EN BANC

[G.R. No. 72915. December 19, 1985.]

PHILIPPINE BAR ASSOCIATION, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. THE

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72922. December 19, 1985.]

MARTINIANO P. VIVO, ET AL. , petitioners, v s . COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72923. December 19, 1985.]

MP AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., ET AL. , petitioners, vs. THE

TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72924. December 19, 1985.]

THE MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY

AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI], ET AL. , petitioners, vs. THE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72927. December 19, 1985.]

THE LIBERAL PARTY, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. THE NATIONAL

TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72928. December 19, 1985.]

CONCERNED WOMEN OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. , petitioners, vs.

HON. MAXIMIANO SAVELLANO, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72935. December 19, 1985.]

ALBERTO G. ROMULO, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72954. December 19, 1985.]

VICTOR C. AVECILLA, ET AL. , petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72957. December 19, 1985.]

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 NATIONAL BAR ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET AL. ,
petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72968. December 19, 1985.]

LABAN NG BAYAN [LABAN], ET AL. , petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION

ON ELECTIONS, ET AL. , respondents.

[G.R. No. 72986. December 19, 1985.]

JUAN T. DAVID , petitioners, vs. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, ET

AL. , respondents.

RESOLUTION

Gentlemen :

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of the Court En Banc

dated December 19, 1985. ATcEDS

"G.R. No. 72915 (Philippine Bar Association, et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.); G.R. No. 72922 (Martiniano P. Vivo, et al. vs. Commission on Elections,
et al.); G.R. No. 72923 (MP Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., et al. vs. The Treasurer of the
Philippines, et al.); G.R. No. 72924 (The Movement of Attorneys for Brotherhood,
Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI], et al. vs. The Commission on Elections, et al.);
G.R. No. 72927 (The Liberal Party, et al. vs. The National Treasurer of the Philippines) ;
G.R. No. 72928 (Concerned Women of the Philippines, et al. vs. Hon. Maximiano
Savellano, et al.); G.R. No. 72935 (Alberto G. Romulo, et al. vs. Commission on Elections,
et al.); G.R. No. 72954 (Victor C. Avecilla, et al. vs. Commission on Elections); G.R. No.
72957 (National Bar Association of the Philippines, et al. vs. Commission on Elections,
et al.); G.R. No. 72968 (Laban ng Bayan [LABAN], et al. vs. The Commission on
Elections, et al.) and G.R. No. 72986 (Juan T. David vs. The Commission on Elections, et
al.). — After considering all the pleadings and deliberating on the issues raised in the
petitions as well as on the oral arguments of the parties and the amici curiae in the
hearings held in these cases, Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino and six (6) Justices,
namely, Justices Claudio Teehankee, Hermogenes Concepcion, Jr., Vicente Abad
Santos, Efren I. Plana, Venicio T. Escolin and Lorenzo Relova, voted to DISMISS the
petitions in these cases and to DENY the prayer for the issuance of an injunction
restraining respondents from holding the election on February 7, 1986. In the opinion of
Chief Justice Aquino, B.P. 883 is constitutional.
"Justices Hugo Gutierrez, Jr., B.S. de la Fuente, Sera n R. Cuevas, Nestor B.
Alampay and Lino M. Patajo voted to DECLARE B. P. 883 unconstitutional and to grant
the injunction prayed for.
"Justice Teehankee is of the opinion that inasmuch as there are less than ten
votes in favor of declaring B.P. Blg. 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in these cases
are hereby dismissed and the writs therein prayed for are denied.
"This is in accordance with the opinion in Gonzales vs. COMELEC, 21 SCRA 802
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 and Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 141.
"Justices Teehankee, Plana, Escolin, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., de la Fuente, Alampay
and Patajo filed separate opinions.
"This resolution is without prejudice to the filing of separate opinions by the other
Members of this Court.
"At the session of January 7, 1986, the Court noted that its act of dismissing the
petitions had not been formally stated in its basic Resolution of December 19, 1985.
The Court therefore authorizes the insertion of the following dispositive portion:
'Accordingly, inasmuch as there are less than the required ten (10) votes to
declare Batas Pambansa Bilang 883 unconstitutional, the petitions in these cases
are hereby DISMISSED and the writs therein prayed for are DENIED.'"
"Chief Justice Aquino is of the opinion that the revision of the December 19, 1985
resolution is totally unnecessary. It is clear. It is understood that the petitions are
dismissed. The public and the Comelec understood that the petitions were dismissed."
ETaSDc

Melencio-Herrera, * J., took no part in all these cases.

Very truly yours,

(SGD.) GLORIA C. PARAS

Clerk of Court

Separate Opinions

TEEHANKEE , J., concurring :

I vote for the dismissal of the petition for prohibition against enforcement of BP
Blg. 883 on the ground that no clear case has been made of an absolute void of power
and authority that would warrant its nulli cation and that prohibition is not a remedy for
acts done that can no longer be undone.
The stated issue is quite simple: Is B.P. Blg. 883 calling for special national
elections on February 7, 1986 for the o ces of President and Vice-President of the
Philippines ( for the rst time since the pre-martial era 1969 presidential elections)
unconstitutional, and should this Court therefore stop and prohibit the holding of the
elections?
Upon the ling on December 3rd of the lead and other petitions at bar, four
members of the Court (Justices Abad Santos, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr. and myself) voted
per the Court's Resolution of December 5th to issue a temporary restraining order
against enforcement of the Act and to hear the petitions on last December 12th so as
to maintain the status quo and thereafter speedily resolve the issue and prevent the
people's expectations from reaching a point of no return. Our vote did not gain the
required concurrence of a majority of eight. Instead the Court granted the parties
substantial periods for ling of respondents' comment and petitioners' replies and to
hear the case only after two weeks on December 17th (continued to December 18th)
with a clear consensus to take a vote and resolve the petitions immediately after the
hearing.
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 It is of public knowledge and record, as pointed out by former Vice-President,
Senator and Executive Committee Member Emmanuel N. Pelaez, amicus curiae, who
helped in drafting the 1984 constitutional amendments abolishing the Executive
Committee and restoring the O ce of Vice-President as the President's successor,
that such restoration was not made effective immediately, but only at the end of the
incumbent President's term on June 30, 1987 in view of his oft-expressed "allergy to
vice-presidents." Hence, Sen. Pelaez submits that the President's letter of conditional
"resignation" (for the word is nowhere used therein) "did not create the actual vacancy
required in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution which could be the basis of the
holding of a special election for President and Vice-President earlier than the regular
election for such positions in 1987. The letter's intent was obvious: to circumvent the
constitutional provision which would, in effect, require the President to actually vacate
his o ce in favor of the Speaker who would then be the Acting President until a new
one shall have been elected and shall have quali ed. . . . In prescribing the procedure to
ll the o ce of President in case of vacancy therein occurred during the term of
President Marcos, it [the cited section] excluded any discretion on the part of the
Batasang Pambansa to legislate on the same subject. In fact, given the very detailed
and precise steps to be taken by the Batasang Pambansa under [the rst four
paragraphs] for the purpose of calling a special election to fill the vacancy, there was no
room for legislative action to supplement the same. BP Blg. 883 which is a
reproduction of Cabinet Bill No. 7, is in con ict with the Constitution in that it allows the
President to continue holding o ce after the calling of the special election. To put it
another way: the President's offer to cut his term short is valid. The trouble is he does
not go far enough: he should actually vacate the office forthwith." 1/ DCISAE

In the interval of over two weeks between December 3rd and now, supervening
facts and events have overtaken the Court and the petitions at bar so much so that
many of the petitions were withdrawn expressly or abandoned impliedly. The political
parties have since chosen and proclaimed their candidates for president and vice-
president and the frenzied campaign is in full swing. President Ferdinand E. Marcos is
quoted as saying: "we have already spent a lot of energy and money on this thing." 2/
The foremost exponent of the Act's unconstitutionality, M.P. Arturo Tolentino who
strongly held that "Mr. Marcos is not intended by the Constitution to succeed himself
before 1987 for an additional six years" and that "the President must rst resign from
o ce in order for the constitutional mandate to go into effect and for the Batasan
speaker to assume the post of Acting President" 3/ had laid aside his "personal
objections" against the bill's validity and has accepted the ruling KBL's nomination as
vice-presidential candidate with President Ferdinand E. Marcos as candidate for
reelection in the scheduled February 7, 1986 national elections. The heretofore divided
opposition has uni ed and likewise presented their standard bearers Corazon "Cory"
Aquino and former Senator Salvador "Doy" Laurel, for president and vice-president,
respectively. President Marcos himself in his letter to the Batasang Pambansa 4/
"irrevocably vacati(ng) the position of President effective only when the election is held
and after the winner is proclaimed and quali ed as President by taking his oath o ce
ten (10) days after his proclamation" urgently stresses that "there is no moment to
lose", that "I am, therefore, left no choice but to seek a new mandate in an election that
will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs I am
undertaking. Such an election necessarily shortens my tenure. But the necessity arises
from no less than the time-honored principle of public accountability, inherent in a
democracy and explicit in our Constitution" and that the " nal settlement of these
issues can be achieved only through a presidential election."
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 The uni ed opposition has likewise realized the imperative urgency of seeking
the mandate and verdict of the people. Rather than insist on strict compliance with the
cited constitutional provision that the incumbent President actually resign, vacate his
o ce and turn it over to the Speaker of the Batasang Pambansa as Acting President,
their standard bearers as the parties most prejudiced have not led any suit or petition
in intervention for the purpose nor repudiated the scheduled election. Instead, the
uni ed opposition, including almost all other political parties of standing, (with the
exception of a few who have lost faith in the electoral process due to past sorry
experiences) have rallied behind the presidential candidacy of Cory Aquino. In short,
they have taken the President at his own terms and conditions and will confront him at
the scheduled February 7, 1986 elections and have not insisted that he vacate the office
of president and its vast powers. As Senator Pelaez reported to the Court: "(T)he
Opposition's answer is rm" they are willing to give the President this illegal handicap,
so long as the election is clean, fair and honest."
The real issue at bar has thus veered from the purely justiciable issue of the
questioned constitutionality of the Act due to the lack of an actual vacancy in the o ce
of President and transformed itself into a political question that can only be truly
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity in a fair, clean and honest election.
(Javellana vs. Exec. Secretary, 50 SCRA 30). Stated differently, may this Court at this
advanced stage stop the holding of the elections?
Labor Minister Blas Ople, an articulate KBL spokesman, stressed that the
people's minds have been prepared and conditioned to expect the holding of the
February 7th, 1986 presidential elections and that the Court "from its ivory tower"
should not stand in the way. (This nation-wide perception that the great majority of the
people want to express their will in the special election as the best chance for
democracy's survival is re ected in all sectors of the press, be they establishment,
neutral or opposition.) As reported by the press: "Ople said the high court, which did not
issue a restraining order to stop preparations for the special elections, "will have to
take judicial notice of a fait accompli — the elections are on. He said the KBL, and the
opposition have formed a consensus by deed by nominating their o cial tickets,
campaigning and spending, while the people 'from whom all sovereignty emanates'
have been conditioned to expect an election. . . . The people and the world, Ople said,
will not believe that the administration did not help in uence a court annulment of the
elections, no matter how unfair this charge of interference in judicial independence
might be. Thus, he said, the cancellation of the elections 'can only aggravate the
prevailing crisis and the President may nd it di cult to govern effectively. 'Here and
abroad, Ople said, there will be calls for the President to step down and allow an
election under Article 7, Section 9 of the Constitution, to clear the last remaining
obstacle to an election which, both sides now agree, should be held to 'break a
dangerous stalemate in both the political and economic climates' in the face of 'issues
threatening national survival.' Ople said a political system that calls an election and then
calls it off after the momentum has built up will not be received kindly by the people. An
election, he said 'should be treated with respect and the majesty it deserved.' It gives
meaning to the central directing principle of the Constitution that all sovereignty
emanates from the people, he said." 5/ cAHIST

Senator Pelaez formulated the same political question in this wise: "These
supervening events . . . may have converted the snap poll issue into a political one,
which would remove from the Supreme Court the authority to stop present snap poll
activities on its tracks. . . . From the standpoint of constitutional government, what has
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 recently happened represents a giant step, the biggest stride yet made by our people in
their struggle for the restoration of freedom and democracy, which were shattered by
the declaration of martial law. Four elections have since been held in 1978 for the
interim Batasan Pambansa, in 1980 for local o cials, in 1981 for President, and in
1984 for the present Batasan. None of these elections could be said to have been truly
democratic, mainly due to the absence of a strong, united opposition. Today, by some
miracle, the Opposition has become united, so that a truly one-on-one contest for the
Presidency can be held and the two-party system has suddenly become a reality. These
are substantial gains that should not be frittered away by postponing the Presidential
and Vice-Presidential election to mid-1987. With these developments, the issue has
been decided by the political will of the people. This Honorable Court should not put
obstacles to their exercise of that will. Beyond these considerations, national survival
depends on the forthcoming snap poll.
"Then the President goes on to state that the mandate he received from the
people in 1981 is no longer valid and that to go on he needs a new mandate. Here is a
confession that he has reached a blank wall, that he can no longer lead the nation, much
less achieve his economic and other programs on the basis of his 1981 election. The
Presidency has lost its capacity to govern. Hence the people must be given a chance to
decide; either to re-elect the incumbent or choose a new leader.
"I would like to commend the President for his manly response. He seeks the
people's judgment now. And it is a wonderful chance for the people either to renew
their mandate to him or elect a new leader. The Supreme Court should not stand in the
way."
A perceptive columnist has expressed the same view thus: "(T)o say that the
political situation of the country is unstable is to belabor the obvious. The nation is
struggling out of an unprecedentedly severe economic crisis while ghting off a
growing communist-led insurgency. Government's credibility has been questioned, as
has been President Marcos' ability to lead the nation to normalcy, hence the coming
political exercise. Indeed, the Filipino nation has been titillated by the prospect of a
change." He quotes MP Renato Cayetano's plea that "(I)t is only fair for the Supreme
Court to tell the parties and the people whether the questioned law is only part of a
charade or a serious attempt to seek a new mandate for the incumbent in Malacañang.
Cayetano says 'Any delay will only exacerbate the political situation. The Supreme Court
should not contribute to the possible destabilization of the government. The
consequences could be horrifying.'" 6/
Retired Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and former Senator Ambrosio Padilla
as amici curiae have likewise urged the Court not to prevent the electorate from giving
expression to the people's sovereign will at the scheduled national election. Chief
Justice Fernando has submitted that "such a vacancy arising from a voluntary act of an
incumbent of the Presidential o ce inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate
from the sovereign people is a novel situation not contemplated by the framers of the
1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution." Senator Padilla noting that both the
President and the Batasang Pambansa having acted in favor of the holding of the
scheduled national election, submitted that the Court should defer to the exercise of
the people's public right to vote and to express their judgment, since there is no issue
or question more political than the election.
AHEDaI

From the realistic standpoint, what should be borne in mind is that President
Marcos has, through his "post-dated resignation" effectively shortened by sixteen (16)
months his tenure (which would have lasted to June 30, 1987) to February 1986, when
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 his successor-elect, be it himself or his opponent Cory Aquino, takes his/her oath of
o ce after proclamation as the winner. Similarly, the Act has accelerated the
restoration of the stabilizing o ce of Vice-President to succeed the President in the
event of the latter's permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation.
The scheduled election may indeed well be Philippine democracy's last chance.
UP President Edgardo J. Angara expressed it aptly when he wrote that "(T)he threat to a
democratic society comes either from the dictatorship of the right or the
totalitarianism of the left. . . . The snap election will provide an opportunity for bringing
these breakaway members back to the center. In a sense, the election is a process of
reuni cation behind the democratic alternative. When the center of society which
constitutes the majority is given full and unhampered expression in the polls, the
democratic system triumphs and the national consensus that will emerge is a strong
force for future governance. . . . Whichever way the votes go, what really matters is the
majority act of rea rming the e cacy of the democratic process. For the center to
emerge uni ed behind the democratic system is the historic lesson which the snap
elections may provide. . . . Prescinding from the legal issues involved, the holding of the
snap elections seems to have gained popular support not only from the various
political camps but also from other sectors as well. The prevailing sentiment seems to
be this — waiting for the 1987 Presidential race may be too late for reasons already
properly articulated in other forums."
I wish to express my appreciation for the valuable insights and perceptions that
the three distinguished amici curiae have furnished the Court at the hearings. The
events that have transpired since December 3rd, as the Court did not issue any
restraining order, have turned the issue into a political question which can be truly
decided only by the people in their sovereign capacity at the scheduled election, which
hopefully will be clean, fair and honest. (Let there be a fervent prayer that the Comelec
with its past ip- opping decisions and orders as recorded in our jurisprudence, will
this time realize that any further desecration of a free and fair election process will spell
disaster for the cause of the peaceful democratic process.) The Court cannot stand in
the way of letting the people decide through their ballot, either to give the incumbent
president a new mandate or to elect a new president.
PLANA , J.:

The narrow legal issue involved in these petitions is whether Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883 which provides for a "snap" election on February 7, 1986 violates the
Constitution.
An examination of the Constitution, particularly Article VII, Section 9, does not
yield the conclusion that B.P. Blg. 883 is offensive to its provisions. What is clear is that
the Constitution does not prohibit the President from tendering a resignation that is not
immediately effective. Indeed, there is no provision whatsoever regarding such kind of
resignation.
Not being prohibited, a Presidential resignation in futuro is allowed. And in such a
case, the Batasang Pambansa is not obliged to sit and wait for the actual vacancy to
arise before enacting necessary legislation. That would be an unreasonable and absurd
interpretation of the Constitution, which is to be eschewed.
Quite apart from the foregoing, there is a strong presumption that a law is
constitutional, which is forti ed by the rule that all reasonable doubt should be resolved
in favor of its constitutionality. Hence, in assessing the constitutionality of a law, "to
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 doubt is to sustain." This approach is dictated by a healthy respect of the courts for a
co-equal department, the Legislature, and the latter's assumed wisdom within the area
of its competence. This principle is doubly applicable as regards B.P. Blg. 883 which is
the product of the joint action of the executive and legislative departments. DTEAHI

Long ago, U.S. Chief Justice Marshall laid down an epochal standard in evaluating
the constitutional validity of a law: "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope
of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to
that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the
constitution, are constitutional." ( M'Culloch v. Maryland, et al. , 4 Wheat. 316.) That
standard remains valid till now.
Accordingly, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
ESCOLIN , J., separate opinion:

In my view, petitioners failed to demonstrate that BP 883 clearly contravenes any

applicable constitutional provision. Besides, the issue posed by these petitions is
essentially political in character. And "when the issue is a political one which comes
within the exclusive sphere of the Legislative or Executive Department of the
government to decide, the Judicial Department or the Supreme Court has no authority
to determine whether or not the act of the Legislature or Chief Executive is against the
Constitution. What determines the jurisdiction of the courts in such case is the issue
involved, and not the law or constitutional provision which may be applied". [ Mabanag,
et al. vs. Lopez Vito, et al., L-1123, March 5, 1948, 78 Phil. 1, See concurring opinion of
Justice Feria].
It appears that the President himself sought the passage of the challenged
legislation, in his quest for a "new mandate" in an election that will constitute "public
judgment now on policies and programs of a fundamental nature". The Batasan
Pambansa, in the exercise of its plenary power of legislation, has authorized the holding
of the election. The positive response of the people to the call for such an election has
been overwhelming; and the body politic itself has decided that only an election in this
crucial time could deliver the country from the clutches of subversive forces as well as
the grave economic problems plaguing the country.
Given this environmental circumstances and a statute not clearly proven to be
violative of the letter and the spirit of the constitution, this Court attuned to the realities
of the situation, should not prevent the electorate from giving expression to their
sovereign will.
RELOVA , J., separate opinion:

Article VII of the Constitution, Section 9 thereof, as amended, provides:

"Section 9. In case of permanent disability, death, removal from o ce
or resignation of the President, the Vice-President shall become the President to
serve the unexpired term. The Batasang Pambansa shall by law provide for the
case of permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation of both the
President and Vice-President, declaring what o cer shall then become President
or the manner in which one shall be selected. In case a vacancy in the O ce of
President occurs before the presidential election in 1987, the Speaker of the
Batasang Pambansa shall act as President until a President and a Vice-President
or either of them shall have been elected and shall have quali ed. Their term of
o ce shall commence at noon of the tenth day following proclamation, and shall
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 end at noon on the thirtieth day of June of the sixth year thereafter."
As held in Gamboa, et al. vs. CA, 108 SCRA 1, [o]ne of the ways of terminating
o cial relations is by resignation. To constitute a complete and operative resignation
of public o ce, there must be an intention to relinquish a part of the term,
accompanied by the act of relinquishment and a resignation implies an expression of
the incumbent in some form, express or implied, of the intention to surrender, renounce,
and relinquish the o ce and the acceptance by competent and lawful authority . In Our
jurisprudence, acceptance is necessary for resignation of a public o cer to be
operative and effective, "otherwise the o cer is subject to the penal provisions of
Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code. . . . ." (Emphasis supplied) In the light of the
abovecited case, actual vacancy need not exist on the day of the election. When,
therefore, the Batasang Pambansa, representing the people, enacted Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883 on December 2, 1985 and the President approved it the following day calling
for the elections on February 7, 1986, it, in effect, accepted the resignation tendered by
the incumbent on November 11, 1985 seeking a new mandate from the people "in an
election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and program I am
undertaking. Such an election necessarily shortens my tenure . . ." (Annex B, G.R. No.
72923). Thus, his term of o ce was cut short by sixteen (16) months. As a
consequence, there is justi cation for the holding of an election before May 1987.
Stated differently, had the President not issued the letter-resignation, dated November
11, 1985, the Batasang Pambansa was without authority to enact Batas Pambansa Blg.
883, otherwise known as Cabinet Bill No. 7. But, with the issuance of said letter-
resignation, the Batasan and the President were well within their constitutional powers
to enact said law which would give the people the chance to exercise its will through
the electoral process — an attribute of sovereignty. TSHEIc

Further, there is merit in the contention of former Chief Justice Enrique M.

Fernando, who appeared as amicus curiae, that "if a resignation is prompted by a
President seeking 'a new mandate' in an election that will constitute 'public judgment
now on policies and programs of fundamental nature,' by its own admission, the above
constitutional provision does not necessarily apply. What appears indubitable is that
such a vacancy arising from a voluntary act of an incumbent of the Presidential o ce
inspired by the desire to seek a fresh mandate from the sovereign people is a novel
situation not contemplated by the framers of the 1981 amendments to the 1973
Constitution. . . ." (Summary of Points Submitted for the Consideration of the Court) He
submits that a legislative act su ces because of the plenary legislative power vested
in the Batasang Pambansa.
Likewise, there is merit in the submission of the Solicitor General that —
"2. The legislative power vested in the Batasang Pambansa is plenary
and subject only to such limitation as are found in the Constitution (see Article VII,
Section 1 of the Constitution; Vera vs. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 [1946]; Arnault vs.
Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 [1950]; Occena vs. Commission on Elections, 95 SCRA 755
[1980].
The interstices of the Constitution are within the power of the legislature to
ll up. What is not prohibited by the Constitution can be provided for by the
Batasang Pambansa. Indeed, it is conceded 'that the Congress of the Philippines
has a wider range of legislative eld than either the Congress of the United States
or a State Legislature' (Arnault vs. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29, 44-45 [1950].
"3. The calling of an election is essentially legislative in nature
(Ututalum vs. Commission on Elections, 15 SCRA 465 [1965]. All elections for
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 President, Vice President, members of the legislature and local o cials in our
country have been called through legislative enactments.
It cannot be doubted that enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 falls
well within the legislative authority of the Batasang Pambansa. The narrow issue
is whether the law violates the Constitution, particularly Section 9, Article VII." (pp.
6-8, Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General.)
Besides, supervening events have occurred since the passage of the law on
December 3, 1985 and there would be no turning back now. The Batasang Pambansa
passed the law and the President has approved it; but the Court failed to issue a
restraining order when the petitions were led on December 3, 1985 so as to maintain
t he status quo. Thereafter, the ruling political parties (KBL and UNIDO) have elded
their respective presidential and vice presidential candidates in conventions and
proclamations attended by thousands of people. So much time, effort and money have
already been spent. We can take judicial notice of the fact that the overwhelming
sentiment and desire of our people is for the holding of the coming snap elections and
that they have tacitly consented and approved the law in question. At this juncture, We
cannot now deprive them of this right of suffrage. The two coordinate branches of the
government (legislative and executive) have spoken. The judiciary should not be an
obstacle to the people's desire to select their Chief Executive in the forthcoming snap
polls.
ACCORDINGLY, I vote to dismiss the petitions.
GUTIERREZ, JR. , J.:

Implicit in the republican nature of our State is adherence to the rule of law. All
acts of government must conform to the Constitution. Otherwise, they have to be
declared void.
As early as 1919, in the leading case of Villavicencio v. Lukban (39 Phil. 778, 787),
this Court declared emphatically that "no o cial, no matter how high, is above the law"
and that "the law . . . is the only supreme power in our system of government and every
man who by accepting o ce participates in its functions is only the more strongly
bound to submit to that supremacy and to observe the limitations which it imposes
upon the exercise of the authority which it gives.'' IECAaD

Today, the above declaration warrants repeating. The law involved in these
petitions is no less than the Constitution, the supreme law of the land enacted by the
people in their exercise, in its highest sense, of sovereign power. The legislative power
vested in the Batasang Pambansa may be employed only within the con nes of
constitutional boundaries. The President is similarly subject to constitutional
limitations and considering his solemn oath, invoking the help of God, to "preserve and
defend the Constitution," he can execute only such statutes as do not con ict with the
supreme law of the land.
In Mutuc v. Commission on Elections (36 SCRA 228, 234) this Court declared:
"The concept of the Constitution as the fundamental law, setting forth the
criterion for the validity of any public act whether proceeding from the highest
o cial or the lowest functionary, is a postulate of our system of government.
That is to manifest fealty to the rule of law, with priority accorded to that which
occupies the topmost rung in the legal hierarchy. The three departments of
government in the discharge of the functions with which it is entrusted have no
choice but to yield obedience to its commands. Whatever limits it imposes must
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 be observed. Congress in the enactment of statutes must ever be on guard lest
the restrictions on its authority, whether substantive or formal, be transcended.
The Presidency in the execution of the laws cannot ignore or disregard what it
ordains. In its task of applying the law to the facts as found in deciding cases, the
judiciary is called upon to maintain inviolate what is decreed by the fundamental
law. Even its power of judicial review to pass upon the validity of the acts of the
coordinate branches in the course of adjudication is a logical corollary of this
basic principle that the Constitution is paramount. It overrides any governmental
measure that fails to live up to its mandates. Thereby there is a recognition of its
being the supreme law."
I am constrained to reiterate the above basic principles because some
distinguished counsel have come forward with the strange proposition that inspite of
the clear circumvention by both the Legislature and the Executive of express
procedures mandated by the Constitution, "national interest" requires that we should
overlook the violations and dismiss the present petitions.
All members of this Court have taken an oath "na aking itataguyod at
ipagtatanggol ang Saligang Batas ng Pilipinas." We do not preserve and defend the
Constitution through a circumvention of its requirements and an ignoring of its
mandates.
The policy nature of their concerns and the passion of politics now animating
them may mitigate the inattention of the Batasan and the Executive to scrupulous
compliance with Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution. We cannot enjoy the same
luxury. I personally feel that during these critical times, more than in happier days, we
should insist on compliance with the rule of law in its punctiliously authentic form.
National interest and political stability cannot be premised upon violations of our
fundamental law. Political expediency and the momentary, easily forgotten cry of the
public are too precarious and shifting to become legal foundations of a free and
hopefully prosperous society. Indeed, much depends on the forthcoming elections but
even more is at stake in the maintenance of constitutionalism upon which our
democratic government is founded and because of which popular and free elections
are held.
I nd no di culty in concluding that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is
unconstitutional.
BP 883 calls a special election for president and vice-president. It is elementary
in the law of public o cers that no valid appointment or election to any public o ce
may be effected if the o ce is not vacant. In the normal course of events, the o ce of
the President becomes vacant upon the expiration of the term of an incumbent. A
regular election lls the vacancy. But we are not concerned with a regular election.
There is a call for a special or an emergency election. TcSHaD

A special election may not be called for just any purpose or on any occasion. A
special election becomes necessary only when a vacancy is created by death,
permanent disability, removal from o ce, or resignation. I cannot accept the
proposition that a simulated or ctitious vacancy is a "vacancy" as understood in the
law of public o cers. The vacancy must be real and in esse, not a parody or shadow of
the real thing. In the same way that death, disability, or removal from o ce must be
actual and permanent before the pertinent provisions of Section 9, Article VII of the
Constitution may come into play, so must a resignation be real and irrevocably
permanent. Inspite of all the learned arguments of distinguished counsel, I still fail to
see how special or emergency elections may be held for a position which is not vacant.
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 Or how the call for special elections can become the means of creating in the future the
now non-existent vacancy. Or how a vacancy can come about only after special and
emergency elections to fill that very same vacancy have already been held. Credulity can
be stretched only too far.
If the exigencies of national interest are pressing, now or in the near future, and if
the need for establishing political and economic stability is imperative, that elections
for a President and a Vice President can no longer wait for 1987, the Constitution
provides the remedy. The President can resign and pursuant to Section 9 Article VII of
the Constitution, the Speaker of the Batasan shall act as President until the President
and the Vice President or either of them shall have been elected in the special elections
called to ll the vacancy thus created and shall have quali ed. The muddling of the
President's term of o ce shall also be obviated. By the same provision of the
Constitution, a new term of o ce, which ignores the present xed term of the
incumbent, shall commence at noon of the tenth day following the proclamation and
shall end at noon on the thirtieth day of the sixth year thereafter.
I nd Section 9 of Article VII clear and intelligibly simple. Any layman reading it
can easily grasp its meaning and understand the contingencies for which it was
intended. The words of Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando speaking for the Court in
J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration (31 SCRA 413, 422) are appropriate:
"We look to the language of the document itself in our search for its
meaning. We do not of course stop there, but that is where we begin. It is to be
assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express
the objective sought to be attained. They are to be given their ordinary meaning
except where technical terms are employed in which case the signi cance thus
attached to them prevails. As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's
document, it being essential for the rule of law to obtain that it should ever be
present in the people's consciousness, its language as much as possible should
be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to
the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the
power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the
people mean what they say. Thus there are cases where the need for construction
is reduced to a minimum."
Since the Constitution itself provides an easily followed remedy, one which any
fairly literate citizen can readily comprehend, I do not see why the Legislature and the
executive should adopt a new fangled, perplexing, and constitutionally in rm method of
achieving a most desirable end. I believe that all of us in Government must sincerely
demonstrate our readiness to abide by the terms and procedures of the Constitution
even as we try to solve serious national problems.
Neither can the special elections be premised on the accountability provisions in
Article XIII of the Constitution. Snap elections to make the executive accountable to the
people are for parliamentary systems. We have a presidential form of government.
When the 1973 Constitution came into force and effect on January 17, 1973, it provided
for a parliamentary system. Section 13 of Article VIII provided that "the National
Assembly may withdraw its con dence from the Prime Minister only by electing a
successor by a majority vote of all its members." Executive power was then exercised
by the Prime Minister assisted by his cabinet. The President was only a symbolic head
of state. The National Assembly could remove the Executive by majority vote but the
Executive could also have the Assembly dissolved and have the questions on
fundamental issues resolved by the people in so-called snap elections. ITAaCc

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 Before this parliamentary government could be installed, we amended the
Constitution and returned to the presidential form. Any lingering traces of
parliamentarism carried over from the original 1973 provisions only serve to make our
government even more presidential. The dominance of the Executive over the
Legislature is much more marked now than in the 1935 presidential system. This being
so, the accountability aspects of parliamentary systems cannot be used to justify our
legitimating BP 883.
I share the sentiments of the respondents and some of the petitioners in their
desire for ascertaining the people's will. But I submit that our basic law, the act of the
people which regulates the entire fabric of our government, must be followed.
I am, therefore, constrained to dissent and to maintain my original vote to enjoin
the holding of elections under a statute I find null and void.
NESTOR B. ALAMPAY , J.:

The basic duty of this Court is restricted to the determination of whether B.P.
833 calling for a special election is in accord with or in violation of our Constitution.
Di culty has been added to this task which the Court has to accomplish because of
the inconsistent and to an extent bewildering positions taken and manifested by some
of the petitioners during the hearing of these cases. Members of the Court are puzzled
as to what petitioners really profess this Court should rightfully decree. Indeed, it would
seem that what was initially asked by certain petitioners in these consolidated petitions
to be done by this Court based on the grounds and reasons stated in their respective
petitions, such as to prohibit the respondent Commission from implementing B.P. 833
on account of this statute's constitutional in rmity, have been now abandoned by the
same petitioners who but recently assailed the legality of B.P. 833. The
unconstitutionality of said statute is still being insisted upon but, nevertheless, it is
prayed that such governing and decisive factor be disregarded, ignored or even
circumvented and that this Court should cooperate in the alleged unanimous will of the
Executive and Legislative departments of our country that there be an election for the
Presidency and Vice-Presidency of the nation next February, 1986, rather than in 1987.
It is my submission that the Court should detach itself from these swirling and
ckle attitudes that it has perceived and it should not be moved by the rhetorical
allusions to the alleged but unquanti ed desire of our people to participate in an
election which is at the same time contended to be not sanctioned by and in con ict
with what is clearly provided for in our Constitution. The rash and reckless suggestions
suggested to the Court by petitioners will only create and give rise to a dangerous
precedent that could erode the stability that inherently should attach and be reposed in
the Constitution. Appeals to what is claimed to be the present popular wish should
assume no signi cance in the resolution of the primary issue. What our Constitution
decrees should be respected and followed.
It is my considered view that the special election on February 7, 1986, called for
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 833, does not meet at all the speci c condition that
there should rst be an actual and existing vacancy before a special election can be
held to elect a new President before the present term of the incumbent expires on May
30, 1987. Logic and simple reasoning alone even without need of legal citations, will be
su ciently persuasive to form a conclusion that no special election is necessary to ll
up a position which is not attended by a vacancy. The absence of an actual vacancy
negates and precludes acceptance of any unwarranted and expensive special election.
The searching analysis made by other Colleagues in the Court who share with me in the
above stated views make needless a repetitious and extended dissertation on this
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 matter. Absent an actual and real vacancy, the holding of a special election cannot be
given color of legality by the reference to certain conditions attaching to the imputed
vacancy but which conditions most plainly would happen only after the election had
already taken place and with the position to be lled up by the election uninterruptedly
occupied by a legal occupant.
On this simple view, I readily conclude that Batas Pambansa Blg. 833 should be
declared unconstitutional for being violative of the spirit and letter of our Constitution. I
vote, therefore, to declare Batas Pambansa Blg. 833 unconstitutional and consequently,
to enjoin the respondent Commission on Elections from conducting the unwarranted
special election for President and Vice-President on February 7, 1986. IaHSCc

PATAJO , J., dissenting :

Fully aware as I am that all laws are presumed constitutional and that all
reasonable doubt should be resolved in favor of their constitutionality and only when
the con ict between any law and the Constitution is clearly beyond reasonable doubt,
should said law be declared unconstitutional, I approach the issue of the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 in the context of what appears to be a
popular clamor for the holding of a special presidential and vice-presidential election on
February 7, 1986.
The common grounds alleged in the petitions assailing the constitutionality of
said law are that the only instance that the Batasan can call for the holding of an
election before the expiration of the term of the President in 1987 is upon the
occurrence of the contingencies provided for in Section 9 of Article VII of the
Constitution, namely the permanent disability, death, removal from o ce or resignation
of the President before the presidential election of 1987 for in that case a vacancy in
the O ce of the President has been created triggering the mechanism for the calling of
a special election to ll up said vacancy together with the election of the vice-president
in accordance with the provisions set forth in Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution
and that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 has in effect shortened the term of the President
elected in 1981 without going through the process of amending the Constitution as the
Batasan in enacting said law acted in the exercise of its legislative powers and not as a
constituent body. Petitioners contend that the letter of the President recommending to
the Batasan the calling of a special election because of the need for the President to
seek a new mandate in an election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the
policies and programs being undertaken by him upon his undertaking that he will
irrevocably vacate the position of the President effective when such election is held and
the winner is proclaimed and quali ed as president by taking his oath of o ce ten days
after his proclamation is not a resignation which would create a vacancy within the
meaning of Section 9 of Article VII. That there is no vacancy is evident from the fact
that the President still continues in o ce until the assumption in o ce by the winning
candidate in the special election instead of the Speaker who, under the provision of the
Constitution, becomes acting president in case of a permanent disability, death,
removal from o ce or resignation of the President before the presidential election of
1987. What Section 9, Article VII contemplates is an actual vacancy and not a vacancy
in futuro.
The Solicitor General defending the constitutionality of said law contends that
there is nothing in the Constitution which prohibits the Batasan Pambansa in the
exercise of its legislative plenary powers to call for the holding of the special election
for the O ce of the President on February 7, 1986 upon the undertaking of the
incumbent President that he will irrevocably vacate the position of president if an
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 election is held for said o ce and the winner proclaimed and quali ed by taking his
oath of o ce ten days after his proclamation. The occasion for the holding of said
special election is the need of the incumbent President to seek a new mandate in an
election that will assess, as demanded by the opposition, the policies and programs
being undertaken by him.
It is my considered view that Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is unconstitutional.
While the 1973 Constitution, as amended, has adopted several features of the
parliamentary system, our government is still essentially a presidential form of
government and the term of office of the President is for a fixed term of six years. Since
the incumbent President was elected in 1981 for a term of six years beginning at noon
on the 30th day of June of 1981 and ending noon of the same date six years thereafter
when the term of his successor shall begin, Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 had shortened
the term of the President without going into the process of amending the Constitution.
The shortening of the term of the o ce of the incumbent President cannot be justi ed
by the action of the President agreeing to vacate his o ce on condition that a special
election be held and the winning candidate for said office is proclaimed and qualified as
president by taking his oath of office ten days after his proclamation. The President can
only shorten his term of o ce by unconditionally resigning therefrom before its
expiration in order that a vacancy is created and the Speaker of the Batasan shall act as
President and the Batas Pambansa shall call for the holding of a special election to
elect a president and a vice-president in accordance with the provisions of Section 9 of
Article VII of the Constitution.aSTAIH

The letter of the President of November 11, 1985 recommending to the Batasan
the enactment of law calling for special election as there will be a de nite and inevitable
vacancy in the O ce of the President which will pave the way for the holding of said
special election because of his undertaking to irrevocably vacate the position of
President effective only when the election is held and the winner is proclaimed and
quali ed as president by taking his oath of o ce ten days after his proclamation does
not create a vacancy that will trigger the mechanism for the calling of a special election
to ll up said vacancy in accordance with the procedure set forth in Section 9 of Article
VII. Actually, the conditions mentioned by the President for calling of a special election
have not at all created a vacancy because he continues in o ce as president up to the
assumption of o ce of the president-elect. As petitioners correctly contended, proof
that there is no vacancy in the O ce of the President as contemplated in Section 9 of
Article VII is that he continues to exercise the functions of the president instead of the
Speaker who, under the provisions of said Section 9, becomes acting president in case
of a permanent disability, death, removal from o ce or resignation of the President
before the presidential election of 1987.
The contention of the Solicitor General that the provisions of Section 9, Article VII
do not preclude the Batasan Pambansa in the exercise of its plenary legislative powers
to call for the holding of a special election for the position of president in a situation
other than that contemplated in Section 9 such as the need of the incumbent President
for a new mandate is without merit. While it is true that the power to call an election is
exclusively a legislative prerogative, such power cannot be exercised where its effect
would be to amend an express provision of the Constitution, more speci cally Section
5, Article VII xing the term of the o ce of the president and the vice-president to six
years. The power to de ne the term of the president and vice-president is not
legislative but constituent and can only be exercised thru an amendment to the
Constitution in the manner provided for in the Constitution. In effect, Batas Pambansa
Blg. 883 has amended the Constitution by an act of the Batasan as a legislative body,
not a constituent assembly and without the rati cation of majority votes cast in a
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 plebiscite.
". . . And we are asked to raise the power from the general legislative
authority by implication, to serve convenience and expedition in making organic
change. If it were conceded that an easier and quicker mode of change is
desirable, a concession not permissible, if the views of the greatest writers on
questions touching government under written Constitutions are of force, a canon
of constitutional construction forbids the implication of the authority, for it is the
rule that where the means by which the power granted shall be exercised are
speci ed, no other or different means for the exercise of such power can be
implied even though considered more convenient or effective than the means
given in the Constitution; and the Constitution gives special power to the
Legislature, and provides the means of exercising it, to effect needed changes in
the organic law. . . ." ( Ellingham v. Dye , 178 Ind. 336; 99 NE 1, 15). (emphasis
ours.)
Neither can the provision of the Constitution providing for accountability of
public o cers be invoked to justify the holding of a special election contemplated by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 883. Impeachment of the President and the other constitutional
officers is the recourse for holding them accountable.
In short, a special election for the O ce of the President before the expiration of
his term in June of 1987 is authorized only on the occurrences of the contingencies
enumerated in Section 9 of Article VII, namely permanent disability, death, removal from
o ce or resignation of the President. The undertaking of the President to vacate his
o ce upon the quali cation of the president-elect in the presidential election of
February 7, 1986 is not a resignation within the meaning of Section 9, Article VII.
While I am not unaware of the popular clamor for the holding of the "Snap
Elections," a move initiated by the "opposition" and nally accepted by the President in
order to provide an opportunity to submit to the electorate the acceptability of the
President's program and policies of government even before the expiration of his term
of o ce in June 1987, I believe the duty to uphold the primacy of the Constitution is a
responsibility that this Court cannot shirk. For as said by the Supreme Court of
Michigan speaking through Cooley, J.: AIHECa

"Constitutions do not change with the varying tides of public opinion and
desire; the will of the people therein recorded is the same in exible law until
changed by their own deliberative action; and it cannot be permissible to the
courts that, in order to aid evasions and circumventions, they shall subject these
instruments * * * to a construction, as if they were great public enemies standing
in the way of progress, and the duty of every good citizen was to get around their
provisions whenever practicable, and give them a damaging thrust whenever
convenient. They must construe them as the people did in their adoption. If the
means of arriving at that construction are within their power." Bay City v. State
Treasurer, 23 Mich. 499, 506. (emphasis ours).
In the same vein is what the Court said in ex rel Kinworthy v. Martin, 60 Ark. 343, 30 S.W.
421, that in construing Constitutions, Courts have nothing to do with the argument ab
inconveniente and should not bend the Constitution to suit the law of the hour, quoting
Greencascñe vs. Black, 5 Ind. 557, 565. 11 Am. Jur. 659.
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 883 is a justiciable one and not a
political question which the Court must decide without equivocation.
I vote, therefore, to grant the petition and declare Batas Pambansa Blg. 883
unconstitutional.
In connection with the resolution of December 19, 1985 in the above-entitled
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 cases, Justice De la Fuente led a separate opinion in the Clerk of Court's O ce on
December 23, 1985:
DE LA FUENTE , J.:

For the reasons well stated by my distinguished colleague, Hon. Lino Patajo, I am
inclined to share the view expressed in his dissent that B.P. Blg. 883 is unconstitutional.
For it contravenes the intent, letter and spirit of the succession provision — section 9,
Article VII — of the Constitution. To my mind the said statute would, if implemented,
sidetrack or bypass the cited constitutional provision designed to govern the selection
of a successor in case of vacancy in the o ce of the President before the next regular
election in 1987. A conditional or quali ed "resignation" of the President which shall
take effect after the February 7, 1986 "special presidential election" and only upon the
proclamation and quali cation of the candidate chosen by the electorate, is not
su cient ground or justi cation for a so-called "snap" election. In explicit language,
section 9, Article VII, provides for the constitutional formula or device in lling the
O ce of the President the moment it becomes vacant by reason of the incumbent's
"permanent disability, death, removal from o ce or resignation" at anytime prior to the
end o f his term in June 1987. Such "resignation", as I see it, must be one resulting in
permanent vacancy — actual or in esse, not merely prospective or inchoate or
contingent — as of the time of the special presidential election, whereupon the Batasan
Speaker shall take over the vacated o ce as caretaker President until a new President
shall have been duly elected, proclaimed and qualified by taking his oath of office.
I have reached this conclusion after the hearings and upon due consideration of
the arguments and submissions for the petitioners and the respondents, the former
Chief Justice E. M. Fernando, and other legal luminaries, especially those of former
Vice-President Emmanuel Pelaez in an article entitled "UNCONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
'SNAP' POLL", 1/ which he mentioned at the hearing as he gave his comments on the
constitutional issue before this Court. I reproduce herein-below the most pertinent
portions of his dissertation. 2/ I also nd the observations of Atty. Sedfrey Ordoñez in
the petition and the reply led for the Liberal Party and former Senator Jovito Salonga
as well as those of Atty. Raul Gonzales, National Bar Association President, who
appeared and argued at the hearing, very persuasive enough to overcome the doubts I
had entertained earlier as to the alleged facial unconsitutionality of B.P. Blg. 883. I am,
however, unable to agree with former Vice-President Pelaez and others who have
stressed the unconstitutionality of the law in question but urged, nonetheless, this
Tribunal to allow its implementation by taking into account "supervening events"
transpiring since the ling of the petitions and the "people's overwhelming desire to
hold" the "snap" election, the constitutional issue having "become a political one, beyond
its [this Court's] authority to enjoin."
While the practice followed under the Constitution and our election laws has
been to allow the President or an elective public o cial to submit himself for re-
election to the same o ce without vacating it (remaining in o ce until the end of his
term and during the election period), this generally refers to a "regular" election, not to a
special election called precisely to ll up an existing permanent vacancy in the elective
o ce. The device or formula found in Section 9, Article VII, having been so conceived
and designed in detail to meet a possible sudden vacancy occurring during a short
period before the regular presidential election in 1987, respect for the will of the Filipino
people who rati ed the constitutional amendment in 1984 demands, I think, no less
than strict adherence to the afore-mentioned succession provision. B.P. Blg. 883
constitutes, plainly, a deviation from and evasion of that provision. SHDAEC

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 Finally, if the objective of the so-called "snap" election law was to enable the
President to ask the Filipino people for a vote of con dence, the most appropriate and
adequate vehicle for that is a referendum as suggested by MP Arturo Tolentino and
former Vice-President Pelaez. A negative vote would surely bring about a vacancy in the
o ce of the President, which can then be lled up in accordance with the succession
procedure provided by section 9, Article VII. The other option, also suggested by both,
is a constitutional amendment incorporating the features of B.P. Blg. 883, to be
submitted to the people for ratification.
Footnotes
* Revision consists in the addition of paragraph 7 and statement that Melencio-Herrera, J., took
no part.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

1/. Emphasis copied.

2/. Phil. Daily Express issue of Dec. 18, 1985.

3/. Times Journal issue of August 4, 1985.

4/. Idem, Annex "A".

5/. Bulletin Today issue of December 17, 1985.

6/. Bulletin Today issue of December 16, 1985, Jesus Bigornia.

DE LA FUENTE, J., separate opinion:

1/. Published in the November 23, 24 and 26, 1985-issues of Bulletin Today .
2/. "The question of the constitutionality of the 'snap' election for President — and maybe Vice-
President? — on Jan. 17, 1986 proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7 is a very serious one. Grave
doubts raised on its constitutional validity must be resolved before any favorable action
is taken on the proposal. Otherwise, the political controversy now rocking the country
could degenerate into irreversible national disunity. Worse still, the rule of law in our
country, the very foundation of a free and democratic society, would be irreparably
compromised.
xxx xxx xxx

". . . a severe blow on it at this time, like holding an unconstitutional presidential election,
could irreparably destroy it.
xxx xxx xxx

"The consequence of all this was: as ratified by the people, the present presidential
succession procedure, which was adopted together with other constitutional
amendments on Jan. 17, 1984, is definite, precise, and clear, leaving no room for the
Batasan to change or add to it one whit. No discretion whatsoever is given to the
Batasan to exercise its legislative power either to amend or to ignore any portion thereof.

"The Batasan's clear duty is circumscribed solely to implement the presidential

succession formula now embodied in the Constitution and nothing more. Its role in
putting it into effect is purely ministerial, which in layman's language means automatic,
mechanical, not requiring the exercise of judgment. To test the validity of the foregoing
assertions, let us analyze Section 9, Article VII — the only section of the Constitution that
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 deals with presidential succession — sentence by sentence.

'Section 9. In case of permanent disability. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

"The first sentence presupposes that a Vice-President shall have been elected and shall
have qualified. It provides that in case the Presidency becomes vacant by reason of
permanent disability, death, removal from office or resignation, the Vice-President shall
automatically become President. This is the 'spare tire' concept of the Vice-Presidency
which our people are familiar with and easily understand from experience . . . The
provision does not apply to the present where we have no Vice-President.

"The next sentence provides that in the absence of a President and Vice-President, the
Batasan shall by law provided for a further line of succession. This is one of only two
instances where the Constitution authorizes the Batasan to take a hand in the
presidential succession procedure. The other one is found in the fifth and last paragraph
of Section 9 above-cited, in case of death, permanent disability or resignation of the
Speaker.

"In other words, where the Constitution wants the Batasan to legislate on presidential
succession, it expressly says so. The clear implication is that, where the Constitution
itself mandates the precise procedure to the last detail, as we shall presently see, the
Batasan must keep out.

"The logic of this position is unassailable. If the Constitution were to permit the Batasan
the discretion to revise the presidential succession formula laid down by it with
meticulous exactitude or, as proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7 [now, B.P. Blg. 883], adopt an
entirely new succession procedure, we would have a situation where every Batasan
could be tinkering with the matter. The inevitable consequence would be the nullification
of the procedure laid down by the Constitution. The plain language of the Constitution's
directive to the Batasan is: you may supplement the line of succession, as in the two
instances above-cited where you are expressly authorized to do so, but you may not
touch what is already prescribed by the Constitution or, much less, replace it with
another.
"The third and following sentences prescribe the succession procedure if a permanent
vacancy occurs during the term of President Marcos, that is, until its expiration in June,
1987. The trigger mechanism which would set off the events enumerated in these
provisions is the occurrence of a permanent vacancy a real, not a "paper" vacancy. This
is sine qua non. Without the occurrence of an actual and permanent vacancy , the
presidential succession procedure cannot come to life. With its occurrence, the events
take place, domino-like, automatically. The Batasan has no authority whatsoever to
contrive another cause, like a post-dated resignation to take place only if the President
loses in the (snap) election proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7, to justify such an election.
This would nullify the succession procedure of the Constitution and would be grossly
unconstitutional.
"Let us, by re-reading the third and succeeding sentences, pinpoint the specifics of the
succession procedure mandated by the Constitution.

"Upon the occurrence of a permanent vacancy in the Presidency during the present term
of President Marcos, the following events would take place:
1. The Speaker of the Batasan automatically becomes the Acting President. He shall
serve as such until President and Vice-President, or either of them shall have been
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 elected and shall have qualified. The language of the Constitution is clear enough,
requiring no explanation or elaboration.

2. On the third day after the occurrence of the vacancy, (a) at ten o'clock in the morning,
(b) the Batasan shall convene in accordance with its rules without need of a call — the
constitutional provision itself makes the call in advance; and (c) within seven (7) days
enact a law, (d) calling a special election to elect a President and Vice- President; (c) not
earlier than forty-five (45) nor later than sixty (60) days from the time of such call.

"Please note how the Constitution goes into painstaking details. The convening of the
Batasan must be on the third day from the occurrence of the vacancy — not on the first
or second or fourth and so forth but on the third. Even the hour of convening is set at ten
(10) o'clock. The Batasan is given a deadline of seven (7) days within which to enact a
law calling for a specified election. The candidates to be selected are specified — the
President and the Vice-President. The Batasan is given very little leeway in fixing the
date of the election: it must not be earlier than forty-five (45) nor later than sixty (60)
days after the call. This minuteness of detail had a definite purpose, as we shall
presently see.
"The provisions of the above-mentioned Section 9, Article VII, are contrary to all
traditional notions of constitution-making. The standard knowledge is that a constitution
must be couched in general terms, allowing the legislature to flesh out the constitution's
broad outlines with details. As above-shown, however, the above-cited Section 9 does
not follow the traditions. The Constitution itself supplies the details. It allows the
legislature no leeway to do so.
xxx xxx xxx

"The foregoing circumstances reveal the clear intent of the Constitution: to prohibit the
Batasan from legislating at all on succession, except in the two instances above-cited
where the Constitution expressly authorizes it to do so.
xxx xxx xxx

"The 'law' calling a special election under the presidential succession provision, Section 9
of Article 7, is in effect, a measure sui generis wherein the Constitution has acted both as
the fundamental law of the land and as the legislature pre-empting any claim of the
Batasang Pambansa to any legislative authority to change or replace the
constitutionally prescribed procedure of presidential succession.

"The claim that the Batasang Pambansa may now, in the exercise of its power of general
legislation, enact a law on presidential succession to call a special election, under
circumstances other than those enumerated in the Constitution, thereby amending and
short-circuiting the very precisely laid down procedure in Section 9, Article VII on the
subject, is utterly baseless. Neither Article VII (on powers of the President and Vice-
President) no Article VIII (on the powers of the Batasan) of the Constitution grants it the
authority claimed.

xxx xxx xxx

"On the basis of the foregoing detailed scrutiny of the pertinent constitutional provisions,
there can be no doubt on the Constitution's meaning the intent: such a special
presidential election during President Marcos' term must take place and must be carried
out strictly in accordance with the circumstances and procedures specifically laid out by
the Constitution.
"Cabinet Bill No. 7, however, would openly defy the Constitution. Consider the following:
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 (a) While Section 9, Article VII of the Constitution would authorize a special election
during the term of President Marcos only in case his office is permanently and actually
vacant, the cabinet bill would authorize a "snap" election without the occurrence of such
a vacancy. (President Marcos' letter of "resignation" categorically states that he will
relinquish the Presidency only if some one else is elected to and qualifies for the
position. Since the "resignation" would be simultaneous with the assumption of office or
any person elected other than President Marcos, there would actually be no vacancy.)

(b) While the Constitution would install the Speaker as Acting president from the moment
the vacancy occurs until a President or, in his absence, a Vice-President, shall have
qualified, so that, in effect, it is the Speaker, as Acting President, who would oversee the
election, the cabinet bill would brush the Speaker aside, (and with him the Constitution),
and allow President Marcos to usurp the Speaker's role and oversee the election in which
his own fitness to continue as President would be the crucial issue.
(c) While the Constitution specifically directs the Batasan to meet on the third day after the
vacancy occurs to enact a law calling for the special election, within seven (7) days, the
cabinet bill would blithely ignore these specifics.

"If the proposal becomes a law and is upheld, then the constitutional provisions on the
same subject would be set aside. It would be a dangerous precedent . . .
xxx xxx xxx

"If we would but . . . hold uppermost in our minds the future of constitutional government
in our country, I believe there can be an accommodation which would bolster rather than
subvert the rule of law. In this connection, may I offer the following suggestions, . . . :
"1. In his speech in Cebu on Nov. 15, 1985, the President stated, more or less, that a 'snap'
election was crucial because his leadership had been assailed abroad and it was
necessary to show the world that the people were still with him . . .

"If this is the objective, rather than holding a 'snap' election in violation of the Constitution,
I would endorse the recommendation of Senator Arturo M. Tolentino that the exercise
appropriate for the purpose should be a referendum on whether or not the President
should continue in office.
"If the vote is in the affirmative, the President would then have the necessary weapon to
counteract what he believes to be a campaign of destabilization against him . . .
"If the vote is in the negative, then the President should resign without delay. A vacancy in
the Presidency would then occur, in which case the constitutional succession procedure
would be operative . . .

"2. Another alternative would be to amend the Constitution. The Batasan should meet as
a constituent assembly and approve a resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution authorizing the calling of a special presidential election more or less in the
manner proposed in Cabinet Bill No. 7 or as may be agreed between the majority and the
minority in the Batasan. The resolution should then be submitted to the people in a
plebiscite . . .
"In either case, the Constitution shall have been shielded from further assaults on its
supremacy . . ."

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