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 563

Harmony and Discord inChina's

Africa Strategy: Some Implications
for Foreign Policy
Chris Alden and Christopher R.Hughes

ABSTRACT This article examines the challenges faced by Beijing in

managing this increasingly complex relationship, reflecting upon the struc-
tural factors that encourage harmony and introduce discord in China-
Africa ties. It examines how various policy solutions being considered by
China, ranging from increasing participants in the policy-making process
to tentative engagement with international development regimes, may still
not address the most difficult issues involving adverse reactions to the
Chinese presence from African civil societies and political opposition
groups. In particular the lack of a strong civil society inside China inhibits
the ability of its policy makers to draw on the expertise of the kind of inde-
pendent pressure groups and NGOs that are available to traditional donor/
investor states. The article concludes by asking how the Chinese system can
make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing
models and practices of the developed countries.

The research agenda generated by the launch of the -new type of strategic part-
nership" between China and Africa has tended to treat the Chinese state as a uni-
tary actor. This has been encouraged to a large degree by the rhetoric of the
Chinese government which claims that the new relationship is devoted to building
"win-win" situations premised on principles of non-interference in domestic poli-
tics and non-conditionality in the provision of aid and investment. Yet it is also
notable that the Chinese government is encouraging an increasing range of
Chinese actors to become involved in African economies and societies. The
resulting growth and diversity of types of engagement means that it has now
become necessary to go beyond the state-to-state level of analysis that dominates
orthodox policy statements.
This has important implications for the way in which policy is made in China,
as growing involvement in African politics and societies leaves Beijing facing the
kinds of problems long experienced by governments in the developed world when
operating on the continent. Various solutions are being sought, ranging from
increasing the number of participants engaged in the policy-making process to

@ The China Quarterly, 2009 doi:10.1017/S0305741009990105

564 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

tentative engagement with international development regimes. However, because

some of the most difficult issues involve adverse reactions to the Chinese presence
from African civil societies and political opposition groups, it remains unclear
how they can be managed when transactions take place mainly through
African elites. Moreover, due to the lack of a strong civil society inside China
itself, policy makers are not able to draw on the expertise of the kind of indepen-
dent pressure groups and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that are avail-
able to policy makers in the traditional donor and investment states. While the
record of the developed world in Africa can rightly be criticized and China can
claim a number of successes, it remains to be seen how the Chinese system can
make up for these weaknesses without moving further towards the existing
models and practices of the developed countries.

Harmony in the "New Type of Strategic Partnership" with Africa

When analysing a relationship like that between China and Africa, the tendency
to take the state as the main unit of analysis can rightly be criticized for neglect-
ing that "China" is anything but a unitary actor.I Rather than take this as a pre-
scription to exclude the state altogether, however, it should be tempered by the
possibility that the specific roles that states are seen to play do matter insofar
as they constitute the structures that give meaning to their international behav-
iour. 2 This can be seen in the way that the central government agencies in
China (hereafter "Beijing") invest considerable resources in portraying the coun-
try's relationship with Africa as a "new type of strategic partnership" made poss-
ible because both have common interests that stem from belonging to the
developing world and shaped by the historical impact of colonialism. The result
is what the constructivist International Relations theorist Alexander Wendt
might call a certain "culture of anarchy," according to which China's relationship
with Africa is different from that of the developed countries because it is not
based on exploitation of the continent but on the principles of "mutual benefit
and common prosperity," "non-interference" and "non-conditionality." 3
Such principles indicate that the role established by Beijing for China in Africa
is highly state-centric. Yet it is easy to overlook that this role has also come to

I Ian Taylor, "Beyond the new 'two whateverisms': China's ties in Africa,' China aktuell, No. 3 (2008),
p. 185.
2 Alexander Wendt, Social Theory of International Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1999), pp. 246-59.
3 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Zhong-Fei hezuo luntan - Beijing xingdong jihua (2007 zhi 09)" ("Forum
on China-Africa Co-operation Beijing Action Plan 2007-09") (Beijing, 2006), http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
zfltleng/zyzl/hywj/t280369.htm; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Zhong-Fei hezuo luntan Beijing fenghui
xuanyan" ("Beijing declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation") (Beijing, 2006), http://
english.focacsummit.org/2006-09/20/content_623.htm State Council, "Zhongguo dui Feizhou zhengce
wenjian' ("Document on China's Africa policy") (Beijing, 2006), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/
2006-01/12/content_4042317.htm); Hu, Jintao, "Hu Jintao zai Zhong-Fei hezuo luntan Beijing fenghw
kaimushi jianghua quan wen" ("Hu Jintao's opening declaration at the China-Africa Forum in
Beijing"), 2006, http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-11-04/114810413137s.shtml.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 565

incorporate a new degree of flexibility, which is made possible by locating the

"new type of strategic partnership" within Beijing's broader foreign policy
themes of building a "harmonious world" (hexie shijie #fijtyF-)and "peaceful
development" (heping fizhan fl?-R), introduced since Hu Jintao became
paramount leader in 2002. That these themes have special implications for
Africa can be seen from the fact that the call to build a "harmonious world"
was first made by Hu in his address to the April 2005 Asia-Africa summit in
Jakarta, the same year in which the State Council began to promote "peaceful
development" in the context of South-South relations. The following year,
Africa took centre stage with the holding of the Forum on China-Africa
Co-operation (FOCAC), described in a report by the National Defence
University as an enrichment of the idea and practice of a "harmonious world."'
These new themes mediate the state-centric principles of Beijing's Africa policy
in important ways because they effectively erode the barrier between China's
domestic politics and foreign policy. In fact, the State Council explicitly describes
"peaceful development" as an attempt to "unify domestic development with the
outside world, linking the development of China with that of the rest of
the world, and combining the fundamental interests of the Chinese people with
the common interests of all peoples throughout the world." 5 This linkage is
also implicit in the way that the call to build a "harmonious world" is an exten-
sion of the promotion of a "harmonious society" inside China.
Such a breaking down of the domestic/international divide can be understood
as part of a broader attempt to rationalize China's growing integration into the
global economic system that is taking place under the "going-out" strategy. It can
be seen more specifically in the interpretation of the stated aims of Beijing's
Africa policy, where the task of building "mutual benefit and common prosper-
ity" is interpreted to extend beyond economics into state-building and social
development. Similarly, "mutual learning, commonly seeking development,"
involves not only scientific, technological and cultural exchanges but also pro-
motes "mutually studying and borrowing from experiences of administration
and governance (zhiguo lizheng Mjl).6
EIn Even the condition that co-operation
between militaries (including conflict resolution and peace-keeping operations)
should be under the authority of the African Union and the United Nations
(UN) is waived when it comes to dealing with "non-traditional security" threats. 7
Surveying Beijing's framework for China's relationship with Africa thus pre-
sents the balancing act of a government that advocates state-centric principles
for its general foreign policy stance, while promoting international transactions

4 Yang Yi (ed.), Guoji zhanle xingshi fenxi 2006/7 (InternationalStrategic Analysis 2006/7) (Beijing:
Shishi chubanshe, 2006), p. 220.
5 State Council Information Office, "Zhongguo de heping daolu" ("China's peaceful development road")
(Beijing, 2005), Chinese version http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2005-12/22/content_134060.htm, English
version http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200512/22/eng20051222-230059.html.
6 "Beijing declaration of the Forum on China-Africa Co-operation."
7 Ibid.; "Document on China's Africa policy."
566 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

that span a range of economic sectors, from investing in energy and raw minerals
to sectors as diverse as agriculture, finance, building infrastructure, IT, tourism,
health care and debt alleviation. Actors encouraged to get involved in these sec-
tors include not only central governments but also local authorities, businesses of
all sizes, news organizations, scientists and medics, and what is labelled
"people-to-people" (minjian K1IeJ) contacts. The "new type of strategic partner-
ship" with Africa is thus a particularly visible aspect of the way in which
China's entry into the global economic system under the "going-out" strategy
ultimately forces a degree of malleability when it comes to interpreting the state-
centric principles of a foreign policy that has its origins in the Cold War.

Loosening State-centric Principles

Despite the frequent repetition of the state-centric principles of Beijing's foreign
policy, therefore, it is important to acknowledge that its Africa policy is adaptive
and instrumentalist. The source of change in this process is often located in an
exogenous environment which demands innovation and metes out "lessons" to
decision makers through a series of recognized successes and failures.
Ultimately, this process of change is expressed in the way that the new rhetoric
of Africa policy attempts to accommodate a broadening range of activities and
actors on the continent within the old paradigm of the Five Principles.
This dynamic of change between practice and foreign policy rhetoric can be seen
in the way that the principle of non-conditionality is broken on a range of issues.
A good example is the way in which the demand that African states should break
diplomatic relations with Taiwan before Chinese investment can be provided (even
though this demand has actually been violated in a number of instances) is
circumvented by the use of sub-state actors. Provinces, in particular. have been
used as semi-official interlopers who can conduct economic activities as wvell as
serve as proxies for official ties, in cases as diverse as South Africa and Senegal.8
The breaching of traditional interpretations of the non-conditionality principle
is even more vividly apparent at the economic level. This can be seen, for
example, when Chinese interlocutors claim that the foreign assistance they pro-
vide is designed to ensure minimal opportunities for abuse on the part of recipi-
ents. 9 The fact that the bulk of Chinese aid is project-based and normally carried
out by public or private Chinese contractors is said to limit the scope for waste
and corruption on the part of recipients. Rather than recipients directly receiving
cash for infrastructure projects, financing is filtered through the Chinese contrac-
tors. Disbursements to African sub-contractors are provided incrementally and in
each case subject to meeting recognized standards set by the Chinese in conjunc-
tion with the African host government requirements.

8 Chen Zhimin and Jian Jinbo (2008), "Chinese provinces as foreign policy actors in Africa. Policy
Report, No. 12 (2008), China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International ATairs,
pp. 1-37.
9 Interviews A, May 2008.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 567

Furthermore, the focus on defining and measuring project effectiveness on the

basis of outcomes rather than an emphasis on correct process, as is the case with
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) where
donors have developed a subscribed format for "good practice," has allowed
Chinese projects to side-step conventional concerns of cost-to-benefit ratios in
their foreign assistance programming. These concerns, coupled with the review
of foreign aid expenditure by national legislatures, were a key part of the original
impetus for imposition of conditionalities on recipients by traditional donors.
Interestingly, there is already some discussion amongst Chinese officials and
scholars as to the diminishing appetite in China for foreign assistance to
Africa, though any reduction would only affect the already limited provisions
for grant aid.' 0
The establishment of the Economic Processing Zones (EPZs) also creates a lot
of scope for Chinese actors to get involved in the organization of African society.
To date, five of these have been formally proclaimed, in Zambia, Mauritius,
Egypt, Nigeria and Tanzania. In addition, a number of free trade zones or similar
entities have been launched, some of them with support from Chinese provinces
and municipalities. Although it is not officially stated that the organization of
these reflects Chinese pragmatism and concern for local conditions, they are
the product of negotiations between Beijing and the African host countries.
This allows for adaptation to local conditions, as can be seen in the difference
between the conditions which pertain in Mauritius's EPZ, which is open to all
foreign investors, and those in Zambia's, which are directed only at Chinese
companies.
There are a number of motives for the creation of the EPZs. First, they have
been established partly as a response to African critics who are concerned that
China is only interested in the extraction of African minerals. They also represent
a platform for consolidating Chinese investment in a particular area in Africa.
For instance, copper mined in Zambia can be smelted locally in the newly
built Chinese smelter and then shipped onwards to markets in China and else-
where using Chinese constructed or rehabilitated transport linkages and port
facilities. Moreover, any preferential forms of access to European and North
American markets that Africa might have through formalized arrangements
such as AGOA or EU Partnership Agreements could be more fully exploited
by Chinese exporters from this position, a point highlighted in Ministry of
Commerce (MOFCOM) material on investment opportunities in Nigeria."
Yet the EPZs also present a challenge for the idea of building a "harmonious
world" because they represent prospective sites for the relocation of industry that
is at present based in China. With rising labour costs in the south-east coastal
areas dampening Chinese competitiveness and a growing consciousness of the

10 Interviews with Chinese researchers on Africa. May 2008.

11 Ministry of Commerce, Government of People's Republic of China, "Nigeria,' April 2007, www.gpj.
20 0 7
mofcom.gov.cn/accessory/ 04/1177553828245.pdf, accessed 27 July 2008.
568 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

environmental and social impact that some industries produce at home, the
Chinese are looking into the possibility of relocating some low-skilled, highly pol-
luting industries to other countries in much the same way Taiwan and Japan did
with China a few decades ago. Africa, together with South-East Asia - especially
Indonesia and Vietnam - is one of the possible candidates for relocation.
The most dramatic departure from the principle of non-interference has
been generated by China's management of its presence in Darfur, where
Beijing has had to exert pressure on Sudan to curb its militias and took
the lead in winning Khartoum's acceptance of a hybrid African Union-UN
peacekeeping force in 2006.12 Chinese commentators defend the actions of
their firms by claiming that they have changed Sudan from an oil-importing to
an oil-exporting economy, providing the wealth needed for a move towards
political stability. In addition they point out that their government has provi-
ded substantial amounts of humanitarian aid. Yet they are also painfully
aware of the damage that their presence in Sudan is doing to China's "soft
power."' 3
Drawing attention to the increasingly active but low-profile role that the
Chinese government claims to be playing in bringing the warring parties to nego-
tiations and supporting the presence of African Union and UN peacekeepers,
however, creates a number of dilemmas. First, describing abstaining from voting
in the Security Council on crucial resolutions concerning Darfur as an expression
of the independent nature of Chinese foreign policy is unlikely to add to the
image of China as a "responsible stakeholder." Secondly, describing China's
actions as "a development of the principle of 'non-interference' within certain
limits" beggars the question as to just how far Beijing is prepared to move
towards departing from what apologistSl4 and critics see as a somewhat
inadequate and outdated shibboleth of its foreign policy.

Discord and the Limits of Elite Ties

Such attempts to build a harmonious relationship by loosening the limits of the
principles of non-interference and non-conditionality are restricted for a number
of reasons. It is well known that a strong attachment to the inviolability of state
sovereignty is an important plank of Beijing's general foreign policy because of
concerns over its own territorial integrity. When this is extended to Africa, how-
ever, it tends to limit political relations to ruling elites. This is beneficial insofar as
it allows peace to be made with those in Africa who maintain control over

12 Dan Large, "From non-interference to constructive engagement? China's evolving relations with
Sudan," in Chris Alden, Dan Large and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (eds.), China Returns to Africa:
A Rising Poiwer and a Continent Embrace (London: C.R. Hurst, 2008), pp. 275-94.
13 Jiang Henkun and Luo Jianbo, "Daerfuer weiji yu Zhongguo zai Feizhou de guojia xingxiang suzao"
("The Darfur crisis and the shaping of China's international image in Africa"), Zhongguo yu shijie
(2008), pp. 28-42.
14 Ibid pp. 39-42.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 569

sought-after resources through leases and other forms of limiting access.

Moreover, the potential for striking deals at this level is considerably enhanced
by the tendency for African elites to view China's growing presence as an oppor-
tunity to exert a new kind of international leverage over the industrialized
countries.15
Confining relations to the elite level, however, does not always sit well with
Beijing's appeal for a partnership based on the shared values of anti-colonialism.
It is true that many in China see their country - despite its spectacular rise - as
above all a victim of imperialism. Yet a parallel anti-imperialist discourse can
also be found across Africa, as seen in the widespread popularity of Robert
Mugabe's defence of his regime's actions in Zimbabwe across the continent,
from individuals on the street to governments.' 6 Despite repeating Beijing's
rhetoric of building a "harmonious world," many African leaders harbour few
illusions about Chinese intentions, recalling that its role in the independence
struggle was somewhat more limited in content and scope than the version pre-
sented by Beijing.' 7 Moreover, when the non-interference principle is used to jus-
tify opacity in dealings with elites, from aid disbursements to business practices,
the view becomes more widespread that China is just another foreign power out
to exploit the continent.
Of course, governments in the developed world are also driven to work with
African elites by the same kind of economic and strategic motives that drive
Beijing. Yet they are not restricted by principles of non-interference from offset-
ting the compromises they make by exerting direct pressure on African govern-
ments or through encouraging positive public actions by businesses and
financial institutions with schemes such as corporate social responsibility pro-
jects. They also embrace the opportunity to work in partnership with civil society
groups that aim to criticize, if not reform, African elite practices.
Beijing's deep concern and surprise about being characterized as a neo-colonial
power is apparent in the unscheduled, lightning visit to the continent in February
2007 by Hu Jintao to counter such a critique by key partners like South African
President Thabo Mbeki. Yet the response is limited to repetitions of the formu-
laic "win-win" approach, which may earn licences and supply agreements from
African elites but offers little guidance for addressing the complexities of operat-
ing in an environment in which many of the key commodity producing countries
are distinguished by weakly legitimated regimes, enervated institutions and tepid
enforcement of the rule of law. When the situation descends into civil war,
China's standing is left tied to the fate of whatever regime happens to be
in power.

15 Marcel Kitissou, "influence of China on governance and human rights in Africa," The Bulletin, Vol. 1,
No. 2 (2008) Addis Ababa, African Union Commission, p. 82.
16 Ian Phimister and Brian Raftopoulos, "Mugabe, Mbeki and the politics of anti-imperialism," Review of
African Political Economy, No. 1001 (2004), pp. 399-400.
17 Chris Alden and Ana Cristina Alves, "History and identity in the construction of China's Africa
policy," Review of African PoliticalEconomy, No. 115 (2008), pp. 43-68.
570 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

Beijing's attachment to the principles of non-interference and non-

conditionality effectively shuts the door on other segments of African society
where a budding concern often spills over into outright hostility. The Chinese
presence then becomes a potential target for dissent from any segment of society
that is discontented with the prevailing circumstances under the government
of the day, whether trade unions concerned about safety standards or businesses
that are unable to compete against Chinese imports, superior access to supply
chains or low-cost bidding.
Such dangers for China are exacerbated when these complaints are used as pol-
itical capital by opposition politicians in Africa. Speaking before the parliament
of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in May 2008, Jean-Lucien
Mbusa, a leading member of the largest opposition party, the Movement for
the Liberation of Congo, thus decried a ground-breaking US$9 billion deal
with China as being incoherent, unbalanced and amounting to the forced sale
of the national heritage to the detriment of several generations. 18 Similar con-
cerns can be seen in persistent rumours that Chinese telecommunications compa-
nies have a special arrangement with the Congolese government through their
joint venture that involves an undisclosed exemption from taxes, giving them
an unfair competitive edge over the other four telecoms operators and suppliers
in the DRC. This perception is only made worse by the inability of the Chinese
parties concerned to address public concerns, as witnessed by the unwillingness of
CCT (a joint venture with Congolese state's postal and telecommunications com-
pany in which Zhong Xing Telecommunications Equipment Company holds a 51
per cent stake) to join Celtel-DRC, Vodacom Congo, Tigo and Supercell in host-
ing a press conference to deny that any special deals for the industry had been
made. 19
Beyond opposition politicians and businesses, within Africa there is an increase
in criticism from trade unions and NGOs that is both notable and significant.
African trade unions have not only played a part in critiquing the conduct of
Chinese firms which ignore local labour laws or for the negative impact that
Chinese imports have had on employment but also in other areas such as
human rights and the arms trade. 20 The revelations that China was shipping
small arms to Zimbabwe on the eve of contentious elections in March 2008.
sparked by the refusal of South African trade unionists to offload the cargo,
and the regional condemnation by African leaders (notably, however, not pub-
licly voiced by South Africa's president, Thabo Mbeki) that followed, demon-
strated that this is an area where the Chinese have to tread carefully. Again,
the fact that China has chosen to forge its ties with African governing elites

18 "S9bn loan deal unfair: DRC opposition," Reuters, 9 May 2008, www.miningweekly.com/articlephp?
a id=132982, accessed 26 July 2008.
19 Gregory Mthembu-Salter, "Pricing power: China's role in the telecoms sector in the Democratic
Republic of the Congo," Policy Report, No. 8 (2008), China in Africa Project, South African
Institute of International Affairs.
20 Chris Alden, Cina in Africa (London: Zed, 2007), pp. 82-89.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 571

has laid it open to suspicion if not outright attacks by civil society actors as col-
laborators with these governments.
The first signs of difficulties came with the explicit targeting of Chinese
workers constructing an oil pipeline in Sudan by the Sudanese People's
Liberation Movement in the late 1990s; this has been followed by threats, kidnap-
ping and even murder of Chinese workers in Sudan, Nigeria and Ethiopia.
Endemic corruption in countries like Angola, Nigeria and the DRC has forced
Chinese officials to scale back proposed investments in these countries. For
instance, previously agreed work on Nigeria's infrastructure was halted with
the change in presidency in Abuja, only to be revived with an offer of a US
$2.5 billion loan aimed at Nigeria's transport infrastructure alongside
Sinosure's US$50 billion extended to Chinese companies investing that country. 2 1
The political fallout resulting from poor practices adopted by Chinese firms has
provoked local criticism and, in the case of Zambia, a firestorm of protest that
resulted in an election campaign shaped in part around an anti-Chinese platform
by the opposition. 22 These hazards of engagement, familiar to long-established
foreign businesses in the resource sector in Africa, have been exacerbated by
the Chinese approach to rapidly securing its resource interests, which links the
problems of China's emphasis on forging its ties with elites, the corrosive impact
of corruption on trade and the spectre of political instability.
China's experience in Gabon highlights both the appeal of its comprehensive
package of financial and diplomatic incentives in exchange for long-term supply
contracts with African governments and the complexities of realizing these deals.
In Gabon, a modest oil producer with significant under-exploited deposits of iron
ore and manganese, the Chinese initially sought a joint venture under the aus-
pices of the Brazilian firm Compania Vale do Rio Doce (now Vale) to secure
a stake in the Belinga iron ore project. 23 Disagreements resulted in an
all-Chinese bid led by China National Machinery and Equipment Corporation
which secured exclusive rights to Belinga and its outputs in exchange for invest-
ment in Gabon's infrastructure topping US$3 billion. This China Exlm Bank
loan would involve the construction of a brand new 560 km railway line linking
Belinga to the coast, a deepwater mining harbour for transportation located
north of Libreville, a hydroelectric dam in the Ivindo River and the iron mining
factory.
For the Gabonese government, which had never invested in its own infrastruc-
ture at this level and had only generated 2 per cent of GDP from the mining sec-
tor as recently as 2005, this would be opening up new revenue streams as well as
expanding local employment possibilities in advance of elections. At the same
time, realizing the deal proved more difficult as a coalition of local and

21 "China oils Nigeria talks with loan," Financial Times, 23 April 2008.
22 Alden, China in Africa, pp. 72--76.
23 Ana Cristina Alves, "China and Gabon," Policy Report, No. 5 (2008), China in Africa Project,
Braamfontein, South African Institute of International Affairs, pp. 17-19.
572 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

international NGOs, along with the World Bank, launched protests over the
secretive nature of the contract, the concern over Chinese "control" of national
resources and the building of a dam in a national park. As a result, the
Chinese were forced to renegotiate the terms of the agreement within a year of
signing the original contract so that the government's stake in the company cre-
ated to run the project, Compagnie Miniere du Belinga, was raised to 25 per cent.
Such setbacks show that access to Africa's resource bounty may have been
deceptively easy for the first wave of Chinese investment under Beijing's strategy.
Limiting political contacts to the African elite according to the principles of non-
interference and non-conditionality is resulting in a degree of discord rather than
harmony, because of numerous unanticipated obstacles to sustaining the initial
gains. Managing this dynamic is made even more complex for Beijing by the
sheer explosion of the number of Chinese actors that it is encouraging to enter
the continent.

The Proliferation of Chinese Actors

As noted above, a deliberate element of the project of building the "new type of
strategic partnership" is to encourage a range of Chinese actors to enter Africa,
extending beyond the central government down to local authorities, businesses of
all sizes, news organizations, scientists and medics and what is labelled
"people-to-people" contacts. 24 The daily activities of these actors have a direct
impact on African societies that is not limited to the elite but extends down to
the grassroots level of small shopkeepers and farmers. While they have thus
been encouraged by the Chinese government, the range and complexity of
their activities tends to generate often unintended consequences that do not
chime well with the orthodox rhetoric.
The most influential among these new actors are the very large Chinese enter-
prises that have been cultivated by the state under the "going-out" strategy.
A good example of these is the Chinese National Mining and Electricity
Company, which is active in Gabon, Zambia and Angola. Another example is
North Industries Corporation, a commercial operation of the People's
Liberation Army which is active in the arms and infrastructure sectors in
Ethiopia, the DRC and South Africa. Huawei fP t is an example of a privatized
"national champion" that has received considerable support and cultivation from
the state to become a global operator. China's Non-Ferrous Metal Mining
Group is probably the most notorious firm because of its activities in Zambia.
In the financial sector, China International Finance is a somewhat mysterious
organization that was established in Hong Kong to handle money transfers to
Angola.

24 "Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Beijing Action Plan 2007-09"; "Beijing declaration of the
Forum on China-Africa Co-operation"; "Document on China's Africa Policy."
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 573

Perhaps the most visible and controversial of the large Chinese enterprises in
the international media have been the national oil corporations, namely the
Chinese National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC), Sinopec and the Chinese
National Offshore Oil Corporation (CNOOC). These have been accused of con-
tributing to the world energy crunch by tying up oil resources. CNPC has also
suffered more specific criticisms over human rights issues due to its operations
in Sudan, resulting in public pressure on major investors like Fidelity
Investments and Berkshire Hathaway to pull out of its publicly listed subsidiary,
PetroChina.
It is interesting to ask just why the Chinese government is prepared to suffer
such damage to its "soft power." From a commercial perspective, the search
for profits drives the national oil corporations to operate in sensitive areas such
as Sudan because their technical capabilities are not up to the challenges of
exploring and extracting in deep water or the polar regions. Yet their sheer size
and opaque relationship to the state also appears to give them the political capital
to promote their own agendas, as witnessed by the push and shove that takes
place between them and the government when attempts are made to keep dom-
estic energy prices low, sometimes even resulting in power cuts. 25
Another example of the problems caused for China's policy by the multipli-
cation of its actors in Africa can be seen in the controversy over the attempt
by the Chinese freighter An Yue Jiang ' Efl to ship arms to Zimbabwe in
April 2008, only to be turned back following the refusal of the South African
unions to handle the cargo, creating acute embarrassment for Beijing. Most intri-
guing as an indication of the ability of the Chinese government to control its
actors in Africa, though, are claims in the Western press that the shipment was
initiated from a connection between President Mugabe and a secretive Chinese
arms-manufacturing firm, Poly Technologies. This firm has a controversial
track record from the Congo to Darfur and is sometimes referred to as the
"supreme headquarters of the China princeling party," referring to the faction
of descendants of high-ranking Chinese Communist Party (CCP) veterans who
have been among the main beneficiaries of "reform and opening." The com-
pany's chairman, Major General He Ping -+, is the son-in-law of Deng
Xiaoping and its upper ranks are full of military veterans and their offspring. 2 6
Agriculture is another sector where the growing range of actors can be seen to
be causing problems for the implementation of Beijing's foreign policy. The state
is certainly enthusiastic about encouraging activity in this area, with the policy
framework devoting considerable space to it. The 2006 China Africa Summit
also committed China to establishing a network of ten agricultural training

25 Daniel H. Rosen and Trevor Houser, "China energy: a guide for the perplexed" (Washington, DC:
Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2007), p. 29.
26 Michael Sheridan, "Arms ship exposes Robert Mugabe's link to Chinese firm," The Times, 27 April
2008, http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/afica/article3822568.ece.
574 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

centres in Africa, since when a more concrete series of measures have been put
forward by Chinese officials aimed at promoting investment in the sector.
Yet the priorities of creating a harmonious relationship with Africa were soon
jeopardized by pressures to accommodate other domestically driven concerns,
including the search for land by large numbers of individual Chinese citizens,
when the head of the China ExIm Bank, Li Ruogu $ declared in
Chongqing in September 2007 that his institution would be prepared to provide
financial assistance to Chinese farmers, some dislocated by urbanization or mas-
sive development projects like the Three Gorges Dam and others through the
ongoing consolidation of commercial agriculture in the region, to settle in
Africa. As Li explained:
Chongqing is well experienced in agricultural mass production, while in Africa there is plenty of
land but food production is unsatisfactory. There is huge room for co-operation on both sides.
We have already supported several agricultural projects in Africa, all of which are generating
very sound profits. Chongqing's labour exports have just started, but they will take off once
we convince the farmers to become landlords abroad. ... the bank will give full support to
the farmers in terms of capital investment, project development and product-selling channels.27

A significant indicator of how this illustrates the problem of co-ordinating pol-

icy from Beijing is that the Chinese government officially distanced itself from
Li's pronouncement the following day. Subsequent soundings on the possibility
of resettling Chinese farmers in Africa have confirmed Beijing's interest, however.
Rather than fraternal solidarity, the motive behind this drive is a concern in
China over food security, which has been exacerbated by the spike in -soft- com-
modity prices and the onset of domestic consumer discontent at the sharp rise in
food prices.
The Chinese officials behind this agricultural policy seem to have been obliV-
ious to the high likelihood that exporting skilled farmers would be controversial
in Africa. However, conflicts over land in countries as diverse as Zimbabwe.
Kenya and Cote d'Ivoire certainly illustrate the potential volatility that the
issue in its various commercial, identity-based, spiritual and ideological forms
raises on the continent. 28 Moreover, these conflicts are all intertwined with dis-
putes over citizenship and overlays of xenophobia towards "non-authentic"
nationals, strongly suggesting the sort of problems Chinese settlers would experi-
ence in Africa. Thus while both conventional agricultural investments and actual
resettlement of Chinese migrants have been mooted in Liberia, Mozambique,
South Africa, Angola and Kenya - and are already in place in modest terms
in Zambia and Uganda this Chinese approach to food security seems destined
to incite negative repercussions at the level of the ordinary African, further com-
plicating Beijing's ability to consolidate its position on the continent.29

27 South China Morning Post, 19 September 2007.

28 "The changing politics of land in Africa: domestic politics, crisis management and regional norms." con-
ference proceedings, IFAS-LSE sponsored, University of Pretoria, 28-29 November 2005.
29 The News (Monrovia), 23 April 2008. According to this report, all of the China-Africa Development
Fund is earmarked for agricultural investment (which does not seem correct).
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 575

In Mozambique, for instance, the Chinese government has been pressing for
long leases to establish "mega-farms" and cattle ranches, with the aim of increas-
ing annual output in rice from 100,000 to 500,000 tonnes. 30 The China ExIm
Bank is not alone in seeking to support investment in agriculture; the China
Development Bank is prioritizing agricultural projects in their disbursements of
loans from the US$5 billion China Africa Development Fund. Moreover, follow-
ing the signing of a memorandum of understanding between the China ExIm
Bank and the World Bank in 2007 and the expansion of a Chinese role in the
institution, the World Bank has itself placed US$6 billion in support of agricul-
tural programmes in Africa.
Despite these problems, however, for individual Chinese in search of economic
opportunities abroad, migration to Africa offers the prospect of a relatively
untrammelled landscape where competition from other Chinese is limited.
With official Chinese figures claiming that three-quarters of a million Chinese
have migrated to Africa in recent years - and unofficial soundings suggesting
even more - the lure of African riches is fast assuming a mythical character. 31
Interviews with Chinese residents in South Africa, a top destination for emi-
grants, suggest that they hold a perception that Africa offers low-skilled
Chinese opportunities for employment if not enrichment when compared with
the competitive labour market in south-east and central China. 32
Encouraged in this process is a raft of Chinese government support aimed at
providing loans and buyer credits to businesses that set up in Africa as well as
a steady diet of programming on Africa in the official media. The proliferation
of retail trading shops, driving traditional retailers out of business, as well as
the opening of a modest service industry (restaurants, grocery stores, travel
agencies) aimed at the Chinese community, shows the limited skills and invest-
ment being utilized by this group of self-styled entrepreneurs. Private Chinese
businesses, following in the wake of the larger SOEs, have brought in Chinese
employees to manage and run activities. Small and medium-sized enterprises,
such as those in the timber cutting and export business in Mozambique,
Cameroon, Liberia and Gabon, in some cases employ Chinese in all aspects of
the production cycle. The 60-odd smelters owned by the Chinese in Katanga pro-
vince in the DRC used as many as 5,000 Chinese labourers, which fact along with
safety violations caused the provincial governor to shut down production and
drive out 600 of them. 33 In the financial sector, the move by Chinese banks
into Africa - highlighted by the purchase of a 20 per cent stake in South
Africa's Standard Bank by the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China in

30 China Business Neii s, 23 July 2008.

31 Yoon Jung Park, "Chinese Migration in Africa," Policy Report, No. 13 (forthcoming), China in Africa
Project, South African Institute of International Affairs, pp. 7-8. Yuan Wu, China and Africa: 1956-
2006 (Beijing: China Intercontinental Press, 2006). p. 110.
32 Non-systematic surveys of Chinese migrants in South Africa conducted January 2008.
33 Simon Clarke, Michael Smith and Franz Wild, "Young workers, deadly mines," Bloomberg Markets
(2008).
576 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

late 2007 - underscores not only the commercial opportunities for financial
services in Africa but also the possibility of longer-term expansion into retail
banking services in step with this growing Chinese community. 34

Learning Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)

The realization within the Beijing leadership that the increasing number of actors
in Africa is leading to friction with African societies can be seen by Hu Jintao's
warning to Chinese personnel on the continent that they need to help
Sino-African relations by contributing to the welfare of local people.35 An aware-
ness of the need to adapt to local conditions can also be seen in tentative initiat-
ives to encourage Chinese firms to behave more like their counterparts from the
developed countries by learning how to practise corporate social responsibility.
Some insight into this process can be gained from the report of a January 2008
investigation tour to assess the condition of CSR in Chinese firms in Mali,
Ethiopia and Sudan, carried out by a team of five researchers working under
the auspices of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, the leading social science
think tank in China affiliated to the State Council. 36 On the positive side, this
paints a remarkably glowing picture of Africans who are delighted with the atti-
tude of Chinese firms working without the burden of conditionality, in contrast
to the unfulfilled promises of aid from the West. Yet it also mentions a number of
concerns on the part of Africans. These include the need to expand investment in
Africa and establish branches of Chinese financial institutions, to ensure that
Chinese enterprises help with the development of native African firms to protect
native industries from being wiped out by Chinese imports. and the importance
of strengthening cultural exchanges and linguistic training.
The general picture is cloudy, though, as the report acknowledges that the atti-
tude of Chinese firms to CSR is one of "just do it, don't talk about it," which only
engenders suspicion due to the resulting lack of information with which to assess
the true situation. Apart from recommending more positive publicity, the group
learnt that it is also necessary to have a sense of long-term development to get
established in Africa, and that it is important to get a deep understanding of
the host country's legal system, customs and religious particularities. The authors
warn that a sense of CSR and being part of the host society should accompany
the search for profits, and that unwholesome competition between similar
Chinese enterprises should be avoided. The report recommends that more effort
and resources should be put into doing research into the real conditions in Africa

34 Riaan Meyer and Chris Alden, "Banking on Africa: the role of Chinese financial institutions in Africa,"
Policy Report, No. 7 (forthcoming), China in Africa Project, South African Institute of International
Affairs.
35 "Li Zhaoxing discusses Chairman Hu Jintao's successful tour of friendship and cooperation," Xinhua,
11 February 2007, http://news.xinhuanet.com/world/2007-02/1 l/content_5726062.htm.
36 Shiming Zhan, "Luxing qiye shehui zeren cujin ZhongFei gongtong fazhan" ("Put into practice corpor-
ate social responsibility to facilitate the common development of China and Africa"). No. 7 (2008),
pp. 63-66.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 577

rather than relying on Western sources. Communication should be strengthened

with government agencies, academics and NGOs in Africa, and there should be
better communication with Chinese embassies and consulates on the continent.
Perhaps most intriguing is the acknowledged need for China to learn something
from Africa about how it can improve the situation there by looking for new
topics of research, such as seeing the "Sudan model" as a successful model of
development for new oil economies, the policy of religious harmony in
Ethiopia and the multi-party democratic system in Mali.
Rather than see this growing interest in CSR as purely the result of exposure to
Africa, it should be stressed that there is already a movement on the part of the
Chinese government and firms to develop CSR inside China itself, with the help
of international advice from organizations like the European Union (EU). Its
extension to the work of Chinese firms operating in Africa can thus be seen as
another consequence of the general erosion of the barrier between domestic poli-
tics and foreign relations. Within the Chinese political system, it appears that
such a development is most likely to succeed when there is a coincidence of inter-
ests between firms, civil society and powerful actors inside the state bureaucracy.
This is most evident in the growing interest in the relationship between CSR and
sustainable development among Chinese academics, autonomous civil society
groups and policy makers. The Chinese leadership has in fact created the admin-
istrative context within which this is made possible by responding to growing
domestic and international concerns over the ecological impact of -reform and
opening" by developing a powerful bureaucracy in the form of the State
Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).
SEPA is well-known for having taken on corporate interests by promoting the
introduction of a Green GDP index and even going so far as to shut down large
industrial projects when they fail to meet legal requirements for assessing the
environmental impact of their investments.3 7 It is, therefore, particularly interest-
ing that SEPA took a significant step towards taking China into the global CSR
regime in January 2008, when it signed an agreement with the International
Finance Corporation to introduce the Equator Principles to China.38 This is
important, because the Equator Principles represent a consensus reached by lead-
ing financial institutions around the world, aiming to ensure that projects with a
total capital cost of at least US$50 million are developed in a manner that is
socially responsible and reflects sound environmental practices. 39
The limitations of even a fairly powerful bureaucracy like SEPA, which is inte-
gral to Beijing's drive for sustainable development, is revealed by the fact that
none of China's financial institutions has yet signed up to the Equator
Principles. One reason for this can be found in the difficulty involved in

37 In the first two months of 2005 SEPA shut down 30 large industrial projects, including several power
plants.
38 China Daily, 25 January 2008.
39 "The Equator Principles," http://www.equator-pinciples.com/documents/Equator-Principles.pdf.
578 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

co-ordinating a large variety of organizations within the Chinese political system

in a way that can make optimal use of foreign experience. A good example is the
system for providing foreign aid. This can at best be described as being "in for-
mation." 40 A mere 70 personnel deal with foreign aid in MOFCOM, which is the
main organ responsible for its management. Moreover, MOFCOM has to liaise
with other powerful actors that may have different agendas, such as the Ministry
of Finance, the top echelon of the State Council, Chinese ambassadors, the China
ExIm Bank and Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In addition to this, none of the aca-
demic think tanks that carry out analysis on Africa for the Chinese government
has issues of international development as part of its remit. 4 1 If this is the situ-
ation for foreign aid, which is a key element of the "new type of strategic partner-
ship" with Africa, it is not surprising that a powerful bureaucracy like SEPA
faces an uphill task in extending the domestic concerns over sustainable develop-
ment from the domestic sphere all the way to Africa.
While the drive for greater CSR is thus a positive development, it is doubtful
how far it can move without the right kinds of incentives. It could be argued that
the need to promote China's brand names around the world is a significant
reason for Chinese firms to work with international development regimes. This
can be seen, for example, in the government's support for engagement with the
UN's Global Compact, a strategic initiative launched by General Secretary
Kofi Annan in July 2000 for businesses that are committed to aligning their oper-
ations and strategies with a set of principles that cover human rights, labour stan-
dards, the environment and fighting corruption. Formally introduced into China
in December 2001 in a meeting hosted by the China Enterprise Confederation,
the 2005 Global Compact summit was held in Shanghai, co-chaired by Deng
Pufang MB l, the son of Deng Xiaoping acting in his capacity as president
of the China Disabled Persons Federation. The All China Federation of
Industry and Commerce has been tasked with guiding its member companies
with regard to all aspects of engagement with the Global Compact.4 2
The fact that some 181 Chinese firms are listed as signatories to the Global
Compact shows that it may have a bit more mileage than the Equator
Principles. While these firms have to post a code of practice that commits
them to the Global Compact norms, many of them have only joined very recently
and have not posted their required communications on progress which should
detail how the norms are being implemented. The firms Haier M S and
Huawei, which joined in 2002 and 2004 respectively, are interesting examples
of very large enterprises that have been cultivated under the going-out strategy
and now have major operations in Africa. Both are listed as having failed to pro-
vide a communication on progress by the relevant deadline. Haier has supplied a

40 Carol Lancaster, "The Chinese aid system,' Centre for Global Development, June 2007, p. 5, http://
www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1 3953.
41 Ibid pp. 3-5.
42 "The Global Compact in the PR China," United Nations Global Compact, http://www.
unglobalcompact.org/NetworksAroundTheWorld/country-contact/china.html.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 579

fairly lengthy document about its operations up to 2005 under the category
"communication in progress," which is a colourful brochure describing the
firm's domestic and global operations, management structure and training
opportunities, with a lot of stress on its commitment to sustainable development.
However, despite the fact that it briefly covers the United States, Europe, the
Middle East and the Asia Pacific, it does not even mention its operations in
Africa, which are now quite substantial. 43
Such evidence provides some support for the sceptical view that CSR regimes are
ultimately about spin and public relations in the absence of verifiable results."
While the temptation to use development regimes to protect one's brand is not
unique to Chinese firms, the poor standards achieved by even some of the most
prestigious firms in China operating in the domestic market shows that there are
good reasons to be sceptical about the relationship between corporate publicity
and practice. 45 This ultimately raises the question as to whether even the combi-
nation of state pressure and CSR regimes can provide the incentives for Chinese
actors in Africa to work according to international development norms.

Chinese Civil Society - the Missing Link

An interesting challenge arises when this question is addressed using the estab-
lished field of development studies, which tends to assume that the policy makers
and actors in donor and investing economies are governed by liberal democratic
political systems. This allows some role to be played by what might loosely be
termed civil society, with strong and well-organized domestic constituencies
seen as a valuable resource for governments in helping to accrue knowledge
and shape and implement policy for working in the developing world. 46
Given that civil society remains weak and under-developed in China, however,
it remains unclear just how much space there is for independent pressure groups
beyond large corporate actors to be used as a resource for policy makers. There is
some movement in this direction in the mushrooming of "GONGOs" (govern-
ment organized NGOs), yet these remain highly regulated and are expected to
follow the leadership of the CCP. 4 7 The scope for them to provide critical

43 Haier huanjing baogao shu, 2005, p. 4, http://www.unglobalcompact.org/data/ungc-cops-resources/

24B2F694-101 F-4F91-93E6-6F31 E46FCDD9/COP.pdf.
44 For a critical view see the remarks on the Global Compact made by Jeremy Hobbs of Oxfam, "Speaking
notes for Global Compact, Geneva, 5 July," http://www.unglobalcompact.org/NewsandEvents/event
archives/2007 Leaders Summit/Session2_OxfamHobbs.pdf.
45 Recently the most notorious case is that of Sanlu Corporation, a dairy products manufacturer exempted
from government safety checks because of its high standing, which supplied contaminated products on
to the domestic and international markets, including poisoned baby formula, for several months until
action was taken by the Chinese authorities under pressure from the New Zealand government in
September 2008.
46 Nicholas Stern, Jean-Jacques Dethier and F. Halsey Rogers, Growth and Empowerment: Making
Development Happen (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005), p. 310.
47 For a recent evaluation of the NGO situation see Zhang Ye. "China's emerging civil society," The
Brookings Institution, 2003, http://www.brookings.edulpapers/2003/08china-ye.aspx. See also He
Baogang, The Democratic Implications of Civil Society, in China (New York: St Martin's Press, 1997);
580 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

feedback into the policy-making process or to balance powerful commercial

interests is thus limited.
The development of Chinese NGOs that embrace the welfare of Africans will
be particularly difficult given the acute sensitivity of foreign affairs. The only
example of a pressure group that might be said to have shaped Chinese foreign
policy is the nationalistic movement to "Defend the Diaoyu Islands" from
Japan. 4 8 When it comes to issues of development, it is even harder to find
clear constituencies within the political system that could support the emergence
of NGOs that might want to influence the discussion and implementation of pol-
icy. 4 9 This is in contrast to traditional donors, whose most ardent civil society
advocates for Africa are generally products of volunteer schemes such as
Voluntary Services Overseas (United Kingdom), Japanese International
Volunteer Centre and the US Peace Corps. It is interesting to note that the gov-
ernment efforts to establish a brigade of similarly inspired Chinese university
graduates to work in Africa have floundered to date.5 0
It would be wrong, of course, to reify civil society as composed entirely of
idealistic groups, when these are often influenced by or compete with self-
interested constituencies like diaspora groups and political exiles from crisis-tom
African states as well as those more narrowly focused on single issues around, for
instance, protection of rivers from hydroelectric dams, or are even local branches
of international non-governmental organizations (INGOs). Because Chinese pol-
icy makers do not operate within this context of push-and-pull politics, however,
it is less clear where they can look for alternative sources of information or to
make alliances that can balance powerful vested interests. Recognition of this
position can be seen emerging from those organs of the state that are at the cut-
ting edge of taking on the corporate sector in domestic politics. Most notable has
been Pan Yue & r, deputy minister for the environment, who in 2005 boldly
asserted: "If it's safe politically to get involved and help the environment, then
all sides will benefit. We must try to convince the central leadership of that."51
Chen Xiwen I dMJt, an advisor to Premier Wen Jiabao on agricultural policy,
even told the South China Morning Post that the determination of farmers to

footnote continued

Tony Saich, "Negotiating the state: the development of social organisations in China," The China
Quarterly. No. 161 (2000); GuobinYang, "Environmental NGOs and institutional dynamics in
China," The China Quarterly. No. 181 (2005), pp. 46-66.
48 Guoli Liu, "Emerging civil society and foreign poliey of a rising China," paper delivered at the 101st
Political Science Association Conference, Washington, DC, 1-4 September 2005, http://www.
allacademic.com//metalp-mla-apa researchcitation/0/4/2/6/6/pages42666/p42666-1.php, pp. 7-8.
49 Lancaster, "The Chinese aid system." p. 5.
50 Confidential discussion with Chinese officials.
51 "Spiegel interview with China's Deputy Minister of the Environment: 'The Chinese miracle will end
soon'," Spiegel, 7 March 2005. http:Iser%ice.spiegel.de/cache/international/spiegel/0, 1518,345694,00.
html.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 581

speak out about injustices should be hailed as a sign of democracy. 52 The possi-
bility for civil society to play a more independent role in policy making appears
to be growing as Chinese leaders realize that NGOs can be a useful resource,
especially when major disasters such as the Sichuan earthquake of 15 May
2008 stretch the capacity of the state.53
A tentative attempt to extend this thinking to Africa policy can be found in
Beijing's sponsorship of minjian links with the continent. 54 This should be treated
with caution, however, because the term is more accurately rendered as
"people-to-people" contacts than "civil society" and involves a broad range of
projects. Sometimes these are clearly under the control of the Chinese govern-
ment, as in the case of the Confucius Institutes that are being established in
Africa as elsewhere around the world and are concerned with promoting
China's "soft power." They also include the participation of individual academics
and activists in international forums concerning Africa. Rather than representing
the emergence of links between Chinese and African civil societies that might call
Chinese actors to account, however, it may be better to see such initiatives as a
continuation of the "people's diplomacy" used to generate goodwill for China
in African states back in the era of Mao Zedong.5 5 Again, it is possible to see
a degree of change, with the Chinese Society for African Historical Studies actu-
ally allowing two African scholars and ten African students to participate in its
annual conference in 2008. Within such forums it is possible to see a more critical
view of China's role in Africa emerging from Chinese academics. 56 It remains to
be seen, however, whether these can be allowed and encouraged to operate in
ways that can shape foreign policy, with global networks increasingly providing
the momentum and knowledge basis for another kind of "going out."
A further source of possible pressure on Africa policy from an emergent
Chinese civil society might be the growing number of Chinese in Africa. To
date, however, this appears to be active only in the pursuit of CCP objectives,
as with attempts by the All Africa Association for Promoting Peaceful
National Unification to mobilize the nearly 200,000 Huaqiao $f from main-
land China and more than 20,000 from Taiwan present in South Africa against
"the forces of Taiwanese independence." 57 A similar trajectory of co-optation by
the Chinese state can be seen with the expansion of the Guangcai fi@

52 "Mainland official hails bloody riots as a sign of democracy: vice-minister says protests inevitable as
country undergoes huge changes,' South China Iforning Post, 4 July 2005.
53 Lixin Jia, "Chinese civil society after the 512 earthquake," Policy Forum Online, Nautilus Institute,
http:I/www.nautilus.org/fora/security/08056Jia.html.
54 "Forum on China-Africa Co-operation Beijing Action Plan 2007-09."
55 A. Ogunsanwo, China's Policv in Africa: 1958-1974 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974),
p. 267.
56 See for example the reported view of Jiang Hengkun of Zhejiang Normal University at the conference,
that China should take more action to settle the crisis in Darfur if it claims to be a responsible actor in
world affairs. "What do Chinese scholars know about Africa?" Pambazuka News. 20 November 2008,
http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/africa-china/52086, accessed 15 April 2009.
57 Beiyang Ye, "Tuanjie yiqie liliang fan 'du' cu tong," Tongyi luntan (Reunification Forum), No. 3 (2008),
p. 2.
582 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

organization of philanthropic entrepreneurs to Africa. Originally established by

entrepreneurs in Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macau in 1994 to campaign for pov-
erty alleviation in China, this now includes mainland Chinese firms and is work-
ing in Africa with the China Africa Business Council to disseminate the
experience of Chinese entrepreneurs in Africa. The fact that the vice-president
of the China Society for the Promotion of the Guangcai Programme, Hu
Deping MitlA, is also vice-president of the All China Federation of Industry
and Commerce and President of the China Africa Business Council, raises doubts
as to whether such a movement could ever constitute an autonomous, critical
voice standing outside government and business circles. That Hu could finished
a speech to the 2007 Global Compact summit by recalling Mao's poetic image
of dividing the sacred Kunlun Mountain into three pieces, representing a world
of harmony between America, Europe and the East, can only increase concerns
that such initiatives amount to tokenism rather than real engagement with the
continent. 58
Given the close control exercised over Chinese GONGOs by Beijing, it is not
surprising that INGOs are sceptical about the scope for co-operation with their
Chinese counterparts. Efforts are being made in this area, as witnessed by a meet-
ing billed as a forum for Chinese and African civil society groups in Shanghai in
May 2007 as well as at discussions held at the World Social Forum meeting in
Nairobi earlier that year. While the report on Shanghai proceedings contains
the views of representatives of genuine African NGOs, however, the Chinese par-
ticipants cited are academics from leading universities who are more concerned
with rebutting Western accusations of Chinese neo-imperialism than with the
concerns of African development. One African participant, Sara Musa Al
Saeed, a consultant with Christian Aid in Sudan, admits that she "might be
dreaming" when she wonders whether the two sides could actually join hands
and form pressure groups and exchange centres that could be a real force against
the negative impacts of governmental and economic policies.59
One problem that the weakness of Chinese civil society presents for Beijing is
that it leaves working with global civil society and INGOs as one of the few
options for African opposition movements and NGOs to exert pressure on
Beijing. The result can be reluctant policy change caused by severe diplomatic
embarrassment. The most spectacular example of this is the shift in public and
private diplomacy towards Sudan under pressure not only from diplomats in
Washington and European capitals but also by parliamentarians and human
rights lobbies that came to a head with the campaign to boycott the Beijing
Olympics.

58 "South south co-operation in economic globalization: a speech by Mr Hu Deping, vice-president of

All-China Federation of Industry and Commerce, vice-president of China Society for the Promotion
of GuangCai Program, president of China-Africa Business Council," http://unglobalcompact.org/
summitblog/index.php/2007/07/14/south-south-cooperation-in-economic-globalization/.
59 Hakima Abbas, "African and Chinese CSOs discuss Africa in China," Pambazuka News, No. 306
(2007), www.africa.edul/afrfocus/afrfocus081007.html.
 Harmony and Discord in China's Africa Strategy 583

Even though the limits of Chinese influence and the obstinacy of the Khartoum
regime were revealed by subsequent problems in implementing UN resolution
1769, coupled with the International Criminal Court's levying of charges against
Omar al-Bashir in June 2008, Beijing's policy shift shows how operating in this
global context has contributed to its growing sensitivity to Western interests in
Africa and even a measure of policy co-ordination. This can be seen in a process
like the Africa-China-EU dialogue that has been discussing development
co-operation since it was promoted by Brussels in 2004. With China unwilling
to subscribe to established OECD codes of practice for donors and many
Africans feeling uncomfortable when they see external partners engaging in dis-
cussions that are aimed at synchronizing their approaches to the continent, the
potential for making such co-operation responsive to Africa's needs remains
limited. In the absence of direct links between civil society in China and Africa,
however, it is hard to see how information can be more effectively accrued and
policy shaped in a more sensitive way.

Conclusion
It has been argued above that there is a growing tension between the state-centric
principles that have been the foundation of Chinese foreign policy since the 1950s
and the "new type of strategic partnership" with Africa. This can be seen in the
increasing dissonance between the principles of non-interference and non-
conditionality and a relationship with Africa that is characterized by a growing
complexity, driven by the tendency to deal with ruling elites and the unintended
consequences that arise from the presence of an expanding number of Chinese
actors.
While the problems that arise from dealing with Africa are not unique to
China, Beijing insists that its policy is fundamentally different from those of
the developed world. As its engagement with the continent deepens, however,
tentative attempts are being made to conform to international development
regimes, such as CSR.
It has been argued elsewhere that the way forward is for China to move further
in this direction by joining international development regimes such as that estab-
lished by the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD.60 The alterna-
tive to this may be an undoing of the international development and aid
regimes themselves, as China's inability to take part encourages states, investors
and traders in Africa from the developed world to follow suit, played off against
each other by African elites who might benefit more from a new scramble for the
continent than the building of a "harmonious world."
Given the interest that Beijing has in minimizing the frictions that are gener-
ated by the growing complexity and scale of China's relationship with Africa,

60 Stefan Stahl, "Towards China's integration into the aid donor architecture: learning from Chinese
participation in international regimes," China aktuell, No. 3 (2008), pp. 130-64.
584 The China Quarterly, 199, September 2009, pp. 563-584

however, it might be better to ask whether the state has the capacity to ensure
that its diverse actors can meet the commitments that joining existing inter-
national regimes would entail. From this perspective, asking how "China
thinks" 6 1 provides less insight than looking at the politics of push and pull that
goes on in and around the policy-making process. This presents an interesting
challenge for the Chinese political system because existing international develop-
ment regimes have been established by states and actors working within the
bounds of the domestic liberal-democratic politics of the developed world. In
principle, at least, this means that the various actors concerned with Africa are
monitored to some degree by the independent pressure groups and constituencies
that make up the civil societies of the developed countries.
The official rhetoric from Beijing, however, rejects the experience of the devel-
oped countries as symptomatic of a neo-colonial attitude. Yet little is appearing
to explain how powerful Chinese actors in Africa can be monitored and called to
account or how policy makers can gain access to the broadest body of objective
knowledge about the continent. In this respect, Africa is no different from other
sensitive areas of Chinese policy making such as the environment and agricultural
policy, where avoiding the unintended adverse consequences that arise from
increasing complexity requires the widest possible input of independent knowl-
edge and expertise. Perhaps the best way to understand the breadth of this chal-
lenge is to go beyond the state-to-state level of analysis and see the complexity of
the problems in China-Africa relations as arising from the much larger historical
process of the erosion of the barrier between China's domestic politics and its
foreign relations.
From a longer historical perspective this can be seen as a logical progression in
China's development trajectory as the domestic economic reform programme is
extended to Africa under the "going-out" strategy, resulting in the doctrines of
"peaceful development" and building a "harmonious world." As xwith China's
domestic development, some of the solutions being developed in this process
are novel and some will depend on working with international regimes. Yet the
problems arising from rapid development are increasingly large and many gaps
in the policy-making process are waiting to be filled.

61 Ibid p. 147.