The Arms of the Ypiranga: The German Side

Author(s): Thomas Baecker

Source: The Americas, Vol. 30, No. 1 (Jul., 1973), pp. 1-17
Published by: Cambridge University Press
Stable URL: https://www.jstor.org/stable/980444
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 THE ARMS OF THE YPIRANGA: THE GERMAN SIDE

N the years prior to the outbreak of the First Wo

Hamburg-American-Lines (HAPAG) steamer Ypir
special reputation in the Western hemisphere. It w
transporting several Mexican Presidents into exile,
especially famous for its 26th voyage, a trip from Hambur
in the spring of 1914.

Its hold filled with weapons for the Mexican Preside

steamer approached the entrance to the Veracruz harb
At that time, its captain had not the slightest idea th
Wilson's order American troops had landed to take control
in order to prevent the weapons his ship carried from
Mexican President.

The weapons of the Ypiranga-and connected with that the German

attitude towards the United States Mexican policy during the weeks
that followed April 21-have been dealt with in numerous American
publications since 1914. But, because no English-speaking historian has
made use of the German records which concern the " Ypiranga affair, "
results have ranged from slightly to completely unsatisfying. One of
the most untenable accounts can be found as late as 1971 in that year'
edition of Barbara Tuchmann's book, The Zimmermann Telegram.
Ms. Tuchmann writes that after England withdrew its support from
Huerta:

Germany saw an opening. To Huerta came the German ambassador

[should be: minister] Admiral von Hintze, with an offer of military
aid against the rebels, provided he would cut off oil to the British Navy
in case of war. Within a few days derricks on the decks of Hamburg
were swinging huge crates o frifles and other munitions aboard the
ships Ypiranga, Bavaria, and Kronprinzessin Cecilie; their destination,
Veracruz?.

In August 1970 M. C. Meyer published an excellent article entitled

"The Arms of the Ypiranga" in The Hispanic American Historical
Review, demonstrating that interest in the topic is still alive. But Meyer,
too, has not used German records, with the consequence that his careful
exposition is-as far as the German side of the whole affair is concerned-
unavoidably incomplete. To fill this void, the following account will
1Barbara Tuchmann, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York, 1971), p. 43. See
also p. 48 et seq.

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2 THE ARMS OF THE "YPIRANGA"

attempt to relate how the events of the Ypi

Germans, as reflected in German documents

On March 4, 1917, John de Kay,3 an ill-rep

man and a former financial "adviser" of
Romberg, the German minister in Bern, and
the shipper of the munitions which had been
early 1914 on the Ypiranga and other shi
visited Romberg again and related to him pa
case. Romberg reported to Berlin:

De Kay explained to me that he had documen

would prove quite clearly to the world that t
and munitions had not been accomplished t
through the 'Cartoucheries Francaises' and th
Chaumont (Chaumond?). Neville Chamber
National Service in England at the time, had
matter in conjunction with the 'Cartoucheries
de Kay-as the agent of the Mexican Governm
had also participated. Transportation had b
French firm of Vairon in Paris, and the G
for that purpose only because it was the onl
regular service to Mexico. Because the two

2F. Katz in Deutschland, Diaz und die mexikanische Revolution (Berlin, 1964),
p. 302 et seq., has used German records in relating his version of the Ypiranga affair,
but he did not use the archives of the HAPAG. See also Katz, Hamburger Schiffahrt
nach Mexiko 1870-1914 (K61n, 1965), p. 104 et seq.
The present article is based on documents from the following archives: Politisches
Archiv des AuswHrtigen Amtes Bonn (hereafter cited as AA Bonn), Deutsches Zentral-
archiv Potsdam (hereafter cited as DZA), Bundesarchiv Koblenz, Milit~irgeschichtliches
Forschungsamt Freiburg (hereafter cited as MGFA), Staatsarchiv Hamburg, Archiv
der Hamburg-Amerika-Linie (hereafter cited as HAPAG Archiv). Record Groups
59, 94, and 141 in the National Archives in Washington, D. C., were also checked in
regard to the Ypiranga affair. The research for this article was undertaken in preparing
a book about German foreign policy towards Mexico. That book has recently been
published by the Colloquium Verlag in Berlin as Die deutsche Mexikopolitik 1913/14
(Berlin, 1971).
3AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Quadt (minister to Hamburg) to Auswlirtiges Amt
(hereafter cited as AA), March 6, 1917. See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1,
Aktennotiz: Vorglinge fiber De Kay, April 10, 1914.
4 AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Romberg to AA, March 4, 1917. De Kay called on
Romberg to offer the German Empire weapons stored in Bilbao, Spain. He explained
that those were part of the weapons he had bought in the spring of 1914 for Huerta
but which could not be shipped to Mexico after the events of April 1914. De Kay
was offering the weapons in the expectation (Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March
21, 1917) ". . . that Germany, in case of war with the United States, would like to
exploit every possibility that might present a chance for the Mexicans to get weapons."
The Foreign Office did not respond to this offer because all information it could get
about de Kay was very negative.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 3

deliver as many weapons and m

represented by de Kay, wished,
over to the consortium weapon
Payment of the consortium w
deposited in a Swiss bank in Be
as well as the English, wanted t
France and in England.5
De Kay's explanations appear
communique of March 24, 1
Foreign Office supports de K
Romberg reported to Berlin that
told him confidentially that th
dealings with the firm of Schr
old cannons and munitions t
offered in Mexican state bonds,

that English and French banks,

of the Swiss General Staff] di
of these bonds. Mexican bond
been deposited in the local cant
sentative of a French munition
firm's name is something like
got the impression that the t
British and that England did a g
through it."

Despite Romberg's offer to lea

financial circles, the German F
report.9

5 AA Bonn, Mexiko 16, vol. 1, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 21, 1917.
De Kay also told Romberg that he had all the records about the events and could
produce them any time. Romberg received the impression that de Kay would show
him the records only for money, and the Foreign Office refused to pay.
6The accuracy of de Kay's account is attested to by all despatches that Paul von
Hintze, the German minister to Mexico at the time of the Ypiranga affair, sent about
these events. What M. C. Meyer has written in his article about the origin of the
weapons and the persons involved in this business is a quite different and a certainly
more profound story (Meyer, "The Arms of the Ypiranga," Hispanic American His-
torical Review, vol. L, p. 546 et seq.). Meyer does not mention de Kay, and Raast
and Ratner in Meyer's account play no role in the German records. How these two
stories fit together has yet to be answered. The following pages of this article are
important in this respect mainly because they show how much or, rather, how little
the German side knew about the background of the whole affair.
7De Kay had close connections with the London banking house of Bruno Schroeder,
which played a central role in financing the arms purchases. AA Bonn, Mexiko 16,
vol. 1, Romberg to AA, March 4, 1917.
8 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 44, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 24, 1914.
9 AA Bonn, Mexiko 13, vol. 1, Romberg to Bethmann Hollweg, March 24, 1914.

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4 THE ARMS OF THE " YPIRANGA"

The Foreign Office might have displaye

Romberg's 1914 despatch had the official wh
about two reports of January and February
German consul general in Odessa. On Januar
that the English steamer Brinkburn, chartered
supposed to arrive in Odessa shortly with 1
1,000 cases of Winchester carbines, and 20 c
board. The munitions were an American p
dollars.'0

The arrival of the ship (despite its cargo of weapons, it passed through
the Dardanelles without difficulty) aroused some excitement in Odessa.
Moreover, it became known that the ship's cargo was not at all intended
for Russia; rather, as Ohnesseit correctly discovered, the cargo was
to proceed to Hamburg on the German steamer Pernau through the
agency of the Levante Line. Ohnesseit further reported that another
shipment from New York similar to that on the Pernau was under
way." On February 7 Ohnesseit communicated that the Russian
Government had permitted the munitions to leave Odessa and that the
Pernau was en route to Hamburg." Finally, on February 18 Ohnesseit
telegraphed, and with that the circle closes, that the weapons on the
Pernau had been purchased by the President of Mexico.'"

At the end of February and the beginning of March the American

consul general in Hamburg also began to display an interest in the arms
cargo on the Pernau by asking the Hamburg police authorities to obtain
information about the size and destination of the steamer's cargo. He
conjectured that it was probably intended for Mexico, and he wanted
to inform his government about the matter.'4

The Hamburg police informed the Senate Commission for Reich and
Foreign Affairs of the American consul general's inquiry. At the same
time they made a report to the Commission about the size of the ship-
ment: 20 cases of machineguns, 100 cases of carbines, and 15,649 cases

10o AA Bonn RuBland 72, vol. 96, Ohnesseit to AA, January 1, 1914. Compare to the
following account Meyer, loc. cit., p. 547 et seq., as well as National Archives, RG 59,
M274, roll 35, and M353, roll 5.
11 AA Bonn, Ruiland 72, vol. 96. Probably these are the weapons that did not get
to Mexico because of the events of April 1914 and that ended up in Bilbao.
12 Ibid. Ohnesseit to AA, February 7, 1914.
3a Ibid. Ohnesseit to AA, February 18, 1914.
14Staatsarchiv Hamburg, CI d 26, Die Polizeibeh6rde an die Senatskommission fiir
die Reichs- und auswairtigen Angelegenheiten, March 2, 1914.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 5

of ammunition with about 1,00

added:

The arms have been shipped on a British steamer from New York to
Odessa in order to convey them to Mexico circuitously, undoubtedly
with the intention of concealing their destination and preventing the
American Government from pursuing the cargo. Up to now, the consul
general's request has not been met because, in the interest of the com-
merce and trade of Hamburg, I consider imparting such information to
a representative of a foreign country a delicate matter.15
The Senate Commission would have informed the American consul
general of what the Hamburg police knew, but the repeal of the U.
embargo on arms to Mexico held it back.' Moreover, in view of th
legal situation, exact details concerning the cargo would have b
difficult to ascertain.7

Meanwhile, the firm of Martin Schrader & Co. of Hamburg ordered

the HAPAG to transfer the arms from the Pernau to the Ypiranga and
to forward them to its address in Veracruz."' In the middle of March,
therefore, the Ypiranga took on board the arms of the Pernau: 15,750
cases of cartridges, 1,000 cases of carbines, and 20 cases of machineguns.'1

The Ypiranga made first port in Le Havre; there, through the firm of
Vairon & Co. and by order of Huerta's agent, John de Kay, it received
for the military commandant of Veracruz 717 cases of shrapnel shells,
78 cases of cartridge shells, and 1 case of artillery ammunition.20

On April 17, the HAPAG steamer Bavaria also departed from

Hamburg. In Antwerp it took on board 1,421 cases of cartridges.
15 Ibid.

16 See particulars on this point in Meyer, loc. cit., pp. 449-450.

17 Staatsarchiv Hamburg, CI d 26, Notiz zum Schreiben: Die Polizeibeh6rde an die
Senatskommission ffir die Reichs- und auswairtigen Angelegenheiten, March 2, 1914.
18 HAPAG Archiv, Bericht fiber Munitionssendungen mit den Dampfern "Ypiranga "
und "Bavaria" nach Mexico (without date and signature, written by an HAPAG
employee in February 1914).
19 HAPAG Archiv, Hamburg-Amerika-Linie: Mit D. "Ypiranga" und "Bavaria"
nach Vera Cruz verladene Munition. The following figures are also taken from this
account. For completeness and to complement the writings of Meyer, it should be
mentioned that the Ypiranga received in Havana from the HAPAG steamer Savoia
(which had come from Antwerp) 1,333 cases of cartridges for the military com-
mandant of Veracruz. Besides that there were on board the Ypiranga 15 cases of sabers
and one case of rifles from private senders. According to the information Hintze gave
(AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 50, Tagebuch Hintze, 3. Tell) the carbine cases contained
10 rifles each, the cartridge cases 2,000 cartridges each.
20o HAPAG Archiv, Bericht fiber Munitionssendungen mit den Dampfern "Ypiranga"
und "Bavaria" nach Mexiko.

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6 THE ARMS OF THE "YPIRANGA"

Again, Vairon & Co. was the consignor by orde

the military commandant in Veracruz was th
arms shipment was also on its way to Mexico
Cecilie, but neither de Kay nor Schrdder &
Mexico21).

At this point it should be emphasized that the only German role in

these transactions was that the most efficient European shipping company
serving Mexico was charged with transporting the arms,22 all of which
were on their way before the April 21 occupation of Veracruz was
precipitated by the arrival of the Ypiranga. Before the conquest of
Veracruz, in fact, neither the HAPAG nor the German political
leadership had any idea of the consequences that would ensue from the
fact that a German company was transporting arms to Mexico. Indeed,
the Foreign Office first heard of the Tampico incident from the press23
and from a short telegram of April 14 from the German cruiser Dresden,
which was on duty in Mexican waters.2 Only communications from
von Hintze, the German minister to Mexico, on April 16 and 19 made
it clear that the situation had been exacerbated surprisingly and that
the Americans ".. ..were preparing a bellicose intervention... "a 25
On April 20 Bernstorff, the German ambassador to the United States,
reported that the Americans did not intend to make war " . ..but only
reprisals such as the capture of Mexican warships, the occupation of
the customhouses in Tampico and probably in Veracruz... " 2'6 During
the days that followed the German Government and German diplomacy
were concerned with the protection of Germans in Mexico; nobody
devoted any attention to the cargo of the Ypiranga.

The Ypiranga arrived at Veracruz on April 21 at 1:00 p.m. As

the steamer approached the entrance to the harbor, a lieutenant com-
mander of the American flagship Florida came on board. He reported
21 Ibid.

22Whether the order was imparted to the HAPAG that in case of diplomatic diffi-
culties German policy towards Mexico would be discredited can only be surmised.
There is nothing in the German records that supports such an idea. See Katz, Deutsch-
land ... , p. 303, and Katz, Schiffahrt ... , p. 105.
28 The Foreign Office paid special attention to the following two articles: "Der
Zwischenfall von Tampico," in Berliner Lokal-Anzeiger, April 12, 1914, and "Mexique,"
in Le Figaro, April 15, 1914.
24AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Chef des Admiralstabes der Marine to Jagow [Secre-
tary of Foreign Affairs], April 14, 1914.
25 Ibid., Hintze to AA, April 19, 1914.
26 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, April 20, 1914.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 7

to Bonath, captain of the Ypira

Veracruz at 11:00 that morning
the Ypiranga was carrying we
harbor because fighting was
thereupon cast anchor near
entrance to the harbor. A short time later another American officer
boarded the Ypiranga to convey Admiral Fletcher's order that t
German ship would not be allowed to leave its place of anchor witho
Fletcher's permission. Bonath obeyed the order and informed HAPA
agent in Veracruz of it.

On the afternoon of April 21 Bonath sent the following telegram

the Dresden, which was moored in Tampico: "Ypiranga detaine
before Veracruz on order of Admiral Fletcher, any continuation o
journey prohibited, what to do? Bonath. "127 At that time Kbhler
captain of the Dresden, knew only that the Ypiranga had been assign
to receive refugees in Veracruz. Hintze had announced on April
that he was providing the Ypiranga for receiving refugees. Becaus
Kohler did not know why the American admiral had detained t
ship, he telegraphed to the Ypiranga: " [I have] requisitioned Ypiran
for the service of the Reich to receive refugees. Requested the American
admiral to facilitate this. For the time being, unloading has to
postponed. " 28

At the time Captain Kohler sent that telegram he did not yet kno
that the American landing at Veracruz had been caused by the arriv
of the HAPAG ship. Neither was this fact known in Berlin, where
was remembered that on April 20 Ambassador Bernstorff had predic
that the Americans might occupy Mexican customhouses.
On April 21 and 22 the State Department came to the realizati
that detaining the Ypiranga was illegal: war had not been declar
nor had a blockade been proclaimed. Therefore, on April 22, befor
Ambassador Bernstorff had a chance to protest the detention,29 h
received a visit from Secretary of State Bryan. In the ambassador'
27HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff "Ypiranga," Rapport des Kapitains, 26. Reise, Ma
6, 1914.
28 MGFA, R-M-A, 637 PG 65 130 M.B. der "Dresden," Nr. 731, April 28, 1914.
29J. Daniels in The Wilson Era, Years of Peace 1910-1917 (Chapel Hill, 1944), p. 200,
writes that Bernstorff had protested the detaining of the steamer. See also Meyer, loc.
cit, p. 552. Bernstorff's despatches, however, contain no mention of the protest.
Kemnitz in the Foreign Office emphasized several times that Bernstorff had made no
representation and that the American Government had apologized "voluntarily." AA
Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, AA to Hintze, April 25, 1914. See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 1,
vol. 45, Zusammenfassung (Kemnitz), April 29, 1914.

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8 THE ARMS OF THE " YPIRANGA"

presence Bryan composed a memorandum t

in which the U. S. Government apologized f
In the same memorandum Bryan wrote of
While the United States hopes that the mun
General Huerta will be landed at the Vera Cruz custom house so that
after landing the United States Government may detain them, still this
Government does not claim the right, as a state of war does not exist,
to interfere with the ship's departure or to exercise control over said
munitions of war ....30
On the same day Chief of Staff Admiral Badgers, commander-in-chief
of the American Atlantic Squadron, who had meanwhile arrived in
Veracruz, apologized to Captain Bonath and told him that the ship was
released and was free to proceed wherever he wished. The Ypiranga
then made port in Veracruz, unloaded its cargo-except the war
material-and took refugees on board.3'

Even at this point-April 22-German leaders were still not aware

that the Ypiranga's arrival had precipitated the American landing in
Veracruz."2

On April 23 Biilow, the Prussian minister in Hamburg, reported to

Bethmann Hollweg, the German Chancellor, that he had had a private
conversation with Ballin, the director of the HAPAG. In this
conversation Ballin, who gave some clues on the arms' origin, had
suggested that Biilow report that ". ..the shipment, consisting of the
arms and munitions on the Ypiranga, presumably [underlined by the
Foreign Office] is being sent back from Veracruz. " Ballin also told
Biilow that, although arms shipments to Mexico were legal, he never-
theless had advised ". . . a local freighter. . . to desist for the time being
from such shipments. " On April 25 the Foreign Office communicated
Ballin's statements to Hintze in Mexico.34

so AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Bernstorff to AA, April 21, 1914.

s31 HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff "Ypiranga," Rapport des Kapitains, 26. Reise,
May 6, 1914.
32 It is also noteworthy that Kohler in his report of April 28 mentioned the arrival
of the Ypiranga as only one among several reasons for the American landing in Vera-
cruz (MGFA, R-M-A, 637 PG 65 130, M.B. der "Dresden," Nr. 731, April 28, 1914).
Hintze only "presumed" there was a connection between the arrival of the Ypiranga
and the American occupation of the town (AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Tagebuch
Hintze, Teil 1, April 26, 1914).
3 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Biilow to Bethmann Hollweg, April 23, 1914. A letter
from HAPAG director Ecker confirmed Ballin's statement-at least it could have been
so understood by the Foreign Office. Ecker wrote the Foreign Office on April 25:
"In accordance with the consignees, we wish to instruct the captain not to discharge
the cargo but to keep it on board." Ibid., Ecker to AA, April 25, 1914.
84 Ibid., AA to Hintze, April 25, 1914.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 9

On April 25 Bryan asked Berns

the Ypiranga and declared that
good all losses incurred by the
unloaded in Veracruz and placed
he wanted to be sure that the arm

The Foreign Office informed

keep arms on board, and they pre
Bernstorff informed Bryan of th
the "instruction given to the Yp

The Foreign Office now consid

It, however, overlooked the fac
expectation of an American-M
His statements did not constitu
transport of the arms. Moreov
to make the Foreign Office awar
not realize that Bryan had got
Government had promised that
Hamburg.
On May 1, 1914, two similar summaries of the Ypiranga affair were
written in the Foreign Office.4o One of them was telegraphed on the
same day to Hintze in Mexico to inform him of the events.4' These
5 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, April 24, 1914.
36 Ibid., AA to Bernstorff, April 25, 1914.
3 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, April 26, 1914.
8 Written as a marginal note from the Foreign Office to Hintze's inquiry of April
23, 1914, concerning the Ypiranga.
39 Articles clipped from the American press can be found among the records of the
German Foreign Office. For example: "Munitions of War Must be Returned to Ger-
many," New York Herald, April 24, 1914. The German press, too, had gotten the
impression that Germany had promised the United States to return the weapons to
Germany. The Kolnische Volkszeitung criticized the alleged promise (" Die Schaidigung
des deutschen Handels durch Wilson," April 27, 1914). Montgelas in the Foreign
Office annotated this article with the marginal note: "Germany has not promised that;
rather, the HAPAG has sent such an instruction to its ship." AA Bonn, Mexiko 1,
vol. 45, Randbemerkung Montgelas.
40 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46, Zimmermann (Undersecretary of State) to Hintze,
May 1, 1914; Bundesarchiv Koblenz, R 85, 6624, Jagow: Zur Information, May 1, 1914.
See also AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 45, Zusammenfassung von Kemnitz, May 29, 1914.
41Until he received the telegram, Hintze knew very little about what had happened
in Tampico and Veracruz-in fact, not much more than what was rumored in the
German colony: for example, that the Ypiranga had been stopped, that the German
cruiser Bremen had defended the Ypiranga and had been sunk in battle by the Ameri-
cans, and so on. Hintze tried as well as he could to avoid any encounter with the
Mexican Foreign Minister, who already had tried to greet Hintze as an "ally." AA
Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, April 24, 1914.

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10 THE ARMS OF THE "YPIRANGA"

two summaries are interesting here because, f

fact that the Americans had left it to the Ypi
and, second, their authors no longer mention
contained in Ballin's communication to Biilow
of the arms. Thus Undersecretary Zimmer
State Jagow, authors of the summaries, had t
assurance that the arms would be returned to
that the Foreign Office had not obtained. For
Office was not alert to the situation whe
Bernstorff's telegram mentioning once m
Bryan used in expressing his thanks for the
Ypiranga affair.42

During the first days of May the German

reports about the unloading of war material i
HAPAG ships in Puerto M6xico. The Kronpri
Bavaria were specifically mentioned.43 The F
did not give any credence to these reports; i
marks on the press articles and underlined pa
would not be unloaded but would be returne

The Foreign Office did not display any greater

even when on May 10 the Berliner Tageblatt
Government was determined to prevent the
all means in its power. "15 On the same da
report:
Count Bernstorff, the German ambassador in Washington, declared
that the American Government had made no request to him to prevent
the landing of arms by German ships in Puerto M6xico. The only way
to prevent the landing, stated Count Bernstorff, was the occupation of
the customhouse in Puerto M6xico by the Americans."6
Bernstorff's statements do not mean he advocated the conquest
of Puerto M6xico. They mean, rather, that because the Americans had
42 Ibid.. Bernstorff to AA, April 30, 1914.
43 The Kronprinzessin Cecilie did not discharge its weapons but returned them to
Hamburg, as the consignees wished (HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff "Kronprinzessin
Cecilie," Rapport des Kapitiins, 47. Reise, May 14, 1914). The Bavaria was still on its
way to Puerto Mexico. Press reports about the Bavaria's discharging weapons at this
time were contradictory, and those that reported that it had unloaded weapons were
wrong. The Dania, also a HAPAG steamer heading for Puerto Mexico, carried no
weapons (cf. Katz, Deutscbland . . . , p. 306). See as an example of the press reports:
"Die Vereinigten Staaten und Mexiko," in Kolnische Zeitung, May 10, 1914.
44 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46.
45 "Die neue Kriegsgefahr in Mexiko," in Berliner Tageblatt, May 10, 1914.
', " Mexiko," Berliner Tageblatt, May 10, 1914.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 11

not addressed themselves to him

reasons mentioned-only the occ
them if they intended to prevent
thought it quite possible that th
was in this way to succeed in occu

German political leaders should

and should have at least investiga
in Puerto M6xico. On that day t
from Washington by Boy-Ed
correctly described how the e
precipitated the occupation of
objective of Germany's Mexica
May 13 to Bernstorff)4 was to av
for military measures against M
in Puerto M6xico, the Foreign Of
It did not realize sufficiently that
to transport the munitions back
of the Ypiranga and its cargo did
unloaded in another Mexican har
statements contained no assuran
Ypiranga case was more a politica

In the meantime, until May 17,

refugees under the flag of th
released from this service, and o
of Veracruz. At this point Hint
drew criticism from the Foreign O
ion that he deliberately helped Hu
Hintze, who did not know exa
could be expected, instructed th
the flag of the Reichsservice as
spare us and the ship inconvenie
the freight. " ' The release of th
4 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 46, Bernst
Ibid., Falcke (consul general in New Yo
Ibid., vol. 47, Bernstorff to Bethmann H
48 Ibid., vol. 46, Boy-Ed to Tirpitz, Apr
49 Ibid., AA to Bernstorff, May 15, 1914
50 Worth noting are the comments of
the Morning Post of May 29 ("The Pac
vol. 48). In the records there are many
point of view there is no reason to objec
51 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintz

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12 THE ARMS OF THE "YPIRANGA"

from American authorities until May 25 when

Puerto Mexico.

In the middle of May it became clear that the United States did n
intend to take further military measures against Mexico. The shippin
agents and Huerta therefore pressed for delivery in Puerto M6xico o
the war material loaded on the HAPAG ships.52 At this time both th
agent of the HAPAG in Veracruz and Hintze believed that the Germ
Government, acting in concert with the American Government, h
prohibited unloading the munitions..1 The HAPAG agent therefore
recommended unloading them in Veracruz. Hintze, who fores
complications, was also opposed to letting the ship steer for Puerto
M6xico.6' Therefore, the German minister, whose only instruction
regarding the Ypiranga read "settled, " - inquired of Berlin what h
should do. He reported the shipping agent's and Huerta's wishe
cabling:
Agent Hamburg-American-Line suggests that if Americans are against
unloading in Puerto M6xico, both [arms and munitions] be unloaded
in Veracruz and delivered up into the temporary control of the Ameri-
cans. Mexican Government naturally wants delivery, so far I have
represented it as a private affair of the consignee, cannot get American
position."6

When one considers that Hintze himself did not know the American
Government's position on the arms delivery, the confusion that prevailed
on the German side becomes apparent. Only against this background
can one understand Zimmermann's telegram sent in reply to Hintze:
Obviously Hamburg-American-Line wants to avoid any conflict with
the United States. Local representative [of the HAPAG] is to get
instruction from the [HAPAG] board of directors, which as yet has
not made any application.57

With that the Foreign Office declared the arms deliveries a matter
between private parties. Because neither the American Government
nor the HAPAG addressed themselves to the German Foreign Office,

Foreign Office's reaction is noted in marginal remarks. Hintze's precautions were felt
to be extreme. Cf. HAPAG Archiv, Dampfschiff "Ypiranga," Rapport des Kapitins,
26. Reise, May 6, 1914.
52AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914.
53 Ibid., Heynen [HAPAG agent in Mexico] to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid., Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 5, Tagebuch Hintze, Tell 2, June 17, 1914.
56 Ibid., vol. 47, Hintze to AA, May 17, 1914.
7 Ibid., AA to Hintze, May 19, 1914.

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 THOMAS BAECKER 13

it did not take any position. Th

blindness and blundering, not
Tuchmann imagines, resulted in
of the arms loaded on the Ypirang

Certainly the Foreign Office w

had conveyed his serious misgivin
M6xico. Hintze knew that the ce
de facto since the end of April, b
He was also aware that it was no
Huerta's government because tha
law and order, and he felt tha
policy had gained among all conc
account of the profit or loss of
Hintze opposed unloading the arm

Our rivals would not hesitate to r

munitions loaded on the Bavaria
our conduct, which has been pr
hesitate to exploit it in Washin
lative. " In this connection I ha
which has good reasons for diver
of its own policies."9

Despite his reservations, Hintze f

ion to treat any "further hand
affair. "6 0 He was able to do
uncertain as he was about America
of Huerta's position would suit th
there might have been similar tho
policy):

58 When the Foreign Office learned on May 26 from Billow in Hamburg that the
weapons would be unloaded in Puerto Mexico, it made a feeble effort to persuade the
HAPAG not to accept further cargoes of weapons for Mexico. Not that the Foreign
Office was aware of the political dangers involved in discharging the weapons; rather,
it acted only because Hintze had in the meantime described the terrible consequences
of a renewed civil war for German commercial interests in Mexico. AA Bonn, Mexiko
1, vol. 47, Biulow to Bethmann Hollweg, May 25, 1914 and ibid., AA to Bilow, May 27,
1914.

59 Ibid., vol. 49, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 3, 1914. Next to Huerta there
was no one happier about the delivery of the weapons than the English Minister,
Carden. When he heard the news, he jumped up and shouted triumphantly: "Then
Huerta will stick! " Ibid., vol. 50, Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 25, 1913, Tage-
buch Hintze, Tell 3, May 24, 1914.
60o Ibid., Hintze to Bethmann Hollweg, June 25, 1914.

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14 THE ARMS OF THE "YPIRANGA"

It is naturally not in American interests to h

Mexico instead of Huerta, ., .hence the [mean
by the U. S.] embargo on arms and munition
the permission to unload the arms destined f
from the Bavaria in Puerto M6xico.61

Because the Foreign Ministry raised no objection to unloading the

arms in Puerto M6xico and because the HAPAG was no better informed
of the U. S. attitude than the Foreign Office and Hintze, the HAPAG
directed the Ypiranga to Puerto M6xico. But before leaving Veracruz
the captain of the Ypiranga duly went to the American port authorities
to clear his ship for Puerto M6xico. Captain Kohler of the Dresden
reported:

The captain pointed out to the commanding officer of the harbor the
possibility that the Mexican Government could request the delivery of
the arms in Puerto M6xico. Because, according to the American view,
there was no state of war, the ship was not subject to any restrictions.
Nevertheless, a settlement conforming to the wishes of the United
States would still have been possible if the Americans had given some
hints in that direction. Instead, the harbor officers in Veracruz were so
little obliging towards the HAPAG agents that the agents saw no
reason to make any suggestions in the interests of the United States.
General Funston, the commander-in-chief of Veracruz, later on
expressed his disapproval of the harbor authorities' behavior and very
much regretted not having seen the agents of the ship himself.62

Admiral Badger had already inquired at the State Department

...what he should do, if the Ypiranga tried to leave Vera Cruz and
land her cargo at any other point along the coast. The reply received
was merely a four word radiogram: 'Give Ypiranga clearance
papers. ' 63

61 Ibid., Tagebuch Hintze, Teil 3, May 23, 1914. It was not only the German side
that understood the American attitude in this way. See ibid., vol. 49, Hintze to Beth-
mann Hollweg, June 3, 1914. The HAPAG explained the American's release of the
Ypiranga and its weapons similarly. Biilow wrote from Hamburg to Berlin: "The
board of directors of the HAPAG explained the attitude of the American admiral
[Badger] as follows: that Washington, unsatisfied at that time, in April, with the
conduct of the rebel leaders Villa and Carranza, might well have intended to let
Huerta gain a stronger position for a while." Ibid., vol. 47, Billow to Bethmann
Hollweg, May 30, 1914.
62 MGFA, R-M-A. 637 PG 65 130, M. B. der "Dresden," G. B. Nr. 395, June 20, 1914.
68 MGFA, Kaiserliche Admiralitiit, 4321 XVII 1.5.-6, H. C. Lodge to Senator Lodge,
May 29, 1914, Anlage zum Washingtoner Marine-Bericht Nr. 87, June 11, 1914. Ac-
cording to Heynen, the American captain in authority at Veracruz mentioned after
the return of the Ypiranga: ". . . had he had any idea that the weapons and munitions
were going to be unloaded, he would have denied the despatch, but that he never had

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 THOMAS BAECKER 15

The fact that the HAPAG was

in Puerto M6xico against the wi
Governments" can be seen espec
between it and Heynen, the H
the company sent Heynen a tele
no difficulties with the Americ
sent him the following telegram: "
[Hintze] and American authori
opposition before discharging am
On May 30 Heynen reported th
later, Heynen pointed out: " .
indication that unloading the arm
would not suit them. " 6

Whatever judgement may be passed on the events described above,

it is quite certain that Huerta did not receive arms shipments on the
Ypiranga and Bavaria as a result of German machinations. Certainly
the shipments cannot be invoked to support the thesis that the Zimmer-
mann despatch of 1917 was more than an invention of the war years.
It is equally not correct to explain the position of the German
Government as based on consideration of the HAPAG.7 The whole
of German economic interests in Mexico would not have been able
to induce German political leaders to endanger friendly German-
American relations;68 in no case would the Germans have jeopardized
these relations out of consideration for a single German shipping
company. Furthermore, there could and there can be no doubt that,
in view of the incomparably more important trade relations between
the HAPAG and the United States, the interests of the HAPAG were

such an idea because he was firmly convinced that the weapons would return to
Hamburg, for he had seen copies of cables from Hamburg in which this had been
instructed." AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Heynen to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
64See also in this regard AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 47, Biilow to Bethmann Hollweg,
May 29, 1914.
65HAPAG Archiv, Telegrammwechsel mit den Herren C. Heynen, Mexiko City,
und G. Bising, Vera Cruz, betreffend Munition in den D. "Ypiranga" und "Bavaria."
Both telegrams are in this compilation. So is the telegram of confirmation from Heynen
to the HAPAG. The HAPAG wrote on June 4 to Undersecretary of State Zimmer-
man: "Had there been any indication from the Americans that they did not want
the landing at Puerto M6xico, we certainly would have respected such a wish." AA
Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, HAPAG to Zimmermann, June 4, 1914.
66 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Heynen to HAPAG, June 4, 1914.
67 Cf. Katz, Deutschland . . . , p. 305, and Katz, Schifffahrt . .. , p. 107.
68 See Baecker, op. cit., pp. 67-109.

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16 THE ARMS OF THE " YPIRANGA"

hardly bound up with two shipments intended

President.

When it became known in the United States that the arms of the
Ypiranga, on account of which 19 Americans had been killed, and t
arms on the Bavaria had been landed in Puerto M6xico, a storm
indignation broke out. A correspondent of the Kiilnische Zeit
reported from Washington: "During the past week German-Ameri
relations once again were not far from being broken. "I The Germ
consul in New York reported the "great excitement" and the "l
complaints" expressed in all American newspapers about the ar
shipment. In the American press, he continued, there was talk
"painful disappointment" with the German position, even of a Germ
"breach of faith. "17 The American public had expected the arms
be returned to Germany, as had Bryan and the American Governm
Bryan told Bernstorff that he was "very unpleasantly affected
because it is now difficult to withhold arms from constitutionalists. " 71
Hintze's apprehensions, too, threatened to be fulfilled. After hearing
that the war material had arrived, Huerta again thought of resuming
the fight,7 and Villa threatened to expel all Germans.

It soon turned out that the consequences of the arms' reaching

Huerta were not as profound as it had at first appeared they would be.
Carranza restrained Villa from expelling the Germans,74 and Huerta,
even with the newly gained war material, was not able to prolong his
rule. The American press soon directed its criticisms from the German
Government to the State Department.75 In the succeeding weeks, too,

69"Der 'Ypiranga '-Zwischenfall," in Kdlnische Zeitung, June 18, 1914.

7 AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Falcke to Bethmann Hollweg, May 29, 1914.
1 Ibid., Bernstorff to AA, June 16, 1914. Bernstorff laid the sole blame for unloading
the weapons on the representative of the HAPAG in Mexico because the representative
had falsely supposed ". . . that under the changed circumstances there would not have
been American objections to the discharge." See also Bernstorff to AA, June 1, 1914.
When Bryan asked Bernstorff on June 1 about the events in Puerto Mexico, Bernstorff
himself had no information or explanation to give.
The HAPAG was soon made to feel American anger about the discharge of the
weapons. When the Ypiranga and Bavaria unsuspectingly returned from Puerto M6xico
to Veracruz, American harbor authorities imposed a large fine upon them. AA Bonn,
Mexiko 1, vol. 49, Hintze to AA, June 31, 1914. See as well Meyer, loc. cit., p. 555.
72AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 47, Hintze to AA, May 26, 1914.
7* ibid., Depesche der Continental-Telegraphen-Compagnie, May 29, 1914.
4 "Mexico," in Frankfurter Zeitung, June 2, 1914.
75See details in AA Bonn, Mexiko 1, vol. 48, Falcke to Bethmann Hollweg, June 2,
1914. Zimmermann instructed Bernstorff on June 2 (ibid.) to work to calm American
public opinion and the American Government. The Foreign Office prepared articles

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 THOMAS BAECKER 17

the mediation congress of the A

conflict attracted public attenti
episode. But with the outbreak
weapons provided grist to the m
propaganda for too long a time n
American relations before 1914 in

THOMAS BAECKER

for the German press which read to the effect (ibid., Kemnitz to Zimmermann, Jun
1914): "Had the American authorities indicated that they would not welcom
discharge at Puerto M6xico, it can be supposed that the Hamburg-American-Line wou
have respected such a wish out of consideration for the larger interest it has in
United States."
76 An egregious example can be found in Alec Tweedie, Mexico, From Diaz to the
Kaiser (New York, 1918), pp. 163, 176, and 268.

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