Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-22488             February 2, 1925
ENRIQUE JOVELLANO and ISABEL JOYOSA, plaintiffs-appellees, 
vs.
ANTONIA LUALHATI, ET AL., defendants. 
LUCIO SOLMIRANO, appellant.
Aurelio Palileo for appellant.
No appearance for appellees.
MALCOLM, J.:
Defendant as appellant rest his case on this legal proposition: There is no cause of action against the vendor of real property to make
him responsible for warranty in case of eviction unless said vendor is given notice of the suit for eviction. Although our local
jurisdiction is silent on the subject, we think that counsel is right.
On November 6, 1911, Dionisia Solmirano, Lucio Solmirano, and Macario Solmirano sold to Enrique Jovellano a parcel of land situated
in the municipality of Nagcarlan, Laguna, for P150. The deed of sale contained the usual covenant against eviction , namely: "That we,
Dionisia, Lucio and Macario Solmirano, the vendors herein, agree, to answer in case of eviction and to warrant the property hereby
sold." In pursuance of this agreement, Jovellano entered upon the land.
On March 4, 1913, one Maxima Dorado instituted action in the justice of the peace court of Nagcarlan against Jovellano to recover the
possession of the land. Maxima Dorado won her case against Jovellano. Instead of appealing from the decision, Jovellano presented a
new complaint in the Court of First Instance of Laguna against the same Maxima Dorado to determine the ownership of the property.
Jovellano was defeated again, and on appeal, this judgment was affirmed by the Supreme Court. (Jovellano vs. Dorado, R.G. No.
11881.1)
The present action was initiated by Enrique Jovellano and his wife Isabel Joyosa against Lucio Solmirano, Macario Solmirano, and
Antonia Lualhati, the daughter of Dionisio Solmirano, to recover from the defendants the price paid for the land, together with all the
expenses incurred in improving it and in maintaining the suits. One of the grounds of the demurrer and one of the allegations of the
defense was that defendants had not been notified as provided by law. The lower court decided the case in favor of the plaintiffs and
against the defendant Lucio Solmirano who was ordered to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P462.73, with legal interest.
As supplemental to the foregoing statement of the case and the facts, it is only necessary to add that in none of the above cited
cases were the Solmiranos cited to appear or made parties. However, Dionisia Solmirano was a witness and Lucio Solmirano may
have been present in the court at the time of the trial. The trial judge argued that this was a substantial compliance with the law.
Section III of Chapter IV of Title IV of Book IV of the Civil Code, is given up to the subject of warranty. Article 1475 of the Code
provides that eviction exists when by final judgment based upon a right prior to the sale, the vendee is deprived of the whole or any
part of the thing purchased. The vendors shall be liable for the eviction even though the contract is silent on the subject. Then with
other articles intervening, come articles 1481 and 1482 here applicable. They read:
ART. 1481. The vendor shall be bound to make good the warranty whenever it is proved that he was given notice, at the
instance of the vendee, of the suit for eviction. In the absence of such notice the vendor shall not be bound to the warranty.
ART. 1482. The defendant vendee, within the time fixed by the Law of Civil Procedure for answering the complaint, shall
cause notice thereof to be served upon the vendor or vendors within the shortest period possible.
This notification shall be made in the manner established in said law for the summoning of defendants.
The time to answer granted to the vendee shall be extended until the expiration of that granted the vendor or vendors to
appear and answer the complaint, which periods shall be the same as those granted all defendants by the Law of Civil
Procedure, counted from the notification prescribed by the first paragraph of this article.
Should the persons summoned to defend against the eviction fail to appear at the proper time and in the proper manner, the
period in which to answer the complaint shall continue with regard to the vendee.
With all the silent facts and legal provisions before us, it is well to recall a few controlling points. The purchaser has been forced to
surrender possession of the land to a third person having a paramount title. The purchaser now relies upon his covenant of warranty.
The purchaser has given the vendor no formal notice of the suits for eviction. Nevertheless, the purchaser expects to recover from
the seller of the land the purchase price and an additional amount sufficient to cover his losses.
Our researches disclose that the Spanish law on the subject of notice to the vendor in the case of covenants of warranty is much
more rigorous than the French and Roman law. By the Code Napoleon, as adapted in the State of Louisiana, the warranty is lost in the
absence of notification to the vendor, provided that the vendor can prove that he had good grounds of defense which he had lost in
consequence of the vendee's failure to call him. (Delacroix vs. Cenas' Heirs [1829], 10 Martin [La.], 187; Kelly vs. Wiseman & Hinson
[1859], 14 La Ann., 661; Bonvillain vs. Bodenheimer [1906], 117 La., VI La. Digest Ann., pp. 617 et seq.) Not so by the Spanish law.
That law speaks both affirmatively and negatively. The buyer who fails to cite his vendor in warranty loses all recourse against him.
The commentator Manresa says:
No discussion, therefore, should be made here as to whether or not the vendor had means of defense. All of this counts very little.
There is only one condition to be complied with by the vendee, and that is to give notice of the complaint. Once this is proven, his
right to the warranty is perfect, and the vendor cannot set up anything against it. This is the preparation for the exercise of the action
for eviction spoken of by us the commentary on the preceding article; the warranty, according to article 1480, cannot be enforced
until a final judgment is rendered, but the action for eviction is prepared, before that judgment, by causing a notice of the complaint
to be given to the vendor. (Comentarios al Codigo Civil Español, Tomo X, p. 212.)
The only doubtful point relates to that part of article 1482 of the Civil Code which refers to the Law of Civil Procedure. But as the
Spanish Ley de Enjuiciamiento Civil has disappeared, the article must be considered as referring to the present Code of Civil
Procedure. (Willard's Notes to the Spanish Civil Code, p. 85.) Section 114 of the Code of Civil Procedure could easily be taken
advantage of to join the vendor as codefendant.
We hold articles 1481 and 1482 of the Civil Code as in full force and effect, said articles to be supplemented by such pertinent
sections of Code of Civil Procedure as should be invoked in particular cases.
In accordance with the prayer of the appellant, the judgment is reversed and the complaint dismissed without special pronouncement
as to costs in either instance. So ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23109             March 20, 1925
SANTIAGO GOCHANGCO, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellants, 
vs.
R.L. DEAN, defendant-appellant.
Bernardino Guerrero and Amador Constantino for plaintiffs-appellants.
G.E. Campbell for defendant-appellant.
ROMUALDEZ, J.:
The plaintiffs seek to recover of the defendant the sum of P17,655 as the value of 5,885 coconut trees, plus P1,000 as attorney's
fees.
The defendant answered with a general denial and a counterclaim for the sum of P1,914 paid by the defendant and which must be
paid by the plaintiffs.
The Court of First Instance of Manila, where the action was instituted, rendered judgment absolving the defendant from the
complaint, and the plaintiffs from the cross-complaint and counterclaim of the defendant.
Both parties have appealed, the plaintiffs assigning the following errors:
 1. The denial of the two motions of the plaintiffs dated January 3 and 7, 1924, praying that the defendant be adjudged in
default on the ground of not having appeared nor answered the complaint within the period fixed by the law, the court
knowing, as it very well knew, that said denial openly and manifestly violated the statutes and jurisprudence of this high
court on the matter (pp. 7-17, plaintiff's B. of E.).
2. The finding that the plaintiffs seek to annul the contract of exchange in order to recover from the defendant the property
exchanged (p. 28, Id.).
3. The finding that it was one Thompson who induced the plaintiffs and defendant to exchange their respective lands (p.
24, Id.), and not the defendant himself, or at least by express order of the latter.
4. The finding that it was not proven that the defendant committed fraud and that he had never had the intention to deceive
the plaintiffs (p. 30, Id.), when, as a matter of fact, the contradictory and improbable testimony of the defendant clearly
shows the falsity, bad faith or fraud committed by him, and the preconceived intention to secure the making of the
exchange by fraudulent means.
5. The finding that the defendant did not positively say (p. 26, Id.) that there were on the lands exchanged more, but
not less, than 6,000 coconut trees, instead of finding that said defendant did so affirm, with full knowledge of the non-
existence of said number of trees, and that such existence of said number was the primary consideration of the contract of
exchange, without which the plaintiffs would not have accepted the carrying out of the transaction between them.
6. The failure to hold, as shown by the record, that while the defendant attempted to establish or has established the fact
that there were on his lands more than 6,000 coconut trees, according to his estimate, statement or belief, yet the fact
is that not all of said coconut trees belong to him exclusively.
7. The admission of Exhibits 1 to 13 of the defendant upon which its findings immaterial to this case are based, taking into
account that, aside from the fact that said exhibits have no bearing at all on the instant case, they were not even identified.
8. The unjust finding against the preponderance of the evidence of the plaintiffs, apparently reconciling it with the evidence
of the defendant, and the absolution of the latter from the complaint.
The defendant, in turn, assigns the following as error:
1. The failure to render judgment in his favor and against the plaintiffs for the sum of P414.
We find no merit in the first assignment of error made by the plaintiffs. The defendant's default is made to consist in the fact of the
latter not having furnished the plaintiffs a copy of his appearance and answer. Such a fact cannot in itself alone constitute sufficient
cause for adjudication of default. The record shows that said appearance and answer were filed with the court in due time, although
the plaintiffs aver that they did not receive any copy thereof.
We find no error, much less injustice, in the denial of the motion for adjudication of default based on such a defect.
The other assignments of error go to the merits of the case.
The plaintiffs had purchased a land of the Pasay Estate by installments. the defendant was the owner of two parcels of land situated
in Masbate. The plaintiffs and defendant agreed to exchange their respective properties, but before the final execution of the contract
of exchange, the plaintiff Gochangco went to Masbate to make an examination of the parcels of land offered for exchange by the
defendant.
The contract of exchange (Exhibits D and 1) was later executed. In the deed Exhibit D, the defendant stated, among other things, the
following:
It is also declared that the said described property is sold will all coconut trees growing on it, and I declared that I believe
there are more than 6,000 coconut trees so growing, together with any and all improvements of any kind whatsoever
existing on the said land including all movable goods, chattel, etc., found thereof.
The plaintiffs allege that defendant made them false and fraudulent representations as to the existence of 6,000 coconut trees on his
lands in Masbate offered for exchange. This was not proven. It does not appear in the record that the defendant deliberately violated
the truth in stating his belief that there were such a number of coconut trees on said lands. Furthermore, it was shown that the
plaintiff viewed the lands and himself estimated that there were there more than six thousand coconut trees.
The facts herein proven, considered in the light of the provisions contained in article 1484 of the Civil Code, made applicable to this
case by article 1541 of said Code, prevent us from holding the action brought by the plaintiffs to be of any merit. They have not
established their alleged right to the judgment prayed for in their complaint.
As to the cross-complaint and counterclaim of the defendant, we find that in the deed Exhibit 1 executed by the plaintiffs in favor of
the defendant, the former agreed to reimburse the latter what he might pay in connection with perfecting his title to the property in
Pasay, exchanged for that of the defendant in Masbate, provided that the sum thus spent should exceed P1,500.
This was admitted by the plaintiffs in their reply to the cross-complaint and counterclaim of the defendant, where they also admitted
the fact that for perfecting his title to the property, the defendant had spent the total sum of P1,914; there being, therefore, an
excess of P414 which the plaintiffs are under obligation to pay unto the defendant.
Wherefore the judgment appealed from is affirmed so far as it absolves the defendant from the complaint, but reversed so far as it
dismisses the cross-complaint and counterclaim, and it is ordered that the plaintiffs pay the defendant the sum of P414, with legal
interest thereon from January 3, 1924, when the cross-complaint and counterclaim was filed, without special findings as to costs. So
ordered.
Johnson, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, and Johns, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15695             October 26, 1920
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, applicant-appelle, 
vs.
ELADIO ADRIANO, ET AL., objectors. 
CURTIS W. WHITE and J.C. WEBSTER, appellants.
Crossfield & O'Brien for appellants.
Attorney-General Paredes for the Government.
MALCOLM, J.
The question of law on which opponents White & Webster ground their appeal, as stated by them, concerns the conclusiveness of
title conveyed by the Government in a sale of land for back taxes.
A statement of the case and the facts, practically admitted by all parties, upon which the legal issue rests , may be succinctly made as
follows: Cadastral proceedings were initiated by the Government to settle the title to a tract of land situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija. Messrs. White and Webster laid claim to all of cadastral lot 2748, and Yap & Borja, and Duran, asserted their rights to portions
thereof. The Director of Lands opposed registration in the name of any of the claimants. It is the case of White & Webster which
particularly concerns us.
On February 18, 1905, one Gervasio Diaz having failed to pay the land tax on his property containing approximately six hundred
hectares, the provincial treasurer of Nueva Ecija sold it at public auction to Curtis W. White and George A. Webster, highest bidders,
in the sum of P362.44. One year having elapsed without any person appearing to redeem the property, the provincial treasurer
executed a deed in favor of White & Webster, appearing herein as Exhibit A, reading as follows:
Know all men by these presents:
That whereas the following described real estate, to wit: The land of Gervasio Diaz situated in the poblacion of
Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, and described under No. 31, Register No. 1 in the office of the provincial treasurer of Nueva
Ecija, has been duly and legally assessed at the valuation of nine thousand and 00/00 dollars ($9,000), money of
the United States, as appears by the Lists of Taxable Real Estate on file in the office of the secretary of the
municipal board of assessors of the municipality of Bongabon, Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands;
And whereas, by virtue of said assessment and according to the provisions of Act No. 82 of the United States
Philippine Commission and the amendments thereof, taxes against said property became delinquent and were
unpaid on the 1st day of August, 1904, in the sum of one hundred forty-six and 26/100 dollars ($146.26), money of
 the United States, and the same remaining unpaid by the owner of said described real estate or any person for him,
due notice of said assessment having been given according to the provisions of said Act No. 82 and the
amendments thereof:
And whereas, the provincial treasurer of said Province of Nueva Ecija (having been unable to find sufficient personal
property of the owner of said described real estate out of which to make all the taxes assessed upon said real
estate) did, within twenty days after said delinquency, and upon warrant of a certified copy of the record of such
delinquency, attested by the municipal secretary of the municipality of Bongabon in said province, advertise for
sale said real estate, or so much thereof as might be necessary to satisfy all public taxes, upon said real estate,
penalties and cost of sale, for a period of thirty days from and after the 12th day of January, 1905, by keeping
posted a notice at the main entrance of the municipal building of the municipality of Bongabon and in a public and
conspicuous place in the barrio in which said real estate is situated (and by publication of note of said sale once a
week for three weeks in ... a newspaper of general circulation published ... in said province);
And whereas, at a public sale pursuant to said notice, held at Bongabon on the 18th day of February, 1905, at 8
o'clock a.m. at the entrance to the municipal building, in said municipality of Bongabon, the same being the hour
and place of sale named in said notice, the following described premises, to wit: Terreno [land], situated in
the poblacion of Bongabon, Nueva Ecija, with boundaries as follows: North , sitio "Manarog;" east, sitio "Platero;"
south, Rio Coronel; west, sitio "Bulsan. Area, 600 hectares we sold to Curtis W. White and George Webster and
certificate issued to said Curtis W. White and George Webster stating the amount of public taxes, penalties, and
interest, amounting to one hundred eighty-one and 22/100 dollars ($181.22), money of the United States, paid by
said Curtis W. White and George Webster for said premises last above described;
And whereas, the owner of said first above described property, or anyone for him, has not within one year from the
date of said sale paid to the treasurer of said Nueva Ecija Province, or his authorized deputy, the amount of said
public taxes, penalties and interest thereon from the date of deliquency, or his authorized deputy, the amount of
said public taxes, penalties and interest thereon from the date of deliquency, or any part thereof, but has wholly
failed and neglected so to do;
Now, therefore, I have conveyed and by these presents do convey to Curtis W. White and George A. Webster, the
owner and holder of said certificate of purchase, all the said premises last above described, free from all liens of
any kind whatsoever.
Witness may hand at San Isidro in said Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, this 23d day of March, 1906.
(Sgd.) J. B. GREEN,           
Provincial Treasurer.         
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
PHILIPPINE ISLANDS           ss
PROVINCE OF NUEVA ECIJA
Personally appeared before me J. B. Green, treasurer of the Province of Nueva Ecija, Philippine Islands, and
acknowledged that he executed the foregoing instruments as his free and voluntary act, for the uses and purposes
therein set forth.
In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand and official seal at San Isidro in said province this 24th day of
March, 1906.
[SEAL.]                    (Sgd.) ROMAN ROQUE,
Provincial Secretary.
Sometime later, George A. Webster transferred his right and interest in the land to J.C. Webster. Although some testimony was
introduced, White & Webster relied absolutely upon the deed of sale above quoted, to obtain registration of the land. The judgment of
the trial court, however, dismissed all the oppositions, and declared the tract to be public land.
On appeal, the contention of White & Webster is, that when the Government sold the land to them "free from all liens of any kind
whatsoever," there being no allegation of fraud or irregularities, they received an absolute title in fee simple. The contention of the
Government, on the other hand, is, that the only title conveyed to White & Webster was the interest or right which the person said to
be the owner might have had in the premises.
A resolution of these rival arguments is not entirely free from perplexities. Nor is it exactly clear, whatever be our ruling, that injustice
will not be done. One cannot but sympathize with White & Webster who purchased the land regularly and lawfully, who then went
upon it and made improvements, and who have faithfully paid the Government the corresponding taxes. Similarly, one can also
understand the precarious situation of some two hundred individuals who live upon the land and who have obtained concessions from
the Government by purchase, lease, or homestead.
After considerable research and study, certain controlling principles have been agreed upon as follows:
There are two distinct doctrines on the subject of what passes by the sale of property for back taxes. In many states where the tax is
a charge on the land alone, where no resort in any event is contemplated against the owner or his personal estate, and where the
proceeding is strictly in rem, the title conveyed by a sale for nonpayment of taxes is not merely the title of the person who had been
assessed for the taxes and had neglected to pay them, but a new and paramount title to the land in fee simple absolute, created by
an independent grant from the sovereign, and free from all equities and encumbrances existing prior to the sale upon the title of the
previous owner. According to this view, the tax title is a breaking up of all titles, and operates not to support, but to destroy them. It
is a new and perfect title emanating from the State, and not merely the sum of old titles. The second doctrine prevailing in other
jurisdictions where the proceedings for the collection of taxes upon real estate are looked upon as in personam, is that the purchaser
at the tax sale gets not better title than was held by the person assessed. According to this view, where the law requires the land to
be listed in the name of the owner, provides for a personal demand for the tax, and, in case of default, authorizes the seizure of the
personal property of the delinquent in satisfaction of the tax, and permits a sale of the land only when all other remedies have been
exhausted, the title is a derivative one, and the purchases acquires only the apparent interest, whatever it is, of the tax delinquent.
(See generally 2 Cooley on Taxation, 3d ed., pp. 960-962; 26R. C. L., pp. 401-404; 33 L.R.A, 689, notes; Turner  vs. Smith [1871], 14
Wall., 553.
Another subsidiary theory, here applicable on the supposition that Diaz, the delinquent taxpayer, had demonstrated no title to the
land and that consequently, it was in the nature of public land, is, that while the title remains in the Government, public lands are not
subject to taxation, and tax sales and tax deed thereof are void. The purchaser of any such lands for delinquency in the payment of
the taxes charged thereon, derives no title or right of any sort to the land so purchased. (Hussman vs. Durham [1896], 165 U.S., 144;
Braxton vs. Rich [1891], 47 Fed., 178.) A case of this nature, remarkably similar in its antecedents and facts to the one before us, is
that of Hall vs. Dowling ([1861], 18 Cal., 619). The action was for ejectment, to recover possession of a certain island called Hierba
Buena in the Bay of San Francisco. Plaintiff claimed title, first, by prior possession in one Spear and King her predecessors; second, by
virtue of a tax deed, and third, by prescription under the laws of Mexico. Plaintiff introduced in evidence at the trial a tax deed
executed by the tax collector of the city and county of San Francisco for the entire island called Hierba Buena formerly Goat Island,
situated in the Bay of San Francisco. The very trite decision of the Supreme Court of California on these facts was that " We cannot
see that the plaintiff makes out title through the tax deed; for this seems to have been public land of the United States, and therefore
could not be sold for taxes."
The exact phraseology of the particular statute would seem to determine the doctrine applicable in each jurisdiction. The Philippine
law on the subject of taxation, when this tax sale occurred, was found in the Municipal Code, Act No. 82 (secs. 74-83), as amended by
Act No. 1139. According to these provisions, in case of default in the payment of land taxes, the personal property of the delinquent
was first seized. Taxes and penalties were thereafter enforcible against the realty and, if necessary, it could be sold to satisfy the
public taxes assessed against it. In case the taxpayer did not redeem the land sold within one year from the date of the sale, the
provincial treasurer, as grantor, executed a deed conveying the land to the purchaser free from all liens of any kind whatsoever.
It is thus seen that there was no provision in the local law, such as is found in Iowa and other states, vesting in the purchaser "all the
title of the former owner as well as of the State and County." (See Hefner vs. Northwestern Mu. L. Ins. Co. [1887], 123 U.S., 747.) It is
further seen that proceedings in the Philippines for the sale of land for the nonpayment of taxes were in personam.
(Valencia vs. Jimenez and Fuster [1908], 11 Phil., 492.) The tax was not a charge upon the land alone. The authorities were first
required to hunt up the owner and to make the tax out of his personal property. Only the particular interest or title of the person to
whom the land is assessed was sold. As a stream cannot rise higher than its source, so the purchaser could not claim any better title
than his predecessor.1awph!l.net
The case at bar is not like that of Denoga vs. Insular Government ([1911], 19 Phil., 261), for there neither the Government nor anyone
else appeared to impugn the applicant's title.
Some of the apparent harshness of our holding will be removed when the words of Mr. Justice Brewer in Hussman  vs. Durham, supra,
are recalled, namely, "It is a familiar law that a purchaser of a tax title takes all the chances. There is no warranty on the part of the
State."
It would be only just to give the claimants another opportunity to prove their title. there is an allegation in their answer that before
acquiring possession of the tract, their predecessors in interest had been in possession thereof for sixty years at the very least. If
White & Webster can show occupation of the six hundred hectares of land for ten years previous to July 26, 1904, they can establish
their title. If they fail in such effort, it would further be only just for the Government, which once through one of its regularly
appointed officers transferred the property to the claimants and, thereafter, accepted the payments of taxes from them, only now to
assail the effect of its own acts, to reimburse the claimants for the amount paid by them for the land and for taxes.
It results that the judgment must be affirmed, without prejudice to the right of Curtis W. White and J.C. Webster, within a reasonable
period, which we fix at one year, to present further evidence in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to establish their title to the
tract of land formerly in the possession of Gervasio Diaz and whose title, whatever it may be, was transferred to them, with costs
against the appellants. So ordered.
Mapa, C.J., Araullo, Avanceña and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Johnson, J., dissents.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-16746             June 26, 1922
THE MUNICIPALITY OF ALBAY, plaintiff-appellee, 
vs.
CONSTANCIO BENITO, in his own behalf and as administrator of the estate of Maria Mijares, deceased, 
and HONGKONG & SHANGHAI BANKING CORPORATION defendants. 
CONSTANCIO BENITO, appellant, 
MANUEL NIETO, intervenor-appellee.
Rafael de la Sierra for appellant.
Acting Attorney-General Tuason for appellee.
Albert E. Somersille for intervenor.
OSTRAND, J.:
In July, 1913, condemnation proceedings were instituted for the expropriation of land for a public market in the municipality of Albay.
Part of the land to be condemned was owned by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation but appears to have been
voluntarily sold to the municipality by the bank after these proceedings were begun. The rest of the land, constituting a parcel of an
area of 4,008.94 square meters, is the property of the estate of Maria Mijares of which the defendant Constancio Benito is the
administrator, and is the only property involved in the appeal.
In his original answer filed October 25, 1913, the defendant Constancio Benito did not question the right of the plaintiff municipality
to expropriate the land in question, and the Court of First Instance, consequently, on November 14, 1913, appointed commissioners
to assess damages to be paid for the condemnation. Thereafter and on January 12, 1914, one Manuel Nieto was permitted to
intervene as lessee of the land of the estate of Maria Mijares.
On April 25, 1914, the defendant Benito presented an amended answer in which he denied the right of the municipality to condemn a
portion of the land measuring 714 square meters on the ground that he had ascertained that said portion was to be used as a site for
stalls to be rented to merchants for long terms. The amendments was allowed by order dated May 2, 1914.
On December 17, 1914, the commissioners reported that in view of the fact that the defendant Benito disputed the right of the
municipality to condemn the 714 square meters of land hereinbefore mentioned, they were unable to definitely assess the damages
and therefore requested instruction from the court. The court, without setting the case for hearing upon the question of the right to
condemn said 714 square meters, returned the case to the commissioners with instruction to disregard the contention that the
municipality had no right to condemn the disputed 714 square meters. To this resolution the defendant duly excepted.
On December 20, 1916, the commissioners filed their report in which they awarded the estate of Maria Mijares the sum of P7,927.93
in damages for the condemnation of her entire parcel, including the aforesaid 714 square meters. Manuel Nieto, the lessee, was
allowed the sum of P1,326.39. After a hearing upon the commissioners' report the court, on January 7, 1918, rendered judgment
awarding the estate of Maria Mijares damages in the total sum of P5,748.76 and increasing the amount due Manuel Nieto to P1,550.
From this judgment Constancio Benito, as administrator of the estate of Maria Mijares, appeals.
The appellant presents three assignments of error:
1. The court erred in not setting the case for hearing upon question of the right of the plaintiff to expropriate the 714 square
meters in regard to which that right was disputed by the appellant; and in returning the case to the commissioners by an
order of February 5, 1915, with instructions to disregard the defendant's impugnation of such right.
2. In not excluding from the condemnation in this case the aforesaid 714 square meters.
3. In assessing the damages for taking of the land at only P5,748.76.
There can be little doubt but that the trial court was in error in not assigning the case for hearing after the filing of defendant-
appellant's amended answer had been allowed and before the commissioners rendered their report. However, if we accept he
allegations of the defendants amended answer in regard to the contemplated use of the 714 square meters as true and fully proven,
the error of the court below will be non-prejudicial to said defendant and will furnish no ground for reversal of the judgment appealed
from, or from remanding the case to the court below for the taking of additional evidence. We will therefore take for granted that the
aforesaid 714 square meters are to be used as the site of a building, divided into various compartments in the form of tiendas or
stalls which are to be rented to merchants for long period and for continuous and permanent use.
Touching the second assignment of error, the defendant's contention appears to be that the term "market" denotes a place used by
transient vendors and excludes the idea of permanency of occupation of any part thereof by any one merchant; and that, therefore,
section 2 Art No. 2249 authorizing municipalities to condemn land for market sites did not authorize the taking of land for the sites of
market stalls to be rented out for longer period as adjuncts to the general market facilities.
We can find no authority in support of this view. The term "public market" is thus defined in Black's Law Dictionary:
Public market. — A market which is not only open to the resort of the general public as purchasers, but also available to all
who wish to offer their wares for sale, stalls, stands, or places being allotted to those who apply, to the limits of the capacity
of the market, on payment of fixed rents or fees. (See American Live Stock Commission Co. vs. Chicago Live Stock
Exchange, 143 Ill., 210; 32 N. E., 274; 18 L. R. A. 190; 36 Am. St. Rep., 385 State vs. Fernandez 39 La. Ann., 538; 2 South.,
233; Cincinnati vs. Bickingham, 10 Ohio, 257.)
There is nothing in this definition to indicate that the renting of stand or stalls mentioned therein is of such an emphemeral character
as to preclude the owner of a market from renting out the stalls or stands for a term of years, if he so desires, without destroying the
character of the place as a market, and it is safe to say that no indication to that effect will be found elsewhere.
The plans accompanying the petition for condemnation in the present case shows clearly the character of both the market and of the
stalls or tiendas. The market is of the usual construction and ground plan approved by the Bureau of Public Works for public markets
in the more important provincial towns. It is divided into three sections of which only one appears to be completed at present, the
other two sections to be constructed when the necessity therefor appears. Each section is to be provided with fourteen stalls
or tiendas, the stalls being 4 meters wide and 5 meters long and separated from each other by substantial partitions or walls. The
fourteen stalls of each section are under one roof and are separated from the main open market-shed by an alley about 8 meters
wide. These are the stalls which the defendant claims cannot be regarded as part of public market because they are intended for
continuous and permanent use.
That stalls of the size and construction indicated are not intended to be rented from day to day, but are designed for more permanent
occupation and use is quite obvious. But both the market and the stalls are of standard design, i.e., the design and construction
adopted by the Government for municipal markets in general, and stalls such as the one in question must therefore be considered
essential component parts of a modern public market in these Islands. We do not think there can be any doubt whatever that
authority to condemn land for a market site also includes the right to take land for sites for stalls, which by the Government
authorities are considered necessary for the proper operation of public markets, and which are now generally understood to form a
part of such markets, irrespective of the fact that in ancient time a different conception of the necessary features of markets may
have prevailed.
The third assignment of error relates to the amount of the damages awarded the appellant. The findings of the court below upon this
point appear to be sufficiently supported by the evidence and we see no reason to disturb them.
The judgment appealed from is affirmed with the costs of this instance against the appellant Constancio Benito. So ordered.
Araullo, C.J., Avanceña, Villamor, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.