Available online at www.sciencedirect.

com

Cognitive Development 22 (2007) 401–405

Editorial
The development of self-regulation: Toward the
integration of cognition and emotion

The impetus for organizing this Special Issue of Cognitive Development grows from two broad
considerations. The first concerns the increasing interest that the topic of self-regulation has begun
to garner from researchers of diverse backgrounds (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004) and our desire, as
editors, to further sustain this interest. The second follows from a growing dissatisfaction with
accounts of psychological functioning that draw a hard divide between emotional and cognitive
processes, and the need for more integrative accounts that attempt to bridge the two (Overton,
1998). As such, the contributions to this Special Issue make up a distinct sampling of researchers
who share this dissatisfaction and who recognize in their own work on self-regulation the futility
of sustaining the cognition–emotion antinomy.
Self-regulation is a multidimensional construct that encompasses cognitive, motivational-
affective, social, and physiological processes involved in the control of goal-directed actions
(Calkins & Fox, 2002; Calkins & Howse, 2004). As with any complex construct, research on self-
regulation crosses many of the traditional boundaries in psychology, making it a rich place for the
convergence of many different research perspectives (Baumeister & Vohs, 2004). In the develop-
mental literature particularly, the origins and growth of self-regulation prove to be a central topic
for a variety of theoretical approaches, including psychoanalytic, behaviourist, socio-cultural,
and cognitive-developmental theories (Bronson, 2000; Flavell, Miller, & Miller, 2002). In large
part, this is because self-regulation is considered vital – from almost any theoretical angle – for
autonomous and adaptive psychological functioning (Calkins & Howse, 2004; Cole, Michel, &
Teti, 1994). Not surprisingly, then, there is growing consensus among researchers regarding the
developmental course of self-regulation. Few would dispute, for instance, that self-regulation
shows steady increases throughout the course of development, with the most pronounced growth
during the early childhood period (Calkins & Howse, 2004; Kopp, 2002). Nor do many researchers
argue against the fact that improvements in self-regulation – which can be seen in children’s
increased ability to control impulses, attention, and emotions – have important ramifications
for developing and managing interpersonal relationships, as well as individual problem solving
abilities.
Where such broad agreement typically falls into disrepair, however, concerns the respective
roles of cognition and emotion in children’s developing self-regulation. Even in a literature where
traditional boundaries seem to constantly dissolve, the classic antinomy between thought and emo-

0885-2014/$ – see front matter © 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
doi:10.1016/j.cogdev.2007.08.008
402 Editorial / Cognitive Development 22 (2007) 401–405

tion continues to persist as one of the “great divides” for self-regulation research. Consistent with
this division, current research on the development of self-regulation can be seen as being pursued
along two different lines. On the one hand, cognitive aspects of self-regulation are emphasized in
research on the development of executive function (EF). This line of research investigates mainly
the “cool” regulatory processes that are involved in monitoring, planning, and executing problem-
solving behavior in relatively abstract, de-contextualized situations (Zelazo & Müller, 2002). On
the other hand, affective-motivational aspects of self-regulation are studied more frequently in the
context of emotion regulation (ER), or what, in EF research has been called “hot” EF (Zelazo &
Cunnigham, 2007). The expressed aims of ER research are to explore “the extrinsic and intrinsic
processes responsible for monitoring, evaluating, and modifying emotional reactions, especially
their intensive and temporal features, to accomplish one’s goals” (Thompson, 1994, pp. 27–28).
While each approach has generated valuable findings, the study of cognitive–executive and
affective–motivational aspects of self-regulation in relative isolation from each other is at odds
with recent trends in neuroscience (Bechara, 2004; Damasio, 1994), emphasizing the integra-
tive nature of “cool” executive and “hot” affective processes in goal-directed actions (Zelazo &
Cunnigham, 2007), as well as advances in relational theorizing (Overton, 1998) and other con-
temporary systems-oriented approaches in psychology (Varela & Depraz, 2005). These recent
instances of resistance to the thought-emotion divide join other past attempts to dissolve this
classic antinomy (e.g., Bearison & Zimiles, 1986; Dupont, 1994). In the context of self-regulation
more particularly, it is important to note that one of these past attempts was initiated by Piaget
(1954/1981). Although perhaps best known for his cognitive theory, he wrote on the topic of self-
regulation, or what he called the “will,” in his book, Intelligence and Affectivity (1954/1981). In
this work, Piaget described the will as “the affective analogue of intellectual decentration” (p. 64)
and argued more generally that “affective structures are isomorphic with intellectual structures”
(p. 9). Following this line of reasoning, he denied any radical dichotomy between cognition and
emotion. Instead, he suggested that emotions complement cognition by serving as the energizers
for action, and they can influence the course of social-cognitive growth, particularly moral devel-
opment, in significant ways. Specifically, Piaget theorized that the organization of affectivity in
the course social interaction leads to moral feelings (or “normative affects”) and to self-regulated
actions according to one’s own standards (an autonomous will).
Although the contributors to this Special Issue of Cognitive Development are unlikely to
identify there own accounts as “Piagetian,” there can be little doubt that they each share the
sentiment expressed by Piaget regarding the integrative roles of cognition and emotion in the
emergence of the will, or self-regulation. Moreover, they carry his legacy forward by working
to unite cognitive–executive and affective–motivational aspects of self-regulation. Beyond this
commonality, these Special Issue contributions also show considerable breadth in how research on
self-regulation may be conducted, ranging from neuro-physiological to socio-moral approaches.
Consistent with such breadth there are important areas of convergence, as well as divergence, in
the findings that are reported. As Editors, we would like to draw readers’ attention to six issues
that prove to be especially salient to us and worth further elaboration.
First, the findings reported by Lewis and Todd, as well by Wolfe and Bell, are consistent with
an interactive specialization viewpoint of brain development (Johnson, 2003). According to this
view, the development of psychological functions, such as memory, attention, or planning, involves
the reorganization of brain activation patterns that is determined by the interaction of different
intra- and inter-hemispheric regions. This view has much in common with Heinz Werner’s (1957)
now classic orthogenetic principle of organization by which some initially global, or diffuse,
activity pattern becomes more highly differentiated and integrated with time. Applying this notion
 Editorial / Cognitive Development 22 (2007) 401–405 403

to brain development, we see how some cortical regions show initially show poorly defined
psychological functions, and consequently, are partially activated in a wide range of different
contexts and tasks. Over the course of development, however, activity-dependent interactions
between different brain regions lead to their functional specialization and the gradual restriction
of activity to a narrower a narrower set of circumstances. Thus, the interactive specialization
framework predicts that psychological functioning will be related to changes in the activity level
of several brain regions, and that earlier in development certain behavioral tasks may elicit a more
diffuse pattern of activation than later in development. This account suggests that the brain is best
viewed as a dynamically self-organizing, context-dependent plastic system (see Lewis & Todd).
However, there are still very few studies that examine how physiological and psychological levels
of development are related to each other.
Second, the contributions by Lewis and Todd, as well as Qu and Zelazo, emphasize two different
mechanisms of regulation: bottom-up, emotional–motivational processes that regulate cognition,
and top–down, cognitive control processes that regulate emotions. These different mechanisms
appear to sometimes function in a complementary manner, sometimes not. For instance, Qu and
Zelao’s findings suggests that emotional processes can facilitate problem solving (particularly
when the emotions evoked are an integral part of the decision making task; see also Bechara,
2004; p. 25), whereas the research by Sequin and his colleagues suggests that emotional processes
can obstruct decision making. Such divergent findings obviously indicate that further work work
will be required to better delineate the contexts in which emotions have either a disruptive or
facilitative effect on problem solving.
Third, the studies by Carlson and Wang, Simonds and her colleagues, as well as Liebermann et
al., suggest that one particular aspect of EF, inhibitory control, is significantly correlated with ER,
whereas other aspects of EF, such as flexibility, working memory, or planning, are not. Moreover,
inhibitory control appears to more strongly correlated with the activation of positive behaviors
(i.e., the gift disappointment procedure) than with the suppression of negative behaviors (see
also Kieras, Tobin, Graziano, & Rothbart, 2005). As well, the relation between inhibitory control
and ER appears to be stronger for tasks that make demands on the simultaneous suppression
of a prepotent response and the activation of a weaker, alternative response than for measures
of inhibition that require only a simple response suppression (e.g., delay inhibition, see Carlson
& Wang; Liebermann et al.). Although these findings are in need of replication, they raise the
question as to the developmental relation between inhibitory control and ER (see Carlson &
Wang). Is (a certain level of) inhibitory control a prerequisite of successful ER, is successful ER
a prerequisite of (a certain level of) inhibitory control, or are both mediated by some third factor?
(Interestingly, Eisenberg and her colleagues suggest a similar concern regarding effortful control
and ER). A further, related question that arises from the study by Carlson and Wang (see also
Lewis & Todd) concerns the kind of relation between inhibitory control and ER: Are higher levels
of inhibitory control related to better ER, or is the relation more complex (e.g., an inverted-U-
shaped relation)? The most promising way to address these questions will require more ambitious
longitudinal research methods, such as those employed by the contribution from Eisenberg et al.
The fourth issue raised by the papers of Carlson and Wang as well as Liebermann and colleagues
concerns the role of social understanding in self-regulation. Carlson and Wang found that the
understanding of emotion is significantly related to emotion regulation, whereas Liebermann
and colleagues did not find any relation between false belief understanding and performance-
based ER (although there was some hint of a relation between parent-rated ER and false-belief
understanding). Prima facie, displaying positive emotions upon receiving a disappointing gift
involves some appreciation of other people’s perspectives – of which false belief understanding
404 Editorial / Cognitive Development 22 (2007) 401–405

may partially tap – and not just their emotions. The specific status of this social knowledge –
whether it is automatic or more reflective (see Liebermann et al.) – needs further investigation.
Beyond whatever other conclusions might be drawn from further study, it is clear that the relation
between social understanding and emotion regulation is not likely to be very simple.
The fifth issue emerging from these contributions concerns the factors that influence self-
regulation. Temperament, parenting, and language development each stand out as important
factors in the present contributions. Given the centrality of these factors in previous research
on self-regulation (Calkins & Fox, 2002; Calkins & Howse, 2004), of course, this comes as little
surprise. In the case of temperament, more particularly, Wolfe and Bell, as well as Eisenberg and
her colleagues, found effortful control significantly related to self-regulation (i.e., working mem-
ory, inhibition tasks, and reports of impulsivity. Nevertheless, Simonds and colleagues failed to
find a relation between parent-reported effortful control and ER, and Eisenberg et al. found differ-
ential relations depending on reporter (teacher, parent, or self) and the gender of the participant.
Obviously, the specific relation between effortful control and self-regulation needs to be clari-
fied. In addition, longitudinal studies need to be conducted to determine whether effortful control
predicts self-regulation, whether advances in self-regulation predict changes in effortful control,
or whether a third factor underlies advances in both areas (see Wolfe & Bell). Furthermore, in
previous studies parenting has been identified as an important factor influencing self-regulation
(Calkins & Howse, 2004; Karreman, van Tuijl, & van Aken, 2006). Cleary, it would be ben-
eficial for prevention and intervention purposes to study the development of different aspects
of self-regulation within the context of care-giving, and, as Eisenberg and her colleagues sug-
gest, the different socialization practices and social expectations that attend boys versus girls.
Finally, returning to a position taken by Vygotsky, the role of language in the development of
self-regulation appears to be especially important and needs to be further investigated (Kopp,
1989). The study by Wolfe and Bell suggests that verbal ability is significantly correlated with
cognitive control (i.e., working memory), and the studies by Carlson and Wang as well as by
Liebermann and colleagues suggest that verbal ability may partially or even completely mediate
the relations between inhibitory control and ER.
Finally, the studies in this Special Issue are not completely consistent as to the relation
between performance-based measures of self-regulation and parent-, teacher-, and/or self-ratings
of self-regulation. For instance, whereas Carlson and Wang found significant correlations between
performance-based measures for self-regulation and parental ratings of self-regulation, there was a
striking absence of such relations in the studies by Simonds et al. and Liebermann et al. As Editors,
we would strongly urge that future studies employ multiple methods to measure self-regulation,
such as those used by Eisenberg and her colleagues, in order to establish the ecological validity
of performance-based measures.
In conclusion, these studies help to prepare the ground for more integrative approaches to
self-regulation. They illustrate the richness of such approaches, as well as the many challenges
that lie ahead for future research. Whatever other conclusions this Special Issue might warrant,
very few, we suspect, will dispute that the road ahead looks to be an intellectually exciting one.
The increased interest that currently surrounds research on self-regulation is well deserved.

References

Baumeister, R. F., & Vohs, K. D. (Eds.). (2004). Handbook of self-regulation. New York: Guilford Press.
Bearison, D. J., & Zimiles, H. (Eds.). (1986). Thought and emotion: Developmental perspectives. Hillsdale, NJ: LEA.
 Editorial / Cognitive Development 22 (2007) 401–405 405

Bechara, A. (2004). A neural view of the regulation of complex cognitive functions by emotions. In P. Philippot & R. S.
Feldman (Eds.), The regulation of emotion (pp. 3–32). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, Publishers.
Bronson, M. B. (2000). Recognizing and supporting the development of self-regulation in young children. Young Children,
55, 32–37.
Calkins, S. D., & Fox, N. A. (2002). Self-regulatory processes in early personality development: A multi-level approach
to the study of childhood social withdrawal and aggression. Development and Psychopathology, 15, 55–71.
Calkins, S. D., & Howse, R. B. (2004). Individual differences in self-regulation: Implications for childhood adjustment.
In P. Philippot & R. S. Feldman (Eds.), The regulation of emotion (pp. 307–332). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates, Publishers.
Cole, P., Michel, M. K., & Teti, L. (1994). The development of emotion regulation and dysregulation. Monographs of the
Society for Research in Child Development, 59(2–3, Serial No. 240), 73–100.
Damasio, A. R. (1994). Descartes’ error: Emotion, reason, and the human brain. New York: Putnam.
Dupont, H. (1994). Emotional development, theory, and applications: A neo-Piagetian perspective. London: Praeger.
Flavell, J. H., Miller, P. H., & Miller, S. A. (2002). Cognitive development (4th ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice
Hall.
Johnson, M. (2003). Development of human brain functions. Biological Psychiatry, 54, 1312–1316.
Karreman, A., van Tuijl, C., & van Aken, M. A. G. (2006). Parenting and self-regulation in preschoolers: A meta-analysis.
Infant and Child Development, 15, 561–579.
Kieras, J. E., Tobin, R. M., Graziano, W. G., & Rothbart, M. K. (2005). You can’t always get what you want: Effortful
control and children’s responses to undesirable gifts. Psychological Science, 16, 391–396.
Kopp, C. B. (1989). Regulation of distress and negative emotions: A developmental view. Developmental Psychology,
25, 343–354.
Kopp, C. (2002). Commentary: The codevelopments of attention and emotion regulation. Infancy, 3, 199–208.
Overton, W. F. (1998). Developmental psychology: Philosophy, concepts, and methodology. In: R. M. Lerner (Ed.),
Theoretical models of human development. Volume 1: The handbook of child psychology (5th ed., pp. 107–188). New
York: Wiley [Editor-in-Chief: William Damon].
Piaget, J. (1981). Intelligence and affectivity: Their relationship during child development (T. Brown & C. Kaegi, Trans.
and Eds.). Palo Alto: Annual Reviews Monograph. (Original work published 1954).
Thompson, R. (1994). Emotion regulation: A theme in search of definition. Monographs of the Society for Research in
Child Development, 59(2–3, Serial No. 240), 25–52.
Varela, F. J., & Depraz, N. (2005). At the source of time: Valence and the constitutional dynamics of affect. Journal of
Consciousness Studies, 12, 61–81.
Werner, H. (1957). The concept of development from a comparative and organismic point of view. In D. B. Harris (Ed.),
The concept of development: An issue in the study of human behavior (pp. 125–148). Minneapolis: University of
Minnesota Press.
Zelazo, P. D., & Cunningham, W. A. (2007). Executive function: Mechanism underlying emotion regulation. In J. J. Gross
(Ed.), Handbook of emotion regulation (pp. 135–158). New York: Guilford.
Zelazo, P. D., & Müller, U. (2002). Executive functions in typical and atypical development. In U. Goswami (Ed.),
Handbook of childhood cognitive development (pp. 445–469). Oxford: Blackwell.

Bryan W. Sokol ∗
St. Louis University, Department of Psychology,
221 North Grand Boulevard, St. Louis, MI 63103-2097, USA
Ulrich Müller
University of Victoria, Department of Psychology,
PO Box 3050 STN CSC, Victoria, British Columbia V8W 3P5, Canada

∗ Corresponding
author.
E-mail addresses: bsokol1@slu.edu (B.W. Sokol), umueller@uvic.ca (U. Müller)