PAFR CASES
41. QUIMIGUING V. ICAO
FACTS:
Carmen Quimiguing’s family and Felix Icao were neighbors and had close and confidential relations.
Despite being married, Icao succeeded in having carnal intercourse with Carmen several times by force
and intimidation, and without her consent. Despite efforts and drugs supplied by Icao, Carmen became
pregnant and had to stop studying. Hence, she filed for support at P120.00 per month, damages and
attorney's fees.
Icao moved to dismiss for lack of cause of action since the complaint did not allege that the child had
been born. The trial judge sustained Icao’s motion and dismissed the complaint. Thereafter, Carmen
moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, she had later given birth to a
baby girl. However, the court ruled that no amendment was allowable since the original complaint
averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to this Court.
ISSUE: May an action for support be filed for an unborn child?
HELD:
YES. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given by law a provisional personality of its own for all
purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The
unborn child, therefore, has a right to support from its progenitors, particularly of Icao (whose paternity
is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de
sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article
742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born after
the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).
The lower court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an obligation of
parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that nowhere appears in the text of Article 291. It is
true that Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for all purposes that
are favorable to it" adds further "provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the following
article" (i.e., that the foetus be alive at the time it is completely delivered from the mother's womb). This
proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first
part of Article 40 would become entirely useless and ineffective.
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a woman not
his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation
of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Thus,
1
independently of the right to Support of the child she was carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of
action was doubly in error.
41. CONTINENTAL STEEL VS MONTANO
FACTS:
Hortillano, an employee of petitioner Continental Steel Manufacturing Corporation (Continental Steel)
and a member of respondent Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel Corporation-Solidarity of Trade
Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment and Reforms (Union) filed a claim for Paternity Leave,
Bereavement Leave and Death and Accident Insurance for dependent, pursuant to the Collective
Bargaining Agreement (CBA) concluded between Continental and the Union. This, after his wife, Marife,
had a pre-mature delivery which resulted to the death of their unborn child.
Continental Steel immediately granted Hortillano’s claim for paternity leave but denied his claims for
bereavement leave and other death benefits, consisting of the death and accident insurance. It posited
that the express provision of the CBA did not contemplate the death of an unborn child, a fetus, without
legal personality.
ISSUE: Whether or not Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits on the death of his unborn child.
RULING:
Yes, Hortillano is entitled to bereavement benefits.
The Court emphasize that bereavement leave and other death benefits are granted to an employee to
give aid to, and if possible, lessen the grief of, the said employee and his family who suffered the loss of a
loved one. It cannot be said that the parents’ grief and sense of loss arising from the death of their
unborn child, who, in this case, had a gestational life of 38-39 weeks but died during delivery, is any less
than that of parents whose child was born alive but died subsequently.
The court also emphasized that life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil
personality first before he/she could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the
Constitution recognizes the life of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with
the life of the mother. If the unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child
being delivered, qualifies as death.
 PAFR CASES
3. REPUBLIC VS. CA AND CASTRO
FACTS:
Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did
not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castro’s earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:
The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied
by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the
contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses
is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.
Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.
2
3. FILIPINA Y. SY, petitioner, V. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Facts:
On November 15, 1973 Filipina Sy and Fernando Sy got married at the Church of Our Lady of
Lourdes in Quezon City. After some time, Fernando left their conjugal dwelling. Two children were born
out of the marriage. Frederick, their son went to his father’s residence. Filipina filed for legal separation.
The Trial Court dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains and granted the custody of their
children to her.
Later on, Filipina was punched at the different parts of her body and was even choked by him
when she started spanking their son when the latter ignored her while she was talking to him.
The Trial Court convicted him for slight physical injuries only. A new action for legal separation
was granted by repeated physical violence and sexual infidelity. Filipina then filed for the declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage citing psychological incapacity.
The Trial Court and Appellate Court denied her petition. On her petition to this Court, she
assailed for the first time that there was no marriage license during their marriage.
Issues:
1) Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and private respondent is void from the
beginning for lack of a marriage license at the time of the ceremony; and
2) Whether or not private respondent is psychologically incapacitated at the time of said marriage
celebration to warrant a declaration of its absolute nullity.
Ruling:
The date of celebration of their marriage on November 15, 1973, is admitted both by petitioner and
private respondent. The pieces of evidence on record showed that on the day of the marriage ceremony,
there was no marriage license. A marriage license is a formal requirement; its absence renders the
marriage void ab initio. In addition, the marriage contract shows that the marriage license, numbered
6237519, was issued in Carmona, Cavite, yet, neither petitioner nor private respondent ever resided in
Carmona.
The marriage license was issued on September 17,1974, almost one year after the ceremony took place
on November 15, 1973. The ineluctable conclusion is that the marriage was indeed contracted without a
marriage license. Under Article 80 of the Civil Code. those solemnized without a marriage license, save
marriages of exceptional character, are void ab initio. This isclearly applicable in this case.
 PAFR CASES
The remaining issue on the psychological incapacity of private respondent need no longer detain the
Court. It is mooted by the conclusion that the marriage of petitioner to respondent is void ab initio for
lack of a marriage license at the time their marriage was solemnized.
3. SEVILLA V. CARDENAS, 497 SCRA 429
FACTS: Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas were married at Manila City Hall where they executed
a marriage contract. A marriage license number was indicated in the contract, which Jaime never applied
for. A church ceremony was conducted on May 31, 1969 using the same license. They lived as husband
and wife and later on went to Spain for Jaime‘s medical education supported by Jaime‘s parents. When in
Spain their marriage turned bad since Jaime was having a hard time balancing marriage and medical
studies; obsession of Jaime with Carmelita‘s knees which he would take countless pictures of,
intrafemural sex between her knees which are attributed to Jaime‘s drug addiction. Their marriage
became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their
marriage. Jaime went to the US to get a divorce in 1981 and a judicial separation in 1983. Later, she
learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States. Sevilla presented 3
certifications from the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan which states that the marriage license with that
number cannot be found. The parish where they were wed presented a Certified copy of a Marriage
certificate dated April 11, 1994. RTC ruled that marriage is null due to lack of marriage license. CA
reversed RTC‘s decision. Marriage license was probably issued but cannot be located
ISSUE: W/N the marriage is valid.
HELD: Valid. Decision of the CA affirmed. The local civil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to
locate the book wherein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered," for the reason that "the employee
handling is already retired." Failure to locate does not mean non-existence of the marriage license.
Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the indissolubility of marriage bonds. Always
presume marriage.
4. COSCA V. PALYPAYON JR. 237 SCRA 249
FACTS:
Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Respondent Judge Lucio P. Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while Nelia
Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was field with the Office of the Court
Administrator charging respondents, among others, illegal solemnization of marriage. Complainants
alleged that respondent Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a
consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage license number. The respondent
3
Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason
being that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was
usually several days after the ceremony.
Indubitably, the marriage contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.
HELD:
[i]The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid
marriage license except in the cases provided for therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence
of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and that,
while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or
parties responsible for the irregularity shall be civilly , criminally and administratively liable.
* The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriage, and
what we are providing for herein pertains to the administrative liability of respondents, all without
prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code provides that “priests or ministers of any
religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage
ceremony shall be punished in accordance with the provisions of the Marriage Law.” This is of course,
within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.
RESPONDENT JUDGE LUCIO P. PALAYPAYON, JR. IMPOSED A FINE WITH STERN WARNING xxx
4. ARANES VS. JUDGE OCCIANO
FACTS:
Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law.
Occiano is the presiding judge in Court of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage
of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couple’s residence in Nabua, Camarines Sur
which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
It appeared in the records that petitioner and Orobia filed their application of marriage license on
January 5, 2000 and was stamped that it will be issued on January 17, 2000 but neither of them claimed
it. In addition, no record also appeared with the Office of the Civil Registrar General for the alleged
marriage.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to
conduct the marriage and advised them to reset the date considering the absence of the marriage
 PAFR CASES
license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from
stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that
same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license
and conducting it outside his territorial jurisdiction.
HELD:
The court held that “the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of
Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines
Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not amount to
gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but
nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for violating the law on marriage”.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Salvador M. Occiano, Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court of
Balatan, Camarines Sur, is fined P5,000.00 pesos with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or
similar offense in the future will be dealt with more severely.
4. MORIGO VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage
with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.
ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before his
second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.
HELD:
Morigo’s marriage with Barrete is VOID AB INITIO considering that there was no actual marriage
ceremony performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a
marriage contract. The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he
4
contracted his second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the
case filed.
4. ROSITA A. ALCANTARA and HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
Facts:
A petition for annulment of marriage was filed by petitioner against respondent Rosita A.
Alcantara alleging that he and respondent celebrated their marriage twice without securing the required
marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage
contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to
apply for a license with the local civil registrar of the said place. On 14 October 1985, respondent gave
birth to their child Rose Ann Alcantara. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner
prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil
Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Answering petitioner’s petition for annulment of marriage, respondent asserts the validity of
their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification
from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. She had actually gave birth to two children, one
as stated by the petitioner and the other was Rachel Ann Alcantara on October 27, 1992. Moreover,
petitioner filed the said case in order to evade prosecution for concubinage for he had a mistress with
whom he had three children. The case for concubinage was actually filed and that petitioner prays that
the annulment case be dismissed for lack of merit.
The Regional Trial Court of Makati City dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The Court of
Appeals dismissed also the petitioner’s appeal. Hence, the appeal to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether or not The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a reversible error when it ruled that
the Petition for Annulment has no legal and factual basis despite the evidence on record that there was
no marriage license at the precise moment of the solemnization of the marriage.
Held:
The certification of Municipal Civil Registrar Macrino L. Diaz of Carmona, Cavite enjoys the
presumption that official duty has been regularly performed and the issuance of the marriage license was
 PAFR CASES
done in the regular conduct of official business. The presumption of regularity of official acts may be
rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty. However, the presumption
prevails until it is overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless
the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive. Every reasonable intendment will be made in
support of the presumption and, in case of doubt as to an officer’s act being lawful or unlawful,
construction should be in favor of its lawfulness. Significantly, apart from these, petitioner, by counsel,
admitted that a marriage license was, indeed, issued in Carmona, Cavite.
Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the validity of the
marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage bonds. The
Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the
presumption is of great weight.
4. NOLLORA V. PEOPLE
Topic: Validity of Marriage, Bigamous Marriage
FACTS:
Atilano Nollora Jr was married to Jesus Nollora. Their marriage was still subsisting when he contracted a
2nd marriage with Rowena Geraldino, who is herself aware of his marriage with Jesusa but still agreed
and contracted marriage with him.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the 2nd marriage is bigamous and void ab initio.
RULING:
Yes. Under Art 349 of the RPC, the marriage is bigamous and pursuant to Art 35 of the Family Code, it is
void ab initio. Nollora’s religious affiliation is inapplicable here. Neither of his marriages were solemnized
under the Muslim Law. The SC ruled that his two marriages were not conducted according to the Code of
Muslim. Hence, his religious affiliation may not be used as a defense.
4. REPUBLIC V. ALBIOS
FACTS:
Fringer and Liberty Albios got married on October 22, 2004, before the sala of Judge Calo in
Mandaluyong City. 2 years after their marriage (December 6, 2006), Albios filed with the RTC a petition
for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Fringer. According to her, the marriage was a marriage in
jest because she only wed the American to acquire US citizenship and even arranged to pay him $2,000 in
exchange for his consent. Adding that immediately after their marriage, they separated and never lived
as husband and wife because they never really had any intention of entering into a married state and
5
complying with their marital obligations. The court even sent summons to the husband but he failed to
file an answer.
Both the RTC and CA ruled in favor of Albios declaring that the marriage was void ab initio for lack of
consent because the parties failed to freely give their consent to the marriage as they had no intention to
be legally bound by it and used it only as a means to acquire American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00.. However, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) elevated the case to the SC. According to
the OSG, the case do not fall within the concept of a marriage in jest as the parties intentionally
consented to enter into a real and valid marriage. That the parties here intentionally consented to enter
into a real and valid marriage, for if it were otherwise, the purpose of Albios to acquire American
citizenship would be rendered futile.
ISSUE:
Is a marriage, contracted for the sole purpose of acquiring American citizenship in consideration of
$2,000.00, void ab initio on the ground of lack of consent?
RULING:
NO. Both Fringer and Albios consented to the marriage. In fact, there was real consent because it was
not vitiated nor rendered defective by any vice of consent.
Their consent was also conscious and intelligent as they understood the nature and the beneficial and
inconvenient consequences of their marriage, as nothing impaired their ability to do so.
That their consent was freely given is best evidenced by their conscious purpose of acquiring American
citizenship through marriage. Such plainly demonstrates that they willingly and deliberately contracted
the marriage. There was a clear intention to enter into a real and valid marriage so as to fully comply with
the requirements of an application for citizenship. There was a full and complete understanding of the
legal tie that would be created between them, since it was that precise legal tie which was necessary to
accomplish their goal.
Under Article 2 of the Family Code, for consent to be valid, it must be (1) freely given and (2) made in the
presence of a solemnizing officer.
A "freely given" consent requires that the contracting parties willingly and deliberately enter into the
marriage.
Consent must be real in the sense that it is not vitiated nor rendered defective by any of the vices of
consent under Articles 45 and 46 of the Family Code, such as fraud, force, intimidation, and undue
influence. None of these are present in the case.
 PAFR CASES
Therefore, their marriage remains valid.
4. ABBAS V. ABBAS
Facts: This is a case filed by Syed Azhar Abbas, petitioner, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage
with Gloria Goo-Abbas on the ground of absence of marriage license, as provided for in Article 4 of the
Family Code.
Syed and Gloria were married in Taiwan on August 9, 1992. When they arrived in the Philippines on
December 1992, a ceremony was conducted between them solemnized by Rev. Mario Dauz and
witnessed by Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez and Mary Ann Ceriola. Present also is Felicitas Goo, mother-in-law of
Syed. During the ceremony, he and Gloria signed a document. Syed claim that he did not know the
nature of the ceremony until Gloria told him that it was a marriage.
In the marriage contract of Syed and Gloria, it is stated that Marriage License No 9969967, issued at
Carmona, Cavite was proven by the MCR being issued to other couple.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Syed and Gloria is valid.
Ruling: No. As the marriage of Syed and Gloria was solemnized on January 9, 1993, the Family Code is the
applicable law, particularly Articles 3, 4 and 35 (3).
Article 3 provides the formal requisites of marriage. Article 4 provides the effects of the absence of the
essential and formal requisites. And Article 35, Paragraph 3 provides that those marriages which are
solemnized without a license are void from the beginning in exception to those covered by the preceding
chapter.
Gloria failed to present actual marriage license or copy relied on the marriage contract and testimonies
to prove the existence of the said license.
Thus, the marriage of Syed and Gloria is void ab initio.
4. SALLY GO-BANGAYAN vs. BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.
TOPIC: Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage (Article 148)
DOCTRINE: Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties
acquired by them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions, in accord with Article 148.
6
FACTS: Benjamin and Sally developed a romantic relationship in 1979. Sally’s father was against the
relationship. Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamin’s marital status, assured him that the marriage contract
would not be registered. Sally filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents
against Benjamin, using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition
for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial court
on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage. Benjamin also asked the trial court for the partition of the properties he acquired with Sally in
accordance with Article 148 of the Family Code, for his appointment as administrator of the properties
during the pendency of the case, and for the declaration of Bernice and Bentley as illegitimate children. A
total of 44 registered properties became the subject of the partition before the trial court. Aside from the
seven properties enumerated by Benjamin in his petition, Sally named 37 properties in her answer.
The trial court ruled that the marriage was not recorded with the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office because it could not be registered due to Benjamin’s subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was not bigamous.
ISSUES:
Whether the marriage between Benjamin and Sally are void for not having a marriage license
Whether Art. 148 should govern Benjamin and Sally’s property relations
Whether bigamy was committed by the petitioner.
HELD:
YES.
We see no inconsistency in finding the marriage between Benjamin and Sally null and void ab initio and,
at the same time, non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34 where no license is necessary, “shall be void from the
beginning.” In this case, the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was solemnized without a license. It
was duly established that no marriage license was issued to them and that Marriage License No. N-07568
did not match the marriage license numbers issued by the local civil registrar of Pasig City for the month
of February 1982. The case clearly falls under Section 3 of Article 35which made their marriage void ab
initio. The marriage between Benjamin and Sally was also non-existent. Applying the general rules on
void or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of the Civil Code, contracts which are absolutely simulated
or fictitious are “inexistent and void from the beginning.” Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in
sustaining the trial court’s ruling that the marriage between Benjamin and Sally was null and void ab
initio and non-existent.
YES.
 PAFR CASES
The property relations of Benjamin and Sally is governed by Article 148 of the Family Code which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling under the preceding Article, only the properties acquired by
both of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be
owned by them in common in proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of proof to
the contrary, their contributions and corresponding shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the
absolute community of conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party who acted in bad
faith is not validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in the manner provided in the
last paragraph of the preceding Article.
contract. However, if the second marriage was void not because of the existence of the first marriage
but for other causes such as lack of license, the crime of bigamy was not committed. For bigamy to
exist, the second or subsequent marriage must have all the essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage. In this case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally
just signed a purported marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall likewise apply even if both parties are in bad faith.

Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the benefit of marriage. Thus, only the properties acquired by
them through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective contributions. Thus, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly excluded the 37 properties being claimed by Sally which were given by Benjamin’s
father to his children as advance inheritance. Sally’s Answer to the petition before the trial court even
admitted that “Benjamin’s late father himself conveyed a number of properties to his children and their
respective spouses which included Sally x x x.”
4. RAQUEL KHO V. REPUBLIC OF THE PH
As regards the seven remaining properties, we rule that the decision of the CA is more in accord with the
evidence on record. Only the property covered by TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names of FACTS:
Benjamin and Sally as spouses. The properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and 190860 were in the name of Petitioner’s parents summoned a clerk to arrange necessary papers on one afternoon of May 31,
Benjamin with the descriptive title “married to Sally.” The property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and 8783 1972 for the intended marriage of parties herein on the midnight as to exclude the public from
were registered in the name of Sally with the descriptive title “married to Benjamin” while the properties witnessing the marriage ceremony. They were only able to fulfill such ceremony at 3AM of June 1, 1972
under TCT Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered in the name of Sally as a single individual. We for reason that there was a public dance held in town plaza that was adjacent to the church and such
have ruled that the words “married to” preceding the name of a spouse are merely descriptive of the civil dance only finished at 2AM. Due to the shortness of period, said clerk was not able to secure them a
status of the registered owner. Such words do not prove co-ownership. Without proof of actual marriage license. RTC declared their marriage null and void. CA reversed it stating that the marriage was
contribution from either or both spouses, there can be no co-ownership under Article 148 of the Family valid and subsisting.
Code.
Issue: W/N CA erred to give due credence to petitioner’s evidence which established the absence
3. NO. or lack of marriage license when the marriage was solemnized.

On whether or not the parties’ marriage is bigamous under the concept of Article 349 of the Revised HELD:
Penal Code, the marriage is not bigamous. It is required that the first or former marriage shall not be null
and void. The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena shall be assumed as the one that is valid, there being
no evidence to the contrary and there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity on the face of their marriage
7
 PAFR CASES
Marriage is void. Art 58 and Art 80 (3) of the Civil Code explicitly provides that no marriage shall
be solemnized without a license first issued by the LCR (Art. 58). Marriage performed without the
corresponding marriage license is void (Art. 80 (3)). Court favors petitioner.
21. GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, v. REDERICK A. RECIO, respondent.
G.R. No. 138322, October 2, 2001
FACTS:
Respondent Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in Malabon,
Rizal, on March 1, 1987. They lived together as husband and wife in Australia. On May 18, 1989, a decree
of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by an Australian family court. On June 26,
1992, respondent became an Australian citizen and was married again to petitioner Grace Garcia-Recio, a
Filipina on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City. In their application for a marriage license, respondent
was declared as “single” and “Filipino.”
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of
their marriage.
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of
bigamy. Respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting marriage at the time he married her. On his Answer,
Rederick contended that his first marriage was validly dissolved; thus, he was legally capacitated to marry
Grace.
On July 7, 1998 or about five years after the couple’s wedding and while the suit for the declaration of
nullity was pending , respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from a family court in Sydney,
Australia because the “marriage had irretrievably broken down.”
The Regional Trial Court declared the marriage of Rederick and Grace Recio dissolved on the ground that
the Australian divorce had ended the marriage of the couple thus there was no more marital union to
nullify or annul.
ISSUE:
1.) Whether or not the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was proven.
2.) Whether or not respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry petitioner
RULING:
1st issue:
8
The Supreme Court ruled that the mere presentation of the divorce decree of respondent’s marriage to
Samson is insufficient. Before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party
pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.
Furthermore, the divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the
aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
2nd issue:
Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
“1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy.”
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, the Court find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the
Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent’s capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence
on this matter.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court a quo for the purpose of receiving evidence. The
Court mentioned that they cannot grant petitioner’s prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null
and void because of the question on latter’s legal capacity to marry.
26. REPUBLIC V. CRASUS IYOY (G.R. NO. 152577)
FACTS:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for the reversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy (respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, in the same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In
1985, Crasus learned that Fely married an American and had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children in which she used her
husband’s last name as hers in the invitation.
 PAFR CASES
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Fely’s acts brought
“danger and dishonor” to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus
submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her new husband’s last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and that since
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted the decree; it was affirmed in the CA.
ISSUE:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason,
Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the court’s unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino
citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to
remarry under Philippine law.

HELD:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.

Furthermore, Article 36 “contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to

assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.”

Finally, Article 36 “is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting ap arty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.”

26. REPUBLIC V. ORBECIDO

FACTS: 26. FUKIJI V. MARINAY

Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of
Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City. They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly,
respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years later, Orbecido
discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his
wife sometime in 2000 had obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed
with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family
Code.
FACTS:
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela Marinay
(Marinay) in the Philippines on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s parents.
Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each
other.

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 PAFR CASES
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being 2. YES. The prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the marriage
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara he contracted and the property relations arising from it. Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki. the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC
entitled: “Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage).”
RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment ·(or Decree of Absolute Nullity
of Marriage)" based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the
petition.
Fujiki filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied upon consideration that Fujiki as a "third
person” in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized.
The OSG agreed with the petitioner that the RTC’s decision be set aside.
3. YES. The Philippine court can recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case
which was already tried and decided under foreign law. Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to
extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does
not contravene domestic public policy. However, the Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a
foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.
In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or on
the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the rule of
lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.

2. Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of
bigamy.

3. Whether the RTC can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

RULING:
1. No. Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages 34. NINAL VS. BAYADOG
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status
of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. FACTS:
Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on
10
 PAFR CASES
April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating
that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito
died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepito’s
marriage after his death?
HELD:
The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted
even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from
the time of Pepito’s first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito
and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that
their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage
to Norma is still void.
Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
34. MANZANO VS. SANCHEZ
FACTS:
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Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21,
1966 in San Gabriel Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her
husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage
contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were “separated” thus, respondent Judge ought to
know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David
and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as
manifested in their joint affidavit that they both left their families and had never cohabit or
communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.
ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an
existing marriage can contract marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of
Family Code.
HELD:
Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other.
Considering that both parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they
are both “separated” is an impediment that would make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just
like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5 years does not severe
the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross
ignorance of the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
34. DE CASTRO VS DE CASTRO
FACTS:
Petitioner and respondent met and became sweethearts in 1991. They planned to get married, thus they
applied for a marriage license with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Pasig City in September 1994. They
had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly engaged in sex thereafter.
When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage license had already expired.
Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license, they executed an affidavit
dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and wife for at least five
years. The couple got married on the same date, with Judge Jose C. Bernabe, presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, administering the civil rites. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the marriage between petitioner and respondent is valid.
HELD:
 PAFR CASES
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted
the falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with
the marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with
each other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the
marriage. The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and
embarrassment concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to
the publication of every applicant’s name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no
"scandalous cohabitation" to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which
petitioner and respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value
whatsoever; it is a mere scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement.
Their failure to obtain and present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.
34. REPUBLIC VS. DAYOT
FACTS:
Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage
license, they executed a sworn affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990,
Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both employees of the National
Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an
administrative complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint
on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of marriage where he contended that his
marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Jose’s marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn
affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD:
CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they
executed their sworn affidavit and contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in
June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on November 1986. Findings of
facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a
marriage. Furthermore, “the falsity of the allegation in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose
12
and Felisa’s cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the requirement
for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law
precisely required to be deposed and attested to by the parties under oath”. Hence, Jose and Felisa’s
marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible.
The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.
34. CARLOS VS. SANDOVAL AND CARLOS II
FACTS: Teofilo Carlos and petitioner Juan De Dios Carlos were brothers who each had three parcels of
land by virtue of inheritance. Later Teofilo died intestate. He was survived by his wife Felicidad Sandoval
and their son, Teofilo Carlos II. Upon Teofilo’s death, two parcels of land were registered in the name of
Felicidad and Teofilo II. In August 1995, Carlos commenced an action for the annulment of the marriage
between Teofilo and Felicidad. In his complaint, Carlos asserted that the marriage between his late
brother and Felicidad was a nullity in view of the absence of the required marriage license. He likewise
maintained that his deceased brother was neither the natural nor the adoptive father of Teofilo Carlos II.
He argued that the properties covered by such certificates of title, including the sums received by
respondents as proceeds, should be reconveyed to him.
ISSUE: Who may file an action for annulment of marriage? 
HELD: A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or
wife. Exceptions: (1) Nullity of marriage cases commenced before the effectivity of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC;
and (2) Marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code. Under the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, the petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage may not be filed by any party outside of the marriage.  A petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife. Only an
aggrieved or injured spouse may file a petition for annulment of voidable marriages or declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriages. Such petition cannot be filed by compulsory or intestate heirs of the
spouses or by the State. The Committee is of the belief that they do not have a legal right to file the
petition. Compulsory or intestate heirs have only inchoate rights prior to the death of their predecessor,
and, hence, can only question the validity of the marriage of the spouses upon the death of a spouse in a
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts . On the
other hand, the concern of the State is to preserve marriage and not to seek its dissolution. The Rule
extends only to marriages entered into during the effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.
The advent of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages marks the beginning of the
end of the right of the heirs of the deceased spouse to bring a nullity of marriage case against the
 PAFR CASES
surviving spouse. But the Rule never intended to deprive the compulsory or intestate heirs of their
successional rights.
While A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC declares that a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage may
be filed solely by the husband or the wife, it does not mean that the compulsory or intestate heirs are
without any recourse under the law. They can still protect their successional right, for, as stated in the
Rationale of the Rules on Annulment of Voidable Marriages and Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void
Marriages, compulsory or intestate heirs can still question the validity of the marriage of the spouses, not
in a proceeding for declaration of nullity but upon the death of a spouse in a proceeding for the
settlement of the estate of the deceased spouse filed in the regular courts.
It is emphasized, however, that the Rule does not apply to cases already commenced before March 15,
2003 although the marriage involved is within the coverage of the Family Code. This is so, as the new
Rule which became effective on March 15, 2003 is prospective in its application.
Carlos commenced the nullity of marriage case against Felicidad in 1995. The marriage in controversy
was celebrated on May 14, 1962. Which law would govern depends upon when the marriage took place.
The marriage having been solemnized prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the applicable law is the
Civil Code which was the law in effect at the time of its celebration. But the Civil Code is silent as to who
may bring an action to declare the marriage void. Does this mean that any person can bring an action for
the declaration of nullity of marriage?
True, under the New Civil Code which is the law in force at the time the respondents were married , or
even in the Family Code, there is no specific provision as to who can file a petition to declare the nullity
of marriage; however, only a party who can demonstrate  “proper interest”  can file the same. A petition
to declare the nullity of marriage, like any other actions, must be prosecuted or defended  in the name of
the real party-in-interest  and must be based on a  cause of action. Thus, in Ninal v. Badayog,  the Court
held that the children have the personality to file the petition to declare the nullity of marriage of their
deceased father to their stepmother as it affects their successional rights.
13
35-36. LEOUEL SANTOS V. COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Leouel and Julia exchanged vows on September 20, 1986. A year after the marriage, the couple when
quarreling over a number of things including the interference of Julia’s parents into their marital affairs.
On May 18, 1998, Julia finally left for the United States. Leouel was then unable to communicate with her
for a period of five years and she had then virtually abandoned their family. Leouel filed a case for nullity
on the ground of psychological incapacity. The Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint for lack of
merit. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the grounds of psychological incapacity in this case should be appreciated.
RULING:
The Supreme Court denied the petition. Psychological incapacity should refer to no less than a mental
(not physical) incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage which, as so expressed by
Article 68 of the Family Code, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and
fidelity and render help and support. The psychological condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated and must be incurable. Mere abandonment cannot therefore qualify as psychological
incapacity on the part of Julia.
35-36. CHI MING TSOI V. CA
FACTS:
Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao Tsoi was married in 1988. After the celebration of their wedding, they
proceed to the house of defendant’s mother. There was no sexual intercourse between them during
their first night and same thing happened until their fourth night. In an effort to have their honeymoon
in a private place, they went to Baguio but Gina’s relatives went with them. Again, there was no sexual
intercourse since the defendant avoided by taking a long walk during siesta or sleeping on a rocking chair
at the living room. Since May 1988 until March 1989 they slept together in the same bed but no attempt
of sexual intercourse between them. Because of this, they submitted themselves for medical
examination to a urologist in Chinese General Hospital in 1989. The result of the physical examination of
Gina was disclosed, while that of the husband was kept confidential even the medicine prescribed. There
were allegations that the reason why Chi Ming Tsoi married her is to maintain his residency status here in
 PAFR CASES
the country. Gina does not want to reconcile with Chi Ming Tsoi and want their marriage declared void
on the ground of psychological incapacity. On the other hand, the latter does not want to have their
marriage annulled because he loves her very much, he has no defect on his part and is physically and
psychologically capable and since their relationship is still young, they can still overcome their
differences. Chi Ming Tsoi submitted himself to another physical examination and the result was there is
no evidence of impotency and he is capable of erection.
ISSUE: Whether Chi Ming Tsoi’s refusal to have sexual intercourse with his wife constitutes psychological
incapacity.
HELD:
The abnormal reluctance or unwillingness to consummate his marriage is strongly indicative of a serious
personality disorder which to the mind of the Supreme Court clearly demonstrates an utter insensitivity
or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage within the meaning of Article 36 of the
Family Code.
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marital
obligations and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Furthermore, one of the essential marital obligations
under the Family Code is to procreate children thus constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally
destroy the integrity and wholeness of the marriage.
35-36. REPUBLIC V. CA AND MOLINA
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a
year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for
aid and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had
an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to
live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological
incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
14
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilities and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldo’s action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each
other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
 burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
 root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
 such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
 such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
 such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
 decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
 court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the
state.
35-36. MARCOS V. MARCOS
FACTS: Brenda and Wilson first met sometime in 1980 when both of them were assigned at the
Malacañang Palace, she as an escort of Imee Marcos and he as a Presidential Guard of President
Ferdinand Marcos. They later on became sweethearts and got married and had 5 children. After the
EDSA revolution, both of them sought a discharge from the military service. He engaged to different
business ventures but failed. She always urged him to look for work so that their children would see him,
instead of her, as the head of the family and a good provider. Due to his failure to engage in any gainful
employment, they would often quarrel and as a consequence, he would hit and beat her. He would even
force her to have sex with him despite her weariness. He would also inflict physical harm on their
children for a slight mistake and was so severe in the way he chastised them. Thus, for several times
during their cohabitation, he would leave their house. In 1992, they were already living separately. She
did not want him to stay in their house anymore so when she saw him in their house, she was so angry
that she lambasted him. He then turned violent, inflicting physical harm on her and even on her mother
who came to her aid. She sought for nullity of their marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The Brenda submitted herself to psychologist Natividad A. Dayan, Ph.D., for psychological evaluation. The
court a quo found Wilson to be psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations mainly
because of his failure to find work to support his family and his violent attitude towards Brenda and their
children. RTC granted the petition. CA reversed. Hence, this case.
 PAFR CASES
ISSUE: W/N there is a need for personal medical examination of respondent to prove psychological
incapacity? Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological incapacity
HELD: Personal medical or psychological examination of respondent is not a requirement for a
declaration of psychological incapacity. Nevertheless, the totality of the evidence she presented does not
show such incapacity. Although SC is convinced that respondent failed to provide material support to the
family and may have resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of these acts does not
lead to a conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing that his
“defects” were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they are incurable.
35-36. DEDEL V. CA
FACTS:
David Dedel and Sharon Corpuz were married on September 28, 1996 and May 20, 1967 in a civil and
church wedding, respectively. They had four children. David instituted a case for the nullity of their
marriage on account of Sharon’s psychological incapacity to perform basic marital obligations. He
claimed that Sharon had extra-marital affairs with several men including a dentist in the AFP, a lieutenant
in the Presidential Security Command, and a Jordanian national. Despite the treatment by a clinical
psychiatrist, Sharon did not stop her illicit relationship with the Jordanian, whom she married and with
whom she had two children. When the Jordanian national left the country, Sharon returned to David
bringing along her two children by the Jordanian national. David accepted her back and even considered
the illegitimate children as his own. However, Sharon abandoned David to join the Jordanian national
with her two children. Since then, Sharon would only return to the country on special occasions.
Dra. Natividad Dayan testified that she conducted a psychological evaluation of David and found him to
be conscientious, hardworking, diligent, a perfectionist who wants all tasks and projects completed up to
the final detail and who exerts his best in whatever he does. On the other hand, Dra. Dayan declared that
Sharon was suffering from Anti-Social Personality Disorder exhibited by her blatant display of infidelity;
that she committed several indiscretions and had no capacity for remorse, even
bringing with her the two children of the Jordanian to live with David. Such immaturity and
irresponsibility in handling the marriage like her repeated acts of infidelity and abandonment of her
family are indications of the said disorder amounting to psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage.
The trial court declared their marriage null and void on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
Sharon to perform the essential obligations of marriage. While the Court of Appeals set aside the trial
15
court’s judgement and ordered the dismissal of the petition. David’s motion for reconsideration was
denied. Hence, he appealed to the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Sharon’s infidelity is equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
RULING:
No. Sharon’s infidelity is not equivalent to psychologically incapacity.
As held in Santos vs. Court of Appeals, “psychological incapacity” should refer to no less than a mental,
not physical, incapacity that causes a party to be truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed and discharged
by the parties to the marriage which as so expressed in Article 68 of the Family Code, include their
mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect and fidelity and render help and support. The
law intended to confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity of inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.
Sharon’s sexual infidelity or perversion and abandonment do not by themselves constitute psychological
incapacity within the contemplation of the Family Code. Neither could her emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility be equated with psychological incapacity. It must be shown that these acts are
manifestations of a disordered personality, which make the respondent completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of the marital state, not merely due to her youth, immaturity or sexual
promiscuity.
At best, the circumstances relied upon by David are grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the
Family Code not for declaring a marriage void. The grounds for legal separation, which need not be
rooted in psychological incapacity, include physical violence, moral pressure, civil interdiction, drug
addiction, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment, and the like. Decision affirmed. Petition
denied.
35-36. VERONICO TENEBRO v. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
FACTS:
Petitioner Veronico Tenebro contracted marriage with private complainant Leticia Ancajas on April 10,
1990. The two were wed by Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City. Tenebro
and Ancajas lived together continuously and without interruption until the latter part of 1991, when
Tenebro informed Ancajas that he had been previously married to a certain Hilda Villareyes on
November 10, 1986. Tenebro showed Ancajas a photocopy of a marriage contract between him and
 PAFR CASES
Villareyes. Invoking this previous marriage, petitioner thereafter left the conjugal dwelling which he
shared with Ancajas, stating that he was going to cohabit with Villareyes.
On January 25, 1993, petitioner contracted yet another marriage, this one with a certain Nilda Villegas,
before Judge German Lee, Jr. of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 15. When Ancajas learned
of this third marriage, she verified from Villareyes whether the latter was indeed married to petitioner. In
a handwritten letter, Villareyes confirmed that petitioner, Veronico Tenebro, was indeed her husband.
Ancajas thereafter filed a complaint for bigamy against petitioner.
The trial court rendered a decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in convicting the accused for the crime of bigamy despite clear proof that
the marriage between the accused and private complainant had been declared null and void ab initio and
without legal force and effect
RULING:
As such, an individual who contracts a second or subsequent marriage during the subsistence of a valid
marriage is criminally liable for bigamy, notwithstanding the subsequent declaration that the second
marriage is void ab initio on the ground of psychological incapacity.
As a second or subsequent marriage contracted during the subsistence of petitioner’s valid marriage to
Villareyes, petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas would be null and void ab initio completely regardless of
petitioner’s psychological capacity or incapacity. Since a marriage contracted during the subsistence of a
valid marriage is automatically void, the nullity of this second marriage is not per se an argument for the
avoidance of criminal liability for bigamy.
Thus, as soon as the second marriage to Ancajas was celebrated on April 10, 1990, during the subsistence
of the valid first marriage, the crime of bigamy had already been consummated. Moreover, the
declaration of the nullity of the second marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity is not an
indicator that petitioner’s marriage to Ancajas lacks the essential requisites for validity. In this case, all
the essential and formal requisites for the validity of marriage were satisfied by petitioner and Ancajas.
Both were over eighteen years of age, and they voluntarily contracted the second marriage with the
required license before Judge Alfredo B. Perez, Jr. of the City Trial Court of Lapu-lapu City, in the presence
of at least two witnesses. The decision of the Court of Appeals convicting petitioner Veronico Tenebro of
the crime of Bigamy is AFFIRMED.
35-36. JARILLIO V. PEOPLE
DOCTRINE:
16
He who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.
FACTS:
On November 1979, the accused Victoria S. Jarillo, being previously united in lawful marriage with Rafael
M. Alocillo in 1974, and without the said marriage having been legally dissolved, contracted a second
marriage with Emmanuel Ebora Santos Uy which marriage was only discovered in 1999.
On the same year, Emmanuel Uy (2nd husband) filed against the appellant a civil case for annulment of
marriage before the RTC. Parenthetically, Jarillo filed for declaration of nullity of their marriage against
Alocillo in 2000.
For her defense, petitioner insisted that (1) her marriage to Alocillo was null and void because Alocillo
was allegedly still married to a certain Loretta Tillman at the time of the celebration of their marriage; (2)
her marriages to both Alocillo and Uy were null and void for lack of a valid marriage license; and (3) the
action had prescribed, since Uy knew about her marriage to Alocillo as far back as 1978. Notwithstanding
her defenses, the RTC found Jarillo guilty for the crime of bigamy in 2001 and was sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of six years to ten years of prision mayor.
On appeal to the CA, petitioner’s conviction was affirmed. It held that petitioner committed bigamy when
she contracted marriage with Emmanuel Santos Uy because, at that time, her marriage to Rafael Alocillo
had not yet been declared null and void by the court. This being so, the presumption is, her previous
marriage to Alocillo was still existing at the time of her marriage to Uy. The CA also struck down, for lack
of sufficient evidence, petitioner’s contentions that her marriages were celebrated without a marriage
license, and that Uy had notice of her previous marriage as far back as 1978.
In the meantime, the RTC rendered a decision in 2003, declaring petitioner’s 1974 marriage to Alocillo
null and void ab initio on the ground of Alocillo’s psychological incapacity. Said decision became final and
executory. In her motion for reconsideration, petitioner invoked said declaration of nullity as a ground for
the reversal of her conviction.
ISSUE:
W/N CA committed a reversible error in affirming the conviction of Jarillo for the crime of bigamy despite
the supervening proof that her marriage to Alocillo had been declared void.
HELD:
No. Jarillo’s conviction of the crime of bigamy must be affirmed. The subsequent judicial declaration of
nullity of her marriage to Alocillo cannot be considered a valid defense in the crime of bigamy. The
moment petitioner contracted a second marriage without the previous one having been judicially
 PAFR CASES
declared null and void, the crime of bigamy was already consummated. Under the law, a marriage, even
one which is void or voidable, shall be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
The outcome of the civil case for annulment of petitioner’s marriage to [private complainant] had no
bearing upon the determination of petitioner’s innocence or guilt in the criminal case for bigamy,
because all that is required for the charge of bigamy to prosper is that the first marriage be subsisting at
the time the second marriage is contracted.
Without a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, it is presumed to be subsisting. Any decision
in the civil action for nullity would not erase the fact that the guilty party entered into a second marriage
during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civil case is not essential to the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question.
35-36. REPUBLIC V. QUINTERO-HAMANO
FACTS:
Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did
not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved.
Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:
17
The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshio’s act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified
Toshio’s illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio
was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
35-36. NAJERA V. NAJERA
FACTS: Petitioner filed with the RTC a verified Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage with
Alternative Prayer for Legal separation, with Application for Designation as Administrator Pendente Lite
of the Conjugal Partnership of Gains. Petitioner alleged that she and respondent are residents of
Bugallon, Pangasinan, but respondent is presently living in the (United States of America). They were
married but are childless.
Petitioner claimed that at the time of the celebration of marriage, respondent was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of the marriage, and such incapacity
became manifest only after marriage; (1) that respondent was jobless and was not exerting effort to find
a job at the time of marriage; only with the help of petitioner’s elder brother, who was a seaman, was
respondent able to land a job as a seaman; (2) that while employed as a seaman, respondent did not give
petitioner sufficient financial support); (3) that respondent would quarrel with petitioner and falsely
accuse her of having an affair with another man whenever he came home, and took to smoking
marijuana and drinking; (4) that on July 1, 1994, while he was quarreling with petitioner, without
provocation, he inflicted physical violence upon her and attempted to kill her with a bolo; and (6) after
the said incident respondent left the family home, taking along all their personal belongings, and
abandoned the petitioner. Petitioner reported the incident at the police station of Bugallon, Pangasinan.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of petitioner’s evidence was able to prove that respondent is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the
annulment of their marriage under Article 1: of the Family Code.
 PAFR CASES
RULING: No. The evidence presented by petitioner in regard to the physical violence or grossly abusive
conduct toward petitioner and respondent’s abandonment of petitioner justifiable cause for more than
one year are grounds for legal separation only and not for annulment of marriage under Article 1: of the
Family Code.
35.36. PEREZ-FERRARIS V. FERRARIS
FACTS: The RTC rendered a Decision denying the petition for declaration of nullity of petitioner’s
marriage with Brix Ferraris. The trial court noted that suffering from epilepsy does not amount to
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Civil Code and the evidence on record were insufficient to
prove infidelity. Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied where the trial court reiterated that
there was no evidence that respondent is mentally or physically ill to such an extent that he could not
have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have given valid assumption
thereof.
Petitioner appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the judgment of the trial court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage of petitioner and respondent is void ab initio on the ground of
respondent’s psychological incapacity.
RULING: It is a well-established principle that factual findings of the trial court, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court, save for the most compelling and cogent reasons, like when
the findings of the appellate court go beyond the issues of the case, run contrary to the admissions of the
parties to the case, or fail to notice certain relevant facts which, if properly considered, will justify a
different conclusion; or when there is a mis appreciation of facts, which are unavailing in the instant case.
18
The term “psychological incapacity” to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.
As all people may have certain quirks and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with
certain personality disorders, there is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to
confine the meaning of “psychological incapacity” to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage.
It is for this reason that the Court relies heavily on psychological experts for its understanding of the
human personality. However, the root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature must be fully explained, which petitioner failed to convincingly demonstrate.
Indeed, the evidence on record did not convincingly establish that respondent was suffering from
psychological incapacity. There is absolutely no showing that his “defects” were already present at the
inception of the marriage, or that those are incurable.
We find respondent’s alleged mixed personality disorder, the “leaving-the-house” attitude whenever
they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment
and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family, are not
rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, where therein respondent preferred to spend more time with his friends
than his family on whom he squandered his money, depended on his parents for aid and assistance, and
was dishonest to his wife regarding his finances, the Court held that the psychological defects spoken of
were more of a “difficulty,” if not outright “refusal” or “neglect” in the performance of some marital
obligations and that a mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity; it is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet their
responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological, not physical, illness.
An unsatisfactory marriage, however, is not a null and void marriage. No less than the Constitution
recognizes the sanctity of marriage and the unity of the family; it decrees marriage as legally “inviolable”
and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and marriage are to be
“protected” by the state.
 PAFR CASES
35-36. PARAS V. PARAS
FACTS: On May 21, 1964, petitioner Rosa Yap married respondent Justo J. Paras in Bindoy, Negros
Oriental. They begot four (4) children, namely: Raoul (deceased), Cindy Rose (deceased), Dahlia, and
Reuel. Twenty-nine (29) years thereafter, or on May 27, 1993,Rosa filed with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Branch 31, Dumaguete City, a complaint for annulment of her marriage with Justo,under Article 36
of the Family Code, docketed as Civil Case No. 10613. She alleged that Justo is psychologically
incapacitated to exercise the essential obligations of marriage as shown by the following circumstances:
(a) he dissipated her business assets and forged her signature in one mortgage transaction; (b) he lived
with a concubine and sired a child with her; (c) he did not give financial support to his children; and (d) he
has been remiss in his duties both as a husband and as a father. She met Justo in 1961 in Bindoy. She was
then a student of San Carlos University, Cebu City. He courted her, frequently spending time at her
"Botica."
Eventually, in1964 convinced that he loved her, she agreed to marry him. Their wedding was considered
one of the "most celebrated" marriages in Bindoy. Sometime in 1975, their daughter Cindy Rose was
afflicted with leukemia. It was her family who paid for her medication. Also, in 1984, their son Raoul was
electrocuted while Justo was in their rest house with his "barkadas." He did not heed her earlier advice to
bring Raoul in the rest house as the latter has the habit of climbing the rooftop. To cope with the death of
the children, the entire family went to the United States. However, after three months, Justo abandoned
them and left for the Philippines. Upon her return to the Philippines, she was shocked to find her "Botica"
and other businesses heavy in debt and he disposed without her consent a conjugal piece of land. At
other times, he permitted the municipal government to take gasoline from their gas station free of
charge. His act of maintaining a mistress and siring an illegitimate child was the last straw that prompted
her to file the present case. She found that after leaving their conjugal house in 1988, Justo lived with
Jocelyn Ching. Their cohabitation resulted in the birth of a baby girl, Cyndee Rose, obviously named after
her (Rosa) and Justo‘s deceased daughter Cindy Rose Paras. He also denied forging her signature in one
mortgage transaction. He maintained that he did not dispose of a conjugal property and that he and Rosa
personally signed the renewal of a sugar crop loan before the bank’s authorized employee. He did not
abandon his family in the United States.
For his part, he was granted only three (3) months leave as municipal mayor of Bindoy, thus, he
immediately returned to the Philippines. He spent for his children’s education. At first, he resented
supporting them because he was just starting his law practice and besides, their conjugal assets were
more than enough to provide for their needs. He admitted though that there were times he failed to give
them financial support because of his lack of income. What caused the inevitable family break-out was
Rosa’s act of embarrassing him during his birthday celebration in 1987. She did not prepare food for the
guests. When confronted, she retorted that she has nothing to do with his birthday. This convinced him
19
of her lack of concern. This was further aggravated when she denied his request for engine oil when his
vehicle broke down in a mountainous and NPA-infested area.
As to the charge of concubine, he alleged that Jocelyn Ching is not his mistress, but her secretary in his
Law Office. She was impregnated by her boyfriend, a certain Grelle Leccioness. Cyndee Rose Ching
Leccioness is not his daughter. After trial or on February 28, 1995, the RTC rendered a Decision upholding
the validity of the marriage. It found that: (a) Justo did not abandon the conjugal home as he was forced
to leave after Rosa posted guards at the gates of their house; (b) the conjugal assets were sufficient to
support the family needs, thus, there was no need for Justo to shell out his limited salary; and (c) the
charge of infidelity is unsubstantiated. The RTC observed that the relationship between the parties
started well, negating the existence of psychological incapacity on either party at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. And lastly, it ruled that there appeared to be a collusion between them as
both sought the declaration of nullity of their marriage.
On October 18, 2000, this Court rendered its Decision finding him guilty of falsifying Rosa’s signature in
bank documents, immorality, and abandonment of his family. He was suspended from the practice of
law, thus: the respondent is suspended from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS on the charge of
falsifying his wife’s signature in bank documents and other related loan instruments; and for ONE (1)
YEAR from the practice of law on the charges of immorality and abandonment of his own family, the
penalties to be served simultaneously. Let notice of this Decision be spread in respondent’s record as an
attorney, and notice of the same served on the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and on the Office of the
Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts concerned.
On December 8, 2000, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision in the present case, holding that
"the evidence of the plaintiff (Rosa) falls short of the standards required by law to decree a nullity of
marriage." It ruled that Justo’s alleged defects or idiosyncrasies "were sufficiently explained by the
evidence," Rosa contends that this Court’s factual findings in A.C. No. 5333 for disbarment are conclusive
on the present case. Consequently, the Court of Appeals erred in rendering contrary factual findings.
Also, she argues that she filed the instant complaint sometime in May, 1993
ISSUES:
1) Whether the factual findings of this Court in A.C. No. 5333 are conclusive on the present case;
2) Whether a remand of this case to the RTC for reception of expert testimony on the root cause of
Justo’s alleged psychological incapacity is necessary; and
3) Whether the totality of evidence in the case shows psychological incapacity on the part of Justo.
HELD:
1) A reading of the Court of Appeals’ Decision shows that she has no reason to feel aggrieved. In
fact, the appellate court even assumed that her charges "are true," but concluded that they are
 PAFR CASES
insufficient to declare the marriage void on the ground of psychological incapacity. Justo's by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioner’s personality disorder
alleged infidelity, failure to support his family and alleged abandonment of their family home are was serious and incurable. CA reversed RTC’s decision.
true, such traits are at best indicators that he is unfit to become an ideal husband and father.
However, by themselves, these grounds are insufficient to declare the marriage void due to an ISSUE: W/N he is psychologically incapacitated.
incurable psychological incapacity. These grounds, we must emphasize, do not manifest that he
was truly in cognitive of the basic marital covenants that he must assume and discharge as a HELD: The testimony of petitioner’s expert witness revealed that petitioner was suffering from
married person. While they may manifest the "gravity" of his alleged psychological incapacity, dependent personality disorder. In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioner’s
they do not necessarily show ‘incurability’, such that while his acts violated the covenants of dependent personality disorder was evident in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his
marriage, they do not necessarily show that such acts show an irreparably hopeless state of parents and depended on them for decisions. Petitioner’s mother even had to be the one to tell him to
psychological incapacity which prevents him from undertaking the basic obligations of marriage seek legal help when he felt confused on what action to take upon learning that his marriage to
in the future. respondent was for real. Dr. Dayan further observed that petitioner typically acted in a self-denigrating
2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a) medically or clinically identified, (b) manner and displayed a self-defeating attitude. This submissive attitude encouraged other people to take
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts, and (d) clearly explained in the advantage of him. This could be seen in the way petitioner allowed himself to be dominated, first, by his
decision. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological -not father who treated his family like robots and, later, by respondent who was as domineering as his father.
physical, although its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must When petitioner could no longer take respondent’s domineering ways, he preferred to hide from her
convince the court that the parties, or one of them, were mentally or psychically ill to such an rather than confront her and tell her outright that he wanted to end their marriage. It has been
extent that the person could not have known the obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, sufficiently established that petitioner had a psychological condition that was grave and incurable and
could not have given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such incapacity need be had a deeply rooted cause.
given here so as not to limit the application of the provision under the principle of ejusdem
generis, nevertheless such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given by qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologist.
3) ART. 36. A marriage contracted by a party who, at the time of celebration, was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential marital obligations of marriage shall likewise be void
even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its solemnization. Psychological incapacity
must be characterized by (a) gravity; (b) juridical antecedence; and (c) incurability.

35-36. HALILI V.HALILI

FACTS: Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona
M. Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage. He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rights thinking that it was a “joke.”
After the ceremonies, they never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship.
However, they started fighting constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing
respondent and started dating other women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him
to stop dating other women as he was already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he
found out that the marriage was not “fake.” Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a
mixed personality disorder, particularly dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed
20
35-36. TE VS. TE
FACTS: Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-
Chinese association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowena’s close friend but, as the latter
already had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It
was Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless.
Her persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he,
providing their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.
 PAFR CASES
They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncle’s house and Edward to
his parents’ home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited
from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a
month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edward’s parents wanted them to
stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996,
she said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.
After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on
the basis of the latter’s psychological incapacity.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD: The parties’ whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996,
eloped in March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who
provided expert testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioner’s behavioral
pattern falls under the classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondent’s, that of the
narcissistic and antisocial personality disorder
There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally
examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts
that manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.
The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.
Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he
is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.
As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to
assume the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
21
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.
Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.
35-36. TING V. TING
FACTS: Benjamin Ting and Carmen Velez-Ting first met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical
school. They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already
pregnant with their first child. On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to
petitioner and while their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before
the RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the
Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the
celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became manifest thereafter.
Carmen’s allegations of Benjamins psychological incapacity consisted of the following manifestations:
1. Benjamins alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;
2. Benjamins violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the family
car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts, because he
no longer had money to pay the same; and
4. Benjamins irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a
respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted
and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week. Both
presented expert witnesses (psychiatrist) to refute each other’s claim. RTC ruled in favor of the
respondent declaring the marriage null and void.
Petitioner appealed to the CA. CA reversed RTC’s decision. Respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should not be applied to this case.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases,
2. Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity
for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has
been liberalized,
 PAFR CASES
3. Whether the CAs decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void is in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
HELD:
1. No. respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina should
not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
2. The Case involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant
facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals.
3. There is no evidence that adduced by respondent insufficient to prove that petitioner is
psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and more
particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago.
35-36. AZCUETA V. REPUBLIC
FACTS:
Petitioner Marietta Azcueta and Rodolfo Azcueta got married on July 24, 1993. They separated in 1997
after four years of marriage and bore no child.
22
Petitioner filed with the RTC a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code, claiming that her husband Rodolfo was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
essential obligations of marriage. According to petitioner, Rodolfo was emotionally immature,
irresponsible and continually failed to adapt himself to married life and perform the essential
responsibilities and duties of husband. Petitioner also complained of physical violence.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the totality of the evidence presented is adequate to sustain a finding that Rodolfo is
psychologically incapacitated to comply with his essential marital obligations.
RULING:
Yes. After a thorough review of the records of the case, we find that there was sufficient compliance with
the guidelines in the Molina case to warrant the annulment of the parties’ marriage under Article 36.
The Court laid down in Republic of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals and Molina stringent guidelines in
the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the Family Code, to wit:
1. The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff;
2. The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the
decision;
3. The incapacity must be proven to be existing at “the time of the celebration” of the marriage;
4. Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable;
5. Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the
essential obligations of marriage;
6. The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family
Code as regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children;
7. Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in
the Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.
In all, the Court agrees with the trial court that the declaration of nullity of the parties’ marriage pursuant
to Article 36 of the Family Code is proper under the premises.
35-36. MENDOZA V. REPUBLIC
 PAFR CASES
FACTS: Arabelle and Dominic Mendoza got married while Arabelle was eight months pregnant. They lived
together but depended on their parents for financial support. Arabelle had different jobs to support the
needs of the family. When Dominic got employed for Toyota in Bel-Air Makati in 1994, he spent his first
salary celebrating with his friends. September of the same year, Arabelle found out of Dominic’s illicit
relationship with Zaida, his co-employee. Communication between them became rare and they started
sleeping in separate rooms. In November 1995, Dominic gave her a car as a birthday present only to find
out that he did not pay for it, forcing her to rely on her father-in-law for the payment of the car. Dominic
eventually got fired from his job because of he ran away with P164,000 belonging to his employer. He
was charged with estafa. Petitioner also found out that he swindled many of his clients some of them
threatening her and their family. On October 15, 1997, Dominic abandoned the conjugal abode because
petitioner asked him for “time and space to think things over.” A month later, she refused his attempt at
reconciliation, causing him to threaten to commit suicide. She and her family immediately left the house
to live in another place concealed from him. On August 5, 1998, petitioner filed in the RTC her petition
for the declaration of the nullity of her marriage with Dominic based on his psychological incapacity
under Article 36 of the Family Code. The RTC found that all the characteristics of psychological incapacity
which are gravity, antecedence and incurability, were attendant, establishing Dominic’s psychological
incapacity. The Republic appealed to the CA, arguing that there was no showing that Dominic’s
personality traits either constituted psychological incapacity existing at the time of the marriage or were
of the nature contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code; that the testimony of the expert witness
was not conclusive upon the court, and that the real reason for the parties’ separation had been their
frequent quarrels over financial matters and the criminal cases brought against Dominic. CA reversed the
decision of RTC. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: W/N psychological incapacity of Dominic was established.
HELD: No. Findings of Dr. Samson were one-sided, because Dominic was not himself subjected to an
actual psychiatric evaluation by petitioner’s expert. He also did not participate in the proceedings. And
that the findings and conclusions on his psychological profile by her expert were solely based the
testimonies of the petitioner.
35-36. REPUBLIC V. CA AND QUINTOS
23
FACTS:
Eduardo and Catalina were married in civil rites. However, the couple were not blessed with a child
because Catalina had a hysterectomy following her second marriage.
Eduardo filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage citing psychological incapacity as a ground.
He alleged that Catalina always left the house without his consent; that she engaged in petty arguments
with him; that she constantly refused to give in to his sexual needs; that she spent most of her time
gossiping with neighbors instead of caring for their adopted daughter; that she gambled away all his
remittances as an overseas worker; and that she abandoned the conjugal home with her paramour.
As support to his claim of psychological incapacity, he also presented the results of a neuro-psychiatric
evaluation conducted by Dr. Annabelle Reyes stating that Catalina exhibited traits of a borderline
personality disorder that was no longer treatable.
Catalina did not appear during trial but admitted her psychological incapacity. She denied flirting with
different men and abandoning the conjugal home.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Catalina was psychologically incapacitated to fulfill marital duties.
HELD:
No. Marriage remains valid.
Psychological incapacity is an incapacity/inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital
obligations, and is not merely the difficulty, refusal or neglect in the performance of marital obligations.
In Republic v CA(Molina), the Supreme Court has established guidelines involving the nullity of marriage
based on the ground of psychological incapacity. These were not met in the instant case since the gravity,
root cause and incurability of Catalina's purported psychological incapacity were not sufficiently
established.
Catalina's behavior of frequent gossiping, leaving the house without Eduardo's consent, refusal to do
household chores, and take care of their adopted daughter were not established. Eduardo presented no
other witness to corroborate these allegations.
Also, the RTC and CA heavily relied on Dr. Reyes' evaluation despite any factual foundation to support
this claim. The report was vague about the root cause, gravity and incurability of the incapacity. Even the
testimony of Dr. Reyes stated a general description of borderline personality disorder which did not
 PAFR CASES
explain the root cause as to why Catalina was diagnosed as such. They did not specify the acts or spouse. The plaintiff bears the burden of proving the juridical antecedence (i.e., the existence at the time
omissions or the gravity which constituted the disorder. What was established was that Catalina was of the celebration of marriage), gravity and incurability of the condition of the errant spouse. In this case,
childish and immature. Cesars testimony failed to prove Lolitas alleged psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Dr. Reyes had only one interview with Catalina. This lacks the depth and objectivity of an
expert assessment.
From the scant evidence presented, it can be adduced that Catalina's immaturity and apparent refusal to
perform her marital obligations do not constitute psychological incapacity alone. It must be shown that
such immature acts were manifestations of a disordered personality that made the spouse completely
unable to discharge the essential obligations of marriage.
35-36. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES V. CESAR ENCELAN
FACTS:
Respondent Cesar married Lolita and the union bore two children. To support his family, Cesar went to
work in Saudi Arabia. While still in Saudi Arabia, Cesar learned that Lolita had been having an illicit affair
with Alvin Perez (Alvin). Subsequently, Lolita allegedly left the conjugal home with her children and lived
with Alvin. Since then, Cesar and Lolita had been separated. Thereafter, Cesar filed with the RTC a
petition against Lolita for the declaration of the nullity of his marriage based on Lolitas psychological
incapacity.
At the trial, Cesar affirmed his allegations of Lolitas infidelity and subsequent abandonment of the family
home. He testified that he continued to provide financial support for Lolita and their children even after
he learned of her illicit affair with Alvin.
RTC declared Cesars marriage to Lolita void. Upon reconsideration, CA affirmed the RTCs decision. The
Office of the Solicitor General then filed the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not there exists sufficient basis to nullify the marriage.
HELD: The petition is meritorious.
CIVIL LAW: Psychological Incapacity
Article 36 of the Family Code governs psychological incapacity as a ground for declaration of nullity of
marriage. In interpreting this provision, the Court have repeatedly stressed that psychological incapacity
contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital
obligations; not merely the refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant
24
In any event, sexual infidelity and abandonment of the conjugal dwelling, even if true, do not necessarily
constitute psychological incapacity; these are simply grounds for legal separation. To constitute
psychological incapacity, it must be shown that the unfaithfulness and abandonment are manifestations
of a disordered personality that completely prevented the erring spouse from discharging the essential
marital obligations.
Petition is GRANTED. The decision of CA is set aside.
35-36. VINAS V. VINAS
Psychological incapacity; Testimony of Expert Witness
FACTS:
Glenn filed a Petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Mary Grace. Glenn sought
professional guidance and submitted himself to a psychological evaluation by Clinical Psychologist. The
doctor found him as “amply aware of his marital roles” and “capable of maintaining a mature and healthy
heterosexual relationship.” On the other hand, Mary Grace’s personality was assessed through the data
gathered from Glenn and his cousin and diagnosed her to be suffering from a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder with anti-social traits. The doctor then concluded that Mary Grace and Glenn’s relationship is
not founded on mutual love, trust, respect, commitment and fidelity to each other. Hence, Dr. Tayag
recommended the propriety of declaring the nullity of the couple’s marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not the lack of personal examination or assessment of a psychologist or psychiatrist is
fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage.
RULING: No. The lack of personal examination or assessment of the respondent by a psychologist or
psychiatrist is not necessarily fatal in a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage. If the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual medical
examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to. In the case of Mary Grace, however, the
documentary evidence offered do not sufficiently prove the root cause, gravity, incurability of Mary
Grace’s condition and that it existed at the inception of marriage.
Moreover, while the various tests administered on the petitioner could have been used as a fair gauge to
assess her own psychological condition, this same statement cannot be made with respect to the
respondent’s condition. To make conclusions and generalizations on the respondent’s psychological
 PAFR CASES
condition based on the information fed by only one side is, to our mind, not different from admitting
hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of the content of such evidence.
35-36. MALLILIN V. JAMESOLAMIN
FACTS: Robert Malilin and Luz Jamesolamin were married on September 6, 1972 and begot three
children. The petitioner filed a complaint for nullity of marriage on the grounds that the respondent
allegedly suffered from psychological and mental incapacity at the time of the marriage celebration,
unpreparedness to enter into such marital life, and to comply with its essential obligations and
responsibilities. . Such incapacity became even more apparent during their marriage when Luz exhibited
clear manifestation of immaturity, irresponsibility, deficiency of independent rational judgment, and
inability to cope with the heavy and oftentimes demanding obligation of a parent.
He testified that Luz was already living in California, USA, and married an American. While they were still
together though, Robert disclosed that respondent did not perform responsibilities of being a housewife
like keeping the house in order, preparing meals, washing clothes and taking care of the children. He also
stated that she dated several men and contracted loans without his knowledge.
In turn Luz filed her answer with a counterclaim, averring that it was Robert who manifested
psychological incapacity.
On September 20, 2002, the Regional Trial Court had rendered a decision declaring the marriage null and
void on the ground of psychological incapacity on the part of Luz as she failed to comply with the
essential marital obligations but the Court of Appeals, in its November 20, 2009 Decision, reversed the
RTC decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the totality of the evidence adduced proves that Luz was psychologically
incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of marriage warranting the annulment of their
marriage under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD: The petition is DENIED.
The Supreme Court stated that Robert’s evidence failed to establish the psychological incapacity of Luz.
Other than his self-serving testimony, no other witness corroborated his allegations on her behavior. As
the Court has repeatedly stressed, psychological incapacity contemplates "downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume the basic marital obligations," not merely the refusal,
neglect or difficulty, much less ill will, on the part of the errant spouse.
25
There was also nothing in the records that would indicate that Luz had either been interviewed or was
subjected to a psychological examination.
On interpretations given by the NAMT of the Catholic Church in the Philippines, yes, they are given great
respect by our courts, but they are neither controlling nor decisive.
Lastly, on petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage, the burden of proof to show the nullity of
marriage lies with the plaintiff. Unless the evidence presented clearly reveals a situation where the
parties, or one of them, could not have validly entered into a marriage by reason of a grave and serious
psychological illness existing at the time it was celebrated, the Court is compelled to uphold the
indissolubility of the marital tie.
35-36. KALAW V. FERNANDEZ
FACTS: Tyrone Kalaw and Malyn Fernandez got married in 1976. After the birth of their 4th child, Tyrone
had an affair with Jocelyn Quejano. In May 1985, Malyn left the conjugal home and her four children with
Tyrone. Meanwhile, Tyrone started living with Jocelyn, and they had three more children. In 1990,
Tyrone went to the United States (US) with Jocelyn and their children. On July 6, 1994, nine years since
the de facto separation from his wife, Tyrone filed a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage based
on Article 36 of the Family Code. He alleged that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform and
comply with the essential marital obligations at the time of the celebration of their marriage. He alleged
that 1) She leaves the children without proper care and attention as she played mahjong all day and all
night; 2) She leaves the house to party with male friends and returned in the early hours of the following
day; and 3) She committed adultery on June 9, 1985 in Hyatt Hotel with one Benjie whom he saw half-
naked in the hotel room. Tyrone presented a psychologist, Dr. Cristina Gates (Dr. Gates), and a Catholic
canon law expert, Fr. Gerard Healy, S.J. (Fr. Healy), to testify on Malyn’s psychological incapacity. Dr.
Gates explained that Malyn suffers from Narcissistic Personality Disorder and that it “may have been
evident even prior to her marriage” because it is rooted in her family background and upbringing. Fr.
Healy concluded that Malyn was psychologically incapacitated to perform her marital duties. He
explained that her psychological incapacity is rooted in her role as the breadwinner of her family. This
role allegedly inflated Malyn’s ego to the point that her needs became priority, while her kids’ and
husband’s needs became secondary.
ISSUE: Whether Tyrone has sufficiently proven that Malyn suffers from psychological incapacity
HELD: No. He presented the testimonies of two supposed expert witnesses who concluded that
respondent is psychologically incapacitated, but the conclusions of these witnesses were premised on
the alleged acts or behavior of respondent which had not been sufficiently proven. No proof whatsoever
 PAFR CASES
was presented to prove her visits to beauty salons or her frequent partying with friends. Malyn’s sexual
infidelity was also not proven because she was only dating other men. Even assuming that she had an
extramarital affair with another man, sexual infidelity cannot be equated with obsessive need for
attention from other men. Sexual infidelity per se is a ground for legal separation, but it does not
necessarily constitute psychological incapacity.
40. DOMINGO V. CA
FACTS: Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of marriage and separation of property. She did not know that Domingo had been previously
married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter filed a
suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave
from work, she discovered that Roberto cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of
her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their marriage was void
ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad
insists the declaration of the nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to
provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD: The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However,
it is also necessary for the protection of the subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her
partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from being
charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the
liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, the custody and support of the
common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been
adjudicated in previous judicial proceedings. Soledad’s prayer for separation of property will simply be
the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the
petitioner’s suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted
for that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity
of marriage, one of which is the separation of property according to the regime of property relations
governing them.
26
40. ATIENZA V. BRILLANTES, JR.
FACTS: This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr.
Complainant alleged that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro with whom respondent Judge was
cohabiting with. Complainant claimed that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he
has 5 children. Respondent alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony (1965)
before a Nueva Ecija town Mayor, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Respondent claims that when he married De
Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California in 1991, he believed in all good faith and for all legal intents
and purposes that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license. Respondent
also argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him considering that his
first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the Philippines; while the second
marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON Article 40 of the Family Code is applicable to the case at bar.
HELD: Yes. Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on
August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code,
said Article is given “retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights
in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.” This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40
to his case.
 PAFR CASES
Antonia Armas y Calisterio, surviving sister of Teodorico filed a petition claiming to be the sole surviving
heir of the latter and that marriage between Marietta and his brother being allegedly bigamous is
thereby null and void. She prayed that her son Sinfroniano be appointed as administrator, without bond,
of the estate of the deceased and inheritance be adjudicated to her after all the obligations of the estate
would have been settled.

ISSUE: Whether Marrieta and Teodorico’s marriage was void due to the absence of the declaration of
presumptive death.

41. REPUBLIC V. NOLASCO
FACTS:
Gregorio Nolasco is a seaman. He met Janet Parker, a British, in bar in England. After that, Janet started
living with Nolasco in his ship for six months. It lasted until the contract of Nolasco expired then he
brought her to his hometown in Antique. They got married in January 1982. Due to another contract,
Nolasco left the province. In 1983, Nolasco received a letter from his mother informing him that his son
had been born but 15 days after, Janet left. Nolasco went home and cut short his contract to find Janet’s
whereabouts. He did so by securing another seaman’s contract going to London. He wrote several
letters to the bar where they first met but it was all returned. Gregorio petitioned in 1988 for a
declaration of presumptive death of Janet.
ISSUE: Whether or not Nolasco had a well-founded belief that his wife, Janet, is already dead?
HELD:
The Supreme Court ruled that Nolasco’s efforts to locate Janet were not persistent to show that he has a
well-founded belief that his wife was already dead because instead of seeking assistance of local
authorities and the British Embassy, he even secured another contract. More so, while he was in London,
he did not even try to solicit help of the authorities to find his wife.
41. ARMAS V. CALISTERIO
FACTS: Teodorico Calisterio, husband of Marietta Calisterio, the respondent, died intestate in April 1992
leaving several parcel of land estimated value of P604,750.00. He was the second husband of Marietta
who was previously married with William Bounds in January 1946. The latter disappeared without a
trace in February 1947. 11 years later from the disappearance of Bounds, Marietta and Teodorico were
married in May 1958 without Marietta securing a court declaration of Bounds’ presumptive death.
HELD: The marriage between the respondent and the deceased was solemnized in May 1958 where the
law in force at that time was the Civil Code and not the Family Code which only took effect in August
1988. Article 256 of the Family Code itself limit its retroactive governance only to cases where it thereby
would not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
Since Civil Code provides that declaration of presumptive death is not essential before contracting
marriage where at least 7 consecutive years of absence of the spouse is enough to remarry then
Marrieta’s marriage with Teodorico is valid and therefore she has a right can claim portion of the estate.
41. MANUEL VS. PEOPLE
FACTS:
November 7, 2001, complaint was filed in the RTC of Baguio City. The following facts were presented:
1. On April 22, 1996, Baguio City, Philippines, Eduardo P. Manuel, respondent, contracted a second
marriage with Tina Gandalera-Manuel, complainant, in RTC of Baguio City. It so appeared in the
marriage contract that Manuel was “single”.
2. Eduardo P. Manuel was previously legally married to Rubylus Gana without the said marriage
having been legally dissolved before the second marriage.
3. Tina Gandalera-Manuel did not know the existence of the first marriage of the respondent to
Rubylus Gana.
4. On July 28, 1975, Makati, Eduardo was married to Ruby.
5. On January 1996, Eduardo met Tina in Dagupan City. Afterwards, Eduardo went to Baguio to
visit her and he proposed assuring her that he was single.
6. Starting 1999, Manuel started making himself scarce and went to their house only twice or thrice
a year.
7. Sometime in January 2001, Eduardo took all his clothes, left, and did not return. He stopped
giving financial support.
8. Sometime in August 2001, Tina learned that Eduardo had been previously married.

27
 PAFR CASES
9. Eduardo testified that he declared that he was single because he believed in good faith that his
marriage was invalid. He said he did not know he had to go to the court to seek for nullification
of his first marriage before marrying Tina. Ruby was jailed and he had not heard from her for
more than 20 years.
On July 2, 2002, RTC found Eduardo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy under Article 349 of the
RPC, and sentenced him an indeterminate penalty of from six (6) years and ten (10) months, as minimum
to ten (10) years, as maximum, and directed to indemnify the private complainant, Tina Gandalera, the
amount of P200,000 by way of moral damages, plus costs of suit.
Manuel appealed the decision to the CA. He insisted that conformably to Article 3 of the RPC, there must
be malice for one to be criminally liable for a felony. He posited that the RTC should have taken into
account Article 390 of the New Civil Code.
On June 18, 2004, the CA rendered judgment affirming the decision of the RTC with modification to
indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision coreccional, as
minimum, to ten (10) years of prision mayor as maximum, and affirmation in all other respect, as to the
penalty of the accused. It ruled that the prosecution was able to prove all the elements of bigamy.
Contrary to the contention of the appellant, Article 41 of the Family Code should apply.
ISSUES:
The issues of the petition are:
1. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it ruled that petitioner’s first wife
cannot be legally presumed dead under Article 390 of the Civil Code as there was no judicial
declaration of presumptive death as provided for under Article 41 of the Family Code; and
2. Whether or not the CA committed reversible error of law when it affirmed the award of
P200,000 as moral damages as it had no basis in fact and in law.
HELD:
1. No. The petitioner’s sole reliance on Article 390 of the Civil Code as basis for his acquittal for
bigamy is misplaced. The presumption of death of the spouse who had been absent for seven
years, is created by law and arises without necessity of judicial declaration. However, Article 41,
of the Family Code, which amended the foregoing rules on presumptive death, provides that for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage (under its preceding paragraph), the spouse
present must institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Court for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of reappearance of the
absent spouse.
2. No. The Court rules against the petitioner. The petitioner is liable to the private complainant for
moral damages under Article 2219 in relation to Articles 19, 20, and 21 of the Civil Code. The
28
Court thus declares that the petitioner’s acts are against public policy as they undermine, and
subvert the family as a social institution, good morals, and the interest, and general welfare of
society. Because the private complainant was an innocent victim of the petitioner’s perfidy, she
is not barred from claiming moral damages. Even considerations of public policy would not
prevent her from recovery as held in Jekshewitz v. Groswald.
41. REPUBLIC V. CA AND ALEGRO
FACTS:
Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February
1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her
parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents’ house but was not there and
even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-law’s house and learned that Lea had been
to their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For some time,
Alan decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls.
In June 2001, Alan reported Lea’s disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was
issued. He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for
the declaration of presumptive death of his wife.
ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.
HELD:
The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He
even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed
to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Lea’s whereabouts before filing his petition in the
RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's
whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of
the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to
dismiss his petition in RTC.
 PAFR CASES
decision in declaring Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the
SSS before the Social Security Commission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
41. SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM V. BAILON
FACTS:
In 1955, Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. More than 15 years later,
Clemente filed an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice, she being an absentee. The petition
was granted in 1970.
In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together until Clemente’s death in 1998. Jarque then
sought to claim her husband’s SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a certain
Cecilia Bailon-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona petitioned
before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was actually them
who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente.
They further claim that Clemente contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the
other with Jarque. Cecilia also averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged.
Cecilia claimed that Clemente obtained the declaration of Alice’s presumptive death in bad faith for he
was aware of the whereabouts of Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parent’s place.
She was in Sorsogon all along in her parents’ place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had
been having extra-marital affairs.
SSS then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia
since she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her
reappearance had terminated Clemente’s marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTC’s
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ISSUE:
Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead automatically
terminates the subsequent marriage.
RULING:
No. If the absentee reappears, but no step is taken to terminate the subsequent marriage, either by
affidavit or by court action, such absentee’s mere reappearance, even if made known to the spouses in
the subsequent marriage, will not terminate such marriage.
Since the second marriage has been contracted because of a presumption that the former spouse is
dead, such presumption continues in spite of the spouse’s physical reappearance, and by fiction of law,
he or she must still be regarded as legally an absentee until the subsequent marriage is terminated as
provided by law.
If the subsequent marriage is not terminated by registration of an affidavit of reappearance or by judicial
declaration but by death of either spouse as in the case at bar, the action for annulment became
extinguished as provided in Article 87, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, requiring that the action for
annulment should be brought during the lifetime of any one of the parties involved.
Voidable marriage under Article 83, paragraph 2, of the Civil Code, cannot be assailed collaterally except
in a direct proceeding. Consequently, such marriages can be assailed only during the lifetime of the
parties and not after the death of either, in which case the parties and their offspring will be left as if the
marriage had been perfectly valid.
And furthermore, the liquidation of any conjugal partnership that might have resulted from such
voidable marriage must be carried out “in the testate or intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse,”
as expressly provided in Section 2 of the Revised Rule 73, and not in the annulment proceeding.
In the case at bar, as no step was taken to nullify, in accordance with law, Bailon’s and respondent’s
marriage prior to the former’s death in 1998, respondent is rightfully the dependent spouse-beneficiary
of Bailon.
41. VALDEZ V. REPUBLIC
FACTS: Angelita Valdez was married with Sofio in January 1971. She gave birth to a baby girl named
Nancy. They argued constantly because Sofio was unemployed and did not bring home any money. In
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March 1972, the latter left their house. Angelita and her child waited until in May 1972, they decided to
go back to her parent’s home. 3 years have passed without any word from Sofio until in October 1975
when he showed up and they agreed to separate and executed a document to that effect. It was the last
time they saw each other and had never heard of ever since. Believing that Sofio was already dead,
petitioner married Virgilio Reyes in June 1985. Virgilio’s application for naturalization in US was denied
because petitioner’s marriage with Sofio was subsisting. Hence, in March 2007, petitioner filed a petition
seeking declaration of presumptive death of Sofio.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s marriage with Virgilio is valid despite lack of declaration of
presumptive death of Sofio.
HELD: The court ruled that no decree on the presumption of Sofio’s death is necessary because Civil Code
governs during 1971 and not Family Code where at least 7 consecutive years of absence is only needed.
Thus, petitioner was capacitated to marry Virgilio and their marriage is legal and valid.
41. SANTOS V. SANTOS
STATEMENT OF THE CASE: In his petition for certiorari, petitioner Celerina J. Santos assails the Court of
Appeals' resolutions dated November 28, 2008 and March 5, 2009. Celerina filed a petition for
annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for the annulment of the trial court's judgment
declaring her presumptively dead.
FACTS OF THE CASE:
On July 27, 2007, the Regional Trial Court of Tarlac City declared petitioner Celerina J. Santos (Celerina)
presumptively dead after her husband, respondent Ricardo T. Santos (Ricardo), had filed a petition for
declaration of absence or presumptive death for the purpose of remarriage on June 15, 2007. Ricardo
remarried on September 17, 2008.
Ricardo alleged that he exerted efforts to locate Celerina. He went to Celerina's parents in Cubao,
Quezon City, but they did not know their daughter's whereabouts. He also inquired about her from other
relatives and friends, but no one gave him any information. Ricardo claimed that it was almost 12 years
from the date of his Regional Trial Court petition since Celerina left. He believed that she had passed
away.
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Celerina claimed that she learned about Ricardo's petition only sometime in October 2008 when she
could no longer avail the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedies.
On November 17, 2008, Celerina filed a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals
on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. She argued that she was deprived her day in
court when Ricardo, despite his knowledge of her true residence, misrepresented to the court that she
was a resident of Tarlac City. According to Celerina, her true residence was in Neptune Extension,
Congressional Avenue, Quezon City. This residence had been her and Ricardo's conjugal dwelling since
1989 until Ricardo left in May 2008. As a result of Ricardo's misrepresentation, she was deprived of any
notice of and opportunity to oppose the petition declaring her presumptively dead.
Celerina claimed that all the allegations of Ricardo were fraudulent, that she never resided in Tarlac and
never left to work as a domestic helper abroad. Further, she also claimed that it was not true that she
had been absent for 12 years. Ricardo was aware that she never left their conjugal dwelling in Quezon
City. It was he who left the conjugal dwelling in May 2008 to cohabit with another woman. Celerina
referred to a joint affidavit executed by their children to support her contention that Ricardo made false
allegations in his petition. Celerina also argued that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over Ricardo's
petition because it had never been published in a newspaper. She added that the Office of the Solicitor
General and the Provincial Prosecutor's Office were not furnished copies of Ricardo's petition.
The Court of Appeals issued the resolution dated November 28, 2008, dismissing Celerina's petition for
annulment of judgment for being a wrong mode of remedy. According to the Court of Appeals, the
proper remedy was to file a sworn statement before the civil registry, declaring her reappearance in
accordance with Article 42 of the Family Code.
Celerina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Court of Appeals erred in dismissing Celerina’s petition on the ground that the proper
remedy is to file a sworn statement before the civil registry declaring her reappearance as stated in
Article 42 of the Family Code
RULING:
Yes. Annulment of judgment is the remedy when the Regional Trial Court's judgment, order, or resolution
has become final, and the remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate remedies
are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner. The grounds for annulment of judgment are
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction.
 PAFR CASES
This court defined extrinsic fraud in Stilianopulos v. City of Legaspi. For fraud to become a basis for
annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual. It is intrinsic when the fraudulent acts pertain to
an issue involved in the original action or where the acts constituting the fraud were or could have been
litigated, It is extrinsic or collateral when a litigant commits acts outside of the trial which prevents a
party from having a real contest, or from presenting all of his case, such that there is no fair submission
of the controversy.
The choice of remedy is important because remedies carry with them certain admissions, presumptions,
and conditions.
The Family Code provides that it is the proof of absence of a spouse for four consecutive years, coupled
with a well-founded belief by the present spouse that the absent spouse is already dead, that constitutes
a justification for a second marriage during the subsistence of another marriage. The Family Code also
provides that the second marriage is in danger of being terminated by the presumptively dead spouse
when he or she reappears. Moreover, a close reading of the entire Article 42 reveals that the termination
of the subsequent marriage by reappearance is subject to several conditions: (1) the non-existence of a
judgment annulling the previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio; (2) recording in the civil registry of
the residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage of the sworn statement of fact and
circumstances of reappearance; (3) due notice to the spouses of the subsequent marriage of the fact of
reappearance; and (4) the fact of reappearance must either be undisputed or judicially determined. The
existence of these conditions means that reappearance does not always immediately cause the
subsequent marriage's termination. Reappearance of the absent or presumptively dead spouse will
cause the termination of the subsequent marriage only when all the conditions enumerated in the Family
Code are present. Hence, the subsequent marriage may still subsist despite the absent or presumptively
dead spouse's reappearance (1) if the first marriage has already been annulled or has been declared a
nullity; (2) if the sworn statement of the reappearance is not recorded in the civil registry of the
subsequent spouses' residence; (3) if there is no notice to the subsequent spouses; or (4) if the fact of
reappearance is disputed in the proper courts of law, and no judgment is yet rendered confirming, such
fact of reappearance.
When subsequent marriages are contracted after a judicial declaration of presumptive death, a
presumption arises that the first spouse is already dead and that the second marriage is legal. This
presumption should prevail over the continuance of the marital relations with the first spouse. The
second marriage, as with all marriages, is presumed valid. The burden of proof to show that the first
marriage was not properly dissolved rests on the person assailing the validity of the second marriage.
The choice of the proper remedy is also important for purposes of determining the status of the second
marriage and the liabilities of the spouse who, in bad faith, claimed that the other spouse was absent.
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A second marriage is bigamous while the first subsists. However, a bigamous subsequent marriage may
be considered valid when the following are present: (1) The prior spouse had been absent for four
consecutive years; (2) The spouse present has a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was already
dead; (3) There must be a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of the absent
spouse; and (4) There is a court declaration of presumptive death of the absent spouse.
A subsequent marriage contracted in bad faith, even if it was contracted after a court declaration of
presumptive death, lacks the requirement of a well-founded belief that the spouse is already dead. The
first marriage will not be considered as validly terminated. Marriages contracted prior to the valid
termination of a subsisting marriage are generally considered bigamous and void. Only a subsequent
marriage contracted in good faith is protected by law. Therefore, the party who contracted the
subsequent marriage in bad faith is also not immune from an action to declare his subsequent marriage
void for being bigamous. The prohibition against marriage during the subsistence of another marriage
still applies.
The provision on reappearance in the Family Code as a remedy to effect the termination of the
subsequent marriage does not preclude the spouse who was declared presumptively dead from availing
other remedies existing in law. This court had, in fact, recognized that a subsequent marriage may also be
terminated by filing "an action in court to prove the reappearance of the absentee and obtain a
declaration of dissolution or termination of the subsequent marriage.
Celerina seeks not merely the termination of the subsequent marriage but also the nullification of its
effects. She contends that reappearance is not a sufficient remedy because it will only terminate the
subsequent marriage but not nullify the effects of the declaration of her presumptive death and the
subsequent marriage.
Celerina is correct. Since an undisturbed subsequent marriage under Article 42 of the Family Code is valid
until terminated, the "children of such marriage shall be considered legitimate, and the property
relations of the spouses in such marriage will be the same as in valid marriages. If it is terminated by
mere reappearance, the children of the subsequent marriage conceived before the termination shall still
be considered legitimate. Moreover, a judgment declaring presumptive death is a defense against
prosecution for bigamy.
However, "a Petition for Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages may be filed solely by the
husband or wife." This means that even if Celerina is a real party in interest who stands to be benefited
or injured by the outcome of an action to nullify the second marriage, this remedy is not available to her.
Therefore, for the purpose of not only terminating the subsequent marriage but also of nullifying the
effects of the declaration of presumptive death and the subsequent marriage, mere filing of an affidavit
 PAFR CASES
of reappearance would not suffice. Celerina's choice to file an action for annulment of judgment will,
therefore, lie.
DISPOSITION:
The case is remanded to the Court of Appeals for determination of the existence of extrinsic fraud,
grounds for nullity or annulment of the first marriage, and the merits of the petition.
41. REPUBLIC V. EDNA ORCELINO-VILLANUEVA
FACTS: Edna worked as a domestic helper in Singapore in 1992 while her husband worked as a mechanic
in Valencia, Bukidnon. The two got married on December 21, 1978, in Iligan City. While she was in
Singapore(1993) , her children informed her that her husband left their home without telling them his
whereabouts. Due to this news, she was prompted to go back to the Philippines to look and find his
husband. Edna searched and made inquiries about her husband thru their common friends, and parents-
in-law in Iligan and Valencia City and even went far as to his birthplace in Negros Oriental.
15 years later she filed to the RTC a petition to declare Romeo presumptively dead under Article 41 of the
Family Code. During the trial, she was presented as the lone witness.
RTC grants her petition.
The OSG thru a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court questioned the decision of the
RTC on the ground that the conclusions reached by the RTC were in direct opposition to established
jurisprudence, as ruled by the Court in Republic v. Nolasco, and U.S. v. Biasbas.
CA dismissed the OSG’s petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the strict standard approach were followed by Edna before she filed a petition for
declaration of presumptive death of her husband.
RULING. NO. Edna claimed that she made diligent search and inquiries to find her husband but it was
found out that it was all consisted of bare assertions without any corroborative evidence on record. Edna
did not present additional witnesses (her children, their common friends, parents-in-law) but herself
alone. There was not even any attempt to seek the aid of the authorities at the time her husband
disappeared.
Therefore, The petition of respondent Edna Orcelino-Villanueva to have her husband declared
presumptively dead is DENIED.
41. REPUBLIC VS. JOSE SAREÑOGON, JR. [G.R. NO. 199194] FEB 10, 2016
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FACTS: On November 4, 2008, the respondent, Jose Sareñogon, filed a petition before the RTC of Ozamiz
to declare the presumptive death of his wife Netchie Sareñogon. The petitioner testified that they got
married and had lived together as husband and wife for a month only because he left to work as a
seaman, while his wife, Netchie, went to Hongkong as a domestic helper. For 3 months, he did not
receive any communication from Netchie and likewise had no idea about her whereabouts. While still
abroad, he tried to contact Netchie’s parents, but failed. He returned home after his contract expired,
then inquired from Netchie’s relatives and friends about her whereabouts but they also did not know
where she was. Because of these, he had to presume that his wife, Netchie was already dead. He filed
the Petition before the RTC so he could contract another marriage pursuant to Article 41 of the Family
Code.
Jose’s testimony was corroborated by his older brother Joel Sareñogon, and by Netchie’s aunt, Consuelo
Sande. These two witnesses testified that Jose and Netchie lived together as husband and wife only for
one month prior to their leaving the Philippines for separate destinations abroad and added that they
had no information regarding Netchie’s location.
On January 31, 2011, in the RTC’s decision found that Netchie had disappeared for more than four years,
reason enough for Jose to conclude that his wife was indeed already dead.
The OSG questioned the RTC ruling via Rule 65 before the CA for the RTC’s error in its misappreciation of
evidence. The CA saw no error in the RTC judgment and further held that Rule 65 is the wrong recourse
in elevating a declaration of presumptive death judgment from the RTC.
ISSUE: WON the “well-founded belief” requisite under Article 41 (FC) was complied with.
HELD: No. This requisite needs the present spouse to prove that his/her belief was the result of diligent
and reasonable efforts and inquiries to locate the absent spouse and that based upon these efforts and
inquiries, he/she believes that under the circumstances, the absent spouse is already dead. It requires
exertion of active effort. At the case at bar, the respondent, Jose Sareñogon, failed to satisfy the required
“well-founded belief” standard. The respondent’s pathetically anemic efforts to locate the missing
Netchie are notches below the required degree of stringent diligence prescribed by jurisprudence. For,
aside from his bare claims that he had inquired form alleged friends and relatives as to Netchie’s
whereabouts, Jose Sareñogon did not call to the witness stand specific individuals or persons whom he
allegedly saw or met in the course of his search or quest for the allegedly missing Netchie. Neither did he
prove that he sought the assistance of the pertinent government agencies as well as the media. Nor did
he show that he undertook a thorough, determined, and unflagging search for Netchie, say for at least
two years, and naming the particular places, provinces, cities, barangays, or municipalities that he visited,
or went to, and identifying the specific persons he interviewed or talked
to in the course of his search.
 PAFR CASES
46. VILLANUEVA VS. COURT OF APPEALS upon appellant, what with the fact that he never sought the assistance of the security personnel of his
school nor the police regarding the activities of those who were threatening him. And neither did he
PROCEDURAL HISTORY: This petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails the January inform the judge about his predicament prior to solemnizing their marriage. Fraud cannot be raised as a
26, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51832, affirming with modification the ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual intercourse is incredible
Decision dated January 12, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, and Branch 172 and is an outright lie. His counsel also conceded before the lower court that his client had a sexual
in Civil Case No. 3997-V-92 (a) dismissing petitioner’s petition for the annulment of his marriage to relationship with Lilia.
private respondent and (b) ordering him to pay moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
Also assailed is the March 5, 1998 Resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. HOLDING: Thus, the petition for annulment was granted, but the award of moral and exemplary
damages is deleted for lack of basis.
FACTS: In April 1988, Orlando Villanueva married Lilia Canalita- Villanueva before a trial court judge in
Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orlando filed before the trial court a petition for annulment of his
marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia who was then
pregnant. Orlando anchored his prayer for the annulment of his marriage on the ground that he did not
freely consent to be married to Lilia. He cited several incidents that created on his mind a reasonable and
well-grounded fear of an imminent and grave danger to his life and safety, to wit: the harassing phone
calls from Lilia and strangers as well as the unwanted visits by three men at the premises of the
University of the East after his classes thereat, and the threatening presence of a certain Ka Celso, a
supposed member of the New People’s Army whom appellant claimed to have been hired by Lilia and
who accompanied him in going to her home province of Palawan to marry her. On the other hand Lilia
denied Orlando’s allegations and she said that Orlando freely cohabited with her after the marriage and
she showed 14 letters that shows Orlando’s affection and care towards her.

ISSUE: Whether the subject marriage may be annulled on the ground of vitiated consent under Article 45
of the Family Code

ANSWER: No. The court ruled that vitiation of consent is not attendant in this case. Therefore, the
petition for annulment, which is anchored to his allegation that he did not freely give his consent, should
be dismissed.

REASONING: The SC ruled that Orlando’s allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it
is obvious that Orlando is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed.
On the merits of the case, Orlando’s allegation of fear was not concretely established. The Court is not
convinced that appellant’s apprehension of danger to his person is so overwhelming as to deprive him of
the will to enter voluntarily to a contract of marriage. It is not disputed that at the time he was allegedly
being harassed, appellant worked as a security guard in a bank. Given his employment at that time, it is
reasonable to assume that appellant knew the rudiments of self-defense, or, at the very least, the proper
way to keep himself out of harm’s way. For sure, it is even doubtful if threats were indeed made to bear
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46. ALMELOR V. RTC-LAS PINAS
FACTS: Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor (Manuel) and respondent Leonida Trinidad (Leonida) were married
on January 29, 1989 and had three children. Manuel and Leonida are both medical practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a pediatrician, respectively. After eleven (11) years of marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las Piñas City to annul their marriage on the ground that Manuel was
psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligations. Leonida that in the public eye, Manuel
was the picture of a perfect husband and father but this was not the case in his private life. At home,
Leonida described Manuel as a harsh disciplinarian, unreasonably meticulous, easily angered. Manuel’s
 PAFR CASES
unreasonable way of imposing discipline on their children was the cause of their frequent fights as a
couple. Leonida complained that this was in stark contrast to the alleged lavish affection Manuel has for
his mother. She also alleged that her husband has concealed from her his homosexuality. She caught him
in an indiscreet telephone conversation manifesting his affection for a male caller. She also found several
pornographic homosexual materials in his possession. And she saw Manuel kissed another man on the
lips. The man was a certain Dr. Nogales. When she confronted Manuel, he denied everything. At this
point, Leonida took her children and left their conjugal abode. Since then, Manuel stopped giving
support to their children. Dr. Valentina del Fonso Garcia, a clinical psychologist, was presented to prove
Leonida’s claim. She testified that she conducted evaluative interviews and a battery of psychiatric tests
on Leonida. She also had a one-time interview with Manuel and face-to-face. She concluded that Manuel
is psychologically incapacitated and such incapacity is marked by antecedence; it existed even before the
marriage and appeared to be incurable. Manuel countered that the true cause of Leonida’s hostility
against him was their professional rivalry. The trial court nullified the marriage, not on the ground of
Article 36, but Article 45 of the Family Code. CA denied the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuel’s concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: Concealment of homosexuality is the proper ground to annul a marriage, not homosexuality per
se. Evidently, no sufficient proof was presented to substantiate the allegations that Manuel is a
homosexual and that he concealed this to Leonida at the time of their marriage. The lower court
considered the public perception of Manuel’s sexual preference without the corroboration of witnesses.
Also, it took cognizance of Manuel’s peculiarities and interpreted it against his sexuality. Even granting
that Manuel is indeed a homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it
alleged and proven that Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonida’s consent had been
vitiated by such.
48. ANCHETA VS. ANCHETA
Annulment of Marriage, Civil Law, Marriage
FACTS: Petitioner Marietta Ancheta and respondent Rodolfo Ancheta were married on March 5, 1959
and had eight children. After 33 years of marriage the petitioner left the respondent and their children.
Their conjugal properties were later separated through a court-sanctioned compromise agreement
34
where the petitioner got among others a resort in Cavite. When the husband wanted to marry again, he
filed before the Regional Trial Court a petition for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the
petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity on June 5, 1995. Although he knew that the
petitioner was already residing at the resort in Cavite, he alleged in his petition that the petitioner was
residing at Las Piñas, Metro Manila, such that summons never reached her. Nevertheless substituted
service was rendered to their son at his residence in Cavite. Petitioner was then declared in default for
failing to answer the said petition. Just over a month after it was filed, the trial court granted the petition
and declared the marriage of the parties void ab initio.
Five years later, petitioner challenged the trial court’s order declaring as void ab initio her marriage with
respondent Rodolfo, citing extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction over her person, among others. She
alleged that the respondent lied on her real address in his petition so she never received summons on
the case, hence depriving her of her right to be heard. The Court of Appeals dismissed her petition so she
now comes to the Supreme Court for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: Whether or not the declaration of nullity of marriage was valid?
HELD: NO. The trial court and the public prosecutor defied Article 48 of the Family Code and Rule 18,
Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure).
A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of collusion,
says the Court. “Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal separation,
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the purpose of
preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is not fabricated or
suppressed.”
“If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court cannot declare him or her in default but
instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to determine if collusion exists between the parties. The
prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose the application for legal separation or annulment through the
presentation of his own evidence, if in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.”
Here, the trial court immediately received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and rendered
judgment against the petitioner “without a whimper of protest from the public prosecutor who even did
not challenge the motion to declare petitioner in default.”
The Supreme Court reiterates: “The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires
vigilant and zealous participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a
sacred institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
invalid one as well.”
 PAFR CASES

Petition is GRANTED.

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