CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
RULE 113 AND RULE 114 DIGESTS
RULE 113
People vs Dela Torre-Yadao 685 S 264
GR No. 162144-54 | November 13, 2012 | Abad, J.
Topic: No need to personally examine complainant and his
witnesses or conduct trial de novo in determining probable
cause
Doctrine: The general rule of course is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of
arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to
personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a
probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
is NOT mandatory. The court’s first option under the above is for it to
“immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause.” That is the situation here: the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause against the
respondents.
Emergency Recit: This is the Kuratong Baleleng case where PNP’s
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group composed of Task
Force Habagat, then headed by Panfilo. Lacson killed 11 suspected
members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang. It was alleged to be a
summary execution, not a shoot-out between the police and those
who were slain. Deputy Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all
the police officers involved. Office of the Ombudsman reversed the
finding and filed charges of murder against the police officers before
the SB. RTC ordered the provisional dismissal of the cases for lack
of probable cause following the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private
complainants. Case was reopened, but CA granted Lacson’s petition
on the ground of double jeopardy. On appeal to SC, SC directed the
RTC to try the case. Case was re-raffled to Judge Yadao. Yadao
junked the murder case against Lacson and other police officials for
lack of probable cause.
The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused her
discretion when she set the motions for determination of probable
cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of arrest, and
allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its case. The
general rule of course is that the judge is not required, when
determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrests,
to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs to personally
review the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable
cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. But here, the
prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to explain in
their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they earlier
submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it was not
unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of determining
probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a hearing and
examine the inconsistent statements and related documents that the
witnesses themselves brought up and were part of the records. The
SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents. In the absence of probable
cause to indict respondents for the crime of multiple murder, they
should be insulated from the tribulations, expenses and anxiety of a
public trial. (See Sec 6, Rule 112 and 2nd part of Doctrine)
Facts: (sorry for the lengthy digest)
· In the early morning of May 18, 1995, the combined forces of
the Philippine National Police’s Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence
Task Group (PNP ABRITG) composed of Task Force Habagat, then
headed by Police Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson killed 11
suspected members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang along
Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City. Subsequently, SPO2
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Eduardo Delos Reyes of the Criminal Investigation Command told
the press that it was a summary execution, not a shoot-out between
the police and those who were slain. After investigation, the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs absolved all the police officers
involved. On review, however, the Office of the Ombudsman
reversed the finding and filed charges of murder against the police
officers involved before the Sandiganbayan. Upon respondents’
motion, the Sandiganbayan ordered the transfer of their cases to the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City on the ground that none
of the principal accused had the rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. On March 29, 1999 the RTC of Quezon City ordered the
provisional dismissal of the cases for lack of probable cause to hold
the accused for trial following the recantation of the principal
prosecution witnesses and the desistance of the private
complainants.
· The case was reopened in March 27, 2001 but the CA rendered
a Decision, granting Lacson’s petition on the ground of double
jeopardy but on appeal to the SC, the latter directed the RTC to try
the cases with dispatch. On motion for reconsideration by
respondent Lacson, the Court ordered the re-raffle of the criminal
cases to a heinous crimes court. Upon re-raffle, however, the cases
still went to Branch 81, which was now presided over by Judge
Yadao
· On November 12, 2003, Judge Yadao issued an order, denying
the prosecution’s motion for re-raffle to a family court (because the
parents of 2 victims showed evidence that they were minors) on the
ground that Section 5 of R.A. 8369 applied only to living minors. She
also granted the motions for determination of probable cause and
dismissed the cases against the respondents since the affidavits of
the prosecution witnesses were inconsistent with those they
submitted in the preliminary investigations before the Ombudsman
for the crime of robbery.
· On November 25, 2003 the prosecution filed a verified
motion to recuse or disqualify Judge Yadao and for reconsideration
of her order. It also filed an administrative complaint against her for
dishonesty, conduct prejudicial to the best interests of the service,
manifest partiality, and knowingly rendering an unjust judgment. This
was denied by Judge Yadao.
· On February 16, 2004 the prosecution withdrew the notices
of appeal that it filed in the cases. Subsequently, it filed the present
special civil action of certiorari.
· The prosecution claims that Judge Yadao gravely abused
her discretion when she set the motions for determination of
probable cause for hearing, deferred the issuance of warrants of
arrest, and allowed the defense to mark its evidence and argue its
case. The prosecution stresses that under Section 6, Rule 112 of the
Rules of Court Judge Yadao’s duty was to determine probable cause
for the purpose of issuing the arrest warrants solely on the basis of
the investigating prosecutor’s resolution as well as the informations
and their supporting documents. And, if she had some doubts as to
the existence of probable cause, the rules required her to order the
investigating prosecutor to present additional evidence to support the
finding of probable cause within five days from notice
· Rather than take limited action, said the prosecution, Judge
Yadao dug up and adopted the Ombudsman’s findings when the
latter conducted its preliminary investigation of the crime of robbery
in 1996. Judge Yadao gave weight to the affidavits submitted in that
earlier preliminary investigation when such documents are proper for
presentation during the trial of the cases.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she dismissed the criminal actions on the ground of lack of
probable cause - NO
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
(2) Whether or not Judge Yadao gravely abused her discretion
when she adopted certain policies in the conduct of the trials - NO
Ruling:
(1) The general rule of course is that the judge is not required,
when determining probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrests, to conduct a de novo hearing. The judge only needs
to personally review the initial determination of the prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial
evidence.
But here, the prosecution conceded that their own witnesses tried to
explain in their new affidavits the inconsistent statements that they
earlier submitted to the Office of the Ombudsman. Consequently, it
was not unreasonable for Judge Yadao, for the purpose of
determining probable cause based on those affidavits, to hold a
hearing and examine the inconsistent statements and related
documents that the witnesses themselves brought up and were part
of the records. The SC held that the evidence on record clearly fails
to establish probable cause against the respondents.
The prosecution points out that, rather than dismiss the criminal
action outright, Judge Yadao should have ordered the panel of
prosecutors to present additional evidence pursuant to Section 6,
Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court gives the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal
information: (1) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly
failed to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it
finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as
to the existence of probable cause.
But the option to order the prosecutor to present additional
evidence is NOT mandatory. The court’s first option under the
above is for it to “immediately dismiss the case if the evidence
on record clearly fails to establish probable cause.” That is the
situation here: the evidence on record clearly fails to establish
probable cause against the respondents.
It is only "in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause" that
the judge may order the prosecutor to present additional evidence
within five days from notice. But that is not the case here.
Discounting the affidavits of Ramos, Medes, Enad, and Seno,
nothing is left in the record that presents some doubtful
probability that respondents committed the crime charged. PNP
Director Leandro Mendoza sought the revival of the cases in 2001,
six years after it happened. It would have been ridiculous to entertain
the belief that the police could produce new witnesses in the five
days required of the prosecution by the rules.
In the absence of probable cause to indict respondents for the crime
of multiple murder, they should be insulated from the tribulations,
expenses and anxiety of a public trial.
(2) Based on Section 5, Rule 135, there is nothing arbitrary about
Judge Yadao’s policy of allowing only one public prosecutor and one
private prosecutor to address the court during the hearing for
determination of probable cause but permitting counsels
representing the individual accused to do so. A criminal action is
prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor.
The burden of establishing probable cause against all the accused is
upon him, not upon the private prosecutors whose interests lie solely
in their clients’ damages claim. Besides, the public and the private
prosecutors take a common position on the issue of probable cause.
On the other hand, each of the accused is entitled to adopt defenses
that are personal to him.
People vs Alunday 564 S 135
GR No. | DATE | PONENTE
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Topic: ARREST - Meaning of “in his presence”
Doctrine: Section 5(a) refers to arrest in flagrante delicto which
means caught in the act of committing a crime. This rule, which
warrants the arrest of a person without warrant, requires that the
person arrested has just committed a crime, or is committing it, or is
about to commit an offense, in the presence or within view of the
arresting officer.
Emergency Recit: A group of policemen was dispatched to scout
the area ahead of the others, while the rest stayed behind as backup
security. At a distance of 30 meters, Saipen, together with the
members of his group, saw Ricardo Alunday cutting and gathering
marijuana plants. SPO1 Saipen and others approached Alunday and
introduced themselves as members of the PNP. The plants were
found positive for mariijuana. He was convicted of violating the
Dangerous Drugs Act. SC held his warrantless arrest was valid as
arrest in flagrante delicto.
Facts:
· Intelligence Section of the Police Provincial Office of
Mountain Province received a report from a confidential
informant of an existing marijuana plantation within the vicinity of
Mount Churyon, Sadanga, Mountain Province. Acting on the
confidential information, Chief of the Intelligence Section of
Mountain Province, Police Senior Inspector Andrew Cayad
(Cayad), engaged the services of another confidential informant
to validate said report. After a series of validations, the
confidential informant confirmed the existence of the subject
plantation.
· A group of policemen, one of whom was SPO1 George
Saipen (Saipen) of the Bontoc PNP, was dispatched to scout the
area ahead of the others, while the rest stayed behind as backup
security. At a distance of 30 meters, Saipen, together with the
members of his group, saw Ricardo Alunday (Alunday) herein
Alunday, cutting and gathering marijuana plants. SPO1 Saipen
and others approached Alunday and introduced themselves as
members of the PNP. SPO1 Saipen, together with the other
policemen, brought said Alunday to a nearby hut.
· Inside the hut, the operatives saw an old woman, an M16
rifle and some dried marijuana leaves. The other members of the
raiding team uprooted and thereafter burned the marijuana
plants, while the team from the Provincial Headquarters got
some samples of the marijuana plants and brought the same to
their headquarters. The samples were tested and found all to be
positive for marijuana.
· Alunday denied the allegations. He said that he went out of
the hut to search for squash to cook for breakfast but a group of
policemen suddenly came. Two of them approached him and
asked if he owned the marijuana plants growing around the
premises and the land on which these were planted. He
answered in the negative and further stated that he did not even
know how a marijuana plant looked like. The policemen then
proceeded to uproot and burn the supposed marijuana plants.
Subsequently, the policemen took him with them to the PNP
Headquarters in Bontoc despite his refusal to go with them.
· RTC: found him guilty of violating Sec. 9 of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. CA: Affirmed. He now argues that jurisdiction
over his person was not acquired because he was arrested
without a warrant and that his warrantless arrest was not done
under any of the circumstances enumerated in Section 5, Rule
113 of the 1985 Rules of Court. He insists that the arresting
officers had three months within which to secure a warrant from
the time they received the information about an existing
marijuana plantation in Mount Churyon, Sadanga, in May 2000,
until they effected Alunday’s arrest on 3 August 2000. Also,
Alunday maintains that the arresting officers’ failure to secure a
warrant can never be justified by the urgency of the situation.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Issue: WON he was irregularly arrested -> NO
Held: Section 5(a) provides that a peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit, an offense. Section 5(a) refers to arrest in
flagrante delicto which means caught in the act of committing a
crime. This rule, which warrants the arrest of a person without
warrant, requires that the person arrested has just committed a
crime, or is committing it, or is about to commit an offense, in the
presence or within view of the arresting officer. The Intelligence
Section received the information sometime in May 2000 and he was
arrested only on Aug. 3, 2000 because the arrest was effected only
after a series of validations to verify the report that indeed a
marijuana plantation existed at the area and after an operation plan
was formed. As admitted by the accused in his supplemental brief,
the information about the existing marijuana plantation was finally
confirmed only on 2 August 2000. On 3 August 2000, the arresting
team of SPO1 Saipen proceeded to the marijuana plantation. SPO1
Saipen saw Alunday personally cutting and gathering marijuana
plants. Thus, Alunday’s arrest on 3 August 2000 was legal, because
he was caught in flagrante delicto; that is, the persons arrested were
committing a crime in the presence of the arresting officers.
People vs Santiago 642 S 639
GR No. | DATE | PONENTE
Topic: When to challenge arrest
Doctrine: Challenge the validity of the arrest before arraignment
and on appeal. Failure to challenge on time is tantamount to a
waiver
FACTS: Santiago was charged for selling illegal drugs.
Arresting officers conducted a test buy and a buy bust
operation which lead to her arrest. Both substances from the
test buy and the buy bust was examined and found to be shabu.
RTC found Santiago guilty
ISSUE: WON there was a valid arrest?
HELD: Arrest is valid.
Santiago only raised the issue of her arrest on appeal. Rule
provides that issues on the validity of the arrest must be raised
before arraignment. Failing to challenge her arrest before
arraignment is a waiver to any question as to the legality of her
arrest.
THUS, arrest was valid.
Sy vs People 655 S 395
GR No. 182178 | August 15, 2011 | Peralta, J.
Topic: Rule 113 Arrest
Doctrine: An accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of
his arrest if he fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of
the information against him on this ground before arraignment.
Emergency Recit:
Stephen Sy was arrested in flagrante delicto because he was seen
by police officers of Dumaguete City flicking a clear plastic sachet
containing white crystalline substance in broad daylight at the area
where an alleged illegal drug trade has been reported. Sy was
arrested and when the substance was tested in resulted to positive
for shabu. RTC and CA both convicted the accused. Sy now
petitions the court questioning the legality of his arrest. First, he
questions that his arrest was not valid since he was not committing
an illegal act by just flicking the plastic sachet in broad daylight.
Second, following the argument that his arrest was illegal, the plastic
sachet seized in evidence should be inadmissible for being a fruit of
the poisonous tree.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
The Court rule in the negative. His arrest was proper and falls within
the valid warrantless arrest under Sec. 5a of R113. The arrest was in
flagrante delicto that upon seeing the act of flicking a plastic sachet
in broad daylight aroused the suspicion of the police officers that he
was committing an act in violation of RA 9165. Furthermore, an
accused is estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he
fails to raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information
against him on this ground before arraignment. In the case at bar,
petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his
arraignment. Moreover, he actively participated in the proceedings
before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived any perceived
defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to the
jurisdiction of the court trying the case. At any rate, the illegal arrest
of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free form
error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.
Facts:
1. Petitioner Stephen Sy was indicted for violation of Sec. 11 of
Ra 9165 (illegal possession for dangerous drug or shabu)
2. Upon his arraignment, petitioner, with assistance of counsel,
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Consequently, trial
ensued.
3. During trial, the testimonial evidence of the prosecution
provide: there was a tip to the PNP Dumaguete that there
was an illegal drug trade going on in Brgy. Looc, Dumaguete
City.
a. During the operation, Po3 Faelogo and PO3
Paquera while walking at the pathway of interior
portion of Brgy. Looc, they saw a man later identified
as Stephen Sy, examining a transparent plastic
sachet containing shabu.
b. They apprehended Sy and informed him that they
were arresting him for illegal possession of
dangerous drugs.
c. Sy was then apprised of his constitutional rights but
while oding so, he hurridely boarded on his
motorcycle for a possible escape.
d. PO3 Faelogo was not able to finish his recital of the
constitutional rights of the petitioner.
e. PO3 Faelogo wrestled with him and picked up the
sachet of shabu. After a few minutes of struggle,
they were able to subdue the petitioner and handcuff
him.
f. PO3 Faelogo continued to inform him of his
constitutional rights in the Cebuano dialect.
g. The police officers where not able to conduct an
inventory in the crime scene as there was a
commotion where some people tried to rescue Sy.
So they left the area immediately.
h. The inventory as well as photograph of the seized
items where conducted at the police station.
4. RTC found Sy guilty and convicted him. On appeal to the CA, it
affirmed in toto the decision of the RTC.
5. Petitioner, before the SC, now contends that since he was not
doing anything illegal at the time of his arrest that would arouse the
suspicion of the arresting officers, his subsequent arrest and the
ensuing search upon his person was illegal and therefore, any
alleged illegal drugs recovered from him cannot be used in trial
against him, without the risk of violating his constitutional right
against unlawful searches and seizure.
6. Sy argues that the act of flicking a clear plastic sachet in broad
daylight cannot be perceived as an illegal act. Thus, he was not
caught in flagrante delicto and the resulting warrantless arrest made
by the police officers was invalid. Moreover, the confiscated sachet is
not admissible in evidence against him for being the fruit of a
poisonous tree.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Issue: W/N Sy (Petitioner) validly questioned his arrest?
Ruling: NO. It has been consistently ruled that an accused is
estopped from assailing any irregularity of his arrest if he fails to
raise this issue or to move for the quashal of the information against
him on this ground before arraignment. Any objection involving a
warrant of arrest or the procedure by which the court acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be made before he
enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.
In the case at bar, petitioner never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment. Moreover, he actively participated in
the proceedings before the RTC. Thus, he is deemed to have waived
any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself to
the jurisdiction of the court trying the case. At any rate, the illegal
arrest of an accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid
judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free form
error. It will not even negate the validity of the conviction of the
accused.
As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary
to ascertain whether or not the search yielded the alleged
contraband lawful.
In searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the
search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a
search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede
the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search. In the case at bar, the established facts reveal
that sufficient evidence supports that the warrantless arrest of
petitioner was effected under Sec. 5(a) R 113 or the arrest in
flagrante delicto. The police officers witnessed petitioner flicking a
transparent sachet containing white crystalline substance in plain
view.
Arousing their suspicion that the sachet contains shabu, the arresting
officers immediately approached petitioner, introduced themselves
as police officers and effected the arrest. After laboratory
examination, the white crystalline substance placed inside the plastic
sachet was found positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride or
shabu. Under these circumstances, petitioner was clearly arrested in
flagrante delicto as he was then committing a crime, violation of the
Dangerous Drugs Act, within the view of the police officers. At the
time of his arrest, the police officers were actively performing their
duties, since they were following up a tip that there was an illegal
drug trade being conducted in the area. This fact, coupled with the
overt acts of petitioner, formed sufficient basis on the part of the
police officers to believe that a crime was actually being committed.
Thus, petitioner’s case falls within the exception to the rule requiring
a warrant before effecting an arrest. Consequently, the results of the
ensuing search and seizure were admissible in evidence to prove
petitioner’s guilt of the offense charged.
PETITION DENIED.
Diega vs CA 655 S 399
GR No. 173510 | DATE: March 15, 2010 | PONENTE: Del Castillo,
J.
Topic: Arrest; when waived
Doctrine: He was deemed to have waived his right to assail legality
of his arrest when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court by
entering a plea instead of filing a motion quash the information for
lack of jurisdiction over his person.
Emergency Recit: Diega was accused of raping and killing AAA.
After being convicted by both the RTC and CA, he assails the
illegality of his arrest. The Supreme Court ruled that he was deemed
to have waived his right to assail the same as he never bothered to
question the legality thereof. He even voluntarily entered his plea. He
was deemed to have waived his right to assail legality of his arrest
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
when he voluntarily submitted himself to the court by entering a plea
instead of filing a motion quash the information for lack of jurisdiction
over his person.
Facts: Erpascual Diega, a stay-in security guard, was charged with
the complex crime of rape with homicide. It was alleged the he raped
and killed a young woman, AAA. According to the version of the
prosecution, when AAA was walking to her home, Diega tied her up
and raped and killed her. As to the defense, Diega alleged that he
was falsely accused by AAA’s parents for informing on them that
they were squatting on the land where he worked as a security
guard. He further claimed that the police prepared his “statement”
despite the fact that he was not assisted by counsel. The statement
was subscribed before one of the officers. He was released after five
days of incarceration without a case having been filed against him.
Then, a warrant of arrest was issued against him based on the sworn
statement of Juanito, an alleged witness. Upon arraignment, Diega
entered a not guilty plea. Thereafter, the RTC convicted him as
charged and the CA affirmed the RTC’s decision. He avers that the
illegality of his arrest is apparent for his detention for five days
without being charged with any offense.
Issue: Whether or not Diega can still raise the illegality of his arrest
in his petition for certiorari
Ruling: No. His contention that his arrest was attended with
irregularity is unworthy of credence. Records show that the
“prepared statements” were given by the witnesses after they
answered the questions of the police authorities. His arrest was not
based merely on statements prepared by the police authorities for
the prosecution witnesses. Even if his arrest was unlawful because
of the absence of a valid warrant of arrest , he was deemed to have
waived his right to assail the same as he never bothered to question
the legality thereof. He even voluntarily entered his plea. He was
deemed to have waived his right to assail legality of his arrest when
he voluntarily submitted himself to the court by entering a plea
instead of filing a motion quash the information for lack of jurisdiction
over his person.
People vs Racho 626 S 633
GR No. 186529 | DATE: August 3, 2010 | PONENTE: Nachura, J.
Topic: Meaning of probable cause; reliable information is not
enough
Doctrine: The long standing rules in this jurisdiction is that “reliable
information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The
rule require, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that
would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
Emergency Recit: Racho, upon alighting from the bus, was
apprehended by the police based on a “reliable information” of an
informant. The police searched Racho and his personal belongings
where they found a white envelope which contained shabu. The RTC
and CA convicted Racho for transporting/delivering dangerous
drugs. Racho went to the SC raising whether or not his warrantless
arrest was valid. The SC held that it was not. At the time of the
arrest, Racho had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting
for tricycle. Racho was not acting in any suspicious manner that
would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to
suspect and conclude that of he was committing or intending to
commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the
informant, Racho would not have been apprehended and no search
would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu
would not have been confiscated.
Facts: On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police
transacted through cellphone with Racho for the purchase of shabu.
The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who
immediately formed a team to apprehend Racho. The team
members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler,
Aurora, and around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus
arrived in Baler. When Racho alighted from the bus, the confidential
agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the
latter was about to board a tricycle , the team approached him and
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying
shabu. When Racho pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a
white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a
small sachet containing the suspected drug. The team then brought
appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents
of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for the
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Racho was charged in two separate information, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering: and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous
drugs. During the arraignment, Racho pleaded “Not Guilty” to both
charges. The RTC rendered a Joint Judgement convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9156 but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9156. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Racho brought the case to
SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity
of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue: Whether or not Racho may be convicted based on a “reliable
information” of the informant
Ruling: No, The long standing rules in this jurisdiction is that
“reliable information” alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless
arrest. The rule require, in addition, that the accused perform some
overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense. We find no cogent
reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.
Racho herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the
police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had
committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the
time of the arrest, Racho had just alighted from the Gemini bus and
was waiting for tricycle. Racho was not acting in any suspicious
manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police
officers to suspect and conclude that of he was committing or
intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by
the informant, Racho would not have been apprehended and no
search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of
shabu would not have been confiscated.
Neither was the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would
allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by
Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their
office received the “tipped information” on May 19, 2003. They
likewise learned from the informant not only the appellant’s physical
description but also his name. Although it was not that appellant
would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that
he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had
ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.
People v. Doria 301 S 728
G.R. No. 125299 | January 22, 1999. | PUNO
Topic: Rule 113 - Meaning of “probable cause”; “Reliable
information not enough”
Doctrine: "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant
under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable
cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when: in the
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the
offense, is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt
of the person to be arrested.
The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites
concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he
can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that
the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or
otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must
lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from
which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful
intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence
incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand
and its discovery inadvertent.
Emergency Recit:
A buy-bust operation led to the seller identifying Gaddao as the
person with whom he left the marked money. The PNP arrested
Gaddao without warrant and the RTC sentenced her to death. SC
acquitted Gaddao and ruled that the warrantless arrest was not valid.
Facts:
1. Doria & Gaddao were charged with violation of Section 4, in
relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act for
‘willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, administer, deliver
and give away to 11 plastic bags of suspected marijuana
fruiting tops.’
2. PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom) received information
from civilian informants that one "Jun" (later identified as
Doria) was engaged in illegal drug activities. The Narcom
agents decided to entrap and arrest "Jun" in a buy-bust
operation. A meeting between the Narcom agents and "Jun"
was scheduled in Mandaluyong City where the marked bills
were given to Doria. Subsequently, "Jun" took out from his
bag an object wrapped in plastic and gave it to PO3
Manlangit. PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested "Jun" as SPO1
Badua rushed to help in the arrest. They frisked "Jun" but did
not find the marked bills with him. Upon inquiry, "Jun"
revealed that he left the money at the house of his associate
named "Neneth" (later identified as Gaddao). "Jun" led the
police team to "Neneth's" house.
3. The team found the door of "Neneth's" house open and a
woman inside. "Jun" identified the woman as his associate,
“Neneth”. SPO1 Badua asked "Neneth" about the P1,600.00
as PO3 Manlangit looked over "Neneth's" house.
4. Standing by the door, PO3 Manlangit noticed a carton box
under the dining table. He saw that one of the box's flaps
was open and inside the box was something wrapped in
plastic. The plastic wrapper and its contents appeared
similar to the marijuana earlier sold to him by "Jun." His
suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered "Neneth's" house
and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and
found that it contained ten (10) bricks of what appeared to be
dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the box's
discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from
"Neneth." The policemen arrested "Neneth." They took
"Neneth" and "Jun," together with the box, its contents and
the marked bills and turned them over to the investigator at
headquarters.
5. RTC convicted Doria & Gaddao and sentenced them to
death and to pay a fine of P500,000.00. Doria & Gaddao
contend before the SC that the court a quo gravely erred in
admitting as evidence the marijuana fruitings found inside
the carton box, since these were obtained through a
warrantless search and seizure.
6. The prosecution admits that appellant Gaddao was arrested
without a warrant of arrest and the search and seizure of the
box of marijuana and the marked bills were likewise made
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
without a search warrant. It is claimed, however, that the
warrants were not necessary because the arrest was made
in "hot pursuit" and the search was an incident to her lawful
arrest.
Issue: WON the warrantless arrest of Gaddao falls within any of the
3 instances enumerated in Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure.
Ruling:
1. To be lawful, the warrantless arrest of appellant Gaddao
must fall under any of the three (3) instances enumerated in
Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure as aforequoted.
2. Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed
during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest
under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any
crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no
occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the
policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." In fact, she
was going about her daily chores when the policemen
pounced on her.
3. Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified
under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal
knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section
5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause"
which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when: in the absence of actual belief of the arresting
officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is
probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith
on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.
4. Accused-appellant Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis
of the alleged identification made by her co-accused. PO3
Manlangit, however, declared in his direct examination that
appellant Doria named his co-accused in response to his
(PO3 Manlangit's) query as to where the marked money
was. Appellant Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as
his associate in the drug business, but as the person with
whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not
necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao
conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs. Appellant
Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without
her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for
accused-appellant Doria's word, the Narcom agents had no
reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug
pushing. If there is no showing that the person who effected
the warrantless arrest had, in his own right, knowledge of
facts implicating the person arrested to the perpetration of a
criminal offense, the arrest is legally objectionable.
5. Since the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Gaddao
was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home
and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and
marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her
arrest. This brings us to the question of whether the trial
court correctly found that the box of marijuana was in plain
view, making its warrantless seizure valid.
6. Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to
be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
even without a search warrant and may be introduced in
evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the
following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in
search of the evidence has a prior justification for an
intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a
particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain
view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the
officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law
enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or
properly be in a position from which he can particularly view
the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came
inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the
accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its
discovery inadvertent.
7. It is clear that an object is in plain view if: the object itself is
plainly exposed to sight. The difficulty arises when the object
is inside a closed container. Where the object seized was
inside a closed package, the object itself is not in plain view
and therefore cannot be seized without a warrant. However,
if the package proclaims its contents, whether by its
distinctive configuration, its transparency, or if its contents
are obvious to an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if the package is
such that an experienced observer could infer from its
appearance that it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they observe may
be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure.
8. PO3 Manlangit and the police team were at appellant
Gaddao's house because they were led there by appellant
Doria. The Narcom agents testified that they had no
information on appellant Gaddao until appellant Doria named
her and led them to her. 131 Standing by the door of
appellant Gaddao's house, PO3 Manlangit had a view of the
interior of said house. Two and a half meters away was the
dining table and underneath it was a carton box. The box
was partially open and revealed something wrapped in
plastic.
9. In his direct examination, PO3 Manlangit said that he was
sure that the contents of the box were marijuana because he
himself checked and marked the said contents. On cross-
examination, however, he admitted that he merely presumed
the contents to be marijuana because it had the same plastic
wrapping as the "buy-bust marijuana." A close scrutiny of the
records reveals that the plastic wrapper was not colorless
and transparent as to clearly manifest its contents to a
viewer. Each of the ten (10) bricks of marijuana in the box
was individually wrapped in old newspaper and placed inside
plastic bags — white, pink or blue in color. PO3 Manlangit
himself admitted on cross-examination that the contents of
the box could be items other than marijuana. He did not
know exactly what the box contained that he had to ask
appellant Gaddao about its contents. It was not immediately
apparent to PO3 Manlangit that the content of the box was
marijuana. The marijuana was not in plain view and its
seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation
of the law and the Constitution. It was fruit of the poisonous
tree and should have been excluded and never considered
by the trial court.
10. The fact that the box containing about six (6) kilos of
marijuana was found in the house of accused-appellant
Gaddao does not justify a finding that she herself is guilty of
the crime charged.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
People vs Racho ibid
GR No. | DATE | PONENTE
Topic: When waived? Effect?
Doctrine:
Considering that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his
arrest before his arraignment and actively participated in the trial of
the case. Jurisprudence has provided that he has voluntarily
submitted his jurisdiction to the court and has deemed to have
waived the right to question the validity of the arrest.
Emergency Recit:
Racho, upon alighting from the bus, was apprehended by the police
based on a “reliable information” of an informant. The police
searched Racho and his personal belongings where they found a
white envelope which contained shabu. The RTC and CA convicted
Racho for transporting/delivering dangerous drugs. Racho went to
the SC raising whether or not the validity of the arrest has been
waived. SC held that since the appellant never objected to the
irregularity of his arrest before arraignment and has actively
participated in the trial of the case, jurisprudence provide that he has
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and deemed to
have waived his right to question the validity of the arrest.
Facts: (same facts lang from the previous topic)
On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted
through cellphone with Racho for the purchase of shabu. The agent
reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately
formed a team to apprehend Racho. The team members posted
themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and around
3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When
Racho alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as
the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to
board a tricycle , the team approached him and invited him to the
police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When Racho
pulled out his hands from his pants’ pocket, a white envelope slipped
therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the
suspected drug. The team then brought appellant. The field test and
laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet
yielded positive results for the methamphetamine hydrochloride.
Racho was charged in two separate information, one for violation of
Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering: and the
second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous
drugs. During the arraignment, Racho pleaded “Not Guilty” to both
charges. The RTC rendered a Joint Judgement convicting appellant
of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9156 but acquitted him of the
charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9156. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The Racho brought the case to
SC assailing for the first time he legality of his arrest and the validity
of the subsequent warrantless search.
Issue:
Whether the validity of the arrest can still be questioned? No.
Ruling:
The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of
his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he
raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active
participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence
which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the
jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to
question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may
have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the
jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest
therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.
However, this is an instance of seizure of the fruit of the poisonous
tree, hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence
consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, any
evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall
be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.
Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be
sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is
warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the
illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in
the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest
affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the
accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an
illegal warrantless arrest.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
1. Appellant Uyboco and others were charged
People vs Uyboco GR 178039, January 19, 2011
GR No 178039. | January 19, 2011 | Perez, J.
Topic: “Personal Knowledge / Hot Pursuit”
Doctrine:
The second instance of lawful warrantless arrest covered by
paragraph (b) Sec. 5, Rule 113 necessitates two stringent
requirements before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
Emergency Recit: Appellant was charged for Kidnapping with
Ransom. On the day of pay-off, police officers were able to witness
the payoff which effectively consummates the crime of kidnapping.
Thereafter, they were able to accost the Appellant.
RTC and CA found him guilty of Kidnapping for Ransom.
Appellant then questioned the validity of his arrest.
SC ruled that it was valid under Sec. 5 (b) of Rule 113 - Hot Pursuit.
Police officers have personal knowledge of the incident (See
doctrine). It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were
monitoring the payoff for a number of hours long enough for them to
be informed that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper.
This is equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Facts:
in three
separate Informations for Kidnapping with Ransom of Jeson
Kirby Dichaves, Jeson Kevin Dichaves and Nimfa Celiz.
Relevant facts are summarized as follows:
On December 1993, Nimfa and her wards (Jeson Kevin and
Jeson Kirby) were abducted and brought to a house in
Merville Subdivision, Paranaque. Kindnappers called Jepson
(Father) and demanded P26 Million. Later on, ransom was
reduced and parties agreed to a ransom of P1.5 Million.
Jepson offered P1.3 Million in cash and the balance to be
paid in kind, such as jewelry and a pistol.16 Appellant asked
Jepson to bring the ransom alone at Pancake House in
Magallanes Commercial Center. Jepson called up Gen.
Canson and Gen. Lacson to inform them of the payoff.
On the day of pay-off, Appellant called Jepson and ordered
him to put the bag in the trunk, leave the trunk
unlocked, and walk away for ten (10) minutes without turning
back. Appellant then apprised him that his sons and helper
were already at the Shell Gasoline Station along South
Luzon Expressway. He immediately went to the place and
found his sons and helper seated at the corner of the gas
station.
(NOTE: Take Note of this -- this will show instances how
the police officers have personal knowledge)
P/Insp. Escandor was assigned to proceed to Magallanes
Commercial Center, together with two other police officers.
They reached the place at 3:30 p.m. and positioned
themselves in front of the Maranao Arcade located at
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Magallanes Commercial Center. He brought a camera to
cover the supposed payoff. He took a total of 24 shots.
P/Supt. Cruz is assigned to the now defunct Presidential
AntiCrime Commission Task Force Habagat and one of the
team leaders of Special Project Task Force organized on 22
December 1993 with the primary task of apprehending the
kidnappers of Dichaves’ children and helper. His group was
assigned at Fort Bonifacio to await instructions from the
overall Field Command Officer Gen. Lacson. They had been
waiting from 4:00 p.m. until 6:00 p.m. when they received
information that the kidnap victims were released unharmed.
They were further asked to maintain their position in Fort
Bonifacio. At around 7:45 p.m., they heard on their radio that
the suspect’s vehicle, a red Nissan Sentra was heading in
their direction. A few minutes later, they saw the red car and
tailed it until it reached Dasmariñas Village in Makati. They
continuously followed the car inside the village. When said
car slowed down, they blocked it and immediately
approached the vehicle.
They introduced themselves as police officers and accosted
the suspect, who turned out to be appellant. Appellant
suddenly pulled a .38 caliber revolver and a scuffle took
place. They managed to subdue appellant and handcuffed
him. Appellant was requested to open the compartment and
a gray bag was found inside. P/Supt. Cruz saw money,
jewelry and a gun inside the bag. Appellant was then
brought to Camp Crame for questioning.
2. RTC found Appellant guilty.
3. CA affirmed.
4. Appellant then questions the validity of his arrest and the search
conducted inside his car in absence of a warrant.
Issue: WON there was a valid arrest and search without warrant
Ruling:
YES.
The arrest was validly executed pursuant to Section 5, paragraph (b)
of Rule 113 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.—A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
xxx
(b) When an offense has in fact been committed and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it;
Requisites are:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and
(2) the person making the arrest has personal knowledge of facts
indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
Records show that both requirements are present in the instant case.
The police officers present in Magallanes Commercial Center were
able to witness the payoff which effectively consummates the crime
of kidnapping. They all saw appellant take the money from the car
trunk of Jepson. Such knowledge was then relayed to the other
police officers stationed in Fort Bonifacio where appellant was
expected to pass by.
Personal knowledge of facts must be based on probable cause,
which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of
suspicion. The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that
the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense
is based on actual facts, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently
strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the
person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion, therefore, must be
founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part
of the peace officers making the arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure does not require the arresting
officers to
It is sufficient for the arresting team that they were monitoring the
payoff for a number of hours long enough for them to be informed
that it was indeed appellant, who was the kidnapper. This is
equivalent to personal knowledge based on probable cause.
Likewise, the search conducted inside the car of appellant was
legal because the latter consented to such search as testified
by P/Supt. Cruz. Even assuming that appellant did not give his
consent for the police to search the car, they can still validly do so by
virtue of a search incident to a lawful arrest under Section 13, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court which states:
“SEC. 13. Search incident to lawful arrest.—A person lawfully
arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which
may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an
offense without a search warrant.”
In lawful arrests, it becomes both the duty and the right of the
apprehending officers to conduct a warrantless search not only on
the person of the suspect, but also in the permissible area within the
latter’s reach. Otherwise stated, a valid arrest allows the seizure of
evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one
arrested or within the area of his immediate control.
The phrase “within the area of his immediate control” means the
area from within which he might gain possession of a weapon or
destructible evidence. Therefore, it is only but expected and legally
so for the police to search his car as he was driving it when he was
arrested.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated 30 August 2002 in Criminal Case
Nos. 93130980, 93132606, and 93132607 RTC, Branch 18, Manila,
finding Ernesto Uyboco y Ramos guilty of kidnapping for
ransom, and the Decision dated 27 September 2006 of the Court of
Appeals, affirming in toto the Decision of the RTC, are AFFIRMED.
RULE 114
Zuño v. Cabebe 444 S 382
A.M. OCA No. 03-1800- RTJ | 26 November 2004 | SANDOVAL-
GUTIERREZ, J.
Topic: Bail; Definition
Doctrine: Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in
granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion; Even in
cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be
held.
Emergency Recit:
There was a case for illegal possession of drugs against certain
policemen. Respondent Judge Cabebe issued an order granting bail
to the accused without the accused applying for motion for bail.
Because of this, the Chief State Prosecutor filed an admin complaint
for unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law, and partiality.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
Was there a violation of the Rules? Yes. (Doctrine). Respondent
judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in
Cortes (#6 in Held). He did not conduct a hearing before he granted
bail, thus depriving the prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the
strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused,
he should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution.
Facts:
1. The instant Administrative case stemmed from a complaint
of Chief State Prosecutor Zuno against RTC Judge Cabebe
for unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law, and
partiality.
2. According to the complaint, a criminal case for illegal
possession of drugs against certain police officers. Upon
arraignment, all the accused pleaded not guilty. Thereafter,
the prosecution filed a petition for change of venue but was
denied. MR was denied. In the meantime, the proceedings
were suspended.
3. The accused filed MTD invoking a ground the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. Judge Cabebe motu proprio
issued an order granting bail to the accused. This was
issued without the accused’s application for motion for bail.
The prosecution filed a MR but instead of acting thereon,
Cabebe issued an order inhibiting himself from further
proceeding with the case, realizing that what he did was
patently irregular.
4. Complainant thus prays that Judge Cabebe be dismissed
from service.
5. In his Comment, Judge Cabebe denied the charges. While
admitting that he issued an order granting bail without
hearing, the same was premised on the constitutional right of
the accused to a speedy trial; that there was delay in the
proceedings due to complainant’s frequent absences, and
failure of the witnesses for the prosecution to appear in
court, resulting in the cancellation of the hearings; the
prosecution did not object to the granting of bail; and the
administrative complaint against his is purely harassment.
6. Subsequently, Cabebe compulsorily retired.
7. Deputy Court Administrator found Judge Cabebe liable for
gross ignorance of the law and recommended the imposition
of a P20,000 fine.
Issue:
Did Judge Cabebe violate the Rules? Yes.
Ruling:
1. Jurisprudence in replete with decisions on the procedural
necessity of a hearing, whether summary or otherwise,
relative to the grant of bail, especially in cases involving
offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life
imprisonment, where bail is a matter of discretion.
2. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in
cases where bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused
is strong, and the determination of whether or not the
evidence is strong is a matter of judicial discretion which
remains with the judge.
3. In order for the latter to properly exercise his discretion, he
must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the
evidence of guilt is strong. In fact, even cases where there is
no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
4. There is no question that respondent judge granted bail
5. to the accused without conducting a hearing, in violation of
Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.
6. The case of Cortes v. Catral laid down the following ruled
outlining the duties of the judge in case an application for
bail is filed:
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
a. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion, notify the prosecutor of the hearing of
the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure);
b. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a
hearing of the application for bail regardless of
whether or not the prosecution refuses to present
evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to
exercise its sound discretion (Sections 7 and 8, id.);
c. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong
based on the summary of evidence of the
prosecution;
d. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the
accused upon the approval of the bail bond (Section
19, id.); otherwise the petition should be denied.
7. Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and
procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did not conduct a
hearing before he granted bail, thus depriving the
prosecution of an opportunity to interpose objections to the
grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the strength or
weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he
should have conducted a hearing and thereafter made a
summary of the evidence of the prosecution.
8. Neither did respondent require the prosecution to submit its
recommendation on whether or not bail should be granted.
He maintains that the prosecution did not object to the grant
of bail to the accused, hence, he cannot be held
administratively liable for not conducting a hearing. However,
in Santos vs. Ofilada, it was held that the failure to raise or
the absence of an objection on the part of the
prosecution in an application for bail does not dispense
with the requirement of a bail hearing.
9. Respondent judge contends that the accused were entitled
to their right to a speedy trial, hence, he granted bail without
a hearing. He blames the prosecution for the delay. This
contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the
records that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the
trial of the case. Even assuming there was a delay, this does
not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is utter
disregard of the Rules.
Leviste vs CA 615 SCRA 619
GR No. 189122 | 17 March 2010 | Corona, J.
Topic: Bail after conviction
Doctrine: After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of
innocence terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail
ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion.
Emergency Recit: After being convicted by the RTC, Leviste
appealed to the CA and pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal contending that
where the penalty imposed by the RTC is more than 6 years but not
more than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the 3 rd
paragraph of Sec. 5 are absent, bail must be granted to an appellant
pending appeal. SC denied the petition.
Facts:
● Petitioner Leviste was convicted by the RTC of homicide and
sentence to suffer an indeterminate penalty of 6 years and 1
day (prision mayor) as minimum to 12 years and 1 day
(reclusion temporal) as maximum.
● Leviste appealed his conviction to the CA.
○ Pending appeal, he filed an urgent application for
admission to bail pending appeal citing his advanced
age and health condition, and claiming the absence
of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019

● CA denied petitioner’s application for bail.

○ Invoked that the discretion to extend bail during the
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) yea
course of appeal should be exercised “with grave
shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the p
caution and only for strong reasons.”
notice to the accuse, of the following or other similar circumstances:
○ Bail is not a sick pass for an ailing or aged detainee
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or
or a prisoner needing medical care outside the
the crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
prison facility.
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evade
● Petitioner now questions as grave abuse of discretion the
violated the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
denial of his application for bail, considering that none of the
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole
conditions justifying denial of bail under the 3 rd paragraph of
pardon;
Sec. 5, Rule 114 was present. Petitioner’s theory is that,
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of fligh
where the penalty imposed by the RTC is more than 6 years
bail; or
but not more than 20 years and the circumstances
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime durin
mentioned in the 3rd paragraph of Sec. 5 are absent, bail
of the appeal.
must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the
Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Issue: In an application for bail pending appeal by an appellant
sentenced by the RTC to a penalty of imprisonment for more than 6
years, does the discretionary nature of the grant of bail pending The third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 applies to two scenarios
appeal mean that bail should automatically be granted absent any of where the penalty imposed on the appellant applying for bail is
the circumstances mentioned in the 3rd par of Sec. 5, Rule 114 of imprisonment exceeding six years.
ROC? 1. The first scenario deals with the circumstances enumerated
in the said paragraph (namely, recidivism, quasi-recidivism,
Ruling: habitual delinquency or commission of the crime aggravated
by the circumstance of reiteration; previous escape from
legal confinement, evasion of sentence or violation of the
Sec. 5. Bail, when discretionary. – Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court ofconditionsan offense of not
his bail without a valid justification; commission
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is discretionary.
of the offense Thewhile under probation, parole or conditional
application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite the filing of a notice
pardon; of
circumstances indicating the probability of flight if
appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the appellate court. released
However,on if the
bail; undue risk of committing another crime
decision of the trial court conviction the accused changed the nature of the offense from non-bailable
during the pendency of the appeal; or other similar
to bailable, the application for bail can only be filed with and resolved by the appellatecircumstances)
court. not present.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed 2. Theto continue on
second scenario contemplates the existence of at least
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bailone subject to the
of the said circumstances.
consent of the bondsman.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial discretion. This
means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has
the discretion to grant or deny bail. An application for bail pending
appeal may be denied even if the bail-negating circumstances in the
third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 are absent. In other words,
the appellate court's denial of bail pending appeal where none of the
said circumstances exists does not, by and of itself, constitute abuse
of discretion.
On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court
exercises a more stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain
whether any of the enumerated circumstances in fact exists. If it so
determines, it has no other option except to deny or revoke bail
pending appeal. Conversely, if the appellate court grants bail
pending appeal, grave abuse of discretion will thereby be committed.
Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application for bail
pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two
stages:
(1) the determination of discretion stage; where the appellate
court must determine whether any of the circumstances in
the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise
sound discretion or stringent discretion in resolving the
application for bail pending appeal and
(2) the exercise of discretion stage where, assuming the
appellant's case falls within the first scenario allowing the
exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may
consider all relevant circumstances, other than those
mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis
thereof, it may either allow or disallow bail.
On the other hand, if the appellant's case falls within the second
scenario, the appellate court's stringent discretion requires that the
exercise thereof be primarily focused on the determination of the
proof of the presence of any of the circumstances that are prejudicial
to the allowance of bail. This is so because the existence of any of
those circumstances is by itself sufficient to deny or revoke bail.
Nonetheless, a finding that none of the said circumstances is present
will not automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will
simply authorize the court to use the less stringent sound discretion
approach.
The development over time of these rules reveals an orientation
towards a more restrictive approach to bail pending appeal. It
indicates a faithful adherence to the bedrock principle, that is, bail
pending appeal should be allowed not with leniency but with grave
caution and only for strong reasons.
The present inclination of the rules on criminal procedure to frown on
bail pending appeal parallels the approach adopted in the United
States where our original constitutional and procedural provisions on
bail emanated. While this is of course not to be followed blindly, it
nonetheless shows that our treatment of bail pending appeal is no
different from that in other democratic societies.
In our jurisdiction, the trend towards a strict attitude towards the
allowance of bail pending appeal is anchored on the principle that
judicial discretion — particularly with respect to extending bail —
should be exercised not with laxity but with caution and only for
strong reasons.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence
terminates and, accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends.
From then on, the grant of bail is subject to judicial discretion. At the
risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised with
grave caution and only for strong reasons. Considering that the
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
accused was in fact convicted by the trial court, allowance of bail
pending appeal should be guided by a stringent-standards approach.
This judicial disposition finds strong support in the history and
evolution of the rules on bail and the language of Section 5, Rule 114
of the Rules of Court.
Furthermore, letting the accused out on bail despite his conviction
may destroy the deterrent effect of our criminal laws. This is
especially germane to bail pending appeal because long delays often
separate sentencing in the trial court and appellate review. In
addition, at the post-conviction stage, the accused faces a certain
prison sentence and thus may be more likely to flee regardless of
bail bonds or other release conditions. Finally, permitting bail too
freely in spite of conviction invites frivolous and time-wasting appeals
which will make a mockery of our criminal justice system and court
processes.
Petition is DISMISSED.
PEOPLE v. HON. RENATO C. DACUDAO, Presiding Judge of
RTC Cebu, Branch XIV, and REY CHRISTOPHER PACLIBAR,
and NERO DESAMPARADO alias TOTO DESAMPARADO alias
WALDAS
G.R. No. 81389 | 21 February 1989 | Gutierrez, Jr., J.
Topic: Rule 114 (Bail) – Capital Offense
DOCTRINE: Although the Constitution states that the death penalty
may not be imposed unless a law orders its imposition for heinous
crimes, it does not follow that all persons accused of any crime
whatsoever now have an absolute right to bail. In §13, Art. III,
Constitution, “capital offense” is replaced by the phrase “offenses
punishable by reclusion perpetua.”
EMERGENCY RECIT: Information for Murder was filed against
Pacliabar and Desamparado for the death of Nolasco. Without
conducting a hearing in an application for bail, Judge summarily
ordered granting of bail. Private prosecutor averred that the grant of
bail without a hearing is violative of procedural due process. Defense
insists that due to the abolition of the death penalty, murder is no
longer a capital offense, thereby making accused entitled to bail. SC
held that the prosecution was deprived of procedural due process on
the account of the grant of bail to the accused without any hearing on
the motion for bail. It likewise held that bail is not a matter of right as
regards persons charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. §5, R114, ROC
requires a hearing before resolving a motion for bail. Petition was
grated. RTC Order granting bail was set aside. Accused was ordered
to be recommitted to jail pending hearing on the bail application.
FACTS:
● An Information for Murder with the qualifying circumstances
of treachery and evident premeditation was filed before RTC
Cebu, presided by Judge Renato C. Dacudao (Judge),
against accused Rey Christopher Paclibar (Paclibar) and
Nero Desamparado (Desamparado) for the death of
Cesarlito Nolasco (Nolasco).
● Upon arraignment, Paclibar entered a plea of “not guilty.”
● Without conducting a hearing in the application for bail,
Judge summarily ordered:
■ Motion for bail presented by Atty. Bernardito
A. Florido granted
■ Fixes the bailbond for Paclibar at P50k
● Private prosecutor Alex R. Monteclar (Monteclar) filed MR
alleging that the grant of bail to the accused without a
hearing is violative of procedural due process, hence, null
and void. Then filed this Petition.
● The defense counsel insists that the accused should be
entitled to bail considering the abolition of the death penalty
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
in the 1986 Constitution. He advances the argument that due
to the abolition of the death penalty, murder is no longer a
capital offense being no longer punishable by death.
ISSUE #1: W/N the private prosecutor has authority to act for the
People. – NO.
● A private prosecutor in a criminal case has no authority to
act for the People of the Philippines before the Supreme
Court.
● It is the Government’s counsel, the Solicitor General, who
appears in criminal cases or their incidents before the SC. At
the very least, the Provincial Fiscal himself, with the
conformity of the SolGen, should have raised the issue
before the SC, instead of the private prosecutor with the
conformity of one of the Assistant Provincial Fiscals (APF) of
Cebu.
● In the interest of a speedy determination of cases, however,
and considering the stand taken by the OSG, the Court
decided to resolve the petition on its merits, with a warning
to the private prosecutor and the APF to follow the correct
procedure in the future.
ISSUE #2:W/N the prosecution was deprived of procedural due
process on account of the grant of bail to the accused without any
hearing on the motion for bail. – YES.
● RTC Cebu acted irregularly in granting bail in a murder case
without any hearing on the motion asking for it, without
bothering to ask the prosecution for its conformity or
comment, and as it turned out later, over its strong
objections.
● The court granted bail on the sole basis of the complaint and
the affidavits of 3 policemen, not one of whom apparently
witnesses the killing.
● Whatever the court possessed at the time it issued the
questioned ruling was intended only for prima facie
determining W/N there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that the crime was committed it. W/N the
evidence of guilt is strong for each individual accused still
has to be established unless the prosecution submits the
issue on whatever it has already presented.
● To appreciate the strength or weakness of the evidence of
guilt, the prosecution must be consulted or heard. It is
equally entitled as the accused to due process.
● People v. San Diego: Whether the motion for bail of a
defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved
in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire
to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity,
there would be a violation of procedural due process, and
the order of the court granting the bail should be considered
void on that ground. The court’s discretion to grant bail in
capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a summary
of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it
would be uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical.
● Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the
presentation of evidence and reasonable opportunity for the
prosecution to refute it. among them are the nature and
circumstances of the crime, character and reputation of the
accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, W/N the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and W/N the accused is
under bond in other cases. It is highly doubtful if the TC can
appreciate these guidelines in an ex parte determination
where the Fiscal is neither present nor heard.
● The effort of the court to remedy the situation by conducting
the required hearing after ordering the release of the
accused may be a face-saving device for the Judge but it
cannot serve the purpose of validating the void order
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
granting bail and stamping an imprimatur of approval on a
clearly irregular procedure.
ISSUE #3: W/N murder is a capital offense. – YES.
● [DOCTRINE]
● Bail is not a matter of right as regards persons charged with
offenses punishable byreclusion perpetuawhen the evidence
of guilt is strong.
● §5, R114 requires a hearing before resolving a motion for
bail by persons charged with offenses punishable by
reclusion perpetuawhere the prosecution may discharge its
burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The
case at bar, which is murder, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua.
ISSUE #4: W/N the Petition for Certiorariis premature. – YES,
however granted.
● Defense interposes an objection to the petition on the
ground that it is premature and therefore, should be
dismissed. It contends that certiorariwill not lie unless the
inferior courts has, through MR, the opportunity to correct
the errors imputed to it.
● GR is that a MR should first be availed of before a petition
for certiorari or prohibition is filed. However, this rule does
not apply when special circumstances warrant immediate or
more direct action.
● MR may be dispensed with in cases like this where
execution has been ordered and the need for relief is
extremely urgent.
● In the case at bar, petitioner is left with no plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law considering
that the respondent court insists on the continuation of the
hearing of the criminal case even while the accused is free
to roam around. Moreover, there is an allegation that the
accused is harassing, threatening, and coercing witnesses
who are now afraid to testify.
PETITION GRANTED. ORDER GRANTING BAIL SET ASIDE.
ACCUSED ORDERED TO BE RECOMMITTED TO JAIL PENDING
HEARING ON THE BAIL APPLICATION.
Bravo v. Borja 134 S 466
GR No. L-655228 | February 18, 1985 | Plana, J.
Topic: Bail
Doctrine: The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one
who is accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is
strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable death
sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This reason
does not hold where the accused has been established without
objection to be a minor who by law cannot be sentenced to death.
Emergency Recit: Petitioner Bravo was charged for murder for the
killing of Ramon Abiog. While he was in detained in the city jail of
Naga after his arrest, he filed a motion for bail, alleging that since he
is a minor, he is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance under
Art. 68 of the RPC which would make the murder charge against him
non-capital. The fiscal opposed the motion for bail on the ground that
the evidence of guilt is strong, but did not contest the minority of the
petitioner. The Court held that the accused is entitled to bail. (SEE
DOCTRINE)
Facts:·
● Petitioner Jojo Pastor Bravo, Jr. was charged with murder for
the killing of Ramon Abiog. He was detained in the city jail of
Naga after his arrest.
● Bravo filed a motion for bail based on two reasons:
1. Evidence against him is not strong in view of the
retraction by the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del
Rosario of his previous statement naming Bravo as
the assailant.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
2. That he is a minor of 16 years, as such, he is
entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance
under Art. 68 of the RPC which would make the
murder charge against him non-capital.
● The prosecution witness del Rosario retracted the testimony
and he again testified against Bravo.
● Respondent Judge Melecio Borja denied the motion for bail
on the finding that the evidence of petitioner’s guilt is strong
and his minority was not proved.
● Bravo filed MR alleging that his minority had been proved by
his birth certificate which was attached to the memorandum
in support of his motion for bail, that his minority was never
challenged by the fiscal, and that the offense charged, as
regards petitioner, is not capital because even if convicted,
he could not be sentenced to death because of his minority.
● The fiscal opposed the motion on the ground that the
evidence of guilt is strong, but did not contest the minority of
the petitioner.
● MR was denied by respondent Judge.
● NBI Regional Office submitted its report. It found that it was
the prosecution witness, Ferdinand del Rosario, and not the
petitioner, who killed the victim.
● Bravo filed the instant petition for certiorari and mandamus,
with two supplementary petitions, seeking his release on bail
or his transfer to the custody of the Ministry of Social
Services and Development (MSSD) pending trial pursuant to
Article 191 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code. In view of
the NBI report, the petition also seeks the issuance of writ of
mandamus commanding respondent Judge to remand the
case the fiscal for reinvestigation.
Issue: Whether or not petitioner Bravo is entitled to bail? YES
Ruling: Under the Constitution, “all persons, except those charged
with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before
conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties.” (Article IV, Section 18.)
Generally, therefore, bail is a matter of right before conviction, unless
the accused is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of
guilt is strong.
The charge against petitioner is murder qualified by treachery and
attended by two aggravating circumstances: evident premeditation
and nocturnity. Punishable by reclusion temporal in its maximum
period to death, the crime is therefore a capital offense.
The petitioner however submits that even assuming that the
evidence of guilt against him is strong, the charge of murder, as to
him who is only 16 years old, cannot be capital because the death
penalty cannot be imposed on account of his minority which entitles
him to a penalty reduction of one degree. In effect, under petitioner’ s
submission, the test to determine whether the offense charged is
capital, is the penalty to be actually imposed on him in view of the
attendant circumstances.
Petitioner’s posture hardly finds support in the law. Under Section 5
of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, a capital offense is “an offense
which, under the law existing at the time of its commission, and at
the time of the application to be admitted to bail, may be punished by
death.” It is clear from this provision that the capital nature of an
offense is determined by the penalty prescribed by law, with
reference to which it is relatively easy to ascertain whether the
evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. Moreover, when the
Constitution or the law speaks of evidence of guilt, it evidently refers
to a finding of innocence or culpability, regardless of the modifying
circumstances.
To allow bail on the basis of the penalty to be actually imposed
would require a consideration not only of the evidence of the
commission of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and
mitigating circumstances. There would then be a need for a complete
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
trial, after which the judge would be just about ready to render a
decision in the case.
Nevertheless, where it has been established without objection that
the accused is only 16 years old, it follows that, if convicted, he
would be given “the penalty next lower than that prescribed by law,”
which effectively rules out the death penalty.
The Constitution withholds the guaranty of bail from one who is
accused of a capital offense where the evidence of guilt is
strong. The obvious reason is that one who faces a probable
death sentence has a particularly strong temptation to flee. This
reason does not hold where the accused has been established
without objection to be a minor who by law cannot be
sentenced to death. WHEREFORE, the orders of respondent
Judge denying bail to petitioner are set aside.
Miranda v Tuliao 486 S 377
GR No. 158763 | March 31, 2006 | J. CHICO-NAZARIO
Topic: Bail: Custody of the law vs jurisdiction over the person
of the accused
Doctrine: In criminal cases, jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is deemed waived by the accused when he files any
pleading seeking an affirmative relief, except in cases when he
invokes the special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such
jurisdiction over his person. Therefore, in narrow cases involving
special appearances, an accused can invoke the processes of the
court even though there is neither jurisdiction over the person nor
custody of the law. However, if a person invoking the special
jurisdiction of the court applies for bail, he must first submit himself to
the custody of the law.
Emergency Recit: Two Informations were filed against petitioners
for the murder of two persons. Petitioners filed an urgent motion to
complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate and to quash the
warrants of arrest; however, it was denied by Judge Tumaliuan on
the ground that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their
persons since they were absent. Hence, the motion cannot be
properly heard. This was reversed by Judge Anghad but was
eventually reinstated by the CA. The SC held that the accused can
seek judicial relief because jurisdiction over their person nor custody
of the law over their body is not required in the adjudication of a
motion to quash a warrant of arrest.Adjudication of a motion to quash
a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of the
accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused. [see
doctrine]
Facts:
Two burnt cadavers identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon
and Elizer Tuliao (son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao) were
discovered in Ramon, Isabela.
Two informations for murder were filed against SPO1 Wilfredo
Leaño, SPO1 Ferdinand Marzan, SPO1 Ruben B. Agustin, SPO2
Alexander Micu, SPO2 Rodel Maderal, and SPO4 Emilio Ramirez in
RTC Santiago City but was later transferred to RTC Manila. They
were convicted but acquitted on appeal due to reasonable doubt.
On April 27, 2001, SPO2 Maderal executed a sworn confession after
being arrested and identified petitioners Jose C. Miranda, SPO3
Alberto P. Dalmacio, PO3 Romeo B. Ocon, a certain Boyet dela Cruz
and Amado Doe, as the persons responsible for the deaths.
Respondent Virgilio filed a criminal complaint for murder against the
5 identified individuals and submitted Maderal’s sworn confession.
Warrants of arrest were issued.
Petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary
investigation, to reinvestigate and to quash the warrants of arrest.
Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and DENIED the
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
motion on the ground that since the court did not acquire jurisdiction
over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court.
In August 2001, the new Presiding Judge Anghad took over the case
and reversed the order of Judge Tumaliuan, whereby he cancelled
the warrant of arrest issued against the 3 petitioners of this case.
Respondent filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition
to this Court, with prayer for TRO, seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad
from further proceeding with the case and to nullify his orders. TRO
was granted. However, Judge Anghad still issued a joint order
dismissing the two Information for murder against petitioners. Due to
this, Tuliao filed a motion to cite public respondent in contempt.
CA granted the petition and ordered the reinstatement of the criminal
cases in the RTC, as well as the issuance of warrants of arrest
against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. CA held that jurisdiction over
the person of the accused may be acquired either through
compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest, or through voluntary
appearance, such as when he surrenders to the police or to the
court. Since the petitioners were not yet arrested nor deprived of
their liberty at the time they filed their “Urgent Motion to complete
preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate and to quash the warrants
of arrest”, they cannot seek any judicial relief.
Hence this petition. Petitioners argue that jurisdiction over the person
of the accused is required only in applications for bail. Nevertheless,
jurisdiction over their person was acquired by their filing of the
Urgent Motion.
Issue: WON petitioners can seek any judicial relief if they do not
submit to the jurisdiction of the court
Ruling: YES, they can seek relief. Adjudication of a motion to quash
a warrant of arrest requires neither jurisdiction over the person of
the accused, nor custody of law over the body of the accused.
Custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the
application for bail, but is not required for the adjudication of other
reliefs sought by the defendant where the mere application therefor
constitutes a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the
person of the accused. Custody of the law is accomplished either by
arrest or voluntary surrender, while jurisdiction over the person of the
accused is acquired upon his arrest or voluntary appearance.
One can be under the custody of the law but not yet subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, such as when a person
arrested by virtue of a warrant files a motion before arraignment to
quash the warrant. On the other hand, one can be subject to the
jurisdiction of the court over his person, and yet not be in the custody
of the law, such as when an accused escapes custody after his trial
has commenced. Being in the custody of the law signifies restraint
on the person, who is thereby deprived of his own will and liberty,
binding him to become obedient to the will of the law. Custody of the
law is literally custody over the body of the accused. It includes, but
is not limited to, detention.
In Pico vs. Judge Combong Jr., the Court ruled that “A person
applying for admission to bail must be in the custody of the law or
otherwise deprived of his liberty. A person who has not submitted
himself to the jurisdiction of the court has no right to invoke the
processes of that court. Respondent Judge should have diligently
ascertained the whereabouts of the applicant and that he indeed had
jurisdiction over the body of the accused before considering the
application for bail.”
The purpose of bail is to secure ones release and it would be
incongruous to grant bail to one who is free. Thus, bail is the security
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
required and given for the release of a person who is in the custody
of law. The rationale behind this special rule on bail is that it
discourages and prevents resort to the former pernicious practice
wherein the accused could just send another in his stead to post his
bail, without recognizing the jurisdiction of the court by his personal
appearance therein and compliance with the requirements therefor.
Alawiya vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. 164170 | April 16, 2009 | J. Carpio
Topic: Custody of the law vs jurisdiction over the person of the
accused: Relevance?
Doctrine: Once the information is filed with the trial court, any
disposition of the information rests on the sound discretion of the
court. The trial court is mandated to independently evaluate or
assess the existence of probable cause and it may either agree or
disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The
trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of
Justice.
Emergency Recit: In a kidnapping for ransom charged against the
respondent accused charged by the petitioners, respondents
questioned the information filed by State Prosecutor against them
because he has no authority to do so. There was also a reversal of
the findings of State Prosecutor by the Secretary of Justice that the
crime should be a buy-bust operation and not kidnapping for ransom.
The highlighted issue arose if the reversal of the Secretary of Justice
by the findings of the State Prosecutor amounted to an executive
acquittal. (See Doctrine)
Facts:
1. Petitioners executed sworn statements before the General
Assignment Section of the Western Police District in UN
Avenue Manila charging accused respondents who were all
policemen assigned at the Northern District for a crime of
kidnapping for ransom.
2. According to the sworn statements of petitioners, about 10
am in the morning, while petitioners were cruising on board a
vehicle along UN Avenue, a blue Toyota Sedan bumped
their vehicle from behind. When petitioners went out of their
vehicle to assess the damage, several armed men came out
from Toyota Sedan, poked guns at, blindfolded and forced
them to ride in the Toyota Sedan. They were brought to an
office where P10 million and two vehicles were demanded
from them in exchange of their freedom.
3. After some bargaining, the amount was reduced to Php 70
plus two vehicles. The money and vehicles were delivered in
an evening and petitioners were released in the early
morning thereafter. Petitioners handed the Deed of Sale and
registration papers of the two vehicles.
4. After an initial investigation by the Western Police District,
the case was reported to the PNP Intelligence Group in
Camp Crame where a lateral coordination was made with
PNP-NCR Police Office Regional Intelligence and
Investigation Division for the identification, arrest and filing of
appropriate charges against the accused. After its own
investigation, the PNP-NCR-RID recommended that the
accused be charged with violation of the RPC as amended
by RA 7659.
5. State Prosecutor who also conducted the PI issued a
resolution recommending that the accused be indicted for
the crime of kidnapping for ransom. The resolution was
endorsed for approval by Assistant Chief Prosecutor and
approved by Chief State Prosecutor.
6. An information was filed by State Prosecutor with the RTC
Manila for kidnapping for ransom against the accused
respondents with no bail recommended. Upon motion by the
prosecution, a hold departure order was made against the
accused. Subsequently, the trial court issued a warrant of
arrest against all the accused.
7. The accused meanwhile filed a petition for review of the
resolution of state prosecutor with the office of the secretary
of justice. The accused moved for the quashal of the
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
information on the ground that the officer who filed the
information has no authority to do so.
8. The trial court denied the motion to quash because under
the ruling in People v. Mapalao, an accused who is at large
is not entitled to bail or other relief. It also held that the
jurisdiction and power of the Ombudsman as well as
Administrative Order are not exclusive but shared or
concurrent with regular prosecutors. Thus, the authority of
the DOJ to investigate, file the information and prosecute the
case could no longer be questioned.
9. Through a resolution, the Secretary of Justice reversed the
ruling of State Prosecutor and ordered the later to cause the
withdrawal or dismissal of the Information for kidnapping for
ransom. The Secretary of Justice ruled that there was no
prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman before the
information for kidnapping was filed with the trial court. Also
found was the incident complained of was a bungled buy-
bust operation not kidnapping for ransom.
10. A motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioners but
denied by the then Secretary of Justice in a promulgated
resolution.
11. A petition for certiorari was filed with the CA to seek the
nullification of SOJ ruling because it was rendered grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
12. CA rendered a decision dismissing the petition for certiorari
and also denied the motion for reconsideration by the
petitioners. According to the CA, the finding of SOJ was
sustained in that it was a buy-bust operation not a
kidnapping for ransom as found by State Prosecutor
Velasco.
13. Hence, an appeal before SC was made.
14. Petitioners contend that the SOJ reversal of resolution of
State Prosecutor findings amount to executive acquittal.
15. Respondent SOJ through OSG agreed with petitioners that
prior approval by the Ombudsman is not required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against
the accused policemen. It cited Honasan II v. The Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors of the DOJ where SC held that the
power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving
public officers or employees is NOT exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government.
Issues:
(1.) Whether the prior approval by the Office of the Ombudsman for
the Military is required for the investigation and prosecution of the
instant case against the accused;
(2.) Whether the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution
of State Prosecutor Velasco amounted to an “executive acquittal;”
(3.) Whether the accused policemen can seek any relief (via a
motion to quash the information) from the trial court when they had
not been arrested yet; and
(4.) Whether there was probable cause against the accused for the
crime of kidnapping for ransom.
Ruling:
On the prior approval by the Ombudsman for the investigation and
prosecution of the case against the accused policemen
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), which is representing the
Secretary of Justice, agrees with petitioners that prior approval by
the Ombudsman is not required for the investigation and prosecution
of the criminal case against the accused policemen. The OSG
correctly cites the case of Honasan II v. The Panel of Investigating
Prosecutors of the Department of Justice, where the Court held that
the power of the Ombudsman to investigate offenses involving public
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019
officers or employees is not exclusive but is concurrent with other
similarly authorized agencies of the government such as the
provincial, city and state prosecutors. In view of the foregoing, both
the Court of Appeals and the Secretary of Justice clearly erred in
ruling that prior approval by the Ombudsman is required for the
investigation and prosecution of the criminal case against the
accused policemen.
On the reversal by the Secretary of Justice of the resolution of State
Prosecutor
Settled is the rule that the Secretary of Justice retains the power to
review resolutions of his subordinates even after the information has
already been filed in court. In Marcelo v. Court of Appeals, reiterated
in Roberts, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court clarified that nothing in
Crespo v. Mogul forecloses the power or authority of the Secretary of
Justice to review resolutions of his subordinates in criminal cases
despite an information already having been filed in court. The nature
of the power of control of the Secretary of Justice over prosecutors
was explained in Ledesma v. Court of Appeals in this wise:
Decisions or resolutions of prosecutors are subject to appeal to the
Secretary of justice who, under the Revised Administrative Code,
exercises the power of direct control and supervision over said
prosecutors; and who may thus affirm, nullify, reverse or modify their
rulings.
Contrary to petitioners’ contention, the Secretary of Justice’s reversal
of the Resolution of State Prosecutor did not amount to “executive
acquittal” because the Secretary of Justice was simply exercising his
power to review, which included the power to reverse the ruling of
the State Prosecutor. However, once a complaint or information is
filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its
continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Trial judges
are not bound by the Secretary of Justice’s reversal of the
prosecutor’s resolution finding probable cause. Trial judges are
required to make their own assessment of the existence of probable
cause, separately and independently of the evaluation by the
Secretary of Justice.
On the motion to quash the information when the accused had not
been arrested yet
People v. Mapalao correctly argued by the OSG, does not squarely
apply to the present case. Furthermore, there is nothing in the Rules
governing a motion to quash which requires that the accused should
be under the custody of the law prior to the filing of a motion to
quash on the ground that the officer filing the information had no
authority to do so. Custody of the law is not required for the
adjudication of reliefs other than an application for bail. However,
while the accused are not yet under the custody of the law, any
question on the jurisdiction over the person of the accused is
deemed waived by the accused when he files any pleading seeking
an affirmative relief, except in cases when the accused invokes the
special jurisdiction of the court by impugning such jurisdiction over
his person.
At any rate, the accused’s motion to quash, on the ground of lack of
authority of the filing officer, would have never prospered because as
discussed earlier, the Ombudsman’s power to investigate offenses
involving public officers or employees is not exclusive but is
concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of the
government.
On the existence or non-existence of probable cause
Ordinarily, the determination of probable cause is not lodged with
this Court. Its duty in an appropriate case is confined to the issue of
whether the executive or judicial determination, as the case may be,
of probable cause was done without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction.
CRIMPRO DIGESTS
Atty. Custodio | Remedial Law Review 2 | 2nd Semester, AY 2018-2019

However, in the following exceptional cases, this Court may recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. The trial court is not
ultimately resolve the existence or non-existence of probable cause bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance
by examining the records of the preliminary investigation. alone on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice amounts to an
abdication of the trial court’s duty and jurisdiction to determine the
● a. To afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of existence of probable cause.
the accused;
● b. When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or
to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions;
● c. When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice;
● d. When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of
authority;
● e. Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance
or regulation;
● f. When double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
● g. Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense;
● h. Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution;
● i. Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by
the lust for vengeance;
● j. When there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been
denied; and
● k. Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme
Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners.

There is no clear showing that the present case falls under any of the
recognized exceptions. Moreover, as stated earlier, once the
information is filed with the trial court, any disposition of the
information rests on the sound discretion of the court. The trial court
is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the existence of
probable cause and it may either agree or disagree with the