US v.

AH CHONG

DOCTRINE: Mistake of fact is a valid defense as long as the requisites are met.

Requisites of Mistake of Fact:

1. The act done would have been lawful had the facts been as the accused believed them to be
2. The intention of the accused in performing the act should be lawful
3. The mistake be without fault or carelessness on the part of the accused

FACTS:

 Ah Chong was a cook in Ft. McKinley. He resided with Pascual Guadalberto who was a
houseboy.
o Their room had a flimsy lock for their door and a window was covered with growing
vines
o The roommates use a chair in order to secure the door by placing it against the door.
 While in bed, Ah Chong was awakened by someone trying to force his way in the room.
o He called out twice to ask who was trying to enter, but received no response.
o Fearing that the intruder was a robber (robberies were prevalent around the area at
the time), he called out saying “if you enter the room, I will kill you”
o Ah Chong reached out for a knife while approaching the door
 Ah Chong was then struck by the chair, apparently from the door being forced open, and
thinking that he was being attacked by the intruder, started swinging the knife wildly and
struck the intruder.
 The said intruder ran out the house, and upon being seen in the moonlight, Ah Chong
immediately recognized his roommate, Guadalberto.
o Apparently, Guadalberto was out walking with his friends and went home at about
10PM.
o His friends even walked with Guadalberto to the front of his house before leaving him,
and after awhile, heard the shouts for help from Ah Chong.
 Ah Chong immediately went over next door, where his employees resided, and asked for help.

ISSUE: Whether Ah Chong should be acquitted due to mistake of fact

HELD: YES. Had the facts been as Ah Chong believed them to be, he would have been justified in
killing the intruder under Art. 11, par. 1, of the RPC, which requires, justifying the act, that there be:

1. Unlawful aggression on the part of the person killed

2. Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it
3. Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself

If the intruder was really a robber, forcing his way into the room of Ah Chong, there would have been
unlawful aggression on the part of the intruder. There would have been a necessity on the part of Ah
Chong to defend himself and/or his home. The knife would have been a reasonable means to prevent
or repel such aggression. Ah Chong gave no provocation at all.

Under Art. 11 of the RPC, there is nothing unlawful in the intention as well as in the act of the person
making the defense.
PEOPLE v. VILLACORTA

DOCTRINE:

FACTS:

 Villacorta was charged with the crime of murder.

 According to the prosecution:
o Crime took place on Jan. 23, 2002
o Mendeja was a witness, who owned the store where the crime occurred.
o She saw Villacorta stab Cruz using a sharpened bamboo stick in front of her sari sari
store.
o A portion of the stick stuck to Cruz.
o Mendeja tried to chase Villacorta but the latter fled.
 Cruz was sent to the hospital
o Tondo Medical Center – Jan. 23, 2002, where he was treated as an outpatient
o San Lazaro Hospital – February 14, 2002, where he died the following day; died of
tetanus infection
 According to the defense:
o Villacorta denied stabbing Cruz
o He was at the store to buy cigarettes and while there, Cruz put his arm around
Villacorta’s shoulder
o This prompted Villacorta to box Cruz. Villacorta then went home. He did not know that
Cru was jhurt or injured at the time.
o He only learned of Cruz’s death upon his arrest a few months after the incident (July
22, 2002)
 RTC – Villacorta guilty of murder qualified by treachery
 CA – affirmed RTC
 Defense during SC petition:
o Mendeja, the prosecution’s witness who identified him as Cruz’s stabber, was
unreliable
o Mendeja’s testimony was full of inconsistencies contrary to normal human
circumstances

ISSUE: Whether Villacorta is guilty of murder with treachery

HELD: NO. The evidence shows that Villacorta is only guilty of slight physical injuries

 On Mendeja’s testimony: Villacorta was unable to present any reason or motivation for
Mendeja to fabricate such a lie and falsely accuse Villacorta of stabbing Cruz

The purported inconsistencies in Mendejas testimony pointed out by Villacorta are on matters that
have no bearing on the fundamental fact which Mendeja testified on: that Villacorta stabbed Cruz

Villacorta could only muster an uncorroborated denial. Denial, like alibi, as an exonerating justification,

is inherently weak and if uncorroborated, regresses to blatant impotence. Like alibi, it also constitutes
self-serving negative evidence which cannot be accorded greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters

 On liability: Villacorta cannot be held criminally liable for attempted or frustrated murder
because the prosecution was not able to establish Villacortas intent to kill. In fact, the Court of
Appeals expressly observed the lack of evidence to prove such an intent beyond reasonable
doubt. Appellant stabbed the victim only once using a sharpened bamboo stick, hitting him on
the left side of the body and then immediately fled. The instrument used is not as lethal as those
made of metallic material. The part of the body hit is not delicate in the sense that instant death
can ensue by reason of a single stab wound. The assault was done only once. Thus, there is
doubt as to whether appellant had an intent to kill the victim, which should be resolved in favor
of the appellant.
There had been an interval of 22 days between the date of the stabbing and the date when Cruz was
rushed to San Lazaro Hospital, exhibiting symptoms of severe tetanus infection. If Cruz acquired severe
tetanus infection from the stabbing, then the symptoms would have appeared a lot sooner than 22 days
later. 

As the Court noted in Urbano, severe tetanus infection has a short incubation period, less than 14 days;
and those that exhibit symptoms with two to three days from the injury, have one hundred percent
(100%) mortality. Ultimately, Cruz’s stab wound was merely the remote cause, and its subsequent
infection with tetanus might have been the proximate cause of Cruz's death. The infection of Cruz’s
stab wound by tetanus was an efficient intervening cause later or between the time Cruz was stabbed
to the time of his death. 

Proximate cause has been defined as that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken
by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and without which the result would not have
occurred.

However, Villacorta is not totally without criminal liability. Villacorta is guilty of slight physical injuries
under Article 266(1) of the Revised Penal Code for the stab wound he inflicted upon Cruz. Although the
charge in the instant case is for murder, a finding of guilt for the lesser offense of slight physical
injuries may be made considering that the latter offense is necessarily included in the former since the
essential ingredients of slight physical injuries constitute and form part of those constituting the
offense of murder.

The intent must be proved in a clear and evident manner to exclude every possible doubt as to the
homicidal (or murderous) intent of the aggressor. The onus probandi lies not on accused-appellant but on
the prosecution. The inference that the intent to kill existed should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove this fact beyond reasonable doubt. When such intent is lacking but
wounds were inflicted, the crime is not frustrated murder but physical injuries only