Comparative Analysis of The Theoretical

Blue Black Sea Congress, Sakarya University, 10-13 October, 2010
'COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES

TO THE PHENOMENON OF THE ‘COLOR REVOLUTION'
Anastasiya Stelmakh1
‘Once upon a time the future was bright, and the future was
orange …’1
‘History again becomes a tunnel where man enters as in the

darkness, without knowing where his actions will lead,
uncertain of his destination, dispossessed of the illusory sense
of security about what he is doing.’
François Furet2
The Color Revolutions that took place in Ukraine and Georgia shifted equilibrium in the
Black Sea Region. Meanwhile the phenomenon per se remains very complex and not thoroughly
determined yet. The cornerstone of this paper is an attempt to trace the roots of the Color
Revolution from classical revolution theories. After further analysis I will define commonalities
as well as differences between the classical revolution and the Color Revolution. I reach a pre-
assumption that the Color Revolution though being still an evolving phenomenon can
nevertheless be listed as new fifth generation of revolution research, so called ‘peaceful
revolution’.
My paper intends to make comparative analysis of the attempts of the scholars to explain
the notion of the Color Revolution with further aim to place this phenomenon within certain
theoretical framework. Reviewing varied approaches, I prioritize main driving forces and their
impact on shaping this phenomenon into a more transparent and predictable conception. Further
as being placed within fifth generation of revolution research, Color Revolution elucidation
foresees two main approaches scrutinizing internal factors (Joshua A. Tucker, Michael McFaul,
Charles H. Fairbanks) and external ones (Mark R. Beissinger, Graeme P. Herd). Hence a
comprehensive picture of the theoretical framework of the Color Revolution phenomenon is
presented. One should admit that these contributions still lack ability to make a phenomenon
fully predictable as recent revolutions in the Middle East proved its variability.

1
PhD student in Middle East Technical University, Ankara. E-mail: nastunia.lviv@gmail.com
1
Anastasiya Stelmakh, Middle East Technical University
My last part of the paper deals with a necessity to review the existence of the vast
literature on Color Revolutions (books, articles, conferences, speeches etc.). My aim is under
critical revision to carefully identify its weak and strong sides. So this paper intends to present a
comprehensive picture of the theoretical framework as well as critique of the existing literature.
The concept of ‘Revolution’: five generations. From classical definition of

‘revolution’ to Color Revolution.
I will start this chapter with taking precise look at the Revolution. This concept has its
own history and therefore I can briefly take the definitions of four classical generations of
scholars, who took ‘revolution’ as a core concept. Analyzing the evolution of the ‘revolution’ in
deterministic terms, I will specify common features of this concept. Doing this I aim to further
compare whether notion of classical definition of the ‘revolution’ can be consistent in developing
quite new notion of ‘color revolution’. So to say, is the title ‘revolution’ used appropriately in
defining the events, which are known as Color Revolutions?
So far there are four generations of scholars of classical revolutionary theory. It should be
mentioned beforehand that none of the schools provides clear definition of revolution. Their
causes, processes and consequences were every time revised, and shifted from very radical and
narrow one to quite broad definition.
The first school is comparative school on the ‘natural history of revolutions’. The
definition, which was shaped gives rather radical view on what is seen as revolution. As defined
by C. Brinton revolution is ‘a point that marks a new era or ends forever the abuses of the old
regime or digs a gulf between the old X and the new Y’3.
The second generation centered modernization and structural functionalism in the
definition. As specified by S. Huntington revolution is ‘a rapid, fundamental, and violent
domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social
structure, leadership, and government activity and policies’4.
The third one, which was widespread during 1970s-1980s, focused on social revolutions
using structural approach. As T. Skocpol defined social revolution ‘as rapid basic transformation
of a society’s state and class structures … accompanied and in part carried through by class-
based revolts from below … set apart from other sorts of conflicts and transformative processes
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above all by the combination of two coincidences; the coincidence of societal structural change
with class upheaval and the coincidence of political, with social, transformation’5.
The fourth generation described revolution using notions of revolutionary ideologies,
ethnic and religious bases for revolutionary mobilization, multi class coalitions, intra-elite
conflicts etc. According to J. Goldstone revolution is seen as ‘the forcible overthrow of a
government followed by the reconsideration of authority by new groups, ruling through new
political (and sometimes social) institutions … although the fall of a government may be sudden,
the causal trends leading up to that fall, the ensuring struggle for power among contenders and
the reconstruction of a stable state often span decades’6.
To sum up, I would like to list common features that can describe ‘revolution’ in its
classical terms. To my mind, the commonalities will include: (1) change of the regime, (2)
change of economic and social structures, (3) change of state political institutions, (4)
replacement of the elite, (5) new ideology, (6) mass mobilization and (7) change through
violence.
If to make a parallel with Color Revolutions, we can see that such features as new
ideology, change of the regime, mass mobilizations and replacement of the elite are present in all
Color Revolution cases. Other features, such as change of economic and social structures as well
as state political institutions, depend on the case and not always are fully exercised. And the
main feature of classical definition of the Revolution – use of violence – is not applicable to the
Color Revolution case (as they were also called ‘peaceful revolutions’).
So to make some pre-conclusions, I would like to point out that an attempt to trace the
roots of Color Revolution from classical Revolution provides us with rather blurred results. Thus
the title ‘revolution’ in terms of Color Revolution has little in common. In this case, one have
two choices – either to list the phenomena ‘Color Revolution’ as a case which provides the
grounds for fifth generation of revolution scholars or to proceed the scrutiny in totally different
direction beyond classical ‘revolution’ case.
I think it is empirically and theoretically grounded that scholars, who try to form the
conceptual framework for ‘Color Revolution’ phenomena, can be determined as fifth generation
of peaceful revolutionists.
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Among these scholars after careful revision of all the theoretical scrutiny exercised in this
area, I would include as follows: Mark R. Beissinger, Joshua A. Tucker, Michael Mc Faul,
Charles H. Fairbanks, Graeme P. Herd etc.
Main debates on ‘Color Revolution’

In this Chapter I would like to shortly define each scholar’s impact to develop a
theoretical framework, which could adequately interpret Color Revolutions. The attention will be
also drawn to a debate between two main groups of scholars; one who determines internal factors
(Joshua A. Tucker, Michael McFaul, Charles H. Fairbanks) as the most essential in initiating
Color Revolutions; the other (Mark R. Beissinger, Graeme P. Herd) who focuses on external
factors (namely, US/Russia assistance in creating the Revolution).
My purpose is to show the general theoretical framework, which is still in the process of
formation; further to analyze which of the existing theories might most adequately explain the
phenomena of the Color Revolutions; and the last remark will be on the perspectives of forming
one joint prevailing theory of Color Revolution.
Joshua A. Tucker (CR = Electoral Fraud + Collective Action)

“Razom Nas Bahato! Nas ne podolaty!”
(‘Together we are many! We can not be defeated!”)
—Chant in Kyiv’s Independence Square during
the Orange Revolution.7
Joshua A. Tucker analyzed the existing literature and divided it into two main groups.
The first group places these Color Revolutions within the framework of post-Cold War world,
namely in the East versus West debate in Europe. Within this framework the events that took
place were treated by the citizens of those countries as threats, which could lead the countries to
permanent exclusion from ‘Europe’. All this resembled good old geopolitical struggle for the
dominance between Russia and the West. Not surprisingly, two views, reflecting the positions of
Russia and USA, appeared. One, pro-Western depicting Color Revolutions as those leading to
democracy and one opposite, pro-Russian, which treated Color Revolutions as imported from
USA with the aim to overthrow the Russian government.
The second group included scholars, who were focusing on the nature of opposition
(McFaul), the phenomenon of ‘unconsolidated authoritarian regimes’ (Lucan Way) etc.
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Tucker admits that these approaches do really explain to some extent the phenomenon,
but they appear to be rather elite-based. So, his understanding of the Color Revolution entails
that one should think of it wearing the lenses of major electoral fraud as means of solving
collective action problems: ‘For once, the entire country is experiencing the same act of abuse
simultaneously; in the language of collective action literature, major electoral fraud provides an
obvious focal point for action. People no longer have to choose whether to react alone.
Especially when crowds grow, individuals know that they will only be one of many, many
protesting, and thus much less likely to be punished individually’8.
His formula that Color Revolution can be equaled to electoral fraud plus collective action
reflects main drivers of the revolution. Rigged elections provide for a concrete argument and an
emotional component (‘they have stolen our will’) that is decisive to push people into the streets.
According to Tucker there are five important implications of thinking about the colored
revolutions through the lens of major electoral fraud as a means of solving collective action
problems.
The first implication is that the limits of the public support shouldn’t be overemphasized
after the Color Revolution.9 The same time we should be cautious about our confidence that if
the Revolution succeeded, it will undoubtedly lead to democracy. As it can appear to be naïve
and has dubious grounds. The third aspect is that countries which are defined as ‘competitive
authoritarian’ (or with ‘delegative democracies’), they are listed among the risk group that are
more fragile to Revolutions than others.
The fourth implication draws attention to the way in which the existing regime reacts to
opposition protests (that explain partially why Color Revolutions did not succeed in other
countries). And the last one is that even the country that lacks prior tradition of restraining their
government can in fact come together to do so in the proper situation.
Tucker tries to give the answer to the most important question – why do people protest?
And he assumes that electoral fraud is the galvanizing event that initiates the protests. Without a
doubt this fraud should be accompanied by opposition encouragement, international attention
etc., but rigged elections will remain the starting point.
Michael McFaul – commonalities of the Color Revolutions
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McFaul uses John Stuart Mill’s ‘method of similarity’ as it enables him to find the
causation of a certain effect, a variable that must be present in every case. So to say he
concentrates on those countries where the revolutions succeeded to identify similarities10 of the
upheavals as well as their differences from other revolutions. He takes three cases of Serbian
(2000), Georgian (2003) and Ukrainian (2004) Revolutions: ‘Identifying the common factors that
contributed to success in these cases may be our best method of predicting future democratic
breakthroughs not only in this region but perhaps in others as well’11.
The factors that conclude successful revolution in these cases will be further listed. Semi-
autocratic regimes are more open to democratization (so to upheavals) than full-blown
dictatorships. Falling popularity of the incumbent leader is another necessary issue for the
breakthrough.12 A united opposition or at least the perception of one is the third factor that
appears to be crucial for democratic breakthrough.13 The role of NGOs was to provide the critical
data exposing voter fraud and can be defined as independent electoral-monitoring capabilities.
But even to be aware of all the fraud would appear to be impossible without independent
media14. Finally the opposition should have been able to mobilize the masses.
The last peculiar factor was split among the ‘guys with guns’. Peaceful evaluation of the
events was also lying on the responsibility of military. This factor was on the edge of blowing
out, but as in Ukrainian case oppositionists succeeded to persuade the militaries not to open the
door to violent repression, the Revolution evaluated as peaceful.
McFaul’s contribution was also in defining unessential factors, which played little or no
role in initiating Revolution. Among these factors should be mentioned: the state of economical
development, ethnic tensions, the relationships between the incumbents and the West, foreign
aid15, no defined ideology16.
He as well as other scholars (Tucker, Beissinger) concludes that even after the Revolution
the possibility of stagnation remains possible, as well as the presence of only few factors won’t
guarantee to generate the same outcome.
Charles H. Fairbanks – non-violent revolution

One among all who deserves to be listed as scholar who contributed most to
understanding of the fifth generation of Revolutions, namely non-violent Revolutions, is Charles
H. Fairbanks. After the revision of the classical approach to revolution17, he insists that there
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evolved new type – non-violent revolution. So Color Revolutions remain, as he suggests, among
other revolutions, but represents rather new subspecies: ‘Revolution is like a stone thrown into a
small pond, a phenomenon with vast secondary consequences’18.
To explain the term of the new revolution, he uses the notion of ‘transition to
democracy’. If transition to democracy implies a long process, the revolution is the notion
implying ‘sudden discontinuity and movement to a new regime’19. ‘[Transition of democracy]
resembles guerrilla warfare: It is hard to know when you are winning because there are no great
victories or defeats that serve as milestones’20.
The crucial point here is whether the new government can totally split with the previous
regime. This is the case on which depends the endurable character of the Revolution changes.
Any clear answer is given to what than Color Revolution is. Revolution according to his
scrutiny remains as via media between the old and the new regimes21. But the responsibility of
future sticking to the democratic paths is being borne by the new leaders, who should fulfill the
declared promises. ‘Perhaps the modern kind of non-violent revolution can function as a gate
that opens only in one direction, giving people energy to open up a new stage of their national
history while closing to them undemocratic past’22.
Henry E. Hale – Patronal Presidentialism

This scholar pointed out the fallacious stem to put postcommunist countries into the
trajectory of democracy-autocracy endpoints. Hale insists that the countries remain neither
democratic, nor purely authoritarian; they are hybrid regimes23.
According to his logic the evolution of the state takes form of cycles. So when
revolutions explode, the countries are entering the periods of succession. This means that leader
is either too old, or too unpopular, or too afraid of legal terms limits to continue, so the era of
leadership alteration is approaching.
He calls this process patronal network of presidentialism. So the situation arises when
specific individual will be gone from power, and people begin to recalculate and imagine the
alternatives: ‘Patronal presidentialism, with reference to post-Soviet cases, tends to generate
cyclical phases of elite contestation and consolidation that are defined by elite expectations about
the future, in particular, a ‘lame-duck syndrome’ that precipitates elite defection from the
incumbent president’s team when elites believe the incumbent may leave office’24.
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In Hale’s logic there can be just three scenarios. The first one, when incumbent enters
lame-duck period, but his team successfully installs hand-picked successors. The vivid example
here is Russia, where Yeltsin chose Putin to be successor and left the citizens apart their right to
vote and decide by themselves. Another example is Heidar Aliev who authorized his son Ilham
Aliev to be a successor. Here the accepted succession was also accepted by population because
of the correct choice of time and space to do this act.
The second group of states presents the situation where the incumbent presidents entered
lame-duck period, but the teams were ousted in the process. This happened in Ukraine, Armenia,
Georgia and Kyrgyzstan. This unsuccessful step of the teams increased the vulnerability of the
state leader, state regime and state institutions. These countries were in the list of the most
vulnerable for further systemic changes. Not surprisingly, the Revolutions took place in three out
of four states.
The third, last group introduces a situation where presidents have never entered the lame-
duck syndrome since their patronal systems were firmly established. In these cases the possibility
of further changes are equal to zero (Belarus, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan). The incumbent presidents secured the elimination of term limits or significant
extensions of their legal time in office through one method or other well in advance and
consistently made clear that they had no plans to leave office.
Hale proves that basing on this theory of presidentialism and hybrid regimes, one can
explain the possibility of change. And change in this case is not simply random ‘instability’ but
is part of reasonably predictable regime cycles produced by a particular institutional framework,
patronal presidentialism (See Table 3).
External factors
Mark R. Beissinger ‘modular phenomena’
Mark R. Beissinger can be listed among those few scholars, who not only found the
commonalities of the Color Revolutions, but tried to draw the line to develop theoretical
framework. This scholar acknowledged one essential feature, that in the case of Color
Revolutions, the classical theory of revolution cannot be used because according to it the
revolutions are taken as separate cases. He was convinced in the contrary fact that one should
look at the Color Revolution as at the phenomenon that unites all these Revolutions within one
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framework. Thus the necessity of the framework of ‘modular political phenomena’25 of the Color
Revolution emerged.
As stated by Beissinger, Color Revolution as modular phenomena is such a revolution
that is ‘based in significant part on emulation of the prior successful example of other
revolutions’. He meant that ‘each successful democratic revolution has produced an experience
that has been consciously borrowed by others, spread by NGOs, and emulated by local social
movements, forming the contours of a model’26.
The basic elements of the modular democratic revolution includes: (1) the use of stolen
elections as the occasion for massive mobilizations; (2) foreign support for the development of
local democratic movements; (3) the organization of radical youth movements; (4) a united
opposition; (5) external diplomatic pressure and usually large electoral monitoring; (6) massive
mobilization (here an important role played the work of Gene Sharp ‘From Dictatorship to
Democracy’27, which was a guidebook for revolutionaries).
What is important here is that emulative character of the revolutions is evident in the
transnational linkages connecting them. An example can serve the opposition youth movements
that were interconnected Otpor (Serbia) – Pora (Ukraine) – Kmara (Georgia) – Kelkel
(Kyrkyzstan). All their leaders were training each next generation in techniques of non-violent
resistance and were playing a role of inspirations for new groups in different post-Soviet
countries. Each successful example brought new followers even in the countries where
revolutions didn’t succeed28.
So as Beissinger is describing color revolutions not as independent cases, but rather an
interrelated modular phenomenon, there is a need to figure out main five features of modular
political phenomena (MPP).
The first one is that MPP can take place only in case when countries share common
institutional characteristics, histories, cultural affinities, or modes of domination, so there should
be really a common background to enable the agents to make analogies across the cases.
The second feature relies on the prior success of the revolution as a driving force for
further spreading.
The weight of example in affecting behavior across cases follows the pattern of a tipping
model. This third feature indicates how rapidly depending on success the emulative action will
take place.
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Fourth feature lies on the will and active efforts of those who succeeded to spread this
knowledge. This is called ‘mutual empowerment’ – the tendency to seek support through the
creation of structurally similar peers29.
Fifth characteristic of MPP specifies that the spread of modular action is not a random
process, but is shaped across time and space by certain pre-existing structural conditions (See
Table 2).
To sum up, MPP of Color Revolution is more likely to take place in case of prior
revolutionary success in the region. But the same time as MPP is quite evolving phenomenon,
one can rarely predict it, and usually it takes us by surprise. One shouldn’t exclude side effects,
which can be placed in form of violence or civil war. And what is the most essential in the MPP
that the outcomes are less robust and less stable than the ones that would occur in case of the
complete independence of the revolutions. As Geddes has shown, out of 85 democratic
transitions that occurred from 1974 through 1999, only 30 developed into stable democracies30.
This situation can resemble the possible outcome with the case of Color Revolutions.
Graeme P. Herd – ‘manufactured revolution’

For Graeme P. Herd the phenomenon of Color Revolutions is mostly defined by the
involvement of the external powers. Thus there are two views determining revolutions as
manufactured (imported) by USA (pro-Russian view) or democratic breakthroughs (pro-Western
view).
Here the scholar focuses on the pro-Russian view, in accordance with which Revolutions
became possible because of the support of the Western-funded international organizations as
well as NGOs (see Table 4). Even prime-minister Viktor Yanukovych characterized the
opposition protests as ‘not a revolution but a PR technology backed by secret services’31. As well
as Russian television repeated the allegation that Western sources had funded the Yushchenko
campaign, maintaining that ‘The U.S. State Department had earmarked at least $3 million for the
rerun of the second round of the presidential election in Ukraine.’32
Part of Russian elite saw external assistance in organizing youth groups as ‘Otpor’,
‘Kmara’, ‘Pora’, ‘Kelkel’. Though same time they disregard that it became possible only because
of the presence of weak leaders and strengthening power of the opposition.
10
Pro-Russian scholars who maintained the line that revolutions are imported, could be
blamed in exaggerating the situation. But one can understand their position as the emerged
situation could have threatened their state as well. This was the key point why it was that easy to
blame Western powers in the involvement of the Color Revolution. As Itogi magazine’s Andrei
Vladimirov summed up the problem: ‘The day before yesterday: Belgrade. Yesterday: Tbilisi.
Today: Kyiv. Tomorrow: Moscow’33. Herd highlighted the possibility that leaders of the post-
Communist regimes will seek to defend themselves against purportedly Western -
‘manufactured’ democratic revolutions in the way that they may opt for authoritarianism in the
guise of ‘managed’ democracy34.
But can really Revolution be 100% imported and be successful in the foreign soil? The
external factors in this approach seemed to be rather overemphasized. Though the involvement
really took place it could have rather played a role of a catalyst.
Color Revolution appears to be rather complex phenomena. So with just pro-Western
involvement, it sounds to be really weak grounded statement that Revolution would succeed. But
for Russia telling in terms of Joseph Nye as she is lacking ‘soft power’ to attract other countries,
it seems suitable to accuse West in the organization of the Color Revolutions. Nevertheless this
approach deserves to have its own place among numerous scenarios of the Color Revolutions.
Is there an appropriate theory to cover Color Revolution Phenomenon?

I sketched the main approaches of the so-called fifth generation of revolution school and
beyond. Scholars all try to scrutinize the Color Revolution in different way. Ones focus on the
importance of the internal factors, other on the external. Ones try to figure out the main driving
forces and the necessary conditions, other see all this as manufactured artificial events.
To my mind, none of the theory can cover that phenomenon fully. They all contributed a
lot via defining unessential factors (McFaul) or the role of the leaders (Henry E. Hale) or even
tried to develop modular phenomena (Mark R. Beissinger), but still they are unlikely to predict
the emergence of the new Color Revolution. They all agreed upon the fact that the predictability
is quite low here as well as the consequences are of undurable character. But their impact
shouldn’t be undervalued. These scholars investigated the very complex phenomenon. I believe
their research will serve a ground for future formation of the comprehensive theory of Color
Revolution.
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From another point of view is it possible that one theory will be able to cover this
divergent issue? In this way the variability of the above-mentioned theories will serve a good
job.
Moreover, I suggest that future research should include such issues as surveys, which can
reflect the position of ordinary citizens before, during and after the Revolutions. My argument is
that nonetheless these revolutions were created by people, ordinary people, who despite all the
implications, left their homes to come and to protest. These people came even from little
villages. Revolution united them even without any prior acquaintance. They were motivated by
high inspiration to preserve their rights and to combat the existing regimes.
So definitely the leaders, opposition, NGOs and others all participated actively, but
without great mass’s support it seems unlikely to have become the reality.
Critics of the literature

As mentioned before there is a vast amount of literature focusing on the Color
Revolutions. For clarity I structure literature in the further way: books written on Color
Revolutions, articles covering different aspects as well as speeches of the leaders.
In my paper I would like to specify magnum opuses of each Color Revolution as well to
identify main contributions of the articles. So I will start my overview from the books, later
proceed to articles and finish with defining strengths and weaknesses of the literature.
Review of the literature

Color Revolutions are presented in the books written by different authors, but covering
the issue more or less comprehensively. Especially the Ukrainian case activated the scholars to
scrutinize the topic. In this case I found three books written by Aslund/McFaul, Askold
Krushelnycky and Andrew Wilson with intentions to give a comprehensive analysis of the event.
What should be taken into consideration is the background of the authors. Askold
Krushelnycky was a journalist for such newspapers as ‘Sunday Times’, ‘The Mail on Sunday’,
and ‘The European’, but currently writes as a freelancer for ‘The Independent’, ‘Chicago
Tribune’ etc. He was born in Britain, but his parents have Ukrainian roots. His father fought for
the Ukrainian SS and his aunt was a heroine of the Red Army. This could have pushed him to
take someone’s side and he has chosen pro-Western one. Thus he is accused in ‘a highly
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personal, partisan account’35; he wants to see his Homeland free from Russian influence. This
line can be traced in the book36. He takes his journey through Ukrainian history clearly taking the
side of the events. One could blame him being affected by his family camp division, but no one
can blame him in the desire to see his Homeland independent and prosperous.
Three other scholars Andrew Wilson, Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, to the
contrary of amateurishness of Krushelnycky, are distinguished academics and specialists in this
area. Nevertheless as many of them were present during the Revolution, they tried to cover all
the events that took place. But also they can be criticized in applying ‘no theory or empirical
testing … to develop its position’37. Namely Wilson created book of politics, not political
science. The arguments and description do not go beyond newspaper articles.
The same time Aslund and McFaul guided the work of a group of authors38, which
included academics, experts and actors in the revolution. This book succeeds not only in
analyzing the proximate causes of the revolution, but highlights the Revolution as an ongoing
process. And again the book doesn’t contain any theory to connect the arguments in clarity and
coherence.
Georgian case is presented in the books of scholars Legvold, Coppieters, and Mitchell.
Here Legvold and Coppieters provide thorough examination of Russian-Georgian relations as
‘the troubled road to accommodation’39. Moscow’s position is determined by the manipulation of
the secessionist conflicts. And USA and EU instead of working together to help democratizing
Georgia, they continue pulling in different directions. The book provides a ‘balanced assessment
of the hard choices that Georgia has to make in order to avoid yet another failure in its state-
building project’40. Whereas Mitchell focuses on the Revolution itself. He argues that the
democratic character of the revolution should be questioned as well as Saakashvili appears to be
a ‘questionable democrat’41. In general, Georgia under Saakashvili as Chris Walker, Director of
Studies at Freedom House, declared was ‘one of the most difficult’ countries for Freedom House
to grade in its annual Freedom in the world report42. He shared the view of the author that US
and EU though participated in democracy assistance via grant-making; they neglected the real
promotion of democratic values through intense diplomatic efforts.
Revolution in Kyrgyzstan is represented by books of further scholars Sally N. Cummings
and Erica Marat. The peculiarity of the books is that they mostly focus on the after-Revolution
consequences. New generation of scholars are brought together in the book edited by
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Cummings43. Tulip Revolution as being third in a row after Ukrainian and Georgian is
questioned whether it can be really correspond to the definition of revolution. They highlight the
problems of placing Tulip Revolution among other Color Revolutions as well as important
domestic and internal factors. And Marat44 examines the consequences of the Revolution as the
book was released one year after the protests. Erica Marat succeeded in collecting various data
from media, local sources, personal observations and fact-based analysis. All this enabled her to
concentrate on the results that followed the revolution during one year term. Moreover being
native of Kyrgyzstan enabled her to critically examine international and domestic influences
since the revolution.
So to sum up, the scholars contributed to the study of the Color Revolution in releasing
books (one-authored or multi-authored), they all tried to depict comprehensive picture of the
Revolution. Their main contribution is that they intended to create magnum opus of each
revolution, so undoubtedly after reading at least one of these books the picture of what happened
there will be clearly drawn in your mind, as they provide vast informational basis.
In the next chapter I will define strengths and weaknesses of the literature, including not
only these books, but also numerous articles.
Literature strengths and weaknesses

As above I mentioned main books where the authors tried to cover each Color
Revolution, here I will also include articles, which are more precise on the concrete issues.
First of all, I will start with defining strengths of the literature giving particular examples.
Further I will proceed to weaknesses trying to find fragile, undeveloped or neglected sides, as
mentioned by existing critics as well as mine own.
So let me start with strengths. To mind the strong side of the literature is that it is really
rich in factual data45, specifying even such details as parties’ development in Ukraine or the
importance of clans etc. So if one would like to trace what was happening in Revolution times,
Wilson (2005), for example, is giving thorough picture fully fledged with details.
In majority of the literature there were observed attempts to clarify the real causes of the
Revolution46. As well while some scholars described the Revolutional process, other focused on
the ongoing revolution47. As stated by the President of the Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace Jessica Mathews in the foreword to the book ‘Revolution in Orange: The Origins of
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Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough’ (by Aslund and McFaul) ‘the true meaning of an event as
major as the Orange Revolution can only be determined with the passage of time’.
Active participation of youth through NGOs is widely described by Taras Kuzio48. He
acknowledges that other scholars focus mainly on the elites (like Hale and D’Anieri), but the role
of the young people shouldn’t be undermined. ‘In Serbia, Georgia and Ukraine the new post-
communist young generation and civil society NGOs played disproportionate role in overcoming
widespread fear and apathy and in mobilizing millions of people to participate in the democratic
revolutions’49.
Another very important contribution is the importance of the use of mass media, Internet,
cellular communication. Olena Prytula, edit-in-chief of the Internet newspaper Ukrainska
Pravda50, showed poor condition of media during Kuchma time. Most of the media was under
control of the government. So Internet came to play rather a surprisingly significant role in
Ukraine as well as the first independent channel 5. ‘Channel 5’s victorious public protest proved
that journalists can protect their right to broadcast uncensored information even under near-total
media control’51.
These are the main strengths of the literature about Color Revolutions.
The main weakness of the literature is that rarely there is an attempt to apply some
theory. Even if it takes place, it gives the impression of rather divergent and non-systematic one
that covers the issue partially (As it can be said that astrologists may be better able to explain the
revolution than social scientists).
Most scholars focus on the revolutions as democratic breakthroughs. The repetition of
this approach can be seen in the articles of Kuzio (2005; 2008); Cheterian (2008); Fairbanks
(2007); Hale (2006); Krushelnycky (2006); McFaul (2005) etc. But the arguments usually lack
coherence and need further development.
Such scholars as Wolchik, Bunce52 and Tucker53 are narrowing Color Revolutions to
‘Electoral Revolutions’. They place elections as the core factor, but I would rather recommend to
treat it as facilitating factor, not the core one.
The role of the new leadership is underemphasized. Any of these scholars try to make the
predictions of the future scenarios basing on the leader’s role in it. They just sum up that leaders
should fulfill their promises. Here I suppose there is seen a gap where the leadership features of
the new presidents were not scrutinized as well as their professional features.
15
The perspective of Russian view of the events is totally missing as these Western scholars
neglected it. Only Herd tries to analyze speeches, interviews of the Russian elite where
Revolution is seen as ‘manufactured’54.
Conclusions
It is rather challenging to cover comprehensively such a wide and very popular
phenomenon of the Color Revolution. That’s why I tried to fulfill two tasks in this paper. First of
all, I tried to understand the absence/presence of the theoretical framework of the Color
Revolution. Secondly, I have analyzed the core literature (which includes main books and
articles on the topic) and further I defined weak and strong sides of it.
The first part showed that Color Revolution as a theory united scholars and formed fifth
generation of the school. I roughly divided them into two groups: those who rely on internal
factors as the most essential and those who rely on the external factors. To sum up, I need to
accept that nowadays there is no comprehensive theory that can explain the phenomena of the
Color Revolutions (in Ukraine, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan) fully bearing all complexity of this notion.
But together all these scholars move in one direction, and finally I believe they will succeed in
forming one comprehensive theory. The impact of Beissinger is for now the most developed and
clear. So I suggest further comprehensive theory to be built on the basis of color revolution as
new non-violent revolution that though can be treated separately, but possesses features of the
modular phenomenon.
The other part pointed the vast amount of the literature, which showed the same time a
great popularity of the Color Revolution among scholars, and also repetition of the approaches,
which do not cover new issues, but instead rephrase the already scrutinized ones. Here strengths
and weaknesses can also show us the main prisms (and sometimes stereotypes) through which
the Color Revolutions are scrutinized.
Color Revolution phenomenon will remain one of the most essential events not only in
the post-Soviet space, but in the world as well. It proved again that there are still so many lessons
to learn and theories to develop. Personally I would like Color Revolution to bear more durable
results, so the democracy could be rooted more profoundly in the countries.
16
References

1
Marcus Tanner, ‘Once upon a time the future was bright, and the future was orange’, review of
An Orange Revolution, by Askold Krushelnycky, Independent, Thursday, 4 May,
http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/books/reviews/an-orange-revolution-by-
askold-krushelnycky-476749.html (accessed 4 November 2009).
2
François Furet, ‘Democracy and Utopia’, Journal of Democracy, 9 (January 1998), 79.
3
Crane Brinton, Anatomy of Revolution (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersy, Prince-Hall, 1938), 237.
4
Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press,
1968), 264.
5
Theda Skocpol, States and Social Revolutions (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979),
4.
6
Jack A. Goldstone, Revolution and Rebellion in the Early Modern World (Berkley: University
of California Press, 1991), 37.
7
This was taken from the rap song ‘Razom Nas Bahato’ by the Ukrainian rock group GreenJolly,
available or download at http://www.greenjolly.net/media/razom.mp3.
8
Joshua A. Tucker, ‘Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-Communist
Colored Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, September 2007, Vol. 5, No. 3: 541.
9
As people are bearing high hopes that the promises they got during the Revolution, will be
fulfilled. A vivid example can serve Yushchenko’s case, when half a year after the Revolution in
the newspaper Kyiv Post the article under the name ‘An Utter Disgrace’ appeared, questioning
whether Yushchenko’s government was more honest than Kuchma’s.
See, ‘An Utter Disgrace’, Kyiv Post, May 17, 2005 and Dominique Arel, ‘The Ukraine List
(UKL)’, No. 349, May 19, 2005.
10
Michael McFaul, ‘The Second Wave of Democratic Breakthroughs in the Post-Communist
World: Comparing Serbia 2000, Georgia 2003, Ukraine 2004, and Kyrgyzstan 2005’,
Danyliw/Jacyk Working Papers, http://www.utoronto.ca/jacyk/files/wp4-mcfaul.pdf (accessed
October 17, 2009).
Michael McFaul, ‘Transitions from Postcommunism’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 16,
Number 3, July 2005: 5-18.
11
Ibid: 6.
12
Shevarnadze was popular at first, but he failed to set Georgia’s economy on his second course
as well as he failed to resolve wars in Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Ajaria. Meanwhile
Kuchma’s severe corruption especially during his second term made him unpopular.
13
In case of Georgian opposition there was none before the polling day and Saakashvili’s
National Movement gained only a fifth of the popular vote. But he gave fiery speeches and
succeeded to mobilize popular protests.
14
In Georgia the cartoon satire ‘Dardubala’ was broadcasted on Rustavi-2; while in Ukraine the
internet became the main means of communication (web-based publication Ukrains’ka Pravda)
as well as Channel 5.
17

15
McFaul doesn’t suggest mentioning foreign aid among independent factors that played
important role for the breakthrough. He insists that foreign aid only contributed to the drama by
increasing or decreasing the relative value of each of the seven factors outlined above.
16
Absence of the defined ideology presupposed that people were protesting with the slogan
‘Enough!’, thus there was no defined platform to offer real changes.
17
As he noted: ‘Revolution is an idea that legitimizes unconstitutional and often violent paths to
power. It is a gift to ambitious and greedy men, who can disguise their coups d’etat as popular
revolutions’. This remains the core of classical understanding of Revolution.
18
Charles H. Fairbanks, ‘Revolution Reconsidered’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18, Number
1, January 2007: 46.
19
Ibid: 50.
20
Ibid: 51.
21
‘These ‘color revolutions’ can be understood in terms of what anthropologists call ‘rites of
passage’, which include weddings, puberty ceremonies, and funerals. These rites separate and
symbolize two distinct periods, whereas the concept of ‘transition to democracy’ has come to
have a foggy indeterminacy. Particularly for postcolonial populations, like many of former
Soviet Union, such rites can give people a sense of efficacy and the energy to solve problems’.
See, Charles H. Fairbanks, ‘Revolution Reconsidered’, Journal of Democracy, Volume 18,
Number 1, January 2007: 56.
22
Ibid: 57.
23
Henry E. Hale, ‘Regime Cycles. Democracy, Autocracy, and Revolution in Post-Soviet
Eurasia’, World Politics, Vol. 58, October 2005: 134.
24
Ibid: 135.
25
Modular phenomena like the democratic revolutions that have occurred among the post-
communist states present a challenge for social science theorizing, because the cross-case
influences that in part drive their spread violate the assumption of the independence of cases that
lies at the basis of much social scientific analysis—both analyses based on the Millian method,
as well as those statistical analyses that rely on the assumption that the result of each throw of the
political dice is independent of the results of prior throws.
26
Mark R. Beissinger, ‘Structure and Example in Modular Political Phenomena: The Diffusion of
Bulldozer/Rose/Orange/Tulip Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, June 2007, Vol. 5, No. 2:
261.
27
This book appeared to be available in 24 languages on-line, Gene Sharp is the head of Albert
Einstein Institute in Boston and his book became bestseller among would-be democrats in the
post-communist region.
See, Gene Sharp, From Dictatorship to Democracy: Conceptual Framework for Liberation
(Albert Einstein Institution, 2002), http://www.aeinstein.org/organizations98ce.html (accessed
November 1, 2009).
28
In Russia the movement organized by students was called ‘Walking Without Putin’, which
appeared to be a rather parody on the pro-Putin youth group ‘Walking Together’. In Belarus the
movement ‘Zubr’ (Bison) was founded.
18

29
See more, Hendryk Spruyt, Sovereign State and Its Competitors (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1994).
30
Barbara Geddes, ‘What do we know about democratization after twenty years?’, Annual
Review of Political Science, 1999, 2: 115-144.
31
Ukrayina TV, Donetsk (December 6, 2004); Ukrainian Television Channel 5 (December 6,
2004). On another occasion, he noted, “There has been no revolution at all. There was a pre-
planned and pre-financed putsch that has been prepared for many years. We saw the end of the
putsch after the runoff ended. That’s all”, Ukrainian Television Channel 1, December 17, 2004.
32
‘Russian TV Accuses West of Orchestrating Ukrainian Crisis’, Russian Television Center,
December 8, 2004.
33
Andrei Vladimirov, ‘Revoliutsiia na eksport’ (Revolution for Export), Itogi (December 7,
2004): 10–12.
34
Graeme P. Herd, ‘Colorful Revolutions and the CIS. ‘Manufactured’ versus ‘Managed’
Democracy?’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 2, March/April 2005: 3.
35
Ibid
36
Askold Krushelnycky, An Orange Revolution: A Personal Journey through Ukrainian History,
(Harvill Secker, 2006), 360.
37
Sophia Wilson, book review of Ukraine’s Orange Revolution, by Andrew Wilson,
Comparative Political Studies: 40, 2007, 222-225.
38
Anders Aslund and Michael McFaul, Revolution in Orange: The Origins of Ukraine’s
Democratic Breakthrough (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D.C.,
2006), 216.
39
Bruno Coppieters, Robert Legvold, Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution
(Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005), 153.
40
Pavel K. Baev, Reviewed work of Statehood and Security: Georgia after the Rose Revolution
by Bruno Coppieters and Robert Legvold, Slavic Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (Summer 2007), 342.
41
As noted by Charles King during discussion panel at Columbia University.
See, Discussion Panel ‘Georgia’s Uncertain Democracy with L.A. Mitchell, V. Bunce, C. King,
L. Craner, C. Walker’, March 26, 2009, Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies,
Columbia University in the City of New York,
http://www.columbia.edu/cu/siwps/images/newsletter16/Mitchell%20Lecture%20Report%20Ma
r%2026%2009.pdf (accessed 10 November 2009).
42
Ibid: 3.
43
Sally Cummings, Domestic and International Perspectives on Kyrgyzstan’s ‘Tulip Revolution
(Routledge, 2009), 176.
44
Erica Marat, The Tulip Revolution: Kyrgyzstan One Year After (Jamestown Foundation, 2006),
170.
45
See Wilson (2005); Aslund and McFaul (2006); Cummings (2009) etc.
46
It is also present in the books of Aslund et al. (2006), Mitchell (2009) and scholars who
attempted to develop theoretical framework (listed in the first part of the paper).
19

47
As noted by Wilson (2005) ‘It was unrealistic to expect political culture to be transformed
overnight … Despite some technical missteps and necessary compromises, the new leadership
has at least tried to put its policies into long-term focus. In ten years’ time, Ukraine could have
been a very different country indeed’, p. 205.
48
He can be undoubtedly named among those scholars who contributed a lot. Despite his
numerous articles on different aspects of the Color Revolutions, he also conducts a course
‘Transition and Colored Revolutions in Ukraine and other Post Communist States’ at George
Washington University. The outline can be found here
http://www.taraskuzio.net/Colored%20Revolutions%20in%20Post%20Communist%20States.ht
ml (accessed 24 October 2009).
49
Kuzio, Taras. ‘Civil society, youth and societal mobilization in democratic revolutions’,
Communist and Post-Communist Studies, 2006, 39: 384.
50
Actually this internet publication was founded by Georgiy Gongadze, who was murdered
during Kuchma’s time.
51
Prytula, Olena, ‘The Ukrainian Media Rebellion’, in Revolution in Orange: The Origins of
Ukraine’s Democratic Breakthrough, ed. Aslund et al., (Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace, Washington, D.C., 2006), 121.
52
Bunce, Valerie J., Wolchik, Sharon L., ‘Favorable Conditions and Electoral Revolutions’,
Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, Number 4, October 2006: 5-18.
53
Joshua A. Tucker, ‘Enough! Electoral Fraud, Collective Action Problems, and Post-
Communist Colored Revolutions’, Perspectives on Politics, September 2007, Vol. 5., No. 3:
535-551.
54
See, Graeme P. Herd, ‘Colorful Revolutions and the CIS. ‘Manufactured’ versus ‘Managed’
Democracy?’, Problems of Post-Communism, Vol. 52, No. 2, March/April 2005: 3-18.
20

Comparative Analysis of The Theoretical

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Blue Black Sea Congress, Sakarya University, 10-13 October, 2010

'COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE THEORETICAL APPROACHES

‘History again becomes a tunnel where man enters as in the

The concept of ‘Revolution’: five generations. From classical definition of

Main debates on ‘Color Revolution’

Joshua A. Tucker (CR = Electoral Fraud + Collective Action)

Michael McFaul – commonalities of the Color Revolutions

Charles H. Fairbanks – non-violent revolution

Henry E. Hale – Patronal Presidentialism

Graeme P. Herd – ‘manufactured revolution’

Is there an appropriate theory to cover Color Revolution Phenomenon?

Critics of the literature

Review of the literature

Literature strengths and weaknesses

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