OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. LETICIA BARBARA B.

GUTIERREZ
G.R. No. 189100
June 21, 2017
VELASCO, JR., J.:

Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may

validly intervene in the said proceedings as its legal interest on the matter
is beyond cavil. (emphasis added) Thus, as things currently stand,
Samaniego remains to be the prevailing doctrine. The Ombudsman has
legal interest in appeals from its rulings in administrative cases.

Facts:
On October 25, 2002, the Bureau of Food and Drugs (BFAD), through
its Bids and Awards Committee (BAC) composed of chairperson Christina
dela Cruz and members Ma. Theresa Icabales, Rosemarie Juafio, Corazon
Bartolome, and Ma. Florita Gabuna, issued an Invitation to Bid for the
procurement of a Liquid Crystal Display (LCD) Projector. The said bidding
was declared a failure because the price offered by the two (2) bidders,
Advance Solutions and Gakken Phils. (Gakken), were higher than the
recommended price of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM).
Thus, on November 2, 2002, a second round of bidding was conducted,
which was participated in by Linkworth International, Inc. (Linkworth).
But again, the bidding was declared a failure because the price offered by
Linkworth exceeded the DBM's recommended amount.

Due to the failure of the biddings, the BF AD decided to enter into

negotiated contracts by way of canvas and based on the end-users'
preference. Thereafter, Linkworth and Gakken submitted their respective
quotations and conducted product demonstrations before the BAC, the BF
AD Secretariat, and the end-users: the Supply Section and the Office of the
Deputy Director, National Drug Policy (NDP). Upon conclusion of the
demonstrations, the Deputy Director of the NDP allegedly informed the
BAC that it preferred the product offered by Gakken. On January 15, 2003,
a new BAC was formed, composed of Jesusa Joyce N. Cinmay (Cinmay) as
chairperson, and Leonida M. Castillo, Marle B. Koffa, Nemia T. Getes, and
Emilio L. Polig, Jr. as members. Then, on July 16, 2003, the BFAD, through
Gutierrez, then Director of the BF AD, issued a Notice of Award to
Linkworth for three (3) units of LCD Projectors for the aggregate amount of
P297 ,000, which notice the supplier received through facsimile. Further,
the notice required Linkworth to signify its conformity and to post a
performance bond equivalent to 5 of the total price. However, when the
representative from Linkworth tried to tender the required bond in the
amount of ₱14,850 on July 25, 2003, the agency refused to accept the same.
Linkworth, thus, wrote to respondent asking for an explanation.

Despite having acknowledged receiving the letter from Linkworth on

July 31, 2003, no written response was given by respondent. Gutierrez
merely informed Linkworth that the agency will investigate the matter.
Linkworth then sought the assistance of a law firm to look into the
anomaly, and it was only then when it found out that it was allegedly
awarded the procurement project by mistake. According to respondent, it
was Gakken that actually won the award for the supply as shown by the
July 10, 2003 Resolution of the BAC, unanimously approved by the new
BAC composition. Linkworth was then advised by Gutierrez to disregard
the Notice of Award earlier made in its favor. This led to the filing of
administrative charges against respondent and the members of the two
BAC’s for grave misconduct.

On February 27, 2006, the Office of the Ombudsman rendered a

Decision finding respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct. Insofar as
respondent is concerned, the CA, on June 16, 2009, reversed the findings of
the Ombudsman. Primarily, petitioner bases its motion to intervene on the
catena of cases it cited in its Omnibus Motion. It reiterates that as the
constitutionally mandated disciplining body, it has the authority to defend
its rulings on appeal, and that it had been allowed to do so via intervention
before judicial authorities. As a party directly affected by the ruling
rendered by the CA, it has sufficient legal interest to intervene, so the
Ombudsman claims. More importantly, petitioner argues that its rulings
were supported by substantial evidence on record. Conspiracy, according
to petitioner, does not require direct evidence to be proven. Here,
respondent's role as a coconspirator was established through her signature
in the Notice of Award. The Arias doctrine could not exonerate respondent
from liability, in view of the difference in factual milieu compared with the
case at bar. The presumption that official duty has been regularly
performed had been overturned since there is evidence to the contrary.

Issue:
Whether or not the the appellate court erred in denying petitioner's
Omnibus Motion.

Ruling:
The petition is devoid of merit. The Ombudsman has legal standing
to intervene on appeal in administrative cases that it has resolved
Preliminarily, the Court rules that petitioner has legal standing to
intervene. Based on the citations by both parties, it would appear that
jurisprudence on this point has been replete, but erratic. A survey of the
Court's pertinent rulings must then be made to shed light on this
conundrum.
In earlier years, an exoneration from an administrative case is akin to an
acquittal in a criminal action-both results are not subject to appeal. This is
brought about not by the existence of a bar in administrative cases similar
to double jeopardy; rather, this is based on the basic premise that appeal is
not a statutory right, but a privilege. Of relevance are Secs. 37 and 39 of
Presidential Decree No. 807 which then provided:
Section 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.The Commission shall decide upon
appeal all administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a
penalty of suspension for more than thirty days, or fine in an amount
exceeding thirty days' salary, demotion in rank or salary or transfer,
removal or dismissal from Office. Section 39. Appeals. Appeals, where
allowable, shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision
within fifteen days from receipt of the decision unless a petition for
reconsideration is seasonably filed, which petition shall be decided within
fifteen days

Jurisprudence describes intervention as a remedy by which a third party,

not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant therein to
enable him, her, or it to protect or preserve a right or interest which may be
affected by such proceedings. However, intervention is not a matter of
right, but is instead addressed to the sound discretion of the courts. It may
be permitted only when the statutory conditions for the right to intervene
are shown. Otherwise stated, the status of the Ombudsman as a party
adversely affected by the CA's assailed Decision does not automatically
translate to a grant of its motion to intervene. Procedural rules must still be
observed before its intervention may be allowed.
Verily, aside from (1) having legal interest in the matter in litigation; (2)
having legal interest in the success of any of the parties; (3) having an
interest against both parties; (4) or being so situated as to be adversely
affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the
court or an officer thereof, the movant must also be able to interpose the
motion before rendition of judgment, pursuant to Sec. 2 of Rule 19. It
should be noted that the Office of the Ombudsman was aware of the
appeal filed by Sison. The Rules of Court provides that the appeal shall be
taken by filing a verified petition for review with the CA, with proof of
service of a copy on the court or agency a quo. Clearly, the Office of the
Ombudsman had sufficient time within which to file a motion to intervene.
As such, its failure to do so should not now be countenanced. The Office of
the Ombudsman is expected to be an activist watchman, not merely a
passive onlooker.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Review on
Certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The June 16, 2009 Decision
and July 23, 2009 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 107
5 51 are hereby AFFIRMED.
GO VS PEOPLE AND HIGHDONECOMPANY, LTD.
G.R. No. 185527
July 18, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Doctrine:
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The
pertinent provision reads thus: SEC. 15. Examination of witness for the
prosecution.—When it satisfactorily appears that a witness for the
prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by the court,
or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is
pending. Such examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his
absence after reasonable notice to attend the examination has been served
on him shall be conducted in the same manner as an examination at the
trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after notice
shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in
behalf of or against the accused.

Facts: Petitioners Harry Go, Tonny Ngo, Jerry Ngo and Jane Go were
charged before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manilafor Other
Deceits under Article 318 of the Revised Penal. The accused allegedly
defrauded Highdone Company Ltd.Represented by Li Luen Ping by means
of false manifestations and fraudulent representations which they made
to Ping tothe effect that they have chattels such as machinery, spare parts,
equipment and raw materials installed and fixed in thepremises of BGB
Industrial Textile Mills Factory located in the Bataan Export Processing
Zone in Mariveles, Bataan, executeda Deed of Mortgage for a consideration
of the amount of $464,266.90 or its peso equivalent at P20,892,010.50 more
or lessin favor of ML Resources and Highdone Company Ltd. Representing
that the said deed is a FIRST MORTGAGE when in truthand in fact the
accused well knew that the same had been previously encumbered,
mortgaged and foreclosed by CHINA BANKCORPORATION, thereby
causing damage and prejudice to said HIGHDONE COMPANY LTD., in
the said amount. The prosecution's complaining witness, Li Luen Ping, a
frail old businessman from Laos, Cambodia, traveled from his home
country back to the Philippines in order to attend the hearing. However,
trial dates were subsequently postponed due to hisunavailability. The
private prosecutor filed with the MeTC a Motion to Take Oral Deposition
of Li Luen Ping, alleging that hewas being treated for lung infection at the
Cambodia Charity Hospital in Laos, Cambodia and that, upon doctor's
advice, hecould not make the long travel to the Philippines by reason of ill
health. Notwithstanding petitioners' Opposition, the MeTCgranted the
motion after the prosecution complied with the directive to submit a
Medical Certificate of Li Luen Ping.Petitioners sought its reconsideration
which the MeTC denied, prompting petitioners to file a Petition for
Certiorari beforethe RTC.The RTC granted the petition and declared the
MeTC Orders null and void. Upon denial by the RTC of their motion
forreconsideration, the prosecution elevated the case to the CA
which denied petitioners' motion.

Issue: Whether or not the MeTC infringed the constitutional right of the
petitioners to a public trial in allowing the taking of thedeposition of the
complaining witness in Laos, Cambodia.

Held: Yes. The Procedure for Testimonial Examination of an Unavailable

Prosecution Witness is covered under Section 15, Rule 119.The examination
of witnesses must be done orally before a judge in open court. This is true
especially in criminal cases wherethe Constitution secures to the accused
his right to a public trial and to meet the witnesses against him face to face.
Therequirement is the "safest and most satisfactory method of investigating
facts" as it enables the judge to test the witness'credibility through his
manner and deportment while testifying. It is not without exceptions,
however, as the Rules of Courtrecognizes the conditional examination of
witnesses and the use of their depositions as testimonial evidence in lieu
of directcourt testimony.But for purposes of taking the deposition in
criminal cases, more particularly of a prosecution witness who would
foreseeablybe unavailable for trial, the testimonial examination should be
made before the court, or at least before the judge, where thecase is
pending as required by the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal ProcedureThe Court takes note that prosecution
witness Li Luen Ping had managed to attend the initial trial proceedings
before theMeTC of Manila. At that time, Li Luen Ping's old age and fragile
constitution should have been unmistakably apparent and yetthe
prosecution failed to act with zeal and foresight in having his deposition or
testimony taken before the MeTC pursuant toSection 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court. In fact, it should have been imperative for the
prosecution to have movedfor the preservation of Li Luen Ping's testimony
at that first instance given the fact that the witness is a non-resident
alienwho can leave the Philippines anytime without any definite date of
return. Obviously, the prosecution allowed its mainwitness to leave the
court's jurisdiction without availing of the court procedure intended to
preserve the testimony of such witness.
12. NENITA GONZALES, et al., Petitioners, vs. MARIANO BUGAAY, et
al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 173008 
February 22, 2012
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Doctrine: Demurrer to Evidence; Being considered a motion to dismiss,

thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court renders
its judgment.—In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a
demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is
competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. Being considered a
motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be
filed before the court renders its judgment.

Facts: The deceased spouses Bartolome Ayad and Marcelina Tejada

("Spouses Ayad") had five (5) children: Enrico, Encarnacion, Consolacion,
Maximiano and Mariano. The latter, who was single, predeceased
hisparents on December 4, 1943. Marcelina died in September 1950
followed by Bartolome much later on February 17, 1964.Enrico has
remained single. Encarnacion died on April 8, 1966 and is survived by her
children, NenitaGonzales, Generosa Gonzales, Felipe Gonzales, Lolita
Gonzales, Dolores Gonzales, Conchita Gonzales and Beatriz Gonzales, the
petitioners in this case. Consolacion, meanwhile, was married to the late
Imigdio Bugaay. Their children are Mariano Bugaay, Alicia Bugaay,
Amelita Bugaay, Rodolfo Bugaay,Letecia Bugaay, Lydia Bugaay,
Luzviminda Bugaay and Belen Bugaay, respondents herein. Maximiano
died single and without issue on August 20, 1986. The spouses of
petitioners, except Nenita, a widow,and those of the respondents, except
Lydia and Belen, were joined as parties in this case.In their Amended
Complaint for Partition and Annulment of Documents with Damages
dated February 5,1991 against Enrico, Consolacion and the respondents,
petitioners alleged, inter alia, that the only surviving children of the
Spouses Ayad are Enrico and Consolacion, and that during the Spouses
Ayad's lifetime, they owned several agricultural as well as residential
properties. Petitioners averred that in 1987, Enrico executed fraudulent
documents covering all the properties owned by the Spouses Ayad in favor
of Consolacion and respondents, completely disregarding their rights.
Thus, they prayed, among others, for the partition of the Spouses Ayad's
estate, the nullification of the documents executed by Enrico, and the
award of actual, moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's
fees. As affirmative defenses Enrico, Consolacion and respondents claimed
that petitioners had long obtained their advance inheritance from the estate
of the Spouses Ayad, and that the properties sought to be partitioned are
now individually titled in respondents' names. The RTC awarded one-
fourth (¼) pro-indiviso share of the estate each to Enrico, Maximiano,
Encarnacion and Consolacion as the heirs of the Spouses Ayad, excluding
Mariano who predeceased them. It likewise declared the Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement and Partition executed by Enrico and respondents,
as well as all other documents and muniments of title in their names, as
null and void. It also directed the parties to submit a project of partition
within 30 days from finality of the Decision. Acting Presiding Judge
Angeles granted respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial
for the specific "purpose of receiving and offering for admission the
documents referred to by the[respondents]. However, instead of presenting
the documents adverted to, consisting of the documents sought to be
annulled, respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence which the RTC,
this time through Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison, denied as well as
respondents' motion for reconsideration. Respondents elevated their case
to the CA through a petition for certiorari, imputing grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in denying their demurrer
notwithstanding petitioners' failure to present the documents sought to be
annulled. The CA reversing and setting aside the Orders of the RTC.

Issue: Whether it is proper to file a demurrer to evidence after a Decision

had been rendered in the case.

Held: Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides:"SECTION 1.

Demurrer to evidence. - After the plaintiff has completed the presentation
of his evidence,the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that
upon the facts and the law the plaintiff hasshown no right to relief. If his
motion is denied, he shall have the right to present evidence. If the motion
isgranted but on appeal the order of dismissal was reversed he shall be
deemed to have waived the right topresent evidence."The Court has
previously explained the nature of a demurrer to evidence in the case of
Celino v. Heirs of Alejo and Teresa Santiago as follows:"A demurrer to
evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
and ispresented after the plaintiff rests his case. It is an objection by one of
the parties in an action, to the effectthat the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to makeout a
case or sustain the issue. The evidence contemplated by the rule on
demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case. "In passing upon
the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to
sustain the judgment.
Being considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must
clearly be filed before the court renders its judgment. In this case,
respondents demurred to petitioners' evidence after the RTC promulgated
its Decision.

 While respondents' motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was

granted, it was for the sole purpose of receiving and offering for admission
the documents not presented at the trial. As respondents never complied
with the directive but instead filed a demurrer to evidence, their motion
should be deemed abandoned. Consequently, the RTC's original Decision
stands. Accordingly, the CA committed reversible error in granting the
demurrer and dismissing the Amended Complaint a quo for insufficiency
of evidence. The demurrer to evidence was clearly no longer an available
remedy to respondents and should not have been granted, as the RTC had
correctly done. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
Decision and Resolution of the CA are SET ASIDE and the Orders of the
RTC denying respondents' demurrer are REINSTATED. The Decision
of the RTC dated November 24, 1995 STANDS.
DARE ADVENTURE FARM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. HON.
COURT OF APPEALS, MANILA, HON. AUGUSTINE VESTIL, as
Presiding Judge of RTC-CEBU, Br. 56, MANDAUE CITY, SPS. FELIX NG
AND NENITA NG, and SPS. MARTIN T. NG AND AZUCENA S. NG and
AGRIPINA R. GOC-ONG, respondents.
G.R. No. 161122. 
September 24, 2012.
BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine: Immutability of Judgments; The doctrine of immutability and

unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the
discharge of judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial
controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is precisely why the
courts exist.

FACTS:
Dare Adventure Farm Corporation (Dare
Adventure) purchased a parcel of land located in Cebu from respondent
Agripina Goc-ong (Agripina), Porferio Goc-ong, Diosdado Goc-ong, Crisostomo
Goc-ong, Tranquilino Goc-ong, Naciancena Goc-ong and Avelino Goc-ong
(collectively, the Goc-ongs). This was evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Later-on,
DareAdventure discovered that the subject property was used as a security for Goc-
ongs obligation by mortgaging it to Felix Ng, married to Nenita N. Ng, and Martin T.
Ng, married to Azucena S. Ng (collectively, the Ngs). Subsequently, the Goc-ongs
apparently failing to pay their obligation, the Ngs filed a complaint for recovery
ofsum of money or, in the alternative, for the foreclosure ofmortgage only against
Agripina. The RTC rendered its decision in favor of the Ngs. Thereafter, Dare
Adventure commenced in the CA anaction for the annulment of the RTCs decision.
The CA dismissed the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for annulment of judgment wasa proper recourse for Dare
Adventure to set aside the decision of the RTC

HELD: The petition is denied. REMEDIAL LAW: petition for annulment of

judgment; doctrine of immutability of final judgments A petition for
annulment of judgment is a remedy inequity so exceptional in nature that it may
be availed of only when other remedies are wanting, and only if the judgment,
final order or final resolution sought to be annulled was rendered by a court
lacking jurisdiction or through extrinsic fraud. Yet, the remedy, being exceptional
in character, is not allowed to be so easily and readily abused by parties aggrieved by
the final judgments, orders or resolutions. The Court has thus instituted safeguards
by limiting the grounds for the annulment to lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud,
and by prescribing in Section 110 of Rule 47 of the Rules of Court that the petitioner
should show that the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or
other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
The attitude of judicial reluctance towards the annulment of a judgment, final
order or final resolution is understandable, for the remedy disregards the time-
honored doctrine of immutability and unalterability of final judgments, a solid corner
stone in the dispensation of justice by the courts. The doctrine of immutability and
unalterability serves a two-fold purpose, namely: (a) to avoid delay in the
administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of
judicial business; and (b) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of
occasional errors, which is precisely why the courts exist. We agree with the
CA’s suggestion that the petitioners proper recourse was either an action
for quieting of title or an action for reconveyance of the property. The Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

ESCRA: Same; Judgments; Parties; A judgment of a court is conclusive and

binding only upon the parties and those who are their successors in interest
by title after the commencement of the action in court. ―It is elementary
that a judgment of a court is conclusive and binding only upon the parties
and those who are their successors in interest by title after the
commencement of the action in court. xxx The principle that a person
cannot be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he has not been made a party conforms to the constitutional
guarantee of due process of law.

Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; The action for quieting of title may be
brought whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
in real property by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance,
or proceeding that is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial
to said title.―The action for quieting of title may be brought whenever
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest in real property by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance, or proceeding that
is apparently valid or effective, but is, in truth and in fact, invalid,
ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title.
In the action, the competent court is tasked to determine the respective
rights of the plaintiff and the other claimants, not only to put things in their
proper places, and make the claimant, who has no rights to the immovable,
respect and not disturb the one so entitled, but also for the benefit of both,
so that whoever has the right will see every cloud of doubt over the
property dissipated, and he can thereafter fearlessly introduce any desired
improvements, as well as use, and even abuse the property.
20. DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GUARIÑA
AGRICULTURAL AND REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 160758.
January 15, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:

Doctrine: Mortgages; By its nature, a mortgage remains an accessory

contract dependent on the principal obligation, such that enforcement of
the mortgage contract will depend on whether or not there has been a
violation of the principal obligation.

Facts: Guariña Corporation applied for a loan from DBP and executed promissory
note, a real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage over several real properties.
Guariña Corporation demanded he release of the balance of the loan, but DBP
refused. Instead, DBP directly paid some suppliers of Guariña Corporation over the
latter's objection. Unsatisfied with the non-action and objection of Guariña
Corporation, DBP initiated extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings. DBP applied for the
issuance of a writ of possession by the RTC. At first, the RTC denied the application
but later granted it upon DBP's motion for reconsideration. Aggrieved, Guariña
Corporation assailed the motion before the CA. CA sustained the RTC's judgment.
DBP timely filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied its motion hence
this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the court adhered to the usual course of judicial proceedings

in accordance with the Law of the Case Doctrine.

Ruling: The doctrine of law of the case did not apply herein. For practical
considerations, indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a
point that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been accorded
to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law of the case and
should not bere opened on remand of the case to determine other issues of the case,
like damages. The foregoing understanding of the concept of the law of the case
exposes DBP's insistence to be unwarranted

ESCRA: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Law of the Case; Words and Phrases;
Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and
means, more specifically, that whatever is once irrevocably established as the
controlling legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same case
continues to be the law of the case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of
the case before the court.—Law of the case has been defined as the opinion
delivered on a former appeal, and means, more specifically, that whatever
is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision
between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the
case, whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on
which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case
before the court. The concept of law of the case is well explained in
Mangold v. Bacon, an American case, thusly: The general rule, nakedly and
boldly put, is that legal conclusions announced on a first appeal, whether
on the general law or the law as applied to the concrete facts, not only
prescribe the duty and limit the power of the trial court to strict obedience
and conformity thereto, but they become and remain the law of the case in
all other steps below or above on subsequent appeal. The rule is grounded
on convenience, experience, and reason. Without the rule there would be
no end to criticism, reagitation, reexamination, and reformulation. In short,
there would be endless litigation. It would be intolerable if parties litigants
were allowed to speculate on changes in the personnel of a court, or on the
chance of our rewriting propositions once gravely ruled on solemn
argument and handed down as the law of a given case. An itch to reopen
questions foreclosed on a first appeal would result in the foolishness of the
inquisitive youth who pulled up his corn to see how it grew. Courts are
allowed, if they so choose, to act like ordinary sensible persons. The
administration of justice is a practical affair. The rule is a practical and a
good one of frequent and beneficial use.

Same; Same; Same; Same; The doctrine of law of the case simply means, that when
an appellate court has once declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to
be the law of that case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule
thus laid down may have been reversed in other cases.—The doctrine of law of
the case simply means, therefore, that when an appellate court has once
declared the law in a case, its declaration continues to be the law of that
case even on a subsequent appeal, notwithstanding that the rule thus laid
down may have been reversed in other cases. For practical considerations,
indeed, once the appellate court has issued a pronouncement on a point
that was presented to it with full opportunity to be heard having been
accorded to the parties, the pronouncement should be regarded as the law
of the case and should not be reopened on remand of the case to determine
other issues of the case, like damages. But the law of the case, as the name
implies, concerns only legal questions or issues thereby adjudicated in the
former appeal.
25. IMELDA ROMUALDEZ-MARCOS and IRENE MARCOS-ARANETA,
petitioners, vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 213253
January 18, 2017

doctrine: Modes of Discovery; Request for Admission; A request for

admission “should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is
to establish said party’s cause of action or defense.”— “a request for
admission may even complement a summary judgment in that the request
for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary judgment”

ESCRA: Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Request for Admission;  Modes of

Discovery; Summary Judgments; A request for admission can be the basis for the
grant of summary judgment.—The Sandiganbayan also properly ruled that
there was no inconsistency or incongruity between Republic’s Request for
Admission and Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Indeed, we have
held that a request for admission can be the basis for the grant of summary
judgment. The request can be the basis therefor when its subject is deemed
to have been admitted by the party and is requested as a result of that
party’s failure to respond to the court’s directive to state what specifically
happened in the case. The resort to such a request as a mode of discovery
rendered all the matters contained therein as matters that have been
deemed admitted pursuant to Rule 26, Section 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure. On the basis of respondent Imelda Marcos’ letter dated 25 May
2009; respondents’ Answer to the 1991 Petition, which was considered to
be a “negative pregnant” in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 406 SCRA 190
(2003); and respondents’ failure to timely respond to petitioner’s Request
for Admission, the Sandiganbayan thus correctly granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment of the Republic.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Modes of Discovery; Request for Admission; A

request for admission “should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact, or
documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose is to
establish said party’s cause of action or defense.”—The Sandiganbayan ruled
that “a request for admission may even complement a summary judgment
in that the request for admission may be used as basis for filing a summary
judgment” citing three cases as follows: Concrete Aggregates Corp. v. CA,
266 SCRA 88 (1997), Diman v. Alumbres, 299 SCRA 459 (1998), and Allied
Agri-Business v. CA, 299 SCRA 680 (1998). The first case instructs that a
request for admission “should set forth relevant evidentiary matters of fact,
or documents described in and exhibited with the request, whose purpose
is to establish said party’s cause of action or defense.”

FACTS: The present consolidated petitions emanated from the same Civil
Case No. 0141, when the Republic filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment dated 24 June 2009 with respect to another property listed in the
1991 Petition. The Republic asked the Sandiganbayan to render judgment
declaring the pieces of jewelry, known as the Malacanang Collection and
specifically mentioned under paragraph 9 (6) of the 1991 Petition, as ill-
gotten; and to subsequently cause this collection of jewelry to be declared
forfeited in favor of the Republic. In support of the motion, the Republic
cited the letter dated 25 May 2009 sent to the PCGG by Imelda Marcos,
through counsel, demanding "the immediate return of all her pieces of
jewelry (i) taken by PCGG from Malacanang Palace and (ii) those turned
over to PCGG by the U.S. Government." The Republic argued that the letter
proved the claim of the Marcoses that they owned the Malacanang
Collection, including the Hawaii Collection. It contended that "the lawful
income of the Marcoses during their incumbencies as public officials was
grossly disproportionate to the value of the pieces of jewelry." Imelda
Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta stated that the Republic's Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment was filed to justify the possession by the PCGG
of the pieces of jewelry, even if these were not part of the forfeiture case
-Civil Case No. 0141.
Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos Araneta subsequently filed a
Manifestation and Motion to Expunge dated 25 July 2009. In their
Manifestation and Motion to Expunge, Imelda Marcos and Irene Marcos
Araneta claimed that the filing of the Request for Admission was to an
abdication of the earlier position of the Republic that the case was ripe for
summary judgment. They argued that the Request for Admission
entertained a possibly genuine issue as to a material fact, which was
needed for the grant of the motion for summary judgment.
The Republic filed its Opposition dated 24 August 2009, in which it said
that the Manifestation and Motion to Expunge of Imelda Marcos and Irene
Marcos Araneta argued on trivial matters, raised puerile arguments, and
failed to refute the contention that the collection was ill-gotten and subject
to forfeiture. The Republic claimed that by operation of law, the failure of
the Marcoses to respond resulted in their admission of the matters
contained in the request.
In a Resolution dated 2 August 2010, the Sandiganbayan denied the
Marcoses' Manifestation and Preliminary Comments and Manifestation
and Motion to Expunge. After the submission of the parties of their
respective memoranda, the Sandiganbayan issued a Partial Summary
Judgment dated 13 January 2014 ruling that (1) the Malacanang Collection
was part and subject of the forfeiture petition; (2) the Motion for Summary
Judgment was proper; and (3) the forfeiture of the Malacanang Collection
was justified pursuant to R.A. 1379. In a Resolution dated 11 June 2014, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Motions for Reconsideration for being mere
rehashes of the arguments of the Marcoses in their Comments and
Opposition to the Republic's Motion for Summary Judgment.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Malacanang Collection can be subject of the

forfeiture case.

HELD: Yes. The Malacanang Collection is subject to forfeiture.

The Court stated that “whenever any public officer or employee has
acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or
employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have
been unlawfully acquired."
In the present case, petitioners failed to satisfactorily show that the
properties were lawfully acquired; hence, the prima facie presumption that
they were unlawfully acquired prevails.