`More Cases under Rule 139-B

(as amended by BM No. 1645, September 5, 2006)

 JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,

ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant,
No. L-18727. August 31, 1964

 BOBIE ROSE V. FRIAS, complainant, vs. ATTY. CARMELITA S. BAUTISTA-LOZADA,

respondent.
A.C. No. 6656. May 4, 2006

 RE: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR REINSTATEMENT OF ROLANDO S.

TORRES AS A MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE BAR.
A.C. No. 5161. August 25, 2015

 CONRADO N. QUE, complainant, vs. ATTY. ANASTACIO E. REVILLA, JR., respondent.

A.C. No. 7054. November 11, 2014

 FLORENCE TEVES MACARUBBO, complainant, vs. ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO,

respondent. RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L.
MACARUBBO.
Adm. Case No. 6148. January 22, 2013

1. CUI V. CUI
FACTS:
The case stems from the provisions of a Deed of Donation. It stipulates that the administrator shall be
legitimate descendants of either Mariano or Mauricio or Vicente Cui, who is a lawyer, physician, civil
engineer, or pharmacist. That in case the absence of this condition, the older male shall be the
administrator of the Hospicio.
Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma.Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of
the nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. Romulo Cui later on intervened,
claiming a right to the same office, being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews
mentioned by the founders in their deed of donation.
As between Jesus and Antonio the Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of Bachelor of Laws from the University
of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having passed the examinations to qualify
him as one.
Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar, and although disbarred on 1957, was
reinstated on 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of the Hospicio de
Barili.
Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office
of administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless
disqualified by virtue of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be
removed on the ground, among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound
moral character.

ISSUE:
Whether the disbarment of Atty. Cui prevents him from being the Administrator of Hospicio de San Jose de
Barili.

RULING:
No. The Court holds that the disbarment of Atty. Cui does not bar him from the succession line of
administrators of Hospicio de San Jose de Barili since reinstatement restored his title and reputation as a
lawyer.
When the Atty. Cui was restored to the roll of lawyers, the restrictions and disabilities resulting from his
previous disbarment were wiped out.
Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court.
The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the
capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character—a fit and proper person to practice law.
The court will take into consideration: the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the
nature and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment,
and the time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement
Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the
attorney has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been
held to be the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree
of proof than in an original admission
The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is 'of good moral
character' in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper
person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental quallifications
are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be
regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications.
Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente
Cui, one of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is
further, in the line of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one
of the said nephews.
Hence, Antonio Cui shall be designated as administrator, as stipulated in the Deed of Donation.
2. FRIAS vs. LOZADA
FACTS:
Respondent Lozada seeks reconsideration of a Supreme Court in 2005 finding her guilty of violating Rules
15.03 and 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of willfully disobeying a final and executory
decision of the Court of Appeals and suspending her from the practice of law for two years.
Lozada contends that the complaint against her was already barred by prescription. She also asserts that
her loan agreement with complainant complied with Rule 16.04 because the interest of complainant was
fully protected.

Lozada anchors her defense of prescription to Rule VIII of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD – IBP which
provides that a complaint for disbarment, suspension or discipline of attorneys prescribes in two (2) years
from the date of the professional misconduct.

CBD – IBP derives its authority to take cognizance of administrative complaints against lawyers from the
Supreme Court which has the inherent power to regulate, supervise and control the practice of law in the
Philippines. Hence, in the exercise of its delegated power to entertain administrative complaints against
lawyers, the CBD-IBP should be guided by the doctrines and principles laid down by the Court. Regrettably,
Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the CBD – IBP which provides for prescriptive period for
the filing of administrative complaints against lawyers runs afoul of the settled ruling of the Court and
should be struck down as void and of no legal effect for being ultra vires.

And assuming that prescription is a valid defense, Lozada raised it only at this stage, as it should be
presumed that she was familiar with that rule yet she failed to invoke it at the earliest opportunity and opted
to insist on her innocence.

ISSUE:
Whether the administrative case against Lozada is barred by prescription.

HELD:
No. The respondent’s contentions have no merit as the Court held that her defense of prescription on the
CBD-IBP rule does not lie in administrative proceedings against lawyers. Moreover, the Court also declared
in Heck v. Santos case (2004), that an administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not
prescribe.
According to the Court, if the rule were otherwise, members of the bar would be emboldened to disregard
the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding from the fact that as long as no private complainant would
immediately come forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for.
It is the duty of this Court to protect the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of
justice. No matter how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of
and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar cannot escape the
disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is aimed at unscrupulous members of the
bench and bar, to deter them from committing acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility,
the Code of Judicial Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.
Thus, even the lapse of considerable time from the commission of the offending act to the institution of the
administrative complaint will not erase the administrative culpability of a lawyer.
On the ground raised by respondent on the implications of her loan agreement with complainant in relation
to Rule 16.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court holds that there is neither sufficient
ground nor compelling reason to reconsider their earlier decision considering the fiduciary character of
respondent’s relationship with complainant, the nature of their agreement and complainant’s lack of
independent advice when she entered into it.
The Court Denied with Finality the motion for reconsideration and the Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of
Procedure of the CBD-IBP is declared null and void as it runs afoul of the settled ruling of the Court.

3. IN RE: TORRES

FACTS:
This is an Administrative Case filed in the Supreme Court by respondent Torres who seeks judicial
clemency in order to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. Records show that respondent was
administratively charged by his sister-in-law, Dumali, for presentation of false testimony; participation in,
consent to, and failure to advise against, the forgery of complainant’s signature in a purported Deed of
Extrajudicial Settlement; and gross misrepresentation in court for the purpose of profiting from such
forgery. 
Dumali alleged that Torres used his relationship with her as a relative and his position as a member of the
Bar to consummate the illegal acts. He was found guilty for violating Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and was disbarred from the practice of law.
Torres was aggrieved and unpertubed, as numerous submissions followed either seeking his reinstatement
to the bar or the reduction of his penalty of disbarment to suspension, all of which were either expunged
from the records or denied by the Court. After more than ten years from his disbarment, he filed the instant
Petition begging for judicial clemency for his reinstatement.

ISSUE:
Whether Torres is worthy of reinstatement.
HELD:
No. The Court denied the petition of Torres.
In its ruling, the Court emphasized that Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is
not a natural, absolute or constitutional right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special
privilege granted and continued only to those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and
in moral character. The same reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer. When exercising its
inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who establish their present
moral fitness and knowledge of the law will be readmitted to the Bar. Thus, though the doors to the practice
of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court owes a duty to the legal profession
as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it is done so only as a matter of
justice.
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
Whether the applicant shall be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys rests to a great extent on the sound
discretion of the Court. The lawyer has to demonstrate and prove by clear and convincing evidence that he
or she is again worthy of membership in the Bar. The Court will take into consideration his or her character
and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and character of the charge/s for which he or she was
disbarred, his or her conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that has elapsed in between the
disbarment and the application for reinstatement.”
In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for
Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534 (2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving
requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

In similar vein, the testimonials attached to his previous Motion for Reconsideration filed on May 20, 2004
which he incorporates in support of his present petition, is equally insufficient to conclude that he has
already reformed because all these testimonials were executed in May 2004. Thus, they can only attest to
respondent’s conduct or attributions a mere month removed from his disbarment on April 14, 2004.

More significantly, it should be discerned that the root cause of respondent’s disbarment was his fraudulent
acts against his sister-in-law, the complainant herein. However, no proof was presented to show that he had
reconciled or even attempted to reconcile with her so as to show remorse for his previous faults. That the
prosecutor found that respondent “merely rendered legal services to the Ting siblings” does not mean that
he rendered the same in accordance with the lawyer’s oath and ethical canons.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

To add, no other evidence was presented in his Petition to demonstrate his potential for public service, or
that he — now being 68 years of age32 — still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good
use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. Thus, the third and fourth guidelines were neither complied
with.
 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Applying the foregoing standards to this case, the Court finds the petition not meritorious and the said
guidelines was not complied with. While more than ten (10) years had already passed since his disbarment,
Torres’ present petition has failed to show substantial proof of his reformation as required in the first
guideline above. Thus, the Court will grant it only if there is a showing that it is merited. Proof of reformation
and a showing of potential and promise are indispensable.

4. QUE v. REVILLA

FACTS:
This is an administrative case seeking the judicial clemency of the court to grant respondent Revilla’s
reinstatement to the Bar.
Revilla was disbarred based from the following grounds: abuse of court procedures and processes; filing of
multiple actions and forum shopping; willful, intentional and deliberate resort to falsehood and deception
before the courts; maligning the name of his fellow lawyer; and fraudulent and unauthorized appearances in
court. He subsequently filed an Appeal for Grace, Succor, and Mercy asking the Court to take a second
look at the penalty imposed upon him. He maintained that complainant Que failed to establish by clear and
convincing evidence that he committed grossly immoral conduct meriting the severe penalty of disbarment.
He also attempted to pass the blame on Piedad, General Manager of Kalayaan Development Corporation
to free himself from liability by claiming that such act was not his own doing.
He also stated that for almost three years of being disbarred from the practice of law, he has never been
involved in any unlawful, dishonest, and immoral activities. He promised to maintain at all times a high
degree of legal proficiency, morality, integrity, and fair dealings to the courts, clients, and the legal
profession in accordance with the values and morals embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Revilla filed a Profound Appeal for Judicial Clemency reiterating his apologies to the Court. He stressed
that the penalty of disbarment has already taken its toll on his health; he has now become most frail and
weak; and he had been diagnosed with chronic kidney disease at stage five (5) and undergoing dialysis
thrice weekly. He also stressed that in the years that he had been excluded from the practice of law, he
devoted his time to Christian and charity.
ISSUE:
Whether Revilla should be reinstated.
HELD:
No. The Court denied the present appeal. In the present case, we are not fully convinced that the passage
of more than four (4) years is sufficient to enable the respondent to reflect and to realize his professional
transgressions.
We emphasize that this is the second time that the Revilla was accused and was found guilty of gross
misconduct. He, in an earlier case of Plus Builders, Inc. v. Revilla, was likewise found guilty of gross
misconduct for committing willful and intentional falsehood before the court; misusing court procedure and
processes to delay the execution of a judgment; and collaborating with non-lawyers in the illegal practice of
law — mostly the same grounds on which the Decision in 2004 (2nd disbarment) was based. In Plus
Builders, the Court granted the respondent’s motion for reconsideration and reduced the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law from two (2) years to six (6) months out of compassion to the
respondent.
Considering Revilla’s earlier disbarment case (and subsequent reduction of the penalty imposed as an act
of clemency), and another disbarment case against him still pending review, the Court is not fully and
convincingly satisfied that the respondent has already reformed. The period of five (5) years is likewise not
considerably long considering the nature and perversity of the respondent’s misdeeds. It is still early for the
Court to consider the respondent’s reinstatement.
Membership in the Bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It is not a natural, absolute or constitutional
right granted to everyone who demands it, but rather, a special privilege granted and continued only to
those who demonstrate special fitness in intellectual attainment and in moral character. The same
reasoning applies to reinstatement of a disbarred lawyer.
When exercising its inherent power to grant reinstatement, the Court should see to it that only those who
establish their present moral fitness and knowledge of the law would be readmitted to the Bar. Thus,
though the doors to the practice of law are never permanently closed on a disbarred attorney, the Court
owes a duty to the legal profession as well as to the general public to ensure that if the doors are opened, it
is done so only as a matter of justice.
The basic inquiry in a petition for reinstatement to the practice of law is whether the lawyer has sufficiently
rehabilitated himself or herself in conduct and character.
While the Court acknowledges that Revilla engaged himself in Christian and moral activities, it is not
convinced that he had sufficiently achieved moral reformation.

5. MACARUBBO v. MACARUBBO
FACTS:
This is an administrative cade in the Supreme Court through a Petition to be Reinstated in the Roll of
Attorneys. Records show that, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having
contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Teves and a third marriage with Constantino while his
first marriage to Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of
Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. 
Respondent then filed a Petition for Extraordinary Mercy seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the
Roll of Attorneys. 

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Macarubbo should be reinstated.

HELD:
Yes. The respondent is reinstated to the practice of law. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz,
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Judicial Clemency, 533 SCRA 534
(2007), the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit:
1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency.
Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession
and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by Teves and maintained a cordial
relationship with them.
Furthermore, respondent’s plea for reinstatement is duly supported by the IBP Cagayan Chapter and by his
former and present colleagues. His parish priest, Rev. Fr Castillejos., certified that he is faithful to and puts
to actual practice the doctrines of the Catholic Church. He is also observed to be a regular churchgoer.
Records further reveal that respondent has already settled his previous marital squabbles, as in fact, no
opposition to the instant suit was tendered by Teves.
The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and
recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14)
years of dedicated government service from 1986 to 2000 as Legal Officer of the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft
Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and
certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions.
At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the
upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to
discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who
have reformed their ways, as in this case.