Egalitarianism and Natural Lottery PDF

Public Affairs Quarterly
Volume 7, Number1, January1993
EGALITARIANISM AND
NATURAL LOTTERY
Neven Sesardic
Introduction
resemble Russian dolls. If you remove one source of

inequality,you usually do not reach equality, but just anotherkind of
inequality. So, when in the name of equality it was almost universally
agreed that characteristicslike social rank, sex or race should not be
allowed to influencethe allocation of jobs, and when the steps were taken
to preclude this,egalitariansentimentswere soon hurtby new inequalities
which were up to thattimeeitherhiddenfromview or simplynot regarded
as a social problem. Even after the defeat of open discrimination,the
disturbingfact of the unequal access to education persisted and it was
perceivedby mostas being incompatiblewithjustice and faircompetition.
It was not enoughthatsocially desirable positionsbe distributedaccording
to competence; it was demanded, in addition, thateveryone should have
also an equal chance to acquire the necessary competence.
Differencesin educational opportunitythus came into focus: theywere
widely assumed to be a major source of social inequalities. But some
twentyyears ago different lines of investigation(see Coleman et al. 1966;
Mosteller & Moynihan 1972; Jenckset al. 1975; Husén 1974) showed that
this assumptionwas highlydubious. It was discovered, first,thatsubstan-
tial educational improvementsin the 1950s and 1960s did not reduce
significantlythe disparitiesbetween social strata,and secondly, thatsur-
viving educational differencesdid not account for much of the existing
social and economic inequalities. It turned out that both educational
achievementand socio-economic status were to a greatextentdetermined
by othercausal factorslike early familyenvironment, inborndispositions
and luck. The beliefin educationas a "greatequalizer" had to be abandoned.
Differentsources of socio-economic inequalitycome to public attention
one afteranother,according to the degree of theirpolitical urgency:first,
inequalities due to outrightdiscrimination,secondly, inequalities of edu-
cational opportunity, and thirdly,those influencedby differencesin family
57
This content downloaded from 137.166.68.70 on Fri, 27 Feb 2015 12:10:18 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
58 PUBLIC AFFAIRS QUARTERLY
influence,talentor luck. Untilmoredisturbinginequalities are removedor

considerably reduced, they usually absorb all energies, keeping out of
public sight other kinds of inequality.For instance, the disillusionment
withthe power of education was necessaryforthe thirdlayer inequalities
to appear on the political agenda. More specifically, it was only fairly
recentlythat inequalities arising fromthe differencesin innate abilities
came to be regardedas a political problem. And it is exactly this type of
inequalitythatis the topic of this paper.
Natural Lottery
It was a great disappointmentfor many that anti-discrimination political

measures and educational reformshad fallen so farbehind expectationsin
reducing socio-economic inequalities. As a consequence, moral indigna-
tion was sometimes simply transferredto the remaininginequalities, al-
thoughtheirsources (e.g. advantagesof familyenvironmentor talent)have
fora long timebeen generallyregardedas morallyunobjectionable.
Apparently,people with egalitarian leanings would find it easier to
tolerateperseveringinequalities if only theywere somehow made smaller;
theirsheer magnitudeis what tends to make theiroriginethicallysuspect
in advance. Interestingly, RobertYoung has even explicitlyarguedthatour
attitudetoward inequalities of natural endowmentsshould crucially de-
pend on the facthow "massive" these inequalities really are. Accordingto
him, resolving the empirical disagreementover the actual extent of in-
equality in naturaltalent"would obviously make a lot of differenceto how
muchof a role desertshould be given" (Young 1992, p. 329). It is doubtful,
however, that our moral evaluations can be in this way "relational" and
"frequencydependent."For iftheywere,it would mean thatin orderto see
whetherI deserve A it would be firstnecessary to findout whethermore
thana criticalnumberof otherpeople have similargroundsforclaimingto
deserve A. Moreover, a very same kind of advantage that were up to a
certaintime deserved could cease to be so merelybecause it became less
rare.
It is ironicalthatcontemporaryegalitariansfinddifferencesin talentsso
embarrassingif we recall that, historically,egalitarians themselves de-
manded the removal of all impedimentsto the full expression of different
naturalabilities. So, one of the pillars of the eighteenthcenturyegalitari-
anism was the thoughtthatpersons are entitledto thefruitsof the exercise
of theirpersonal capacities and talents.Also, when the principleof ascrip-
tion of the old regimewas replacedby theprincipleof achievement,thiswas
done undertheslogan "Careersopen to talent."The FrenchDeclarationof the
Rightsof Man proclaimedthatall citizens"are equally eligible to all honors,
places and employments,accordingto theirdifferent abilities,withoutany
otherdistinctionthanthatof theirvirtuesand talents."And it was fromthe
EGALITARIANISM AND NATURAL LOTTERY 59
very idea of human equality that Immanuel Kant derived the following
maxim witha similarcontent:"Jedes Glied [des gemeinenWesens]mußzu
jeder Stufeeines Standes.. . gelangendürfen,wozu ihnsein Talent,sein Fleiß
und sein Glückhinbringenkönnen"(Kant 1965, p. 82).
In our times, however,the egalitarian impulse advanced so far that in
the end it was frustratedby its own success. Aftermany obstacles to the
development of talent were by and large removed in accordance with
egalitarian demands, today it is precisely the residual inequalities due to
differentnaturalendowmentsthatcome to be seen as particularlyrepug-
nant. JohnRawls thinksthatdifferencesin naturalendowmentsare "arbi-
traryfroma moral perspective"and thatforthis reason theyshould not be
permittedto determinethe distributionof wealth and income (Rawls 1972,
p. 74); ChristopherJencksstates that "for a thoroughgoingegalitarian...
inequalitythatderives frombiology oughtto be as repulsive as inequality
that derives from early socialization" (Jencks 1975, p. 173); in Ronald
Dworkin4s opinion, "the liberal... finds the marketdefective principally
because it allows morallyirrelevantdifferences,like differencesin talent,
to affectdistribution,and he thereforeconsiders thatthose who have less
talent,as the marketjudges talent,have a rightto some formof redistribu-
tion in the name ofjustice" (Dworkin 1985, p. 199, cf. p. 207); in a similar
vein, Thomas Nagel writes: "In most societies reward is a functionof
demand, and manyof the humantraitsmost in demand resultlargelyfrom
giftsor talents. The greatestinjustice in our society, I believe, is neither
racial nor sexual but intellectual...When racial and sexual injustice have
been reduced,we shall still be leftwiththe greatinjustice of the smartand
the dumb, who are so differently rewardedforcomparable effort"(Nagel
1979, pp. 99, 104); this view has spread into economics, as witnessed by
the followingwords of JohnRoemer: "If we considertalenta resource,the
distributionof which is morallyarbitrary, thenone mightwish to compen-
sate those who draw a low talent in the birthlottery"(Roemer 1985, p.
163); but perhapsno one can go further thanBruce Ackermanwho claimed
nothingless thanthat"a victimof cripplingset of genetic disadvantages
a
[would] have no difficultyestablishinghimselfas a victimof exploitation
[sic!] of a kind that,prima facie, requires special assistance in a liberal
state" (Ackerman 1980, p. 267).
The views of all these authorsdiffer,sometimesto an importantdegree,
but theirmain objection to the inequalities resultingform"naturallottery"
is that inborn differencesare regarded as being "arbitraryfroma moral
point of view" (Rawls) or as a productof the morallyunacceptable "brute
luck" (Dworkin 1981, p. 293). To criticize this line of egalitarianthought
head-on would involve us dealing with the questions of personal desert,
entitlement,distributivejustice, determinism,etc., and it would require a
paper of its own. Instead, I shall tryhere a differentstrategy.
60 PUBLIC AFFAIRSQUARTERLY
Inequalities: FromBiology to Economics

To beginwith,notethatdifferences in innateabilitiescan have different
effects.First,differencesin naturaltalentsometimescause differences in
educationalachievement. This effect,however,occasionallyproducesa
new consequence:thedifferences in educationalachievement caused by
biological differencesmay lead further to occupational differences. And
again, these occupationaldifferences (ultimately caused bybiologicaldif-
be
ferences)could responsiblefor differences in income (economicine-
qualities). So, biological inequalities give rise in succession to
educational,occupationaland economicinequalities.The egalitarianwho
condemnsinequalitiesbecause of theirbiologicaloriginis underobliga-
tionto indicateat whichpointin theaforementioned sequencethebiolog-
ically rooted inequalities become morally unacceptable. To put it
differently,we wouldsimply not understand an egalitarianwho came up
withtheclaimthatno particular wronghas beendoneat anystagebutwho
insistedthatthe whole transformation is still "somehownot in order."
Afterall, assumingthatinjusticehas been committed and thatit is to be
avoidedin thefuture, theblamemustbe assignableto a specificplace in
the schemeif we are to knowwhereto directour efforts to changethe
courseof eventsin similarcases.
Basically,thereare fourlines open to theegalitarian,whereto tryto
locatetheoccurrenceof injustice.I shall argue,though,thatanyof these
optionsleadstoseriousdifficulties, andthattheyareall actuallyunaccept-
able. In thiswayI hopeto undermine theegalitarian standpoint indirectly:
byshowing thattheegalitarian cannot fulfil
his and
obligation pinpoint the
morallyobjectionable event in the of of
sequence consequences biological
inequalitieswe obtaina strongreasonto believethathisgeneralargument
mustbe mistaken.
Figure1 is introducedin orderto have a simple,schematicrepresenta-
tionoftheegalitarianpredicament.
Inequalities
-
Biological * in educational - ► Occupational - ► Economic
inequalities achievement inequalities inequalities
Figure1
The arrowsrepresentcausal influencesgoing fromleftto right,the

earlierinequalitiesgivingriseto thesubsequentones. It is notsuggested,
of course,thatinequalitiesat a givenstagealwaysproducethenextstage
inequalities,nor thatthe laterinequalities have no othercauses thanthose

here pictured.The only assumption(a fairlyplausible one, it seems) is that
there is some causal influenceflowing throughthe arrows, Le,, that the
startinginnateinequalities are at least sometimesresponsibleforthe next-
stage (educational) inequalities, which themselves in turn,again at least
sometimes,generatenew (occupational) inequalities, and so on.
The main targetof egalitarian criticismare, of course, economic ine-
qualities. In particular,we are here interestedin the opposition to the
economic inequalities thatare ultimatelydue to biological inequalities. It
is easily seen fromFigure 1 thatthe egalitariancan choose between four
differentways of how to attemptto stop the process of transformation of
biological inequalities into economic inequalities. He could, first,decide
to strikeat the root and propose to eliminatethe initialbiological inequal-
ities themselves. Or, second, he could concentrateon the firstarrow,and
trynot to permitthe differencesin talentto give rise to differenteduca-
tional achievements.The thirdoption is to attackthe second arrow,and to
obstructthe transitionfromeducational inequalities to occupational ine-
qualities. Finally, the egalitarian could aim to preclude occupational ine-
qualities to be "translated"into economic inequalities.
The Nationalization of Talents
Due to the initialinequalityof theirnaturalendowmentsdifferentindivid-

uals have alreadyat birthunequal life prospects.Those geneticallyfavored
have not deserved theiradvantages over others,and some people findthis
situationdeeply unfair.Obviously,thingscannotbe here rectifieddirectly,
by distributingtalents anew. Talents are sometimes designated as "non-
transferableresources," and if the unluckyones in the birthlotteryare to
be compensated,theyhave to be paid back in some othercurrency.Actu-
ally, according to a very influentialview in the egalitarian literature(see
Dworkin 1981; Roemer 1985) those biologically underprivilegedshould
on the account of theirinitialsetback receive comparativelymore of those
social resourcesthatare transferable.
The idea implicitin this approach is to treatinnatepersonal abilities as
social resources. Ideally, at least, theyare thoughtto enterthe pool of all
resources,a totalthatis theobject of social distribution.But as talentshave
been alreadyarbitrarily distributedby "naturallottery,"it is arguedthatthe
care should be taken to apportiontheremainingsocial goods in such a way
thatin the end all individuals come out approximatelyequal. It is as if the
process of dividing social propertyhas at the very beginningrun out of
control,so to speak. A part of the pie is already missing even before the
distributionstarted;some personsacquired importantadvantages although
"no one had an antecedentclaim to be benefitedin thisway" (Rawls 1979,
p. 17). Since restitutionis not possible, the only thingto do is to distribute
what is leftover so as to make up forthe previous unjust,but irreversible

inequalities.
This move has the appearance of the second-bestsolution: restitutionis
always preferableto compensation.So, what if we imagine thatthe direct
redistributionof biological advantages according to "non-arbitrary"cri-
teria (whateverthatis supposed to mean) were to become feasible? And if,
consequently,those who got less thanthe "fair share" in genetic benefits
could now claim fromsocietynottherightquantityof Ersatz resourcesbut
the real thing?Assuming thattheirgrievances are justified,why actually
take trouble to determinewhat would be an adequate compensation for
theirconditionand not give themsimplywhattheylack? It seems thatthe
view under consideration pulls stronglytowards recognizing the legiti-
macy of such claims. But this conflictswith our basic moral intuitions.
However much we mightdeplore the bad luck of the victims of "cosmic
injustice,"we do not in factbelieve that,on thataccount, theywould have
any claim on othersin our counterfactualsituation.As Gerald Cohen said:
[People] do not immediatelyagree that,were eye transplantseasy to
achieve,it wouldthenbe acceptableforthestateto conscribepotentialeye
donorsintoa lotterywhoselosersmustyieldan eye to beneficiaries who
wouldotherwise be notone-eyedbutblind.Thefactthattheydo notdeserve
theirgoodeyes,thattheydo notneedtwogoodeyesmorethanblindpeople
needone,andso forth;thefact,ina word,thattheyaremerelyluckytohave
good eyesdoes notalwaysconvincethemthattheirclaimon theirowneyes
thanthatofsomeunluckyblindperson.(Cohen 1986, p. Ill)
is no stronger
Of course, few egalitarianswould favorsuch a nationalizationof natural
endowmentsif theybecame readily transferable.My point is merelythat
there is a strand in their argumentwhich, if not counteractedby other
considerations,leads themnaturallyin thatdirection.For example, when
one speaks of the "per capita share in all endowments"(Roemer 1982, p.
212) or of the distributionof naturalabilities as being "a collective asset"
(Rawls 1972, p. 179) or "a common asset" (ibid., p. 101), this comes
dangerouslyclose to expandingthe scope of legitimatestate intervention
in the private sphere. In a way, egalitarians can affordnot to be much
botheredby this issue preciselybecause such an infringement of personal
rights is at presentoutside the realm of serious possibility.So, by having
a certainair of unreality,the disquietingimplicationsof theirstandpoint
fail to ringthe alarm bell in our moral consciousness.
The First Arrow
If nothingis done about it some of the initial biological inequalities will

eventuallybe translatedintoeducational inequalities. This transitionis the
next step where the egalitariancan interferein the causal chain leading to
economic inequalities. The strategy calls to mind the famous Kurt
Vonnegut's story"Harrison Bergeron" where the society intervenesvery

early and suppresses the mere expression of superior innate abilities by
imposing artificialobstacles on giftedindividuals. Here is just one short
passage fromVonnegut:
And George,while his intelligencewas way above normal,had a little
mental-handicap radioin his ear- he was requiredby law to wearit at all
times.It was tunedto a government transmitterand,everytwentyseconds
wouldsendoutsomesharpnoise to keep people like
or so, thetransmitter
Georgefromtakingunfairadvantageof theirbrains.
We all get a chill fromthenightmareworld of "HarrisonBergeron."But in
its milder formsthe idea thatif the less talentedcannot be broughtup to
the level of those betterendowed, the lattershould then be held back in
theirdevelopmentforthesake of equalityis notentirelywithoutadherents.
Thus, in one of the most carefullyargued studies on inequalitythe follow-
ing is what we can read about the transitionfrombiological inequalities to
inequalities of educational achievement(the firstarrow in Figure 1):
A societycommitted to achievingfullcognitiveequalitywould,forexam-
ple,probably have to excludegeneticallyadvantagedchildrenfromschool.
It mightalso have to imposeotherhandicapson them,like denyingthem
access to books and television.Virtuallyno one thinkscognitiveequality
worthsuch a price.Certainlywe do not. But if our goal weresimplyto
reducecognitiveequalityto,say,halfitspresentlevel,insteadofeliminat-
theprice mightbe muchlower. (Jenckset al. 1972, pp.
ing it entirely,
75-76- emphasisadded)
This looks verymuchlike tryingto make a bitterpill palatableby halvingit.
But even in Rawls there are ideas with a similar bent. Recall thatthe
DifferencePrinciple,the core of his theoryof justice, says thatonly those
inequalities are legitimate by which the worst off also benefit; signifi-
cantly,it does not say, as one would perhaps expect, that legitimateine-
qualities are those by which the worstoffare not harmed.The difference
is all-important:thesecond (inauthentic)versionprotectsthoseat thebottom
of
by not allowing theirposition to be deterioratedby the improvements
others,while the first(Rawlsian) versiondoes notallow theposition of those
on the top to be improvedeven when,ex hypothesi,no one is therebymade
worse off.
The Second Arrow
Going furtherto the rightand consideringthe influencethatflows through

the second arrow,frominequalities in educational achievementto unequal
occupations, this stage seems particularlyinappropriatefor egalitarian
intervention.On the reasonable assumptionthateducational achievement
predictsfuturecompetence,those who would wish to stop the unfoldingof
initialinequalities at thispointhave no otheroptionbutto say,bluntly,that
jobs should not be distributedaccording to competence. The anti-biologi-

cal egalitarianmustindeed sympathizewiththisvaliantresponse for,from
his perspective,if competence is itselfalready acquired with the help of
morally undeserved advantages, it should definitelynot be permittedto
give rise to still furthergains: or, to paraphrase Occam's razor, in-
aequalitates non sunt multiplicandaepraeter nécessitaient.
But whatis an alternativeto competence?Many criticsargue withsome
force that, if they want to be consequent, egalitarians would have to
advocate the allocation of jobs by some random procedure. Egalitarians
themselves,with minor exceptions, turna deaf ear to this siren call. Al-
thoughit is notuncommonto hear fromthedefendersof affirmative action
or reversediscriminationthatcompetenceshould not be the sole criterion
forjob acquisition, it is seldom explicitlystated thatselection oughthere
to be left to pure chance, and that the old liberal principle "'Carrière
ouverteaux talents" is thus to be replaced by the "genuinelydemocratic"
principle "Carrière ouverteà tous" But it is not unheardof: to give just
one example, medical studentsin Holland, at least until quite recently,
were chosen by lottery(weighted in favorof those withthe higherschool
marks),and it was in orderto compensatefortherepeatedbad luck of some
that even the numberof times an applicant has lost out in a lotterywas
taken into consideration(Payer 1978).
Understandablyenough, even the most radical egalitariansare not very
enthusiasticabout recommendingsuch a procedureas a remedyfor"natu-
ral injustice." But theirsituationis additionallyaggravatedby thefactthat
on two differentcounts we have reason to believe thatthe role of innate
abilities in determiningcompetencetendsto increase withtime.First,with
the equalization of educational opportunitiesand otherenvironmentalin-
fluences the importanceof genetic factorsmust relativelygrow. As fre-
quentlypointed out (Jencks 1975, p. 73; Scarr 1976; Herrnstein1973, pp.
13, 46; Young 1961, p. 115), it is a matterof pure logic that when one
source of variance is made smaller the share of otherfactorsin the total
variance must,ceterisparibus, become larger.
The second reason has to do withstatistics.As the level of achievement
required to get a certainjob rises, the recipientsof the job will be all the
more recruitedfromthe pool of giftedindividuals.To see this,consider in
Figure 2 two groups of people, A and B, with,respectively,inferiorand
superior innate abilities (relevant for a given occupation). A built-inas-
sumptionis thatthe differencesin achievementare normallydistributedin
both groups. If all other factors influencingachievement are randomly
distributedand if theyequally affectboth groups,persons belonging to Β
will on average do betterdue to theirinbornadvantage. Now, we want to
know what will happen when a change occurs and when the degree of
achievement minimally qualifying for the job gets higher- the natural
outcome of the pressure of competitionin prestigious occupations. The

consequences are conspicuous in Figure 2 wherethecompetencethreshold
moves to the right,firstfromI to II, and thenfromII to III.
B
S/ I || in^
achievement
Figure 2
The more demandingacceptance criteria,thegreaterproportionof qual-

ified applicants will come fromgroup Β till at last, at the limit,it might
even happen thatthereis simplyno individualin groupA who qualifies for
the job. It is worthmentioningthat for this patternto appear it is not
necessary for the differencein the average achievement between two
groups to be especially large. This shows that,contraryto a widespread
opinion, a weak statisticalvariationbetween groups can undersome con-
ditions make a big differenceand have strong,socially importanteffects.
(This point is also made in Levin 1987, pp. 32-33.)
The Third Arrow
In followingthe evolution of inequality,the timehas now come to take

up thefinalstage, thetranslationof inequalityof occupation intoeconomic
inequalities (as representedby the last arrowin Figure 1). Biology casts a
long shadow over thisarrow,and my interestis as muchin theshadow as in
the arrowitself.Less metaphorically, I do not wantto discuss here whether
economicinequalitiesare morallyacceptableper se, butonlyinsofaras these
inequalities carry the remotetraces of initial biological differences.This
restrictiondoes not make our topic lose on its importancesince manyegali-
tarians(as documentedon p. 4g) do not object to economic inequalities as
such, but only to the ones thatare due to "morallyarbitrary"differencesin
innateabilities.
There is somethingratherpeculiar in the position of these egalitarians.

They allow initial inequalities to be reproducedwithoutinterferenceup to
the economic domain and only thenis theirpulse quickened. At the same
time,however,theysay thatwhat theyfindethicallyobjectionable is the
source of these inequalities which belongs to a much earlier stage in the
whole process. This is peculiar because one would expectthatattemptsto
correctthemoralwrongwouldbe directedsomewhereclose to theplace where
injusticehas been committed. Otherwise,theproceduremightbeginto look like
forbiddingthe sale of stolen goods insteadof forbidding thestealingitself.
The centralproblem is thatthe egalitarianstandpointunder discussion
is eminentlyhistorical.It objects to inequalities because theyderivefrom
biological differences.But if having superiorinnateabilities is a "morally
arbitrary"feature,whyprotestonly against its producingeconomic advan-
tages, and not also against its generatingeducational and occupational
inequalities? To put it differently, if the distantorigins of inequalities is
what makes them unacceptable, it is hard to understandwhy they are
allowed to develop freelyall along the way until at long last in the eco-
nomic domain they suddenly become an abomination. I shall venturea
speculation on the reasons for such a characteristicdelayed reaction of
anti-biological egalitarians.
I hope I have alreadyshown thattheattemptsto interveneat some place
earlier in the sequence have littleappeal. On the one hand, meddlingwith
biological differencesdirectly,if possible, would conflict with personal
integrity. On theotherhand,tryingto breaktheconnectionsrepresentedby
two firstarrows in Figure 1 (the connection of talent with achievement,
and the connectionof achievementwithoccupation) goes so much against
the liberal-democraticgrain that most egalitarians balk at the idea of
supportingsuch measures. Althoughtheirown idea of "undeserved and
unfairadvantages frombirthlottery"pushes themnaturallytoward inter-
vening at the earliest time possible, the tendencyis in these earlierphases
opposed by much strongerand deeply entrenchedmoral principles. So,
egalitariandissatisfactionis held in check thereand thengiven a delayed
outletin the sphere of economic inequalities.
The situationin the economic sphere is markedlydifferent.Here, there
is no readily recognizable damage from tryingto disrupt the existing
association between occupations and incomes. Little attentionis paid to
thewarningsabout possibly far-reachingnegativeside effectsof economic
redistribution(for a shortoverview,see Mead 1976, pp. 189-190). Public
opinion is imbued with the view that presenteconomic inequalities are
beyond the limits of tolerance. It is hence not only that proposals for
economic redistribution are notencounteringobstacles: theyare positively
encouraged.
The fascinationwith the subject goes back to the antiquity.Plato sug-
gested that differencesin wealth among citizens should not exceed the
ratio 4:1. Aristotledisagreed: he preferredthe relationof 5:1. The discus-
sion continues to the presentday, with the scene being dominated by a
revolt against inequality,less reasoned out and more grounded in vague
moral intuitions.It was by sensing this atmospherethat Irving Kristol,
acting as editor of Public Interest,was motivated to approach several
intellectuals who were known for their criticism of the distributionof
income in the United States, and to invite them to contributean article
describing what a fair distributionof income would be like. He never
received such an article and concluded that "no one seems willing to
commit himselfto a precise definitionfromwhich statesmenand social
criticscan take theirbearings." (Kristol 1972, p. 41)
Rawls's DifferencePrinciple mightseem to be an exception. And it is.
It provides a relativelysimple and unambiguous criterionof acceptable
inequalities: these are the ones by the existence of which those who are
worstoffalso benefit.Rawls's principledoes not sufferfromimprecision.
However, thereis anotherproblemwithit. It owes muchof its moral appeal
to our presupposingthatthe worstoffare poor. This presuppositionforces
itselfupon us almost irresistiblybecause it is so clearly truein all present
societies. But is it not possible thatby accepting the DifferencePrinciple
we actually react not against inequality,but against poverty?Indeed, it is
a standingcriticismof egalitarianism(Cooper 1980, p. 79; Bauer 1983, p.
380; Letwin 1983, p. 68; Miller 1982, p. 80; Flew 1981, pp. 24-27; Frank-
furt1987, pp. 21-23) thatit illegitimatelydraws its plausibilityfromsuch
a conflationof povertywithinequality.
Thus, if those worstoffwere not hungry,if theyhad decent housing, if
theirchildrenwere not educationallydeprived,etc., it is doubtfulwhether
the improvementof theirposition would have any moral priorityin our
considerations.What is disturbingabout the worstoffis not thattheyhave
less than othersin relative terms,but thattheirsituationis so bad (abso-
lutely) that some of theirbasic and urgentneeds remain unsatisfied.Of
course, whichneeds are classified as being "basic" or "urgent"depends on
the general level of economic prosperity,so thatin richersocieties these
minimalneeds ofteninclude muchof whatis elsewhereregardedas luxury.
Nevertheless, the descriptions "worst off" and "poor" are conceptually
distinct,and we should try,therefore,to make clear to ourselves which of
the two categories moves us, morally,to economic redistribution.When
this ambiguityis broughtto the foresome people, at least, mightno more
see anythingobjectionable in economic inequalities per se, and egalitari-
anism may lose forthemmost of its magnetism.
Even Thomas Nagel, who is more concerned withequality thanRawls,
admits thathis "moral instinctsreveal no egalitarianpriorityforthe well-
to-do over the rich and superrich" (Nagel 1991, p. 70). Apparently,for
68 PUBLIC AFFAIRSQUARTERLY
Nagel, too, the DifferencePrinciplewould cease to apply in a society

where,aftertheVeilofIgnoranceis lifted,theworstpossibleoutcomefor
itsmemberswereto realizethat,horribiledictu,theyarenotmillionaires
butmerelywell-off.
I wantto suggestthatwe tendin a verysimilarwayto misinterpret our
own moralreactionto biologicalinequalities.Whenwe feel thatwe are
underthepull of theidea thatthosewithinferior naturalabilitiesshould
on thatgroundhavea righttosomecompensation fromsocietywe takethis
as an argument foregalitarianism;forwe thinkthatwe are drivenin this
directionby our yearningto restorethe equalitywhichis so arbitrarily
disrupted Butperhapsithas nothing
by"naturallottery." to do withequal-
We
ity. may discover,on that
reflection, inpondering on thisissueitsimply
happens that theexamples most frequentlythought of are seriousbiologi-
cal handicaps,andthatthemanifest presenceofurgent needinthesecases
So, again, we are misled
is what actuallyjustifiessocial intervention.
insofaras we ascribeto themoralforceofequalitywhatis reallyonlythe
resultof ourconcernforspeciallydifficulthumansituations.It maywell
be thatwhenthetwo kindsof cases are keptdistinctin ourmindsmuch
fewerpeoplewillbe attracted toextendegalitarianreasoningtothenormal
range of human biologicaldifferences.1
Centerfor Interdisplinary Research
Germany
ofBielefeld,
University
ReceivedJune24, 1992
Bibliography
Ackerman,B. A. (1980). Social Justicein the Liberal State (New Haven & London:
Yale University Press).
Bauer, P. (1983). "The Grail of Equality," in W. Letwin (ed.), Against Equality
(London: Macmillan).
Brown,H. P. (1988). Egalitarianismand theGenerationofInequality(Oxford:Clar-
endon Press).
Cohen, G. A. (1986). "Self-Ownership,World-Ownership, and Equality," in F. S.
Lucash (ed.), Justiceand Equality Here and Now (Ithaca & London: Cornell
UniversityPress).
Coleman,J.et al (1966). Equalityof Educational Opportunity (Washington,D.C.: U.
S. GovernmentPrintingOffice).
Cooper, D. (1980). Illusions of Equality(London: Routledge& Kegan Paul).
Dworkin, R. (1985). A Matter of Principle (Cambridge,MA & London: Harvard
UniversityPress).
Dworkin,R. (1981). "What is Equality? Part2: Equality of Resources," Philosophy
and Public Affairs,vol. 10, pp. 283-345.
Flew , A. (1981). The Politics of Procrustes(London: Temple Smith).

Frankfurt, H. (1987). "Equalityas a Moral Ideal," Ethics,vol. 98, pp. 21-43.
Herrnstein, R. J. (1973). I.Q. in theMeritocracy(Boston & Toronto:Little,Brown&
Co.).
Husén, T. (1974). Talent,Equalityand Meritocracy(The Hague: MartinusNijhoff).
Jencks,C. et al. (1975). Inequality.A Reassessmentof the Effectof Family and
Schooling in America(Harmondsworth:Penguin).
Kant,I. (1965). PolitischeSchriften(Köln und Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag).
Kristol,I. (1972). "About Equality,"Commentary, vol. 54, pp. 41-47.
Levin, M. (1987). Feminismand Freedom (New Brunswick& Oxford:Transaction
Books).
Letwin,W. (1983). "The Case AgainstEquality,"in W. Letwin(ed.), AgainstEquality
(London: Macmillan).
Mead, J.E. (1976). JustEconomy(London: George Allen & Unwin).
Miller,D. (1982). "ArgumentsforEquality,"in MidwestStudies in Philosophy,Vol.
VII: Social and Political Philosophy (Minneapolis: Universityof Minnesota
Press).
Mosteller,F. & Moynihan,D. P. (1972). On Equality of Educational Opportunity
(New York: VintageBooks).
Nagel, T. (1979). Mortal Questions(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress).
Nagel, T. (1991). Equality and Partiality(Oxford& New York: OxfordUniversity
Press).
Okun, M. A. (1975). Equality and Efficiency:The Big Tradeoff(Washington,D.C.:
The BrookingsInstitution).
Payer,L. (1978). "Dutch Choosing Medical Studentsby Lottery,"The Chronicleof
HigherEducation,January30.
Rawls, J. (1972). A TheoryofJustice(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress).
Rawls, J. (1979). "A Well-OrderedSociety,"in P. Laslett& J. Fishkin(eds.), Philos-
ophy,Politics and Society(FifthSeries) (Oxford:Blackwell).
Roemer,J.E. (1982). A General Theoryof Exploitationand Class (Cambridge,MA:
HarvardUniversityPress).
Roemer,J.E. (1985). "Equality of Talent," Economics and Philosophy,vol. 1, pp.
151-88.
Scarr,S. (1976). "Unknownin IQ Equation," in N. Block & G. Dworkin(eds.), The
IQ Controversy (New York: RandomHouse).
Young, M. (1961). The Rise of the Meritocracy,1870-2033 (Harmondsworth:Pen-
guin).
Young,R. (1992). "Egalitarianismand PersonalDesert,"Ethics,vol. 102, pp. 319-41.
NOTES
1. I would like to thankLorraineDaston and PeterSloep forveryusefulcomments

on the firstdraft.

Egalitarianism and Natural Lottery PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Egalitarianism and Natural Lottery PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Public Affairs Quarterly

Volume 7, Number1, January1993

resemble Russian dolls. If you remove one source of

influence,talentor luck. Untilmoredisturbinginequalities are removedor

It was a great disappointmentfor many that anti-discrimination political

Inequalities: FromBiology to Economics

The arrowsrepresentcausal influencesgoing fromleftto right,the

inequalities,nor thatthe laterinequalities have no othercauses thanthose

Due to the initialinequalityof theirnaturalendowmentsdifferentindivid-

what is leftover so as to make up forthe previous unjust,but irreversible

The First Arrow

If nothingis done about it some of the initial biological inequalities will

Vonnegut's story"Harrison Bergeron" where the society intervenesvery

The Second Arrow

Going furtherto the rightand consideringthe influencethatflows through

jobs should not be distributedaccording to competence. The anti-biologi-

outcome of the pressure of competitionin prestigious occupations. The

The more demandingacceptance criteria,thegreaterproportionof qual-

In followingthe evolution of inequality,the timehas now come to take

There is somethingratherpeculiar in the position of these egalitarians.

Nagel, too, the DifferencePrinciplewould cease to apply in a society

Flew , A. (1981). The Politics of Procrustes(London: Temple Smith).

1. I would like to thankLorraineDaston and PeterSloep forveryusefulcomments

You might also like