1/46 G.R. No. 172604 (Formerly G.R. Nos.
155345-47) August 17, 2010
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS. VENANCIO ROXAS Y ARGUELLES, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
On appeal by way of automatic review is the Decision [1] dated January 13, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00666, affirming the Judgment[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) convicting appellant Venancio
Roxas y Arguelles (appellant) for the crimes of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder,
Violation of Republic Act (R.A.) 6539, or the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, and Theft. The Informations alleged -
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention with Frustrated Murder -
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then
and there by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, willfully, unlawfully,
and feloniously kidnap, carry away and detain AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a female, thereby depriving her of her
liberty, and thereafter bring her to an uninhabited place in Barangay Bagong Pook, San Jose, Batangas and then
and there, with intent to kill and with treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of superior strength, willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously shoot her in the face with a hand gun, thus performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of MURDER as consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of
causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the able and timely medical assistance given to said Agnes
Guirindola which prevented her death, resulting to her utmost grief, sorrow, sufferings and sleepless night,
compensable in actual, moral and exemplary damages in such amounts as may be awarded to them under the
provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[3]
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286 for Carnapping -
That on or about January 12, 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, take and carry away one Nissan Sentra Model 1993 with Plate No.
TKR-837, then driven by Agnes Guirindola but owned by her mother Elvira G. Guirindola, to the damage and
prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola and Elvira G. Guirindola in such amount as may be awarded to them under the
Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[4]
and -
In Criminal Case No. 94-54287 (amended) for Robbery -
That on or about January 12, 1994 in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
intent to gain and by means of force, violence against and intimidation of person and at gunpoint, did then and
there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, while on board the motor vehicle of AGNES GUIRINDOLA, a 1993
Nissan Sentra with Plate No. TKR-837, and in the course of its trip, divested and robbed said Agnes Guirindola of
the following cash, check and personal belongings, to wit:
Cash                                                         P1,000.00
Check                                                         3,000.00
Pieces of jewelry valued at                         34,000.00
and in the course of execution thereof, shoot and fatally wounded Agnes Guirindola with a handgun, which is
clearly unnecessary in the commission of the crime, to the damage and prejudice of said Agnes Guirindola, in
such amount as may be awarded to her under the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
CONTRARY TO LAW.[5]
The antecedent facts as culled from the records are as follows:
On January 12, 1994, around 3:00 p.m., Agnes Guirindola (Agnes), while cruising along Panay Avenue, Quezon
City, on board a red 1993 model Nissan Sentra sedan with plate number TKR-837, was suddenly flagged down by
a man wearing a PNP reflectorized vest. The man signaled her to make a U-turn. Agnes complied and made the
U-turn. The man walked in front of her car and proceeded to the right side of the car. [6] Agnes, later on, identified
the man in open court as appellant, Venancio Roxas (Roxas).
Agnes opened the right front window of the car and asked Roxas, who had positioned himself at the front
passenger side, "Ano ang problema?" Roxas replied, "Miss, one way street po ito." Agnes explained to the man
that she usually passed by the same street and it was only that day that she had been caught. Roxas told her that
the street had been made a one-way street because a girl figured in an accident in the same street two days ago.
[7]
Roxas then asked for Agnes' driver's license. After taking the driver's license, Roxas handed her a piece of paper
which she was asked to sign. Agnes noticed that it was not the usual traffic citation ticket but, nevertheless, she
pretended to sign the same by making a check thereon. [8]
When Agnes handed back the paper to Roxas, the latter asked her to open the door of the car so that he could
show her the one-way sign and the other traffic aide at the corner of the street. Agnes let Roxas enter the car.
Roxas then instructed Agnes to drive to the corner of the street, and upon reaching the corner, Roxas pointed to
her the one-way sign and looked for the traffic aide he had told Agnes about. The traffic aide was not there.
Agnes asked Roxas where she could drop him. Roxas told Agnes to make a left turn from the corner of the street
and that he will alight somewhere in Mother Ignacia. Agnes obliged and made a left turn and stopped the car.
Thinking that Roxas was waiting for a bribe, Agnes took out her wallet, pulled a P50.00 bill and gave it to Roxas.
After receiving the money, Roxas returned to Agnes her driver's license. [9]
Upon returning the driver's license to Agnes, Roxas immediately switched off the engine of the car and poked a
gun at her saying "Miss, kailangan ko ang kotse mo." Agnes, terrified and shocked by Roxas' actions, cried and
pleaded with him to let her go and just take the car. Roxas continued to poke a gun at her, unmindful of what
Agnes was telling him.[10]
After a while, Agnes heard a knock from outside the car. Roxas opened the rear door and then someone boarded
the car, occupying the back seat. The second passenger immediately reclined the driver's seat and pulled Agnes
towards the back seat. Agnes identified this man as Roberto Gungon (Gungon). Subsequently, Roxas took the
driver's seat and drove the car while Gungon held Agnes on the shoulder with one hand, and her leg with the
other.[11]
Agnes then heard Gungon say: "Boss, dalhin natin sya sa Philcoa." After crossing Mother Ignacia Street, Gungon
got his beeper and told Roxas: "Boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon na natin siya i-s." Agnes became more
frightened as she understood "s" to mean "salvage," a lingo for summary execution. [12]
Along the way, Roxas stopped the car and went to a sari-sari store. Gungon was left behind, holding Agnes, and
would tighten his grip every time she made a slight move and sometimes would poke a gun at her. Upon
returning to the car, Roxas offered Agnes a bottle of soft drink and Skyflakes biscuit. Agnes refused so Roxas
handed the softdrink to Gungon and told him: "Mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya." Gungon took
the bottle of softdrink and tried to force Agnes to drink the contents thereof. Agnes refused because she saw
tablets floating inside the bottle. Roxas resumed driving, while Gungon held Agnes. [13]
Agnes testified that she planned to escape, but could not make a single move because every time she made a
slight move, Gungon would poke the gun at her. The windows of the car were tinted and remained closed. [14]
Around 5:00 p.m., Agnes noticed that they were already at the South Superhighway. [15]
Along the superhighway, Roxas stopped the car in order to urinate. Gungon guarded Agnes by holding her. When
Roxas returned, Gungon alighted to relieve himself too. While Gungon was out of the car, Roxas sat at the
driver's seat facing Agnes and poked his gun at her. Shortly thereafter, Gungon came back to the car and Roxas
resumed driving.  When Agnes took the prayer leaflet from her wallet, Gungon looked at her wallet and saw the
picture of her sister. When asked if she was the one in the picture, Agnes told Gungon that it was her sister. Out
of the blue, Gungon also took his wallet and showed Agnes three (3) pictures which, according to him, were the
pictures of his niece, her girlfriend and that of Roxas and a lady with a little child. After showing the same to
Agnes, Gungon returned the said pictures to his wallet. [16] Agnes planned to escape at that time but the car was
running at a speed of 80 to 100 kilometers per hour. Agnes just continued to pray. [17]
At this point, Gungon again offered the softdrink to Agnes. When she refused, Gungon became mad and
tightened his hold on Agnes, forcing her to drink it. Sensing that Gungon was already furious, Agnes took the
softdrink. After Agnes drank it, Roxas told Gungon, "Ipainom mo pa itong dalawang tablets dahil malaki sya,
mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya." Gungon took the tablets from Roxas and forced Agnes to swallow the
same. Out of fear, Agnes took the tablets, but did not swallow them. She placed the tablets under her tongue.
When Roxas and Gungon were not looking, she took her handkerchief and spat out the tablets into the
handkerchief.[18]
Afterwards, Agnes told Roxas and Gungon that she was hungry and wanted to eat a McDonald's sandwich.
Gungon replied that they were in the province and that there was no McDonald's there. Roxas told Agnes that
they will just drop by a restaurant to buy something to eat. Roxas then stopped by a bakery and alighted from
the car, while Gungon held Agnes. It was at this point that Agnes noticed the signboard of the bakery which read
something like Sto. Tomas or San Jose, Batangas. After a while, Roxas came back with a "taisan" cake and offered
it to Agnes which she refused. At that instance, Agnes felt dizzy and fell asleep. [19]
When Agnes woke up, she found herself lying at the back seat with her legs on the lap of Gungon. The car was at
a standstill. She noticed from the car's clock on the dashboard that it was about 9:30 or 10:00 p.m. She also
found out that her jewelries consisting of bracelets, pair of earrings, necklace and a watch worth around
P30,000.00 to P40,000.00, as well as her pair of shoes, were already gone. When she asked Gungon about them,
the latter told her that they were just keeping the same for her. Agnes also lost her wallet containing a check in
the amount of P3,000.00 and cash in the amount of P1,000.00. [20]
Agnes also noticed that there was already a third man sitting in front of the car beside Roxas who was still
driving. She then asked them if she could relieve herself. Gungon asked Roxas if Agnes would be allowed to
relieve herself to which Roxas answered in the affirmative. Agnes fixed her hair and then asked Gungon for her
shoes. Gungon put the shoes on her feet. Roxas alighted from the car and opened the rear door. Gungon
alighted first from the car followed by Agnes. Gungon then led Agnes to a nearby grassy area and told her, "O,
dyan ka na lang umihi." After Agnes relieved herself, and as she was about to get up and return to the car, she
saw white sparks at her right side and then she fell down. When she opened her eyes, she saw Roxas walking
back towards the car with a gun in his hand. She did not see Gungon at that particular time. Then she lost
consciousness.[21]
When Agnes regained consciousness, she was all alone. Roxas, Gungon and the third man, as well as the car,
were no longer there. It was very dark. She followed a "sparkling light" that led her to a small house. Upon
reaching the house, she opened the door and saw two (2) children and a teenager singing. She asked for their
help but upon seeing her, they ran away. She then saw a lady standing at the stairs of the house carrying a baby.
Agnes asked for her help but the lady went upstairs and locked herself inside the room. Agnes followed her and
knocked at the door of the room asking for help, but still the lady did not come out of the room. She then went
downstairs and lied down on the sofa. Only then did she notice that blood was profusely oozing from her face
and there were "holes" in the left side of her neck and her right cheek. [22]
After a while, Agnes heard a vehicle arrive and also heard voices saying: "May taong duguan sa loob ng bahay,
tulungan natin siya!" Agnes was then carried to a Fiera motor vehicle and brought to the Batangas Regional
Hospital, where she was treated for her wounds and given first aid. [23]  Agnes sustained the following injuries:
Gunshot wound, POE, Zygomatic area (R), POX Sudmandibular area (L); Fx, zygomatic arch & condylar area, (R)
Sec to GSW; Submandibular Gland involvement with sinus tract. (Exhibit "A," Medical Certificate dated February
1, 1994 signed by attending physician Dr. Lauro R. San Jose, Captain MC, Neurosurgery 4-A, p. 177, Volume III,
Record)
The following day, about 3:00 a.m. of January 13, 1994, the parents of Agnes and the rest of the family arrived at
the hospital. Her parents immediately arranged for her transfer to the V. Luna General Hospital (now AFP
Medical Center) in Quezon City, where she was treated further, operated on and confined for forty-three (43)
days.[24] Agnes incurred actual damages amounting to P36,161.83 for her hospitalization, surgical operation and
medical treatment, and suffered moral damages the amount of which she cannot readily quantify, as a result of
the ordeal she underwent on that fateful day of January 12, 1994. [25]
Upon transfer of Agnes to the V. Luna General Hospital, her parents immediately reported the incident to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in Manila, which promptly conducted an investigation. On January 17,
1994, some NBI agents visited her for the taking of the cartographic sketches of Roxas and Gungon. On January
19, 1994, another group of NBI agents went to the hospital and showed her 3 to 4 pictures of Gungon who was
subsequently arrested in Davao City. On February 1, 1994, Agnes positively identified Gungon at the NBI in a
police lineup consisting of 5 to 6 men. Likewise, Agnes was able to identify certain personal effects recovered
from Gungon such as her rosary beads,[26] jewelry purse,[27] key chain with a key to the lock of her Nissan Sentra
car,[28] and the check taken from her, which were all presented in evidence in the trial of Gungon as well as in the
trial of the instant case against Roxas.[29]
In the meantime, the NBI conducted a manhunt for Roxas. On September 11, 1995, Roxas was arrested by
elements of the NBI inside the municipal hall of Taysan, Batangas, where he was working under the Office of the
Mayor using the aliases "Joe Villamor" and "Marianito Villamor."
Agnes further testified that the name of appellant Venancio Roxas was supplied by the NBI, but she was very
sure that he was the person who fatally shot her. She positively identified Roxas on January 12, 1994 during a
police line-up at the NBI as the perpetrator other than Gungon, of the crimes charged.  She told the NBI agents
that the person in the picture was the one who had flagged her down and shot her on January 12, 1994.
For the defense, appellant denied committing the crimes charged against him. He claimed that it was impossible
for him to be at the place of incident on January 12, 1994. He narrated that on that same day, at around 6:00 to
7:00 p.m., he and a certain Tranquilino Mangiliman and two others were installing an antenna on the roof of his
house. He added that he never left his house that evening. Both Mangiliman and his wife, Hermogena Roxas,
testified that on January 12, 1004, Roxas was in his house at Feria Compound, Commonwealth Town Homes,
Quezon City.
Subsequently, in a Decision[30] dated September 5, 2002, the court a quo, found Roxas guilty of Kidnapping and
Serious Illegal Detention with frustrated murder, carnapping and theft, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in these cases finding accused Venancio Roxas y Arguelles guilty
beyond reasonable doubt:
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54285 for Kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder, and
sentences him to suffer the maximum penalty of DEATH.
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54286, for Carnapping, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from 18 years, as minimum, to 25 years, as maximum;
In Criminal Case No. Q-94-54287, for the crime of Theft, and sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty
of imprisonment from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional, as minimum, to 8 years, 8 months and
1 day of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for the additional P10,000.00 in excess of P20,000.00 value of
the property taken or a total of 9 years, 8 months and 1 day, as maximum.
The accused shall be credited in full of his preventive imprisonment.
Accused Roxas is also liable to pay the offended party Agnes Guirindola, moral and exemplary damages in the
amount of P1,000,000.00 and P500,000.00, respectively, actual damages in the amount of P36,161.83,
representing her hospitalization and related expenses, and P38,000.00 representing the value of the articles
taken from her. Accused Roxas is likewise ordered to pay Mrs. Elvira Guirindola the amount of P250,257.90.00,
representing the cost of repair of the subject vehicle.
SO ORDERED.
August 29, 2002, Quezon City.[31]
Roxas moved for a reconsideration of the September 5, 2002 decision of the court a quo. Likewise, noting the
well-attended promulgation of the court a quo's decision, Roxas also moved for the inhibition of the Honorable
Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. He argued that the presence of then Justice Secretary Hernando Perez showed
the court's predisposition to convict him of the offenses charged. Roxas contended that he was robbed of his
right to due process because the Judge Demetrio Macapagal, Sr. had lost the cold neutrality of an impartial judge
required of him in trying and resolving cases.
In an Order[32] dated October 8, 2002, the RTC denied appellant's motions for inhibition and reconsideration.
Meanwhile, appellant's co-accused Roberto Gungon y Santiago was found guilty of the same charges in a
Decision[33] dated March 19, 1998. Roxas was at-large during the trial and was arrested only after the RTC
rendered the judgment of conviction against Gungon. Thus, the cases, as far as they concerned Roxas, was
archived until he was eventually arrested on September 11, 1995.
The records of this case were originally elevated to this Court for automatic review. Conformably with our ruling
in People v. Mateo,[34] however, the case was referred to the Court of Appeals for intermediate review.
In its Decision[35] dated January 13, 2006, the appellate court affirmed in toto the decision of the court a quo.
Thus, this appeal, raising the following arguments:
I 1994. Actual restraint of the victim's liberty was evident in the instant case from the moment Agnes was taken
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN RENDERING IN THE ABOVE-TITLED CASE DESPITE THE FACT THAT
THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE COURT A QUO HAS LOST THE COLD NEUTRALITY OF AN IMPARTIAL JUDGE,
THEREBY VIOLATING THE RIGHT OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT TO DUE PROCESS.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES
OF (1) KIDNAPPING AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL DETENTION WITH FRUSTRATED MURDER, (2) CARNAPPING, AND (3)
THEFT.
Roxas challenged the RTC judge's neutrality as he invoked that he was deprived of his right to due process
because of the "unexplained presence" of the former Secretary of the Department of Justice, Hernando Perez, in
court.  He contended that the RTC was already predisposed to convict him even before trial.
We are unconvinced.
Agnes not only positively identified her abductors, she also graphically narrated what happened on January 12,
from Panay Avenue to a remote place in Batangas. Agnes testified, thus:
Q - After Roberto Gungon pulled you towards the back seat, what happened?
A - Venancio Roxas took the driver seat and started the car, sir. I mean, he took the driver seat and started the
car.
Q - What was Roberto Gungon doing after Venancio Roxas started the car?
A - He was holding me sir.
Q - How was he holding you?
A - One hand on my shoulder and the other one is (sic) on my leg, sir.
xxxx
Q - What did Gungon do with the bottle?
A - He still forced me but when I refused he just placed it down in the car, sir.

The Court finds no basis for appellant's allegation that he was deprived of due process of law and that the trial Q - After that what happened?
conducted was far from impartial and fair. The imputation of bias and partiality is not supported by the record. A - Roxas still drove and Gungon was still holding me, then after that we went to this gasoline station to gas up,
The fact that the trial judge opted to believe the prosecution's evidence rather than that of the defense is not a sir.
sign of bias.[36]
xxxx
Even if the RTC had allowed the presence of then Secretary Hernando Perez and the media, there is no sufficient
basis to show that their presence or pervasive publicity unduly influenced the court's judgment. Before we could Q - Why were you not able to escape while you were seated and crying?
conclude that appellant was prejudiced by the presence of the media and Secretary Perez, he must first show A - Because Gungon was holding me and everytime I just made a slight move, he poked the gun at me, sir. [39]
substantial proof, not merely cast suspicions. There must be a showing that adverse publicity indeed influenced
the court's decision.[37] We found none, in this case. xxxx

Appellant further argued that the RTC erred in finding him guilty of the crimes charged against him. Q - While you were praying, do you know what Gungon and Roxas were doing at that time?

Time and again, we have ruled that the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and their xxxx
testimonies are entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any clear
showing that the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and A - Yes, Roxas was driving and Gungon was still holding me and he asked Roxas if he could relieve himself, sir.
substance which would have affected the result of the case. The trial court is in a better position to decide the
question of credibility, having seen and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner xxxx
of testifying.[38]
Q - After your car stopped, what happened?
We have painstakingly examined the records of the case, particularly the testimonies for the prosecution and the A - He told Gungon that he'll take a leak (sic) first before Gungon so Roxas alighted from the car and took a leak
defense. However, after much examination, we find no persuasive much less compelling reason to depart from (sic), sir.
the findings of the trial court.
Q - How about Gungon, where was he?
A - He was seated beside me, he was still holding me, sir.
Q - After Roxas finished leaking (sic), do you know what did he do (sic), if any?
A- Yes, he went back to the car, he sat at the driver's seat, he faced in front of me (sic), took the gun and poked it
at me and then Gungon alighted from the car and he was the next one who took a leak (sic), sir.
xxxx
Q - After Roxas alighted from the car, where were you at that time?
A - I was still sitting at the car, with Gungon, sir.
Q- What was Gungon doing at that time?
A- Yes, we were waiting for Roxas and he was holding my leg, sir. [40]
xxxx
Q - Previously, you testified that Gungon was holding you and everytime you made a slight movement he would
grips (sic) you firmly and poke a gun at you. My question is - for how long had Gungon been doing this?
A - Ever since he pulled me from the driver seat to the back seat up to the time when we were cruising along
South Superhighway, sir.
Q - Up to that while you were driving?
A - Yes, sir.
Q - When you reached Batangas, in the bakery, what was Gungon's (sic) doing to you, if any?
A- He kept on holding me although from time to time and only when I made a slight move, sir. [41]
Thus, based on the foregoing testimony of Agnes, the trial court did not err in convicting appellant of the crime
of kidnapping and serious illegal detention. Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code defines the crime, thus:
Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. -- Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death;
1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority;
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or
detained, or if threats to kill him shall have been made;
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the
parents, female or a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. (As amended by Sec. 8, Republic Act No. 7659). [42]
The evidence likewise reveal, undoubtedly, the commission of frustrated murder as qualified by the
circumstances of treachery and evident premeditation. The medical findings show that had it not been due to
the timely and proper medical attention given to the victim, the gunshot wound sustained by the victim would
have been fatal.
Treachery exists when an offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods or
forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and specially to ensure its execution, without risk to himself,
arising from the defense which the offended party might make.  As narrated by Agnes, she could not have been
aware that she would be attacked by appellant. In the darkness of the night while she just finished relieving
herself and still trying to get up, she was shot by appellant in the head with a gun. There was no opportunity for
her to defend herself, since appellant, suddenly and without provocation, shot her as she was about to get up. 
The essence of treachery is the unexpected and sudden attack on the victim which renders the latter unable and
unprepared to defend himself by reason of the suddenness and severity of the attack. This criterion applies
whether the attack is frontal or from behind.[43]
Moreover, the requisites of evident premeditation was likewise duly established in this case, to wit: (a) the time
when the accused determined to commit the crime; (b) an act manifestly indicating that the accused has clung to
his determination; and (c) a sufficient lapse of time between such determination and execution to allow him to
reflect upon the consequences of his act.[44]
The prosecution's evidence particularly the testimony of Agnes demonstrated that Gungon and Roxas had indeed
planned to kill her from the time they took the car.  As testified to by Agnes:
Q- You said that Roxas returned with a biscuit and a bottle of softdrink, what was done with the biscuit and
bottle of softdrink, if you know?
A - I refused to accept it, he insisted but still I refused so he just handed it to Gungon. He just told Gungon
"mamaya painom mo sa kanya at pakainin mo siya," sir.
Q - Why did you refuse the softdrink?
A- Simply because when he handed it to me I saw tablets floating inside the bottle, sir. [45]
xxxx
Q - At about 5:00 and 6:00 in the evening of January 12, 1994 where were you at that time?
xxxx
A- Actually we were not really there, its (sic) we were headed towards South Superhighway. I mean I don't know
the exact place but I am familiar that we were heading towards South super highway, sir.
xxxx
Q - When you reached the South Superhighway at that time what happened?
A - While we were in the car Gungon got his beeper and then he told Roxas "Boss, negative Philcoa," sir.
xxxx
Q - While you were driving along South super highway at that time, do you know what happened inside the car
between the three of you?
A - Yes, sir. That time Gungon was still holding me and then he told Roxas "boss, dalhin na natin siya sa dati, doon
na natin siya i-s."
Q - After you heard that remark of Gungon, what did you do?
A - Well, of course I was shocked and I asked them if they were going to rape me or kill me or just leave me
somewhere, I do not know, sir.
Q - After you uttered those words, do you know if Gungon answered?
A - Yes, sir, he told me that don't give us ideas (sic). [46]
Q - How were you able to place the time?
A - There is a watch on the dashboard of the car, sir.[48]
Thus, from the foregoing, it is evident that the commission of the killing, albeit frustrated, was formed from the
moment the accused took the victim in Quezon City until she was ultimately "executed" in Batangas.  The lapse
of more than eight hours, that is, approximately from 1:00 p.m. to 10:00 p.m., satisfies the last requisite for the
appreciation of evident premeditation as there was sufficient time for meditation and reflection before the
commission of the crime yet appellant proceeded with the same.
Likewise, we agree that Roxas is also guilty of violation of the Anti-Carnapping Law.  R.A. 6539, otherwise known
as An Act Preventing and Penalizing Carnapping, defines carnapping as the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor
vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things."  More specifically, the elements of the crime are as follows:
1. That there is an actual taking of the vehicle;
2. That the offender intends to gain from the taking of the vehicle;
3. That the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender himself;

xxxx 4. That the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means of
violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things.
Q - What did you do when the bottle of softdrink was being offered to you?
A - I refused to get it, sir. A careful examination of the evidence presented would show that all the elements of carnapping were proven in
this case. It cannot be denied that the 1993 Nissan Sentra with plate number TKR-837 was unlawfully taken from
Q - When you refused to drink it, do you know what did Gungon do? Agnes without her consent and by means of force or intimidation, considering that he and his co-accused
A - Yes, he got mad and furious, he held me so tight and forced me to drink it, sir. alternately poked a gun at Agnes. After shooting her, appellant also flee with the subject vehicle which shows his
intent to gain. Agnes also positively identified appellant and Gungon as the ones who took the subject vehicle
Q - Now, because he was furious and he was angry at you, what did you do? from her.
A - I took the softdrink, sir.
Finally, we likewise agree that Roxas is only guilty of theft and not robbery as initially charged.
Q- After you drank that softdrink, what happened?
From the records, it appears that the jewelries and cash were taken from Agnes without the attendance of
xxxx violence or intimidation upon her person.  Agnes herself testified that when she regained consciousness, she
already found her necklace, pair of earrings, watch and cash, to be missing. [49] While it was proven beyond
A - Yes, sir, after drinking it Roxas offered two (2) more tablets to Gungon, he told to Gungon "ipainom mo pa sa reasonable doubt that appellant took Agnes' personal things, there was no evidence, however, that the taking
kanya itong dalawang tabletas dahil malaki siya, mahina iyong dalawa para sa kanya". [47] was employed with the use of force, violation and intimidation.
PENALTIES
xxxx
As to the imposable penalty, we sustain the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the appellate court, with
Q - Do you know what time was it when you woke up? modification as to the penalty for the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with frustrated murder
A - I guess it was about 9:30 or 10:00 in the evening, sir. and the awarding of damages.
The crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention has been correctly complexed by the RTC with frustrated
murder.  A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more, grave or less grave, felonies,
or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other.
In a complex crime, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its
maximum period. Since the kidnapping and serious illegal detention is the more serious crime, the proper
penalty under Article 267[50] of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659, should be applied in its
maximum period; thus, the penalty should be death.  However, in light of R.A. 9346, or the Anti-Death Penalty
Law, which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the imposition of the penalty of reclusion
perpetua instead of death is, thus, proper and ineligible for parole.
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.  The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated January 13, 2006, in CA-
G.R. CR-HC No. 00666, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, insofar as to sentence appellant Venancio Roxas y
Arguelles to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention
with Frustrated Murder, and to declare him ineligible for parole. Appellant is, likewise, ordered to pay Agnes
Guirindola P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages. 
Costs against the appellant.
SO ORDERED.

Likewise, in accordance with current jurisprudence, we modify the award of damages, and apply People  of the Philippines v. Richard O. Sarcia[51] where we said:

The principal consideration for the award of damages, under the ruling in People v. Salome  and People v.
Quiachon is the penalty provided by law or imposable for the offense because of its heineousness, not the
public penalty actually imposed on the offender.

xxxx

It should be noted that while the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for
by law for a heinous offense is still death and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for
the victim is still Php75,000.00.

People v. Quiachon also rationcinates as follows:

With respect to the award of damages, the appellate court, following prevailing jurisprudence, correctly awarded
the following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity which is awarded if the crime is qualified by circumstances
warranting the imposition of the death penalty; P75,000.00 as moral damages because the victim is assumed to
have suffered moral injuries, hence, entitling her to an award of moral damages even without proof thereof, x x
x.

Even if the penalty of death is not to be imposed on the appellant because of the prohibition in R.A. No.
9346, the civil indemnity of P75,000.00 is still proper because, following the rationcination in People v.
Victor, the said award is not dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that
qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death penalty attended the commission of the
offense. The Court declared that the award of P75,000.00 shows "not only a reaction to the apathetic societal
perception of the penal law and the financial fluctuations over time but also the expression of the displeasure
of the court of the incidence of heinous crimes against chastity."

The litmus test therefore, in the determination of the civil indemnity is the heinous character of the crime
committed, which would have warranted the imposition of the death penalty, regardless of whether the penalty
actually imposed is reduced to reclusion perpetua.[52]
2/47 G.R. No. 224562/G.R. No. 237216. September 18, 2019
G.R. No. 224562 - EXCEL GURRO Y MAGA, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.; G.R. NO.
237216 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLE, v. EXCEL GURRO Y MAGA, WENNIE INTING, JJ. IDIAN
Y JAMINDANG AND JOEL JAMINDANG Y ZOSA, ACCUSED, WENNIE IDIAN Y JAMINDANG AND EXCEL GURRO Y
MAGA. ACCUSED-APPELLANTS:
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
Assailed in these consolidated cases is the Decision  dated September 23, 2015 and the Resolution 2 dated May
1
11, 2016, rendered by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 06112, which affirmed the Decision 3 dated
December 5, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City, Branch 192, in Criminal Case No. 2008-
10454-MK, convicting Excel Gurro y Maga (Excel) and Wennie Idian y Jamindang (Wennie) of Kidnapping with
Homicide.
The Antecedents
On August 12, 2008, an Information for Kidnapping for Ransom was filed against Excel. 4
On October 3, 2008, the prosecution, with leave of court, filed an Amended Information to include Wennie and
Joel Jamindang y Zosa (Joel) as additional accused.5
Then, on January 6, 2009, with leave of court, a Second Amended Information, 6 alleging the fact of death was
filed and, accordingly, the offense was amended to Kidnapping with Homicide. The accusatory portion of the
Second Amended Information states that:
The undersigned State Prosecutors hereby accuse EXCEL GURRO y MAGA @ EXCEL, JOEL JAMINDANG y ZOSA @
JOJO, WENNIE IDIAN y JAMINDANG @ WINNIE, and JOHN DOE/S, of the crime of KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE,
defined and penalized under Article 267 of the [R]evised Penal Code committed as follows:
That on or about August 2, 2008, at Malanday, Marikina City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating, and mutually helping one another,
together with other persons whose names and identities are unknown, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously kidnapped and detained victim, AAA, AN 8-YEAR- OLD MINOR, AGAINST HER WILL, FOR THE
PURPOSE OF EXTORTING RANSOM FROM THE VICTIM AND THE LATTER'S FAMILY AND THEREAFTER, DEMANDED
THE AMOUNT OF Three Million (Php 3,000,000.00) Pesos, and actually received the amount of One Hundred
Eighty-Six Thousand (Php186,000.00) pesos ransom money in exchange for AAA's life and liberty. While in
captivity victim AAA was murdered by the accused while in detention.
CONTRARY TO LAW.7
Joel pleaded guilty to the charge of kidnapping with homicide, while Excel and Wennie pleaded not guilty to the
charge.8 Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The antecedent facts reveal that on August 2, 2008, Arnel Salvador (Arnel) brought his daughter AAA to the
house of Wennie. Wennie is the wife of Randy, the brother of Arnel's wife, Helen Salvador (Helen). 9
Prosecution witness Patrick Mabulac (Patrick) confirmed that he saw AAA at Wennie's house playing with the
latter's daughters, at around 2:00 p.m. of August 2, 2008. Later on, he saw Wennie leave with AAA. Wennie
returned alone at 3:00 p.m.10
AAA went missing thereafter.
At around 5:00p.m. of even date, Bernard, Helen's brother received a text message from an unknown person
saying, "hawak namin ang anak ninyo. Don 't call cops. 3 Million, kung hindi papatayin namin ang anak ninyo."11
At around 6:00 to 7:00p.m., Helen, Arnel, Randy, and Helen's mother went to Wennie's house looking for AAA.
When the group had left, Wennie asked Patrick to help her look for AAA. Since Wennie's cellphone battery was
running low, she borrowed Patrick's cellphone and inserted her SIM card therein. She then texted someone.
After removing her SIM Card from Patrick's phone, Wennie apologized to him, claiming that she accidentally
deleted all of the messages in his cellphone. Later that night, Wennie again borrowed Patrick's cellphone and
deleted all of the latter's contacts. 12
The next day, Patrick was about to send Joel a text quote, when he suddenly noticed that Joel's number had
been deleted from his contact list. Patrick commented to Wennie that she had deleted Joel's number, to which
Wennie casually replied that she may have erased it by accident as she was not accustomed to using Patrick's
cellphone. Then, Patrick asked Wennie for Joel's number, but the latter dismissively said that Joel no longer has a
cellphone. Patrick asked for Joel's number from the house helper. Later on, Patrick showed the Salvador family
Joel's cellphone number and they noticed that Joel's number matched that of the kidnapper's. 13
At around 8:00 p.m., Arnel's family received another text message from the kidnappers asking if the money was
already available. The kidnappers ordered Arnel to come up with the money, otherwise, they would kill AAA. 14
The next morning, Arnel sent a message to the kidnappers and informed them that he only had P186,000.00. The
kidnappers instructed him to bring the money to 7-Eleven at Bayan, Marikina City. Upon reaching 7-Eleven, Arnel
received another message ordering him to go to Metrobank instead and deposit the money in the account of one
Jackielou Guevarra (Jackielou). 15
Randy accompanied Arnel at Metrobank. While depositing the money, Arnel was informed that the amount he
deposited was being wired to Catbalogan City. Hearing this, Randy commented that Jojo (Joel) might be
involved.16
At around 5:00 p.m., Arnel again received a text message from the kidnappers saying that AAA will be dropped
off in Cubao, Quezon City. However, AAA was never released. Arnel and his family learned that AAA had been
killed on August 3, 2008. They were instructed to go to a funeral parlor in Laguna to identify her body. 17
On August 5, 2008, Wennie suddenly left for Catbalogan, Samar. 18
During the trial, prosecution witness Jackielou testified that at around 12 noon of August 4, 2008, Excel suddenly
approached her while she was standing in line at the Automated Teller Machine in Metrobank Catbalogan,
Samar. She had known Excel since high school. Excel asked if he could borrow her account number so that his
cousin Joel could deposit P20,000.00 in her account for his tuition fee. 19
Later on, Jackielou received a text message from Excel informing her that P186,000.00 had been deposited to her
account. She withdrew the money and handed it to Excel, who placed it inside a yellow plastic bag. 20
The accused vehemently denied the charges leveled against them. Wennie and Joel related that they are siblings,
while Excel is their cousin. Joel admitted that he kidnapped AAA and, thereafter, killed her because he got
irritated with her, as she kept insisting to go home. 21
Joel stated that Wennie had nothing to do with the crime, and that he merely used Excel to receive the ransom
money. He related that he told Excel to look for somebody with a Metrobank account because Joel's father will
be sending a large sum of money to Excel. After withdrawing the money, Excel remitted P183,000.00 to Joel
through ML Kwarta Padala. Thereafter, he and his· cohorts went to Naga City and divided the ransom. 22
Likewise, Joel claimed that Patrick was the mastermind of the plot to kidnap AAA. He related that he sent
P30,000.00 to Patrick from the ransom money he received from the Salvador family. 23
Wennie also denied the charges leveled against her. Wennie admitted that Arnel left AAA. in her care. She
claimed that she brought the victim to her friend's house and they went home after 15 minutes. Then, AAA left
for home at around 2:00 p.m.24
Ruling of the RTC
On December 5, 2012, the RTC rendered a Decision 25 conv1ctmg Wennie and Joel, as principals and Excel, as an
accomplice for the crime of Kidnapping with Homicide.
The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the court finds accused [JOEL] and [WENNIE], GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of
KIDNAPPING WITH HOMICIDE. Both accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The accused, [EXCEL], is GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT as an ACCOMPLICE and hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months, and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
The accused are hereby ORDERED to pay, jointly and severally, to the heirs of the victim, AAA, civil indemnity in
the amount of Fifty Thousand (Php 50,000.00) Pesos.
SO ORDERED.26
Aggrieved, Wennie and Excel filed an appeal before the CA..
Ruling of the CA
On September 23, 2015, the CA rendered the assailed Decision 27 affirming the conviction meted by the RTC unto
Wennie and Excel. The CA found that Joel and Wennie conspired to kidnap AAA. Also, the CA held that Excel was
an accomplice of Joel and Wennie. According to the CA, Excel's act of borrowing the Metrobank account of his
friend, thereby allowing him to receive the ransom was proof that he assisted in thecrime. 28
As for the damages awarded, the CA increased the amount of civil indemnity awarded by the RTC to
P100,000.00. The CA, likewise, awarded moral damages of P100,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00.
Finally, the CA apportioned the award of damages by adjudging Joel and Wennie liable to shoulder the greater
share of the damages in the amount of 5/6, while holding Excel liable for merely 1/6 of the total amount of
damages.29
The dispositive portion of the assailed CA decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeals are DENIED. The assailed December 5, 2012 Decision is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, that:
1. Joel Jarnindang y Zosa and Wem1ie Idian y Jamindang are jointly and severally ORDERED to pay the heirs of
the victim, Php 250,000.00 as civil indemnity, moral and exemplary damages;
2. Excel Gurro y Maga is ORDERED to pay the heirs of the victim, Php 50,000.00 as civil indemnity, moral and
exemplary damages; and
3. Interest is imposed on the monetary awards at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this
judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.30
Aggrieved, Wennie filed a Notice of Appeal31 under Section 13(c) of Rule 124 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure.
On the other hand, Excel filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari32 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
On August 13, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution33 ordering the consolidation of the two cases.
The Issue
The main issue raised for the Court's resolution rests on whether or not the prosecution sufficiently established
the guilt of Wennie and Excel beyond reasonable doubt.
Both Wennie and Excel claim that the prosecution failed to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Particularly, Wennie argues that the circumstance that she was last seen with AAA is not by itself sufficient to
prove her complicity to the crime. Likewise, she urges the Court to give credence to Joel's statement that she
(Wennie) was not involved in kidnapping AAA.34
In the same vein, Excel asserts in his Petition for Review on Certiorari35 that both the trial court and the CA erred
in convicting him as an accomplice to the crime. He contends that he did not assist Joel in profiting from the
effects of the crime. He was not aware of the kidnapping and had no idea that the amount deposited in the
account of Jackielou partook of ransom money.
On the other hand, the People of the Philippines, through the Office of the 'Solicitor General (OSG), counters that
the prosecution sufficiently established the guilt of both Wennie and Excel. The OSG avers that the evidence
shows that Wennie conspired with Joel to kidnap AAA. She was the last person seen with AAA, and her acts
subsequent to the kidnapping were certainly dubious. In fact, prosecution witnesses Arnel and Patrick confirmed
that AAA was last seen with Wennie. As a conspirator, Wennie was equally responsible for all the acts committed
by Joel.36
Likewise, Excel actively cooperated with Joel and Wennie in the crime of kidnapping, by acting as the medium
through which Joel received the ransom money.37
Ruling of the Court
The Court affirms the conviction of Wennie and Excel.
The Prosecution Established Beyond
Reasonable Doubt the Guilt of
Wennie as a Principal to the Crime
of Kidnapping for Ransom with
Homicide
Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659, 38 defines and penalizes
the crime of kidnapping, as follows:
Article 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another,
or in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
1. If the kidnapping or detentio11 shall have lasted more than three days.
2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.
3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if threats to
kill him shall have been made.
4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents, female or
a public officer.
The penalty shall be death where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present
in the commission of the offense.
When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed. 39
In the cases of People v. Dionaldo, et al.40 and People v. Elizalde, et al.,41 the Court explained that if the victim was
detained for the purpose of extorting ransom and the victim dies during detention, then the crime committed
shall be the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This holds true in the case at bar,
considering that all the elements for the said crime were sufficiently alleged in the Information, in that: (i) the
victim was detained against her will; (ii) the accused demanded ransom from the victim's family; and (iii) the
victim was killed during detention. Thus, the proper nomenclature for the offense committed shall be kidnapping
for ransom with homicide, and not simply kidnapping for homicide, as the prosecution charged.
More importantly, the prosecution was able to prove each of the component offenses of kidnapping for ransom
with homicide. AAA was a minor, who was taken on August 2, 2008 and was, thereafter, detained or deprived of
her liberty, in exchange for ransom. Later on, AAA was killed while in detention.
Joel pleaded guilty to the crime but denied conspiring with his sister Wennie. In the same regard, Wennie urges
that the prosecution failed to prove the alleged conspiracy between her and Joel.
The Court is not persuaded.
It cannot be gainsaid that conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. 42 Once conspiracy is established, the responsibility of the
conspirators is collective, thereby rendering them all equally liable regardless of the extent of their respective
participations.43 This means that each conspirator is responsible for everything done by his/her confederates
which follows incidentally in the execution of a common design as one of its probable and natural
consequences.44 Simply stated, their responsibility is not confined to the accomplishment of the particular
purpose of conspiracy, but extends to collateral acts and offenses incident to and growing out of their intended
purpose.45 In the same vein, the conspirators are deemed to have intended the consequences of their acts and
by purposely engaging in conspiracy which necessarily and directly produces a prohibited result, they are, in
contemplation of law, chargeable with intending that result. 46
Equally important, direct proof is not necessary to establish the fact of conspiracy. Rather, conspiracy may be
presumed from, and proven by the acts of, the accused pointing to a joint purpose, design, concerted action and
community of interests.47
In the case at bar, the prosecution presented credible and sufficient pieces of circumstantial evidence which,
when taken together, prove that Wennie conspired with Joel, to wit:
(i) At around 1:00 p.m. of August 2, 2008, AAA was brought by her father to Wennie's house;
(ii) An hour thereafter, Wennie, together with AAA, left the house on board the former's tricycle;
(iii) At 3:00 p.m., Wennie came home alone;
(iv) AAA was never seen again;
(v) Wennie started acting suspiciously after AAA's disappearance;
(vi) On the night that AAA's family went looking for her, Wennie kept secretly texting an unknown person using
Patrick's cellphone;
(vii) Wennie admitted having deleted the cellphone number of Joel from Patrick's cellphone;
(viii) Wennie kept misleading Patrick as to Joel's correct cellphone number and deliberately gave him the wrong
cellphone number; and
(ix) Joel's cellphone number was found to be the same as that of the kidnapper's.
It is all too apparent that Wennie's susp1cwus acts show her complicity to the crime. To begin with, she was the
last person seen with AAA. She and AAA went outside of the house, but the former returned home alone. AAA
went missing thereafter.
Likewise, Wennie's staunch efforts at protecting Joel were indeed questionable. It was certainly suspicious why
Wennie constantly misled Patrick as to Joel's true cellphone number. First, she deleted all of the messages in
Particle's cellphone after using the same, and then she deleted all of Patrick's contacts. Not content, Wennie
even misled Patrick, by deliberately giving a wrong number. All of these suspicious deeds cast doubt unto
Wennie's innocence, especially since it was later on discovered that Joel's cellphone number matched that of the
kidnapper's.
In addition, it was highly suspicious why Wennie suddenly went home to Catbalogan City - the town where the
money was wired. Also, it was discovered that Wennie was heavily indebted and had pawned pieces of jewelry
belonging to her husband Randy without this knowledge. 48
Certainly, the acts of Wennie, when taken together, reveal that she acted in concert with Joel and that their acts
emanated from the same purpose or common design showing unity in its execution. For sure, Joel would not
have been able to kidnap AAA if not for the participation of Wennie.
Against this factual backdrop, all that Wennie offers as proof of her innocence is the weak defense of denial. This
defense cannot prevail, as it is settled that "alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing
evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in law. They are considered with
suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently weak and unreliable but also
because they are easily fabricated and concocted." 49 A denial cannot prevail over the positive testimony of
prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to falsely testify against the appellants. 50
Excel is Guilty as an Accessory to
the Crime of Kidnapping for
Ransom with Homicide
The RPC delineates the liabilities of each of the offenders by determining the extent of their respective
participations in the offense committed.
Relatedly, principals are those who either (i) "take a direct part in the execution of the act;" 51 (ii) "directly force
or induce others to commit it;"52 (iii) "or cooperate in the commission of the offense by another act without
which it would not have been accomplished." 53 While accomplices are those persons who, not having acted as
principals, cooperate in the execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts. 54
On the other hand, accessories to the crime are described in Article 19 as:
[T]hose who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime, and without having participated therein, either
as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its commission in any of the following manners:
1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offender to profit by the effects of the crime.
2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.
3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principals of the crime, provided the accessory acts
with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason, parricide, murder, or
an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty of some other
crime.55 (Emphasis Ours)
In the instant case, Excel was convicted by the trial court and the CA as an accomplice to the special complex
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide.
The Court disagrees.
It must be noted that the prosecution failed to prove, much less allege, any overt act on Excel's part showing his
direct participation in the kidnapping itself. It must be remembered that for one to be regarded as an
accomplice, it must be shown that (i) he knew the criminal design of the principal by direct participation, and
concurred with the latter in his purpose; (ii) he cooperated in the execution by previous or simultaneous acts,
with the intention of supplying material or moral aid in the execution of the crime in an efficacious way; and (iii)
his acts bore a direct relation with the acts done by the principal. 56
There was no showing that Excel actually cooperated or assisted in kidnapping AAA and detaining the latter. At
best, Excel's participation in the incident was limited to acts committed after the abduction was already
consummated. Particularly, Excel retrieved the ransom money from Metrobank and, thereafter, immediately
forwarded the same to Joel, through four money transfer transactions through ML Kwarta Padala remittance on
August 4, 2008, merely two hours after Arnel wired the ransom money to the kidnappers. 57 This was established
through the documents presented by Atty. Heidi Caguioa (Atty. Caguioa), Compliance Officer of ML Kwarta
Padala. Atty. Caguioa presented photocopies of Excel's identification card and the accomplished "Know-Your-
Customer Form" of Joel, as well as the Payout Receipts issued to Joel. 58
Likewise, there is no doubt that Excel was aware of the crime Joel committed. His actuations are certainly
suspect. He deceived Jackielou by telling her that his cousin Joel will be depositing P20,000.00 to her account for
his tuition fee. However, he later on texted Jackielou that the amount was P183,000.00. He did not express any
shock or surprise about suddenly receiving a hefty sum. Moreover, he immediately forwardede money to Joel,
two hours after the said amount was deposited by Arnel. 59
Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide and shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as maximum.
Likewise, Wennie Idian y Jamindang and Joel Jamindang y Zosa, as principals, are solidarily liable for P100,000.00
as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, while Excel
Gurro y Maga shall bear P25,000.00 for each of the said damages.
All amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of this
Decision until the full satisfaction thereof.
SO ORDERED.

The Proper Penalties

Having thus established the guilt of Wennie as Joel's co-conspirator in the special complex crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom with Homicide, she shall be meted with the penalty of death. However, in view I of R.A. No. 9346,60
which suspended the imposition of the death penalty,  she shall be sentenced to the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole.

On the other hand, Excel, as an accessory to the crime, shall be punished with a penalty two degrees lower
than reclusion perpetua, which shall be prision mayor. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty
shall be two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.61

As for the award of damages, the Court grants P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages;
and P100,000.00 exemplary damages, in conformity with the Court's ruling in People v. Jugueta.62

The liability of Joel, Wennie and Excel for the payment of damages shall be apportioned in accordance with the
degrees of their liability, respective responsibilities and actual participation in the crime.     This means that the
P100,0000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages, shall
be bot1ne solidarily by the principals Wennie and Joel, while Excel, as an accessory Ito the crime, shall be liable
for P25,000.00 for each of the aforementioned damages.

Finally, all the amounts due shall earn a legal interest of six percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality
of the Court's Decision until full satisfaction. 64

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated September 23, 2015 and the Resolution dated May 11,
2016, rendered by :the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR- HC No. 06112, are AFFIRMED with modification. Wennie
Idian y Jamindang and Joel Jamindang y Zosa are declared GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals to the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide and shall be meted with the penalty of reclusion
perpetua without eligibility for parole. Excel Gurro y Maga shall be held liable as an accessory to the crime of

3/48 G.R. No. 226836, December 05, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BONG CHAN AND ELMO CHAN, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
Actual taking indicates an intention to deprive the victim of his liberty. 1
This is an appeal filed by appellants Bong Chan (Bong) and Elmo Chan (Elmo) from the March 31, 2016
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R CR-HC No. 06418, affirming the July 31, 2013 Decision 3 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Alaminos City, Pangasinan, Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 4755-A, finding
appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as defined
and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC).
The Factual Antecedents
Appellants were charged under the following Information:
That on or about September 27, 2004 in the evening[,] in Barangay Tawin-tawin, Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and helping each other and after threatening to kill the victim, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously club Reynard P. Camba with pieces of bamboo until he was rendered unconscious and
thereafter, the same accused placed his body in a sack and carried him away depriving him of his liberty against
his will and continued to detain and hide him illegally up to the present.
Contrary to [Article] 267 of the Revised Penal Code. 4
When arraigned, appellants pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. 5
Version of the Prosecution
During the bail hearing, the prosecution presented as witness, the victim's second cousin, Tito Camba (Tito) who
was present the night the victim had an altercation with the family of the appellants. 6
During the trial, the prosecution presented as witnesses: (1) Ernesto Estepa (Ernesto), the victim's uncle; (2)
Rachelle Camba (Rachelle) and Erica Jean Camba (Erica), daughters of the victim; and (3) Rey Camba (Rey), the
brother of the victim.7
According to the version of the prosecution, the victim was the nephew of Ernesto's wife; that at around
9:00p.m. of September 27, 2004, the victim went to Ernesto's house to visit his (victim's) son, who was living with
Ernesto and his wife; that the victim stayed at Ernesto's house for about two hours; that the victim told Ernesto
that, earlier that evening, the victim had a quarrel with Melrose Libadia (Melrose) and her husband, Ronnie,
because Melrose refused to sell the victim liquor from her store and that Melrose's father, appellant Elmo,
threatened to kill the victim; that upon hearing this, Ernesto told the victim that it would be better for the latter
to stay the night; that the victim refused because his wife might look for him; that around 11:00 p.m., the victim
left Ernesto's house; that Ernesto followed the victim only until the latter was nearing the house of Helen Pamo;
that the victim was about 10-20 meters ahead of Ernesto; that when the victim reached Melrose's house,
Ernesto saw appellants come out of the yard; that upon seeing appellants, Ernesto hid; that Ernesto saw
appellants hit the victim with bamboo sticks on the neck and kept hitting him even after he became unconscious
and fell to the ground face down; that appellants went inside the yard; that they came back carrying a sack; that
the appellants placed the victim, who was then unconscious, inside the sack and carried him inside their yard;
that Ernesto did not see what happened thereafter; that he went home and had a restless night; that the
following day, he drove his jeepney plying the route of Alaminos-Lingayen; that when he arrived at his house at
around 5:30 p.m., he met Rey, the brother of the victim; and that Ernesto told Rey that appellants killed the
victim and that Rey should not tell anyone about it because they might kill him also. 8
Rachelle, Erica, and Rey testified for the sole purpose of proving damages. 9
Version of the Defense
The defense, on the other hand, offered the testimony of appellant Bong and his sister, Melrose. 10
Melrose testified that around 9:00p.m. of September 27, 2004, she was inside their house when the victim and
Tito wanted to buy liquor; that she told the victim that she had no more stock of wine; that, contrary to the claim
of the prosecution, there was no heated argument; that she left them and returned inside their house to take
care of her husband who was sick at that time; and that on the said night, her brother and her father were at the
auditorium of Barangay Tawin-tawin, which is a kilometer away from their house, to watch over their sacks
of palay.11
Appellant Bong, on the other hand, denied the accusations against them and claimed that, on the said evening,
at around 10:00 p.m., he and his father were at the cemented pavement near the auditorium to watch over their
palay that was scheduled for drying the following day; and that they stayed there until the morning of
September 28, 2004.12
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 31, 2013the RTC rendered a Decision finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the RPC. The RTC gave no
credence to the appellants' defenses of alibi and denial considering the positive testimony of Ernesto, who had
no ill motive to testify falsely against the appellants.13 Thus -
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds both accused Bong Chan and Elmo Chan
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention as defined and penalized
under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and as charged in the afore-quoted Information and, accordingly,
hereby sentences them to each suffer the penalty of imprisonment of reclusion perpetua or twenty (20) years
and one (1) day to forty (40) years with the accessory penalties provided for by law; to pay the heirs of the late
Reynald Camba the amount of P50,000.00 as indemnification and the amount of P30,000.00 as moral damages,
both without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs.
In the service of their sentence, the accused shall be credited with the full time during which they underwent
preventive imprisonment provided that they voluntarily agreed in writing to abide by the same disciplinary rules
imposed upon convicted prisoners otherwise they shall be credited to only four fifths (4/5) thereof. (Article 29,
Revised Penal Code, as amended).SO ORDERED.14
Appellants appealed the case to the CA putting in issue the credibility of Ernesto. They contended that Ernesto's
testimony that he was driving his jeepney in the morning of September 28, 2004 to earn money contradicted
with the testimony of Rachelle that Ernesto was with them in the morning of September 28, 2004 looking for the
victim.15 They further argued that the prosecution failed to prove actual confinement, detention, or restraint of
the victim.16
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On March 31, 2016, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The CA agreed with the RTC that the prosecution
was able to establish all the elements of the crime. 17 The CA pointed out that the element of restraint was clearly
established by the testimony of Ernesto. 18 As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimonies of Ernesto and
Rachelle, the CA ruled that these pertained to events which transpired after the commission of the crime. 19 As
such, these inconsistencies on minor details did not in any way affect the veracity of Ernesto's testimony. 20
Hence, appellants filed the instant appeal, raising the same arguments they had in the CA.
Our Ruling
The appeal lacks merit.
The prosecution was able to prove all the elements of the crime.
Under Article 267 of the RPC, the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are, as
follows: "(1) the offender is a private individual; (2) he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner
deprives the victim of his liberty; (3) the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal; and (4) in the commission of the
offense, any of the following circumstances is present: (a) the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three
days; (b) it is committed by simulating public authority; (c) serious physical injuries are inflicted on the victim or
threats to kill are made; or (d) the person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or public officer." 21
All the elements of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case. First, appellants
are both private individuals. Second, the fact that they kidnapped the victim was clearly established by the
testimony of the prosecution's eyewitness, Ernesto. Third, appellants' act of kidnapping was illegal. Lastly, the
victim has been detained for more than three days. In fact, until now, the victim has not returned, nor his body
been found.
Appellants, however, insist that the element of restraint was not clearly established as the prosecution allegedly
failed to establish actual confinement, detention, or restraint of the victim.
The Court does not agree.
Actual confinement, detention, and restraint of the victim is the primary element of the crime of
kidnapping.22 Thus, in order to sustain a conviction, the prosecution must show "actual confinement or
restriction of the victim, and that such deprivation was the intention of the malefactor." 23
In this case, Ernesto testified that he saw appellants: (1) hit the victim on the neck and other body parts using
bamboo sticks causing the victim to fall down on the ground unconscious; (2) retrieve a sack from their yard; (3)
place the victim inside the sack; and (4) carry him to their yard. Clearly, the acts of appellants of hitting the victim
until he was unconscious, of putting him inside the sack, and of carrying him to their yard showed their intention
to immobilize the victim and deprive him of his liberty. Thus, contrary to the claim of appellants, the element of
restraint was clearly established. As aptly pointed out by the CA, "[a]ctual restraint of the victim was evident
from the moment appellants clubbed the victim on the neck and other parts of his body and thereafter placed
him inside a sack. Not only was [the victim's] freedom of movement restricted, he was immobilized because the
blows rendered him unconscious. Putting him inside the sack completely rendered the victim powerless to
resist."24
Minor inconsistencies do not affect the credibility and veracity of the testimony of the prosecution's witness.
Appellants' attempt to discredit the credibility of the prosecution's eyewitness must likewise fail.
Discrepancies or inconsistencies in the testimonies of the witnesses pertaining to minor details, not touching
upon the central fact of the crime, do not impair the credibility of the witnesses; on the contrary, they even tend
to strengthen the credibility of the witnesses since they discount the possibility of witnesses being rehearsed. 25 In
this case, discrepancies or inconsistencies in the testimony of Ernesto, vis-a-vis the testimony of Rachelle
pertaining to minor details that have no bearing on the elements of the crime, do not affect the veracity and
credibility of Ernesto's positive testimony, who had no ill motive to testify against appellants. As the Court has
consistently ruled, "the positive identification of the appellants, when categorical and consistent and without any
[ill motive] on the part of the [eyewitness] testifying on the matter, prevails over alibi and denial." 26
All told, the Court affirms the factual findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA. However, in order to conform to
prevailing jurisprudence, 27 the Court finds it necessary to increase the awards of civil indemnity and moral
damages to P75,000.00 each, and award exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 to set an example for
the public good. In addition, all damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of judgment until fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The March 31, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 06418, which affirmed the July 31, 2013 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Alaminos City, Pangasinan,
Branch 55, in Criminal Case No. 4755-A, finding appellants GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code,
is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS that the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages be increased to
P75,000.00 each and that exemplary damages in the amount of P75,000.00 be awarded. In addition, the
damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of this Decision until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
4/49 G.R. No. 226400, January 24, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. JOSELITO BRINGCULA Y FERNANDEZ, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the appeal of appellant Joselito Bringcula y Fernandez that seeks to reverse and set aside the
Decision1 dated April 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 01294-MIN finding him guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with rape.
The facts follow.
On the night of May 2, 2011, private complainant AAA was sleeping in her house together with her children,
househelper and niece. She was awakened at early dawn by the barking of the dog and when she stood up to see
if there was any one inside their house, she saw no one and went back to sleep. She was again awakened when a
man wearing a mask touched her shoulder and poked a firearm at her neck. The man told her that it was a
robbery and that she should keep quiet or else he would kill her. She was able to recognize the voice of the man
to be that of appellant Bringcula. Then, she was ordered to lie face down and was hogtied using a shoelace. The
appellant took AAA's two bracelets and wedding ring, and asked her where her money was. AAA pointed at her
bag inside the aparador  beside her bed, where she placed her money which the appellant also took.
Appellant, thereafter, made AAA lie on her back and pulled her  pajama and underwear. He also removed his
own clothing including his mask. Appellant proceeded to lick AAA's vagina, kissed her neck, laid on top of her and
inserted his penis into her vagina. AAA was unable to cry for help because appellant threatened to kill her if she
does. After satisfying his lust, appellant dressed up and took AAA's necklace and two (2) cellular phones. When
appellant left, AAA awakened her niece and told her to shout for help. A certain BBB, Barangay Captain CCC,
Kagawad EEE and some neighbors arrived at AAA's house and when they asked who the culprit was, she opted
not to immediately disclose appellant's identity.
Later in the morning, AAA went to the police station to report the incident and submitted herself for a medical
examination.
Thus, the following Information was filed against the appellant:
That on or about the 2nd day of May, 2011, in ______ , municipality of ________, Province of Bukidnon,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with firearm, by
means of force and violence, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to gain and
without the consent of the owner thereof enter the house of AAA and once inside entered the room of AAA and
rob, take, and carry away: necklace worth P1,000.00, bracelet worth P1,500.00, ring worth P600.00, two (2)
cellular phones worth P1,500.00 and cash money in the amount of P5,000.00 with a total value of P9,600,
Philippine currency, belonging to AAA;
That on the occasion of the said robbery, accused, prompted by lewd designs, by means of threat and
intimidation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously poke the firearm in the neck of AAA, hogtied
her, remove her pajama and panty, lick her vagina, place himself on top of her and inserted his penis into her
vagina and have sexual intercourse with AAA, against her will.
CONTRARY to and in violation of Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code. 2
Appellant denied the allegations and inteposed alibi as a defense. He claimed that in the evening of May 2, 2011,
he was at home sleeping. His testimony was corroborated by his wife who testified that appellant was sleeping
beside her on May 2, 2011 around 1 o'clock in the early morning.
The Regional Trial Court (RTC),3 Branch 11, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon found appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged; thus, he was sentenced with the following:
Premises above-considered and with no mitigating or aggravating circumstance, the court finds the accused DDD
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of Robbery with Rape and hereby sentences him to
suffer the penalty of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua. The preventive detention undergone by the accused
at the BJMP, Manolo, Fortich, Bukidnon shall be credited to his penalty of imprisonment, the remainder of which
he shall serve at the Davao Penal and Prison Farm, B.E. Dujali Davao Del Norte.
Furthermore, the accused is hereby ordered to pay PC the following:
1. P 9,600.00 Actual damages, if restitution is not feasible with legal interest.
2. P75,000.00 Moral damages
3. P50,000.00 Exemplary damages
4. Costs of the suits.
SO ORDERED.4
According to the RTC, the elements of the crime charged are present in the case and that the defense of
appellant is weak.
The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC with modification that appellant pay AAA 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED, the 25 March 2014 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manolo Fortich,
Bukidnon, Branch 11, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant is DIRECTED to pay AAA P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, in addition to the other damages awarded by the lower court. Interest at the rate of six percent
(6%) per annum is imposed on all the damages awarded in this case from date of finality of this judgment until
fully paid.
SO ORDERED.5
The CA agreed with the RTC that the elements of the crime of robbery with rape are present. It also agreed that
appellant's defense of denial and alibi must fail. The CA also ruled that the aggravating circumstance of dwelling
must be appreciated.
Hence, the present appeal.
Appellant claims that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He contends that his
identity was not properly established and that the testimony of AAA is not credible because of its inconsistencies.
He also questions the legality of his warrantless arrest.
The crime of Robbery with Rape is penalized under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by
Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7659. Robbery with Rape is a special complex crime under Article 294 of the
RPC. It contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take, with intent to gain,
personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime.6
In People v. Evangelio, et al.,7 this Court ruled that:
For a conviction of the crime of robbery with rape to stand, it must be shown that the rape was committed by
reason or on the occasion of a robbery and not the other way around. This special complex crime under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code contemplates a situation where the original intent of the accused was to take,
with intent to gain, personal property belonging to another and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as
an accompanying crime. x x x8
Thus, to be convicted of robbery with rape, the following elements must concur: (1) the taking of personal
property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is characterized by intent to gain or animus lucrandi; and (4) the robbery is accompanied by rape. 9
The RTC and the CA were correct in ruling that the elements of robbery with rape are present in this case. As
ruled by the CA:
As to the asportation by appellant of private complainant's personal properties constituting the first three (3)
elements of the crime, We find the same sufficiently established by the evidence on records. The prosecution
was able to prove that appellant entered the house of private complainant and took her money, some pieces of
jewelry and cellphones by means of violence and intimidation. Appellant barged into the house of the victim
armed with a weapon, tied her down to immobilize her, and robbed her of some personal belongings. Private
complainant saw the perpetrator leaving her house carrying the pieces of jewelry and other items taken from
her.
Having established that the personal properties of the [victim were] unlawfully taken by the appellant, intent to
gain was sufficiently proven.x x x
xxxx
The prosecution was likewise able to establish that appellant raped private complaint on the occasion of the
robbery.
Private complainant's account on what appellant did to her was straightforward, candid and carries a disturbing
ring of sordid truth. She vividly recounted how appellant forced himself on her and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with her. x x x
xxxx
It is a settled rule that the foremost even sometimes, the only consideration in the prosecution for rape is the
victim's testimony. The victim's testimony alone, if credible, is sufficient to convict. A rape victim, who testifies in
a categorical, straightforward, spontaneous, and frank manner, and remains consistent on all material points, is a
credible witness.10
The prosecution was also able to establish, based on AAA's testimony, that the robbery preceded the crime of
rape and that the latter crime was an incident to the original intent of the appellant to rob AAA, thus:
Q: Now that was the first word asked by the accused that he was looking for money from you, am I right?
A: After he called my attention by touching my shoulder and he tied me, he asked where is the money.
Q: At that time you were already lying on your back or still facing down?
A: I was still lying face down.
Q: But according to you, the first thing that the accused allegedly got from your possession is your wedding ring
and your bracelet, am I right?
A: Yes sir because when he ordered me to lay (sic) on my face and tied my hands, he saw the wedding ring and
the bracelet and he took it.
Q: And after that, the accused asked you where is your money?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, according to you, the accused then removed your pajama, am I right?
A: Yes sir.
Q: At that time, what was your position?
A: I was lying on my back.
Q: And you mean to say, you were already face to face looking with (sic) the accused, am I right?
A: Yes sir.
Q: But at that time, the accused was allegedly still concealing his identity with the use of the clothing?
A: No more.
Q: In other words, when you were already lying on your back, you already saw the accused already removing the
clothing, to show his identity?
A: Yes sir.11
As to the issue raised by appellant that the testimony of AAA is not credible because it was impossible for her to
have identified her aggressor because of her inconsistent statements and that she did not disclose the violation
committed against her person immediately after the incident, deserves no merit. This Court has ruled in several
cases that inconsistencies of witnesses with respect to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the
substance of their declarations, their veracity or the weight of their testimonies. It would be unfair to expect a
flawless recollection from one who is forced to relive the gruesome details of a painful and humiliating
experience such as rape.12 What is clear is that AAA was able to testify in a straightforward manner the incident
that took place or on how she was raped, thus:
Q: So he tied your hands behind your back while you were lying down and he undressed himself or he undress
you first?
A: He first remove[s] my pajama.
Q: And your underwear?
A: Yes sir.
Q: And he followed that up by undressing himself?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Which one was undressed on the part of the accused?
A: He removed all his clothing.
Q: You want to impress to this court that the accused was entirely naked?
A: Yes sir.
Q: That is before he licked your vagina?
A: Yes sir.
Q: Now, when the accused laid on top of you, he was doing such push and pull movement, am I right?
A: Yes sir.13
When the testimony of a rape victim is simple and straightforward, unshaken by rigorous cross-examination and
unflawed by any serious inconsistency or contradiction, the same must be given full faith and credit. 14
Also, AAA's behavior after the incident, particularly opting not to disclose her ordeal in the hands of the appellant
immediately thereafter, is inconsequential. Jurisprudence has established that delay in revealing the commission
of rape is not an indication of a fabricated charge, and the same is rendered doubtful only if the delay was
unreasonable and unexplained.15
Anent the defense of denial and alibi interposed by appellant, such must not be appreciated by the Court.
Between the categorical statements of the prosecution witness, on one hand, and the bare denial of the
appellant, on the other, the former must perforce prevail. An affirmative testimony is far stronger than a
negative testimony especially when it comes from the mouth of a credible witness. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence undeserving of weight in
law. They are considered with suspicion and always received with caution, not only because they are inherently
weak and unreliable but also because they are easily fabricated and concocted. 16 Denial cannot prevail over the because in this class of robbery, the crime may be committed without the necessity of trespassing the sanctity of
positive testimony of prosecution witnesses who were not shown to have any ill-motive to testify against the the offended party's house.25 It is considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of
appellant.17 privacy that the law accords to the human abode. 26 He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong
As to the legality of his warrantless arrest, appellant is already estopped from questioning such because it was is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere. 27 Hence, under Article 63, paragraph 1 of the RPC, the
never raised prior to his having entered a plea of not guilty. Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped imposable penalty upon appellant is death since the aggravating circumstance of dwelling was duly alleged and
from assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information against him before his proven. However, since the death penalty has been prohibited under R.A. 9346, the penalty of reclusion
arraignment.18 Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction perpetua  should be imposed.
over the person of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed As to the award of damages, the amounts must be modified in accordance with People v. Jugueta.28 Since the
waived.19 Even in the instances not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and imposable penalty is death but due to R.A. 9346, the actual penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the amounts
objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits to arraignment without objection. 20 The of civil indemnity, moral damages and exemplary damages shall be P100,000.00 each. Also, the CA was correct in
subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest against a person illegally awarding civil indemnity in view of the finding of rape. 29
detained will cure the defect of that detention. 21 As aptly ruled by the CA: WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court DISMISSES the present appeal and AFFIRMS the Decision dated
In the present case, appellant was arrested on the very same day that the crime was committed. Albeit the arrest April 8, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 01294-MIN finding appellant Joselito Bringcula y
was not effected immediately after the incident, this is readily explained by the fact that private complainant Fernandez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Rape under Article 294 the Revised
opted not tell anyone who [her] assailant was until that morning when she officially filed her complaint in the Penal Code with MODIFICATION that the same appellant is ORDERED to PAY the victim, the amounts of
police station. True enough, she cannot just divulge to her companions that she was raped, a conduct consistent P100,000.00 as civil indemnity, P100,000.00 as moral damages, and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages per
with a woman who had just underwent a grievous ordeal. It was thus only upon the filing of the complaint and People v. Jugueta,30 with legal interest on all the said damages awarded at the rate of six percent (6%) per
on the basis thereof that the police found a reasonable ground to make appellant a suspect of the crime and annum  from the date of the finality of this Decision until fully paid.
accordingly caused his arrest With the fact that appellant and private complainant are neighbors, the latter's SO ORDERED.
identification of the former as her assailant strongly created the probable cause of the guilt of appellant. As such,
in the inquest investigation, the Provincial Prosecutor found a probable cause that appellant committed the
crime of robbery with rape, thus rendering his arrest without warrant legal.
At any rate, accused-appellant already pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him during his
arraignment without questioning his warrantless arrest. He actively participated in the proceedings before the
trial court thereafter. In effect, appellant is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court and
waived any perceived defect or irregularity that may have attended his arrest.
Settled is the rule that an accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity with regard to his arrest if he fails to
raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against him on this ground before his arraignment.
Any objection involving a warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the accused must be made before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 22
As imposition of the penalty, the crime of robbery with rape is a special complex crime punishable under Article
294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. 7659. 23 Article 294 provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death, when the robbery was accompanied by rape. The provision reads as follows:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed; or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson; x x x
The CA is correct in appreciating the aggravating circumstance of dwelling. Dwelling aggravates a felony where
the crime is committed in the dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given provocation
therefor.24 In this particular case, robbery with violence was committed in the house of the victim without
provocation on her part. In robbery with violence and intimidation against persons, dwelling is aggravating
5/50 G.R. No. 181626               May 30, 2011
SANTIAGO PAERA, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This resolves the petition for review1 of the ruling2 of the Regional Trial Court of Dumaguete City3 (RTC) finding
petitioner Santiago Paera guilty of three counts of Grave Threats, in violation of Article 282 of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).
The Facts
As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera (petitioner) allocated his
constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of
Mampas, Bacong. The tank sits on a land located in the neighboring barangay of Mampas, Valencia and owned
by complainant Vicente Darong (Vicente), father of complainant Indalecio Darong (Indalecio). Despite
petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the tank. On 7 April 1999, petitioner reminded
Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access.
The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption.
Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from
the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio
arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties.
According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio,
shouting "Patyon tikaw!" (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea
Darong (Diosetea) who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was
the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!" ("I don’t
spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!"). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the
nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As
petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards
him, shouting "Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!" ("Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!").
According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why
petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance
using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper.
Except for Vicente, who was seriously ill, the Darongs testified during trial. Petitioner was the defense’s lone
witness.
The Ruling of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court
The 7th Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Valencia-Bacong, Negros Oriental (MCTC) found petitioner guilty as
charged, ordering petitioner to serve time and pay fine for each of the three counts. 4 The MCTC found the
prosecution evidence sufficient to prove the elements of Grave Threats under Article 282, noting that the
Darongs’ persistent water tapping contrary to petitioner’s directive "must have angered" petitioner, triggering
his criminal behavior.5 The MCTC rejected petitioner’s defense of denial as "self-serving and uncorroborated." 6
Petitioner appealed to the RTC, reiterating his defense of denial.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
The RTC affirmed the MCTC, sustaining the latter’s finding on petitioner’s motive. The RTC similarly found
unconvincing petitioner’s denial in light of the "clear, direct, and consistent" testimonies of the Darongs and
other prosecution witnesses.7
Hence, this appeal.
Abandoning his theory below, petitioner now concedes his liability but only for a single count of the "continued
complex crime" of Grave Threats. Further, petitioner prays for the dismissal of the case filed by Vicente as the
latter’s failure to testify allegedly deprived him of his constitutional right to confront witnesses. Alternatively,
petitioner claims he is innocent of the charges for having acted in defense of the property of strangers and in
lawful performance of duty, justifying circumstances under paragraphs 3 and 5, Article 11 of the RPC. 8
In its Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) finds merit in petitioner’s concession of liability for the
single count of the "continued complex crime" of Grave Threats. The OSG, however, rejects petitioner’s prayer
for the dismissal of Vicente’s complaint, arguing that petitioner’s guilt was amply proven by the prosecution
evidence, not to mention that petitioner failed to raise this issue during trial. Further, the OSG finds the claim of
defense of stranger unavailing for lack of unlawful aggression on the part of the Darongs. Lastly, the OSG notes
the absence of regularity in petitioner’s performance of duty to justify his conduct. 9
The Issue
The question is whether petitioner is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.
The Ruling of the Court
We rule in the affirmative, deny the petition and affirm the RTC.
Due Process Mischief in Raising
New Issues on Appeal
Although uncommented, petitioner’s adoption of new theories for the first time before this Court has not
escaped our attention. Elementary principles of due process forbid this pernicious procedural strategy - it not
only catches off-guard the opposing party, it also denies judges the analytical benefit uniform theorizing affords.
Thus, courts generally refuse to pass upon freshly raised theories. 10 We would have applied this rule here were it
not for the fact that petitioner’s liberty is at stake and the OSG partially views his cause with favor.
Petitioner Liable for Three Counts of Grave Threats
To limit his liability to one count of Grave Threats, petitioner tries to fit the facts of the case to the concept of
"continued crime" (delito continuado) which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising
from one criminal intent or resolution. 11 To fix the penalty for his supposed single continued crime, petitioner
invokes the rule for complex crime under Article 48 of the RPC imposing the penalty for the most serious crime,
applied in its maximum period.
The nature of the crime of Grave Threats and the proper application of the concepts of continued and complex
crimes preclude the adoption of petitioner’s theory.
Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats "any person who shall threaten another with the infliction
upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any wrong amounting to a crime[.]" This felony is
consummated "as soon as the threats come to the knowledge of the person threatened." 12
Applying these parameters, it is clear that petitioner’s threat to kill Indalecio and Diosetea and crack open
Vicente’s skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the very least) homicide and serious physical injuries
as penalized under the RPC. These threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard
petitioner utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to these three
individuals, albeit in rapid succession, petitioner incurred three separate criminal liabilities.
Petitioner’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he only had "a single mental
resolution, a single impulse, and single intent"13 to threaten the Darongs assumes a vital fact: that he had
foreknowledge of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente’s presence near the water tank in the morning of 8 April 1999.
The records, however, belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, petitioner was as much surprised to
see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing petitioner when they chanced upon each other near the water tank.
Similarly, petitioner came across Diosetea as he was chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly,
petitioner crossed paths with Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, petitioner went to the water tank
not to execute his "single intent" to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate a suspected
water tap. Not having known in advance of the Darongs’ presence near the water tank at the time in question,
petitioner could not have formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came
across each of them.
The importance of foreknowledge of a vital fact to sustain a claim of "continued crime" undergirded our ruling
in Gamboa v. Court of Appeals.14 There, the accused, as here, conceded liability to a lesser crime – one count of
estafa, and not 124 as charged – theorizing that his conduct was animated by a single fraudulent intent to divert
deposits over a period of several months. We rejected the claim –
15
 x x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Similarly, petitioner’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm arose only when he
chanced upon each of his victims.
Indeed, petitioner’s theory holds water only if the facts are altered – that is, he threatened Indalecio, Diosetea,
and Vicente at the same place and at the same time. Had this been true, then petitioner’s liability for one count
of Grave Threats would have rested on the same basis grounding our rulings that the taking of six roosters 16 or 13
cows17 found at the same place and taken at the same time results in the commission of only one count of theft
because –
[t]here is no series of acts committed for the accomplishment of different purposes, but only of one which
was consummated, and which determines the existence of only one crime. The act of taking the roosters [and
heads of cattle] in the same place and on the same occasion cannot give rise to two crimes having an
independent existence of their own, because there are not two distinct appropriations nor two intentions that
characterize two separate crimes.18 (Emphasis in the original)
Having disposed of petitioner’s theory on the nature of his offense, we see no reason to extensively pass upon
his use of the notion of complex crime to avail of its liberal penalty scheme. It suffices to state that under Article
48 of the RPC, complex crimes encompass either (1) an act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave
offenses; or (2) an offense which is a necessary means for committing another 19 and petitioner neither
performed a single act resulting in less or less grave crimes nor committed an offense as a means of
consummating another.
The Prosecution Proved the Commission
of Grave Threats Against Vicente
We find no reversible error in the RTC’s affirmance of the MCTC’s ruling, holding petitioner liable for Grave
Threats against Vicente. The prosecution’s evidence, consisting of the testimonies of Indalecio, Diosetea and two
other corroborating witnesses,20 indisputably show petitioner threatening Vicente with death. 21 Vicente’s
inability to take the stand, for documented medical reason, 22 does not detract from the veracity and strength of
the prosecution evidence. Petitioner’s claim of denial of his constitutional right to confront witnesses is
untenable as he had every opportunity to cross-examine the four prosecution witnesses. No law requires the
presentation of the private complainant as condition for finding guilt for Grave Threats, especially if, as here,
there were other victims and witnesses who attested to its commission against the non-testifying complainant.
Significantly, petitioner did not raise Vicente’s non-appearance as an issue during the trial, indicating that he saw
nothing significant in the latter’s absence.
No Justifying Circumstances Attended Petitioner’s
Commission of Grave Threats
There is likewise no merit in petitioner’s claim of having acted to "defend[] and protect[] the water rights of his
constituents" in the lawful exercise of his office as punong barangay.23 The defense of stranger rule under
paragraph 3, Article 11 of the RPC, which negates criminal liability of –
[a]nyone who acts in the defense of the person or rights of a stranger, provided that the first and second
requisites mentioned in the first circumstance of this article are present and that the person defending be not
induced by revenge, resentment or other evil motive.1avvphi1
requires proof of (1) unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) absence of evil motives such as revenge and resentment. 24 None of
these requisites obtain here. Not one of the Darongs committed acts of aggression against third parties’ rights
when petitioner successively threatened them with bodily harm. Indeed, all of them were performing ordinary,
peaceful acts – Indalecio was standing near the water tank, Diosetea was walking towards Indalecio and Vicente
was standing in the vegetable garden a few meters away. With the element of unlawful aggression absent,
inquiry on the reasonableness of the means petitioner used to prevent or repel it is rendered irrelevant. As for
the third requisite, the records more than support the conclusion that petitioner acted with resentment, borne
out of the Darongs’ repeated refusal to follow his water distribution scheme, causing him to lose perspective and
angrily threaten the Darongs with bodily harm.
Lastly, the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11
of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the due performance
of duty or the lawful exercise of office.25 Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure
delivery of basic services"26 when he barred the Darongs’ access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless,
petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon,
threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due
discharge of his office lay before petitioner27 and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal
liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct.
Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective
officials of violence or threats of violence.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the Decision dated 28 November 2007 of the Regional Trial
Court of Dumaguete City, Branch 39.
SO ORDERED.
6/51 G.R. No. L-62050 November 25, 1983
JOSE "PEPITO" TIMONER, petitioner,
vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, IV DIVISION, respondents.
ESCOLIN, J.:
Petition for review of the affirmance in toto  by the Court of Appeals, now the Intermediate Appellate Court, of
the judgment of conviction handed down by the then Municipal Court of Daet, Camarines Norte, in Criminal Case
No. 4281, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Jose Timoner, finding petitioner guilty of the crime of grave
coercion, as follows: têñ.£îhqwâ£
WHEREFORE this Court finds the accused JOSE 'PEPITO' TIMONER guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Grave Coercion as penalized under Art. 286 in the Revised Penal Code, and hereby
sentences the said accused pursuant to the provision of Rule 64, Par. 3, to suffer SIX MONTHS OF
IMPRISONMENT OF ARRESTO MAYOR IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD, to pay a fine of P300.00 and to pay
the offended party in the amount of P5,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary liability in case of
insolvency. The other accused SAMUEL MORENA and ERNESTO QUIBRAL are hereby ordered
ACQUITTED.
The salient facts are not disputed. At about 10:00 in the evening of December 13, 1971, petitioner, then Mayor
of Daet, Camarines Norte, accompanied by two uniformed policemen, Samuel Morena and Ernesto Quibral, and
six laborers, arrived in front of the stalls along Maharlika highway, the main thoroughfare of the same town.
Upon orders of petitioner, these laborers proceeded to nail together rough lumber slabs to fence off the stalls
which protruded into the sidewalk of the Maharlika highway. Among the structures thus barricaded were the
barbershop of Pascual Dayaon, the complaining witness and the store belonging to one Lourdes Pia-Rebustillos.
These establishments had been recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer, Dra. Alegre, for non-
compliance with certain health and sanitation requirements.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte against Lourdes Pia-
Rebustillos and others for judicial abatement of their stalls. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 2257,
alleged that these stalls constituted public nuisances as well as nuisances per se. Dayaon was never able to
reopen his barbershop business.
Subsequently, petitioner and the two policemen, Morena and Quibral, were charged with the offense of grave
coercion before the Municipal Court of Daet. As already noted, the said court exonerated the two policemen, but
convicted petitioner of the crime charged as principal by inducement.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed in full the judgment of the trial court. Hence, the present recourse.
Petitioner contends that the sealing off of complainant Dayaon's barbershop was done in abatement of a public
nuisance and, therefore, under lawful authority.
We find merit in this contention. Unquestionably, the barbershop in question did constitute a public nuisance as
defined under Article Nos. 694 and 695 of the Civil Code, to wit: têñ.£îhqwâ£
ART. 694. A nuisance is any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of property, or
anything else which:
(1) Injures or endangers the health or safety of others; or
(2) Annoys or offends the senses; or
(3) Shocks, defies or disregards decency or morality; or
(4) Obstructs or interferes with the free passage of any public highway or street, or any body
of water; or
(5) Hinders or impairs the use of property.
ART. 695. Nuisance is either public or private. A public nuisance affects a community or
neighborhood or any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance,
danger or damage upon individuals may be unequal A private nuisance is one that is not
included in the foregoing definition.
The barbershop occupied a portion of the sidewalk of the poblacion's main thoroughfare and had been
recommended for closure by the Municipal Health Officer. In fact, the Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte,
in its decision in Civil Case No. 2257, declared said barbershop as a nuisance  per-se. Thus: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Under the facts of the case, as well as the law in point, there is no semblance of any legality or right that
exists in favor of the defendants to build a stall and conduct their business in a sidewalk, especially in a
highway where it does not only constitute a menace to the health of the general public passing through the
street and also of the unsanitary condition that is bred therein as well as the unsightly and ugly structures in
the said place. Moreover, even if it is claimed and pretended that there was a license, permit or toleration of
the defendants' makeshift store and living quarters for a number of years does not lend legality to an act
which is a nuisance  per se. Such nuisance affects the community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons and the general public which posed a danger to the people in general passing and using
that place, for in addition, this is an annoyance to the public by the invasion of its rights — the fact that it is
in a public place and annoying to all who come within its sphere [Baltazar vs. Carolina Midland, Ry, Co., 54
S.C. 242, 32 SB 258, cited in 11 Tolentino's Civil Code of the Philippines, p. 375; Kapisanan Lingkod ng Bayan,
Inc. vs. Lacson, CA-G.R. No. 27260R, March 25, 1964; 61 O.G. 2487].
xxx xxx xxx
... IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby declares that the structures subject of this complaint as
well as those occupied by the impleaded defendants are nuisances per se and therefore orders the
defendants to demolish the stall and vacate the premises immediately ...
But even without this judicial pronouncement, petitioner could not have been faulted for having fenced off said
barbershop. Paragraph 3, Article 699 of the Civil Code authorizes the abatement of a public nuisance without
judicial proceedings. 
ART. 699. The remedies against a public nuisance are:
[l] A prosecution under the Penal Code or any local ordinance; or
[2] A civil action; or
[3] Abatement, without judicial proceedings.
In the case at bar, petitioner, as mayor of the town, merely implemented the aforesaid recommendation of the
Municipal Health Officer. Having then acted in good faith in the performance of his duty, petitioner incurred no
criminal liability.
Grave coercion is committed when "a person who, without authority of law, shall by means of violence, prevent
another from doing something not prohibited by law or compel to do something against his will, either it be right
or wrong." 1 The three elements of grave coercion are: [1] that any person be prevented by another from doing
something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his will, be it right or wrong; [2] that the
prevention or compulsion be effected by violence, either by material force or such display of it as would produce
intimidation and control the will of the offended party, and [3] that the person who restrained the will and
liberty of another had no right to do so, or, in other words, that the restraint was not made under authority of
law or in the exercise of a lawful right. 2
The third element being absent in the case at bar, petitioner cannot be held guilty of grave coercion.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. No. 19534-CR, is hereby set aside and petitioner is
acquitted of the crime charged. Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
7/52 G.R. No. 121175 November 4, 1998
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,vs. MARILYN RAFAEL VILLAMAR, accused-appellant.
ROMERO, J.:
Marilyn Villamar was charged with the crime of illegal detention and frustrated murder in an information dated
November 9, 1993, the accusatory portion of which reads:
That in or about and during the period beginning 7:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 to 9:00 a.m. of the
same day, in Barangay Cabalantian, Municipality of Bacolor, Province of Pampanga,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
MARILYN RAFAEL-VILLAMAR, suspecting that Maria Luz Cortez would not return her daughter
Jonalyn Villamar whom she entrusted to said Maria Luz Cortez, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously surreptitiously enter the house of Maria Luz Cortez and by means
of force and intimidation and with threats to kill take said Maria Luz Cortez, a woman of 20
years old as the latter entered her house whom said accused detained and kept locked inside
the house from 7:00 a.m. to 9:00 a.m. of June 5, 1993 or a period of two (2) hours, more or
less, under restraint and against the will of the said Maria Luz Cortez and said accused during
the period of detention maltreated and refused to release said Maria Luz Cortez until her
demand for a sum of money and a getaway vehicle was given to her and on the occasion
thereof, accused with evident premeditation and with intent to kill, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and strike with a deadly weapon to wit: a
knife and a chisel, one Maria Luz Cortez who as a result thereof, suffered various lacerated
wounds on the head which ordinarily would cause the death of the said Maria Luz Cortez,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder as
a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of her
will, that is, by the timely arrival of the authorities who rescued Maria Luz Cortez which
prevented her death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On November 23, 1993, the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the merits
proceeded.
The evidence for the prosecution established the following facts:
On February 11, 1993, Villamar went to the house of the private offended party Cortez and inquired if the latter
was interested in adopting her daughter, explaining that her offer was due her husband's hasty departure.
Unable to refuse, Cortez accepted the offer and immediately prepared a "Sinumpaang Salaysay" to formalize the
adoption. Unfortunately, on June 5, 1993, Villamar, apparently regretting her decision, went to the house of
Cortez and decided to take her daughter back. This sudden reversal was, of course, not taken lightly by Cortez,
who vehemently refused to relinquish custody of the girl to Villamar.
Thereupon, a scuffle ensued between the two, during which Villamar managed to hit Cortez with a chisel on the
head rendering the latter weak and immobilized, after which she threatened her with a pair of scissors. Villamar
was demanding that Cortez reveal where the "Sinumpaang Salaysay" was located. Meanwhile, attracted by the
commotion, a curious crowd was already gathering outside the Cortez residence. Sensing imminent danger,
Villamar demanded money and a get-away vehicle to extricate herself from her predicament. However, on her
way to the car, a melee ensued resulting in her immediate arrest by the responding policemen.
The defense, on the other hand, narrates a different scenario.
Villamar admits that a struggle did occur between her and Cortez, after the latter refused her request for the
return of her child. However, while she acknowledged that she brandished a pair of scissors before Cortez, this
was motivated more out of fear of the crowd assembled outside the house which might harm her. In other
words, in order to protect herself, she had to use Cortez as a "human shield" to keep the crowd at bay.
The trial court, not having been convinced with Villamar's version of the incident, convicted her for serious illegal
detention and less serious physical injuries, but at the same time acquitted her on the charge of frustrated
murder. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:
Accordingly, finding the accused Marilyn Rafael Villamar to be guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention and Less Serious Physical Injuries, the Court
hereby sentences her as follows:
1) On the Serious Illegal Detention — for the accused to suffer the penalty of  Reclusion
Perpetua and all the accessory penalties as provided by law;
2) On the Less Serious Physical Injuries — for the accused to suffer a four (4) months
imprisonment and any accessory penalty as maybe provided by law.
The accused is entitled to credit of her preventive imprisonment in accordance with the law.
SO ORDERED. 1
Insisting on her innocence, Villamar has interposed the instant appeal.
The focal point of Villamar's thesis is that she cannot be guilty of serious illegal detention since she had no
intention to deprive or detain Cortez of her liberty. 2
Before a conviction for kidnapping and serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code can
be sustained, the following elements must concur, namely: (a) the offender is a private individual, (b) kidnaps or
detains another that will deprive the victim of his liberty, (c) the act of detention is illegal and (d) in the
commission of the offense any of the following circumstances are present — the detention lasts for more than
five (5) days; it is committed by simulating a public authority, serious physical injuries are inflicted or threats to
kill are made and the person kidnapped is a minor, female or public officer. 3 It is important that indubitable
proof be presented that the actual intent of the malefactor was to deprive the offended party of his/her
liberty,4 and not when such restraint of liberty was merely an incident in the commission of another offense
primarily intended by the offender. 5
Contrary therefore to the prosecution's assertions, we are of the opinion that Villamar had no intention to
kidnap or deprive Cortez of her personal liberty. This is clearly demonstrated in the tesimony of Villamar
herself:
Q — Were you able to reach at their house, the spouses Maria Luz
Cortez?
A — Only the wife, sir.
Q — Upon reaching Maria Luz Cortez at their house, what happened
next?
A — I talked to her, sir.
Q — When you talked to her what did you talk about?
A — I told her again that I wanted to regain custody of my daughter, sir.
Q — What did she tell you when you told her about that?
 A — She told me again that I don't have to go back to their place month maximum period provided for in the old law, there is no more legal justification for her continued
because there was no more baby that I could get, sir. confinement. She has served for a longer period than she should.
Q — Upon hearing that, what did you do? WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Appellant is convicted only of grave
A — I still pleaded to (sic) her, sir. 6 coercion and is sentenced to six (6) months of arresto mayor. Unless she is being held for some other lawful
The actuations of Villamar appear to be more of a product of a mother's desperation and distraught mind cause, her immediate RELEASE is hereby ordered, considering that she has served beyond the maximum
when her plea for the return of her child was refused by Cortez, unmindful of the consequences which her penalty imposed by law. Costs  de oficio.
reckless outburst would cause to the latter. In a celebrated case, this Court rejected the kidnapping charge SO ORDERED.
where there was not the slightest hint of a motive for the crime. 7 In other words, what actually transpired was
the rage of a woman scorned. The undeniable fact that the purpose of Villamar was to seek the return of her
child was never assailed by the prosecution. Until the defendant's purpose to detain the offended party is
shown, a prosecution for illegal detention will not prosper.
Still, the prosecution insists that assuming that Villamar had no intention to deprive Cortez of her liberty, the
fact that she demanded and received One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) from Cortez constitutes a ransom
within the contemplation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code. 8 Again, we cannot agree with the
prosecution's theory.
Under the law, as presently worded, it is essential that the kidnapping or detention was committed for the
purpose of extorting ransom.9 In the instant case, there is no showing whatsoever that Villamar wanted to
extort money from Cortez prior to their confrontation.
When accused-appellant coerced Cortez to reveal the whereabouts of the "Sinampaang Salaysay" for the
purpose of destroying the same, the act merely constituted grave coercion, as provided in Article 286 of the
Revised Penal Code. The crime of grave coercion has three elements: (a) that any person is prevented by
another from doing something not prohibited by law, or compelled to do something against his or her will, be
it right or wrong; (b) that the prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such
a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the will of the offended party;
and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty of another has no right to do so; in other words, that
the restraint is not made under authority of law or in the exercise of any lawful right. 10
While Villamar did compel Cortez to do something against the latter's will, it must be stressed that the same
cannot be categorized as an act of illegal detention. Still, when Villamar was erroneously charged for illegal
detention, such oversight will not preclude a guilty verdict for the crime of grave coercion. In the early case
of  U.S. v. Quevengco, 11 and, recently, in People v. Astorga, 12 we ruled that the offense of grave coercion is
necessarily included in illegal detention; as such, an information for illegal detention will not bar the accused
from being convicted of grave coercion, instead of the original charge. 13
Regarding the imposable penalty, while we are aware that on February 20, 1995, Republic Act No. 7890 14 was
passed increasing the penalty for crimes involving grave coercion from arresto mayor to prision correccional,
such amendatory law will not be applicable in the instant case, for the simple reason that the offense was
committed on June 5, 1993 two years before the said law was enacted. Villamar should not, therefore, be
unduly prejudiced by the imposition of a more severe penalty than that provided in the law then in
force. 15
Hence, we hold that the penalty of arresto mayor, which is from one month and one day to six months, is the
proper penalty imposable for the offense of grave coercion. Considering that Villamar has been in detention
since July 1995 to the present — a period of three years and three months — which is well beyond the six-
8/53 G.R. No. 228000 July 10, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v. RONALD PALEMA Y VARGAS, RUFEL PALMEA Y BAUTISTA, LYNDON SALDUA Y QUEZON, AND VIRGO
GRENGIA, ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
In the prosecution of robbery with homicide, the State must prove that the offender's original intent was to
commit the crime of robbery. The killing of the victim must only be incidental. Nevertheless, the act of taking the
victim's life may occur before, during, or even after the robbery. So long as the homicide was committed by
reason of or on the occasion of the robbery, the offense committed is the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide.1
For this Court's resolution is a Notice of Appeal2 challenging the May 18, 2016 Decision3 of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06250. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court's April 15, 2013
Decision4 convicting Ronald Palema y Vargas (Palema), Rufel Palmea y Bautista (Palmea), Lyndon Saldua y
Quezon (Saldua), and Virgo Grengia (Grengia) of the crime of robbery with homicide.
Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Grengia, along with Lester Ladra y Palema (Ladra), Edwin Manzanero y Bautista
(Manzanero), and Marvin Marqueses (Marqueses), were charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in an
Information5 dated November 26, 2007, which read:cralawred
That on or about 11:05 p.m. of 10 November 2007, at the Calamba Town Plaza at Brgy. 6, Calamba City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating, and
with the accused minor Lester Ladra y Palema acting with discernment, with intent to gain, by means [of]
violence against and intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and
steal the Nokia N70 cellular phone worth Php 13,000.00 of Enicasio Depante y Rosales against the consent of the
said Enicasio Depante y Rosales and on the occasion and by reason of the robbery, with intent to kill, abuse of
superior strength [and] cruelty, did then and there willfully and feloniously assault, maul and stab to death
Enicasio Depante y Rosales the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
Contrary to law.6
chanRoblesvirtualLaw1ibrary
On arraignment, Ladra, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, Manzanero, and Grengia pleaded not guilty to the crime
charged. Marvin, meanwhile, remained at large. 7
After pre-trial, trial on the merits ensued. 8
The evidence for the prosecution revealed that at around 11:00 p.m. on November 10, 2007, Enicasio Depante
(Enicasio), his common-law spouse, his son Erickson Depante (Erickson), and his stepdaughter Jamie Rose Baya
(Jamie) were sitting on the benches at the Calamba Town Plaza. That was when three (3) men, who were later
identified as Palema, Palmea, and Manzanero, approached Enicasio. 9
Suddenly, Palmea threw a punch at Enicasio in an attempt to grab his phone. Palema simultaneously pulled out a
knife and tried to stab him in the abdomen, but was warded off by Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he
retrieved his knife, Palema stabbed Enicasio on the right thigh, causing him to fall on the ground. Then, Grengia
and Saldua arrived at the scene and joined in beating Enicasio. 10
Seated on the bench near Enicasio, Erickson stood and tried to help his father, but Ladra stopped him. When he
resisted, Ladra attempted to stab him, but he was able to evade the attack and immediately look for a weapon.
Upon reaching his father, however, he saw that Enicasio had already collapsed from the stab wounds. Erickson
brought his father to the Calamba Medical Center, but he later died from blood loss. 11
Enicasio's family testified that they incurred medical expenses in the amount of P20,000.00, although they were
only able to keep P3,751.00 worth of receipts. 12 They, likewise, testified that they had incurred funeral expenses
worth P120,000.00, as evidenced by a receipt 13 they submitted.14
During the case's pendency, Manzanero died as shown in his Death Certificate. 15 Thus, the Regional Trial Court
dismissed the case against him.16
Meanwhile, Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia denied the accusations against them. They insisted that while
all of them were at the Plaza during the incident, they were not there as a group, but with different people. They
maintained that the police officers mistook them for the men who attacked Enicasio. 17
Ladra, for his part, changed his plea to guilty after the prosecution had presented its evidence. The Regional Trial
Court then directed him to take the witness stand to answer some clarificatory questions. 18
Ladra testified that he was with Palema, Palmea, Saldua, Marqueses, and Manzanero at the night of the incident.
All of them drunk, they decided to eat gruel at the Plaza. Later, Palema's girlfriend approached them and
complained that a man in a red shirt had acted indecently toward her. 19 Believing that the man was Enicasio, the
group attacked and mugged him. When he saw Enicasio fighting back, he took Marqueses' knife and stabbed
Enicasio twice.20
Ladra added that Grengia was not with them and did not participate in the attack. 21
In its March 6, 2012 Decision,22 the Regional Trial Court found Ladra guilty beyond reasonable doubt:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused minor LESTER LADRA GUILTY of "Robbery with Homicide" and in
consideration with the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority and voluntary plea of GUILTY, sentenced
(sic) him to the penalty of Eight (8) Years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor, as Minimum to Fourteen (14) Years,
Eight (8) months and One (1) [day] of Reclusion Temporal, as Maximum and ordered (sic) to pay the heirs of the
victim the following sums of money:cralawred
1. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for civil indemnity;
2. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for moral damages; and,
3. Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) for exemplary damages.
In accordance with the provisions of the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 (R. A. No. 9344) and
jurisprudence thereto, the service of sentence is suspended and the accused is remanded to the custody of The
National Training School for Boys (NTSB) for proper disposition. The NTSB has thirty (30) days from receipt of this
Decision to comply with the post sentenced procedure of the law and submit to this Court their recommendation
for disposition.
SO ORDERED.23
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In its March 31, 2012 Progress Report,24 the National Training School for Boys recommended to the trial court
that the case against Ladra be dismissed and that he be discharged to his parents. 25
On March 5, 2013, the Regional Trial Court granted the National Training School for Boys' recommendation and
ordered that the case against Ladra be dismissed. Similarly, it ordered that Ladra be discharged to his parents'
custody.26
On April 15, 2013, the Regional Trial Court rendered another Decision, 27 convicting Palema, Palmea, Saldua, and
Grengia of the crime of robbery with homicide. The dispositive portion of the Decision read:cralawred
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused Ronald Palema, Rufel Palmea, Lyndon Saldua, and Virgo Grengia guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide and sentenced (sic) to suffer the penalty
of Reclusion Perpetua in view of the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Accused Ronald Palema, Rufel Palmea, Lyndon Saldua, and Virgo Grengia are also ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim, the following:cralawred
(a) P3,000.00 as hospital expenses;
(b) P120,000.00 for funeral expenses;
(c) P75,000.00 as moral damages[.]
The Court hereby acquits Marvin Marqueses of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.28
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The Regional Trial Court found that the four (4) men conspired in committing the crime charged. It brushed aside
their defense of denial and decreed that they failed to offer any evidence showing that they performed an overt
act that would have prevented the assault from happening. 29
The Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses for the prosecution's failure to present evidence that he
participated in committing the crime.30
On appeal,31 Saldua, Palema, Palmea, and Grengia argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in giving credence
to the prosecution witnesses' testimonies. They maintained that while Jamie testified that her stepfather was
stabbed in the right thigh, 32 the post-mortem examination revealed that the sole stab wound sustained by the
victim was on the right side of his buttocks. 33 They also questioned Erickson's ability to testify, alleging that he
was not fully focused on the incident since he was texting before the crime happened. 34
Moreover, assuming that the prosecution sufficiently identified the assailants, the men contended that it still
failed to establish the existence of conspiracy in committing the offense. They insisted that while they allegedly
attacked the victim, there was no community of interest among them. 35
In its assailed May 18, 2016 Decision, 36 the Court of Appeals dismissed the group's appeal and affirmed the
Regional Trial Court Decision. It ruled that the trial court's appreciation of the witnesses' credibility is entitled to
great respect and would not be disturbed on appeal absent any showing that it overlooked the material facts
that could have affected the results of the case.37
The Court of Appeals further declared that while Erickson was using his phone when the incident occurred, this
did not affect the value of his testimony. It noted that since he was seated near Enicasio at the time of the
assault, it was impossible for him not to witness the events that transpired. 38
The Court of Appeals dispelled the group's claim that there was no conspiracy, ruling that the prosecution has
proved that the men acted in unison in committing the offense. It further noted that in his confession, Ladra
himself admitted the existence of conspiracy. 39
Aggrieved, the group filed a Notice of Appeal,40 which the Court of Appeals gave due course in its June 15, 2016
Resolution.41
In its January 11, 2017 Resolution, 42 this Court required the parties to file their supplemental briefs. However,
both accused-appellants43 and plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, 44 through the Office of the Solicitor
General, manifested that they would no longer file a supplemental brief and instead adopt all the arguments
they raised in their Briefs filed before the Court of Appeals.
The issues to be resolved here are:cralawred
First, whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the conviction of accused-appellants Ronald Palema
y Vargas, Rufel Palmea y Bautista, Lyndon Saldua y Quezon, and Virgo Grengia for the crime of robbery with
homicide; and
Second, whether or not the acquittal of accused Marvin Marqueses is proper.
I
Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punished under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code. It is
perpetrated when, by reason or on the occasion of robbery, homicide is committed. 45 Article 294(1)
states:cralawred
ARTICLE 294. Robbery with Violence Against or Intimidation of Persons — Penalties. — Any person guilty of
robbery with the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:cralawred
1. The penalty of reclusión perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed.
To hold a person liable for this crime, the prosecution must establish the following elements with proof beyond
reasonable doubt:cralawred
(1) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons; (2) the property taken belongs
to another; (3) the taking was done with animo lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, homicide was committed.46 (Citation omitted)
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in robbery with homicide, the offender's original intent must be the
commission of robbery. The killing is merely incidental and subsidiary. 47 However, when the offender's "original
criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as
a minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a
single complex offense."48
In People v. De Jesus,49 this Court had the opportunity to comprehensively discuss the nature of the crime of
robbery with homicide:cralawred
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking
of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained,
without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the
commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into one
and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus,
includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property.
When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is
justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution
is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the
robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the
robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent
the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of
robbery and not of robbery . with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty
as principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it
has materialized.50 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
In convicting accused-appellants, the Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses, who recounted that the accused men were the ones who had simultaneously assaulted Enicasio.
Based on their testimonies, Manzanero and accused-appellants Palema and Palmea all approached Enicasio and
took his cellphone. When Enicasio tried to fight back, Palema stabbed him, causing him to fall. Immediately after,
the other accused joined the fray and beat Enicasio. 51
It is clear that accused-appellants' primary objective was to rob Enicasio. But, by reason or on the occasion of the
robbery, Enicasio was stabbed and died as a result.
Finally, while accused-appellants argued that the Regional Trial Court erred in giving weight to the prosecution
witnesses' testimonies, they failed to present evidence to the contrary.
Settled is the rule that "the matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial [court] judge," 52 who has "the unmatched opportunity to observe the
witnesses and to assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the record." 53 As
such, this Court gives great weight and respect to the judge's assessment of the witnesses' credibility. 54
II
Insisting on their innocence, accused-appellants argue that the prosecution failed to prove that they conspired in
committing the crime charged.55 They insist that while they acted simultaneously, the prosecution failed to show
that there was a unity of purpose among them.56
Accused-appellants' argument deserves scant consideration.
Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Like any other element of a crime,
the existence of conspiracy must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt. 57
Here, the Court of Appeals correctly affirmed the Regional Trial Court's finding of conspiracy. It found that
accused-appellants' acts were coordinated and complementary with each other, demonstrating the existence of
conspiracy. It ruled that the prosecution was able to establish that accused-appellants came in two (2) groups.
The first group—accused-appellants Palema and Palmea, along with Manzanero—attacked Enicasio and took his
cellphone. The second group—accused-appellants Grengia and Saldua, along with Ladra—joined the fray when
they saw Enicasio fighting back.58
Notably, while accused-appellants denied participating in the crime, they all admitted that they were at the
Calamba Town Plaza during the incident. Moreover, their claim that they did not come as a group, but were with
other people, remains a bare allegation after they failed to present the testimonies of the individuals who were
supposedly with them that night.
As the Regional Trial Court correctly ruled:cralawred
Granting that they were merely present during the robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt
himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed an overt act to dissociate or detach himself
from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission thereof. Accused offered no evidence
that they performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the assailants or to prevent the assault
from taking place. Their denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of denial and alibi
with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As both
evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime
committed.59 (Citations omitted)
III
It is a basic principle in criminal law that a notice of appeal throws the entire case open for review. Once an
appeal is accepted by this Court, it will have "the authority to review matters not specifically raised or assigned
as errors by the parties, if their consideration is necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case." 60 In Ramos
v. People:61
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review and it is the
duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned. "The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law."62 (Citations omitted)
Here, the Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses after having found no evidence of his participation in the
crime charged.63 However, a perusal of the records shows that Marqueses was never arraigned. While the
Regional Trial Court, in its January 8, 2008 Order, 64 noted that all the accused were present on arraignment and
that they all pleaded not guilty to the crime charged, only the names of accused-appellants Palema, Palmea, SO ORDERED.
Saldua, and Grengia, as with Ladra and Manzanero, were shown in the Certificate of Arraignment. 65 Marqueses'
name is nowhere to be found.
Even during the January 17, 2008 pre-trial, Marqueses was absent. 66
It bears noting that Marqueses was never arrested and remained at large. On March 12, 2008, the Warrant of
Arrest67 issued against him was returned to the trial court as he could not be located at the given address despite
effort exerted.68
Arraignment is defined as "the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused
to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him." 69 Its purpose is to notify the accused of
"the reason for his indictment, the specific charges he is bound to face, and the corresponding penalty that could
be possibly meted against him."70 It is not an idle ceremony that can be brushed aside peremptorily, but an
indispensable requirement of due process, the absence of which renders the proceedings against the accused
void.71
In Borja v. Mendoza,72 this Court stressed that an arraignment not only satisfies the due process clause of the
Constitution, but also affords an accused an opportunity to know the precise charge that confronts him or her.
Through arraignment, the accused is placed in a position to enter his or her plea with full knowledge of the
consequences.73 It is a vital aspect of any criminal prosecution, demanded by no less than the Constitution itself.
In People v. Verra,74 this Court held that "just as an accused is accorded this constitutional protection, so is the
State entitled to due process in criminal prosecutions. It must similarly be given the chance to present its
evidence in support of a charge."75
There is no proof of Marqueses' arraignment here. After the Warrant of Arrest issued against him was returned,
his name appeared again only in the Regional Trial Court's April 1, 2013 Order. 76 There, the Regional Trial Court
did not state if he was belatedly arraigned or if he made a voluntary appearance. It merely granted the
prosecution's Motion to correct the names of Saldua and Palmea.
Without evidence of Marqueses' arraignment, the Regional Trial Court had no authority to order his acquittal. All
proceedings against him before the Regional Trial Court are deemed void.
Finally, in line with current jurisprudence, 77 this Court deems it proper to impose exemplary damages and civil
indemnity, both in the amount of P75,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The May 18, 2016 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
06250 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS. The acquittal of accused Marvin Marqueses is deemed VACATED.
Accused-appellants Ronald Palema y Vargas, Rufel Palmea y Bautista, Lyndon Saldua y Quezon, and Virgo Grengia
are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide punished under Article 294 of the Revised
Penal Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. They are also DIRECTED to pay the
heirs of the victim, Enicasio Depante y Rosales, the amounts of: (1) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as
moral damages; (2) Seventy-Five Thousand Pesos (P75,000.00) as civil indemnity; (3) Seventy-Five Thousand
Pesos (P75,000.00) as exemplary damages; (4) Three Thousand Seven Hundred Fifty-One Pesos (P3,751.00) as
hospital expenses; and (5) One Hundred Twenty Thousand Pesos (P120,000.00) as funeral expenses.

All damages awarded shall be subject to interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of
this Decision until full satisfaction. 78
9/54 G.R. No. 238457 SEPTEMBER 18, 2019
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE,
v. JOJO BACYAAN Y SABANIYA, RONNIE FERNANDEZ Y GONZALES, AND RYAN GUEVARRA Y SIPRIA, ACCUSED-
APPELLANTS
DECISION
INTING, J.:
We reiterate the doctrine that in the assessment of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies, the findings
of the trial courts deserve utmost respect. In this case, appellants invariably interposed alibi and. denial as their
defenses. Needless to say, these are inherently weak defenses as they constitute self-serving, negative evidence
and may easily be fabricated. These cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the declaration of the
prosecution witnesses who testify on affirmative matters.1
Brought to fore is an appeal from the Decision dated January 18, 2017 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 07670 which affirmed with modification the Decision 3 dated March 30, 2015 of Branch 215 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City (RTC), finding appellants Jojo Bacyaan y Sabaniya (Bacyaan), Ronnie
Fernandez y Gonzales (Fernandez), and Ryan Guevarra y Sipria (Guevarra), guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
special complex crime of robbery with homicide as defined and penalized under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC).
Appellants were charged with the crimes of robbery with homicide and serious illegal detention under the
following Informations:
Criminal Case No. O-07-147516
That on or about the 31st day of May, 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, conspiring
and confederating with three others namely; RIC MENDOZA, ERWIN MASAN y MORENA and MANUEL SAGAYAP y
ARIRIO, who were killed by policemen, and mutually helping each other, all armed with unlicensed firearm and
constituting themselves as armed band, with intent to gain, by means of force, violence and intimidation against
person, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob a JMK Bus with [Plate] No. TWH-291[,] driven
by LAURO SANTOS and [traveling] on its route from Baclaran to Balintawak, Caloocan City[,] in the following
manner, to wit: pretending to be passengers, above-named accused boarded the public utility bus, and when it
reached EDSA [en route] to Quezon City, accused brought out their hidden firearms and announced a hold-up,
and, thereafter, robbed and divested the passengers of the bus of their cash money, cellphones and other
personal belongings of undetermined amounts, to the damage and prejudice of said passengers, namely:
MARGIE VILLATIMA^ AVILA, SHIENANEGRETE, NAOMI M. CRUZ, CECILLE P. MAMARIL, CHRISTIAN N. RUGAS,
LIWILYN T. OPALALIC, JOEMAR M. PAULINO, BOBBY DAMO, SAMPAGUITA CORTUNA y TIBAYAN, ANNE MARIE P.
BAMBALAN, MARIE P. BAMBALAN, MARINO BANTILAN, RICHMOND
D. TELEBANGCO, LLOYD S. BALAGTAS, GIOVANNI CUADRO y REYES and HERMAN MENDOZA.y JANDONERO;
That on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, accused[,] pursuant to their conspiracy, with intent to kill,
evident premeditation, treachery[,] and abuse of superior strength, attack, assault and employ personal violence
upon LAURO SANTOS, the driver of the bus, and upon RENATO JAMES VELOSO, a passenger, at Balintawak,
Quezon City, by then and there shooting them with their (accused) firearms, thereby causing said LAURO
SANTOS and RENATO JAMES serious and mortal wounds[,] which were the direct and immediate cause of their
death. (Emphasis in the original.)
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
Criminal Case No. O-07-147515
That on or about the 31st day of May, 2007, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, private individuals,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully[,] and
feloniously and illegally seize, drag and detain the persons of SAMPAGUITA CORTUNA y TIBAYAN and MARGIE
VILLATIMA, both female, and GIOVANNI CUADRO y REYES, in a Mitsubishi Adventure with plate number CSX-806,
under threats to kill them, thereby depriving them of their liberty, to the damage and prejudice of the said
offended parties.
CONTRARY TO LAW.5 (Emphasis in the original.)
The two cases were consolidated before the RTC. On arraignment, appellants entered their respective pleas of
not guilty.6 Trial on the merits thereafter ensued.
The facts are as follows:
Giovanni Cuadro7 (Cuadro) testified that on May 31, 2017, he boarded the JMK bus along Ayala Avenue, Makati
City. When the bus reached the EDSA-Ayala Flyover, six men, armed with guns and a grenade, declared a hold-
up. He identified appellant Bacyaan as the one who announced the hold-up, while appellants Guevarra and
Fernandez were the ones who divested himself and the other passengers of their personal belongings including
money. Meanwhile, policemen started pursuing the bus. When the bus reached the Muñoz Market in Caloocan
City, the policemen flagged it down. As the passengers tried to escape by jumping off the bus, Bacyaan shot
passenger Renato James Veloso in the back which resulted in his death. Bacyaan also shot Lauro Santos, the bus
driver, in the head, causing his immediate death.8
Thereafter, appellants grabbed a passenger to be used as a shield. They also grabbed Cuadro and two female
passengers outside the bus as they looked for a vehicle to commandeer. They saw a [Mitsubishi] Adventure van
with the driver inside, boarded it, pointed a gun at the driver, and ordered him to take the vehicle to the North
Luzon Expressway and look for an exit route. Appellants continued to exchange gunshots with the pursuing
policemen until the vehicle finally ditched into a gutter and became immobile because of blown tires, just inside
the Lawang Bato exit. According to Cuadro, he escaped through a broken windshield and saw appellants
commandeering a dump truck to escape.9
Police Officer I Engracio Baluya also testified that a concerned citizen approached him and reported that
appellants had boarded a dump truck with Plate No. PDL 127. Together with his team, they pursued appellants
and another exchange of gunshots ensued until the driver of the dump truck jumped out causing the vehicle to
stop. Three male persons, later identified as appellants, also jumped out and surrendered. The police officers
searched the dump truck and recovered a bag containing several amounts of money, cellphones, and guns. 10
In their defense, appellants denied that they were participants in the robbery incident. Guevarra, in particular,
averred that he was an innocent passenger of the bus and was on his way home. He was wrongfully arrested and
imputed of the crime charged. Meanwhile, Fernandez claimed that at the time of the incident, he was in the
Balintawak Market waiting for a ride on his way home to Bulacan when he heard gunshots being fired. He ran
towards a street corner and dropped to the ground. After the commotion subsided, he returned to where he was
previously waiting for a ride to gather his things but a policeman grabbed him and implicated him as one of the
hold-uppers. Lastly, Bacyaan narrated that on the day of the incident, at around 11:00 a.m., he was selling fruits
in front of the Balintawak Market when policemen in civilian clothes approached and invited him for questioning
at the Valenzuela Police Station. When they reached the station, they had his picture and fingerprints taken. He
was then brought to Camp Karingal, where he was detained and informed that he was a suspect in the robbery
incident.11
12
In its Decision  dated March 30, 2015, the trial court rendered a verdict of conviction, thus:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused Ryan Guevarra, Ronnie Fernandez and Jojo Bacyaan, GUILTY of the
crime lodged against them beyond reasonable doubt, they are hereby sentenced to suffer the following:
1. For the crime of Serious Illegal Detention, without mitigating but aggravated by the used (sic) of unlicensed
firearm, the maximum penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
2. As to the crime of Robbery with Homicide with the used of Unlicensed Firearm, without mitigating but
aggravated by the used of Unlicensed Firearm, the maximum penalty of Reclusion Perpetua.
3. All the accused are further ordered to [pay] the heirs of LAURO SANTOS and RENATO JAMES VELOSO, the
amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,836.00 as actual damages supported with credible receipts,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000 as exemplary damages[,] respectively.
4. Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.13 (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC held that appellants' bare defenses of alibi and denial cannot be appreciated against the positive
identification of appellants as well as the categorical and consistent testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. 14
On appeal, the CA affirmed appellants' conviction for the crime of robbery with homicide but dismissed the
criminal case for serious illegal detention. It held that the detention of the victims was only incidental to the
main crime of robbery; hence, it was deemed absorbed. 15
Thus, this appeal.
On June 25, 2018, the Court issued a Resolution 16 requiring the parties to file their respective supplemental
briefs, if they so desired, within ten days from notice. On September 7, 2018, the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG) filed its Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief, 17 adopting its arguments in its Appellee's Brief. On
October 1, 2018, appellants also filed a Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief, 18 stating that they will no
longer file a supplemental brief as the filing thereof would only be a repetition of the arguments raised in their
Appellants' Brief.
Issues
Appellants assigned the following errors in their Brief:19
1. THE RTC ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE TESTIMONY OF GIOVANNI CUADRO DESPITE ITS
INCONSISTENCIES;
2. THE RTC ERRED IN DISREGARDING THEIR DEFENSE AND CONVICTING THEM OF THE CRIMES CHARGED; AND
3. THE RTC ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE ALLEGED USE OF UNLICENSED FIREARMS AS AN AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE.20
The Court's Ruling
After due consideration, the Court affirms appellants' conviction for robbery with homicide but modifies the
award of damages.
It is settled that "when the decision hinges on the credibility of witnesses and their respective testimonies, the
trial court's observations and conclusions deserve great respect and are often accorded finality," 21 unless it
appears that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood or misappreciated some fact or circumstance of
weight, which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case. 22
Thus, we ruled in People v. Dela Cruz,23 that:
x x x By and large, the instant case basically revolves around the question of credibility of witnesses. The well-
entrenched rule in this jurisdiction, of course, is that the matter of assigning values to the testimonies of
witnesses is best discharged by the trial court, and appellate courts will not generally disturb the findings of the
trial court in this respect. The reason is quite simple: the trial judge is in a better position to determine the
conflicting testimonies of witnesses after having heard them and observed their deportment and manner of
testifying. xxx24
In this case, the Court finds no cogent reason to overturn the findings of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, as it was
not shown that the lower courts had overlooked, misunderstood, or misappreciated facts or circumstances of
weight that could have altered the result of the case.
The Elements of Robbery with Homicide.
Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC, as amended by Republic Act No. (RA) 7659, 25 states:
Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons; Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:
l.The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional
mutilation or arson, x x x x
There is robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC when a homicide is committed by
reason of or on occasion of a robbery. In order to sustain a conviction for robbery with homicide, the following
elements must be proven by the prosecution: (1) the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain or animus lucrandi; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; and (4) on the
occasion or by reason of the robbery, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. 26
"A conviction requires certitude that the robbery is the main purpose and objective of the malefactor, and the
killing is merely incidental to the robbery." 27 Thus, it follows that "[t]he intent to rob must precede the taking of
human life but the killing may occur before, during or after the robbery. 28 Elucidating on the nature of the crime
of robbery with homicide, the Court explained in People v. Palema et al. ,29 that:
In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide
perpetrated on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. The intent to commit robbery must precede the
taking of human life. The homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result
obtained, without reference or distinction as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in
the commission of the crime that has to be taken into consideration. There is no such felony of robbery with
homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The constitutive elements of the crime, namely,
robbery and homicide, must be consummated.
It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than
the victim of robbery, or that two or more persons are killed or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional
mutilation, or usurpation of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise
immaterial is the fact that the victim of homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with
homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery
with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the occasion of the robbery are integrated into
one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is used in its generic sense.
Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.
Intent to rob is an internal act but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property.
When the fact of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is
justified even if the property subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may
have been abandoned or thrown away and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. The prosecution
is not burdened to prove the actual value of the property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the
robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the victim is of no moment because the motive for robbery
can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved.
When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in
the robbery would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide
although they did not actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to
prevent the same.
If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of
robbery and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as
principals of such crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal
conspiracy adopts the criminal designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it
has materialized.30 (Emphasis and italics supplied.)
In the present case, there is no doubt that the above-mentioned elements are present. The candid testimony of
Cuadro, one of the passengers of the bus held-up by appellants, unmistakably produces a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt, viz.:
Private complainant Geovani Cuadro in his testimony vividly recalled the incident of [the] [r]obbery, and x x x the
shooting by one of the accused Jojo Bacyaan of a passenger named Renato James Veloso and the driver of the
bus[,] Lauro Santos[,] which caused their death. He identified all the herein accused as the persons who[,] armed
with guns[,] had declared a hold-up in that morning of May 31, 2007, and thereafter [divested them of] their
belongings x x x, and among [which were] his Ipod and an Oakley shades. Positive identification[,] where
categorical and consistent and without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitness testifying on the
matter[,] prevails over a denial which if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence is negative and self-
serving evidence[,] undeserving of weight in law. They cannot be given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify in affirmative matters, x x x 31
From these circumstances, there is no mistaking from the actions of appellants that their main intention was to
rob the passengers of the JMK bus and that on the occasion of the robbery, a homicide was committed.
Accordingly, personal properties, such as cellphones and money, belonging to the passengers were taken by
appellants by means of force and with obvious intent to gain. During the robbery, passenger Renato James
Veloso and bus driver Lauro Santos were both mercilessly gunned down by Bacyaan.
Appellants deny the foregoing accusations. Guevarra claims that he was a mere innocent passenger of the bus.
He was on his way home when he was arrested. Similarly, Fernandez asserts that he was only standing
somewhere in the Balintawak Market when a shooting incident involving a bus occurred. After the commotion
subsided, a policeman suddenly grabbed and accused him of being one of the hold-uppers. Meanwhile, Bacyaan
insists that he was selling fruits in the Balintawak Market when policemen invited him to go to the Valenzuela
Police Station for questioning. Later, he was detained in Camp Karingal, and thereafter, charged in connection
with the robbery incident.
The Court is not convinced with the appellants' defenses. They merely denied participating in the robbery but
their presence during the commission of the crime was well-established by the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses. It bears stating that "[f]or the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only that he was
at some other place at the time the crime was committed, but that it was likewise impossible for him to be at
the locus criminis at the time of the alleged crime."32 Such physical impossibility was not sufficiently proven by
appellants in this case.
As properly observed by the RTC and the CA, appellants' denial, too, cannot be given more weight over their
positive identification by the prosecution witnesses. Furthermore, "[a] categorical and consistent positive
identification without any showing of ill motive on the part of the eyewitnesses testifying on the matter prevail
over a denial."33
The Court also agrees with the CA that the use of an unlicensed firearm was not duly proven by the prosecution.
While it is true that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere testimony, the fact that an accused
was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. Here, the prosecution failed to present any written or
testimonial evidence to prove that appellants did not have a license to carry or own a firearm. Therefore, the use
of an unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated. 34
The penalty, damages, and civil liability.
Robbery with Homicide and shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.
Appellants are ORDERED to pay the heirs of Lauro Santos the following amounts: (1) P100,000.00 as civil
indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4) P 50,536.00 as
actual damages.
Appellants are likewise ORDERED to pay the heirs of Renato James Veloso the following amounts: (1) F
100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages; (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (4)
P50,000.00 as temperate damages.
All monetary awards for damages shall earn interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the time of finality of
this decision until fully paid.

The special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Article 294, paragraph 1 of the RPC is penalized Appellants are ORDERED to RETURN the value of the stolen items if restitution is no longer possible.
with reclusion perpetua to death. Under the circumstances, the element of band, appreciated as a generic
aggravating circumstance, would have merited the imposition of the death penalty. In view of RA SO ORDERED.
9346,35 however, "the imposition of the penalty of death has been prohibited and in lieu thereof, the penalty
of reclusion perpetua is to be imposed."36

The Court resolves, at this point, to modify the damages awarded by the CA. "In robbery with homicide, civil
indemnity and moral damages are awarded automatically without need of allegation and evidence other than
the death of the victim owing to the crime."37 Both the RTC and the CA were correct in granting these awards,
except that the award should be P100,000.00 each. Recent jurisprudence provides that when the penalty to be
imposed is death, civil indemnity and moral damages shall be awarded at P100,000.00 each. 38

Apart from civil indemnity and moral damages, the lower courts likewise properly awarded exemplary damages
under Article 2230 of the Civil Code because of the presence of an aggravating circumstance and to serve as a
deterrent to others similarly inclined. The Court, however, increases the awarded amount from P30,000.00 to
P100,000.00 to conform to prevailing jurisprudence. 39

The Court likewise increases the amount of temperate damages awarded to the heirs of Renato James Veloso
from P25,000.00 to P50,000.00 in accordance with People v. Jugueta.40

In addition, interest at the rate of 6% per annum shall be imposed on all monetary awards from the date of
finality of this Decision until fully paid.

Finally, the Court orders appellants to restitute the stolen items or to pay their monetary value,  if restitution is
no longer possible.

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision dated January 18, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 07670 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellants Jojo Bacyaan y Sabaniya, Ronnie
Fernandez y  Gonzales, and Ryan Guevarra y Sipria are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
10/55 G.R. No. 235739 JULY 22, 2019
EDWIN DEL ROSARIO, PETITIONER, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CAGUIOA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Edwin del
Rosario (Edwin) assailing the Decision2 dated May 12, 2017 and Resolution 3 dated November 6, 2017 of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 01228-MIN, which affirmed the Decision 4 dated August 22, 2014 of the
Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 16 (RTC) in Criminal Case No. 71,449-11, finding Edwin guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery.
The Facts
Edwin, together with Roxan Cansiancio5 (Roxan), was charged with Robbery. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:
That on or about January 30, 2012, in the City of Davao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-mentioned accused, conspiring and confederating with one another with intent to gain and by
means of violence or intimidation against person, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously took, stole and carried
away by means of force an Italian Gold Necklace with pendant worth P18,000.00, belonging to private
complainant CHARLOTTE CASIANO to the latter's damage and prejudice in the aforesaid
CONTRARY TO LAW. 6
Upon arraignment, both Edwin and Roxan pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, before trial ensued,
Roxan changed his mind and decided to withdraw his earlier plea. 7 He plea bargained the charge of
consummated robbery to a lower offense of attempted robbery. 8 With the approval of the prosecution and with
the conformity of Charlotte Diane9 Evangelista Casiano (Charlotte), the private complainant, the RTC sentenced
Roxan to suffer the straight penalty of six (6) months arresto mayor.10
As to Edwin, trial ensued thereafter.
Version of the Prosecution
In the afternoon of January 30, 2012, Charlotte and Kim Evangelista Casiano (Kim) flagged down a jeepney going
to G-Mall.11 After boarding said jeepney, two male persons, who were later identified to be Roxan and Edwin,
also boarded the vehicle.12 Roxan sat across Charlotte while Edwin sat on the side of Kim with a woman
passenger in between them.13
While on board the jeepney, Charlotte and Kim heard Roxan and Edwin talking about who will pay the
fare.14 Upon reaching the corner of Quirino Street near the Villa Abrille Building, the jeepney stopped at a red
light.15 Kim saw Edwin giving the signal to Roxan and heard him say "tirahi na nang babaye bai"16 Thereafter,
Roxan snatched the necklace of Charlotte, disembarked from the jeepney, and ran away. Edwin also
disembarked.17
Charlotte shouted "magnanakaw".18 She and Kim disembarked from the jeepney and tried to run after Roxan but
they were unable to catch him.19
They later learned that Roxan was apprehended. 20 With Roxan in custody, the police decided to conduct a follow-
up operation.21 PO3 Rizalito Clapiz III testified on cross-examination that Roxan provided the police with the
information that his companion is a bald person. 22 The police went to the address of Edwin and upon Roxan's
confirmation that he is his companion, Edwin was apprehended. 23
On the same day, the police, at 10:00 in the evening, requested that Charlotte and Kim identify Edwin. 24 Due to
health reasons, Charlotte and Kim were only able to go to the police station the next day. 25 They both identified
Edwin as the bald person who was the companion of Roxan in the alleged robbery. 26
Version of the Defense
Edwin's defense was that of an alibi. The defense presented four witnesses, namely Victoriano Lumosad
(Victoriano), Emilyn27 Batulan (Emilyn), Henry Parreno, Sr.28 (Henry) and Edwin himself.
Victoriano claimed that about 3:30 to 4:00 in the afternoon of January 30, 2012, he saw Edwin driving. 29 Emilyn
also testified that she saw Edwin take his usual jeepney route on January 30, 2012 and that she saw him pass by
her residence at 10:00 in the morning and at 3:00 to 4:00 in the afternoon. 30 Henry, who is the father-in-law of
Edwin, also testified that he saw him on January 30, 2012 at about 2:00 in the afternoon driving his jeepney from
Talomo going to downtown.31
The defense also averred that the prosecution's witnesses failed to give sufficient identification of Edwin. 32 Their
arguments relied heavily on the fact that Charlotte only identified Roxan's companion as a bald person. 33 The
defense argued that there was no description provided as to the companion's complexion, built, and other
features. Thus, the description of Roxan's companion as a bald person is insufficient to properly identify Edwin as
the perpetrator.
Additionally, the defense alleged that the in-court identification made by Charlotte and Kim was heavily tainted
because even before they were able to identify Roxan's companion, the police already told them that the
perpetrator has been arrested.34
 Ruling of the RTC
After trial on the merits, in its Decision 35 dated August 22, 2014, the RTC convicted Edwin of the crime charged.
The RTC ruled that Edwin's alibi would not prosper because he was unable to comply with the requirements of
time and place, since he was in Davao City. Hence, it was not physically impossible for him to be at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission.36
The dispositive portion of the said Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court finds the evidence sufficient to prove the guilt of
accused EDWIN DEL ROSARIO beyond reasonable doubt. There being no mitigating nor aggravating
circumstance and pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, the Court hereby sentences
accused EDWIN DEL ROSARIO to suffer the indeterminate penalty, ranging from [s]ix (6) [m]onths and one (1)
[d]ay, [p]rision correccional, as minimum, to six (6) [y]ears and [o]ne (1) [d]ay, [p]rision [m]ayor, as maximum.
No award of civil liability.
SO ORDERED.37
Aggrieved, Edwin appealed to the CA.
Ruling of the CA
In the questioned Decision38 dated May 12, 2017, the CA affirmed the RTC's conviction of Edwin. The CA
explained that denial and alibi by Edwin cannot prevail over the positive and categorical testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.39 The CA also ruled that there was conspiracy because the commonality of criminal intent
between Edwin and Roxan was apparent: (1) Edwin and Roxan rode the jeepney together; (2) Edwin said "tirahi
na ng babaye bai; (3) Roxan grabbed the necklace of Charlotte; and (4) both Roxan and Edwin disembarked from
the jeepney and ran away.40
The CA, however, modified the penalty and disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 16, Davao City dated
August 22, 2014 is Affirmed but Modified only as to the penalty imposed on the [prison] term which shall be six
(6) months of arresto mayor as minimum to six (6) years of prision correccional as maximum.
SO ORDERED.41
Issue
For resolution of the Court is the issue of whether the RTC and the CA erred in convicting Edwin of the crime of
robbery.
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it must be stressed that an appeal in criminal cases opens the entire case for review, and it is the
duty of the reviewing tribunal to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are
assigned or unassigned.42 The appeal confers the appellate court full jurisdiction over the case and renders such
court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from, increase the penalty, and cite the
proper provision of the penal law.43
Edwin's guilt  was proven beyond
reasonable doubt
In the case at bar, the Court adopts the CA's findings and conclusion as to Edwin's guilt. The Court is convinced
that the elements of taking of personal property which belongs to another person without his consent have been
established and such taking was with intent to gain. The Court consistently held that intent to gain is a mental
state whose existence is demonstrated by a person's overt acts. 44
As to Edwin's allegation that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the required identification
that he was one of the persons responsible for the crime charged, the Court agrees with the CA when it ruled as
follows:
Indeed, a perusal of the testimonies [of] both witnesses on direct and cross-examinations would show that they
were consistent on their narrative of the incident and of the participation of appellant Del Rosario. Thus, there is
no reason to depart from the findings of the trial court especially since "[t]he direct appreciation of testimonial
demeanor during examination, veracity, sincerity and candor was foremost the trial court's domain, not that of a
reviewing court that had no similar access to the witnesses at the time they testified." 45
As a matter of fact, the testimonies of Kim and Charlotte demonstrate that they are certain that Edwin was the
perpetrator:
[Kim's testimony:]
Q: Okay, are you positive that it is Del Rosario, who is in Court, who gave the signal to Cansancio?
A: Yes sir.
 Q: How certain are you from 1 to 100%? Q: What happened when you were in the police station?

A: 101% sir. A: At first, we were not able to see that person but they were detained there, they made us identify that
person sir.
Q: 101%?
Q: Were you able to identify him?
A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: 101%, your identification?
Q: Is he in Court?
A: Yes sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: That means it is impossible for you to forget the face of accused Del Rosario?
Q: If he is in Court, can you point to him?
A: Yes sir because it is our first time to meet this kind of incident.

xxxx A: Yes sir.

Q: xxx MR. MOLINA: Witness pointed to a person wearing a black t-shirt and when asked, identified himself as Edwin
Del Rosario.
What happened after you went to the San Pedro Police Station?
PROS. BELLO: He is the same person you saw boarded on the same jeepney?
A: They made us identify the companion sir.
A: Yes sir.
Q: Where (sic) you able to identify him?
xxxx
A: Yes sir.
PROS. BELLO: Madam Witness, after you went to the San Pedro Police Station, you identify the accused ...
Q: Who was that?
COURT: Who among the accused?
A: Edwin Del Rosario sir.
PROS. BELLO: Accused del Rosario your Honor.
Q: The Edwin del Rosario you just identified before this Court, what is his relation to the person you
identified in San Pedro Police Station? Is he the same person you saw in the puj you boarded earlier?

A: He is one and the same person sir. A: Yes sir.

Q: You are very sure that the person in Court who identified himself as Edwin Del Rosario is the same Q: You are very certain of that?
person, Edwin del Rosario you identified in San Pedro Police Station?
A: Yes sir, I immediately identify him.
A: Very sure sir.46
Q: You are very sure that he is the same person?
[Charlotte's testimony:]
 A: Yes sir. A: Mr. Del Rosario sir.

May be because 1 was angry sir, it was stuck in my mind sir. Q: The one who is in court?

Q: Between the range from 1 to 10, what is [your] certainty of your identity? A: Yes sir.

A: 100% sir.47 Q: Okay, you just refer to him as Del Rosario. Del Rosario gave a signal?

A: Yes, sir.
Crime committed is theft, not robbery Q: What kind of signal?

From the foregoing, the Court notes that the material issue left to be addressed is whether the snatching of the A: He said "tirahi na nang babaye bai" (Hit that lady bai).
necklace is robbery or theft. Did Edwin employ violence or intimidation upon persons, or force upon things,
when he snatched Charlotte's necklace? Q: So, upon hearing that message from Del Rosario, what did Cansancio do?

The elements of robbery are: (1) there is a taking of personal property; (2) the personal property belongs to A: He quickly snatched the necklace sir and then Cansancio ran away.
another; (3) the taking is with animus lucrandi; and (4) the taking is with violence against or intimidation of
persons or with force upon things.48 Theft, on the other hand, is committed by any person who, with intent to Q: What about del Rosario?
gain but without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take the personal
property of another without the latter's consent. 49 A: He was left in the jeep sir.

Thus, the distinguishing element between the crimes of robbery and theft is the use of violence or intimidation Q: Then?
as a means of taking the property belonging to another; the element is present in the crime of robbery and
absent in the crime of theft.50 A: I chased Cansancio sir and my sister disembark[ed] from the jeep and [s]he als[o] chased Cansancio. 51

The testimonies of the witnesses reveal that the snatching of the necklace was without violence against or
intimidation of persons or with force upon things. Kim, during his direct examination, testified as follows: Such fact was also bolstered by Charlotte's testimony:

COURT: Okay what happened when these two men boarded the vehicle? Q: Madam Witness, what happened when the jeepney you were riding was already in motion?

A: They have a conversation about the fare sir, as to who will pay the fare sir. A: I was hinting something and there was a male person in front of me, in fact, the people who are also
about to board a jeep was telling him to move towards the inside direction, but he did not move sir.
Q: Then?
Q: What happened?
A: The jeep stop[ped] briefly at Villa Abrille Building because there was a red light.
A: What I was able to recall was that I heard a person saying "you will be the one to pay the fare."
Q: So, what happen[ed]?
xxxx
A: When I looked at them, they gave a signal.
Q: What else happened?
Q: Who gave a signal?
 recovered from the accused at or about the same time it was stolen.
A: After that sir, upon reaching the corner of Quirino, there was a red light so the jeepney stopped.

Q: What happened when the red traffic light flashed? In People v. Omambong,57 the Court distinguished robbery from theft. The Court held:
Had the appellant then run away, he would undoubtedly have been guilty of theft only, because the asportation
A: When the jeep was again about to move that male person in front of me suddenly grabbed my was not effected against the owner's will, but only without his consent; although, of course, there was some sort
necklace. of force used by the appellant in taking the money away from the owner.

Q: What happened after he grabbed your necklace? xxxx

A: I was weak at that time sir, coming from the hospital, I tried to hold on to my necklace but I was not What the record does show is that when the offended party made an attempt to regain his money, the
able to prevent him from grabbing my necklace so he jumped and ran away and I also jumped and appellant's companions used violence to prevent his succeeding.
shouted "theft".
xxxx
Q: What did your brother do, if any?
The crime committed is therefore robbery and not theft, because personal violence was brought to bear upon
A: When I jumped off from the jeep, my brother also chased the person sir, we were shouting the offended party before he was definitely deprived of his money. 58
"magnanakaw" (theft).
In the strikingly similar case of Ablaza v. People,59 the Court clarified that "for the requisite of violence to obtain
Q: What happened when your brother was chasing the person who grabbed your necklace? in cases of simple robbery, the victim must have sustained less serious physical injuries or slight physical injuries
in the occasion of the robbery."60 The Court added that the fact that the necklace was "grabbed" did not
A: I was trying to look at the ground sir if there was something that fell your Honor, I return to the automatically mean that force attended the taking. The Court explained:
multicab sir I identified all those passengers then I followed my brother sir.
The OSG argues that the use of the word "grabbed", by itself, shows that violence or physical force was
Q: What happened to that person who grabbed your necklace?
employed by the offenders in taking Snyders' necklaces. The Court, however, finds the argument to be a pure
play of semantics. Grab means to take or seize by or as if by a sudden motion or grasp; to take hastily. Clearly,
A: He was running, heading to the direction of Villa Abrille.
the same does not suggest the presence of violence or physical force in the act; the connotation is on the
Q: Then, what happened next, if any? suddenness of the act of taking or seizing which cannot be readily equated with the employment of violence or
physical force. Here, it was probably the suddenness of taking that shocked Snyder and not the presence of
A: When I arrived there, there were three civilian police who caught or apprehended that person sir. 52 violence or physical force since, as pointed out by petitioner, Snyder did not at all allege that She was pushed or
otherwise harmed by the persons who took her necklaces. 61

In the case of People v. Concepcion,53 the Court ruled that when the complainant herself merely testified that the
offender snatched her shoulder bag, without saying that such offender used violence, intimidation or force in
snatching her shoulder bag, the snatching of the shoulder bag constitutes the crime of theft, not robbery. 54 The
Court reached the same conclusion in the following cases:
In People v. [De la] Cruz,55 this Court found the accused guilty of theft for snatching a basket containing jewelry,
money and clothing, and taking off with it, while the owners had their backs turned.
In People v. Tapang,56 this Court affirmed the conviction of the accused for frustrated theft because he stole a
white gold ring with diamond stones from the victim's pocket, which ring was immediately or subsequently
Applying the foregoing in the case at bar, the crime committed by Edwin is thus clearly only theft, instead of
robbery.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court is aware that Edwin was indicted under a charge for robbery, not theft.
The failure to specify the correct crime committed, however, will not bar Edwin's conviction for the crime of
theft. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information, or by the
specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated. 62 The crime committed is determined by the
recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. 63 In this case, the allegations in
the Information are sufficient to make out a charge of theft.
Proper Penalty to be imposed
The CA imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to six (6) years of prision
correccional, as maximum. Under Republic Act No. 10951,64 which was promulgated on August 29, 2017, Article
309(4) of the Revised Penal Code has been relevantly amended as follows:
ART. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
Where the penalty actually imposed does not exceed one (1) year, the accused cannot avail himself of the
benefits of the law, the application of which is based upon the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law
and not upon that which may be imposed in the discretion of the court. (People v. Hidalgo, [CA] G.R. No. 00452-
CR, January 22, 1962).69

xxxx In other words, since the maximum imposable penalty does not exceed one year, the ISL does not apply. 70 As
aforementioned, the maximum term to be considered is the penalty actually imposed in accordance with law,
4. Arresto mayor  in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of the property which is arresto mayor in its maximum period, that is four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
stolen is over Five thousand pesos (P5,000) but does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). months.71 Accordingly, his penalty is fixed at six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Accordingly, the Court modifies the penalty. Article 309(4) provides that the penalty shall be arresto mayor in its Court DECLARES petitioner EDWIN DEL ROSARIO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of THEFT, for which he is
medium period to prisión correccional in its minimum period, which consist of the following periods: sentenced to suffer the straight penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor.

SO ORDERED.
(a) MINIMUM –  arresto mayor in its medium period, that is from two (2) months and one (1) day to four
(4) months;

(b) MEDIUM –  arresto mayor in its maximum period, that is four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months; and

(c) MAXIMUM – prision correccional in its minimum period, that is six (6) months and one (1) day to two
(2) years and four (4) months.

Pursuant to Article 64(1)65 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that in cases in which the penalties
prescribed by law contain three periods, whether it be a single divisible penalty or composed of three different
penalties, and there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the penalty imposable shall be in its
medium period. Hence, the imposable penalty is arresto mayor in its maximum period, that is, four (4) months
and one (1) day to six (6) months.66

In Romero v. People67 citing Argoncillo v. Court of Appeals,68 the Court summarized the application and non-
application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law (ISL), to wit:

x x x It is basic law that x x x the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is mandatory where
imprisonment exceeds one (1) year, except only in the following cases:

xxxx

h. Those whose maximum period of imprisonment does not exceed one (1) year.
11/56 G.R. No. 209137               July 1, 2015 (60) sixty pcs. of Php50.00 bills worth Php3,000.00
EDUARDO CELEDONIO, Petitioner, (100) one hundred pcs. of Php20.00 bills worth Php2,000.00
vs. (15) fifteen pcs. of Php100.00 bills worth Php1,500.00 owned and belonging to CARMENCITA DE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. GUZMAN y SERRANO, to the damage and prejudice of the herein complainant, in the aforementioned
DECISION amount of Php223,000.00.
MENDOZA, J.: Contrary to law.5
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by Eduardo Celedonio (Celedonio) Version of the Prosecution
assails the April 8, 2013 Decision1 and the September 17, 2013 Resolution 2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA- The evidence for the prosecution shows that on the evening of April 21, 2007, a certain Adriano Marquez
G.R. CR No. 34472, affirming the August 18, 2011 Decision 3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 73, Malabon City (Marquez)witnessed the robbery perpetrated in the house of Carmencita De Guzman (De Guzman)while she was
(RTC), in Criminal Case No. 35668-MN. away to attend to the wake of her deceased husband. No one was left in the house. Marquez, whose house was
The Information,4 dated April 25, 2007, charged Celedonio with the crime of Robbery with Force Upon Things, opposite the house of De Guzman and Celedonio, which were adjacent to each other, identified Celedonio as the
the accusatory portion of which reads: culprit. Upon learning of the incident, De Guzman reported it to the police and requested that Celedonio be
That on or about the 22nd day of April 2007, in the Municipality of Navotas, Metro Manila, Philippines and within investigated for possibly having committed the crime, based on the account of Marquez.
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to gain and by means of force Later, a follow-up operation was conducted by PO1 Rommel Roque (PO1 Roque)and SPO2 Adrian Sugui (SPO2
upon things, and without the consent of the owner, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously enter Sugui), accompanied by Marquez. They proceeded to Raja Humabon St., Navotas, to survey the area for the
the house of the herein complainant by destroying the backdoor of said house, and once inside, take, rob and possible identification and apprehension of the suspect. On their way, Marquez pointed to a man on a
carry away the following: motorcycle and said, "Sir, siya po si Eduardo Celedonio." The police immediately flagged down Celedonio. PO1
(1) one gold bracelet 24K Php8,000.00 Roque asked him if he was Eduardo Celedonio, but he did not reply and just bowed his head.
(3) necklace (1) one 24K and (2) two 18K Php42,000.00 SPO2 Sugui informed Celedonio of a complaint for robbery against him. Celedonio still remained silent and just
(2) two digicam Sony player Php22,000.00 bowed his head. SPO2 Sugui asked him, "Where [were] the stolen items?" Celedonio then alighted from his
motorcycle and opened its compartment where PO1 Roque saw some of the stolen items, as per report of the
(1) one DVD portable Php5,000.00
incident, such as the portable DVD player and a wristwatch, among others. 6
(1) one wrist watch Tagheur Php30,000.00
PO1 Roque asked Celedonio if the same were stolen, to which the latter answered, "Iyan po." 7 Thus, Celedonio
(1) one sun glass Guess Php5,000.00 was arrested and was informed of his constitutional rights. More itemswere seized from Celedonio at the police
(1) one camera Canon Php2,500.00 station.
(1) one Gameboy advance Php5,000.00 Version of the Accused
(1) one calculator Php1,500.00 After the prosecution rested its case, Celedonio filed his Demurrer to Evidence (with leave of court) citing as his
(1) one discman Sony Php3,000.00 ground the alleged illegality of his arrest and the illegal search on his motorcycle. The RTC denied the demurrer,
(2) two pcs. 100.00 US dollar bills stating that the question of the legality of Celedonio’s arrest had been mooted by his arraignment and his active
participation in the trial of the case. It considered the seizure of the stolen items as legal not only because of
(22) twenty two pcs. Php500.00 bills
Celedonio’s apparent consent to it, but also because the subject items were in a moving vehicle. 8
(2) two necklace 18K worth Php30,000.00
In his defense, Celedonio claimed that he was at home with his wife, sleeping, at the time of the incident. His
(2) two bracelet worth Php11,500.00 wife corroborated his statement.
(2) two gold ring worth Php8,000.00 In its Decision, dated August 18,2011, the RTC found Celedonio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
(1) one wedding ring worth 14K worth Php1,500.00 Robbery with Force Upon Things. The dispositive portion of the RTC decision 9 reads:
(1) one wrist watch swiss military worth Php10,000.00 WHEREFORE, finding the accused EDUARDO CELEDONIO y MONIS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the
(1) one cellphone NOKIA 8250 worth Php3,000.00 offense of Robbery with Force Upon Things as defined and penalized under Article 299 (a)2 of the Revised Penal
(3) three pairs of earrings worth Php15,000.00 Code, he is therefore sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional as
(3) three pcs. of 100.00 US dollars worth Php15,000.00 minimum to 8 years and 1 day of prision mayor as maximum. He is also ordered to pay private complainant the
amount of Php105,000.00 which is the worth of what has not been recovered from the loss she suffered by
reason of the robbery.
SO ORDERED.10
The trial court was convinced that the prosecution clearly established that: 1) a robbery had been committed; 2)
it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items including cash were found in Celedonio’s possession;
and 4) Celedonio had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen goods. 11
Insisting on his innocence, Celedonio appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that the RTC erred: 1) in
convicting him of the crime despite the insufficiency of the circumstantial evidence; 2) in not finding that the
search was illegal, rendering the articles recovered inadmissible; and 3) in not finding that the prosecution
witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him. 12
The CA, however, affirmed the RTC in toto. It found that the totality of circumstances warranted the finding that
Celedonio was solely and directly responsible for the crime. 13
In addition, the CA brushed aside Celedonio’s argument that he was illegally arrested and that the items seized
should be excluded as evidence. It stressed that Celedonio was not arrested when he voluntarily opened the
compartment of his motorcycle. He was only brought to the police for investigation after some of the stolen
items were found in his motorcycle compartment. 14 Further, Celedonio’s failure to raise the issue before his
arraignment constituted a waiver on his part to question the legality of his arrest. 15
Celedonio moved for reconsideration, but his motion was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
ISSUES
I rendering the seized articles inadmissible; and 3) the witness Marquez was ill-motivated in testifying against him.
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURT’S RULING
THAT THE PETITIONER’S GUILT WAS PROVEN BASED ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
II
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED ON THE PETITIONER WAS ILLEGAL, RENDERING THE ARTICLES RECOVERED INADMISSIBLE.
III
WHETHER THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION
WITNESS ADRIANO MARQUEZ WAS ILL-MOTIVATED IN TESTIFYING AGAINST THE PETITIONER.
The petition lacks merit.
Jurisprudence tells us that direct evidence of the crime is not the only matrix from which a trial court may draw
its conclusion and finding of guilt. The rules on evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to
support its conclusion of guilt. The lack of direct evidence does not ipso facto bar the finding of guilt against the
appellant. As long as the prosecution establishes the accused-appellant’s participation in the crime through
credible and sufficient circumstantial evidence that leads to the inescapable conclusion that he committed the
imputed crime, the latter should be convicted.16
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: 1) there is more than one circumstance; 2) the facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and 3) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 17
In this case, the prosecution sufficiently laid down the circumstances that, when taken together, constituted an
unbroken chain that led to a reasonable conclusion that Celedonio was the perpetrator. The CA opined that:
xxx As correctly pointed out by the trial court, these circumstances are: accused was a next door neighbor of
private complainant; he was seen by another neighbor going over the concrete fence separating their houses and
ransacking a room in complainant’s house; during the time, no one was inside complainant’s house as all of them
were at the wake of private complainant’s recently demised husband; two (2) days after, most of the items
discovered to have been stolen that night were found in the compartment of the accused’s motorcycle which he
was riding on when accosted by the police; the items recovered from him were identified by the complainant as
her stolen property; during the trial accused denied that the stolen items were found in his possession and
claimed that they were "planted" by the police investigators to frame him up of the robbery. In short, the
accused could not explain his possession of the recently stolen items found in his sole possession.
xxxx
We find the conviction of accused-appellant based on circumstantial evidence factually and legally tenable, as
the facts from which the aforementioned circumstances arose have been proved through the positive testimony
of Adriano Marquez, PO1 Rommel Roque and Carmencita de Guzman. 18
The defense does not refute the existence of the commission of robbery. In fact, Celedionio himself
acknowledged that the prosecution’s circumstantial evidence, although weak, ambiguous and inconclusive,
established that 1) a robbery had been committed; 2) it was committed recently; 3) several of the stolen items
including cash were found in his possession; and 4) he had no valid explanation for his possession of the stolen
goods.19 Celedonio, however, still insisted that he cannot be convicted of the crime of robbery because 1) he was
not caught in exclusive possession of the stolen items; 2) the search conducted on him was illegal thereby
These arguments, however, do not hold water.
First, Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of the stolen items when the police officers
flagged down his motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a reasonable explanation as to
his possession of the said items. Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a person found
in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over, is owned by him.
Celedonio never claimed ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items were found in his
motorcycle compartment which he had control over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the stolen
items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation.
Thus, the only plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he took the items.
Second, no illegal search was made upon Celedonio. When the police officers asked where the stolen items
were, they merely made a general inquiry, and not a search, as part of their follow-up operation. Records did not
show that the police officers even had the slightest hint that the stolen items were in Celedonio’s motorcycle
compartment. Neither was there any showing that the police officers frisked Celedonio or rummaged over his
motorcycle. There was no showing either of any force or intimidation on the part of the police officers when they
made the inquiry. Celedonio himself voluntarily opened his motorcycle compartment. Worse, when he was
asked if the items were the stolen ones, he actually confirmed it. 20 The police officers, therefore, were left
without any recourse but to take him into custody for further investigation. At that instance, the police officers
had probable cause that he could be the culprit of the robbery. He did not have any explanation as to how he got
hold of the items. Moreover, taking into consideration that the stolen items were in a moving vehicle, the police
had to immediately act on it.
Third, contrary to Celedonio’s argument, Marquez was a credible witness. Jurisprudence also tells us that where
there is no evidence that the witnesses of the prosecution were actuated by ill motive, it is presumed that they
were not so actuated and their testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 21
In this case, if only to discredit Marquez, Celedonio claimed that they once had a fight over a water meter. As
correctly observed by the CA, however, such allegation was too insignificant that it could not destroy whatever
credibility Marquez possessed as a witness. The CA, thus, posited:
xxx It is true that under the Rules of Court, a witness may be impeached by evidence that his general reputation
for truth, honesty or integrity is bad.1âwphi1 However, a witness cannot be impeached by evidence of particular
wrongful acts, unless there is a showing of previous conviction by final judgment such that not even the
existence of pending information maybe shown to impeach him.
More so, in this case, wherein no information was filed against the witness, but only the mere say so of the
accused on Marquez' alleged involvement in a quarrel with him over a water meter. Furthermore, no testimony
was presented to show that the reputation of Marquez for truth, honesty or integrity is bad; no evil motive has
been established against prosecution witness Marquez that might prompt him to testify falsely against accused-
appellant Celedonio.22
Alibi and denial were the only defenses of Celedonio. Unless he can strongly support his claims that the items
were "planted" and that it was physically impossible for him to be in De Guzman's house other than the mere
averment that he was asleep at the time, his defenses cannot prevail over the strong circumstantial evidence. 23
Having established the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence, the CA did not commit any reversible error in
upholding the RTC. In the absence of any indication that the R TC and the CA overlooked facts or circumstances
that would result in a different ruling in this case, the Court will not disturb their factual findings. 24
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
12/57 G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014
LITO CORPUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
This is to resolve the Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, dated November 5,
2007, of petitioner Lito Corpuz (petitioner), seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision 1 dated March 22, 2007
and Resolution2 dated September 5, 2007 of the Court of Appeals (CA), which affirmed with modification the
Decision3 dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding the
petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub–paragraph
(b) of the Revised Penal Code.
The antecedent facts follow.
Private complainant Danilo Tangcoy and petitioner met at the Admiral Royale Casino in Olongapo City sometime
in 1990.  Private complainant was then engaged in the business of lending money to casino players and, upon
hearing that the former had some pieces of jewelry for sale, petitioner approached him on May 2, 1991 at the
same casino and offered to sell the said pieces of jewelry on commission basis.  Private complainant agreed, and
as a consequence, he turned over to petitioner the following items:  an 18k diamond ring for men; a woman’s
bracelet; one (1) men’s necklace and another men’s bracelet, with an aggregate value of P98,000.00, as
evidenced by a receipt of even date.  They both agreed that petitioner shall remit the proceeds of the sale,
and/or, if unsold, to return the same items, within a period of 60 days.  The period expired without petitioner
remitting the proceeds of the sale or returning the pieces of jewelry.  When private complainant was able to
meet petitioner, the latter promised the former that he will pay the value of the said items entrusted to him, but
to no avail.
Thus, an Information was filed against petitioner for the crime of estafa, which reads as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
That on or about the fifth (5th) day of July 1991, in the City of Olongapo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above–named accused, after having received from one Danilo Tangcoy, one (1)
men’s diamond ring, 18k, worth P45,000.00; one (1) three–baht men’s bracelet, 22k, worth P25,000.00; one (1)
two–baht ladies' bracelet, 22k, worth P12,000.00, or in the total amount of Ninety–Eight Thousand Pesos
(P98,000.00), Philippine currency, under expressed obligation on the part of said accused to remit the proceeds
of the sale of the said items or to return the same, if not sold, said accused, once in possession of the said items,
with intent to defraud, and with unfaithfulness and abuse of confidence, and far from complying with his
aforestated obligation, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and
convert to his own personal use and benefit the aforesaid jewelries (sic) or the proceeds of the sale thereof, and
despite repeated demands, the accused failed and refused to return the said items or to remit the amount  of 
Ninety– Eight  Thousand  Pesos  (P98,000.00),  Philippine currency, to the damage and prejudice of said Danilo
Tangcoy in the aforementioned amount.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
On January 28, 1992, petitioner, with the assistance of his counsel, entered a plea of not guilty.  Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.
The prosecution, to prove the above–stated facts, presented the lone testimony of Danilo Tangcoy.  On the other
hand, the defense presented the lone testimony of petitioner, which can be summarized, as
follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Petitioner and private complainant were collecting agents of Antonio Balajadia, who is engaged in the financing
business of extending loans to Base employees.  For every collection made, they earn a commission.  Petitioner
denied having transacted any business with private complainant.  However, he admitted obtaining a loan from
Balajadia sometime in 1989 for which he was made to sign a blank receipt.  He claimed that the same receipt was
then dated May 2, 1991 and used as evidence against him for the supposed agreement to sell the subject pieces
of jewelry, which he did not even see.
After trial, the RTC found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged in the Information. 
The dispositive portion of the decision states:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, finding accused LITO CORPUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the felony of Estafa under
Article 315, paragraph one (1), subparagraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code;
there being no offsetting generic aggravating nor ordinary mitigating circumstance/s to vary the penalty
imposable;
accordingly, the accused is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of deprivation of liberty consisting of an
imprisonment under the Indeterminate Sentence Law of FOUR (4) YEARS AND TWO (2) MONTHS of Prision
Correccional in its medium period AS MINIMUM, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS of Reclusion
Temporal in its minimum period AS MAXIMUM; to indemnify private complainant Danilo Tangcoy the amount of
P98,000.00 as actual damages, and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
The case was elevated to the CA, however, the latter denied the appeal of petitioner and affirmed the decision of
the RTC, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DENIED.  The assailed Judgment dated July 30, 2004 of the RTC of San
Fernando City (P), Branch 46, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION on the imposable prison term, such that
accused–appellant shall suffer the indeterminate penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 8 years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus 1 year for each additional P10,000.00, or a total of 7
years.  The rest of the decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner, after the CA denied his motion for reconsideration, filed with this Court the present petition stating
the following grounds:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONFIRMING THE ADMISSION AND APPRECIATION BY THE
LOWER COURT OF PROSECUTION EVIDENCE, INCLUDING ITS EXHIBITS, WHICH ARE MERE MACHINE COPIES, AS
THIS VIOLATES THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE;
B.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
CRIMINAL INFORMATION FOR ESTAFA WAS NOT FATALLY DEFECTIVE ALTHOUGH THE SAME DID NOT CHARGE
THE OFFENSE UNDER ARTICLE 315 (1) (B) OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN THAT –
1.  THE INFORMATION DID NOT FIX A PERIOD WITHIN WHICH THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY SHOULD BE
RETURNED, IF UNSOLD, OR THE MONEY TO BE REMITTED, IF SOLD;
2.  THE DATE OF THE OCCURRENCE OF THE CRIME ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION AS OF 05 JULY 1991 WAS
MATERIALLY DIFFERENT FROM THE ONE TESTIFIED TO BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT WHICH WAS 02 MAY
1991;
C.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT DEMAND TO
RETURN THE SUBJECT [PIECES OF] JEWELRY, IF UNSOLD, OR REMIT THE PROCEEDS, IF SOLD – AN ELEMENT OF
THE OFFENSE – WAS PROVED;
D.  THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE LOWER COURT'S FINDING THAT THE
PROSECUTION'S CASE WAS PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT ALTHOUGH –
1.  THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT TESTIFIED ON TWO (2) VERSIONS OF THE INCIDENT;
2.  THE VERSION OF THE PETITIONER – ACCUSED IS MORE STRAIGHTFORWARD AND LOGICAL, CONSISTENT WITH
HUMAN EXPERIENCE;
3.  THE EQUIPOISE RULE WAS NOT APPRECIATED IN AND APPLIED TO THIS CASE;
4.  PENAL STATUTES ARE STRICTLY CONSTRUED AGAINST THE STATE.
In its Comment dated May 5, 2008, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) stated the following counter–
arguments:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The exhibits were properly admitted inasmuch as petitioner failed to object to their admissibility.
The information was not defective inasmuch as it sufficiently established the designation of the offense and the
acts complained of.
The prosecution sufficiently established all the elements of the crime charged.
This Court finds the present petition devoid of any merit.
The factual findings of the appellate court generally are conclusive, and carry even more weight when said court
affirms the findings of the trial court, absent any showing that the findings are totally devoid of support in the
records, or that they are so glaringly erroneous as to constitute grave abuse of discretion. 4  Petitioner is of the
opinion that the CA erred in affirming the factual findings of the trial court.  He now comes to this Court raising
both procedural and substantive issues.
According to petitioner, the CA erred in affirming the ruling of the trial court, admitting in evidence a receipt
dated May 2, 1991 marked as Exhibit “A” and its submarkings, although the same was merely a photocopy, thus,
violating the best evidence rule.  However, the records show that petitioner never objected to the admissibility
of the said evidence at the time it was identified, marked and testified upon in court by private complainant.  The
CA also correctly pointed out that petitioner also failed to raise an objection in his Comment to the prosecution’s
formal offer of evidence and even admitted having signed the said receipt.  The established doctrine is that when
a party failed to interpose a timely objection to evidence at the time they were offered in evidence, such
objection shall be considered as waived.5
Another procedural issue raised is, as claimed by petitioner, the formally defective Information filed against him. 
He contends that the Information does not contain the period when the pieces of jewelry were supposed to be
returned and that the date when the crime occurred was different from the one testified to by private
complainant.  This argument is untenable.  The CA did not err in finding that the Information was substantially
complete and in reiterating that objections as to the matters of form and substance in the Information cannot be
made for the first time on appeal.  It is true that the gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1, subparagraph (b) of the RPC is the appropriation or conversion of money or property received to
the prejudice of the owner6  and that the time of occurrence is not a material ingredient of the crime, hence, the
exclusion of the period and the wrong date of the occurrence of the crime, as reflected in the Information, do
not make the latter fatally defective.  The CA ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x  An information is legally viable as long as it distinctly states the statutory designation of the offense and the
acts or omissions constitutive thereof.  Then Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court provides that a complaint
or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the
acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed.  In the case at bar, a
reading of the subject Information shows compliance with the foregoing rule.  That the time of the commission
of the offense was stated as “ on or about the fifth (5th) day of July, 1991” is not likewise fatal to the
prosecution’s cause considering that Section 11 of the same Rule requires a statement of the precise time only
when the same is a material ingredient of the offense.  The gravamen of the crime of estafa under Article 315,
paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) is the appropriation or conversion of money or property
received to the prejudice of the offender.  Thus, aside from the fact that the date of the commission thereof is
not an essential element of the crime herein charged, the failure of the prosecution to specify the exact date
does not render the Information ipso facto defective.  Moreover, the said date is also near the due date within q  Did you know his residence?
which accused–appellant should have delivered the proceeds or returned the said [pieces of jewelry] as testified a  Yes, sir.
upon by Tangkoy, hence, there was sufficient compliance with the rules.  Accused–appellant, therefore, cannot
now be allowed to claim that he was not properly apprised of the charges proferred against him. 7 q  Did you go there?
a  Yes, sir.
It must be remembered that petitioner was convicted of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of
the RPC, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary q  Did you find him?
ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned a  No, sir.
hereinbelow.
q  Were you able to talk to him since 5 July 1991?
1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely: a  I talked to him, sir.
xxxx
q  How many times?
a  Two times, sir.
(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any other personal property
received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation involving
q  What did you talk (sic) to him?
the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be totally or partially guaranteed
a  About the items I gave to (sic) him, sir.
by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other property; x x x
q  Referring to Exhibit A–2?
The elements of estafa with abuse of confidence are as follows: (a) that money, goods or other personal property a  Yes, sir, and according to him he will take his obligation and I asked him where the items are and he
is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or under any other obligation promised me that he will pay these amount, sir.
involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return the same; (b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of
such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of such receipt; (c) that such misappropriation or q  Up to this time that you were here, were you able to collect from him partially or full?
conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (d) that there is a demand made by the offended party a  No, sir. 9
on the offender.8
No specific type of proof is required to show that there was demand. 10 Demand need not even be formal; it may
Petitioner argues that the last element, which is, that there is a demand by the offended party on the offender,
be verbal.11 The specific word “demand” need not even be used to show that it has indeed been made upon the
was not proved.  This Court disagrees.  In his testimony, private complainant narrated how he was able to locate
person charged, since even a mere query as to the whereabouts of the money [in this case, property], would be
petitioner after almost two (2) months from the time he gave the pieces of jewelry and asked petitioner about
tantamount to a demand.12  As expounded in Asejo v. People:13
the same items with the latter promising to pay them.  Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With regard to the necessity of demand, we agree with the CA that demand under this kind of estafa need not be
PROS. MARTINEZ
formal or written. The appellate court observed that the law is silent with regard to the form of demand in estafa
under Art. 315 1(b), thus:
q  Now, Mr. Witness, this was executed on 2 May 1991, and this transaction could have been finished on 5 July
1991, the question is what happens (sic) when the deadline came? When the law does not qualify, We should not qualify. Should a written demand be necessary, the law would
a  I went looking for him, sir. have stated so. Otherwise, the word “demand” should be interpreted in its general meaning as to include both
written and oral demand. Thus, the failure of the prosecution to present a written demand as evidence is not
q  For whom? fatal.
a  Lito Corpuz, sir. In Tubb v. People, where the complainant merely verbally inquired about the money entrusted to the accused,
we held that the query was tantamount to a demand, thus:
q  Were you able to look (sic) for him? x x x  [T]he law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the existence of the crime of
a  I looked for him for a week, sir. embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for funds or property held in trust, is
circumstantial evidence of misappropriation. The same way, however, be established by other proof, such as that
introduced in the case at bar.14
In view of the foregoing and based on the records, the prosecution was able to prove the existence of all the
elements of the crime.  Private complainant gave petitioner the pieces of jewelry in trust, or on commission
basis, as shown in the receipt dated May 2, 1991 with an obligation to sell or return the same within sixty (60)
days, if unsold.  There was misappropriation when petitioner failed to remit the proceeds of those pieces of
jewelry sold, or if no sale took place, failed to return the same pieces of jewelry within or after the agreed period
despite demand from the private complainant, to the prejudice of the latter.
Anent the credibility of the prosecution’s sole witness, which is questioned by petitioner, the same is
unmeritorious.  Settled is the rule that in assessing the credibility of witnesses, this Court gives great respect to
the evaluation of the trial court for it had the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of witnesses and
their deportment on the witness stand, an opportunity denied the appellate courts, which merely rely on the
records of the case.15  The assessment by the trial court is even conclusive and binding if not tainted with
arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence, especially when such finding is
affirmed by the CA.16  Truth is established not by the number of witnesses, but by the quality of their testimonies,
for in determining the value and credibility of evidence, the witnesses are to be weighed not numbered. 17
As regards the penalty, while this Court’s Third Division was deliberating on this case, the question of the
continued validity of imposing on persons convicted of crimes involving property came up. The legislature
apparently pegged these penalties to the value of the money and property in 1930 when it enacted the Revised
Penal Code. Since the members of the division reached no unanimity on this question and since the issues are of
first impression, they decided to refer the case to the Court  en banc for consideration and resolution. Thus,
several amici curiae  were invited at the behest of the Court to give their academic opinions on the matter.
Among those that graciously complied were Dean Jose Manuel Diokno, Dean Sedfrey M. Candelaria, Professor
Alfredo F. Tadiar, the Senate President, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.  The parties were later
heard on oral arguments before the Court en banc, with Atty. Mario L. Bautista appearing as counsel of the
petitioner.
After a thorough consideration of the arguments presented on the matter, this Court finds the
following:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
There seems to be a perceived injustice brought about by the range of penalties that the courts continue to
impose on crimes against property committed today, based on the amount of damage measured by the value of
money eighty years ago in 1932. However, this Court cannot modify the said range of penalties because that
would constitute judicial legislation. What the legislature’s perceived failure in amending the penalties provided
for in the said crimes cannot be remedied through this Court’s decisions, as that would be encroaching upon the
power of another branch of the government. This, however, does not render the whole situation without any
remedy. It can be appropriately presumed that the framers of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) had anticipated this
matter by including Article 5, which reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
ART. 5. Duty of the court in connection with acts which should be repressed but which are not covered by the
law, and in cases of excessive penalties. – Whenever a court has knowledge of any act which it may deem
proper to repress and which is not punishable by law, it shall render the proper decision, and shall report to
the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons which induce the court to believe that said
act should be made the subject of penal legislation.
In the same way, the court shall submit to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, such
statement as may be deemed proper, without suspending the execution of the sentence, when a strict
enforcement of the provisions of this Code would result in the imposition of a clearly excessive penalty, taking
into consideration the degree of malice and the injury caused by the offense. 18
The first paragraph of the above provision clearly states that for acts bourne out of a case which is not
punishable by law and the court finds it proper to repress, the remedy is to render the proper decision and
thereafter, report to the Chief Executive, through the Department of Justice, the reasons why the same act
should be the subject of penal legislation. The premise here is that a deplorable act is present but is not the
subject of any penal legislation, thus, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive of the need to make that
act punishable by law through legislation. The second paragraph is similar to the first except for the situation
wherein the act is already punishable by law but the corresponding penalty is deemed by the court as excessive.
The remedy therefore, as in the first paragraph is not to suspend the execution of the sentence but to submit to
the Chief Executive the reasons why the court considers the said penalty to be non–commensurate with the act
committed. Again, the court is tasked to inform the Chief Executive, this time, of the need for a legislation to
provide the proper penalty.
In his book, Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 19 Guillermo B. Guevara opined that in Article 5, the duty
of the court is merely to report to the Chief Executive, with a recommendation for an amendment or
modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
This provision is based under the legal maxim “nullum crimen, nulla poena sige lege,” that is, that there can exist
no punishable act except those previously and specifically provided for by penal statute.
No matter how reprehensible an act is, if the law–making body does not deem it necessary to prohibit its
perpetration with penal sanction, the Court of justice will be entirely powerless to punish such act.
Under the provisions of this article the Court cannot suspend the execution of a sentence on the ground that
the strict enforcement of the provisions of this Code would cause excessive or harsh penalty. All that the Court
could do in such eventuality is to report the matter to the Chief Executive with a recommendation for an
amendment or modification of the legal provisions which it believes to be harsh.20
Anent the non–suspension of the execution of the sentence, retired Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and retired
Associate Justice Carolina C. Griño–Aquino, in their book, The Revised Penal Code, 21 echoed the above–cited
commentary, thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The second paragraph of Art. 5 is an application of the humanitarian principle that justice must be tempered
with mercy. Generally, the courts have nothing to do with the wisdom or justness of the penalties fixed by law.
“Whether or not the penalties prescribed by law upon conviction of violations of particular statutes are too
severe or are not severe enough, are questions as to which commentators on the law may fairly differ; but it is
the duty of the courts to enforce the will of the legislator in all cases unless it clearly appears that a given
penalty falls within the prohibited class of excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment.” A petition for
clemency should be addressed to the Chief Executive.22
There is an opinion that the penalties provided for in crimes against property be based on the current inflation
rate or at the ratio of P1.00 is equal to P100.00 .  However, it would be dangerous as this would result in
uncertainties, as opposed to the definite imposition of the penalties. It must be remembered that the economy
fluctuates and if the proposed imposition of the penalties in crimes against property be adopted, the penalties
will not cease to change, thus, making the RPC, a self–amending law. Had the framers of the RPC intended that
to be so, it should have provided the same, instead, it included the earlier cited Article 5 as a remedy. It is also
improper to presume why the present legislature has not made any moves to amend the subject penalties in
order to conform with the present times. For all we know, the legislature intends to retain the same penalties in
order to deter the further commission of those punishable acts which have increased tremendously through the
years. In fact, in recent moves of the legislature, it is apparent that it aims to broaden the coverage of those who
violate penal laws. In the crime of Plunder, from its original minimum amount of P100,000,000.00 plundered, the
legislature lowered it to P50,000,000.00. In the same way, the legislature lowered the threshold amount upon
which the Anti–Money Laundering Act may apply, from P1,000,000.00 to P500,000.00.
It is also worth noting that in the crimes of Theft and Estafa, the present penalties do not seem to be excessive
compared to the proposed imposition of their corresponding penalties. In Theft, the provisions state
that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 309. Penalties. — Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of  prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more than
12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, but if the value of the thing stolen exceeds the latter amount
the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each
additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.
In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may
be.
2. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the thing stolen is more
than 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos.
3. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property stolen is
more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos.
4. Arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional  in its minimum period, if the value of the property
stolen is over 50 pesos but does not exceed 200 pesos.
5. Arresto mayor to its full extent, if such value is over 5 pesos but does not exceed 50 pesos.
6. Arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
7. Arresto menor or a fine not exceeding 200 pesos, if the theft is committed under the circumstances
enumerated in paragraph 3 of the next preceding article and the value of the thing stolen does not exceed 5
pesos. If such value exceeds said amount, the provision of any of the five preceding subdivisions shall be made
applicable.
8. Arresto menor in its minimum period or a fine not exceeding 50 pesos, when the value of the thing stolen is
not over 5 pesos, and the offender shall have acted under the impulse of hunger, poverty, or the difficulty of
earning a livelihood for the support of himself or his family.
In a case wherein the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the above–provision states that the penalty is prision
correccional in its minimum and medium periods (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months).  Applying the
proposal, if the value of the thing stolen is P6,000.00, the penalty is imprisonment of arresto mayor in its
medium period to prision correccional minimum period (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4  months).  It would
seem that under the present law, the penalty imposed is almost the same as the penalty proposed.  In fact, after
the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law under the existing law, the minimum penalty is still lowered
by one degree; hence, the minimum penalty is arresto mayor in its medium period to maximum period (2
months and 1 day to 6 months), making the offender qualified for pardon or parole after serving the said
minimum period and may even apply for probation.  Moreover, under the proposal, the minimum penalty after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law is arresto menor in its maximum period to arresto mayor in its
minimum period (21 days to 2 months) is not too far from the minimum period under the existing law.  Thus, it
would seem that the present penalty imposed under the law is not at all excessive.  The same is also true in the
crime of Estafa.23
Moreover, if we apply the ratio of 1:100, as suggested to the value of the thing stolen in the crime of Theft and
the damage caused in the crime of Estafa, the gap between the minimum and the maximum amounts, which is
the basis of determining the proper penalty to be imposed, would be too wide and the penalty imposable would
no longer be commensurate to the act committed and the value of the thing stolen or the damage
caused:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
I.  Article 309, or the penalties for the crime of Theft, the value would be modified but the penalties are not
changed:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00 will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punished by  prision mayor minimum
to prision mayor medium (6 years and 1 day to 10 years).
2. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punished by prision correccional medium
and to prision correccional maximum (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years).24
3. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by prision correccional minimum 3, considering that the IPR is limited to existing conditions at the time the law was promulgated, conditions that
to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). no longer exist today.

4. P50.00 to P200.00 will become P5,000.00 to P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor medium to prision
correccional minimum (2 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
5. P5.00 to P50.00 will become P500.00 to P5,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6
months).
Assuming that the Court submits to the argument of Dean Diokno and declares the incremental penalty in Article
315 unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause, what then is the penalty that should be applied in
case the amount of the thing subject matter of the crime exceeds P22,000.00?  It seems that the proposition
poses more questions than answers, which leads us even more to conclude that the appropriate remedy is to
refer these matters to Congress for them to exercise their inherent power to legislate laws.

6. P5.00 will become P500.00, punishable by  arresto mayor minimum to arresto mayor  medium. Even Dean Diokno was of the opinion that if the Court declares the IPR unconstitutional, the remedy is to go to
Congress. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
x x x x. xxxx

II.  Article 315, or the penalties for the crime of Estafa, the value would also be modified but the penalties are not JUSTICE PERALTA:
changed, as follows: Now, your position is to declare that the incremental penalty should be struck down as unconstitutional because
1st. P12,000.00 to P22,000.00, will become P1,200,000.00 to P2,200,000.00, punishable by prision it is absurd.
correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 8 years). 25
DEAN DIOKNO:
2nd. P6,000.00 to P12,000.00 will become P600,000.00 to P1,200,000.00, punishable by prision Absurd, it violates equal protection, Your Honor, and cruel and unusual punishment.
correccional minimum to prision correccional medium (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months). 26
JUSTICE PERALTA:
3rd. P200.00 to P6,000.00 will become P20,000.00 to P600,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum Then what will be the penalty that we are going to impose if the amount is more than Twenty–Two Thousand
to prision correccional minimum (4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months). (P22,000.00) Pesos.

4th. P200.00 will become P20,000.00, punishable by arresto mayor maximum (4 months and 1 day to 6 months) DEAN DIOKNO:
An argument raised by Dean Jose Manuel I. Diokno, one of our esteemed amici curiae, is that the incremental Well, that would be for Congress to ... if this Court will declare the incremental penalty rule unconstitutional,
penalty provided under Article 315 of the RPC violates the Equal Protection Clause. then that would ... the void should be filled by Congress.

The equal protection clause requires equality among equals, which is determined according to a valid JUSTICE PERALTA:
classification. The test developed by jurisprudence here and yonder is that of reasonableness, 27 which has four But in your presentation, you were fixing the amount at One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos ...
requisites:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; DEAN DIOKNO:
(2) It is germane to the purposes of the law; Well, my presen ... (interrupted)
(3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. 28 JUSTICE PERALTA:
For every One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos in excess of Twenty–Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos
you were suggesting an additional penalty of one (1) year, did I get you right?
According to Dean Diokno, the Incremental Penalty Rule (IPR) does not rest on substantial distinctions as
P10,000.00 may have been substantial in the past, but it is not so today, which violates the first requisite; the IPR
DEAN DIOKNO:
was devised so that those who commit estafa  involving higher amounts would receive heavier penalties;
Yes, Your Honor, that is, if the court will take the route of statutory interpretation.
however, this is no longer achieved, because a person who steals P142,000.00 would receive the same penalty as
someone who steals hundreds of millions, which violates the second requisite; and, the IPR violates requisite no.
JUSTICE PERALTA: 
Ah ... That will be equivalent to the incremental penalty of one (1) year in excess of Twenty–Two Thousand
(P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO: 
If the Court will say that they can go beyond the literal wording of the law... DEAN DIOKNO:
Yes, Your Honor.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
But if we de ... (interrupted) JUSTICE PERALTA:
The amount in excess of Twenty–Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos.
DEAN DIOKNO: Thank you, Dean.
....then....
DEAN DIOKNO:
JUSTICE PERALTA: Thank you.
Ah, yeah. But if we declare the incremental penalty as unsconstitutional, the court cannot fix the amount ...
x x x x29
DEAN DIOKNO:
No, Your Honor. Dean Diokno also contends that Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.
Citing Solem v. Helm,30 Dean Diokno avers that the United States Federal Supreme Court has expanded the
JUSTICE PERALTA: application of a similar Constitutional provision prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment, to the duration of the
... as the equivalent of one, as an incremental penalty in excess of Twenty–Two Thousand (P22,000.00) Pesos. penalty, and not just its form. The court therein ruled that three things must be done to decide whether a
sentence is proportional to a specific crime, viz.; (1) Compare the nature and gravity of the offense, and the
DEAN DIOKNO: harshness of the penalty; (2) Compare the sentences imposed on other criminals in the same jurisdiction, i.e.,
No, Your Honor. whether more serious crimes are subject to the same penalty or to less serious penalties; and (3) Compare the
sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other jurisdictions.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
The Court cannot do that. However, the case of Solem v. Helm cannot be applied in the present case, because in Solem what respondent
therein deemed cruel was the penalty imposed by the state court of South Dakota after it took into account the
DEAN DIOKNO: latter’s recidivist statute and not the original penalty for uttering a “no account” check.  Normally, the maximum
Could not be. punishment for the crime would have been five years imprisonment and a $5,000.00 fine.  Nonetheless,
respondent was sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole under South Dakota’s recidivist
JUSTICE PERALTA: statute because of his six prior felony convictions.  Surely, the factual antecedents of Solem are different from
The only remedy is to go to Congress... the present controversy.

DEAN DIOKNO: With respect to the crime of Qualified Theft, however, it is true that the imposable penalty for the offense is
Yes, Your Honor. high.  Nevertheless, the rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that
in the commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon
JUSTICE PERALTA: her by her employer.  After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting
... and determine the value or the amount. upon such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer’s loved ones and properties, a subsequent
betrayal of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the
DEAN DIOKNO: commission of such wrongful acts.
Yes, Your Honor.
There are other crimes where the penalty of fine and/or imprisonment are dependent on the subject matter of
JUSTICE PERALTA: the crime and which, by adopting the proposal, may create serious implications.  For example, in the crime of
Malversation, the penalty imposed depends on the amount of the money malversed by the public official,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property; Presumption of malversation. — Any public officer who, by
reason of the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same or shall
take or misappropriate or shall consent, through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to
take such public funds, or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or
malversation of such funds or property, shall suffer:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1.  The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the
misappropriation or malversation does not exceed two hundred pesos.
2.  The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than two
hundred pesos but does not exceed six thousand pesos.
3.  The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal  in its minimum period, if the
amount involved is more than six thousand pesos but is less than twelve thousand pesos.
4. The penalty of reclusion temporal, in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more
than twelve thousand pesos but is less than  twenty–two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal  in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.
In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a
fine equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.
The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be  prima facie  evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use.
The above–provisions contemplate a situation wherein the Government loses money due to the unlawful acts of
the offender.  Thus, following the proposal, if the amount malversed is P200.00 (under the existing law), the
amount now becomes P20,000.00 and the penalty is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2
years 4 months and 1 day to 6 years). The penalty may not be commensurate to the act of embezzlement
of P20,000.00 compared to the acts committed by public officials punishable by a special law, i.e., Republic Act
No. 3019 or the Anti–Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, specifically Section 3,31 wherein the injury caused to the
government is not generally defined by any monetary amount, the penalty (6 years and 1 month to 15
years)32 under the Anti–Graft Law will now become higher. This should not be the case, because in the crime of
malversation, the public official takes advantage of his public position to embezzle the fund or property of the
government entrusted to him.
The said inequity is also apparent in the crime of Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited)
where the value of the thing unlawfully taken and the act of unlawful entry are the bases of the penalty
imposable, and also, in Malicious Mischief, where the penalty of imprisonment or fine is dependent on the cost
of the damage caused.
In Robbery with force upon things (inhabited or uninhabited), if we increase the value of the thing unlawfully
taken, as proposed in the ponencia, the sole basis of the penalty will now be the value of the thing unlawfully
taken and no longer the element of force employed in entering the premises.  It may likewise cause an inequity
between the crime of Qualified Trespass to Dwelling under Article 280, and this kind of robbery because the
former is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to
6 years) and a fine not exceeding P1,000.00 (P100,000.00 now if the ratio is 1:100) where entrance to the
premises is with violence or intimidation, which is the main justification of the penalty.  Whereas in the crime of
Robbery with force upon things, it is punished with a penalty of prision mayor (6 years and 1 day to 12 years) if
the intruder is unarmed without the penalty of Fine despite the fact that it is not merely the illegal entry that is
the basis of the penalty but likewise the unlawful taking.
Furthermore, in the crime of Other Mischiefs under Article 329, the highest penalty that can be imposed
is arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods (2 months and 1 day to 6 months) if the value of the
damage caused exceeds P1,000.00, but under the proposal, the value of the damage will now
become P100,000.00 (1:100), and still punishable by  arresto mayor (1 month and 1 day to 6 months).  And, if the
value of the damaged property does not exceed P200.00, the penalty is arresto menor or a fine of not less than
the value of the damage caused and not more than P200.00, if the amount involved does not exceed P200.00 or
cannot be estimated.  Under the proposal, P200.00 will now become P20,000.00, which simply means that the
fine of P200.00 under the existing law will now become P20,000.00.  The amount of Fine under this situation will
now become excessive and afflictive in nature despite the fact that the offense is categorized as a light felony
penalized with a light penalty under Article 26 of the RPC. 33  Unless we also amend Article 26 of the RPC, there
will be grave implications on the penalty of Fine, but changing the same through Court decision, either expressly
or impliedly, may not be legally and constitutionally feasible.
There are other crimes against property and swindling in the RPC that may also be affected by the proposal, such
as those that impose imprisonment and/or Fine as a penalty based on the value of the damage caused, to
wit: Article 311 (Theft of the property of the National Library and National Museum), Article 312 (Occupation of
real property or usurpation of real rights in property), Article 313 (Altering boundaries or landmarks), Article
316 (Other forms of swindling), Article 317 (Swindling a minor), Article 318 (Other deceits), Article 328 (Special
cases of malicious mischief) and Article 331 (Destroying or damaging statues, public monuments or paintings). 
Other crimes that impose Fine as a penalty will also be affected, such as: Article 213 (Frauds against the public
treasury and similar offenses), Article 215 (Prohibited Transactions), Article 216 (Possession of prohibited interest
by a public officer), Article 218 (Failure of accountable officer to render accounts), Article 219 (Failure of a
responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country).
In addition, the proposal will not only affect crimes under the RPC.  It will also affect crimes which are punishable
by special penal laws, such as Illegal Logging or Violation of Section 68 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as
amended.34 The law treats cutting, gathering, collecting and possessing timber or other forest products without
license as an offense as grave as and equivalent to the felony of qualified theft. 35 Under the law, the offender
shall be punished with the penalties imposed under Articles 309 and 31036 of the Revised Penal Code, which
means that the penalty imposable for the offense is, again, based on the value of the timber or forest products
involved in the offense.  Now, if we accept the said proposal in the crime of Theft, will this particular crime of
Illegal Logging be amended also in so far as the penalty is concerned because the penalty is dependent on
Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC?  The answer is in the negative because the soundness of this particular law is
not in question.
With the numerous crimes defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code and Special Laws, and other
related provisions of these laws affected by the proposal, a thorough study is needed to determine its effectivity
and necessity.  There may be some provisions of the law that should be amended; nevertheless, this Court is in
no position to conclude as to the intentions of the framers of the Revised Penal Code by merely making a study
of the applicability of the penalties imposable in the present times. Such is not within the competence of the
Court but of the Legislature which is empowered to conduct public hearings on the matter, consult legal
luminaries and who, after due proceedings, can decide whether or not to amend or to revise the questioned law
or other laws, or even create a new legislation which will adopt to the times.
Admittedly, Congress is aware that there is an urgent need to amend the Revised Penal Code.  During the oral
arguments, counsel for the Senate informed the Court that at present, fifty–six (56) bills are now pending in the
Senate seeking to amend the Revised Penal Code, 37 each one proposing much needed change and updates to
archaic laws that were promulgated decades ago when the political, socio–economic, and cultural settings were
far different from today’s conditions.
Verily, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall not usurp legislative
powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or construction, it should not make or
supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify, revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the
law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to its terms. 38  The Court should apply the law in a manner
that would give effect to their letter and spirit, especially when the law is clear as to its intent and purpose.  courts to apply the law, especially when they are clear and not subject to any other interpretation than that
Succinctly put, the Court should shy away from encroaching upon the primary function of a co–equal branch of
the Government; otherwise, this would lead to an inexcusable breach of the doctrine of separation of powers by
means of judicial legislation.
Moreover, it is to be noted that civil indemnity is, technically, not a penalty or a Fine; hence, it can be increased
by the Court when appropriate.  Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Art. 2206. The amount of damages for death caused by a crime or quasi–delict shall be at least three thousand
pesos, even though there may have been mitigating circumstances. In addition:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
(1) The defendant shall be liable for the loss of the earning capacity of the deceased, and the indemnity shall be
paid to the heirs of the latter; such indemnity shall in every case be assessed and awarded by the court, unless
the deceased on account of permanent physical disability not caused by the defendant, had no earning capacity
at the time of his death;
(2) If the deceased was obliged to give support according to the provisions of Article 291, the recipient who is not
an heir called to the decedent’s inheritance by the law of testate or intestate succession, may demand support
from the person causing the death, for a period not exceeding five years, the exact duration to be fixed by the
court;
(3) The spouse, legitimate and illegitimate descendants and ascendants of the deceased may demand moral
damages for mental anguish by reason of the death of the deceased.
In our jurisdiction, civil indemnity is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary restitution or
compensation to the victim for the damage or infraction that was done to the latter by the accused, which in a
sense only covers the civil aspect.  Precisely, it is civil indemnity. Thus, in a crime where a person dies, in addition
to the penalty of imprisonment imposed to the offender, the accused is also ordered to pay the victim a sum of
money as restitution.  Clearly, this award of civil indemnity due to the death of the victim could not be
contemplated as akin to the value of a thing that is unlawfully taken which is the basis in the imposition of the
proper penalty in certain crimes.  Thus, the reasoning in increasing the value of civil indemnity awarded in some
offense cannot be the same reasoning that would sustain the adoption of the suggested ratio.  Also, it is
apparent from Article 2206 that the law only imposes a minimum amount for awards of civil indemnity, which is
P3,000.00.  The law did not provide for a ceiling. Thus, although the minimum amount for the award cannot be
changed, increasing the amount awarded as civil indemnity can be validly modified and increased when the
present circumstance warrants it. Corollarily, moral damages under Article 2220 39 of the Civil Code also does not
fix the amount of damages that can be awarded.  It is discretionary upon the court, depending on the mental
anguish or the suffering of the private offended party.  The amount of moral damages can, in relation to civil
indemnity, be adjusted so long as it does not exceed the award of civil indemnity.
In addition, some may view the penalty provided by law for the offense committed as tantamount to cruel
punishment.  However, all penalties are generally harsh, being punitive in nature.  Whether or not they are
excessive or amount to cruel punishment is a matter that should be left to lawmakers.  It is the prerogative of the
which is plainly written.
Similar to the argument of Dean Diokno, one of Justice Antonio Carpio’s opinions is that the incremental penalty
provision should be declared unconstitutional and that the courts should only impose the penalty corresponding
to the amount of P22,000.00, regardless if the actual amount involved exceeds P22,000.00. As suggested,
however, from now until the law is properly amended by Congress, all crimes of Estafa will no longer be
punished by the appropriate penalty. A conundrum in the regular course of criminal justice would occur when
every accused convicted of the crime of estafa will be meted penalties different from the proper penalty that
should be imposed.  Such drastic twist in the application of the law has no legal basis and directly runs counter to
what the law provides.
It should be noted that the death penalty was reintroduced in the dispensation of criminal justice by the Ramos
Administration by virtue of Republic Act No. 7659 40 in December 1993. The said law has been questioned before
this Court. There is, arguably, no punishment more cruel than that of death. Yet still, from the time the death
penalty was re–imposed until its lifting in June 2006 by Republic Act No. 9346, 41 the Court did not impede the
imposition of the death penalty on the ground that it is a “cruel punishment” within the purview of Section 19
(1),42 Article III of the Constitution. Ultimately, it was through an act of Congress suspending the imposition of the
death penalty that led to its non–imposition and not via the intervention of the Court. Per capita income.

Even if the imposable penalty amounts to cruel punishment, the Court cannot declare the provision of the law PROFESSOR TADIAR:
from which the proper penalty emanates unconstitutional in the present action.  Not only is it violative of due Per capita income.
process, considering that the State and the concerned parties were not given the opportunity to comment on the
subject matter, it is settled that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked collaterally because JUSTICE PERALTA:
constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally, 43 more so in the present controversy Consumer price index.
wherein the issues never touched upon the constitutionality of any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Besides, it has long been held that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishments is generally aimed at the Yeah.
form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of duration or amount, and applies to
punishments which public sentiment has regarded as cruel or obsolete, for instance, those inflicted at the JUSTICE PERALTA:
whipping post, or in the pillory, burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling, and the like. Fine Inflation ...
and imprisonment would not thus be within the prohibition. 44
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe for a penalty to be obnoxious to Yes.
the Constitution.  The fact that the punishment authorized by the statute is severe does not make it cruel and
unusual. Expressed in other terms, it has been held that to come under the ban, the punishment must be JUSTICE PERALTA:
“flagrantly and plainly oppressive,” “wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral ... and so on.  Is the Supreme Court equipped to determine those factors?
sense of the community.” 45
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Cruel as it may be, as discussed above, it is for the Congress to amend the law and adapt it to our modern time. There are many ways by which the value of the Philippine Peso can be determined utilizing all of those economic
terms.
The solution to the present controversy could not be solved by merely adjusting the questioned monetary values
to the present value of money based only on the current inflation rate.  There are other factors and variables JUSTICE PERALTA:
that need to be taken into consideration, researched, and deliberated upon before the said values could be Yeah, but ...
accurately and properly adjusted.  The effects on the society, the injured party, the accused, its socio–economic
impact, and the likes must be painstakingly evaluated and weighed upon in order to arrive at a wholistic change PROFESSOR TADIAR:
that all of us believe should be made to our existing law.  Dejectedly, the Court is ill–equipped, has no resources, And I don’t think it is within the power of the Supreme Court to pass upon and peg the value to One Hundred
and lacks sufficient personnel to conduct public hearings and sponsor studies and surveys to validly effect these (P100.00) Pesos to ...
changes in our Revised Penal Code. This function clearly and appropriately belongs to Congress.  Even Professor
Tadiar concedes to this conclusion, to wit:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary JUSTICE PERALTA:
xxxx Yeah.

JUSTICE PERALTA: PROFESSOR TADIAR:

Yeah, Just one question.  You are suggesting that in order to determine the value of Peso you have to take into ... One (P1.00.00) Peso in 1930.
consideration several factors.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
PROFESSOR TADIAR: That is legislative in nature.
Yes.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
JUSTICE PERALTA: That is my position that the Supreme Court ...
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Yeah, okay.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
... has no power to utilize the power of judicial review to in order to adjust, to make the adjustment that is a
power that belongs to the legislature.
JUSTICE PERALTA:
Thank you, Professor.
PROFESSOR TADIAR:
Thank you.46
Finally, the opinion advanced by Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. A. Sereno echoes the view that the role of the
Court is not merely to dispense justice, but also the active duty to prevent injustice.  Thus, in order to prevent
injustice in the present controversy, the Court should not impose an obsolete penalty pegged eighty three years
ago, but consider the proposed ratio of 1:100 as simply compensating for inflation.  Furthermore, the Court has
in the past taken into consideration “changed conditions” or “significant changes in circumstances” in its
decisions.
Similarly, the Chief Justice is of the view that the Court is not delving into the validity of the substance of a
statute.  The issue is no different from the Court’s adjustment of indemnity in crimes against persons, which the
Court had previously adjusted in light of current times, like in the case of People v. Pantoja.47 Besides, Article 10
of the Civil Code mandates a presumption that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
With due respect to the opinions and proposals advanced by the Chief Justice and my Colleagues, all the
proposals ultimately lead to prohibited judicial legislation.  Short of being repetitious and as extensively
discussed above, it is truly beyond the powers of the Court to legislate laws, such immense power belongs to
Congress and the Court should refrain from crossing this clear–cut divide.  With regard to civil indemnity, as
elucidated before, this refers to civil liability which is awarded to the offended party as a kind of monetary
restitution.  It is truly based on the value of money.  The same cannot be said on penalties because, as earlier
stated, penalties are not only based on the value of money, but on several other factors.  Further, since the law is
silent as to the maximum amount that can be awarded and only pegged the minimum sum, increasing the
amount granted as civil indemnity is not proscribed.  Thus, it can be adjusted in light of current conditions.
Now, with regard to the penalty imposed in the present case, the CA modified the ruling of the RTC. The RTC
imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional in its medium
period, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, as
maximum.  However, the CA imposed the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years of prision mayor, as maximum, plus one (1) year for each additional
P10,000.00, or a total of seven (7) years.
In computing the penalty for this type of estafa, this Court’s ruling in Cosme, Jr. v. People48 is highly instructive,
thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
With respect to the imposable penalty, Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
ART. 315 Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the
amount of the fraud is over 12,000 but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the latter
sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each
additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years.  In such
case, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other
provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be.
The penalty prescribed by Article 315 is composed of only two, not three, periods, in which case, Article 65 of the
same Code requires the division of the time included in the penalty into three equal portions of time included in
the penalty prescribed, forming one period of each of the three portions. Applying the latter provisions, the
maximum, medium and minimum periods of the penalty prescribed are:
Maximum – 6 years, 8 months, 21 days to 8 years
Medium – 5 years, 5 months, 11 days to 6 years, 8 months,
20 days
Minimum – 4 years, 2 months, 1 day to 5 years, 5 months,
10 days49
To compute the maximum period of the prescribed penalty, prisión correccional maximum to prisión
mayor minimum should be divided into three equal portions of time each of which portion shall be deemed to
form one period in accordance with Article 6550 of the RPC.51  In the present case, the amount involved is
P98,000.00, which exceeds P22,000.00, thus, the maximum penalty imposable should be within the maximum
period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years of prision mayor.  Article 315 also states that a period of one
year shall be added to the penalty for every additional P10,000.00 defrauded in excess of P22,000.00, but in no
case shall the total penalty which may be imposed exceed 20 years.
Considering that the amount of P98,000.00 is P76,000.00 more than the P22,000.00 ceiling set by law, then,
adding one year for each additional P10,000.00, the maximum period of 6 years, 8 months and 21 days to 8 years
of  prision mayor minimum would be increased by 7 years.  Taking the maximum of the prescribed penalty, which
is 8 years, plus an additional 7 years, the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is 15 years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, since the penalty prescribed by law for the estafa charge against
petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next lower would then
be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate
sentence should be anywhere from 6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months.
One final note, the Court should give Congress a chance to perform its primordial duty of lawmaking.  The Court
should not pre–empt Congress and usurp its inherent powers of making and enacting laws.  While it may be the
most expeditious approach, a short cut by judicial fiat is a dangerous proposition, lest the Court dare trespass on
prohibited judicial legislation.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari dated November 5, 2007 of petitioner Lito Corpuz is
hereby DENIED. Consequently, the Decision dated March 22, 2007 and Resolution dated September 5, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals, which affirmed with modification the Decision dated July 30, 2004 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 46, San Fernando City, finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa
under Article 315, paragraph (1), sub–paragraph (b) of the Revised Penal Code, are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the penalty imposed is the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment
ranging from THREE (3) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS and ELEVEN DAYS of prision correccional, as minimum, to
FIFTEEN (15) YEARS of reclusion temporal as maximum.

Pursuant to Article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, let a Copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the
Republic of the Philippines, through the Department of Justice.

Also, let a copy of this Decision be furnished the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives.

SO ORDERED.
13/58 G.R. No. 120367             October 16, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ANTONIO BARRETA, DANILO BARRETA, LITO BARRETA, DOMINGO BARRETA (At Large), EDGAR BARRETA, and
ROGELIO BARRETA, accused.
ANTONIO BARRETA, LITO BARRETA, EDGAR BARRETA, and ROGELIO BARRETA, accused-appellants
QUISUMBING, J.:
On appeal is the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, Branch 8, in Criminal Cases Nos. 8459-
60, promulgated on June 2, 1993, finding accused-appellants Antonio, Edgar, Lito, and Rogelio, all surnamed
Barreta, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery in band in Criminal Case No. 8459 and murder in Criminal
Case No. 8460, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, this Court finds each of the four accused Lito Barreta, Antonio
Barreta, Edgar Barreta and Rogelio Barreta, guilty of the crime of Murder punishable by reclusion
perpetua with accessory penalties provided by law and to indemnify jointly and severally the legal heirs
of the deceased Clemente Tesaluna, Sr.1 in the sum of P50,000.00, plus costs. The imposable penalty
being reclusion perpetua, the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law do not apply.
The prosecution having proved beyond reasonable doubt, the crime of robbery in band in conspiracy,
each of the four accused is likewise guilty for the crime of robbery in band under Article 294 (5) which
is (sic) prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium or four (4) years two (2) months and
one (1) day to ten (10) years should be imposed.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the four accused is sentenced to an indeterminate
penalty ranging from four (4) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years and twenty
one (21) days of prision mayor as maximum. The sum of P700.00 and the properties taken such as hoe,
scythe and bolo should be returned to the private complainants.
Issue Warrants of Arrest to Antonio 2 and Danilo3 both surnamed Barreta who are still at large.
SO ORDERED.4
The facts of this case, as gleaned from the records, are as follows:
On January 26, 1988, sometime between 5:00 to 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon, a much-frightened Epifania
Balboa arrived at the farmhouse of her son, Dominador Balboa, in Taguite, Babatngon, Leyte. She informed him
that there were suspicious-looking persons in the house of his half brother, Clemente Tesaluna, Jr., some 200
meters away. Dominador and his hired hand, named Celso Salas, became concerned. They farmed in a remote
part of a mountainous area accessible only by walking. Strangers were seldom seen there. Dominador dashed off
to Clemente's house.
Near the house he stopped, for he could not get nearer than fifty (50) meters. There he easily recognized the
brothers Antonio, Danilo, Domingo, Edgar, Lito and Rogelio, all surnamed Barreta. Dominador was familiar with
the Barretas, since they resided in Bagong Silang, a neighboring barangay. Three of them, namely Antonio, Lito
and Danilo were holding an unarmed Clemente. They were holding bolos, locally known as "pisao." He saw
Antonio, Lito and Danilo stab Clemente with their bolos. Antonio hit Clemente on the right side of his body.
Danilo stabbed him on the left, followed by a thrust by Lito to Clemente's right. Meanwhile Domingo, Edgar and
Rogelio ransacked Clemente's house. Domingo then took Clemente's hoe, scythe and bolo, then hurriedly left the
place. They jumped out of the house and escaped towards the mountains. 5
Clemente died from the wounds inflicted on him by the Barreta brothers. Epifania informed the victim's wife,
Renila, of her husband's fate. Renila asked for help from the barangay chairman. Several barangay officials and
some relatives accompanied her home. They found Clemente dead with three clearly visible wounds. The clothes
and personal effects of the Tesaluna couple were scattered all over the floor. Some P700.00 in cash and farm
implements were missing. The bag where Clemente kept his money was forced open with a bolo. The police
investigated the incident. Dr. Victor Hilarion Cruz, of the Leyte Provincial Hospital, performed an autopsy on
Clemente. He reported on three stab wounds and a hacking wound. He identified the cause of death as
"cardiorespiratory arrest (due) to hacking wound." 6
The Provincial Prosecutor's Officer filed the Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. 8460, with the RTC of
Palo, Leyte. He charged Antonio, Danilo, Domingo, Edgar, Lito, and Rogelio, thus:
That on or about the 26th day of January, 1988 in the municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, did, then and there with malice aforethought and
with deliberate intent to take the life of Clemente Tesaluna, Sr., willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
suddenly, unexpectedly and treacherously take advantage of superior strength and with the aid of
armed men attack and hack the latter with long bolos, producing fatal wounds on the body of the said
Clemente Tesaluna, Sr., thereby causing his direct and immediate death.
Contrary to law.7
A separate Information in Criminal Case No. 8459 also charged the six brothers for robbery in band, allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 26th day of January, 1988, in the Municipality of Babatngon, Province of Leyte,
Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused who were all
armed with long-bladed bolos conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another did, then
 and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously with intent to gain and with the use of force upon
things to wit: by forcibly breaking open with a bolo the clothes bag belonging to Clemente Tesaluna,
Sr., take and carry away money in an undetermined amount, to the damage and prejudice of the said
owner.
Contrary to law.8
Warrants for the arrest of the six Barreta brothers were issued, but only four, namely Antonio, Edgar, Lito and
Rogelio were apprehended. The remaining brothers went into hiding.
On arraignment Antonio, Edgar, Lito and Rogelio pleaded not guilty to the charges of murder and robbery in
band. Criminal Cases Nos. 8459 and 8460 were then jointly tried.
The prosecution's relied on the testimony of Dominador Balboa who positively identified the Barreta brothers as
the malefactors who killed Clemente Tesaluna, Jr., and robbed his house of money and belongings.
The defense averred that it was Lito Barreta alone who killed Clemente. In the afternoon of January 26, 1988,
according to the defense's version, Lito was on his way to buy cigarettes at Taguite. Clemente, who suspected
that Lito gathered tuba from his coconut tree, accosted him. Clemente challenged Lito to a fight. Lito denied
Clemente's accusation. The latter drew his bolo, but since Lito was quicker, he beat Clemente to the draw. Lito
stabbed Clemente twice with his bolo. He immediately went home. Lito denied that his brothers were involved.
He also denied that they robbed Clemente, whom he knew only by name. He could not understand why his
brothers were implicated in the stabbing. He also denied that he knew Dominador Balboa, Celso Salas, and
Epifania Balboa. He admitted he hit Clemente first below his left armpit and then, while Clemente was down, on
his face.9
Antonio, Edgar, and Rogelio denied any participation in the murder and robbery. All three testified that at the
time of incident, they were at Barangay Silang, Babatngon, Leyte, carousing and making merry after a hard day's
work. They presented Fausto Rosales, a farmer, who testified that from January 20, 1988 to January 28, 1988, he
hired the three accused to work on his farm from January 20-28, 1988. At the time of the incident, Antonio,
Edgar and Rogelio were working on his farm as hired hands. On January 28, 1988, they had a drinking spree in a
residence of a certain Bunglas. That day, they cut the tall grasses on Fausto's farm from 7:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M.,
pausing only at 12:00 noon to eat lunch. They went home after their work on January 28, 1988 at five o'clock in
the afternoon. He was sure that they were home on January 28, 1988, because when he brought the 1/2 gallon
of tuba to Bunglas' house, the three brothers were with their father, Celestino, in the drinking spree, which
lasted until 7:00 P.M. When he went home, he knew nothing of the incident at sitio Bosque, which is 9 to 10
kilometers distant from Barangay Bagong Silang, and could only be negotiated by foot. He did not know the
deceased Clemente.10
The lower court gave full faith and credence to the prosecution's evidence and, as earlier noted, convicted
accused-appellants of the offenses charged.
Appellants moved for reconsideration of the lower court's judgment with respect to Criminal Case No. 8460,
arguing that since the trial court found that they were all minors at the time of the incident, they were entitled
to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority under Article 68 11 of the Revised Penal Code. They prayed
that the penalty imposed upon them be reduced to four (4) years, two (2) months, and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum. The
prosecution opposed the motion, on the ground that only Rogelio Barreta could be considered a minor, and
doubtfully at that, there being no evidence to support his claim that he was only seventeen years old at the time
of the incident. On November 15, 1993, the trial court denied the motion.
Hence, the instant case, with appellants assigning the following errors allegedly committed by the trial court:
I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ALL THE ACCUSED GUILTY OF THE CRIMES OF ROBBERY
AND MURDER BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT PRESCRIBING THE CORRECT PENALTY FOR THE PROPER
CRIME AND IN NOT APPRECIATING THE PRIVILEGE(D) MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCE OF MINORITY IN
FAVOR OF ACCUSED-APPELLANTS.
We find pertinent the following issues: (1) Whether the guilt of appellants of the crimes of robbery in band and
murder were proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) Whether minority should be
considered as a privileged mitigating circumstance in favor of appellants.
Appellants assail the testimony of Dominador Balboa for being "incredible." 12 They submit that Dominador
testified that it was both late in the afternoon and windy, and the scene "definitely dark and turbulent." 13 With
poor vision and being fifty meters away, Dominador could not have positively identified the accused who were
inside the house. Appellants also argue that Epifania Balboa did not know the "six persons" who came to the
house of the victim; her identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime is thus doubtful. Appellants
suggest that the relatives of the victim would like to see virtually all the members of the Barreta family suffer
because Lito Barreta killed the latter in a fight. Finally, appellants charge that the trial court erred in refusing to
appreciate their alibi, which was corroborated by Fausto Rosales.
We have carefully examined the records of this case and find nothing in them to support appellants' claim that it
was so dark and turbulent so as to make positive identification difficult. What Dominador testified to was that he
decided not to prepare smoke for copra because it was already late and it was windy. 14 Nothing would show that
Dominador had poor vision. Dominador's positive identification was unshaken under rigorous cross-examination.
It was straightforward and candid. As a rule, appellate courts will not interfere with the judgment of the trial
court in passing upon the credibility of a witness, unless there appears in the record some fact or circumstance of
weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misinterpreted or
misapprehended.15 That general rule holds true in this case.
Nor do we doubt Epifania's identification because she did not know the "six persons." Even if she did not know
their names prior to the incident,16 she was able to identify them in open court. There is nothing in law or
jurisprudence which requires, as a condition sine qua non, that, for a positive identification of a felon by a
prosecution witness to be good, the witness must first know the former personally. 17 The witness need not have
to know the names of the accused for so long as she recognizes their faces. 18 Besides, the defense did not
contradict her identification of appellants whose presence so frightened her that she ran off to call for help.
Neither are we convinced of any alleged malicious motive on the part of the witnesses who testified against the
appellants. The records are bare of any evidentiary support for such an allegation. The presumption is that no
such improper motive exists and their testimonies should thereby be accorded full faith and credit. 19
Appellants insinuate that since Dominador Balboa is a half-brother of the victim, he had motive enough to testify
against them, even falsely. But as often stated, we hold that relatives of a victim would not avenge the death of
their kin by blaming it on persons whom they know to be innocent. 20 Family members who have witnessed the
killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants, 21 so that justice would be served.
The alibi of Antonio, Edgar, and Rogelio likewise fails to persuade us against the positive identification made by
the eyewitness. For alibi to prosper, the accused should prove not only that he was at some other place when
the crime was committed but also that it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus criminis at the time
of the commission.22 The distance between Taguite and Bagong Silang, Babatngon is a mere 3.5 kilometers which
can be negotiated by walking in two hours. 23 The distance of 3.5 kilometers to the crime scene cannot provide
sufficient credence to appellants' alibi.
That Lito alone killed Clemente in self-defense is less than believable. He said he met the victim in a chance
encounter on the road to Taguite after the latter accused him of stealing tuba from his coconut palm.24 He said
he stabbed the victim twice in self-defense, after which he left the victim. 25 Physical evidence, however, does not
support Lito's testimony. For he claimed that he inflicted two stab wounds on the victim. The autopsy
report26 clearly showed that the victim suffered three (3) stab wounds and one (1) hacking wound. 27 Further Lito's
claim that he left the victim dead on the road is contradicted by the Renila Tesaluna's testimony that she and
barangay officials found her husband's corpse in their kitchen.28 Thus, on the first issue, we must conclude that
no errors were committed by the court a quo.
On the second issue, without admitting their guilt, appellants fault the trial court for convicting them of the
separate offenses of murder and robbery in band, instead of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide. They also claim that said court erred in failing to consider the special privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority of appellants in imposing upon them the penalty of reclusion perpetua for murder.
In robbery with homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1) the taking of personal
property with the use of violence or intimidation against a person; (2) the property thus taken belongs to
another; (3) the taking is characterized by animus lucrandi; and (4) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, the crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed. 29 In robbery with homicide, the
principal purpose of the accused must be shown to be to commit robbery, the homicide being committed either
by reason of, or on occasion of the robbery. 30 The homicide may precede or occur after the robbery. What is
essential is that there is a nexus, an intimate connection between robbery and the killing, whether the latter be
prior or subsequent to the former, or whether both crimes be committed at the same time. 31
In the instant case, the testimony of prosecution eyewitness Dominador Balboa shows, that the killing of the
deceased took place simultaneously with the robbery. 32 While Antonio, Lito, and Danilo attacked the victim in his
kitchen, Danilo, Domingo, and Rogelio were ransacking the house for valuables to steal. These simultaneous
events show applicants' intention to both rob and kill the victim. There is no showing that the robbery was
committed after the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident to the homicide. The criminal acts of
appellants cannot, thus, be viewed as two distinct offenses. Hence, appellants should not have been convicted of
the separate offenses of murder and robbery in band under Articles 248 (1) 33 and 29634 of the Revised Penal
Code, respectively, but of robbery with homicide under Article 294 (1) 35 of the Revised Penal Code.
Finally, appellants, except for Rogelio, are not entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.
When appellant Antonio Barreta testified in his defense on January 8, 1991, he admitted that he was 24 years
old.36 Appellant Lito Barreta, in turn, declared that he was 22 years of age, when he took the witness stand on
September 17, 1990,37 while appellant Rogelio Barreta admitted to being 19 years of age when he testified on
November 6, 1990.38 Since the incident in question took place on January 26, 1988, appellant Antonio Barreta
must have been 22 years old at that time, appellant Lito Barreta, 20 years old, and appellant Rogelio Barreta 17
years old, if their claims and admissions are to be taken at face value. Thus, only Rogelio can be deemed a minor
at the time of the commission of the offense. Mitigating circumstances are personal to an accused in whose favor
they are determined to exist and cannot be enjoyed by his co-accused. 39 Rogelio, being below 18 years of age at
the time the crime was committed, is entitled to the privileged circumstance of minority pursuant to Article 68
(1) of the Revised Penal Code. The penalty for robo con homicidio at the time of the commission of the offense
is reclusion perpetua to death. At that time, the imposition of the death penalty was suspended by virtue of
Article III, Section 19 (1) of the Constitution. Hence, the maximum allowable penalty was reclusion perpetua,
which the trial court imposed in Criminal Case No. 8460. Under Article 68 (2) of the Revised Penal Code, where
the offender is over 15 and under 18 years of age, "the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law shall be
imposed, but always in the proper period." The penalty next lower is reclusion temporal. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable upon Rogelio is prision mayor maximum to reclusion
temporal medium, or from ten (10) years and one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. The
penalty imposed in Criminal Case No. 8459 (robbery in band) should be deleted as this will favor all the accused,
the proper charge being for a special complex crime of robbery with homicide, instead of two separate offenses
of murder and robbery in band.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, Branch 8, in Criminal Cases Nos. 8459-60,
dated June 2, 1993, is MODIFIED. Appellants Antonio, Edgar, Lito and Rogelio, all surnamed Barreta are found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the special complex crime of ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE as defined and
penalized under Article 294 (1) of the Revised Penal Code. Antonio, Edgar and Lito, all surnamed Barreta, are
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided by law. The
privileged mitigating circumstance of minority being in Rogelio Barreta's favor, he is hereby sentenced to a prison
term of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years, five (5) months, and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal as maximum. Appellants are also ordered to jointly and severally pay the heirs of
Clemente Tesaluna, Jr., P50,000.00 as civil indemnity.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
14/59 G. R. No. 160188              June 21, 2007
ARISTOTEL VALENZUELA y NATIVIDAD, petitioner,
vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. COURT OF APPEALS NACHURA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
This case aims for prime space in the firmament of our criminal law jurisprudence. Petitioner effectively
concedes having performed the felonious acts imputed against him, but instead insists that as a result, he should
be adjudged guilty of frustrated theft only, not the felony in its consummated stage of which he was convicted.
The proposition rests on a common theory expounded in two well-known decisions 1 rendered decades ago by
the Court of Appeals, upholding the existence of frustrated theft of which the accused in both cases were found
guilty. However, the rationale behind the rulings has never been affirmed by this Court.
As far as can be told,2 the last time this Court extensively considered whether an accused was guilty of frustrated
or consummated theft was in 1918, in People v. Adiao. 3 A more cursory
treatment of the question was followed in 1929, in People v. Sobrevilla, 4 and in 1984, in Empelis v. IAC.5 This
petition now gives occasion for us to finally and fully measure if or how frustrated theft is susceptible to
commission under the Revised Penal Code.
I.
The basic facts are no longer disputed before us. The case stems from an Information 6 charging petitioner
Aristotel Valenzuela (petitioner) and Jovy Calderon (Calderon) with the crime of theft. On 19 May 1994, at
around 4:30 p.m., petitioner and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket within the
ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security guard who was then manning his
post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw petitioner, who was wearing an identification card
with the mark "Receiving Dispatching Unit (RDU)," hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known
"Tide" brand. Petitioner unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting. Petitioner
then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with more cartons of Tide Ultramatic
and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open parking space. 7
Thereafter, petitioner left the parking area and haled a taxi. He boarded the cab and directed it towards the
parking space where Calderon was waiting. Calderon loaded the cartons of Tide Ultramatic inside the taxi, then
boarded the vehicle. All these acts were eyed by Lago, who proceeded to stop the taxi as it was leaving the open
parking area. When Lago asked petitioner for a receipt of the merchandise, petitioner and Calderon reacted by
fleeing on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow security guards of the incident. Petitioner and
Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and the stolen merchandise recovered. 8 The filched items seized from
the duo were four (4) cases of Tide Ultramatic, one (1) case of Ultra 25 grams, and three (3) additional cases of
detergent, the goods with an aggregate value of ₱12,090.00. 9
Petitioner and Calderon were first brought to the SM security office before they were transferred on the same
day to the Baler Station II of the Philippine National Police, Quezon City, for investigation. It appears from the
police investigation records that apart from petitioner and Calderon, four (4) other persons were apprehended
by the security guards at the scene and delivered to police custody at the Baler PNP Station in connection with
the incident. However, after the matter was referred to the Office of the Quezon City Prosecutor, only petitioner
and Calderon were charged with theft by the Assistant City Prosecutor, in Informations prepared on 20 May
1994, the day after the incident. 10
After pleading not guilty on arraignment, at the trial, petitioner and Calderon both claimed having been innocent
bystanders within the vicinity of the Super Sale Club on the afternoon of 19 May 1994 when they were haled by
Lago and his fellow security guards after a commotion and brought to the Baler PNP Station. Calderon alleged
that on the afternoon of the incident, he was at the Super Sale Club to withdraw from his ATM account,
accompanied by his neighbor, Leoncio Rosulada. 11 As the queue for the ATM was long, Calderon and Rosulada
decided to buy snacks inside the supermarket. It was while they were eating that they heard the gunshot fired by
Lago, leading them to head out of the building to check what was
transpiring. As they were outside, they were suddenly "grabbed" by a security guard, thus commencing their
detention.12 Meanwhile, petitioner testified during trial that he and his cousin, a Gregorio Valenzuela, 13 had been
at the parking lot, walking beside the nearby BLISS complex and headed to ride a tricycle going to Pag-asa, when
they saw the security guard Lago fire a shot. The gunshot caused him and the other people at the scene to start
running, at which point he was apprehended by Lago and brought to the security office. Petitioner claimed he
was detained at the security office until around 9:00 p.m., at which time he and the others were brought to the
Baler Police Station. At the station, petitioner denied having stolen the cartons of detergent, but he was detained
overnight, and eventually brought to the prosecutor’s office where he was charged with theft. 14 During
petitioner’s cross-examination, he admitted that he had been employed as a "bundler" of GMS Marketing,
"assigned at the supermarket" though not at SM.15
In a Decision16 promulgated on 1 February 2000, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 90,
convicted both petitioner and Calderon of the crime of consummated theft. They were sentenced to an
indeterminate prison term of two (2) years of prision correccional as minimum to seven (7) years of prision
mayor as maximum.17 The RTC found credible the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and established the
convictions on the positive identification of the accused as perpetrators of the crime.
Both accused filed their respective Notices of Appeal, 18 but only petitioner filed a brief19 with the Court of
Appeals, causing the appellate court to deem Calderon’s appeal as abandoned and consequently dismissed.
Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the
time he was apprehended, he was never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen. 20 However, in
its Decision dated 19 June 2003,21 the Court of Appeals rejected this contention and affirmed petitioner’s
conviction.22 Hence the present Petition for Review,23 which expressly seeks that petitioner’s conviction "be
modified to only of Frustrated Theft."24
Even in his appeal before the Court of Appeals, petitioner effectively conceded both his felonious intent and his
actual participation in the theft of several cases of detergent with a total value of ₱12,090.00 of which he was
charged.25 As such, there is no cause for the Court to consider a factual scenario other than that presented by the
prosecution, as affirmed by the RTC and the Court of Appeals. The only question to consider is whether under
the given facts, the theft should be deemed as consummated or merely frustrated.
II.
In arguing that he should only be convicted of frustrated theft, petitioner cites 26 two decisions rendered many
years ago by the Court of Appeals: People v. Diño27 and People v. Flores.28 Both decisions elicit the interest of this
Court, as they modified trial court convictions from consummated to frustrated theft and involve a factual milieu
that bears similarity to the present case. Petitioner invoked the same rulings in his appeal to the Court of
Appeals, yet the appellate court did not expressly consider the import of the rulings when it affirmed the
conviction.
It is not necessary to fault the Court of Appeals for giving short shrift to the Diño and Flores rulings since they
have not yet been expressly adopted as precedents by this Court. For whatever reasons,
the occasion to define or debunk the crime of frustrated theft has not come to pass before us. Yet despite the
silence on our part, Diño and Flores have attained a level of renown reached by very few other appellate court
rulings. They are comprehensively discussed in the most popular of our criminal law annotations, 29 and studied in
criminal law classes as textbook examples of frustrated crimes or even as definitive of frustrated theft.
More critically, the factual milieu in those cases is hardly akin to the fanciful scenarios that populate criminal law
exams more than they actually occur in real life. Indeed, if we finally say that Diño and Flores are doctrinal, such
conclusion could profoundly influence a multitude of routine theft prosecutions, including commonplace
shoplifting. Any scenario that involves the thief having to exit with the stolen property through a supervised
egress, such as a supermarket checkout counter or a parking area pay booth, may easily call for the application of
Diño and Flores. The fact that lower courts have not hesitated to lay down convictions for frustrated theft further
validates that Diño and Flores and the theories offered therein on frustrated theft have borne some weight in
our jurisprudential system. The time is thus ripe for us to examine whether those theories are correct and should
continue to influence prosecutors and judges in the future.
III.
To delve into any extended analysis of Diño  and  Flores, as well as the specific issues relative to "frustrated theft,"
it is necessary to first refer to the basic rules on the three stages of crimes under our Revised Penal Code. 30
Article 6 defines those three stages, namely the consummated, frustrated and attempted felonies. A felony is
consummated "when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present." It is
frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator." Finally, it is attempted "when the offender commences the commission of a felony directly by overt
acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which should produce the felony by reason of some cause or
accident other than his own spontaneous desistance."
Each felony under the Revised Penal Code has a "subjective phase," or that portion of the acts constituting the
crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the
offender which, with prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. 31 After that point has been breached,
the subjective phase ends and the objective phase begins. 32 It has been held that if the offender never passes the
subjective phase of the offense, the crime is merely attempted. 33 On the other hand, the subjective phase is
completely passed in case of frustrated crimes, for in such instances, "[s]ubjectively the crime is complete." 34
Truly, an easy distinction lies between consummated and frustrated felonies on one hand, and attempted
felonies on the other. So long as the offender fails to complete all the acts of execution despite commencing the
commission of a felony, the crime is undoubtedly in the attempted stage. Since the specific acts of execution that
define each crime under the Revised Penal Code are generally enumerated in the code itself, the task of
ascertaining whether a crime is attempted only would need to compare the acts actually performed by the
accused as against the acts that constitute the felony under the Revised Penal Code.
In contrast, the determination of whether a crime is frustrated or consummated necessitates an initial
concession that all of the acts of execution have been performed by the offender. The critical distinction instead
is whether the felony itself was actually produced by the acts of execution. The determination of whether the
felony was "produced" after all the acts of execution had been performed hinges on the particular statutory
definition of the felony. It is the statutory definition that generally furnishes the elements of each crime under
the Revised Penal Code, while the elements in turn unravel the particular requisite acts of execution and
accompanying criminal intent.
The long-standing Latin maxim "actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea" supplies an important characteristic of a
crime, that "ordinarily, evil intent must unite with an unlawful act for there to be a crime," and accordingly, there
can be no crime when the criminal mind is wanting. 35 Accepted in this jurisdiction as material in crimes mala in
se,36 mens rea has been defined before as "a guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent," 37 and
"essential for criminal liability."38 It follows that the statutory definition of our mala in se crimes must be able to
supply what the mens rea of the crime is, and indeed the U.S. Supreme Court has comfortably held that "a
criminal law that contains no mens rea requirement infringes on constitutionally protected rights." 39 The criminal
statute must also provide for the overt acts that constitute the crime. For a crime to exist in our legal law, it is
not enough that mens rea be shown; there must also be an actus reus. 40
It is from the actus reus and the mens rea, as they find expression in the criminal statute, that the felony is
produced. As a postulate in the craftsmanship of constitutionally sound laws, it is extremely preferable that the
language of the law expressly provide when the felony is produced. Without such provision, disputes would
inevitably ensue on the elemental question whether or not a crime was committed, thereby presaging the
undesirable and legally dubious set-up under which the judiciary is assigned the legislative role of defining
crimes. Fortunately, our Revised Penal Code does not suffer from such infirmity. From the statutory definition of
any felony, a decisive passage or term is embedded which attests when the felony is produced by the acts of
execution. For example, the statutory definition of murder or homicide expressly uses the phrase "shall kill
another," thus making it clear that the felony is produced by the death of the victim, and conversely, it is not
produced if the victim survives.
We next turn to the statutory definition of theft. Under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, its elements are
spelled out as follows:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.— Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but without
violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property of another
without the latter’s consent.
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. Any person who, having found lost property, shall fail to deliver the same to the local authorities or to its
owner;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall remove or make use of the
fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and
3. Any person who shall enter an inclosed estate or a field where trespass is forbidden or which belongs to
another and without the consent of its owner, shall hunt or fish upon the same or shall gather cereals, or other
forest or farm products.
Article 308 provides for a general definition of theft, and three alternative and highly idiosyncratic means by
which theft may be committed.41 In the present discussion, we need to concern ourselves only with the general
definition since it was under it that the prosecution of the accused was undertaken and sustained. On the face of
the definition, there is only one operative act of execution by the actor involved in theft ─ the taking of personal
property of another. It is also clear from the provision that in order that such taking may be qualified as theft,
there must further be present the descriptive circumstances that the taking was with intent to gain; without
force upon things or violence against or intimidation of persons; and it was without the consent of the owner of
the property.
Indeed, we have long recognized the following elements of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised
Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3)
that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5)
that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon
things.42
In his commentaries, Judge Guevarra traces the history of the definition of theft, which under early Roman law as
defined by Gaius, was so broad enough as to encompass "any kind of physical handling of property belonging to
another against the will of the owner," 43 a definition similar to that by Paulus that a thief "handles (touches,
moves) the property of another."44 However, with the Institutes of Justinian, the idea had taken hold that more
than mere physical handling, there must further be an intent of acquiring gain from the object, thus: "[f]urtum
est contrectatio rei fraudulosa, lucri faciendi causa vel ipsius rei, vel etiam usus ejus possessinisve." 45 This
requirement of animo lucrandi, or intent to gain, was maintained in both the Spanish and Filipino penal laws,
even as it has since been abandoned in Great Britain. 46
In Spanish law, animo lucrandi was compounded with apoderamiento, or "unlawful taking," to characterize theft.
Justice Regalado notes that the concept of apoderamiento once had a controversial interpretation and
application. Spanish law had already discounted the belief that mere physical taking was constitutive of
apoderamiento, finding that it had to be coupled with "the intent to appropriate the object in order to constitute
apoderamiento; and to appropriate means to deprive the lawful owner of the thing." 47 However, a conflicting
line of cases decided by the Court of Appeals ruled, alternatively, that there must be permanency in the
taking48 or an intent to permanently deprive the owner of the stolen property; 49 or that there was no need for
permanency in the taking or in its intent, as the mere temporary possession by the offender or disturbance of
the proprietary rights of the owner already constituted apoderamiento. 50 Ultimately, as Justice Regalado notes,
the Court adopted the latter thought that there was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of
his property to constitute an unlawful taking. 51
So long as the "descriptive" circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including animo lucrandi and
apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of personal property of another
establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the attempted stage. As applied to the present case, the
moment petitioner obtained physical possession of the cases of detergent and loaded them in the pushcart, such
seizure motivated by intent to gain, completed without need to inflict violence or intimidation against persons
nor force upon things, and accomplished without the consent of the SM Super Sales Club, petitioner forfeited the
extenuating benefit a conviction for only attempted theft would have afforded him.
On the critical question of whether it was consummated or frustrated theft, we are obliged to apply Article 6 of
the Revised Penal Code to ascertain the answer. Following that provision, the theft would have been frustrated
only, once the acts committed by petitioner, if ordinarily sufficient to produce theft as a consequence, "do not
produce [such theft] by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator." There are clearly two
determinative factors to consider: that the felony is not "produced," and that such failure is due to causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator. The second factor ultimately depends on the evidence at hand in
each particular case. The first, however, relies primarily on a doctrinal definition attaching to the individual
felonies in the Revised Penal Code52 as to when a particular felony is "not produced," despite the commission of
all the acts of execution.
So, in order to ascertain whether the theft is consummated or frustrated, it is necessary to inquire as to how
exactly is the felony of theft "produced." Parsing through the statutory definition of theft under Article 308, there
is one apparent answer provided in the language of the law — that theft is already "produced" upon the "tak[ing
of] personal property of another without the latter’s consent."
U.S. v. Adiao53 apparently supports that notion. Therein, a customs inspector was charged with theft after he
abstracted a leather belt from the baggage of a foreign national and secreted the item in his desk at the Custom
House. At no time was the accused able to "get the merchandise out of the Custom House," and it appears that
he "was under observation during the entire transaction." 54 Based apparently on those two circumstances, the
trial court had found him guilty, instead, of frustrated theft. The Court reversed, saying that neither circumstance
was decisive, and holding instead that the accused was guilty of consummated theft, finding that "all the
elements of the completed crime of theft are present." 55 In support of its conclusion that the theft was
consummated, the Court cited three (3) decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain, the discussion of which we
replicate below:
The defendant was charged with the theft of some fruit from the land of another. As he was in the act of taking
the fruit[,] he was seen by a policeman, yet it did not appear that he was at that moment caught by the
policeman but sometime later. The court said: "[x x x] The trial court did not err [x x x ] in considering the crime
as that of consummated theft instead of frustrated theft inasmuch as nothing appears in the record showing that
the policemen who saw the accused take the fruit from the adjoining land arrested him in the act and thus
prevented him from taking full possession of the thing stolen and even its utilization by him for an interval of
time." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, October 14, 1898.)
Defendant picked the pocket of the offended party while the latter was hearing mass in a church. The latter on
account of the solemnity of the act, although noticing the theft, did not do anything to prevent it. Subsequently,
however, while the defendant was still inside the church, the offended party got back the money from the
defendant. The court said that the defendant had performed all the acts of execution and considered the theft as
consummated. (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, December 1, 1897.)
The defendant penetrated into a room of a certain house and by means of a key opened up a case, and from the
case took a small box, which was also opened with a key, from which in turn he took a purse containing 461
reales and 20 centimos, and then he placed the money over the cover of the case; just at this moment he was
caught by two guards who were stationed in another room near-by. The court considered this as consummated
robbery, and said: "[x x x] The accused [x x x] having materially taken possession of the money from the moment
he took it from the place where it had been, and having taken it with his hands with intent to appropriate the
same, he executed all the acts necessary to constitute the crime which was thereby produced; only the act of
making use of the thing having been frustrated, which, however, does not go to make the elements of the
consummated crime." (Decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, June 13, 1882.) 56
It is clear from the facts of Adiao itself, and the three (3) Spanish decisions cited therein, that the criminal actors
in all these cases had been able to obtain full possession of the personal property prior to their apprehension.
The interval between the commission of the acts of theft and the apprehension of the thieves did vary, from
"sometime later" in the 1898 decision; to the very moment the thief had just extracted the money in a purse
which had been stored as it was in the 1882 decision; and before the thief had been able to spirit the item stolen
from the building where the theft took place, as had happened in Adiao and the 1897 decision. Still, such
intervals proved of no consequence in those cases, as it was ruled that the thefts in each of those cases was
consummated by the actual possession of the property belonging to another.
In 1929, the Court was again confronted by a claim that an accused was guilty only of frustrated rather than
consummated theft. The case is People v. Sobrevilla,57 where the accused, while in the midst of a crowd in a
public market, was already able to abstract a pocketbook from the trousers of the victim when the latter,
perceiving the theft, "caught hold of the [accused]’s shirt-front, at the same time shouting for a policeman; after
a struggle, he recovered his pocket-book and let go of the defendant, who was afterwards caught by a
policeman."58 In rejecting the contention that only frustrated theft was established, the Court simply said,
without further comment or elaboration:
We believe that such a contention is groundless. The [accused] succeeded in taking the pocket-book, and that
determines the crime of theft. If the pocket-book was afterwards recovered, such recovery does not affect the
[accused’s] criminal liability, which arose from the [accused] having succeeded in taking the pocket-book. 59
If anything, Sobrevilla is consistent with Adiao and the Spanish Supreme Court cases cited in the latter, in that the
fact that the offender was able to succeed in obtaining physical possession of the stolen item, no matter how
momentary, was able to consummate the theft.
Adiao, Sobrevilla and the Spanish Supreme Court decisions cited therein contradict the position of petitioner in
this case. Yet to simply affirm without further comment would be disingenuous, as there is another school of
thought on when theft is consummated, as reflected in the Diño and Flores decisions.
Diño was decided by the Court of Appeals in 1949, some 31 years after Adiao and 15 years before Flores. The
accused therein, a driver employed by the United States Army, had driven his truck into the port area of the
South Harbor, to unload a truckload of materials to waiting U.S. Army personnel. After he had finished unloading,
accused drove away his truck from the Port, but as he was approaching a checkpoint of the Military Police, he
was stopped by an M.P. who inspected the truck and found therein three boxes of army rifles. The accused later
contended that he had been stopped by four men who had loaded the boxes with the agreement that they were
to meet him and retrieve the rifles after he had passed the checkpoint. The trial court convicted accused of
consummated theft, but the Court of Appeals modified the conviction, holding instead that only frustrated theft
had been committed.
In doing so, the appellate court pointed out that the evident intent of the accused was to let the boxes of rifles
"pass through the checkpoint, perhaps in the belief that as the truck had already unloaded its cargo inside the
depot, it would be allowed to pass through the check point without further investigation or checking." 60 This
point was deemed material and indicative that the theft had not been fully produced, for the Court of Appeals
pronounced that "the fact determinative of consummation is the ability of the thief to dispose freely of the
articles stolen, even if it were more or less momentary." 61 Support for this proposition was drawn from a decision
of the Supreme Court of Spain dated 24 January 1888 (1888 decision), which was quoted as follows:
Considerando que para que el apoderamiento de la cosa sustraida sea determinate de la consumacion del delito
de hurto es preciso que so haga en circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor la libre disposicion de aquella,
siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente, pues de otra suerte, dado el concepto del delito de hurto, no
puede decirse en realidad que se haya producido en toda su extension, sin materializar demasiado el acto de
tomar la cosa ajena.62
Integrating these considerations, the Court of Appeals then concluded:
This court is of the opinion that in the case at bar, in order to make the booty subject to the control and disposal
of the culprits, the articles stolen must first be passed through the M.P. check point, but since the offense was
opportunely discovered and the articles seized after all the acts of execution had been performed, but before the
loot came under the final control and disposal of the looters, the offense can not be said to have been fully
consummated, as it was frustrated by the timely intervention of the guard. The offense committed, therefore, is
that of frustrated theft.63
Diño thus laid down the theory that the ability of the actor to freely dispose of the items stolen at the time of
apprehension is determinative as to whether the theft is consummated or frustrated. This theory was applied
again by the Court of Appeals some 15 years later, in Flores, a case which according to the division of the court
that decided it, bore "no substantial variance between the circumstances [herein] and in [Diño]." 64 Such
conclusion is borne out by the facts in Flores. The accused therein, a checker employed by the Luzon Stevedoring
Company, issued a delivery receipt for one empty sea van to the truck driver who had loaded the purportedly
empty sea van onto his truck at the terminal of the stevedoring company. The truck driver proceeded to show
the delivery receipt to the guard on duty at the gate of the terminal. However, the guards insisted on inspecting
the van, and discovered that the "empty" sea van had actually contained other merchandise as well. 65 The
accused was prosecuted for theft qualified by abuse of confidence, and found himself convicted of the
consummated crime. Before the Court of Appeals, accused argued in the alternative that he was guilty only of
attempted theft, but the appellate court pointed out that there was no intervening act of spontaneous
desistance on the part of the accused that "literally frustrated the theft." However, the Court of Appeals,
explicitly relying on Diño, did find that the accused was guilty only of frustrated, and not consummated, theft.
As noted earlier, the appellate court admitted it found "no substantial variance" between Diño and Flores then
before it. The prosecution in Flores had sought to distinguish that case from Diño, citing a "traditional ruling"
which unfortunately was not identified in the decision itself. However, the Court of Appeals pointed out that the
said "traditional ruling" was qualified by the words "is placed in a situation where [the actor] could dispose of its
contents at once."66 Pouncing on this qualification, the appellate court noted that "[o]bviously, while the truck
and the van were still within the compound, the petitioner could not have disposed of the goods ‘at once’." At
the same time, the Court of Appeals conceded that "[t]his is entirely different from the case where a much less
bulk and more common thing as money was the object of the crime, where freedom to dispose of or make use of
it is palpably less restricted,"67 though no further qualification was offered what the effect would have been had
that alternative circumstance been present instead.
Synthesis of the Diño and Flores rulings is in order. The determinative characteristic as to whether the crime of
theft was produced is the ability of the actor "to freely dispose of the articles stolen, even if it were only
momentary." Such conclusion was drawn from an 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain which had
pronounced that in determining whether theft had been consummated, "es preciso que so haga en
circunstancias tales que permitan al sustractor de aquella, siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente." The
qualifier "siquiera sea mas o menos momentaneamente" proves another important consideration, as it implies
that if the actor was in a capacity to freely dispose of the stolen items before apprehension, then the theft could
be deemed consummated. Such circumstance was not present in either Diño or Flores, as the stolen items in
both cases were retrieved from the actor before they could be physically extracted from the guarded compounds
from which the items were filched. However, as implied in Flores, the character of the item stolen could lead to a
different conclusion as to whether there could have been "free disposition," as in the case where the chattel
involved was of "much less bulk and more common x x x, [such] as money x x x." 68
In his commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino makes the following pointed observation on the import of the Diño
ruling:
There is a ruling of the Court of Appeals that theft is consummated when the thief is able to freely dispose of the
stolen articles even if it were more or less momentary. Or as stated in another case[ 69 ], theft is consummated
upon the voluntary and malicious taking of property belonging to another which is realized by the material
occupation of the thing whereby the thief places it under his control and in such a situation that he could dispose
of it at once. This ruling seems to have been based on Viada’s opinion that in order the theft may be
consummated, "es preciso que se haga en circumstancias x x x [70 ]"71
In the same commentaries, Chief Justice Aquino, concluding from Adiao and other cases, also states that "[i]n
theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused had material possession of the thing with intent to
appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the thing was frustrated." 72
There are at least two other Court of Appeals rulings that are at seeming variance with the Diño and Flores
rulings. People v. Batoon73 involved an accused who filled a container with gasoline from a petrol pump within
view of a police detective, who followed the accused onto a passenger truck where the arrest was made. While
the trial court found the accused guilty of frustrated qualified theft, the Court of Appeals held that the accused
was guilty of consummated qualified theft, finding that "[t]he facts of the cases of U.S. [v.] Adiao x x x and U.S. v.
Sobrevilla x x x indicate that actual taking with intent to gain is enough to consummate the crime of theft." 74
In People v. Espiritu,75 the accused had removed nine pieces of hospital linen from a supply depot and loaded
them onto a truck. However, as the truck passed through the checkpoint, the stolen items were discovered by
the Military Police running the checkpoint. Even though those facts clearly admit to similarity with those in Diño,
the Court of Appeals held that the accused were guilty of consummated theft, as the accused "were able to take
or get hold of the hospital linen and that the only thing that was frustrated, which does not constitute any
element of theft, is the use or benefit that the thieves expected from the commission of the offense." 76
In pointing out the distinction between Diño and Espiritu, Reyes wryly observes that "[w]hen the meaning of an
element of a felony is controversial, there is bound to arise different rulings as to the stage of execution of that
felony."77 Indeed, we can discern from this survey of jurisprudence that the state of the law insofar as frustrated
theft is concerned is muddled. It fact, given the disputed foundational basis of the concept of frustrated theft
itself, the question can even be asked whether there is really such a crime in the first place.
IV.
The Court in 1984 did finally rule directly that an accused was guilty of frustrated, and not consummated, theft.
As we undertake this inquiry, we have to reckon with the import of this Court’s 1984 decision in Empelis v. IAC. 78
As narrated in Empelis, the owner of a coconut plantation had espied four (4) persons in the premises of his
plantation, in the act of gathering and tying some coconuts. The accused were surprised by the owner within the
plantation as they were carrying with them the coconuts they had gathered. The accused fled the scene,
dropping the coconuts they had seized, and were subsequently arrested after the owner reported the incident to
the police. After trial, the accused were convicted of qualified theft, and the issue they raised on appeal was that
they were guilty only of simple theft. The Court affirmed that the theft was qualified, following Article 310 of the
Revised Penal Code,79 but further held that the accused were guilty only of frustrated qualified theft.
It does not appear from the Empelis decision that the issue of whether the theft was consummated or frustrated
was raised by any of the parties. What does appear, though, is that the disposition of that issue was contained in
only two sentences, which we reproduce in full:
However, the crime committed is only frustrated qualified theft because petitioners were not able to perform all
the acts of execution which should have produced the felony as a consequence. They were not able to carry the
coconuts away from the plantation due to the timely arrival of the owner. 80
No legal reference or citation was offered for this averment, whether Diño, Flores or the Spanish authorities who
may have bolstered the conclusion. There are indeed evident problems with this formulation in Empelis.
Empelis held that the crime was only frustrated because the actors "were not able to perform all the acts of
execution which should have produced the felon as a consequence." 81 However, per Article 6 of the Revised
Penal Code, the crime is frustrated "when the offender performs all the acts of execution," though not producing
the felony as a result. If the offender was not able to perform all the acts of execution, the crime is attempted,
provided that the non-performance was by reason of some cause or accident other than spontaneous
desistance. Empelis concludes that the crime was
frustrated because not all of the acts of execution were performed due to the timely arrival of the owner.
However, following Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, these facts should elicit the conclusion that the crime
was only attempted, especially given that the acts were not performed because of the timely arrival of the
owner, and not because of spontaneous desistance by the offenders.
For these reasons, we cannot attribute weight to Empelis as we consider the present petition. Even if the two
sentences we had cited actually aligned with the definitions provided in Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, such
passage bears no reflection that it is the product of the considered evaluation of the relevant legal or
jurisprudential thought. Instead, the passage is offered as if it were sourced from an indubitable legal premise so
settled it required no further explication.
Notably, Empelis has not since been reaffirmed by the Court, or even cited as authority on theft. Indeed, we
cannot see how Empelis can contribute to our present debate, except for the bare fact that it proves that the
Court had once deliberately found an accused guilty of frustrated theft. Even if Empelis were considered as a
precedent for frustrated theft, its doctrinal value is extremely compromised by the erroneous legal premises that
inform it, and also by the fact that it has not been entrenched by subsequent reliance.
Thus, Empelis does not compel us that it is an insurmountable given that frustrated theft is viable in this
jurisdiction. Considering the flawed reasoning behind its conclusion of frustrated theft, it cannot present any
efficacious argument to persuade us in this case. Insofar as Empelis may imply that convictions for frustrated
theft are beyond cavil in this jurisdiction, that decision is subject to reassessment.
V.
At the time our Revised Penal Code was enacted in 1930, the 1870 Codigo Penal de España was then in place.
The definition of the crime of theft, as provided then, read as follows:
Son reos de hurto:
1. Los que con ánimo de lucrarse, y sin volencia o intimidación en las personas ni fuerza en las cosas, toman las
cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño.
2. Los que encontrándose una cosa perdida y sabiendo quién es su dueño se la apropriaren co intención de lucro.
3. Los dañadores que sustrajeren o utilizaren los frutos u objeto del daño causado, salvo los casos previstos en
los artίculos 606, núm. 1.0; 607, núms, 1.0, 2.0 y 3.0; 608, núm. 1.0; 611; 613; Segundo párrafo del 617 y 618.
It was under the ambit of the 1870 Codigo Penal that the aforecited Spanish Supreme Court decisions were
handed down. However, the said code would be revised again in 1932, and several times thereafter. In fact,
under the Codigo Penal Español de 1995, the crime of theft is now simply defined as "[e]l que, con ánimo de
lucro,
tomare las cosas muebles ajenas sin la voluntad de su dueño será castigado" 82
Notice that in the 1870 and 1995 definition of theft in the penal code of Spain, "la libre disposicion" of the
property is not an element or a statutory characteristic of the crime. It does appear that the principle originated
and perhaps was fostered in the realm of Spanish jurisprudence.
La doctrina hoy generalmente sustentada considera que el hurto se consuma cuando la cosa queda de hecho a la
disposición del agente. Con este criterio coincide la doctrina sentada últimamente porla jurisprudencia española
que generalmente considera consumado el hurto cuando el culpable coge o aprehende la cosa y ésta quede por
tiempo más o menos duradero bajo su poder. El hecho de que éste pueda aprovecharse o no de lo hurtado es
indiferente. El delito no pierde su carácter de consumado aunque la cosa hurtada sea devuelta por el culpable o
fuere recuperada. No se concibe la frustración, pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente, los raros casos que nuestra jurisprudencia, muy vacilante,
declara hurtos frustrados son verdaderos delitos consumados. 87 (Emphasis supplied)
Cuello Calón’s submissions cannot be lightly ignored. Unlike Viada, who was content with replicating the Spanish
Supreme Court decisions on the matter, Cuello Calón actually set forth his own thought that questioned whether
theft could truly be frustrated, since "pues es muy dificil que el que hace cuanto es necesario para la
consumación del hurto no lo consume efectivamente." Otherwise put, it would be difficult to foresee how the
execution of all the acts necessary for the completion of the crime would not produce the effect of theft.

The oft-cited Salvador Viada adopted a question-answer form in his 1926 commentaries on the 1870 Codigo
This divergence of opinion convinces us, at least, that there is no weighted force in scholarly thought that obliges
Penal de España. Therein, he raised at least three questions for the reader whether the crime of frustrated or
us to accept frustrated theft, as proposed in Diño and Flores. A final ruling by the Court that there is no crime of
consummated theft had occurred. The passage cited in Diño was actually utilized by Viada to answer the
frustrated theft in this jurisdiction will not lead to scholastic pariah, for such a submission is hardly heretical in
question whether frustrated or consummated theft was committed "[e]l que en el momento mismo de
light of Cuello Calón’s position.
apoderarse de la cosa ajena, viéndose sorprendido, la arroja al suelo." 83 Even as the answer was as stated in
Diño, and was indeed derived from the 1888 decision of the Supreme Court of Spain, that decision’s factual
predicate occasioning the statement was apparently very different from Diño, for it appears that the 1888 Accordingly, it would not be intellectually disingenuous for the Court to look at the question from a fresh
decision involved an accused who was surprised by the employees of a haberdashery as he was abstracting a perspective, as we are not bound by the opinions of the respected Spanish commentators, conflicting as they
layer of clothing off a mannequin, and who then proceeded to throw away the garment as he fled. 84 are, to accept that theft is capable of commission in its frustrated stage. Further, if we ask the question whether
there is a mandate of statute or precedent that must compel us to adopt the Diño and Flores doctrines, the
answer has to be in the negative. If we did so, it would arise not out of obeisance to an inexorably higher
Nonetheless, Viada does not contest the notion of frustrated theft, and willingly recites decisions of the Supreme
command, but from the exercise of the function of statutory interpretation that comes as part and parcel of
Court of Spain that have held to that effect.85 A few decades later, the esteemed Eugenio Cuello Calón pointed
judicial review, and a function that allows breathing room for a variety of theorems in competition until one is
out the inconsistent application by the Spanish Supreme Court with respect to frustrated theft.
ultimately adopted by this Court.

Hay frustración cuando los reos fueron sorprendidos por las guardias cuando llevaban los sacos de harino del
V.
carro que los conducia a otro que tenían preparado, 22 febrero 1913; cuando el resultado no tuvo efecto por la
intervención de la policia situada en el local donde se realizó la sustracción que impidió pudieran los reos
disponer de lo sustraído, 30 de octubre 1950. Hay "por lo menos" frustración, si existe apoderamiento, pero el
culpale no llega a disponer de la cosa, 12 abril 1930; hay frustración "muy próxima" cuando el culpable es
detenido por el perjudicado acto seguido de cometer la sustracción, 28 febrero 1931. Algunos fallos han
considerado la existencia de frustración cuando, perseguido el culpable o sorprendido en el momento de llevar
los efectos hurtados, los abandona, 29 mayo 1889, 22 febrero 1913, 11 marzo 1921; esta doctrina no es
admissible, éstos, conforme a lo antes expuesto, son hurtos consumados. 86

Ultimately, Cuello Calón attacked the very idea that frustrated theft is actually possible:
The foremost predicate that guides us as we explore the matter is that it lies in the province of the legislature,
through statute, to define what constitutes a particular crime in this jurisdiction. It is the legislature, as
representatives of the sovereign people, which determines which acts or combination of acts are criminal in
nature. Judicial interpretation of penal laws should be aligned with what was the evident legislative intent, as
expressed primarily in the language of the law as it defines the crime. It is Congress, not the courts, which is to
define a crime, and ordain its punishment. 88 The courts cannot arrogate the power to introduce a new element
of a crime which was unintended by the legislature, or redefine a crime in a manner that does not hew to the
statutory language. Due respect for the prerogative of Congress in defining crimes/felonies constrains the Court
to refrain from a broad interpretation of penal laws where a "narrow interpretation" is appropriate. "The Court
must take heed of language, legislative history and purpose, in order to strictly determine the wrath and breath
of the conduct the law forbids." 89
With that in mind, a problem clearly emerges with the Diño/Flores dictum. The ability of the offender to freely
dispose of the property stolen is not a constitutive element of the crime of theft. It finds no support or extension
in Article 308, whether as a descriptive or operative element of theft or as the mens rea or actus reus of the
felony. To restate what this Court has repeatedly held: the elements of the crime of theft as provided for in
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be taking of personal property; (2) that said property
belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the
consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or
intimidation of persons or force upon things. 90
Such factor runs immaterial to the statutory definition of theft, which is the taking, with intent to gain, of
personal property of another without the latter’s consent. While the Diño/Flores dictum is considerate to the
mindset of the offender, the statutory definition of theft considers only the perspective of intent to gain on the
part of the offender, compounded by the deprivation of property on the part of the victim.
For the purpose of ascertaining whether theft is susceptible of commission in the frustrated stage, the question
is again, when is the crime of theft produced? There would be all but certain unanimity in the position that theft
is produced when there is deprivation of personal property due to its taking by one with intent to gain. Viewed
from that perspective, it is immaterial to the product of the felony that the offender, once having committed all
the acts of execution for theft, is able or unable to freely dispose of the property stolen since the deprivation
from the owner alone has already ensued from such acts of execution. This conclusion is reflected in Chief Justice
Aquino’s commentaries, as earlier cited, that "[i]n theft or robbery the crime is consummated after the accused
had material possession of the thing with intent to appropriate the same, although his act of making use of the
thing was frustrated."91
It might be argued, that the ability of the offender to freely dispose of the property stolen delves into the
concept of "taking" itself, in that there could be no true taking until the actor obtains such degree of control over
the stolen item. But even if this were correct, the effect would be to downgrade the crime to its attempted, and
not frustrated stage, for it would mean that not all the acts of execution have not been completed, the "taking
not having been accomplished." Perhaps this point could serve as fertile ground for future discussion, but our
concern now is whether there is indeed a crime of frustrated theft, and such consideration proves ultimately
immaterial to that question. Moreover, such issue will not apply to the facts of this particular case. We are
satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that the taking by the petitioner was completed in this case. With intent to
gain, he acquired physical possession of the stolen cases of detergent for a considerable period of time that he
was able to drop these off at a spot in the parking lot, and long enough to load these onto a taxicab.
Indeed, we have, after all, held that unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is deemed complete from the moment
the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 92 And long ago,
we asserted in People v. Avila:93
x x x [T]he most fundamental notion in the crime of theft is the taking of the thing to be appropriated into the
physical power of the thief, which idea is qualified by other conditions, such as that the taking must be
effected animo lucrandi and without the consent of the owner; and it will be here noted that the definition does
not require that the taking should be effected against the will of the owner but merely that it should be without
his consent, a distinction of no slight importance. 94
Insofar as we consider the present question, "unlawful taking" is most material in this respect. Unlawful taking,
which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element which produces the felony in its
consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be
attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, theft cannot
have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.
Neither Diño nor Flores can convince us otherwise. Both fail to consider that once the offenders therein obtained
possession over the stolen items, the effect of the felony has been produced as there has been deprivation of
property. The presumed inability of the offenders to freely dispose of the stolen property does not negate the
fact that the owners have already been deprived of their right to possession upon the completion of the taking.
Moreover, as is evident in this case, the adoption of the rule —that the inability of the offender to freely dispose
of the stolen property frustrates the theft — would introduce a convenient defense for the accused which does
not reflect any legislated intent,95 since the Court would have carved a viable means for offenders to seek a
mitigated penalty under applied circumstances that do not admit of easy classification. It is difficult to formulate
definite standards as to when a stolen item is susceptible to free disposal by the thief. Would this depend on the
psychological belief of the offender at the time of the commission of the crime, as implied in Diño?
Or, more likely, the appreciation of several classes of factual circumstances such as the size and weight of the
property, the location of the property, the number and identity of people present at the scene of the crime, the
number and identity of people whom the offender is expected to encounter upon fleeing with the stolen
property, the manner in which the stolen item had been housed or stored; and quite frankly, a whole lot more.
Even the fungibility or edibility of the stolen item would come into account, relevant as that would be on
whether such property is capable of free disposal at any stage, even after the taking has been consummated.

All these complications will make us lose sight of the fact that beneath all the colorful detail, the owner was
indeed deprived of property by one who intended to produce such deprivation for reasons of gain. For such will
remain the presumed fact if frustrated theft were recognized, for therein, all of the acts of execution, including
the taking, have been completed. If the facts establish the non-completion of the taking due to these peculiar
circumstances, the effect could be to downgrade the crime to the attempted stage, as not all of the acts of
execution have been performed. But once all these acts have been executed, the taking has been completed,
causing the unlawful deprivation of property, and ultimately the consummation of the theft.

Maybe the Diño/Flores rulings are, in some degree, grounded in common sense. Yet they do not align with the
legislated framework of the crime of theft. The Revised Penal Code provisions on theft have not been designed in
such fashion as to accommodate said rulings. Again, there is no language in Article 308 that expressly or
impliedly allows that the "free disposition of the items stolen" is in any way determinative of whether the crime
of theft has been produced. Diño itself did not rely on Philippine laws or jurisprudence to bolster its conclusion,
and the later Flores was ultimately content in relying on Diño alone for legal support. These cases do not enjoy
the weight of stare decisis, and even if they did, their erroneous appreciation of our law on theft leave them
susceptible to reversal. The same holds true of Empilis, a regrettably stray decision which has not since found
favor from this Court.

We thus conclude that under the Revised Penal Code, there is no crime of frustrated theft. As petitioner has
latched the success of his appeal on our acceptance of the Diño and Flores rulings, his petition must be denied,
for we decline to adopt said rulings in our jurisdiction. That it has taken all these years for us to recognize that
there can be no frustrated theft under the Revised Penal Code does not detract from the correctness of this
conclusion. It will take considerable amendments to our Revised Penal Code in order that frustrated theft may be
recognized. Our deference to Viada yields to the higher reverence for legislative intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
15/60 G.R. No. 225735, January 10, 2018
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. BELEN MEJARES Y VALENCIA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
This Court affirms with modification the conviction of accused appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia (Mejares) for
the crime of qualified theft. While this Court finds no reversible error in the ruling that she was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt, this Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty initially imposed upon her. In light of the
recently enacted Republic Act No. 10951,1 which adjusted the amounts of property and damage on which
penalties are based, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and considering the prosecution's failure to
establish the precise values of the stolen items, accused-appellant must be ordered released on time served.
In an Information dated May 24, 2012,2 Mejares was charged with qualified theft of cash and jewelry amounting
to P1,556,308.00. This Information read:
nd
That on or about the 22  day of May 2012 in the City of San Juan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then a domestic servant of complainant Jacqueline Suzanne
Gavino y Aquino, as such, enjoyed the trust and confidence reposed upon her with intent to gain, without the
consent of the owner thereof and with grave abuse of confidence, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the following items, to wit:
The prosecution presented five (5) witnesses. The first witness, Raquel Torres (Torres), was a household helper
for Mark Vincent and Jacqueline Suzanne Gavino (the Spouses Gavino) from August 2011 to July 2012. 4
According to Torres, she was cleaning the dining area of the condominium unit of the Spouses Gavino at around
1:00 p.m. on May 22, 2012, when she noticed that Mejares' cellphone kept ringing. Mejares answered it,
hurrying to the computer room and away from Torres. When Mejares returned, she was "pale, perspiring and
panicky."5 When Torres asked about the identity of the caller, Mejares did not answer. She told her instead that
Jacqueline Suzanne Gavino (Jackie) met an accident and instructed her to get something from a drawer in the
masters' bedroom. Since it was locked, Mejares was supposedly told to destroy it. 6
Torres added that when Mejares emerged from the bedroom, she was holding a plastic hamper that contained a
black wallet and envelopes and was talking with someone on her cellphone. After a few minutes, Mejares
informed her that Jackie did not want other household members to know what happened and that Mejares was
instructed to also take a watch and jewelry, since the cash in the drawer was not enough to pay the other driver
in the accident who was threatening to sue. Torres narrated that after preparing everything, Mejares left with a
green bag.7
When Mejares returned at about 3:00p.m., she asked Torres if there had been an incoming landline call while
she was gone. Torres answered in the negative and Mejares stated that she had purposely hung it. At 4:00 p.m.,
Torres started to receive calls from Jackie, who sounded "loud, normal and animated,'' 8 making Torres wonder if
Jackie had really encountered an accident. Torres then asked Mejares once again if it was Jackie she had spoken
with earlier. According to Torres, Mejares "grew ashen and perspired" before answering that she was certain. 9
The prosecution's second witness was private complainant, Jackie.

Rolex wrist watch (antique)
Assorted jewelries gold and
Cash money
Cash money ($2,000.00)
- Php 400,000.00 She recalled that when she interviewed Mejares back in May 2011, Mejares then indicated that she was familiar
with the operation of the  dugo-dugo gang. She further narrated that in the early afternoon of May 22, 2012, she
- 1,000,000.00 was at work. She tried calling but could not access her household landline past 5:00p.m., so she decided to call
Torres' cellular phone to have her instruct the driver to pick her up from the Movie and Television Review and
- 50,000.00
Classification Board's Office. After the phone call was cut, she then received a call from Mejares, informing her
about what happened.10
- 86,308.00

Cash assorted foreign money - 20,000.00 According to Jackie, Mejares told her about receiving a call from a certain Nancy, who stated that Jackie wanted
to avoid the publicity that may arise from her supposed accident. Jackie continued that Mejares thereafter
claimed that she was instructed to break the drawer in the masters' bedroom and to take all its contents.
with a total amount of Php 1,556,308.00, belonging to said complainant to the damage and prejudice of the However, Jackie clarified in her account that she had neither a personal secretary nor an aide named Nancy. She
latter in the aforementioned amount. also affirmed that she did not figure in any accident.11

CONTRARY TO LAW.3 The third prosecution witness was Bonifacio Baluyot (Baluyot), the stay-in driver of the Spouses Gavino who had
been working for Jackie since 1976.12
Baluyot claimed that on May 22, 2012, Mejares told him to bring her to Greenhills Shopping Mall, allegedly on
Jackie's orders. He complied. He narrated that he saw her carry a green bag. After dropping Mejares at the mall
entrance, he returned to the condominium. He added that when the incident was subsequently being
investigated, he heard the guards say that they tried to stop Mejares from leaving, although she had told him
that it was only Torres who was stopped by the guards for not having a gate pass. 13
The prosecution's fourth witness was Pedro Garcia (Garcia), the condominium security guard who was on duty at
the lobby on May 22, 2012.14
After trial, the Regional Trial Court found accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
qualified theft of assets amounting to P1,056,308.00. The dispositive portion of its February 6, 2014
Decision18 read:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby renders judgment finding accused BELEN MEJARES y VALENCIA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the felony of qualified theft of articles worth P1,056,308.00, thereby sentencing her
to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Article 310 vis à vis Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused is ordered
to pay to Jacqueline Aquino Gavino the sum mentioned in actual damages. Cost against accused.

Garcia narrated that at around 1:30 p.m., he saw Mejares about to leave the premises carrying a green bag. SO ORDERED.19
However, he did not allow her to leave in the absence of a gate pass signed by her employer. Despite his
insistence that Mejares call her employer, she did not. After a few moments, her cellphone rang. Instead of On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the Regional Trial Court Decision in toto  in its July 30, 2015 Decision. 20
answering Garcia's query on the caller's identity, Mejares rushed to the elevator. Afterwards, Garcia saw Mejares
leave using her employer's car driven by Baluyot. According to him, he still attempted to stop them by warning
Accused-appellant filed her Notice of Appeal.21
them that they could be victims of dugo-dugo gang, to no avail.15

In its January 23, 2017 Resolution, 22 this Court noted the parties' manifestations in lieu of supplemental briefs.
The prosecution's last witness was investigating officer PO3 Clifford Hipolito (PO3 Hipolito).

He testified that during the investigation, he questioned Mejares about what happened. She stated that
someone called her and instructed her to destroy her employer's drawer, take the cash and valuables there, and
bring everything to Baclaran because Jackie had met an accident. When asked if she was aware of the dugo-
dugo gang, she answered that she was. PO3 Hipolito was likewise informed that condominium security initially
prevented Mejares from leaving but she went back to the unit, refusing to call her employer. 16
The defense presented Mejares as its lone witness. She denied the charge and claimed that she was a victim of
the dugo-dugo gang.
For resolution is the sole issue of whether or not accused-appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified theft.
I
Theft is consummated when three (3) elements concur: (1) the actual act of taking without the use of violence,
intimidation, or force upon persons or things; (2) intent to gain on the part of the taker; and (3) the absence of
the owner's consent.23 Moreover, for qualified theft to be committed, the following elements must concur:

According to her, she received a phone call from the condominium unit's landline at 1:00 p.m. on May 22, 2012 1. Taking of personal property;
from a certain Nancy, who introduced herself as Jackie's assistant and informed her that Jackie had met an
accident. Afterwards, she claimed that Jackie herself talked to her and instructed her to get something from a 2. That the said property belongs to another;
drawer in the master's bedroom and to use a screwdriver to destroy its lock because the other driver in the
accident had a 50-50 chance of survival. She further narrated that when the lobby guard did not allow her to 3. That the said taking be done with intent to gain
leave after she had gathered and packed the contents of the drawer, Jackie called her and told her to return to
the unit and to ask the driver to take her to Virra Mall. From there, she took a cab going to Baclaran Church, 4. That it be done without the owner's consent;
where she met an unknown woman. Before handing the bag to the unidentified lady, she claimed that she was
able to talk again over the phone to Jackie, who told her to give the bag to the woman and return to the unit. 5. That it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon
She only had second thoughts about what had happened when after arriving at the condominium, Torres stated things;
that she might have been tricked. She also contended that she had never heard of the dugo-dugo gang.17
6. That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.24
Accused-appellant hopes to convince this Court that her actions only reflected the will of her employer,
emphasizing that there could be no theft on her part because there was no intent to gain. 25 She insists that she
only took instructions from the secretary of private complainant and later on, from private complainant
herself.26 Additionally, she claims that she is as much a victim of the  dugo-dugo gang as was her employer.27
Her contentions are untenable.
This Court has been consistent in holding that "intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act that is
presumed from the unlawful taking by the offender of the thing subject of asportation. [Thus,] [a]ctual gain is
irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain." 28 In this case, it is clear from the established facts
that it was accused-appellant who opened the drawer in the masters' bedroom and took away the cash and
valuables it contained. Therefore, the burden is on the defense to prove that intent to gain was absent despite
accused-appellant's actual  taking of her employer's valuables. It is precisely this burden that the defense failed
to discharge.
The Court of Appeals is correct in pointing out that the actions of accused-appellant before, during, and after the
crime all belie her claim that she did not willfully commit the crime. It correctly underscored the following
observations of the Regional Trial Court:
Why would accused hang the landline phone if not to insure that she was not discovered in the nick of time to
have her loot recovered?
While accused portrays herself as the victim, prosecution evidence has established that she is the victimizer. This
conclusion has the following bases: first, the surreptitious way accused handled the incoming calls; second, her
failure to heed the warnings of persons around her, i.e. Raquel and security guard Garcia; third, her inability to
make use of the myriad opportunities available to verify the alleged vehicular accident where her mistress
figured in.29
Normal human experience, as well as the consistency in and confluence of the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses lead to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant, taking advantage of her being a domestic
helper of private complainant for approximately a year, committed the crime of qualified theft. If she honestly
believed that her employer had met an accident and was genuinely worried for her, she could have easily sought
the help of any of her co-workers in the household. When warned about the  dugo-dugo gang, accused-appellant
could have paused to re-assess the situation. She failed to do all these security measures with no convincing
justification. Indeed, accused-appellant's persistence to leave the condominium with the valuables and her
refusal to let the security guard talk to her employer further belie her position.
To make matters worse, accused-appellant was a domestic helper who had been working for the Spouses Gavino
for at least one (1) year when she committed the crime. By this fact alone, the offense committed is qualified and
warrants graver penalties, pursuant to Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended:
Article 310. Qualified theft. — The crime of theft shall be punished by the penalties next higher by two degrees
than those respectively specified in the next preceding article, if committed by a domestic servant, or with grave
abuse of confidence, or if the property stolen is motor vehicle, mail matter or large cattle or consists of coconuts
taken from the premises of a plantation, fish taken from a fishpond or fishery or if property is taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance. (Emphasis supplied.)
This Court has explained that while grave abuse of trust and confidence per se does not produce the felony as an
effect, it is a "circumstance which aggravates and qualifies the commission of the crime of theft"; 30 hence, the
imposition of a higher penalty is necessary. It is not difficult to understand why the character of accused-
appellant's work as a domestic helper qualifies the offense she committed. As explained in Corpuz v. People of
the Philippines:31
[T]he rationale for the imposition of a higher penalty against a domestic servant is the fact that in the
commission of the crime, the helper will essentially gravely abuse the trust and confidence reposed upon her by
her employer. After accepting and allowing the helper to be a member of the household, thus entrusting upon
such person the protection and safekeeping of the employer's loved ones and properties, a subsequent betrayal
of that trust is so repulsive as to warrant the necessity of imposing a higher penalty to deter the commission of
such wrongful acts.32
The established facts point to the soundness of the Regional Trial Court's and the Court of Appeals' conclusion:
that accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft. Thus, her conviction must be upheld.
II
However, this Court modifies the penalty to be imposed upon accused-appellant pursuant to Republic Act No.
10951, in view of the other details of the case, as established during trial.
On August 29, 2017, President Rodrigo Roa Duterte signed into law Republic Act No. 10951 that sought, among
others, to help indigent prisoners and individuals accused of committing petty crimes. It also increased the fines
for treason and the publication of false news; and likewise increased the baseline amounts and values of
property and damage to make them commensurate to the penalties meted on the offenses committed in
relation to them.
Basic wisdom underlies the adjustments made by Republic Act No. 10951. Imperative to maintaining an effective
and progressive penal system is the consideration of exigencies borne by the passage of time. This includes the
basic economic fact that property values are not constant. To insist on basing penalties on values identified in
the 1930s is not only anachronistic and archaic; it is unjust and legally absurd to a moral fault.
In his dissenting opinion in Corpuz v. People,33 Justice Roberto Abad illustrated in the context of qualified theft
the cruelty foisted by insistence on the values set by the Revised Penal Code when it was originally adopted:
The harshness of this antiquated 1930 scheme for punishing criminal offenders is doubly magnified in qualified
theft where the offender is a domestic helper or a trusted employee. Qualified theft is a grievous offense since its
penalty is automatically raised two degrees higher than that usually imposed on simple theft. Thus, unadjusted
for inflation, the domestic helper who steals from his employer would be meted out a maximum of:
a) 6 years in prison for a toothbrush worth P5;
b) 12 years in prison for a lipstick worth P39;
c) 14 years and 8 months in prison for a pair of female slippers worth P150;
d) 20 years in prison for a wristwatch worth P19,000; or
e) 30 years in prison for a branded lady's handbag worth P125,000.
Unless checked, courts will impose 12 years maximum on the housemaid who steals a P39 lipstick from her
employer. They will also impose on her 30 years maximum for stealing a pricy lady's handbag. This of course is
grossly obscene and unjust, even if the handbag is worth P125,000.00 since 30 years in prison is already the
penalty for treason, for raping and killing an 8-year-old girl, for kidnapping a grade school student, for robbing a
house and killing the entire family, and for a P50-million plunder.
It is not only the incremental penalty that violates the accused's right against cruel, unusual, and degrading
punishment. The axe casts its shadow across the board touching all property-related crimes. This injustice and
inhumanity will go on as it has gone on for decades unless the Court acts to rein it in. 34 (Citations omitted.)
Given its possibly fairer and more just consequences, Republic Act No. 10951 is a welcome development in our
legal system.
Republic Act No. 10951 has since come into effect during the pendency of this case. 35 It likewise specifically
stipulates that its provisions shall have retroactive effect. 36 Section 100 adds that this retroactivity applies not
only to persons accused of crimes but have yet to be meted their final sentence, but also to those already
"serving sentence by final judgment."37 This retroactivity is in keeping with the principle already contained in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code that "[p]enal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the
person guilty of a felony."38 Given these circumstances, it is proper for this Court to adjust the penalty to be
imposed on accused-appellant.
Since the penalty in cases of theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal properties, 39 it is critical to ensure
that the penalty is based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information or uncorroborated
testimonies presented by the prosecution. Here, a perusal of the records leads to the conclusion that while the
Regional Trial Court reduced the value of the stolen jewelry from P1,000,000.00 40 to P500,000.00 on the basis of
the complainant's social standing,41 such determination is devoid of evidentiary basis.
Citing People v. Paraiso42 and People v. Marcos43 in Francisco v. People,44 this Court explained that "an ordinary
witness cannot establish the value of jewelry"45 and that courts cannot take judicial notice of the value of
properties when "[it] is not a matter of public knowledge [or] unquestionable demonstration"; thus:
The value of jewelry is not a matter of public knowledge nor is it capable of unquestionable demonstration and in
the absence of receipts or any other competent evidence besides the self-serving valuation made by the
prosecution, we cannot award the reparation for the stolen jewelry.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Regional Trial Court did not only err in setting the amount of the stolen jewelry on the basis of nothing but
the complainant's social standing, but also in sustaining the values of the other stolen items as they appeared in
the Information and asserted by the complainant. These items were valued as follows: the antique Rolex
wristwatch at P400,000.00, the foreign currencies at P86,308.00, and cash at P50,000.00. They were valued this
way since no other competent evidence such as in the form of watch make, model description, receipts, or
exchange rates was presented to satisfactorily prove their value.
Thus, in the absence of factual and legal bases, the amount of P1,056,308.00 could  not be the basis to determine
the proper penalty to be imposed on accused-appellant. On the same ground, the complainant is likewise not
entitled to reparation.47 Instead, the rule articulated in Candelaria v. People48 applies:
In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either apply the
minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the attendant circumstances
of the case.49 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted.)
Given that the value of the stolen personal properties in this case was not determined by reliable evidence
independent of the prosecution's uncorroborated testimonies, this Court is constrained to apply the minimum
penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section 81 of Republic Act No. 10951,
which is arresto mayor.
However, in view of Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code concerning qualified theft, 50 accused-appellant must
be meted a penalty two (2) degrees higher, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a
range of two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years.
Also applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, where there are no modifying circumstances and the minimum of
the indeterminate penalty is computed from the full range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period and the maximum of the indeterminate penalty is reckoned from the medium
of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, accused-appellant must only suffer a minimum
indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to a maximum of three (3) years, six
(6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional.

In view of these considerations, this Court finds that accused-appellant is now entitled to  immediate release for
having fully served her sentence. In a Letter from Elsa Aquino-Albado, Officer-in-Charge of the Correctional
Institution for Women, dated October 15, 2016,51 she affirmed that accused-appellant has been confined
since February 10, 2014 until today. Evidently, she has been deprived of her liberty for a period well beyond
what the law has required, having already served her time for almost 4 years.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals July 30, 2015
Decision in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 06778 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

While this Court affirms that accused-appellant Belen Mejares y Valencia is GUILTY of the offense of qualified
theft, the prosecution failed to discharge the burden of proving the total value of the stolen articles through
reliable and independent evidence. Thus, pursuant to Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Republic Act No. 10951, and upon application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant is
sentenced to suffer only the minimum penalty of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto mayor to the
maximum penalty of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional.
Complainant Jacqueline Gavino is likewise no longer entitled to reparation.

However, given that accused-appellant has been confined for almost four (4) years already since February 10,
2014, she is now considered to have fully served her sentence and MUST BE IMMEDIATELY RELEASED, unless
she is being detained for a separate charge.

SO ORDERED.
16/61 G. R. No. 148233             June 8, 2004
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. LUISITO D. BUSTINERA, appellant.
DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
From the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 217, Quezon City finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft2 for the unlawful taking of a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, he comes to this Court on appeal.
In an information3 dated June 17, 1997, appellant was indicted as follows:
The undersigned accuses LUISITO D. BUSTINERA of the crime of Qualified Theft, committed as follows:
That on or about the 25th day of December up to the 9 th day of January, 1997, in Quezon
City, Philippines, the said accused being then employed as one [of] the taxi Drivers of Elias S.
Cipriano, an Operator of several taxi cabs with business address at corner 44 Commonwealth
Avenue, iliman (sic), this City, and as such has free access to the taxi he being driven, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with intent to gain, with grave abuse of
confidence reposed upon him by his employer and without the knowledge and consent of
the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away a Daewoo Racer GTE Taxi with Plate No. PWH-
266 worth ₱303,000.00, Philippine Currency, belonging to Elias S. Cipriano, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party in the amount of ₱303,000.00.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Upon arraignment4 on March 27, 2000, appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.
Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
From the evidence for the prosecution, the following version is established.
Sometime in 1996, Edwin Cipriano (Cipriano), who manages ESC Transport, the taxicab business of his father,
hired appellant as a taxi driver and assigned him to drive a Daewoo Racer with plate number PWH-266. It was
agreed that appellant would drive the taxi from 6:00 a.m. to 11:00 p.m, after which he would return it to ESC
Transport’s garage and remit the boundary fee in the amount of ₱780.00 per day. 5
On December 25, 1996, appellant admittedly reported for work and drove the taxi, but he did not return it on
the same day as he was supposed to.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, on December 25, 1996, did you report for work?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, since you reported for work, what are your duties and responsibilities as taxi driver of the taxi
company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi at night with the boundary.
Q: How much is your boundary?
A: ₱780.00, sir.
Q: On December 25, 1996, did you bring out any taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, when ever (sic) you bring out a taxi, what procedure [do] you follow with that company?
A: That we have to bring back the taxi to the company and before we leave we also sign something, sir.
Q: What is that something you mentioned?
A: On the record book and on the daily trip ticket, sir.
Q: You said that you have to return your taxi at the end of the day, what is then the procedure reflect
(sic) by your company when you return a taxi?
A: To remit the boundary and to sign the record book and daily trip ticket.
Q: So, when you return the taxi, you sign the record book?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You mentioned that on December 25, 1996, you brought out a taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What kind of taxi?
A: Daewoo taxi, sir.
Q: Now did you return the taxi on December 25, 1996?
A: I was not able to bring back the taxi because I was short of my boundary, sir. 6
The following day, December 26, 1996, Cipriano went to appellant’s house to ascertain why the taxi was not
returned.7 Arriving at appellant’s house, he did not find the taxi there, appellant’s wife telling him that her
husband had not yet arrived.8 Leaving nothing to chance, Cipriano went to the Commonwealth Avenue police
station and reported that his taxi was missing.9
On January 9, 1997, appellant’s wife went to the garage of ESC Transport and revealed that the taxi had been
abandoned in Regalado Street, Lagro, Quezon City.10 Cipriano lost no time in repairing to Regalado Street where
he recovered the taxi.11
Upon the other hand, while appellant does not deny that he did not return the taxi on December 25, 1996 as he
was short of the boundary fee, he claims that he did not abandon the taxi but actually returned it on January 5,
1997;12 and that on December 27, 1996, he gave the amount of ₱2,000.00 13 to his wife whom he instructed to
remit the same to Cipriano as payment of the boundary fee 14 and to tell the latter that he could not return the
taxi as he still had a balance thereof. 15
Appellant, however, admits that his wife informed him that when she went to the garage to remit the boundary
fee on the very same day (December 27, 1996), 16 Cipriano was already demanding the return of the taxi. 17
Appellant maintains though that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and signed the record book, 18 which
was company procedure, to show that he indeed returned it and gave his employer ₱2,500.00 19 as partial
payment for the boundary fee covering the period from December 25, 1996 to January 5, 1997.
Continuing, appellant claims that as he still had a balance in the boundary fee, he left his driver’s license with
Cipriano;20 that as he could not drive, which was the only work he had ever known, without his driver’s license,
and with the obligation to pay the balance of the boundary fee still lingering, his wife started working on
February 18, 1997 as a stay-in maid for Cipriano, with a monthly salary of ₱1,300.00, 21 until March 26, 1997 when
Cipriano told her that she had worked off the balance of his obligation; 22 and that with his obligation
extinguished, his driver’s license was returned to him. 23
Brushing aside appellant’s claim that he returned the taxi on January 5, 1997 and that he had in fact paid the
total amount of ₱4,500.00, the trial court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft by
Decision of May 17, 2001, the dispositive portion of which is quoted verbatim:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged,
and he is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and to pay the costs.
In the service of his sentence, accused is ordered credited with four-fifths ( 4/5) of the preventive
imprisonment undergone by him there being no showing that he agreed in writing to abide by the
same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis and italics in the original)
Hence, the present appeal anchored on the following assigned errors:
I.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONCLUDING WITHOUT CONCRETE BASIS THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT HAS INTENT TO GAIN WHEN HE FAILED TO RETURN THE TAXI TO ITS GARAGE.
II.
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT.25
It is settled that an appeal in a criminal proceeding throws the whole case open for review, and it becomes the
duty of the appellate court to correct such errors as may be found in the judgment even if they have not been
specifically assigned.26
Appellant was convicted of qualified theft under Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended for the
unlawful taking of a motor vehicle. However, Article 310 has been modified, with respect to certain vehicles,27 by
Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, otherwise known as "AN ACT PREVENTING AND PENALIZING CARNAPPING."
When statutes are in pari materia28 or when they relate to the same person or thing, or to the same class of
persons or things, or cover the same specific or particular subject matter, 29 or have the same purpose or
object,30 the rule dictates that they should be construed together – interpretare et concordare leges legibus, est
optimus interpretandi modus.31 Every statute must be so construed and harmonized with other statutes as to
form a uniform system of jurisprudence,32 as this Court explained in City of Naga v. Agna,33  viz:
. . . When statutes are in pari materia, the rule of statutory construction dictates that they should be
construed together. This is because enactments of the same legislature on the same subject matter are
supposed to form part of one uniform system; that later statutes are supplementary or complimentary
to the earlier enactments and in the passage of its acts the legislature is supposed to have in mind the
existing legislation on the same subject and to have enacted its new act with reference thereto. Having
thus in mind the previous statutes relating to the same subject matter, whenever the legislature enacts
a new law, it is deemed to have enacted the new provision in accordance with the legislative policy
embodied in those prior statutes unless there is an express repeal of the old and they all should be
construed together. In construing them the old statutes relating to the same subject matter should
be compared with the new provisions and if possible by reasonable construction, both should be so
construed that effect may be given to every provision of each. However, when the new provision and
the old relating to the same subject cannot be reconciled the former shall prevail as it is the latter
expression of the legislative will . . .34 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
The elements of the crime of theft as provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that there be
taking of personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with intent to
gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the taking be accomplished
without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things. 35
Theft is qualified when any of the following circumstances is present: (1) the theft is committed by a domestic
servant; (2) the theft is committed with grave abuse of confidence; (3) the property stolen is either a motor
vehicle, mail matter or large cattle; (4) the property stolen consists of coconuts taken from the premises of a
plantation; (5) the property stolen is fish taken from a fishpond or fishery; and (6) the property was taken on the
occasion of fire, earthquake, typhoon, volcanic eruption, or any other calamity, vehicular accident or civil
disturbance.36
On the other hand, Section 2 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended defines "carnapping" as "the taking, with
intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence
against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things." The elements of carnapping are thus: (1) the
taking of a motor vehicle which belongs to another; (2) the taking is without the consent of the owner or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or by using force upon things; and (3) the taking is done
with intent to gain.37
Carnapping is essentially the robbery or theft of a motorized vehicle, 38 the concept of unlawful taking in theft,
robbery and carnapping being the same.39
In the 2000 case of People v. Tan40 where the accused took a Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania41  which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of
motor vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
There is no arguing that the anti-carnapping law is a special law, different from the crime of robbery
and theft included in the Revised Penal Code. It particularly addresses the taking, with intent to gain,
of a motor vehicle belonging to another without the latter's consent, or by means of violence against or
intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. But a careful comparison of this special law with
the crimes of robbery and theft readily reveals their common features and characteristics, to wit:
unlawful taking, intent to gain, and that personal property belonging to another is taken without the
latter's consent. However, the anti-carnapping law particularly deals with the theft and robbery of
motor vehicles. Hence a motor vehicle is said to have been carnapped when it has been taken, with
intent to gain, without the owner's consent, whether the taking was done with or without the use of
force upon things. Without the anti-carnapping law, such unlawful taking of a motor vehicle would
fall within the purview of either theft or robbery which was certainly the case before the enactment
of said statute.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted.)
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it
excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as roadrollers, trolleys, street-sweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the
theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended and the provisions on robbery, respectively.43
From the foregoing, since appellant is being accused of the unlawful taking of a Daewoo sedan, it is the anti-
carnapping law and not the provisions of qualified theft which would apply as the said motor vehicle does not fall
within the exceptions mentioned in the anti-carnapping law.
The designation in the information of the offense committed by appellant as one for qualified theft
notwithstanding, appellant may still be convicted of the crime of carnapping. For while it is necessary that the
statutory designation be stated in the information, a mistake in the caption of an indictment in designating the
correct name of the offense is not a fatal defect as it is not the designation that is controlling but the facts
alleged in the information which determines the real nature of the crime. 44
In the case at bar, the information alleges that appellant, with intent to gain, took the taxi owned by Cipriano
without the latter’s consent.45 Thus, the indictment alleges every element of the crime of carnapping, 46 and the
prosecution proved the same.
Appellant’s appeal is thus bereft of merit.
That appellant brought out the taxi on December 25, 1996 and did not return it on the same day as he was
supposed to is admitted.47
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things; it is deemed complete from
the moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if he has no opportunity to dispose of the same. 48
While the nature of appellant’s possession of the taxi was initially lawful as he was hired as a taxi driver and was
entrusted possession thereof, his act of not returning it to its owner, which is contrary to company practice and
against the owner’s consent transformed the character of the possession into an unlawful one. 49 Appellant
himself admits that he was aware that his possession of the taxi was no longer with Cipriano’s consent as the
latter was already demanding its return.
Q: Also you said that during your direct testimony that when you gave your wife the ₱2,500.00, you
also told her to go to the company to ask the company for permission for you to use the taxi since you
were then still short of the boundary. Alright, after telling that to your wife and after seeing your wife
between December 27, 1996 and January 5, 1997, did you ask your wife what was the answer of the
company to that request of yours?
A: He did not allow me, sir, and he even [got] angry with me.
Q: So, when did you learn that the company was not agreeable to your making use of the taxicab
without first returning it to the company?
A: Before the new year, sir.
Q: When you said new year, you were referring to January 1, 1997?
A: Either December 29 or December 30, 1996, sir.
Q: So, are you telling us that even if you knew already that the company was not agreeable to your
making use of the taxicab continually (sic) without returning the same to the company, you still went
ahead and make (sic) use of it and returned it only on January 5, 1997.
A: Yes, sir.50 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Appellant assails the trial court’s conclusion that there was intent to gain with the mere taking of the taxi
without the owner’s consent. He maintains that his reason for failing to return the taxi was his inability to remit
the boundary fee, his earnings that day not having permitted it; and that there was no intent to gain since the
taking of the taxi was not permanent in character, he having returned it.
Appellant’s position does not persuade.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act, presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor
vehicle.51 Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the intent to gain. 52 The term "gain" is not
merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any other sense may be derived or
expected from the act which is performed. 53 Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without the
owner’s consent constitutes gain.54
In Villacorta v. Insurance Commission55 which was reiterated in Association of Baptists for World Evangelism, Inc.
v. Fieldmen’s Insurance Co, Inc.,56 Justice Claudio Teehankee (later Chief Justice), interpreting the theft clause of
an insurance policy, explained that, when one takes the motor vehicle of another without the latter’s
consent even if the motor vehicle is later returned, there is theft, there being intent to gain as the use of the
thing unlawfully taken constitutes gain:
Assuming, despite the totally inadequate evidence, that the taking was "temporary" and for a "joy
ride", the Court sustains as the better view57 that which holds that when a person, either with the
object of going to a certain place, or learning how to drive, or enjoying a free ride, takes possession of a
vehicle belonging to another, without the consent of its owner, he is guilty of theft because by taking
possession of the personal property belonging to another and using it, his intent to gain is evident
since he derives therefrom utility, satisfaction, enjoyment and pleasure. Justice Ramon C. Aquino
cites in his work Groizard who holds that the use of a thing constitutes gain and Cuello Calon who
calls it "hurt de uso."58 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citation omitted)
Besides, the trial court did not believe appellant’s claim that he in fact returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
The Court can not (sic) believe accused’s assertion that he returned the subject vehicle on January 5, 1997 to the
garage and that he had in fact paid the amount of ₱4,500.00 in partial payment of his unremitted "boundary" for
ten (10) days. He could not even be certain of the exact amount he allegedly paid the taxicab owner. On direct-
examination, he claimed that he paid Edwin Cipriano on December 27, 1996 the amount of ₱2,000.00 and it was
his wife who handed said amount to Cipriano, yet on cross-examination, he claimed that he gave ₱2,500.00 to
his wife on that date for payment to the taxicab owner. 59
The rule is well-entrenched that findings of fact of the trial court are accorded the highest degree of respect and
will not be disturbed on appeal absent any clear showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or
misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and significance which, if considered, would alter the result of
the case.60 The reason for the rule being that trial courts have the distinct advantage of having heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying or their conduct and behavior
during the trial.61
Other than his bare and self-serving allegations, appellant has not shown any scintilla of evidence that he indeed
returned the taxi on January 5, 1997.
Q: You said that you returned the taxi on January 5, 1997, correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Now, Mr. Witness, did you sign any record when you returned the taxi?
A: Yes, sir.
 Q: Do you have any copy of that record? accused-appellants is an indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years
A: They were the one (sic) in-charge of the record book and I even voluntarily left my driver’s license and 4 months, as maximum.67 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
with them, sir. Appellant being then culpable for carnapping under the first clause of Section 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as
Q: You said that you did not return the taxi because you were short of (sic) boundary, did you turn over amended, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years and 8 months, not more than 17
any money to your employer when you returned the taxi? years and 4 months,68 for, as discussed above, the provisions of the Revised Penal Code cannot be applied
A: I gave them [an] additional ₱2,500.00, sir. suppletorily and, therefore, the alleged aggravating circumstance of grave abuse of confidence cannot be
appreciated.
Q: At the time when you returned the taxi, how much was your short indebtedness (sic) or short
boundary (sic)? Applying Section 1 of Act No. 4103,69 as amended, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, if the
offense is punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the
A: I was short for ten (10) days, and I was able to pay ₱4,500.00.
maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed by said law and the minimum term shall not be less
Q: Do you have any receipt to show receipt of payment for this ₱4,500.00? than the minimum prescribed by the same – the penalty imposed being a range. 70
A: They were the ones having the record of my payment, and our agreement was that I have to pay WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 217, in Crim Case No. Q-97-71956,
the balance in installment.62 (Emphasis supplied) finding appellant Luisito D. Bustinera guilty beyond reasonable doubt of qualified theft, is REVERSED and SET
While appellant maintains that he signed on January 5, 1997 the record book indicating that he returned the taxi ASIDE, and another judgment entered in its place, finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
on the said date and paid Cipriano the amount of ₱4,500.00 as partial payment for the boundary fee, appellant carnapping under Republic Act No. 6539, as amended and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty of
did not produce the documentary evidence alluded to, to substantiate his claim. That such alleged record book is Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months, as minimum, to Seventeen (17) Years and Four (4) Months, as
in the possession of Cipriano did not prevent him from producing it as appellant has the right to have compulsory maximum.
process issued to secure the production of evidence on his behalf. 63 SO ORDERED.
The trial court having convicted appellant of qualified theft instead of carnapping, it erred in the imposition of
the penalty. While the information alleges that the crime was attended with grave abuse of confidence, the same
cannot be appreciated as the suppletory effect of the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in Article
10 of said Code, cannot be invoked when there is a legal impossibility of application, either by express provision
or by necessary implication.64
Moreover, when the penalties under the special law are different from and are without reference or relation to
those under the Revised Penal Code, there can be no suppletory effect of the rules, for the application of
penalties under the said Code or by other relevant statutory provisions are based on or applicable only to said
rules for felonies under the Code.65
Thus, in People v. Panida66 which involved the crime of carnapping and the penalty imposed was the
indeterminate sentence of 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 17 years and 4 months, as maximum, this
Court did not apply the provisions of the Revised Penal Code suppletorily as the anti-carnapping law provides for
its own penalties which are distinct and without reference to the said Code.
The charge being simple carnapping, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than 14 years
and 8 months and not more than 17 years and 4 months. There can be no suppletory effect of the
rules for the application of penalties under the Revised Penal Code or by other relevant statutory
provisions based on, or applicable only to, the rules for felonies under the Code. While it is true that
the penalty of 14 years and 8 months to 17 years and 4 months is virtually equivalent to the duration
of the medium period of reclusion temporal, such technical term under the Revised Penal Code is not
given to that penalty for carnapping. Besides, the other penalties for carnapping attended by the
qualifying circumstances stated in the law do not correspond to those in the Code. The rules on
penalties in the Code, therefore, cannot suppletorily apply to Republic Act No. 6539 and special laws of
the same formulation. For this reason, we hold that the proper penalty to be imposed on each of
17/62 G.R. No. 163437             February 13, 2008
ERNESTO PIDELI, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
ON appeal via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA),
affirming that2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Baguio City, convicting petitioner Ernesto Pideli of theft in the
amount of P49,500.00 belonging to his brother’s business partner. The appeal zeroes in on the questions of
ownership, unlawful taking and intent to gain. In short, is it estafa or theft?
The Facts
Sometime in March 1997, Placido Cancio (Placido) and Wilson Pideli (Wilson) entered into a verbal partnership
agreement to subcontract a rip-rapping and spillway project at Tongcalong, Tinongdan Dalupirip Road, Itogon,
Benguet. Placido and Wilson agreed to undertake the project in favor of ACL Construction (ACL), the contractor
awarded the development project by the Department of Public Works and Highways. 3
Petitioner Ernesto Pideli (petitioner), brother to Wilson and neighbor and friend to Placido, offered the duo the
use of his credit line with the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (MTFSH) in La Trinidad, Benguet. Petitioner
was an employee of the Provincial Planning and Development Office of Benguet, likewise based in La Trinidad.
With the said arrangement, Wilson and Placido, with the assistance of petitioner, were able to secure an
assortment of construction materials for the rip-rap and spillway contract. 4
On November 17, 1997, after the completion of the project, ACL summoned all its subcontractors to a meeting.
Placido, Wilson and petitioner were in attendance. At the meeting, ACL management informed Placido and
Wilson that the final payment for the work that they have done would be withheld. It was learned that they
failed to settle their accountabilities with the MTFSH. 5
Placido, Wilson and petitioner made representations with the accountable ACL personnel, a certain Boy Candido,
to facilitate the release of their payment. They assured Boy that the matter of the unpaid obligations to MTFSH
has been resolved. Boy acceded to the request and proceeded to release the final payment due to Placido and
Wilson, amounting to P222,732.00.6
Consequently, Placido, Wilson and petitioner computed their expenses and arrived at a net income
of P130,000.00. Placido, as partner, claimed one-half (1/2) or P65,000.00 of the net amount as his share in the
project. Petitioner, however, advised the two to first settle their accountabilities for the construction materials
taken from the hardware store. Placido and Wilson did as told and entrusted the full amount to petitioner, with
express instructions to pay MTFSH and deliver the remaining balance to them. 7
The following day, or on November 18, 1997, Placido attempted but failed to contact petitioner. He had hoped to
obtain his share of the partnership income. Placido got hold of petitioner the next morning. Unexpectedly,
petitioner informed Placido that nothing was left of the proceeds after paying off the supplier. 8 Despite repeated
demands, petitioner refused to give Placido his share in the net income of the contract. 9
Alarmed over the sudden turn of events, Placido lodged a complaint for theft against petitioner Ernesto Pideli.
Eventually, an Information bearing the following allegations was instituted against petitioner:
The undersigned accuses ERNESTO PIDELE (sic) of the crime of THEFT, committed as follows:
That on or about the 17th day of November, 1977, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent of gain (sic) and without the
knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
take, steal and carry away, cash money in the amount of P65,000.00, belonging to PLACIDO CANSIO
(sic) y TALUKTOK, to the damage and prejudice of the owner thereof in the aforementioned amount of
SIXTY-FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P65,000.00), Philippine Currency.
CONTRARY TO LAW.10
Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge. Then, trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence for the People portraying the foregoing facts was supplied by private complainant Placido, the lone
prosecution witness.
Petitioner’s defense founded on denial is summarized by the trial court as follows:
Ernesto Pideli, 43 years old, married, government employee and a resident of Km. 4, La Trinidad,
Benguet. He is a government employee at the Provincial Planning and Development Office, Capitol, La
Trinidad, Benguet. He was first employed at the Provincial Engineer’s Office on April 11, 1978.
Sometime in 1980, he was appointed as Project Development Officer of the Provincial Planning and
Development Office and continuously up to the present.
Wilson Pideli is his brother. In 1997, his brother Wilson had a construction project along Tinongdan,
Itogon, Benguet. His brother asked him if he knows of a hardware which can extend him credit for
construction materials. He approached the manager of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware, Mrs.
Editha Paayas, who then said that they could extend credit to his brother. As of 1997, his brother owed
the hardware the amount of P279,000.00 for the construction materials supplied by the hardware,
namely: reinforcement bars, cement, tire wires and other construction materials. This amount was paid
to the hardware by installment. The first installment was paid in June 1997 when the main contractor
paid his brother. His brother gave him P179,000.00 at his residence and he was the one who paid the
hardware which issued him a receipt (Exhibit 1-C). After the project was completed, his brother gave
him P100,000.00 on November 18, 1997 while he, his brother and Placido Cancio were at the Rose
Bowl Restaurant. He went to the hardware but the manager was not there. One of the staff then
informed him that the manager will still have to compute the interest of their loan credit and so he
deposited P75,000.00 which was covered by a receipt (Exhibit 1-B). Their account was finally computed
in December 1997 and so he paid their balance of P25,000.00. All in all, he paid the hardware the
amount of P279,000.00.
When his brother tendered to him the P100,000.00 at the Rose Bowl Restaurant, Placido Cancio was
also there discussing the expenses. The money which his brother got from the main contractor, Boy
Cupido, the partner of the late Engineer Lestino, was being held by his brother and not Placido Cancio.
The total cost of the materials taken by his brother from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply is P279,000.00. On
June 10, 1997, he paid the initial payment of P179,000.00 covered by Exhibit 1-C issued by the sales
boy Cris. The second partial payment was made on November 18, 1997 in the amount of P75,000.00
covered by Exhibit 1-B issued by Mrs. Editha Paayas. The last time that he paid was on December 18,
1997 in the amount of P25,000.00. This was not yet the full payment because according to Mrs. Paayas
she still has to compute for the interest. (TSN, May 2, 2000, pp. 19-20). Aside from the amount
 of P279,000.00 representing the materials taken by his brother, he still has an outstanding account
with Mt. Trail Farm Supply charged in his name. This is the reason why in the receipt it was noted as
part payment (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 21).
On cross-examination, Ernesto Pideli said that he was never a partner of his brother. It was only in
1997 that his brother sought his assistance to look for a hardware where he can buy construction
materials on credit. All materials ordered by Wilson for the project were placed in his account because
it was easier for the hardware to contact him at their office which is nearer. After the project in Itogon,
Wilson stopped his construction project. He denies having taken the P65,000.00. He does not also
know where the amount went (TSN, May 2, 2000, p. 18).
On redirect, he said that when he tendered the first payment of P179,000.00, a statement of account
was prepared by the salesboy of Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (Exhibit 1-D). He was furnished a
copy of the statement of account. After the first and second payment, other materials were obtained
by his brother, this is the reason why they still have a balance of P20,000.00 to be settled within the
hardware.11 (Underscoring supplied)
RTC and CA Dispositions
On March 13, 2001, the RTC handed down a judgment of conviction, disposing in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is
hereby rendered CONVICTING the accused of the crime of theft and hereby sentences him after
applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, to suffer imprisonment from 4 years of prision
correccional medium as minimum, to 12 years of prision mayor maximum as maximum (applying Art.
309(1) of the Revised Penal Code) and to reimburse the private complainant the amount of P49,500.00
plus interest thereon at the rate of 6% per annum from date of filing of the complaint up to the time it
is actually paid.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED.12
In convicting petitioner of theft, the trial court ratiocinated:
x x x Upon evaluation of the testimonies of the witnesses, the court finds the lone testimony of the
private complainant more credible than the testimony of the defense witnesses. The testimony of the
private complainant is positive and credible, sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of
corroboration. The testimony of defense witness Wilson Pideli was glaringly inconsistent and
contradictory on material points. At the initial stages of his (Wilson Pideli) testimony on direct
examination, he categorically stated that it was he and his laborers who implemented the project (rip
rap project along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet) awarded to him by ACL Construction. The private
complainant had no participation in the project (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 9-10). Later, in his
narration of what actually transpired between him, his brother Ernesto Pideli and private complainant
at the Rose Bowl Restaurant on November 17, 1997, he said that after computing their expenses, he
entrusted to the private complainant the following amounts: 1. P15,000.00 to be given by the private
complainant to the laborers who excavated for the project; 2. P500.00 to be given by the private
complainant to Mr. Apse as payment for the cement test; 3. P10,500.00 because he (private
complainant) was pestering him (TSN, October 18, 1999, pp. 14-16). The question is, if the private
complainant had no real participation in the project subject of this case, why would Wilson Pideli be
entrusting such amounts to the former. If really private complainant has no involvement whatsoever in
the project, why was he present at the: 1. Mido Restaurant where Josephine Bentres was disbursing
final payments to the subcontractors of the project, and 2. At the Rose Bowl Restaurant when the
Pideli brothers were computing the expenses incurred in the project and also presenting his list of
expenses (Exhibit B, Exhibit 2). Later, in his testimony on direct, Wilson Pideli said that when he started
the project, private complainant asked him to join him and he (Wilson Pideli) agreed provided the
private complainant share in the expenses. Private complainant did not, however, share in the
expenses nor did he provide any equipment (TSN, October 18, 1999; p. 13) yet he entrusted the
aforementioned amounts to Cancio. On cross-examination, Wilson Pideli admitted that he gave private
complainant P10,500.00 despite the fact that he did not share in the expenses for the implementation
of the project (TSN, November 22, 1999, pp. 5-6). Such act is abnormal and contrary to human
behavior and experience. The only plausible and logical conclusion is, private complainant and Wilson
Pideli were partners in a joint venture. Just as private complainant did, in fact, stated, he was the one
who provided the laborers and some equipments used in the project. Thus, it is only logical that the
money for the payment of the wages and the cement test were entrusted to him because it was his
responsibility/obligation to pay them and not because they were his neighbors as the defense would
like this court to believe. The reason propounded by Wilson Pideli to explain his actuations is too flimsy
for this court to believe. Furthermore, Wilson Pideli admitted on cross that while the case was filed by
private complainant against his brother Ernesto Pideli, he submitted an affidavit with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Baguio City. In Paragraph 1 of the said affidavit which was read into the records of
the case, he (Wilson Pideli) alleged that "Placido Cancio was his companion in the project at Dalupirip
Road, Itogon, Benguet which he subcontracted for ACL Construction." When asked by the Public
Prosecutor what he meant by his statement, Wilson Pideli categorically admitted that Placido Cancio
(the private complainant) is his partner in the endeavor along Dalupirip Road, Itogon, Benguet (TSN,
November 22, 1999, p. 8). The testimony of Wilson Pideli, instead of being corroborative, in effect,
weakened the cause of the defense. The rule is that witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered. It has
not been uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness
(People v. Gondora, 265 SCRA 408). Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the
quality of their testimonies (People v. Ferrer, 255 SCRA 190).
It is unfortunate that the evidence on record does not disclose the agreement between the private
complainant and Wilson Pideli with regards to the sharing of the capital (expenses) and profits on the
project. Article 1790 of the Civil Code, however, provides: "Unless there is stipulation to the contrary,
the partners shall contribute equal shares to the capital of the partnership." Paragraph 1 of Article
1797 of the same code further provides: "The losses and profits shall be distributed in conformity with
the agreement. If only the share of each partner in the profits has been agreed upon, the share of each
in the losses shall be in the same proportion." Thus, it is safe for the court to conclude that as a partner
in the joint venture, Placido Cancio is entitled to 1/2 share in the net proceeds, i.e. P130,000.00 + 2
= P65,000.00.
The accused insists that private complainant and his brother were not partners in the subcontract
project. According to him, he merely acted as guarantor of his brother so the latter can withdraw
construction materials on credit from the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware. As the guarantor, he
 was also the one who paid his brother’s credit when his brother was able to collect payment. Thus,
denying the charges filed against him. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, is a
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary value over the testimony of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters (People v.
Paragua, 257 SCRA 118). Affirmative testimony is stronger than a negative one. As between positive
and categorical testimony which has a ring of truth, on one hand, and a bare denial, on the other hand,
the former is generally held to prevail (People v. Tuvilla, 259 SCRA).
Finding the testimony of the private complainant to be more credible than that of the accused and his
witnesses, the court rules that the presumption of innocence guaranteed by law in favor of the accused
has been overturned and must be convicted of the crime charged.
Article 309(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides: Any person guilty of theft shall be
punished by:
"The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing
stolen is more than P12,000.00, but does not exceed P22,000.00; but if the value of the thing
stolen exceeds the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one
prescribed in this paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the
total of the penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, and
in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the
other provisions of the code the penalty shall be termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal,
as the case may be." x x x
The penalty imposed upon those guilty of theft depends on the amount stolen. Accused carted
away P65,000.00 representing private complainant’s share in the next proceeds of the project.
Accused’s brother, Wilson Pideli, however, gave the private complainant and this was admitted by the
latter the amount of P10,500.00 when the latter kept on pestering him at the Rose Bowl Restaurant
and P5,000.00 at the initial (first) payment. Thus, the amount of P10,500.00 and P5,000.00 should be
deducted from his net share of P65,000.00 leaving a balance of P49,500.00 which is now the basis for
the construction of the penalty.13 (Underscoring supplied)
Petitioner appealed to the CA. In a decision promulgated on April 30, 2003, the CA affirmed 14 the trial court
disposition.
Petitioner moved to reconsider the adverse judgment. The motion was, however, denied with finality through a
Resolution dated March 9, 2004.15
Issues
In this petition, petitioner imputes to the CA triple errors, viz.:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING THAT THE
PROPERTY ALLEGEDLY STOLEN WAS OWNED BY THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT;
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THERE WAS AN
UNLAWFUL TAKING OF PERSONAL PROPERTY;
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THAT THE ALLEGED TAKING BY
THE PETITIONER WAS ATTENDED WITH INTENT TO GAIN.16 (Underscoring supplied)
Our Ruling
Prefatorily, the thrust of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the resolution only of questions of
law.17 Any peripheral factual question addressed to this Court is beyond the ambit of this mode of
review.18 Indeed, well-entrenched is the general rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it
from the CA is limited to reviewing or revising errors of law. 19
The petition at bench raises not only questions of law but also of facts. We are asked to recalibrate the evidence
adduced by the parties and to reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. On this ground alone, the petition is
dismissible.
We, however, deem it proper to delve into the merits of the present petition considering that an appeal in a
criminal case throws the whole case wide open for review. 20
Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code provides for the concept of the crime of theft, viz.:
ART. 308. Who are liable for theft. – Theft is committed by any person who, with intent to gain but
without violence against or intimidation of persons nor force upon things, shall take personal property
of another without the latter’s consent. x x x
Accordingly, the elements of theft are as follows:
1. That there be taking of personal property;
2. That said property belongs to another;
3. That the taking be done with intent to gain;
4. That the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and
5. That the taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or
force upon things.21
There is, here, a confluence of the elements of theft. Petitioner received the final payment due the partners
Placido and Wilson under the pretext of paying off their obligation with the MTFSH. Under the terms of their
agreement, petitioner was to account for the remaining balance of the said funds and give each of the partners
their respective shares. He, however, failed to give private complainant Placido what was due him under the
construction contract.
In an effort to exculpate himself, petitioner posits that he cannot be held liable for theft of the unaccounted
funds. The monies subject matter of the complaint pertain to the partnership. As an agent of partner Wilson,
intent to gain cannot be imputed against petitioner.
The CA correctly debunked petitioner’s postulation in the following tenor:
We likewise find no merit in appellant’s contention that the money did not belong to the private
complainant as the latter was only claiming for his share of P65,000.00; that it was owned by the
partnership and was for payment of materials obtained from the supplier. Complainant’s share in the
amount of P65,000.00 manifestly belonged to and was owned by the private complainant .
Appellant’s argument that since the money belonged to the partnership, hence, cannot be the object
of the crime of theft as between the partners, and that appellant as their agent acted in good faith and
without intent to gain, holds no water. Parenthetically, this argument is inconsistent with the assertion
 of the defense witnesses that complainant had no participation at all in the project, and, hence, had no
right to a share in its payment. In any case, appellant was not complainant’s partner but his brother. As
for his alleged acting in good faith and without intent of gain, it is jurisprudentially settled that intent is
a mental state, the existence of which is made manifest by overt acts of the person. The intent to gain
is presumed from the taking of property appertaining to another.
Appellant presented a receipt dated November 18, 1997 allegedly evidencing his payment
of P75,000.000 to Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware store. Granting arguendo that appellant
paid P75,000.00 to the Mt. Trail Farm Supply and Hardware (which the trial court did not grant
credence), the same still does not exculpate him from liability. The net income earned and disbursed to
the partnership of private complainant and Wilson Pideli was P130,000.00 and a balance of P55,000.00
still remained despite the alleged payment, which should be divided into two (2) or P27,000.00 for
each of them. However, not a single centavo of this amount was received by private complainant.
When appellant received the disbursement, he had only physical custody of private complainant’s
money, which was supposed to be applied to a particular purpose, i.e. settle the account with the
supplier. Appellant’s failure to do so or to return the money to the private complainant renders him
guilty of the crime of theft. This is in line with the rulings of the Supreme Court in the case of United
States vs. De Vera, 43 Phil. 1000 (1929) that the delivery of money to another for a particular purpose
is a parting with its physical custody only, and the failure of the accused to apply the money to its
specific purpose and converting it to his own use gives rise to the crime of theft. The basic principles
enunciated in the De Vera case was reiterated in the recent case of People vs. Tan, 323 SCRA 30, an
Anti-Carnapping case, where the High Court ruled that the unlawful taking or deprivation may occur
after the transfer of physical possession and, in such a case, "the article (is considered as being) taken
away, not received, although at the beginning the article was, in fact, given and received." We agree
with the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) that appellant had but the material/physical or de
facto possession of the money and his act of depriving private complainant not only of the possession
but also the dominion (apoderamiento) of his share of the money such that he (the appellant) could
dispose of the money at will constitutes the element of "taking" in the crime of theft. 22 (Underscoring
supplied)
Although there is misappropriation of funds here, petitioner was correctly found guilty of theft. As early as U.S. v.
De Vera,23 the Court has consistently ruled that not all misappropriation is estafa. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino,
in his commentary on the Revised Penal Code, succinctly opined:
The principal distinction between the two crimes is that in theft the thing is taken while in estafa the
accused receives the property and converts it to his own use or benefit. However, there may be theft
even if the accused has possession of the property. If he was entrusted only with the material or
physical (natural) or de facto possession of the thing, his misappropriation of the same constitutes
theft, but if he has the juridical possession of the thing, his conversion of the same constitutes
embezzlement or estafa.24
In De Vera, the accused, Nieves de Vera, received from Pepe, an Igorot, a bar of gold weighing 559.7 grams for
the purpose of having a silversmith examine the same, and bank notes amounting to P200.00 to have them
exchanged for silver coins. Accused appropriated the bar of gold and bank notes. The Court ruled that the crime
committed was theft and not estafa since the delivery of the personal property did not have the effect of
transferring the juridical possession, thus such possession remained in the owner; and the act of disposal with
gainful intent and lack of owner’s consent constituted the crime of theft.
In People v. Trinidad,25 defendant received a finger ring from the offended party for the purpose of pledging it as
security for a loan of P5.00 for the benefit of said offended party. Instead of pledging the ring, the defendant
immediately carried it to one of her neighbors to whom she sold it for P30.00 and appropriated the money to her
own use. The Court, citing De Vera, similarly convicted defendant of theft.
In People v. Locson,26 this Court considered deposits received by a teller in behalf of a bank as being only in the
material possession of the teller. This interpretation applies with equal force to money received by a bank teller
at the beginning of a business day for the purpose of servicing withdrawals. Such is only material possession.
Juridical possession remains with the bank. In line with the reasoning of the Court in the above-cited cases,
beginning with People v. De Vera, if the teller appropriates the money for personal gain then the felony
committed is theft and not estafa. Further, since the teller occupies a position of confidence, and the bank places
money in the teller’s possession due to the confidence reposed on the teller, the felony of qualified theft would
be committed.
In People v. Isaac,27 this Court convicted a jeepney driver of theft and not estafa when he did not return the
jeepney to its owner since the motor vehicle was in the juridical possession of its owner, although physically held
by the driver. The Court reasoned that the accused was not a lessee or hirer of the jeepney because the Public
Service Law and its regulations prohibit a motor vehicle operator from entering into any kind of contract with
any person if by the terms thereof it allows the use and operation of all or any of his equipment under a fixed
rental basis. The contract with the accused being under the "boundary system," legally, the accused was not a
lessee but only an employee of the owner. Thus, the accused’s possession of the vehicle was only an extension of
the owner’s.
The doctrine was reiterated in the recent case of Roque v. People.28
Now, on the penalty. Article 309 of the Revised Penal Code penalizes theft in the following tenor:
Art. 309. Penalties. – Any person guilty of theft shall be punished by:
1. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the thing stolen is
more than 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; but if the value of the thing stolen exceed
the latter amount, the penalty shall be the maximum period of the one prescribed in this
paragraph, and one year for each additional ten thousand pesos, but the total of the penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. 29 (Underscoring supplied)
The record bears out that private complainant originally claimed P65,000.00 as his share in the partnership.
However, he admitted receiving the total amount of P15,500.00, on two separate occasions, from Wilson Pideli.
Verily, only P49,500.00 is due private complainant.
Hence, the imposable penalty is the maximum period of prision mayor minimum and medium prescribed in the
abovequoted first paragraph of Article 309. That period ranges from six (6) years and one (1) day to ten (10)
years, plus one (1) year for every additional ten thousand pesos in excess of P22,000.00, which in this case is two
(2) years for the excess amount of P27,500.00.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term could be twelve (12) years while the minimum
term would fall under the next lower penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (2
years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years), to be imposed in any of its periods.
Both the trial court and the CA sentenced petitioner to an indeterminate penalty of four (4) years of prision
correccional medium, as minimum term, to twelve (12) years of prision mayor maximum, as maximum term. We
sustain it. Petitioner’s civil liability is likewise maintained.
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.