Bar On2018 PDF

The Radical Right and Nationalism
Oxford Handbooks Online

Tamir Bar-On
The Oxford Handbook of the Radical Right
Edited by Jens Rydgren
Print Publication Date: Apr 2018 Subject: Sociology, Political Sociology

Online Publication Date: Feb 2018 DOI: 10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.2
Abstract and Keywords
This chapter argues that nationalism is the master concept of the radical right. It posits
that the radical right’s nationalism is different from that of the mainstream right in its
radicalism (or far-reaching and fundamental nature), its obsession with the dominance of
the main ethnic group, and its longing for homogeneous nations and states. In addition,
this nationalism is often populist in tone; it is indebted to direct rather than
representative variants of democracy; and in some cases it is ambiguous about its
relationship to fascism, Nazism, collaborationist regimes, or the Holocaust. In short,
without ethnic nationalism as its master concept, the radical right’s thinkers, political
parties, and movements would lack a stable anchor.
Keywords: radical right, nationalism, master concept, mainstream right, populism, master frame
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date: 24 June 2018

SINCE the 1990s, we have seen the explosion of electorally successful radical right-wing
political parties and movements in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. De Lange
(2012, 173, 192) trenchantly highlights how in the 1990s and the new millennium these
parties joined coalition governments in Austria, Denmark, Estonia, Italy, the Netherlands,
Norway, Poland, Romania, and Slovakia. Rydgren (2007) notes that these political parties
have also made inroads in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand. Moreover, there are
successful radical right-wing parties in countries as diverse as Israel, Japan, Russia, and
Turkey.
This chapter will explore the relationship between the contemporary radical right and
nationalism. In this respect, it is important to stress that the radical right includes
political parties, social movements, Internet sites, radio stations, intellectuals, and think
tanks, all of which promote nationalistic or ultra-nationalistic discourses. While I focus
especially on the political parties of the radical right, I agree with Rydgren (2007) that the
relationships between political parties and non-party movements and think tanks of the
radical right are seldom explored in the literature. In previous works I examined the ways
in which French nouvelle droite (ND, or New Right) intellectuals such as Alain de Benoist
have provided ideological ammunition for the radical right-wing populist parties,
including the notions of radical ethnopluralism and the “right to difference” for peoples
and nations against the steamrollers of capitalist globalization, Americanization, state
homogenization, multiculturalism, and the European Union (EU) (Bar-On 2007, 165–176;
2013, 212–226).
In this chapter, I argue that nationalism is the master concept of the radical right. I
borrow the notion of “master concept” from Dan Stone (2013) to connote the main
animating feature of any movement or political party. Rydgren (2004, 475) uses a slightly
different term, arguing that radical right-wing populist parties’ “master frame” is the
combination of ethnonationalist xenophobia and anti-political-establishment populism.
Stone (2013, 111) suggests that “when one examines the cultural politics of the (p. 18)
radical right fascism is not the master concept.” I posit that the radical right’s
nationalism is different from that of the mainstream right in its radicalism (or far-
reaching and fundamental nature), its obsession with the dominance of the main ethnic
group, and its longing for the erection of homogeneous nations and states. In addition,
this nationalism is often populist in tone; it is indebted to direct rather than
representative variants of democracy; and in some cases, it is ambiguous about its
relationship to fascism, Nazism, collaborationist regimes, or the Holocaust. In short,
without ethnic nationalism, the master concept of the radical right, its thinkers, its
political parties, and its movements would lack a stable anchor.
As the radical right’s understanding of nationalism is ethnically driven, it privileges

ethnic variants of nationalism as opposed to more liberal, civic variants (Kohn 2008, 574).
As we shall see, ethnic nationalism is the savior of the radical right, its daily oxygen, and
—without any disrespect to Christianity—its Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. Without ethnic
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nationalism, the radical right would be deprived of its principal arguments in respect to
the following issues:
1. Threats to cultural and national identity and even ethnic survival stemming from
capitalist globalization, Americanization, terrorism, and especially pro-immigration
“demographic swamping” and cultural ghettos created through the growing
presence of nonwhite and Muslim immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers.
Williams (2006, 4–5) remarks that radical right parties have moved away from
mainstream material concerns: “What people fear perhaps more than the economic
conditions that confront them is the loss of their identity. It is not that people do not
fear poor conditions, but perhaps that they view these as more easily reversed than
loss of identity, culture, and values.” Betz (1993, 417) points out that the French
Front National (FN) and the Belgian Vlaams Belang (VB, Flemish Interest; formerly
Vlaams Blok), as well as the Austrian Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs (FPÖ, Freedom
Party of Austria), were the first radical right parties “to draw a connection between
falling birthrates and foreign immigration.” As one FN propaganda pamphlet stated,
immigration “threatens the survival of the French nation, the security of its territory,
the integrity of its patrimony, its culture, its language” (quoted in Betz 1993, 417).
2. The ways established national political parties and the EU “collude” to create a
permissive immigration regime and support multiculturalism, which leads to the
“destruction” of the nation and ultimately a “one-world civilization” (Faye 1981,
2000). Umberto Bossi, the leader of the Lega Nord (LN, Northern League), accused
the mainstream parties of wanting to turn Italy into a “multiracial, multiethnic and
multireligious society” that “comes closer to hell than to paradise” (quoted in Betz
1993, 417). As Pelinka (2013, 8) argues, “Right-wing populism sees multiculturalism
as a recipe to denationalize one’s (own) nation, to deconstruct one’s (own) people.”
Fennema (2004, 3) insists that “the only programmatic issue all radical right parties
have in common is their resentment against immigrants and against the immigration
policies of their government.” Against the mainstream (p. 19) right and left, the
radical right aims to instill its supporters with radical nationalist fervor as well as
profound pride in the accomplishments of the national past. It also seeks to
concretely overturn a policy of open borders for immigrants and refugees, and to
replace multiculturalism with monoculturalism.
3. How various EU states spend too much money on a welfare state designed for
immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers at the expense of “original” European
nationals. Thus, the radical right promotes national preference in citizenship,
government jobs, corporate support, and welfare benefits. As Kitschelt (2007, 1199)
argues, “the generosity of the welfare state” oils the immigration issue and “helps to
boost radical right-wing party support.” The radical right’s “anti-welfarism” is rooted
in “a populist mistrust of elites, directed even at leaders of leftist parties, and a
generalized rejection of intermediary representations in favor of plebisicitarian
politics” (Kitschelt 2007, 1184). Thus, in order to bypass “elitist” parliaments, the
radical right proposes referenda on the welfare state, immigration, multiculturalism,
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the EU and its treaties, and a number of other issues. In this way, by consulting the
people, the nation would be better represented.
4. The ways in which allotment of government jobs, citizenship laws, state support
for corporations, or educational curricula discriminate against nationals and favor
“foreigners.” As a result, the radical right longs for ethnocracies, or the political,
economic, legal, and cultural dominance of titular European ethnic groups in all
realms of the state and society, which challenges the pluralistic values of liberal
democracy (Betz 2005; Bar-On 2013, 138).
5. The linkages between rampant criminality, the breakdown of law and order, and
unemployment (of European nationals) and an excess of foreigners. During the 1984
European elections, the French FN used the slogan “Two million immigrants are the
cause of two million French people out of work” (quoted in Chebel d’Appollonia
2012, 241).
6. The dangers of the EU in relation to national sovereignty, the “impotence” of
national parliaments, and the lack of popular, democratic participation. In studying
the positions of radical right parties in respect to the EU, Rodriguez-Aguilera de Prat
(2013, 14) argues that unlike the radical left, which focuses on the anti-worker,
neoliberal, and pro-big-business nature of the EU, “the ideological and programmatic
centrality of the doctrine of national sovereignty” unites the radical right parties. In
addition, ethnic or religious differences, minority rights, immigration,
multiculturalism, immigrants, refugees, and the EU are viewed as anti-democratic
and contrary to the will of the dominant ethnic majority, as a threat to the existence
of homogeneous nations and sovereign states, and as steps toward a universal,
“totalitarian” world order in which equality and cultural sameness reign (Griffin
2000). As Mudde (2010, 1169) explains, the radical right embraces “monism,” or “the
tendency to treat cleavages and ambivalence as illegitimate.” As a result, the radical
right challenges pluralism within the nation and constitutional limits on popular
sovereignty. The principal aim of the radical right is to restore national sovereignty
through the establishment of ethnically and culturally (p. 20) homogeneous nations
and states, which would restore European nations to the glories of their pasts. In
some cases, nationalist pride leads to ambiguity about fascism, Nazism, or
collaborationist regimes. Yet while the radical right shares with the fascists of the
past a preference for ethnic nationalism, they do not openly reject parliamentary
democracy like their interwar-era fascist counterparts (Fennema 2004, 11).
7. The penchant for conspiracies, scapegoats, and “the politics of fear” (Fennema
2004, 10–12; Wodak 2015) directed against “enemies,” whether internal (e.g.,
liberals, socialists, Muslims, Jews, Rom, etc.) or external (e.g., Zionists, the EU, the
United States, capitalism, etc.). Ultimately, the radical right wants to make the
boundaries of the state equivalent with those of the titular and dominant ethnic
group (Mudde 2007), as well as to cleanse the nation of these internal and external
“enemies.”
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The purpose of this chapter is fivefold. First, I define both nationalism and the radical
right. Second, I demonstrate how a general consensus exists in the literature that ethnic
nationalism is the master concept for the radical right. Despite this consensus, the
discourses changes of the radical right are significant in relation to nationalism, including
the belief in radical ethnopluralism and a tendency toward pan-Europeanism (Bar-On
2013). Third, I explore the discourses of movements and political parties of the radical
right in relation to nationalism, focusing on immigration—the bread and butter of the
contemporary radical right. Fourth, I highlight both similarities and important differences
among the ethnic nationalisms of the radical right in Western, Central, and Eastern
Europe. In the conclusion, I suggest areas of opportunity for researchers studying the
radical right and nationalism.
Defining Nationalism
Nationalism, writes Roger Griffin (2003, 152), “has an aura of antiquity about it, even of
the pre-historical.” Yet Gellner (1983) and Anderson (1983) are united in their belief that
the various types of nationalisms, as well as the nation-states that are based on them, are
distinctively modern (Griffin 2003, 152). For Kohn (2008), nationalism is a modern idea
with ancient roots. While it is based on the unity of strangers linked through an
“imagined community” (Anderson 1983), nationalism is a form of group solidarity based
on a number of shared characteristics, including common language, common traditions,
common territory, and attachment to the native soil, and it finds its highest expression in
the destiny of the nation and a sovereign state (Kohn 2008, 18–19). For Gellner (1983, 1),
nationalism is “primarily a political principle that holds that the political and the national
unit should be congruent.” Or as Mudde (2010, 1173) puts it, “The idea of the nation-state
holds that each nation should have its own state and, although this is often left implicit,
each state should have only one nation.” For ethnic nationalists (p. 21) of the radical
right, this principle is sacred because the nation can achieve its destiny only through a
state that represents and ultimately favors the dominant ethnic group. To advance a
liberal multicultural perspective is to be a “traitor” to one’s people and the single nation,
argue ethnic nationalists.
Griffin (2003, 154) defines nationalism as “the sense of belonging to and serving a
perceived national community.” For the radical right, “serving a perceived national
community” means first serving the “French French,” “Hungarian Hungarians,” or “true
Finns,” as well as excluding non-dominant groups from the political community.
Moreover, Griffin (2003, 154–155) highlights five other characteristics of nationalism:
1. The belief that the nation possesses a distinctive cultural identity, which makes it
unique from other nations and gives it a special historical mission.
2. The belief that the nation has a unique set of constitutional, historical,
geographical, religious, linguistic, ethnic, and/or genetic realities.
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3. Pride in national culture and traditions.

4. The belief that the national community should form a state in which sovereignty
resides in the people and the state is recognized by the international community.
5. Both civic and ethnic forms, with the latter prone to chauvinism, ethnocentrism,
xenophobia, racism, or in extreme cases, genocide. The radical right rejects liberal
or civic nationalism and supports ethnic nationalism. It favors “natives” above
foreigners in society and the state. It complains that the “true racism” is the liberal
state’s pro-immigration, pro-minority, and pro-multiculturalism regime, which
“discriminates” against “natives.” Buštíková (2014, 1739, 1758) claims that radical
right parties aim to reverse the political gains of minorities, and she cites Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Lebanon, and Switzerland, where popular discontent has been
generated by an excess of accommodation for minorities.
Like Griffin, Kohn (2008, 574) distinguishes between ethnic and civic variants of
nationalism. Ethnic nationalists valorize tribal solidarity, an emotional and mystical
connection to an idealized past, and national development. In contrast, civic nationalism
focuses on liberal universalism, rationality, individual rights and self-transcendence, and a
community of numerous sovereign states living in harmony. This latter type of nationalism
is, in theory, more cosmopolitan and colorless than ethnic nationalism and based on
shared republican values. This distinction between ethnic and civic variants of
nationalism is fundamental because it separates the radical right from the mainstream
right. Civic nationalists stress the unity of all social and ethnic groups born on the
national territory. In theory, they provide members of dominant and non-dominant ethnic
groups with access to citizenship, welfare benefits, and government jobs. In contrast,
ethnic nationalists promote national preference, which allows the state to privilege
nationals or “pure nationals” above non-nationals. Ethnic nationalists long for a
homogeneous state cleansed of minority ethnic, cultural, religious, or biological
differences. (p. 22)
For ethnic nationalists, “dangerous others” (e.g., immigrants, Muslims, or Jews), who are
supposedly outside of the nation, must be removed from the body politic (Albertazzi and
McDonnell 2008). Whereas civic nationalists are united by merit and shared liberal
values, ethnic nationalists appeal to the mists of history, blood origins, and homogeneous
cultural roots. It is thus no accident that the radical right advances an ethnic variant of
nationalism, or a “specific, Manichean, form of nationalism, which emphasizes the
antagonistic relationship between the Good nation and Evil outsiders” (Rooduijn 2014,
80). In practice, this means that ethnic nationalists of the radical right are more radical in
their immigration and asylum policies than civic or “moderate nationalists,” preferring a
full halt to immigration from non-Western or Muslim countries; citizenship based
exclusively on jus sanguinis (right of blood); a complete end to worker immigration,
asylum, and family reunion programs; zero tolerance for those who entered the country
illegally; a drastic curtailing of permanent residency in order to protect the “nation” from
decay; and the interrogation of dual nationals as threats to the “nation” and national
identity (Akkerman and Rooduijn 2015, 1141). Radical right parties also demand cultural
assimilation, tests of loyalty to the nation, civic education, extensive knowledge of the
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language, culture, and history of the country, and a commitment to the dominant cultural
and political values (Jacobs and Rea 2007). Countries with stronger radical right parties
“help to reduce immigration, whether by making conventional parties in government
tighten immigration laws and/or by generating a political climate that makes potential
immigrants move elsewhere” (Kitschelt 2007, 1199). Importantly, established politicians
in power, from former French president Nicolas Sarkozy to a former British Prime
Minister (David Cameron) to German chancellor Angela Merkel, have questioned the
merits of multiculturalism because it supposedly creates ethnic ghettos, encourages the
rise of radical Islamists predisposed toward a “clash of civilizations,” and provokes
charges of dual loyalty, thus co-opting the message of the radical right (Bar-On 2013, 45).
The Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (known as Jobbik; Movement for a Better

Hungary) and other radical right parties promote an ethnic variant of nationalism based
on “monuments and graveyards, even harking back to the mysteries of ancient times and
of tribal solidarity” (Kohn 2008, 574). Gábor Vona, the Jobbik party leader, once stated
that “we [Hungarians] are the descendants of Attila” (quoted in Kovács 2013, 227). Geert
Wilders, the leader of the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV, Party for Freedom), could
invoke the metaphor of the fall of the Roman Empire in relation to the West’s support for
immigration and multiculturalism: “They did not perceive the immigration of the
Barbarians as a threat until it was too late” (quoted in Wodak 2013, 31).
Despite this opposition between civic and ethnic variants of nationalism, Calhoun (2008,
xii) warned that we should not be “too complacent” and posit a simplistic dichotomy
between our “good” liberal nationalism in the West and “bad” ethnic nationalism in
Russia or Hungary today. We might also ask why we continue to base our political
communities on nationalist distinctions between “us” and “them,” which unites ethnic
and civic variants of nationalism. We underestimate how even civic liberal forms of
nationalism, which have their origins in the American and French Revolutions, are
(p. 23) in part based on ethnic forms of belonging rather than merely commitment to
shared liberal ideals, values, and constitutional principles (Bar-On 2014, 2). Moreover,
Billig (1995, 6) uses the term “banal nationalism” to refer to “ideological habits which
enable the established nations of the West to be reproduced.” The celebration of national
holidays, which is an expression of “banal nationalism,” thus unites civic and ethnic
supporters of nationalism.
Changes toward more restrictive citizenship laws and citizenship tests, as well as inviting
radical right parties into national coalitions, point to the ways in which liberal and civic
variants of nationalism can converge in practice. Vasilopoulou (2013) demonstrates that
electorally successful radical right parties (e.g., the Swiss Schweizerische Volkspartei
[SVP, Swiss People’s Party], the Dutch Pim Fortuyn List and PVV, and the French FN)
have oscillated between ethnic and civic variants of nationalism, sometimes arguing in a
civic vein that they are the true defenders of the nation’s tolerant and democratic values.
Zaslove (2004, 99) noted that “the Freedom Party and the Lega Nord have been
instrumental in passing more restrictive immigration policy, limiting the flow of
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immigrants and the ability of non-EU labour to live, work or settle in either Austria or
Italy.”
Mudde (2010) argues that sometimes there are more “dangers” to the health of
democracies from the mainstream than from the radical right. Bale (2008, 12) insists that
the mainstream right is more responsible than the radical right for a rising anti-
immigrant tide, suggesting that they adopted stricter immigration policies in some
countries. This is the case with the ruling Fidesz party in Hungary, which has become a
“prisoner” to the “illiberal” rhetoric of the radical right (Pytlas 2016). In 2015, Hungarian
prime minister Viktor Orbán called for internment camps for illegal immigrants. At a
summer university camp, he argued that Hungary and Europe were fighting for “the
survival or extinction of European values” and stated that he wanted “to preserve
Hungary as a Hungarian country” (Mudde 2016). Yet in official Fidesz election
manifestos, the party refrains from such overtly radical right discourses (Mudde 2016).
While its anti-Semitism is not as obsessive as Jobbik’s, some of its members of parliament
have resurrected anti-Semitic tropes about “anti-national” elements and “Jewish financial
control” of Hungary (Rensmann 2013, 227). These examples lead us to reflect on the
ways in which the mainstream is influenced by the radical right, or how the radical right
informs the ideals and policies of the mainstream. In this respect, Fidesz is often
classified as mainstream, conservative right and Jobbik as radical right, but perhaps this
approach needs some reassessment.
Defining the Radical Right: A Radical Right

Family?
The term “radical right” was used by Daniel Bell (2008) in an edited volume in 1955.
Bell’s object of study was the radical right in the United States, which was distinguished
(p. 24) by its vociferous opposition to domestic and international communism and
rejection of the pro-welfare-state politics of the New Deal. In the context of the Cold War,
the U.S. radical right tended toward McCarthyism—an obsessive, dogmatic, and surreal
search for communist enemies of the nation. Bell’s analysis could apply to many
contemporary European radical right parties: their anti-communism, nationalism, and
fear of the excesses of the welfare state. In an age of “communism in ruins,” the radical
right’s anti-communism still exists, although today immigrants and Muslims are often
viewed as the primary threats to the nation.
A literature emerged in the 1990s arguing that a radical right populist family existed. The
French FN was inspired by the neofascist Movimento Sociale Italiano (MSI, Italian Social
Movement) (Ignazi 2006), and in turn the Belgian Vlaams Belang engaged in “copying not
just the posters but even whole programmes” of the FN (Mudde 2010, 1180). Mudde
(2002, 2) noted that the concept of “the party family” is often constructed ideologically.
Von Beyme (1985) highlighted nine ideological or “spiritual families,” which included
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regional and ethnic parties and right-wing extremist parties. Rydgren (2005) opined that
the radical right parties embraced a new “master frame” in the 1980s and 1990s, which
led to more respectable profiles and the dropping of overt racism, anti-Semitism, and
anti-democratic tendencies. Yet, as Akkerman and Rooduijn (2015, 1141) argued, leaders
of parties with neofascist subcultures were unwilling to, or could not always, distance
themselves from overt fascist and Nazi symbolism or anti-Semitism. Eatwell (1996, 174)
made a crucial distinction between “esoteric and exoteric appeal” related to the radical
right and its supporters, with the former limited to “closed circles” and the latter
connoting what is “considered wise to say in public.”
Scholars do not agree on this “new consensus” or even on basic terminology in respect to
the radical right. So, for example, Mudde (2007) uses the term “populist radical right,”
while Carter (2005) prefers “extreme right.” For Carter, parties are radical right if (1)
they are nationalistic in a xenophobic way, (2) they are racist or culturally conformist, and
(3) they reject liberal democracy or call for its restriction or expansion (Kitschelt 2007,
1178). There are disagreements about which parties to include under the ambit of the
radical right, such as the Italian MSI, which was deeply indebted to its fascist past and
later made a transition to “post-fascism” and national coalition government under a new
name in 1995, Alleanza Nazionale (AN, National Alliance). Art (2011) argues that the
Austrian Freedom Party only became a radical right party after Jörg Haider captured
control of the party in 1986, while Rydgren (2004) explains that the Progress Parties in
Denmark and Norway only joined the radical right family after they adopted the anti-
immigrant issue in the 1980s.
Moreover, the radical right populist party literature is rather Eurocentric, focusing on
parties in Europe and especially Western Europe. Kitschelt (2007, 1198) notes that Norris
(2005) and Mudde (2007) include Central and Eastern European countries in their
analysis of the radical right, although “they are often not sufficiently sensitive to these
contextual differences between regions and types of political economies.” In countries
such as Russia or Romania, former communists appeal to the same constituency as
radical right parties (Kitschelt 2007, 1198), which means that we should examine (p. 25)
both the radical left and radical right. Furthermore, there is little research on the right or
radical right in the Americas outside of the United States and Canada, in Africa, and in
Asia. As intellectuals in Latin America are largely left-wing, they identify more with
research about the left, the people, social movements, and indigenous peoples. Yet Latin
American intellectuals err in not studying the right because of its importance and
resilience in the region, including its connections to the military, conservative and
neoliberal parties, ultra-Catholic circles, business elites, and even drug cartels (Luna and
Rovira Kaltwasser 2014).
While radical right populist parties such as the FN under Marine Le Pen argued that they
were a “mass” or “popular” party (Fourest and Venner 2011, 75), Betz (1994, 4) posited
that such parties combined radical right-wing and populist ideals: they are “right-wing”
because they reject political projects that sought to attain individual and social equality,
they are radical because they oppose the “established socio-cultural and social-political
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system,” and they are populist since they appeal to “the superior common sense” of the
“common man.” Mudde (2007) highlighted three characteristics of what he termed the
“populist radical right” parties: (1) nativism, or the defense of the privileges of a
homogeneous native population against immigrants; (2) authoritarianism, or the belief in
strong leadership and a strong state, and (3) a pronounced populism, or a strong anti-
establishment stance, disdain for established parties, and a valorization of the “little man
on the street” against the political, economic, and cultural elites.
Yet in an earlier work, Mudde (1995, 206) noted that scholars of the “extreme right” and
“radical right” could not agree on core concepts, while nationalism, racism, xenophobia,
anti-democracy, and the strong state tended to repeat as core concepts in the literature.
This point is significant, as I argue that ethnic nationalism is the master concept of the
radical right. Racism, xenophobia, and a strong state are tools used by the radical right in
order to advance an ethnic conception of the nation and nationalism. While some radical
right outfits are more critical and dismissive of democracy, most of the radical right today
is not against democracy per se. Rather, they are against liberal variants of democracy,
which hinder the emergence of the “true democracy” wedded to the homogeneous nation.
In terms of the relationship between the radical right and nationalism, Mudde (2007, 18–
24) holds that nativism is the key factor linking all “populist radical right” parties. This
nativism, argues Mudde, is based on “the belief that states should be inhabited
exclusively [emphasis added] by members of the ‘native’ group,” while “non-native
elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-
state.” What Mudde calls “nativism” is what I have in mind with the term “ethnic
nationalism.” In short, nativism or ethnic nationalism is what ideologically drives the
radical right. It is the master concept fueling the ideals of the radical right. Furthermore,
for Mudde (2010, 1181), this nativism should not be viewed as a “normal pathology,” but
rather is a “pathological normalcy” and “a radicalisation of mainstream values.” It should
be noted that this nativism can, on occasion, lead to a defense of the West, Europe,
Christianity (or sometimes the Judeo-Christian tradition), humanism, or secular values—
insofar as they are presented as “authentic native culture” (Zúquete 2008). “Denmark
belongs to (p. 26) the Danes. . . . A multiethnic Denmark would mean the breaking down
of our stable homogeneous society by anti-development and reactionary cultures,” stated
the Dansk Folkeparti (DF, Danish People’s Party) in its 2007 Work Program (Fryklund
2013, 267). The radical right targets non-Europeans, Africans, Muslims, immigrants,
refugees, and asylum seekers as the carriers of non-nativist values and cultures.
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The Master Concept: Ethnic Nationalism

In this section, I suggest that ethnic nationalism, or what Mudde dubs “nativism,” is the
master concept for the radical right. Recall that Kohn made the distinction between
ethnic and civic variants of nationalism, while Griffin insisted that with ethnic variants of
nationalism, common stances include chauvinism, ethnocentrism, and xenophobia. Or as
Dunn (2015, 369) writes, “An ethnic/cultural conceptualization of nationalism largely
follows from a ‘primordial’ belief regarding the nature of the nation—the belief that
nations have existed since the dawn of human history. This sense of nationalism is narrow,
traditional and unchanging.” For the radical right, ethnic nationalism, or what Dunn dubs
“exclusive nationalism,” connotes that the national borders and the state should be
equivalent with the dominant ethnic group; that national preference should be promoted;
the homogeneous nation is idealized; that ethnocracies are longed for; and that “enemy
Others” constantly threaten to tear the nation asunder and hence should be removed
from the body politic. For the nation to be free, sovereign, and whole, the state must be
cleansed of non-nativist influences and cultures. Remember that immigrants, asylum
seekers, and Muslims (and at times Jews or Rom) are viewed by the radical right as
mortal dangers to the nation, more lethal than guns.
Some of the literature on nationalism suggests that ethnic nationalists of the radical right
are “nationalists” and civic nationalists are merely “patriots.” This position is best
exemplified by Blank and Schmidt (2003, 305):
Nationalism supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and idealized

excessive valuation of one’s own nation, whereas patriotism supports
heterogeneous structures within the society and a critical distance to the state
and the regime. They are linked to different attitudes toward objects that are
strange and different: Nationalism leads to the denigration of such outgroups and
minorities, whereas patriotism strengthens tolerance toward such groups.
While ethnic nationalism is shared by most of the radical right, there are some minor
exceptions. As different lefts and rights mutate over time, some elements of the radical
right have increasingly stressed regionalism and pan-Europeanism. In fact, the ideal
European community for French nouvelle droite leader Alain de Benoist is “hundreds of
independent regions” (i.e., a “Europe of a hundred flags”) under the ambit of a sovereign,
(p. 27) “respiritualized, secular, hierarchical, pan-European framework” (Bar-On 2008,
339). For most of the radical right, the notion of a “Europe of a hundred flags” challenges
the sanctity of the nation and state borders. It would lead to the creation of more
European states, including for the Basques, Bretons, and Kosovars. Each state would be
internally ethnically homogeneous, while a pan-Europeanism would prevail in common
defense, currency, and banking concerns, among other areas of political life. A “Europe of
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a hundred flags” would challenge existing borders and create more nations, states, and
nationalism.
While this conception of a “Europe of a hundred flags” is regionalist and clashes with the
radical right’s ethnic and territorial appraisal of nationalism, it shares with the radical
right a desire to create homogeneous regions or nations cleansed of immigrants and bent
on preserving ethnic homogeneity within the “authentic,” historic regions of Europe
(Spektorowski 2003, 55–70). This “ultra-regionalism” conceives of the rebirth of hundreds
of ethnically “pure” states within a larger post-liberal, pan-European framework
(Spektorowski 2007). This framework is usually also associated with what Spektorowski
(2012) has dubbed a “multiculturalism of the right”: a new, innovative way to publicly
recognize foreigners and immigrants to Europe, while ultimately excluding them from the
polity and refusing to assimilate them.
Zaslove (2011, 4) points out that the Italian LN has been classified by some scholars as
radical right, although it “combines regionalism with radical right populism.” In the
history of the LN, this regionalism has been expressed, at different times, as separation
from the Italian state (nationalism), as a radically reconstituted federalist state
(federalism), or as devolution (Zaslove 2011, 14). The LN’s “regionalist nationalism”
targets either internal or external “outsiders” for political exclusion (e.g., the former
includes southerners and the latter immigrants, refugees, and asylum seekers). Indeed,
Zaslove (2011, 15) calls the LN’s positions, which target “outsiders” for political
exclusion, “nativist nationalism.” Not all variants of regionalism are interested in creating
sovereign states. While the Belgian Vlaams Belang seeks to create an independent
Flemish republic free of liberal multiculturalism, the LN has become more autonomist
rather than outright separatist. Yet all this invites an obvious question: is regionalism the
new nationalism?
While the radical right might flirt with regionalism and pan-Europeanism, its bread and
butter is ethnic nationalism. This has been confirmed by the literature on the radical
right. In his Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Mudde (2007, 22) argues that
nativism, or the combination of nationalism and xenophobia, is the main ideological
feature of the radical right parties. Mudde uses the term “nativism” in order to exclude
liberal forms of nationalism (which are supported by the center, mainstream right, and
left) and to suggest that the radical right advances an ethnic conception of nationalism.
In a review of Mudde’s book, Ellinas (2008, 561) explains, “The book joins a growing
consensus in the literature that distinguishes nationalism as the single characteristic that
all radical right parties share.” As (ethnic) nationalism unites the radical right, its
political parties “divide the world into friends and foes thriving on the spread of fear
about ‘non-natives’— especially Muslims, Jews, and Rom” (Ellinas 2008, 561). Note that
ethnic (p. 28) nationalism implicitly posits a politically dominant religious group, while
minority religions are conceived as threats to the nation. Muslims or Jews are viewed as
“enemies” of the “true nation” because they undermine nation-state homogeneity. Radical
right positions on the EU, economy, liberal democracy, minorities, immigration,
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multiculturalism, and capitalist globalization are informed by the master concept, namely,
ethnic nationalism.
Other scholars have supported the characterization of the radical right as driven by
nationalism. Rooduijn (2014, 80) states that “one of the key characteristics of PRR
[populist radical right] parties is their nationalism.” Halikiopoulou, Nanou, and
Vasilopoulou (2012) agree with this position. Yet recall that for Rooduijn this nationalism
“is not just nationalism in general that these parties propagate; it is a specific,
Manichean, form of nationalism, which emphasises the antagonistic relationship between
the Good nation and Evil outsiders.” In short, this exclusive form of nationalism is what
Mudde calls nativism and I have called ethnic nationalism. This nationalism is illiberal,
ethnically driven, and xenophobic (Mudde 2007, 24). This nativism or ethnic nationalism
is generally, but not necessarily, racist and based on ethnicity. If we take the Dutch PVV,
“a religious [minority, i.e., Muslims] instead of an ethnic minority constitutes the main
‘enemy’ ” (Rooduijn 2014, 82).
Rydgren (2007) is unambiguous in highlighting ethnic nationalism as the key

characteristic of the contemporary radical right: “First, although the populist
ultranationalism (i.e., organic ethno-nationalism) of the new radical right is less
aggressive and expansive, and rather turned inwards, it still constitutes the ideological
core of these parties.” What Rydgren means is that the radical right today is divorced
from the fascism of the past because it does not generally seek to expand its borders
beyond existing nation-states. Under the influence of the nouvelle droite and historical
circumstances, the radical right today is for the “right to difference” of all nations—that
is, the right to maintain their cultures and traditions against the homogenizing tendencies
of liberal democracy (and hence civic nationalism), multiculturalism, capitalist
globalization, the EU, or even a global human rights regime. Within their state borders,
the best way for nations to protect the “right to difference” is through “ethno-
nationalism,” “nativism,” or “ethnic nationalism.” In short, it is through the erection of
homogeneous political communities. For Rydgren (2007), this “organic ethno-nationalism”
is tied to myths about the glories of the national past, a desire to return to traditional
values, and the right of national majorities to protect their culture against incursions
from internal minorities or internationalist pressures.
As a result of the ethno-nationalist core at the heart of the radical right, immigrants and
in particular Muslim immigrants are seen as the primary threats to the “health” of the
nation. Yet even if immigrants are not openly scapegoated, as with Alain de Benoist and
some sectors of the AN in Italy (i.e., instead global capitalism is blamed for immigration)
(Ignazi 2006, 35–61), the aim is nonetheless for immigrants to return to their countries of
origins. If France belongs to the French, similarly Algeria belongs to the Algerians. A
radical, worldwide cultural and ethnic ethnopluralism is promoted in which internal
ethnic homogeneity is highly valorized. Global processes of (p. 29) homogenization
promoted by established parties, the EU, capitalism, or the UN are seen as “killers” of
nations, ethnic groups, and cultures (Faye 1981, 2000).
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Givens (2005, 20) notes that “one of the main defining characteristics” of the radical right
is “nationalism,” but suggests that this nationalism is not ordinary, mainstream, or liberal
nationalism but rather ethnic nationalism, as the radical right parties are “anti-
immigrant” and promote “national preference in citizenship and welfare benefits (or
welfare chauvinism).” The radical right, insists Givens, plays on the fears associated with
multiculturalism: cultural sameness and the obliteration of national cultures and
communities. In comparing the party positions of radical right parties on immigration, the
EU, and economy, Givens (2005, 35) suggests that “most of the positions of the radical
right are derived from nationalism.” Slogans of the radical right such as “Austria
First” (FPÖ), “France for the French” (FN), or “Our program is Germany” (the
Republikaner Party in 1990) connote an ethnic nationalism as the highest political
principle. These political outfits insist that the “true patriots” are the radical right
because they protect the nation, its culture, and its past. The radical right is thus viewed
as “the only possible guide of the nation” and the true representative of the people; it is a
nationalist antidote to supranational institutions, corrupt established elites, and political
“infiltration” of the state by ethnic or religious minorities (Pirro 2015, 8).
Norris argues that the “signature” issues of the radical right are related to xenophobia,
nationalism, and cultural protectionism. She posits that supporters of radical right parties
have “homogeneous values” (2005, 30–31), and that the parties have encouraged more
restrictive immigration policies compared to established parties. The radical right parties
promote strong cultural protectionism, the repatriation of immigrants, the closure of
borders to foreigners (as foreigners are linked to criminality and the breakdown of law
and order), and economic protectionism (Norris 2005, 25). Taken together, the
combination of fear of foreigners, nationalism, and defense of culture amounts to
“nativism,” “ethno-nationalism,” or “ethnic nationalism.”
Fennema (2004, 11) notes that the Italian MSI, the Belgian Vlaams Belang, and some
members of the French FN go further than merely embracing “ethnic nationalism,”
instead “referr[ing] quite openly to pre-war fascist intellectuals as their ideological
inspiration.” He also highlights how, in addition to ethnic nationalism, anti-materialism
and a tendency to conspiracy theories unite the contemporary radical right. What
distinguishes today’s radical right from the fascist right, argues Fennema, is that they do
not reject parliamentary democracy.
If we move to Central and Eastern Europe, the radical right’s biological racism has
become less pronounced and more ethnocentric, while its stances on democracy are
“softened” (Minkenberg 2002, 340). Nonetheless, the sharp rhetoric of the radical right
toward “enemies of the nation” has even led to open violence against minorities. Jobbik’s
use of paramilitary uniforms mimics its interwar-era fascist counterparts. Moreover, the
radical right promotes at its core the myth of an “extreme” homogeneous nation, as well
as a “romantic and populist ultranationalism,” against the “perils” of liberal and
pluralistic democracy, individualism, and universalism (Minkenberg 2002, 337).
Minkenberg (2002, 46) insists that Central and Eastern Europe are infused with “high
(p. 30) levels” of nationalism mixed with rabid anti-Semitism, territorial concerns, and
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anti-system sentiments. What drives all these issues is an ethnic conception of

nationalism. Or, as Pelinka (2013, 14) maintains, both “open anti-Semitism and ethno-
nationalism—directed especially against minorities” drive the radical right in Central and
Eastern Europe.
In contrast, in 2010 the European Freedom Alliance, consisting of Heinz Christian

Strache (FPÖ), Felip Dewinter (Vlaams Belang), and other politicians, traveled to Israel
and the West Bank in order to stand with Israel and highlight their anti-Muslim stances
(Shroufi 2015). Sectors of the radical right in Western Europe, including the FN under
Marine Le Pen, have toned down their anti-Semitism and seek “to prevent Islam’s
supposed contamination of the nation’s cultural heritage” through “post-national
cooperation and European identity” (Shroufi 2015, 24). In short, some of these parties
have moved “from nationalist anti-Jewish hatred to European philo-Semitism,” arguing
that Jews represent an integral part of the Western Judeo-Christian tradition and hence
are allies, while “Islam” (not Islamism) represents a “totalitarian ideology” and Muslims
(immigrants and refugees, or even sometimes citizens) are a real threat to national and
pan-European cultures because of their radically different “civilization” (Shroufi 2015,
35–36). As a result, most of the radical right has positioned itself against Turkey’s
entrance into the EU, arguing that it represents an existential threat to Europe. Dewinter,
a Vlaams Belang leader, highlights this position: “If Turkey becomes a member of the
European Union that will mean once again eighty million Muslims, who will join the
European Union, that means that Europe will come to about one hundred and twenty, one
hundred and thirty million Muslims. Then it’s over and out for Europe” (Shroufi 2015,
27). Or, as Heinz-Christian Strache, the chairman of the FPÖ, argues, European states do
not advance a coherent “family policy” for “European peoples” and instead choose
immigrants from Muslim countries for entrance into the state, while “original” Europeans
are allowed to “become a minority” and the “downfall of Europe” is an imminent reality
(Shroufi 2015, 27).
In summary, the master concept of the radical right is ethnic nationalism. Most scholars
have suggested that a variant of ethnic nationalism, whether “nativism,” “welfare
chauvinism,” “ethno-nationalism,” or “organic ethno-nationalism,” drives the
contemporary radical right. At times, regionalism and pan-Europeanism have made their
marks on the radical right. Yet even pan-European initiatives of the radical right such as a
common parliamentary group have been troubled by nationalistic tensions such as
between Hungarian and Slovak ethnic nationalists.
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Radical Right Discourses

In this section, I sample the discourses of radical right parties and highlight how they are
related to ethnic nationalism. Moreau (2012, 75–76) pointed out that the major
preoccupation of radical right-wing parties is nationalism, but this nationalism is ethnic
(p. 31) in that it longs for a return to a national “golden age”; denounces genetic
miscegenation and national or (white) European demographic collapse; engages in

xenophobic agitation against foreigners; rejects multiculturalism and the integration of
foreigners; promotes radical ethnopluralism and homogeneous political communities; and
supports economic protectionism on behalf of the nation and the dominant ethnic group.
If we examine the discourses and rhetorical strategies of the radical right, they follow
those themes, all of which revolve around defending the ethnically conceived nation.
Following are examples of radical right campaign discourses and how they are connected
to the nation, nationalism, and ultimately ethnic nationalism:
1. In its founding charter, Jobbik (2003) insists that the spirit of a more direct
democracy best represents the nation: “Jobbik the Movement for a Better Hungary
wishes to represent the entire nation.” It suggests that it is “a patriotic party, which
lays its political foundations on the protection of national values and interests.” Like
Guillaume Faye in France, the Hungarian party asserts that “we confront the
increasingly blunt effort to eliminate nations as the fundamental communities of
human existence.” The Hungarian nation is ethnic and transcends the boundaries of
Hungary, claims the group’s charter: “In the age of globalism and consumerism,
there is an increasingly pressing need to truly form a common nation with the
Hungarian communities living in the territories torn away from us so that we could
connect with them more closely and demonstrate the vitalizing force of national
togetherness to the upcoming generations.”
2. The Austrian FPÖ’s 2008 election platform, “Our Promise to Austria,” advocated
“a humane and consequential return of foreigners to their homelands, especially
criminals and ‘parasites’ ” (Moreau 2012, 84). This position is the same as the French
nouvelle droite’s Manifesto for the Year 2000 (Champetier and de Benoist 2000),
arguing that immigration is negative for both “hosts” and “immigrants.”
3. In the same election platform, the FPÖ called for “the protection of the labor
market by a national preference system” (Moreau 2012, 85). Recall that back in the
early 1990s the French FN was advocating national preference, thus privileging an
ethnic rather than civic conception of the nation.
4. In 2009, the British National Party (BNP) used an electoral slogan called
“Campaign Against Islam,” thus associating Islam with a “clash of civilizations,”
pitting it against the United Kingdom and the West, and associating it with Islamist
terrorism and with demographic fears of “Eurabia” (Ye’Or 2005). The implication is
that non-European cultures and ethnic groups, particularly from Muslim countries,
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are “unfit” for entrance to the United Kingdom and upset the nation’s ethnic
demographic balance. Thus, Muslims are left with no chance of gaining citizenship.
5. In the 2010 Dutch general elections, the PVV reached dizzying heights with its
anti-Muslim polemics: “Eradicating Islam should be the primary target of Dutch
foreign policy” and Islam (not Islamism) is a “totalitarian doctrine.” Voting for its
leader, Wilders was seen as equivalent to struggling “against Islam and mass (p. 32)
immigration” (Moreau 2012, 108). While the PVV rails against Islam and Muslim
immigrants, it argues that attachment to the Dutch nation is cultural and based on
shared democratic values.
6. In the French FN’s program published in April 2011, the party calls for reforms to
the current practice in which people whose father or mother is French automatically
acquire French nationality (Fourest and Venner 2011, 185). The party also makes
acquisition of French nationality contingent on good conduct (that is, no criminal
record) and ability to integrate into French society. In short, the FN wants to
promote a more ethnically “pure” France.
7. Under the influence of former nouvelle droite number two Guillaume Faye, the FN
declared “Islamicization” as “the new peril,” while making no distinctions between
Islam, Islamism, and Islamicization (Fourest and Venner 2011, 249). For the French
radical right party, even under new leader Marine Le Pen, the political formula was
simple: Islam = immigration = the “occupation of France.” Le Pen has openly
compared the demographic changes in French society (i.e., more mosques, prayers
on the streets, and the proliferation of hijabs and burqas) to France under the Nazi
occupation and the Vichy period. If we read between the lines, this means that Islam
and immigrants are “un-French.” In addition, these Muslim immigrants “occupy”
France with their values and lead the political class toward a politics of multicultural
tolerance, thus diluting the ethnic conception of the nation. Moreover, the FN
muddies the historical record by suggesting that Muslim immigration to France is
worse than pro-Nazi Vichy occupation—a false and dubious analogy.
8. Typical LN propaganda and posters use the figure of a North American native (a
Native American) in order to argue that the peoples of northern Italy (also called
Padania) are “victims” of “cultural genocide” at the hands of the Italian state and its
pro-immigration and pro-multiculturalism regime. For the LN, the “right to cultural
defense” against immigration and multiculturalism is “normal,” and “true racism” is
to be found in a “global, Anglophone, and totalitarian village on the ruins of
people” (Moreau 2012, 116). Both Faye and de Benoist have argued that liberal
multiculturalism is “totalitarian” and a silent, genocidal “killer” of rooted cultures,
peoples, and nations. Referenda on immigration policy, refugee and asylum issues, or
multiculturalism would eventually restore more ethnically homogeneous political
communities to Italy and the European continent.
9. The Belgian Vlaams Belang views immigration, especially Muslim immigration, as
a “machine to kill the peoples” (Moreau 2012, 120). This means not merely the
“killing” of Flemish peoples, but also the “killing” of various “original” ethnicities
and peoples of Europe.
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10. An election platform of the Slovenská Národna Strana (SNS, Slovak National
Party) states that Slovaks should rediscover their roots and identity as a mechanism
“to counterbalance the risks of globalization of the culture and the creation of global
pseudo-values” (Moreau 2012, 127). Under the influence of the nouvelle droite, the
Slovak radical right rebelled against “liberalism and socialism because (p. 33) they
were universal and ‘abstract’ ideologies, which assimilated and homogenized diverse
peoples worldwide. Moreover, the human rights agenda of the West and the new
wars of humanitarian intervention are presented as fake projects hiding a neo-
imperialist ‘will to power’ ” (Bar-On 2013, 225). A politics based on “roots” would
mean attacking any traces of liberal multiculturalism, refusing to support minority
rights, and promoting a politics of ethnic protectionism for Slovaks.
11. The manifesto of the UK Independence Party (UKIP 2015), “Believe Britain,”
includes its immigration section early in the manifesto, only second after the
economy. Nigel Farage, its former leader, states in the introduction to the manifesto
in a nationalistic tone, “If you believe we should have the sovereign right to control
our own borders, . . . then we are the party for you.” The immigration section opens
with these lines: “Britain is a compassionate, caring nation. In the course of our
island’s history we have welcomed millions of people to these shores and we are
proud of that record. UKIP does not have a problem with migration. What we do have
a problem with is the uncontrolled, politically-driven immigration that has been
promoted and sustained by Labour and the Conservatives.” It also notes, in a
nouvelle droite–like formulation, “Immigration is not about race: it is about space.
Immigrants are not the problem, it is the current immigration system that is broken.”
Note that, like the French right-wing intellectuals, the UKIP does not want to be
labeled racist and hence blames not immigrants themselves but the immigration
system. Yet UKIP sees immigration as a national demographic threat and a strain on
the welfare system: “The sheer weight of numbers, combined with rising birth rates
(particularly to immigrant mothers) and an ageing population, is pushing public
services to breaking point.” Although it discriminates against immigrants and
creates a negative climate for potential immigrants, UKIP claims that the current
immigration regime is discriminatory: “Our current immigration rules ignore the
wishes of the British people. They discriminate in favour of EU citizens and against
the rest of the world.” In short, UKIP supports a less liberal and anti-multicultural
conception of the nation.
12. The current electoral platform of the French FN, “Le Projet du Front
National” (2016), includes main sections on “the authority of the state” and “the
future of the nation”—both connected to the party’s primordial nationalistic
concerns. The “immigration” subsection, within the section on “the authority of the
state,” notes that “immigration must be stopped” and French national identity should
be “reinforced.” Immigration is condemned for three reasons: (1) it is not a
“humanist project” but an “arm in the service of big capital,” (2) it is a huge cost for
“the national community,” and (3) it causes problems for the French Republic.
Among those problems are ghettoes, interethnic conflicts, threats to national
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identity, conspicuous expressions of Islamism, and ethnic communitarianism (which

is called a “poison” against “national cohesion”). In essence, “immigration must be
stopped” because it is a threat to the ethnic conception of the French nation.
(p. 34)
Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and

Beyond
It has been suggested that ethnic nationalism is the key animating feature of the radical
right. In this section, I highlight similarities and important differences in the nationalisms
of the radical right in Western, Central, and Eastern Europe. While the contemporary
radical right emerged earlier in Western Europe, the radical right is now part of
mainstream party politics in Central and Eastern Europe (Minkenberg 2015; Pytlas 2016).
Ethnic nationalism is the uniting characteristic of the contemporary radical right in all
these areas. However, as we move toward Central and Eastern Europe, the nationalism is
more racist, xenophobic, and anti-Semitic. Ethnic nationalists in the region make more
allusions to the possible utilization of violence and the delegitimization of the system.
However, it is important not to overstate the differences between the radical right in
Western and that in Central and Eastern Europe. So, for example, some radical right
politicians in Western Europe have made extremely vitriolic and fear-based anti-Muslim
statements, failing to distinguish between law-abiding Muslim citizens and violent
Islamists. The PVV’s Geert Wilders compared the Qur’an to Mein Kampf, while the FN’s
former leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen, once warned of France being turned into an Islamic
state.
If we examine the differences between the radical right in Western Europe and that in
Central and Eastern Europe, the intensity and conspicuous nature of anti-Semitism
stands out in countries in the latter regions, including Russia, Hungary, and Slovakia.
Holz (2011) notes that in former Stalinist-communist European countries, anti-Semitism
has a “unifying” role because the Jew is conceived as an internal enemy—even “the
enemy of the entire world” (Wodak 2015, 25). In contrast, in Western Europe there are
pro-Israel radical right parties such as the Dutch PVV, and in some countries such as
Britain and Germany “anti-Muslim prejudice and stereotypes seem to have replaced, or at
least backgrounded, anti-Semitic rhetoric” (Wodak 2015, 26). And, as we have seen, the
four Western European radical right politicians calling themselves the European Freedom
Alliance sought to “frame Islam as the new totalitarian threat facing Europe and insinuate
that it is not Nazis that Europe’s Jews have to fear, but Muslims” (Shroufi 2015, 37). They
also sought to distance these parties from the perception that the radical right is always
and necessarily anti-Semitic. In any case, whereas elements of the Austrian FPÖ or
Vlaams Belang are today more pro-Israel and less anti-Semitic, one is less likely to
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witness such philo-Semitism and pro-Israel sentiments coming from sectors of the radical
right in Central and Eastern Europe.
Volen Siderov, leader of the Bulgarian Attack Party (Атака), is an old-school, open anti-
Semite. He published a blatantly anti-Semitic book called The Boomerang of Evil (Ivanov
and Illieva 2005, 9). He advanced crude anti-Masonic conspiracy theories in which
puppet regimes, international organizations, and the press seek to control the world and
commit “ethnocide” (i.e., a silent genocide) against the Bulgarian people. (p. 35)
In eastern Germany, anti-Semitism is more problematic than in western Germany.

Germany’s Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes (Pegida,
Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West) movement, which is based in
Dresden, has declared open “war” on the Muslim community. But Pegida has been
infiltrated by neo-Nazi groups and anti-Israel radicals, and so it is no accident that Pegida
demonstrations have included signs such as “Just Say No to Israel” and “Let Germany
Finally Be Germany,” suggesting that Germany cannot be a “normal nation” because it
must deal with an “imposed” war guilt and Holocaust remembrance.
Hungary is a country in which anti-Semitic discourses are promoted openly and Jews are
often viewed as enemies of the nation and even the world. Here is a sample of the most
vociferous anti-Semitic statements of radical right politicians in Hungary:
1. Founded in 1993 by Hungarian playwright Istvan Csurka, the Magyar Igazság és

Élet Pártja (MIÉP, Hungarian Justice and Life Party) called for a Hungarian
Lebensraum in clearly racist and anti-Semitic terms; dubbed NATO an agent of “US-
Zionist plans”; insisted that the IMF and World Bank are “Zionist” organizations;
attacked the Frankfurt International Book Festival as anti-national and used the
phrase “the Holocaust of Hungarian literature”; and denounced bankers as “Jews
who suck away little people’s money to distribute it among themselves” (Bernath,
Miklosi, and Mudde 2005, 76).
2. Before the 2009 elections to the European Parliament, a comment was posted on
an unofficial political Internet forum under the name of Krisztina Morvai, the head of
Jobbik’s electoral list. Claiming to speak to Hungarian Jews, the post stated that the
party “would be glad if the so-called proud Hungarian Jews went back to playing
with their tiny circumcised dicks instead of vilifying me” (Lahav 2009a).
3. “Given our current situation, anti-Semitism is not just our right, but it is the duty
of every Hungarian homeland lover, and we must prepare for armed battle against
the Jews,” wrote Judit Szima, a Jobbik candidate for EU parliament (Lahav 2009b).
4. In November 2012, Jobbik’s deputy parliamentary leader, Márton Gyöngyösi,
posted a video of a speech on the party’s website in which he united classical anti-
Semitism with ethnic nationalism: “I think such a conflict makes it timely to tally up
people of Jewish ancestry who live here, especially in the Hungarian Parliament and
the Hungarian government, who, indeed, pose a national security risk to
Hungary” (Ynetnews 2012).
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What also differentiates the radical right in Western Europe from its counterparts in
Central and Eastern Europe is that the latter are “a combination of old and new
politics” (Pirro 2015, 1). What Pirro means is that while these parties are simultaneously
attached to old-style politics (including anti-Semitism, historical revisionism, and
conspicuous ethnic nationalism), they also deal with new “post-materialist” issues such as
immigration, defense of cultural identity, and security (Taggart 2000). Pirro (2015, 9)
argues that while these parties emphasize nativism and authoritarianism, they are
different from their Western counterparts because they are not reactions to the liberal-
left values of the (p. 36) 1968 activists but rather a response to “the transformation of
1989.” In short, the radical right parties in Central and Eastern Europe are reacting to
structural conditions as a result of the transitions to capitalism and liberal democracy, but
also expressing resentment of challenges to authority and values. For Minkenberg (2009,
454), the ideological tool kit of the past is “revived—and reinterpreted—by the radical
right” in Central and Eastern Europe, while new issues related to disaffection with the
post-1989 transitions are raised. These parties are inspired by a “synthetic construct”
consisting of communist and pre-communist pasts and ideologies (Tismaneanu 2007;
Minkenberg 2014), as well as novel issues such as defense of cultural identity. Some have
suggested that a “national communism” has emerged in some parts of Central and
Eastern Europe (Shafir 2000).
Future Research Possibilities

This chapter has defined both nationalism and the radical right. I suggested that a radical
right party family exists, but its relationships to fascism, Nazism, and pro-collaborationist
regimes remain bones of contentions among academics. Second, I showed how a general
consensus exists in the literature that ethnic nationalism is a central animating force, or
master concept, for the radical right. Yet the discourses changes of the radical right are
significant in relation to nationalism, including the belief in radical ethnopluralism and a
tendency toward pan-Europeanism. Third, I explored the discourses of movements and
political parties of the radical right in relation to nationalism, focusing on immigration.
Fourth, I analyzed the similarities of and important differences between the ethnic
nationalism of the radical right in Western Europe and that in Central and Eastern
Europe.
Yet I have examined the radical right in only a limited sense. I have followed the general
academic trend by looking at the radical right largely in Western Europe. Thus, Central
and Eastern Europe are ripe for more research on the radical right. In addition, we must
move beyond our Eurocentric lenses and study the radical right in Latin America, Asia,
and Africa. Some interesting countries for further research include Japan (but see
Higuchi, Chapter 34 in this volume), China, India, Pakistan, South Korea, South Africa,
Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico.
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If I were charting a research agenda for radical right studies and nationalism, I would
include the following elements:
1. More comparative studies of Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

2. Greater attention to think tanks, social movements, and the media, as well as their
relationships with radical right-wing parties, in promoting the rise of ethnic
nationalist solutions.
3. Detailed studies of center, mainstream right, and social democratic parties
throughout Europe in terms of how they have resisted or given in to the radical
right’s vision of ethnic nationalism. (p. 37)
4. Country-by-country studies of the radical right in the non-Western world.
5. An analysis of the radical right in the Muslim world and how it navigates between
ethnic nationalism, on one hand, and pan-Islamism, on the other hand.
6. Sensitivity to the specific cultural, historical, and political contexts and meanings
of nationalism in various regions of the world.
7. An appraisal of how civic and ethnic variants of nationalism in practice can unite
against liberal multiculturalism in Europe.
8. A clearer understanding of how nationalistic conceptions of the fascist and Nazi
pasts inform some contemporary radical right parties.
9. More discourse analyses of the ethnic nationalist core of the radical right.
10. Greater attention to how “economic nationalism,” including the rejection of a
common currency (Marcus 1995), and national preference solutions proposed by the
radical right are functions of historical, political, social, or spiritual crises.
11. An understanding of how the radical right appeals to women as the guardians of
the ethnically based nation in different political contexts and countries.
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Tamir Bar-On
Tamir Bar-On received his Ph.D. from McGill University in 2000. He is a Professor-
Researcher in the School of Social Sciences and Government, Tec de Monterrey,
Campus Querétaro, Mexico. A member of Mexico’s Sistema Nacional de
Investigadores, Bar-On is the author of four books, including Where Have All The
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2017).
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The Radical Right and Nationalism

Oxford Handbooks Online

Print Publication Date: Apr 2018 Subject: Sociology, Political Sociology

Abstract and Keywords

date: 24 June 2018

As the radical right’s understanding of nationalism is ethnically driven, it privileges

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3. Pride in national culture and traditions.

date: 24 June 2018

The Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom (known as Jobbik; Movement for a Better

date: 24 June 2018

Defining the Radical Right: A Radical Right

date: 24 June 2018

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The Master Concept: Ethnic Nationalism

Nationalism supports homogeneity within society, blind obedience, and idealized

date: 24 June 2018

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Rydgren (2007) is unambiguous in highlighting ethnic nationalism as the key

date: 24 June 2018

date: 24 June 2018

anti-system sentiments. What drives all these issues is an ethnic conception of

In contrast, in 2010 the European Freedom Alliance, consisting of Heinz Christian

date: 24 June 2018

Radical Right Discourses

miscegenation and national or (white) European demographic collapse; engages in

date: 24 June 2018

date: 24 June 2018

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identity, conspicuous expressions of Islamism, and ethnic communitarianism (which

Western, Central, and Eastern Europe, and

date: 24 June 2018

In eastern Germany, anti-Semitism is more problematic than in western Germany.

1. Founded in 1993 by Hungarian playwright Istvan Csurka, the Magyar Igazság és

date: 24 June 2018

Future Research Possibilities

date: 24 June 2018

1. More comparative studies of Western and Central and Eastern Europe.

Anderson, B. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of

date: 24 June 2018

———. 1994. Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe. London: Macmillan.

———. 2005. “Against the System: Radical Right-Wing Populism’s Challenge to

Liberal Democracy.” In Movements of Exclusion: Radical Right-Wing Populism in the

Billig, M. 1995. Banal Nationalism. London: Sage.

Carter, E. 2005. The Extreme Right in Western Europe. Manchester: Manchester

De Lange, S. L. 2012. “Radical Right-Wing Parties in Office.” In Right-Wing Extremism in

date: 24 June 2018

Eatwell, R. 1996. Fascism: A History. London: Vintage.

Faye, G. 1981. Le système à tuer les peuples. Paris: Copernic.

Front National. 2016. Le projet du Front National. Available online at http://

Fryklund, B. 2013. “Populism—Change over Time and Space: A Comparative and

Gellner, E. 1983. Nations and Nationalism. Oxford: Basil Blackwell.

Griffin, R. 2000. “Interregnum or Endgame? Radical Right Thought in the ‘Postfascist’

———. 2003. “Nationalism.” In Contemporary Political Ideologies, ed. R. Eatwell and A.

Holz, K. 2011. “Die antisemitische Verbrüderung der europäischen Rechten.” In Die

date: 24 June 2018

Jobbik. 2003. “Manifesto.” Available online at http://jobbik.com/manifesto_0 (accessed

Kitschelt, H. 2007. “Growth and Persistence of the Radical Right in Postindustrial

date: 24 June 2018