
petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-
Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be included in the listing
of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano,
Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed for authority to
continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the death of Attorney
Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in peace). He was the founder of the
firm which was originally known as the Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta, Romulo, De
Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976, prayed that they be
allowed to continue using the said firm name notwithstanding the death of two
partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and
February 14, 1976, respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law Office
which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and that, as to the said
law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership of the
name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is cited to justify the
petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued use by a law firm of the
name of a deceased partner, "when permissible by local custom, is not unethical" as
long as "no imposition or deception is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the
Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that it be
indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be) that Alexander
Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are dead or the period when they
served as partners should be stated therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the names of their
deceased founders is to retain the clients who had customarily sought the legal
services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and to benefit from the goodwill attached to
the names of those respected and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate
motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was followed before
the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding the death of Judge Ross the
founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence, Selph and Carrascoso, his name was
retained in the firm name with an indication of the year when he died. No one
complained that the retention of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was
illegal or unethical.
A.C. No. 7766               August 5, 2014
JOSE ALLAN TAN, Complainant,
vs.
PEDRO S. DIAMANTE, Respondent.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
For the Court's resolution is an administrative Complaint1 for disbarment dated
February 1, 2008 filed by complainant Jose Allan Tan (complainant) against
respondent Pedro S. Diamante (respondent), charging him of violating the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) and the lawyer’s oath for fabricating and using a
spurious court order, and for failing to keep his client informed of the status of the
case.
The Facts
On April 2, 2003, complainant, claiming to be a recognized illegitimate son of the
late Luis Tan, secured the services of respondent in order to pursue a case for
partition of property against the heirs of the late spouses Luis and Natividad
Valencia-Tan.2 After accepting the engagement, respondent filed the corresponding
complaint3 before the Regional Trial Court of Bacolod City, Branch 46 (RTC),
docketed as Civil Case No. 03-11947. The complaint was eventually dismissed by the
RTC in an Order4 dated July 25, 2007 for lack of cause of action and insufficiency of
evidence.5 While respondent was notified of such dismissal as early as August 14,
2007,6 complainant learned of the same only on August 24, 2007 when he visited
the former’s office.7 On such occasion, respondent allegedly asked for the amount
of ₱10,000.00 for the payment of appeal fees and other costs, but since
complainant could not produce the said amount at that time, respondent, instead,
asked and was given the amount of ₱500.00 purportedly as payment of the
reservation fee for the filing of a notice of appeal before the RTC.8 On September
12, 2007, Tan handed the amount of ₱10,000.00 to respondent, who on even date,
filed a notice of appeal9 before the RTC.10
In an Order11 dated September 18, 2007, the RTC dismissed complainant’s appeal
for having been filed beyond the reglementary period provided for by law.
Respondent, however, did not disclose such fact and, instead, showed complainant
an Order12 dated November 9, 2007 purportedly issued by the RTC (November 9,
2007 Order) directing the submission of the results of a DNA testing to prove his
filiation to the late Luis Tan, within 15 days from receipt of the notice. Considering
the technical requirements for such kind of testing, complainant proceeded to the
RTC and requested for an extension of the deadline for its submission. It was then
that he discovered that the November 9, 2007 Order was spurious, as certified by
the RTC’s Clerk of Court.13 Complainant also found out that, contrary to the
representations of respondent, his appeal had long been dismissed.14 Aggrieved, he
filed the instant administrative complaint for disbarment against respondent.
In his Comments/Compliance15 dated September 4, 2009, respondent alleged that it
was complainant’s failure to timely produce the amount of 1,400.00 to pay for the
appeal fees that resulted in the late filing of his appeal. According to him, he
informed complainant of the lapse of the reglementary period to appeal, but the
latter insisted in pursuing the same. He also claimed to have assisted complainant
"not for money or malice" but being a desperate litigant, he was blamed for the
court’s unfavorable decision.16
The IBP’s Report and Recommendation
In a Report and Recommendation17 dated September 21, 2010, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) Investigating Commissioner found respondent
administratively liable, and accordingly recommended that the penalty of
suspension for a period of one (1) year be meted out against him.18
The Investigating Commissioner found complainant’s imputations against
respondent to be well-founded, observing that instead of meeting complainant’s
allegations squarely, particularly, the issue of the nondisclosure of the dismissal of
the partition case, respondent sidestepped and delved on arguments that hardly
had an effect on the issues at hand.19
Moreover, the Investigating Commissioner did not find credence in respondent’s
accusation that the spurious November 9, 2007 Order originated from complainant,
ratiocinating that it was respondent who was motivated to fabricate the same to
cover up his lapses that brought about the dismissal of complainant’s appeal and
make it appear that there is still an available relief left for Tan.20
In a Resolution dated April 16, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors unanimously
adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation.21
The Issue Before the Court
39
The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held
administratively liable for violating the CPR.
The Court’s Ruling
After a judicious perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the IBP’s findings,
subject to the modification of the recommended penalty to be imposed upon
respondent.
Under Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the CPR, it is the lawyer’s duty to keep his client
constantly updated on the developments of his case as it is crucial in maintaining
the latter’s confidence, to wit:
CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND
DILIGENCE.
Rule 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and
shall respond within a reasonable time to client’s request for information.
As an officer of the court, it is the duty of an attorney to inform his client of
whatever important information he may have acquired affecting his client’s case. He
should notify his client of any adverse decision to enable his client to decide
whether to seek an appellate review thereof. Keeping the client informed of the
developments of the case will minimize misunderstanding and loss of trust and
confidence in the attorney. The lawyer should not leave the client in the dark on
how the lawyer is defending the client’s interests.22 In this connection, the lawyer
must constantly keep in mind that his actions, omissions, or nonfeasance would be
binding upon his client. Concomitantly, the lawyer is expected to be acquainted
with the rudiments of law and legal procedure, and a client who deals with him has
the right to expect not just a good amount of professional learning and competence
but also a whole-hearted fealty to the client’s cause.23
In the case at bar, records reveal that as of August 14, 2007, respondent already
knew of the dismissal of complainant’s partition case before the RTC. Despite this
fact, he never bothered to inform complainant of such dismissal as the latter only
knew of the same on August 24, 2007 when he visited the former’s office. To add
insult to injury, respondent was inexcusably negligent in filing complainant’s appeal
only on September 12, 2007, or way beyond the reglementary period therefor, thus
resulting in its outright dismissal. Clearly, respondent failed to exercise such skill,
care, and diligence as men of the legal profession commonly possess and exercise in
such matters of professional employment.24
Worse, respondent attempted to conceal the dismissal of complainant’s appeal by
fabricating the November 9, 2007 Order which purportedly required a DNA testing
to make it appear that complainant’s appeal had been given due course, when in
truth, the same had long been denied. In so doing, respondent engaged in an
unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful conduct that caused undue prejudice and
unnecessary expenses on the part of complainant. Accordingly, respondent clearly
violated Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provides:
CANON 1 – A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.
Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
As officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of
legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing,25 failing in
which whether in his personal or private capacity, he becomes unworthy to
continue his practice of law.26 A lawyer’s inexcusable neglect to serve his client’s
interests with utmost diligence and competence as well as his engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, and deceitful conduct in order to conceal such neglect should never be
countenanced, and thus, administratively sanctioned.
In view of the foregoing, respondent’s conduct of employing a crooked and
deceitful scheme to keep complainant in the dark and conceal his case’s true status
through the use of a falsified court order evidently constitutes Gross
Misconduct.27 His acts should not just be deemed as unacceptable practices that are
disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw that makes him unfit to
practice law.28 In this regard, the Court’s pronouncement in Sebastian v. Calis29 is
instructive, viz.:
Deception and other fraudulent acts by a lawyer are disgraceful and dishonorable.
They reveal moral flaws in a lawyer.1âwphi1 They are unacceptable practices. A
lawyer’s relationship with others should be characterized by the highest degree of
good faith, fairness and candor. This is the essence of the lawyer’s oath. The
lawyer’s oath is not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must
be upheld and keep inviolable. The nature of the office of an attorney requires that
he should be a person of good moral character. This requisite is not only a condition
precedent to the admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also
essential for remaining in the practice of law. We have sternly warned that any
gross misconduct of a lawyer, whether in his professional or private capacity, puts
his moral character in serious doubt as a member of the Bar, and renders him unfit
to continue in the practice of law.30 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence reveals that in analogous cases where lawyers failed to inform their
clients of the status of their respective cases, the Court suspended them for a
period of six (6) months. In Mejares v. Romana,31 the Court suspended the lawyer
for the same period for his failure to timely and adequately inform his clients of the
dismissal of their petition. In the same vein, in Penilla v. Alcid, Jr.,32 the same penalty
was imposed on the lawyer who consistently failed to update his client of the status
of his cases, notwithstanding several follow-ups.
However, in cases where lawyers engaged in unlawful, dishonest, and deceitful
conduct by falsifying documents, the Court found them guilty of Gross Misconduct
and disbarred them. In Brennisen v. Contawi,33 the Court disbarred the lawyer who
falsified a special power of attorney in order to mortgage and sell his client’s
property. Also, in Embido v. Pe,34 the penalty of disbarment was meted out against
the lawyer who falsified an in existent court decision for a fee.
As already discussed, respondent committed acts of falsification in order to
misrepresent to his client, i.e., complainant, that he still had an available remedy in
his case, when in reality, his case had long been dismissed for failure to timely file
an appeal, thus, causing undue prejudice to the latter. To the Court, respondent’s
acts are so reprehensible, and his violations of the CPR are so flagrant, exhibiting his
moral unfitness and inability to discharge his duties as a member of the bar. His
actions erode rather than enhance the public perception of the legal profession.
Therefore, in view of the totality of his violations, as well as the damage and
prejudice caused to his client, respondent deserves the ultimate punishment of
disbarment.
WHEREFORE, respondent Pedro S. Diamante is hereby DISBARRED for Gross
Misconduct and violations of Rule 1.01, Canon 1, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, and his name is ordered STRICKEN OFF from the
roll of attorneys.
Let a copy of this Decision be attached to respondent Pedro S. Diamante's record in
this Court. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to
circulate them to all the courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 80718 January 29, 1988
FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR.,
HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR., respondents.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2)
resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in the case of Luis
Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first
resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied petitioners' motion for
extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second
Resolution dated 27 October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration
for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being
verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the
instant petition did not suffer from this defect, this Court, on procedural and
substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out building owned
by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of
private respondents, resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of
Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to
vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court. First Judicial
Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen, rendered judgment
finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to private
respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of
the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of
time to file a motion for reconsideration, which was eventually denied by the
appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their
motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the
Resolution of October 27, 1987.
40
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of
discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and denied their motion for
reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises,
Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on July 30,
1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be
strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for
reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the
Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate Court. Such a motion may be
filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which
may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p. 212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate Appellate
Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and
went further to restate and clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 15, 1986,144 SCRA
161],stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation
of the grace period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in
the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986,
within which the rule barring extensions of time to file
motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly
enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on
February 27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which
expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R.
No. 73669, October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].]
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time was filed on
September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on
June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace period.
Considering the length of time from the expiration of the grace period to the
promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987,
petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule
for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary period.
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be
made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of
the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the time the subject decision of
the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law
requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before
they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the bounden
duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently
reiterated, and published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R.
s) and in such publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of
discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding petitioner liable under
Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides that "the proprietor of a building or
structure is responsible for the damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if
it should be due to the lack of necessary repairs.
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had
the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the. warning to
vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be
disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear chance," which has been applied to
vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant
petition for lack of merit.
B.M. No. 850     August 22, 2000
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION (MCLE)
ADOPTING THE RULES ON MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION FOR
MEMBERS OF THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES
EN BANC
RESOLUTION
Considering the Rules on Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) for
members of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), recommended by the IBP,
endorsed by the Philippine Judicial Academy, and reviewed and passed upon by the
Supreme Court Committee on Legal Education, the Court hereby resolves to adopt,
as it hereby adopts, the following rules for proper implementation:
RULE 1
PURPOSE
Section 1. Purpose of the MCLE
Continuing legal education is required of members of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) to ensure that throughout their career, they keep abreast with law
and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards
of the practice of law.
RULE 2
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION
Section 1. Constitution of the MCLE Committee
Within two (2) months from the approval of these Rules by the Supreme Court En
Banc, the MCLE Committee shall be constituted in accordance with these Rules.
Section 2. Requirements of completion of MCLE
Members of the IBP not exempt under Rule 7 shall complete, every three (3) years,
at least thirty-six (36) hours of continuing legal education activities approved by the
MCLE Committee. Of the 36 hours:
(a) At least six (6) hours shall be devoted to legal ethics.
(b) At least (4) hours shall be devoted to trial and pretrial skills.
(c) At least five (5) hours shall be devoted to alternative dispute
resolution.
(d) At least nine (9) hours shall be devoted to updates on substantive and
procedural laws, and jurisprudence.
(e) At least four (4) hours shall be devoted to legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(f) At least two (2) hours shall be devoted to international law and
international conventions.
(g) The remaining six (6) hours shall be devoted to such subjects as may
be prescribed by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 3
COMPLIANCE PERIOD
Section 1. Initial compliance period
The initial compliance period shall begin not later than three (3) months from the
constitution of the MCLE Committee. Except for the initial compliance period for
members admitted or readmitted after the establishment of the program, all
compliance periods shall be for thirty-six (36) months and shall begin the day after
the end of the previous compliance period.
Section 2. Compliance Group 1.
Members in the National Capital Region (NCR) or Metro Manila shall be
permanently assigned to Compliance Group 1.
Section 3. Compliance Group 2.
Members in Luzon outside NCR shall be permanently assigned to Compliance Group
2.
Section 4. Compliance Group 3.
Members in Visayas and Mindanao shall be permanently assigned to Compliance
Group 3.
Section 5. Compliance period for members admitted or readmitted after
establishment of the program.
41
Members admitted or readmitted to the Bar after the establishment of the program
shall be permanently assigned to the appropriate Compliance Group based on their
Chapter membership on the date of admission or readmission.
The initial compliance period after admission or readmission shall begin on the first
day of the month of admission or readmission and shall end on the same day as that
of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
(a) Where four (4) months or less remain of the initial compliance period
after admission or readmission, the member is not required to comply
with the program requirement for the initial compliance.
(b) Where more than four (4) months remain of the initial compliance
period after admission or readmission, the member shall be required to
complete a number of hours of approved continuing legal education
activities equal to the number of months remaining in the compliance
period in which the member is admitted or readmitted. Such member
shall be required to complete a number of hours of education in legal
ethics in proportion to the number of months remaining in the
compliance period. Fractions of hours shall be rounded up to the next
whole number.
RULE 4
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT UNITS
Section 1. Guidelines
The following are the guidelines for computation of credit units (CU):
PROGRAMS CREDIT UNITS SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS
1. SEMINARS, CONVENTIONS, CONFERENCES, SYMPOSIA, IN-HOUSE
EDUCATION PROGRAMS, WORKSHOPS, DIALOGUES, ROUND TABLE
DISCUSSIONS BY APPROVED PROVIDERS UNDER RULE 7 AND OTHER
RELATED RULES
1.1 PARTICIPANT 1 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATE OF
ATTENDANCE WITH NUMBER OF HOURS
1.2 LECTURER 5 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
SPONSOR'S CERTIFICATION
1.3 RESOURCE 3 CU PER HOUR PHOTOCOPY OF PLAQUE OR
SPONSOR'S SPEAKER CERTIFICATION
1.4 ASSIGNED 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
SPONSORING PENALIST/ ORGANIZATION
REACTOR/COMMENTATOR
1.5 MODERATOR/ 2 CU PER HOUR CERTIFICATION FROM
SPONSORING COORDINATOR/ ORGANIZATION FACILITATOR
2. AUTHORSHIP, EDITING AND REVIEW
2.1 RESEARCH/ 5-10 CREDIT UNITS DULY
CERTIFIED/PUBLISHED INNOVATIVE TECHNICAL
REPORT/PAPER PROGRAM/CREATIVE PROJECT
2.2 BOOK 50-100 PP 101+ PUBLISHED BOOK SINGLE AUTHOR
12-16 CU 17-20 CU
2 AUTHORS 10-12 CU 13-16 CU
3 OR MORE 5-6 CU 7-11 CU
2.3 BOOK EDITOR 1/2 OF THE CU OF PUBLISHED BOOK WITH
PROOF AUTHORSHIP AS EDITOR CATEGORY
2.4 LEGAL ARTICLE 5-10 PP 11+ PUBLISHED ARTICLE SINGLE
AUTHOR 6 CU 8 CU
2 AUTHORS 4 CU 6 CU
3 OR MORE 2 CU 4 CU
2.5 LEGAL 3-6 CU PER ISSUE PUBLISHED
NEWSLETTER/JOURNAL NEWSLETTER/LAW JOURNAL EDITOR
3. PROFESSIONAL 6 CU PER CHAIR CERTIFICATION OF LAW DEAN
CHAIR/BAR 1 CU PER LECTURE OR BAR REVIEW DIRECTOR REVIEW/
HOUR LECTURE/LAW TEACHING
Section 2. Limitation on certain credit units
In numbers 2 and 3 of the guidelines in the preceding Section, the total maximum
credit units shall not exceed twenty (20) hours per three (3) years.
RULE 5
CATEGORIES OF CREDIT
Section 1. Classes of credits
The credits are either participatory or non-participatory.
Section 2. Claim for participatory credit
Participatory credit may be claimed for:
(a) Attending approved education activities like seminars, conferences,
symposia, in-house education programs, workshops, dialogues or round
table discussions.
(b) Speaking or lecturing, or acting as assigned panelist, reactor,
commentator, resource speaker, moderator, coordinator or facilitator in
approved education activities.
(c) Teaching in a law school or lecturing in a bar review class.
Section 3. Claim for non-participatory credit
Non-participatory credit may be claimed per compliance period for:
(a) Preparing, as an author or co-author, written materials published or
accepted for publication, e.g., in the form of an article, chapter, book, or
book review which contribute to the legal education of the author
member, which were not prepared in the ordinary course of the
member's practice or employment.
(b) Editing a law book, law journal or legal newsletter.
RULE 6
COMPUTATION OF CREDIT HOURS
Section 1. Computation of credit hours
Credit hours are computed based on actual time spent in an activity (actual
instruction or speaking time), in hours to the nearest one-quarter hour.
RULE 7
EXEMPTIONS
Section 1. Parties exempted from the MCLE
The following members of the Bar are exempt from the MCLE requirement:
(a) The President and the Vice President of the Philippines, and the
Secretaries and Undersecretaries of Executives Departments;
(b) Senators and Members of the House of Representatives;
(c) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court,
incumbent and retired members of the judiciary, incumbent members of
the Judicial and Bar Council and incumbent court lawyers covered by the
Philippine Judicial Academy program of continuing judicial education;
(d) The Chief State Counsel, Chief State Prosecutor and Assistant
Secretaries of the Department of Justice;
(e) The Solicitor General and the Assistant Solicitor General;
(f) The Government Corporate Counsel, Deputy and Assistant
Government Corporate Counsel;
(g) The Chairmen and Members of the Constitutional Commissions;
(h) The Ombudsman, the Overall Deputy Ombudsman, the Deputy
Ombudsmen and the Special Prosecutor of the Office of the
Ombudsman;
(i) Heads of government agencies exercising quasi-judicial functions;
42
(j) Incumbent deans, bar reviews and professors of law who have
teaching experience for at least 10 years accredited law schools;
(k) The Chancellor, Vice-Chancellor and members of the Corps of
Professors and Professorial Lectures of the Philippine Judicial Academy;
and
(l) Governors and Mayors.
Section 2. Other parties exempted from the MCLE
The following Members of the Bar are likewise exempt:
(a) Those who are not in law practice, private or public.
(b) Those who have retired from law practice with the approval of the
IBP Board of Governors.
Section 3. Good cause for exemption from or modification of requirement
A member may file a verified request setting forth good cause for exemption (such
as physical disability, illness, post graduate study abroad, proven expertise in law,
etc.) from compliance with or modification of any of the requirements, including an
extension of time for compliance, in accordance with a procedure to be established
by the MCLE Committee.
Section 4. Change of status
The compliance period shall begin on the first day of the month in which a member
ceases to be exempt under Sections 1, 2, or 3 of this Rule and shall end on the same
day as that of all other members in the same Compliance Group.
Section 5. Proof of exemption
Applications for exemption from or modification of the MCLE requirement shall be
under oath and supported by documents.
RULE 8
STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF EDUCATION ACTIVITIES
Section 1. Approval of MCLE program
Subject to the rules as may be adopted by the MCLE Committee, continuing legal
education program may be granted approval in either of two (2) ways: (1) the
provider of the activity is an approved provider and certifies that the activity meets
the criteria of Section 3 of this Rules; and (2) the provider is specially mandated by
law to provide continuing legal education.
Section 2. Standards for all education activities
All continuing legal education activities must meet the following standards:
(a) The activity shall have significant current intellectual or practical
content.
(b) The activity shall constitute an organized program of learning related
to legal subjects and the legal profession, including cross profession
activities (e.g., accounting-tax or medical-legal) that enhance legal skills
or the ability to practice law, as well as subjects in legal writing and oral
advocacy.
(c) The activity shall be conducted by a provider with adequate
professional experience.
(d) Where the activity is more than one (1) hour in length, substantive
written materials must be distributed to all participants. Such materials
must be distributed at or before the time the activity is offered.
(e) In-house education activities must be scheduled at a time and
location so as to be free from interruption like telephone calls and other
distractions.
RULE 9
APPROVAL OF PROVIDERS
Section 1. Approval of providers
Approval of providers shall be done by the MCLE Committee.
Section 2. Requirements for approval of providers
Any persons or group may be approved as a provider for a term of two (2) years,
which may be renewed, upon written application. All providers of continuing legal
education activities, including in-house providers, are eligible to be approved
providers. Application for approval shall:
(a) Be submitted on a form provided by the IBP;
(b) Contain all information requested on the form;
(c) Be accompanied by the approval fee;
Section 3. Requirements of all providers
All approved providers shall agree to the following:
(a) An official record verifying the attendance at the activity shall be
maintained by the provider for at least four (4) years after the
completion date. The provider shall include the member on the official
record of attendance only if the member's signature was obtained at the
time of attendance at the activity. The official record of attendance shall
contain the member's name and number in the Roll of Attorneys and
shall identify the time, date, location, subject matter, and length of the
education activity. A copy of such record shall be furnished the IBP.
(b) The provider shall certify that:
(1) This activity has been approved for MCLE by the IBP in the
amount of ________ hours of which hours will apply in (legal
ethics, etc.), as appropriate to the content of the activity;
(2) The activity conforms to the standards for approved
education activities prescribed by these Rules and such
regulations as may be prescribed by the IBP pertaining to
MCLE.
(c) The provider shall issue a record or certificate to all participants
identifying the time, date, location, subject matter and length of the
activity.
(d) The provider shall allow in-person observation of all approved
continuing legal education activities by members of the IBP Board of
Governors, the MCLE Committee, or designees of the Committee and IBP
staff for purposes of monitoring compliance with these Rules.
(e) The provider shall indicate in promotional materials, the nature of the
activity, the time devoted to each devoted to each topic and identify of
the instructors. The provider shall make available to each participant a
copy of IBP-approved Education Activity Evaluation Form.
(f) The provider shall maintain the completed Education Activity
Evaluation Forms for a period of not less than one (1) year after the
activity, copy furnished the IBP.
(g) Any person or group who conducts an unauthorized activity under
this program or issues a spurious certificate in violation of these Rules
shall be subject to appropriate sanctions.
Section 4. Renewal of provider approval
The approval of a provider may be renewed every two (2) years. It may be denied if
the provider fails to comply with any of the requirements of these Rules or fails to
provide satisfactory education activities for the preceding period.
Section 5. Revocation of provider approval
The approval of any provider referred to in Rule 9 may be revoked by a majority
vote of the IBP Board of Governors, upon recommendation of the MCLE Committee,
after notice and hearing and for good cause.
RULE 10
ACTIVITY AND PROVIDER APPROVAL FEE
Section 1. Payment of fees
Application for approval of an education activity or as a provider requires payment
of an appropriate fee.
43
RULE 11
GENERAL COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. Compliance card
Each member shall secure from the MCLE Committee a Compliance Card before the
end of his compliance period. He shall complete the card by attesting under oath
that he has complied with the education requirement or that he is exempt,
specifying the nature of the exemption. Such Compliance Card must be returned to
the address indicated therein not later than the day after the end of the member's
compliance period.
Section 2. Member record keeping requirement
Each member shall maintain sufficient record of compliance or exemption, copy
furnished the MCLE Committee. The record required to be provided to the
members by the provider pursuant to Section 3(c) of Rule 9 should be sufficient
record of attendance at a participatory activity. A record of non-participatory
activity shall also be maintained by the member, as referred to in Section 3 of Rule
5.
RULE 12
NON-COMPLIANCE PROCEDURES
Section 1. What constitutes non-compliance
The following shall constitute non-compliance
(a) Failure to complete the education requirement within the compliance
period;
(b) Failure to provide attestation of compliance or exemption;
(c) Failure to provide satisfactory evidence of compliance (including
evidence of exempt status) within the prescribed period;
(d) Failure to satisfy the education requirement and furnish evidence of
such compliance within sixty (60) days from receipt of a non-compliance
notice;
(e) Any other act or omission analogous to any of the foregoing or
intended to circumvent or evade compliance with the MCLE
requirements.
Section 2. Non-compliance notice and 60-day period to attain compliance
A member failing to comply will receive a Non-Compliance Notice stating the
specific deficiency and will be given sixty (60) days from the date of notification to
explain the deficiency or otherwise show compliance with the requirements. Such
notice shall contain, among other things, the following language in capital letters:
YOUR FAILURE TO PROVIDE ADEQUATE JUSTIFICATION FOR NON-
COMPLIANCE OR PROOF OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE MCLE
REQUIREMENT BY (INSERT DATE 60 DAYS FROM THE DATE OF NOTICE),
SHALL BE A CAUSE FOR LISTING AS A DELINQUENT MEMBER.
The Member may use this period to attain the adequate number of credit hours for
compliance. Credit hours earned during this period may only be counted toward
compliance with the prior compliance period requirement unless hours in excess of
the requirement are earned, in which case, the excess hours may be counted
toward meeting the current compliance period requirement.lawphil.net
RULE 13
CONSEQUENCES OF NON-COMPLIANCE
Section 1. Non-compliance fee
A member who, for whatever reason, is in non-compliance at the end of the
compliance period shall pay a non-compliance fee.
Section 2. Listing as delinquent member
Any member who fails to satisfactorily comply with Section 2 of Rule 12 shall be
listed as a delinquent member by the IBP Board of Governors upon the
recommendation of the MCLE Committee, in which case, Rule 139-A of the Rules of
Court shall apply.
RULE 14
REINSTATEMENT
Section 1. Process
The involuntary listing as a delinquent member shall be terminated when the
member provides proof of compliance with the MCLE requirement, including
payment of non-compliance fee. A member may attain the necessary credit hours
to meet the requirement for the period of non-compliance during the period the
member is on inactive status. These credit hours may not be counted toward
meeting the current compliance period requirement. Credit hours attained during
the period of non-compliance in excess of the number needed to satisfy the prior
compliance period requirement may be counted toward meeting the current
compliance period requirement.lawphil.net
Section 2. Termination of delinquent listing administrative process
The termination of listing as a delinquent member is administrative in nature but it
shall be made with notice and hearing by the MCLE Committee.
RULE 15
MANDATORY CONTINUING LEGAL EDUCATION COMMITTEE
Section 1. Composition
The MCLE Committee shall be composed of five (5) members, namely: a retired
Justice of the Supreme Court, as Chair, and four (4) members, respectively,
nominated by the IBP, the Philippine Judicial Academy, a law center designated by
the Supreme Court and associations of law schools and/or law professors.
The members of the Committee shall be of proven probity and integrity. They shall
be appointed by the Supreme Court for a term of three (3) years and shall receive
such compensation as may be determined by the Court.
Section 2. Duty of the Committee
The MCLE Committee shall administer and adopt such implementing rules as may
be necessary subject to the approval by the Supreme Court. It shall, in consultation
with the IBP Board of Governors, prescribe a schedule of MCLE fees with the
approval of the Supreme Court.
Section 3. Staff of the IBP
The IBP shall employ such staff as may be necessary to perform the record-keeping,
auditing, reporting, approval and other necessary functions.
Section 4. Submission of annual budget
The IBP shall submit to the Supreme Court an annual budget for a subsidy to
establish, operate and maintain the MCLE Program.
This resolution shall take effect in October 2000, following its publication in two (2)
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.
Adopted this 22nd day of August, 2000.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban,
Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon,
Jr., JJ.,conc
B.M. No. 1922             June 3, 2008
RE. NUMBER AND DATE OF MCLE CERTIFICATE OF COMPLETION/EXEMPTION
REQUIRED IN ALL PLEADINGS/MOTIONS.
Sirs/Mesdames:
Quoted hereunder, for your information is a resolution of the Court En Banc
dated June 3, 2008
"Bar Matter No. 1922. – Re: Recommendation of the Mandatory Continuing Legal
Education (MCLE) Board to Indicate in All Pleadings Filed with the Courts the
Counsel’s MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption. – The Court
Resolved to NOTE the Letter, dated May 2, 2008, of Associate Justice Antonio
Eduardo B. Nachura, Chairperson, Committee on Legal Education and Bar Matters,
informing the Court of the diminishing interest of the members of the Bar in the
MCLE requirement program.
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar
to INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance
44
period. Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of
the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.
The New Rule shall take effect sixty (60) days after its publication in a newspaper of
general circulation." Caprio-Morales Velasco, Jr., Nachura, JJ., on official leave.
(adv216a)
G.R. No. 207041, November 09, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE OFFICE OF THE CITY
PROSECUTOR, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, ROXAS CITY, Petitioner, v. JESUS A.
ARROJADO, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the
Decision1 and Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 8, 2011
and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 04540. The assailed Decision
affirmed the Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 16,
dated July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 in Criminal Case No. C-75-09, while the
questioned Resolution denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration.
The pertinent factual and procedural antecedents of the case are as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
In an Information dated March 23, 2009, herein respondent was charged with the
crime of murder by the Office of the City Prosecutor of Roxas City, Capiz.  The case
was docketed as Criminal case No. C-75-09 and was raffled off to Branch 16 of the
Regional Trial COurt of Roxas City, Iloilo (RTC of Roxas City).
On June 16, 2009, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss3 the Information fiked
against him on the ground that the investigating prosecutor who filed the said
Information failed to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education (MCLE) Certificate of Compliance, as
required by Bar Matter No. 1922 (B.M. No. 1922) which was promulgated by this
Court via an En Banc Resolution dated June 3, 2008.4
Herein petitioner filed its Comment/Opposition5 to respondent's Motion to Dismiss
contending that: (1) the Information sought to be dismissed is sufficient in form and
substance; (2) the lack of proof of MCLE compliance by the prosecutor who
prepared and signed the Information should not prejudice the interest of the State
in filing charges against persons who have violated the law; and (3) and
administrative edict cannot prevail over substantive or precedural law, by imposing
additional requirements for the sufficiency of a criminal information.
On July 2, 2009, the RTC of Roxas City issued an Order6 dismissing the subject
Information without prejudice. respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration.7 but
the trial court denied it in its Order8 dated July 23, 2009
Respondent then filed a petition for certiorari and/or mandamus with the CA
assailing the July 2, 2009 and July 23, 2009 Orders of the RTC of Roxas City.
In its presently assailed Decision, the CA denied respondent's petition and affirmed
the questioned RTC Orders.  Respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was likewise
denied by the CA in its disputed Resolution.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari raising a sole Assignment of
Error, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT RULED THAT THE FAILURE OF
THE INVESTIGATING PROSECUTOR TO INDICATE HER MCLE COMPLIANCE NUMBER
AND DATE OF ISSUANCE THEREOF IN THE INFORMATION AGAINST RESPONDENT
JESUS A. ARROJADO WARRANTED THE DISMISSAL OF THE SAME.9cralawlawlibrary
Petitioner contends that: (1) the term "pleadings" as used in B.M. No. 1922 does not
include criminal Informations filed in court; (2) the failure of the investigating
prosecutor to indicate in the Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to
dismiss the subject Information which is otherwise complete in form and substance.
The petition lacks merit.
Pertinent portions of B.M. No. 1922, provide as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
The Court further Resolved, upon the recommendation of the Committee on Legal
Education and Bar Matters, to REQUIRE practicing members of the bar to
INDICATE in all pleadings filed before the courts or quasi-judicial bodies, the
number and date of issue of their MCLE Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of
Exemption, as may be applicable, for the immediately preceding compliance period.
Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records.

x x x10cralawlawlibrary
Section 1, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, as amended, defines pleadings as the written
statements of the respective claims and defenses of the parties submitted to the
court for appropriate judgment. Among the pleadings enumerated under Section 2
thereof are the complaint and the answer in a civil suit. On the other hand, under
Section 4, Rule 110 of the same Rules, an information is defined as an accusation in
writing charging a person with an offense, subscribed by the prosecutor and filed
with the court. In accordance with the above definitions, it is clear that an
information is a pleading since the allegations therein, which charge a person with
an offense, is basically the same as a complaint in a civil action which alleges a
plaintiffs cause or cause of action. In this respect, the Court quotes with approval
the ruling of the CA on the matter, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
xxxx
[A]n information is, for all intents and purposes, considered an initiatory pleading
because it is a written statement that contains the cause of action of a party, which
in criminal cases is the State as represented by the prosecutor, against the accused.
Like a pleading, the Information is also filed in court for appropriate judgment.
Undoubtedly then, an Information falls squarely within the ambit of Bar Matter No.
1922, in relation to Bar Matter 850.11cralawlawlibrary
Even under the rules of criminal procedure of the United States, upon which our
rules of criminal procedure were patterned, an information is considered a
pleading. Thus, Rule 12(a), Title IV of the United States Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, states that: "[t]he pleadings in a criminal proceeding are the indictment,
the information, and the pleas of not guilty, guilty, and nolo contendere." Thus, the
Supreme Court of Washington held that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
An information is a pleading. It is the formal statement on the part of the state of
the facts constituting the offense which the defendant is accused of committing. In
other words, it is the plain and concise statement of the facts constituting the cause
of action. It bears the same relation to a criminal action that a complaint does to a
civil action; and, when verified, its object is not to satisfy the court or jury that the
defendant is guilty, nor is it for the purpose of evidence which is to be weighed and
passed upon, but is only to inform the defendant of the precise acts or omissions
with which he is accused, the truth of which is to be determined thereafter by direct
and positive evidence upon a trial, where the defendant is brought face to face with
the witnesses.12cralawlawlibrary
In a similar manner, the Supreme Court of Illinois ruled that "[a]n indictment in a
criminal case is a pleading, since it accomplishes the same purpose as a declaration
in a civil suit, pleading by allegation the cause of action in law against [a]
defendant."13
As to petitioner's contention that the failure of the investigating prosecutor to
indicate in the subject Information the number and date of issue of her MCLE
Certificate of Compliance is a mere formal defect and is not a valid ground to
dismiss such Information, suffice it to state that B.M. No. 1922 categorically
provides that "[f]ailure to disclose the required information would cause the
dismissal of the case and the expunction of the pleadings from the records." In this
regard, petitioner must be reminded that it assailed the trial court's dismissal of the
subject Information via a special civil action for certiorari filed with the CA. The writ
of certiorari is directed against a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions that acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion.14 Grave abuse of discretion means such capricious or
whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.15 To justify
the issuance of the writ of certiorari, the abuse of discretion must be grave, as when
the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or
personal hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of
a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined, or to act at all, in
contemplation of law, as to be equivalent to having acted without
jurisdiction.16 Since the trial court's dismissal of the subject Information was based
on a clear and categorical provision of a rule issued by this Court, the court a
quo could not have committed a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment nor
did it exercise its discretion in an arbitrary or despotic manner. Thus, the CA did not
commit error in dismissing petitioner's petition for certiorari.
In harping on its contention that the ends of justice would be best served if the
criminal case would be allowed to proceed in order to determine the innocence or
culpability of the ciccused, petitioner sounds as if the dismissal of the Information
left the prosecution with no other recourse or remedy so as to irreversibly
jeopardize the interests of the State and the private offended party. On the
contrary, the Court agrees with the CA that the dismissal of the Information,
without prejudice, did not leave the prosecution without any other plain, speedy
and adequate remedy. To avoid undue delay in the disposition of the subject
criminal case and to uphold the parties' respective rights to a speedy disposition of
their case, the prosecution, mindful of its duty not only to prosecute offenders but
more importantly to do justice, could have simply re-filed the Information
containing the required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's
MCLE Certificate of Compliance, instead of resorting to the filing of various petitions
in court to stubbornly insist on its position and question the trial court's dismissal of
the subject Information, thereby wasting its time and effort and the State's
resources.
The Court is neither persuaded by petitioner's invocation of the principle on liberal
45
construction of procedural rules by arguing that such liberal construction "may be
invoked in situations where there may be some excusable formal deficiency or error
in a pleading, provided that the same does not subvert the essence of the
proceeding and connotes at least a reasonable attempt at compliance with the
Rules." The prosecution has never shown any reasonable attempt at compliance
with the rule enunciated under B.M. No. 1922. Even when the motion for
reconsideration of the RTC Order dismissing the subject Information was filed, the
required number and date of issue of the investigating prosecutor's MCLE
Certificate of Compliance was still not included nor indicated. Thus, in the instant
case, absent valid and compelling reasons, the requested leniency and liberality in
the observance of procedural rules appear to be an afterthought, hence, cannot be
granted.
In any event, to avoid inordinate delays in the disposition of cases brought about by
a counsel's failure to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of
his or her MCLE Certificate of Compliance, this Court issued an En Bane Resolution,
dated January 14, 2014 which amended B.M. No. 1922 by repealing the phrase
"Failure to disclose the required information would cause the dismissal of the case
and the expunction of the pleadings from the records" and replacing it with "Failure
to disclose the required information would subject the counsel to appropriate
penalty and disciplinary action." Thus, under the amendatory Resolution, the failure
of a lawyer to indicate in his or her pleadings the number and date of issue of his or
her MCLE Certificate of Compliance will no longer result in the dismissal of the case
and expunction of the pleadings from the records. Nonetheless, such failure will
subject the lawyer to the prescribed fine and/or disciplinary action.
In light of the above amendment, while the same was not yet in effect at the time
that the subject Information was filed, the more prudent and practical thing that
the trial court should have done in the first place, so as to avoid delay in the
disposition of the case, was not to dismiss the Information but to simply require the
investigating prosecutor to indicate therein the number and date of issue of her
MCLE Certificate of Compliance.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals, dated September 8, 2011 and April 18, 2013, respectively, in CA-
G.R. SPNo. 04540 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED
A.M. No. 1418 August 31, 1976
JOSE MISAMIN, complainant,
vs.
ATTORNEY MIGUEL A. SAN JUAN, respondent.
RESOLUTION
 
FERNANDO, J.:
It certainly fails to reflect credit on a captain in the Metro Manila Police Force and a
member of the bar, respondent Miguel A. San Juan, to be charged with being the
legal representative of certain establishments allegedly owned by Filipinos of
Chinese descent and, what is worse, with coercing an employee, complainant Jose
Misamin, to agree to drop the charges filed by him against his employer Tan Hua,
owner of New Cesar's Bakery, for the violation of the Minimum Wage Law. There
was a denial on the part of respondent. The matter was referred to the Office of the
Solicitor-General for investigation, report and recommendation. Thereafter, it
would seem there was a change of heart on the part of complainant. That could
very well be the explanation for the non- appearance of the lawyer employed by
him at the scheduled hearings. The efforts of the Solicitor General to get at the
bottom of things were thus set at naught. Under the circumstances, the outcome of
such referral was to be expected. For the law is rather exacting in its requirement
that there be competent and adequate proof to make out a case for malpractice.
Necessarily, the recommendation was one of the complaints being dismissed, This is
one of those instances then where this Court is left with hardly any choice.
Respondent cannot be found guilty of malpractice.
Respondent, as noted in the Report of the Solicitor-General, "admits having
appeared as counsel for the New Cesar's Bakery in the proceeding before the NLRC
while he held office as captain in the Manila Metropolitan Police. However, he
contends that the law did not prohibit him from such isolated exercise of his
profession. He contends that his appearance as counsel, while holding a
government position, is not among the grounds provided by the Rules of Court for
the suspension or removal of attorneys. The respondent also denies having
conspired with the complainant Misamin's attorney in the NLRC proceeding in order
to trick the complainant into signing an admission that he had been paid his
separation pay. Likewise, the respondent denies giving illegal protection to
members of the Chinese community in Sta. Cruz, Manila." 1
Then came a detailed account in such Report of the proceedings: "Pursuant to the
resolution of this Honorable Court of March 21, 1975, the Solicitor General's Office
set the case for investigation on July 2 and 3, 1975. The counsel for the complainant
failed to appear, and the investigation was reset to August 15, 1975. At the latter
date, the same counsel for complainant was absent. In both instances, the said
counsel did not file written motion for postponement but merely sent the
complainant to explain the reason for his absence. When the case was again called
for hearing on October 16, 1975, counsel for complainant failed once more to
appear. The complainant who was present explained that his lawyer was busy
"preparing an affidavit in the Court of First Instance of Manila." When asked if he
was willing to proceed with the hearing' in the absence of his counsel, the
complainant declared, apparently without any prodding, that he wished his
complaint withdrawn. He explained that he brought the present action in an
outburst of anger believing that the respondent San Juan took active part in the
unjust dismissal of his complaint with the NLRC. The complainant added that after
reexamining his case, he believed the respondent to be without fault and a truly
good person." 2
The Report of the Solicitor-General did not take into account respondent's practice
of his profession notwithstanding his being a police official, as "this is not embraced
in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the grounds for
the suspension or removal of an attorney. The respondent's appearance at the labor
proceeding notwithstanding that he was an incumbent police officer of the City of
Manila may appropriately be referred to the National Police Commission and the
Civil Service Commission." 3 As a matter of fact, separate complaints on this ground
have been filed and are under investigation by the Office of the Mayor of Manila
and the National Police Commission." As for the charges that respondent conspired
with complainant's counsel to mislead complainant to admitting having' received his
separation pay and for giving illegal protection to aliens, it is understandable why
the Report of the Solicitor-General recommended that they be dismissed for lack of
evidence.
The conclusion arrived at by the Solicitor-General that the complaint cannot prosper
is in accordance with the settled law. As far back as in re Tionko, 4 decided in 1922,
the authoritative doctrine was set forth by Justice Malcolm in this wise: "The serious
consequences of disbarment or suspension should follow only where there is a clear
preponderance of evidence against the respondent. The presumption is that the
attorney is innocent of the charges preferred and has performed his duty as an
officer of the court in accordance with his oath." 5 The Tionko doctrine has been
subsequently adhered to. 6
This resolution does not in any wise take into consideration whatever violations
there might have been of the Civil Service Law in view of respondent practicing his
profession while holding his position of Captain in the Metro Manila police force.
That is a matter to be decided in the administrative proceeding as noted in the
recommendation of the Solicitor-General. Nonetheless, while the charges have to
be dismissed, still it would not be inappropriate for respondent member of the bar
to avoid all appearances of impropriety. Certainly, the fact that the suspicion could
be entertained that far from living true to the concept of a public office being a
public trust, he did make use, not so much of whatever legal knowledge he
possessed, but the influence that laymen could assume was inherent in the office
held not only to frustrate the beneficent statutory scheme that labor be justly
compensated but also to be at the beck and call of what the complainant called
alien interest, is a matter that should not pass unnoticed. Respondent, in his future
actuations as a member of the bar. should refrain from laying himself open to such
doubts and misgivings as to his fitness not only for the position occupied by him but
also for membership in the bar. He is not worthy of membership in an honorable
profession who does not even take care that his honor remains unsullied
WHEREFORE, this administrative complaint against respondent Miguel A. San Juan
is dismissed for not having been duly proved. Let a copy of this resolution be spread
on his record.
Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-35133 May 31, 1974
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
RAYMUNDO MADERA @ "Mundo", MARIANITO V. ANDRES @ "Totoy",
GENEROSO ANDRES @ "Ross", defendants-appellants.
Francisco G. Munsayac, Sr. for appellant Madera.
Apolinar F. Tolentino and Jose C. Vitug for appellant Andres, et al.
Office of the Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General
Dominador L. Quiroz and Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for appellee.
FERNANDEZ, J.:p
This case is now before Us on appeal of the three appellants from a decision of the
Circuit Criminal Court 1 finding them guilty of the crime of murder, and sentencing
them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to jointly and severally
indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amount of P12,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the cost proportionately.
46
There is no question that at about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning of April 20,
1970, three men barged at the doorstep of the house of the victim Elino Bana in
Sitio Baag, Barrio Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija. The gunman, standing on the first
rung of the stairs of the house, fired a volley of shots from a .45 caliber gun at Elino
Bana who was then sleeping on the floor of his house near the stairs. Two gunshot
wounds were inflicted on the victim but the fatal one was the one that hit him on
the abdominal region. Elino Bana did not die immediately. He stood up and told his
wife to call for his brother Conrado who lives not far away from their house. The
victim's wife fetched Conrado; but when they returned, the wounded man was no
longer at home for he was already brought to the Municipal Building of Gabaldon.
He was carried by his son-in-law, Francisco Viloria, with the assistance of some
people. From the Municipal Building, he was brought to the Nueva Ecija General
Hospital, but he died on the way that same day, April 20,1970.
We affirm the lower court's finding that the prosecution has proven beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant Raymundo Madera was the one who fired the
shots at the victim Elino Bana, one of which was the fatal shot, and that appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were with Madera at the time.
Juanita Bana, a son of the victim, testified that he was awakened by the gunfire and
saw the appellant Raymundo Madera standing on the first step of their stairs
holding a .45 caliber firearm. He also saw the appellants Marianito Andres and
Generoso Andres just behind the appellant Madera, at a distance of 1 1/2 meters
from the stairs. Bernarda Bana, wife of the victim, declared that she saw Raymundo
Madem as the one who shot her husband with a foot-long firearm, and appellants
Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres were then with Madera.
In addition to the testimonies of these two witnesses, the prosecution presented
the dying, declaration of the victim Elino Bana. The trip from the house of Elino
Bana to the Municipal Building took only about thirty minutes. On the way, they
were met by policeman Ambrosio Feliciano from Gabaldon who was fetched from
his house by Barrio Captain Emiliano Jornadal of Bantug to look into the shooting
incident. Upon reaching the Municipal Building, Patrolman Feliciano told Elino Bana
that he would have to take down his written statement regarding the shooting
incident, and the latter agreed. The latter was then in agony. It was then 3:00
o'clock in the morning. In said dying declaration, he was asked who shot him and
the answer was: Mundo Madera and two others whom he could not recognize.
The lower court was correct in refusing to give credence to the testimony of
Patrolman Feliciano that while they were on their way to the Municipal Building,
Elino Bana told him that he could not identify the persons who shot him. Said
policeman has been an investigator in the police force since 1964. He should have
asked Elino Bana while he was giving his dying declaration in the Municipal Building
why he said earlier that he did not know who shot him. But Patrolman Feliciano did
not do this. It must be noted that not only Patrolman Feliciano but also Francisco
Viloria, a witness to the dying declaration, testified to its lawful execution.
The fact that Juanito Bana and Bernarda Bana failed to reveal right away the
identities of the appellants to the Victim himself and to their relatives Conrado Bana
and Francisco Viloria, does not militate against their credibility. There is no evidence
on record that they were asked by their relatives about the identity of the
appellants. Had they been asked, they would have readily revealed appellants'
identities as they did to the Chief of Police and Municipal Mayor of Gabaldon only a
few hours after the fateful incident, during a formal investigation of the case in the
Office of the Chief of Police when and where they executed their respective sworn
statements.
In their respective written statements taken on April 20, 1970, subscribed and
sworn on the same date before the Mayor of Gabaldon, Bernardo Bana and Juanito
Bana categorically stated that Elino Bana was shot by Raymundo Madera @ Mundo,
while Ross and Totoy Andres were downstairs.
Juanito Bana was then living with his parents. He must be familiar with their house.
He testified on direct examination that he slept in the balcony of their house. On
cross examination, he said that he slept inside their house. That does not show any
inconsistency in his testimony, because on further questioning, he said that the
balcony referred to by him was inside their house. Yes, he said that after he heard
the shots, he jumped to the ground through the back portion of their house. The
falsity of this statement has not been shown by the defense. The pictures presented
by it which apparently show that there was no such opening, can be explained by
the fact that the tall grasses could obscure the back portion of the house where the
kitchen door was located.
Juanito Bana admitted that he was gripped with fear when he heard the burst of
gunfire. But that would not prove that he failed to recognize the appellants.
An excited person may overlook the presence of another
whom he would otherwise have observed.
Under some circumstance, however, excitement may whet
the attention to a keen edge. In some other cases, it has been
observed, in effect, that the emotion incident to the
impending peril may not be the kind of excitement which
confuses, but that which focalizes the faculties to scrutinize.
 the circumstance of the threatened danger in order to avoid The evidence fails to meet such requirements. To hold him
it.2 liable, upon the other hand, as an accomplice, it must be
shown that he had knowledge of the criminal intention of the
principal, which may be demonstrated by previous or
The appellants asserted in their briefs3 that "the evidence on record does not show
simultaneous acts which contributes to the commission of the
that there was a moon shining in the early morning of April 20, 1970, at Barrio
offense as aid thereto whether physical or moral. As aptly
Bantug, Gabaldon, Nueva Ecija;" that it was then "a moonless night;" hence, Juanito
stated in People v. Tamayo: "It is an essential condition to the
Bana and Bernarda Bana could not have recognized the appellants. This position is
existence of complicity, not only that there should be a
untenable. Why?
relation between the acts done by the principal and those
attributed to the person charged as accomplice, but it is
The Court can take judicial notice of the "laws of nature"4 and, under this rule, of further necessary that the latter, with knowledge of the
the time when the moon rises or sets on a particular day.5 This not withstanding and criminal intent, should cooperate with the intention of
for certainty, We took it unto Ourselves to get a certification from the Weather supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime
Bureau6 which shows that the moon was bright at the time of the shooting incident. in an efficacious way." ... From our view of the evidence it has
It reads: not been convincingly established that appellant cooperated
in the commission of the offense, either morally, through
To whom It May Concern: advice, encouragement or agreement or materially through
external acts indicating a manifest intent of supplying aid in
the perpetration of the crime in an efficacious way. Such
This is to certify that, based on the computations made by circumstances being absent, his mere passive presence at the
this office, the following astronomical data for Gabaldon, scene of the crime certainly does not make him either a co-
Nueva Ecija are true and correct: principal or an accomplice in the commission of the offense.7

1. that the moon rose at 4:11 P.M. on April 19, 1970 and set This is good a time as any to emphasize upon those in charge of the prosecution of
the following day, April 20, at 4:27 A.M.; criminal cases that the prosecutor's finest hour is not when he wins a case with the
conviction of the accused. His finest hour is still when, overcoming the advocate's
2. that at 2:00 A.M. on April 20, 1970, the moon was at an natural obsession for victory, he stands up before the Court and pleads not for the
altitude of 34 degrees above the western horizon with conviction of the accused but for his acquittal. For indeed, his noble task is to
bearing of South 73 degrees West; prosecute only the guilty and to protect the innocent. We, therefore, commend
Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz and
Solicitor Sinfronio I. Ancheta for having correctly recommended the acquittal of the
3. and that the moon was illumined 97% at 2:00 A.M. on April appellants Marianito Andres and Generoso Andres.
20, 1970, full moon having occurred at 00.21 A.M. on April
22,1970.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed with respect to the
appellant Raymundo Madera alias "Mundo", with 1/3 of the cost charged against
This certification is issued upon the request of Mr. Estanislao him; and it is hereby reversed as regards appellants Marianito Andres alias "Totoy"
Fernandez, Associate Justice, Supreme Court, Manila. and Generoso Andres alias "Ross", who are hereby acquitted of the crime charged
with proportionate costs de oficio. Their immediate release from confinement is
hereby ordered unless they are held for another legal cause.
For the Administrator:
(Sgd) Simeon V. Inciong
SIMEON V. Zaldivar
INCIONG(Chairman),
Chief, Astronomical
Fernando,Division
Barredo, Antonio and Aquino, JJ., concur.

It was not necessary for the prosecution to prove motive on the part of the  
appellants for there is no doubt as to their identities.

It is true that, according to Maximo A. Obra, the forensic chemist of the NBI,
appellant Raymundo Madera was found negative in a paraffin test. But Obra himself
admitted that, the paraffin test having been conducted fourteen days after the
incident, the test could have given a negative result even if the appellant had fired a
gun fourteen days earlier, because the nitrate deposits on his hands could have
been washed off by washing or could have been removed by perspiration.

The defense of the appellants was alibi. But said defense cannot prevail over the
positive identification of the appellants by the prosecution witnesses. The house of
appellant Raymundo Madera is just about 400 meters away from that of the victim
Elino Bana.

We need not discuss further the defense of alibi of the appellants Marianito Andres
and Generoso Andres because the Solicitor General recommended their acquittal.
And We agree.

The fact that these two appellants were standing behind appellant Madera when
the latter fired shots at Elino Bana, did not make them liable for what Madera did,
there being no proof whatsoever of any conspiracy among the three appellants.
They were not armed. They did nothing to help Madera. Their mere passive
presence at the scene of the crime did not make them liable either as co-principals
or accomplices. In one of the latest decisions of this Court, penned by Justice Felix
Q. Antonio, We held:

It is well to recall the settled rule that conspiracy presupposes

the existence of a preconceived plan or agreement and in
order to establish the existence of such a circumstance, it is
not enough that the persons supposedly engaged or
connected with the same be present when the crime was
perpetrated. There must be established a logical relationship
between the commission of the crime and the supposed
conspirators, evidencing a clear and more intimate
connection between and among the latter, such as by their
overt acts committed in pursuance of a common design.
Considering the far-reaching consequences, of criminal
conspiracy, the same degree of proof required for
establishing the crime is required to support a finding of its
presence that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the offense itself.

47