CONSTITUTIONAL LAW REVIEW 2019 CASE DIGESTS

LECTURE 4

ARTICLE VIII - THE JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Section 1: The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.

1) RE: Letter of UP Faculty, A.M. 10-10-4-C, June 7, 2011

FACTS:

On 28 April 2010, the decision of the case Vinuya v Executive Secretary was promulgated with Justice Mariano
del Castillo as its ponente. Motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner’s counsel on various grounds
but most notably on the ground that not only did the ponente of the case plagiarised at least 3 books and
articles in discussing the principles of jus cogens and erga omnes, but have also twisted such quotations
making it appear contrary to the intent of the original works. Thereafter, news regarding the plagiarism by the
Supreme Court spread over the media and the original authors wrote letters to the Chief Justice expressing
discontent by the questioned act of Justice del Castillo.

On 27 July 2010, the UP College of Law faculty members gave their opinion on the matter of plagiarism by
issuing an article titled “Restoring Integrity: A statement by the Faculty of the University of the Philippines
College of Law on the Allegations of Plagiarism and Misrepresentation in the Supreme Court” signed overall 37
faculty members. In said article, the faculty expressly gave their dismay saying that the court had the hopes of
relief from those “comfort women” during the war “crushed by a singularly reprehensible act of dishonesty and
misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the Land.”

In the article, it was stated that plagiarism, as appropriation and misrepresentation of another person’s work as
one’s own, is considered as “dishonesty, pure and simple.” Hence, it was argued that since the decision in the
Vinuya case form part of the Philippine judicial system, the Court, in fine, is allowing dishonesty to be
promulgated. Furthermore, the plagiarism and misrepresentation in the Vinuya case undermines the judicial
system of our country and is a dirt on the honor and dignity of the Supreme Court, the article sought for the
resignation of Associate Justice Mariano del Castillo.

In response to the said article, the Court issued a resolution stating that the remarks and choice of words used
were such a great insult to the members of the Court and a threat to the independence of the judiciary, a clear
violation of Canons 1, 11 and 13 and the Rules 1.02 and 11.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Thereafter, the Court ordered the signatories to show cause on why they should not be disciplined as members
of the Bar for such alleged violations.

In fulfillment of the directive by the Court, the signatories passed a Common Compliance stating therein that
their intention in issuing the article in question “was not to malign the Court but rather to defend its integrity and
credibility and to ensure continued confidence in the legal system” by the words used therein as “focusing on
constructive action.” Also, it was alleged that the respondents are correct in seeking responsibility from Justice
del Castillo for he, indeed, committed plagiarism thus, rectifying their issuance of the article. Furthermore, the
respondents argued that the article in question is a valid exercise of the freedom of expression as citizens of a
democracy, and an exercise of academic freedom.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents have violated their duty stated in Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. (A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.)

RULING: YES.

The Show Cause Resolution does not deny respondents their freedom of expression.

It is respondents’ collective claim that the Court, with the issuance of the Show Cause Resolution, has interfered
with respondents’ constitutionally mandated right to free speech and expression. It appears that the underlying
assumption behind respondents’ assertion is the misconception that this Court is denying them the right to
criticize the Court’s decisions and actions, and that this Court seeks to "silence" respondent law professors’
dissenting view on what they characterize as a "legitimate public issue."

This is far from the truth. A reading of the Show Cause Resolution will plainly show that it was neither the fact
that respondents had criticized a decision of the Court nor that they had charged one of its members of
plagiarism that motivated the said Resolution. It was the manner of the criticism and the contumacious language
by which respondents, who are not parties nor counsels in the Vinuya case, have expressed their opinion in
favor of the petitioners in the said pending case for the "proper disposition" and consideration of the Court that
gave rise to said Resolution. The Show Cause Resolution painstakingly enumerated the statements that the
Court considered excessive and uncalled for under the circumstances surrounding the issuance, publication,
and later submission to this Court of the UP Law faculty’s Restoring Integrity Statement.

To reiterate, it was not the circumstance that respondents expressed a belief that Justice Del Castillo was guilty
of plagiarism but rather their expression of that belief as "not only as an established fact, but a truth" when it
was "[o]f public knowledge [that there was] an ongoing investigation precisely to determine the truth of such
allegations." It was also pointed out in the Show Cause Resolution that there was a pending motion for
reconsideration of the Vinuya decision. The Show Cause Resolution made no objections to the portions of the
Restoring Integrity Statement that respondents claimed to be "constructive" but only asked respondents to
explain those portions of the said Statement that by no stretch of the imagination could be considered as fair or
constructive, to wit:

Beyond this, however, the statement bore certain remarks which raise concern for the Court. The opening
sentence alone is a grim preamble to the institutional attack that lay ahead. It reads:
An extraordinary act of injustice has again been committed against the brave Filipinas who had suffered abuse
during a time of war.

The first paragraph concludes with a reference to the decision in Vinuya v. Executive Secretary as a
reprehensible act of dishonesty and misrepresentation by the Highest Court of the land. x x x.

The insult to the members of the Court was aggravated by imputations of deliberately delaying the resolution of
the said case, its dismissal on the basis of "polluted sources," the Court’s alleged indifference to the cause of
petitioners [in the Vinuya case], as well as the supposed alarming lack of concern of the members of the Court
for even the most basic values of decency and respect.114 x x x. (Underscoring ours.)

To be sure, the Show Cause Resolution itself recognized respondents’ freedom of expression when it stated
that:

While most agree that the right to criticize the judiciary is critical to maintaining a free and democratic society,
there is also a general consensus that healthy criticism only goes so far. Many types of criticism leveled at the
judiciary cross the line to become harmful and irresponsible attacks. These potentially devastating attacks and
unjust criticism can threaten the independence of the judiciary. The court must "insist on being permitted to
proceed to the disposition of its business in an orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its
functions and tending to embarrass the administration of justice."

The Court could hardly perceive any reasonable purpose for the faculty’s less than objective comments except
to discredit the April 28, 2010 Decision in the Vinuya case and undermine the Court’s honesty, integrity and
competence in addressing the motion for its reconsideration. As if the case on the comfort women’s claims is
not controversial enough, the UP Law faculty would fan the flames and invite resentment against a resolution
that would not reverse the said decision. This runs contrary to their obligation as law professors and officers of
the Court to be the first to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court, to which they owe fidelity according to
the oath they have taken as attorneys, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice.

Indeed, in a long line of cases, including those cited in respondents’ submissions, this Court has held that the
right to criticize the courts and judicial officers must be balanced against the equally primordial concern that the
independence of the Judiciary be protected from due influence or interference. In cases where the critics are not
only citizens but members of the Bar, jurisprudence has repeatedly affirmed the authority of this Court to
discipline lawyers whose statements regarding the courts and fellow lawyers, whether judicial or extrajudicial,
have exceeded the limits of fair comment and common decency.

In a democracy, members of the legal community are hardly expected to have monolithic views on any subject,
be it a legal, political or social issue. Even as lawyers passionately and vigorously propound their points of view
they are bound by certain rules of conduct for the legal profession. This Court is certainly not claiming that it
should be shielded from criticism. All the Court demands is the same respect and courtesy that one lawyer
owes to another under established ethical standards. All lawyers, whether they are judges, court employees,
professors or private practitioners, are officers of the Court and have voluntarily taken an oath, as an
indispensable qualification for admission to the Bar, to conduct themselves with good fidelity towards the courts.
There is no exemption from this sworn duty for law professors, regardless of their status in the academic
community or the law school to which they belong.

2) Tan v. Matsura, G.R. No. 179003, January 9, 2013

FACTS
Petitioner Tan filed a complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor for the crime of falsification against
Petitioners Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua which was dismissed by the said office for lack of probable cause.
Petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration was as well denied by the same office. Petitioner then filed a Petition for
review with the Department of Justice (DOJ).

In April 2003, then Secretary of Justice Datumanong denied the petition for lack of evidence. Petitioner filed a
Motion for Reconsideration which was granted by then DOJ Acting Secretary Ma. Merceditas Gutierrez in a
Resolution dated July 1, 2004. Respondents filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said resolution which was
denied by DOJ Undersecretary Pineda on behalf of the Secretary but with modification. The latter resolution
excluded Respondent Cua from the filing of an information. Petitioner filed for a Partial Motion for
Reconsideration which was later granted by the DOJ.

Respondents filed their Petitions for Certiorari with the Court of Appeals which were granted by the appellate
court.

Petitioner assails the decision of the Court of Appeals granting Respondents’ petitions.

ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can take cognizance of petitions filed before it where the Department of
Justice, through the Secretary of Justice, has already rendered a resolution where cause has already been
determined and information for such has already been instituted in court.

RULING
Yes.

Despite the established principle that the determination of probable cause is vested in the public prosecutors
and the Secretary of Justice, it is also a well-settled rule that the courts are vested with the power to review
findings of prosecutors during preliminary investigations in exceptional cases.

While the findings of the prosecutors are reviewable by the DOJ, this does not mean that the courts cannot
intervene and review the findings of the prosecutors or the DOJ.

In this case, the appellate court can take cognizance of the petitions considering that several varying resolutions
were issued by the DOJ.
The appellate court is merely exercising its power of review to determine if there was grave abuse of discretion.

3) Pichay v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary

Facts:
On April 16, 2001, then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Executive Order No. 12 (E.O. 12) creating
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC) and vesting it with the power to investigate or hear
administrative cases or complaints for possible graft and corruption,... among others, against presidential
appointees and to submit its report and recommendations to the President.
On November 15, 2010, President Benigno Simeon Aquino III issued Executive Order No. 13 (E.O. 13),
abolishing the PAGC and transferring its functions to the Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs (ODESLA), more particularly to its newly-established
Investigative and Adjudicatory Division (IAD).
On April 6, 2011, respondent Finance Secretary Cesar V. Purisima filed before the IAD-ODESLA a complaint
affidavit[2] for grave misconduct against petitioner Prospero A. Pichay, Jr., Chairman of the Board of Trustees of
the Local Water Utilities
Administration (LWUA), as well as the incumbent members of the LWUA Board of Trustees, namely, Renato
Velasco, Susana Dumlao Vargas, Bonifacio Mario M. Pena, Sr. and Daniel Landingin, which arose from the
purchase by the LWUA of Four Hundred Forty-Five Thousand Three Hundred
Seventy Seven (445,377) shares of stock of Express Savings Bank, Inc.
On April 14, 2011, petitioner received an Order[3] signed by Executive Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr.
requiring him and his co-respondents to submit their respective written explanations under oath. In compliance
therewith, petitioner filed a Motion to
Dismiss Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam manifesting that a case involving the same transaction and charge of
grave misconduct entitled, "Rustico B. Tutol, et al. v. Prospero Pichay, et al.", and docketed as OMB-C-A-10-
0426-I, is already pending before the Office of the
Ombudsman.
Now alleging that no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy is available to him in the ordinary course of law,
petitioner has resorted to the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition

Issues:
I. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO CREATE A
PUBLIC OFFICE.
II. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF THE LEGISLATURE TO
APPROPRIATE FUNDS.
III. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR USURPING THE POWER OF CONGRESS TO DELEGATE
QUASI-JUDICIAL POWERS TO ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES.
IV. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR ENCROACHING UPON THE POWERS OF THE OMBUDSMAN.
V. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE GUARANTEE OF DUE PROCESS.
VI. E.O. 13 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR VIOLATING THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
In assailing the constitutionality of E.O. 13, petitioner asseverates that the President is not authorized under any
existing law to create the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division, Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for
Legal Affairs (IAD-ODESLA) and that by creating a... new, additional and distinct office tasked with quasi-
judicial functions, the President has not only usurped the powers of congress to create a public office,
appropriate funds and delegate quasi-judicial functions to administrative agencies but has also encroached
upon the... powers of the Ombudsman.
Petitioner, however, goes on to assert that the President went beyond the authority granted by E.O. 292 for him
to reorganize the executive department since his issuance of E.O. 13 did not merely involve the abolition of an
office but the creation of one as well.
Petitioner next avers that the IAD-ODESLA was illegally vested with judicial power which is reserved to the
Judicial Department and, by way of exception through an express grant by the legislature, to administrative
agencies. He points out that the name Investigative and
Adjudicatory Division is proof itself that the IAD-ODESLA wields quasi-judicial power.

Ruling:
The President has Continuing Authority... to Reorganize the Executive Department... under E.O. 292.
Section 31 of Executive Order No. 292 (E.O. 292), otherwise known as the Administrative Code of 1987, vests
in the President the continuing authority to reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve simplicity,
economy and efficiency. E.O. 292 sanctions the following... actions undertaken for such purpose:
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of the President Proper, including the immediate Offices,
the Presidential Special Assistants/Advisers System and the Common Staff Support System, by abolishing,
consolidating, or merging units thereof or... transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as
transfer functions to the Office of the President from other Departments and Agencies; and
(3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department or Agency as well as transfer
agencies to the Office of the President from other departments or agencies.[4]
Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its functions to a division specially created within the
ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the President under his continuing "delegated legislative authority
to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
Generally, this authority to implement organizational changes is limited to transferring either an office or a
function from the Office of the President to another Department or Agency, and the other way around.[7] Only
Section 31(1) gives the President a... virtual freehand in dealing with the internal structure of the Office of the
President Proper by allowing him to take actions as extreme as abolition, consolidation or merger of units, apart
from the less drastic move of transferring functions and offices from one unit to... another.
The Reorganization Did not Entail... the Creation of a New, Separate and
Distinct Office.
The abolition of the PAGC did not require the creation of a new, additional and distinct office as the duties and
functions that pertained to the defunct anti-graft body were simply transferred to the ODESLA, which is an
existing office within the Office of the President
Proper. The reorganization required no more than a mere alteration of the administrative structure of the
ODESLA through the establishment of a third division the Investigative and Adjudicatory Division through which
ODESLA could take on the additional functions it has... been tasked to discharge under E.O. 13.
The Reorganization was
Pursued in Good Faith.
A valid reorganization must not only be exercised through legitimate authority but must also be pursued in good
faith. A reorganization is said to be carried out in good faith if it is done for purposes of economy and efficiency.
[13] It appears in this case... that the streamlining of functions within the Office of the President Proper was
pursued with such purposes in mind. In its Whereas clauses, E.O. 13 cites as bases for the reorganization the
policy dictates of eradicating corruption in the government and... promoting economy and efficiency in the
bureaucracy. Indeed, the economical effects of the reorganization is shown by the fact that while Congress had
initially appropriated P22 Million for the PAGC's operation in the 2010 annual budget,[14] no separate... or
added funding of such a considerable amount was ever required after the transfer of the PAGC functions to the
IAD-ODESLA.
Apparently, the budgetary requirements that the IAD-ODESLA needed to discharge its functions and maintain
its personnel would be sourced from the following year's appropriation for the President's Offices under the
General Appropriations Act of 2011.[15]
Petitioner asseverates, however, that since Congress did not indicate the manner by which the appropriation for
the Office of the President was to be distributed, taking therefrom the operational funds of the IAD-ODESLA
would amount to an illegal appropriation by the President.
The contention is without legal basis.
There is no usurpation of the legislative... power to appropriate public funds.
In the chief executive dwell the powers to run government. Placed upon him is the power to recommend the
budget necessary for the operation of the Government,[16] which implies that he has the necessary authority to
evaluate and determine the structure that... each government agency in the executive department would need
to operate in the most economical and efficient manner.[17] Hence, the express recognition under Section 78 of
R.A. 9970 or the General Appropriations Act of 2010 of the President's authority to
"direct changes in the organizational units or key positions in any department or agency." The aforecited
provision, often and consistently included in the general appropriations laws, recognizes the extent of the
President's power to reorganize the executive offices and... agencies under him, which is, "even to the extent of
modifying and realigning appropriations for that purpose."[18]
And to further enable the President to run the affairs of the executive department, he is likewise given
constitutional authority to augment any item in the General Appropriations Law using the savings in other items
of the appropriation for his office.[19]
In fact, he is explicitly allowed by law to transfer any fund appropriated for the different departments, bureaus,
offices and agencies of the Executive Department which is included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau... or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment.[20]
Thus, while there may be no specific amount earmarked for the IADODESLA from the total amount
appropriated by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the President, the necessary funds for the
IADODESLA may be properly sourced from the President's own office budget... without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the legislature's power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously appropriated by Congress for his office.
The IAD-ODESLA is a fact- finding... and recommendatory body not vested... with quasi- judicial powers.
while the term "adjudicatory" appears part of its appellation, the IAD-ODESLA cannot try and resolve cases, its
authority being limited to the conduct of investigations, preparation of... reports and submission of
recommendations. E.O. 13 explicitly states that the IAD-ODESLA shall "perform powers, functions and duties
xxx, of PAGC."[22]
Under E.O. 12, the PAGC was given the authority to "investigate or hear administrative cases or complaints
against all presidential appointees in the government"[23] and to "submit its report and recommendations to the
President."[24] The IAD-ODESLA is a fact-finding and recommendatory body to the President, not having the
power to settle controversies and adjudicate cases.
The President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and constitute the IAD ODESLA as his fact-finding investigator
cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive Department to
ensure the enforcement of the laws. Section 17, Article VII of... the Constitution provides:
Section 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall
ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully executed necessitates the corresponding power in the
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of officials and employees in the executive department.[27]
The IAD-ODESLA does not encroach... upon the powers and duties of the
Ombudsman.
The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to criminal cases
cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction that... the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the investigation being conducted by another
investigatory agency. Section 15 (1) of R.A. No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, empowers the
Ombudsman to
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer
or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over... cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of government, the investigation of
such cases. (Emphasis supplied)
Since the case filed before the IAD-ODESLA is an administrative disciplinary case for grave misconduct,
petitioner may not invoke the primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to prevent the IAD-ODESLA from
proceeding with its investigation. In any event, the Ombudsman's authority... to investigate both elective and
appointive officials in the government, extensive as it may be, is by no means exclusive. It is shared with other
similarly authorized government agencies.[28]
While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination of the existence of probable cause and the
adjudication of the merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the IAD-ODESLA is limited to
that of a fact-finding investigator whose determinations and... recommendations remain so until acted upon by
the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the Ombudsman's constitutional duties.
Executive Order No. 13 Does Not
Violate Petitioner's Right to Due
Process and the Equal Protection... of the Laws.
Presidential appointees come under the direct disciplining authority of the President. This proceeds from the
well settled principle that, in the absence of a contrary law, the power to remove or to discipline is lodged in the
same authority on which the power to appoint is... vested.[32] Having the power to remove and/or discipline
presidential appointees, the President has the corollary authority to investigate such public officials and look into
their conduct in office.[33] Petitioner is a presidential... appointee occupying the high-level position of Chairman
of the LWUA. Necessarily, he comes under the disciplinary jurisdiction of the President, who is well within his
right to order an investigation into matters that require his informed decision.
Also, contrary to petitioner's assertions, his right to due process was not violated when the IAD-ODESLA took
cognizance of the administrative complaint against him since he was given sufficient opportunity to oppose the
formal complaint filed by Secretary Purisima. In... administrative proceedings, the filing of charges and giving
reasonable opportunity for the person so charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process,[35] which simply means having the opportunity to explain... one's side.
[36] Hence, as long as petitioner was given the opportunity to explain his side and present evidence, the
requirements of due process are satisfactorily complied with because what the law abhors is an absolute lack
of opportunity to be... heard.[37] The records show that petitioner was issued an Order requiring him to submit
his written explanation under oath with respect to the charge of grave misconduct filed against him. His own
failure to submit his explanation despite notice defeats his... subsequent claim of denial of due process.
Finally, petitioner doubts that the IAD-ODESLA can lawfully perform its duties as an impartial tribunal,
contending that both the IAD-ODESLA and respondent Secretary Purisima are connected to the President. The
mere suspicion of partiality will not suffice to invalidate the... actions of the IADODESLA. Mere allegation is not
equivalent to proof. Bias and partiality cannot be presumed.[38] Petitioner must present substantial proof to
show that the lAD-ODES LA had unjustifiably sided against him in the conduct of the investigation.
No such evidence has been presented as to defeat the presumption of regularity m the perfonnance of the fact-
finding investigator's duties. The assertion, therefore, deserves scant consideration.
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one.[39] Petitioner has failed to
discharge the burden of... proving the illegality of E.O. 13, which IS indubitably a valid exercise of the
President's continuing authority to reorganize the Office of the President.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Principles:
The equal protection of the laws is a... guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the
government.[29] It is embraced under the due process concept and simply requires that, in the application of the
law, "all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both... as to rights conferred and
responsibilities imposed."[30] The equal protection clause, however, is not absolute but subject to reasonable
classification so that aggrupations bearing substantial distinctions may be treated differently from each other.
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as hostile
discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation which is limited either in the
object to which it is... directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality
among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The... equal protection clause is not infringed
by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if it applies alike to all persons
within such class, and reasonable grounds exist for making a distinction between those who fall within such
class and... those who do not. (Emphasis supplied)
Substantial distinctions clearly exist between elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy their
office by virtue of the mandate of the electorate. They are elected to an office for a definite term and may be
removed therefrom only upon... stringent conditions. On the other hand, appointive officials hold their office by
virtue of their designation thereto by an appointing authority. Some appointive officials hold their office in a
permanent capacity and are entitled to security of tenure while others serve... at the pleasure of the appointing
authority.
x x x x
An election is the embodiment of the popular will, perhaps the purest expression of the sovereign power of the
people. It involves the choice or selection of candidates to public office by popular vote. Considering that
elected officials are put in office by their constituents... for a definite term, x x x complete deference is accorded
to the will of the electorate that they be served by such officials until the end of the term for which they were
elected. In contrast, there is no such expectation insofar as appointed officials are concerned.
(Emphasis supplied)

4) People v. Sandiganbayan, 699 SCRA 713

FACTS

The principal respondent in this case, Homero A. Mercado, was the President of JAM Liner, Inc. Tax
Credit and Drawback Center (DOF One-Stop Shop). Sometime in 2000, showing willingness to testify
against the criminal syndicate that allegedly ran the tax credit scam at the DOF One-Stop Shop,
Mercado applied with the Department of Justice (DOJ) for immunity as state witness

under its witness protection program. The DOJ favorably acted on the application and granted
immunity to Mercado. Still, since the investigation of the case fell within the authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman (Ombudsman), the latter charged him and the other respondents before the
Sandiganbayan’s.

The first information alleged that respondent DOF officials approved and issued in 1996 Tax Credit
Certificate 7711 for P7,350,444.00 in favor of JAM Liner, Inc. The second Information alleged that they
further illegally issued in 1996 Tax Credit Certificate 7708 for P4,410,265.50 in favor of the same
company. Mercado filed a motion for reconsideration or reinvestigation before the Ombudsman, citing
the DOJ’s grant of immunity to him. Acting favorably on the motion, the Ombudsman executed an
Immunity Agreement with Mercado. The agreement provided that, in consideration for granting him
immunity from suit, Mercado would produce all relevant documents in his possession and testify
against the accused in all the cases, criminal or otherwise, that may be filed against them. Accordingly,
on the same date, the Ombudsman filed a motion to discharge Mercado from the information involving
him. the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution, denying the Ombudsman’s motion. That court held that
the pieces of evidence adduced during the hearing of the Ombudsman’s motion failed to establish the
conditions required under Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court for the discharge of an accused
as a state witness.
Petitioner’s contention

The Ombudsman premised its grant of immunity to Mercado on his undertaking to produce all the
documents in his possession relative to the DOF tax credit scam and to testify in all pending criminal,
civil, and administrative cases against those involved.

Respondent’s contention:

The immunity that the Ombudsman gave Mercado does not bind the court, which in the meantime
already acquired jurisdiction over the case against him. That immunity merely relieves Mercado from
any further proceedings, including preliminary investigation, which the state might still attempt to
initiate against him.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in refusing to recognize the immunity
from criminal prosecution that the Ombudsman granted respondent Mercado and, as a result, in
declining to discharge him from the information as a state witness.

RULING

The decision to move for the discharge of Mercado was

part of prosecutorial discretion in the determination of who should be used as a state witness to bolster
the successful prosecution of criminal offenses. Unless made in clear violation of the Rules, this
determination should be given great weight by our courts. the filing of the criminal action against an
accused in court does not prevent the Ombudsman from exercising the power that the Congress has
granted him. His above authority enables the Ombudsman to carry out his constitutional mandate to
ensure accountability in the public service. It gives the

Ombudsman wide latitude in using an accused discharged from the information to increase the
chances of conviction of the other accused and attain a higher prosecutorial goal. Immunity statutes
seek to provide a balance between the state’s interests and the individual’s right against self-
incrimination.

As it happened in this case, the Ombudsman had already filed with the Sandiganbayan the criminal
action against Mercado and the other respondents in Criminal Cases 27511-14 prior to the
Ombudsman’s grant of immunity to Mercado. Having already acquired jurisdiction over Mercado’s
case, it remained within the Sandiganbayan’s power to determine whether or not he may be
discharged as a state witness in accordance with Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. In any event, the question before the Sandiganbayan was whether or not Mercado met,
from its point of view, the following requirements of Section 17, Rule 119 for the

discharge of an accused to be a state witness: (a) there is absolute necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested; (b) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper
prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) the testimony of said
accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) said accused does not appear to
be the most guilty; and (e) said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving
moral turpitude.

The authority to grant immunity is not an inherent judicial function. Indeed, Congress has vested such
power in the Ombudsman as well as in the Secretary of Justice. Besides, the decision to employ an
accused as a state witness must necessarily originate from the public prosecutors whose mission is to
obtain a successful prosecution of the several accused before the courts. The

latter do not as a rule have a vision of the true strength of the prosecution’s evidence until after the trial
is over. Consequently, courts should generally defer to the judgment of the prosecution and deny a
motion to discharge an accused so he can be used as a witness only in clear cases of failure to meet
the requirements of Section 17, Rule 119. Here, the Sandiganbayan held that Mercado’s testimony is
not absolutely necessary because the state has other direct evidence that may prove the offenses
charged. It held that Mercardo’s testimony, in large part, would only help (1) identify numerous
documents and (2) disclose matters that are essentially already contained in such documents. But the
records, particularly Mercado’s consolidated affidavit, show that his testimony if true could be
indispensable in establishing the circumstances that led to the preparation and issuance of fraudulent
tax credit certificates. Indeed, nobody appears to be in a better position to testify on this than he, as
president of JAM Liner, Inc., In coming to his conclusions as to the necessity for the testimony of the
accused whose discharge is requested, as to the availability or non-availability of other direct or
corroborative evidence; as to which of the accused is the ‘most guilty’ one; and the like, the judge
must rely in a large part upon the suggestions and the information furnished by the prosecuting officer.

One rule of wisdom is that where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the
conspirators is essential so he can testify against the others. While he is liable, the State saw a higher
social value in eliciting information from him rather than in engaging in his prosecution.

5) City of Manila v. Grecia-Cuetdo, 715 SCRA 182

FACTS:
Petitioner City of Manila, through its treasurer, assessed taxes against private respondents SM Mart, Inc., SM
Prime Holdings, Inc., Star Appliances Center, Supervalue, Inc., Ace Hardware Philippines, Inc., Watsons
Personal Care Stores Phils., Inc., Jollimart Philippines Corp., Surplus Marketing Corp. and Signature Lines. In
addition to the taxes purportedly due from private respondents pursuant to Section 14, 15, 16, 17 of the Revised
Revenue Code of Manila (RRCM), said assessment covered the local business taxes petitioners were
authorized to collect under Section 21 of the same Code. Because payment of the taxes assessed was a
precondition for the issuance of their business permits, private respondents were constrained to pay the
₱19,316,458.77 assessment under protest.

Private respondents filed a complaint for “Refund or Recovery of Illegally and/or Erroneously-Collected Local
Business Tax, Prohibition with Prayer to Issue TRO and Writ of Preliminary Injunction” alleging inter alia that, in
relation to Section 21 thereof, Sections 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19 and 20 of the RRCM were violative of the
limitations and guidelines under Section 143 (h) of Republic Act. No. 7160 [Local Government Code] on double
taxation.

The RTC granted private respondents’ application for a writ of preliminary injunction, and denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.

Petitioners then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA. The CA dismissed the petition holding that it
has no jurisdiction over the said petition since the appellate jurisdiction over private respondents’ complaint for
tax refund, which was filed with the RTC, is vested in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).

ISSUE:

Whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari assailing an interlocutory order
issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

RULING:

This Court rules in the affirmative.

PROCEDURAL ASPECT, discussed:

BEFORE proceeding, to resolve the question on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper to likewise
address a procedural error which petitioners committed.

Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which dismissed their petition filed
with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such dismissal. The assailed Resolutions of
the CA are in the nature of a final order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that
when an assailed judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal.
Hence, in the instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45,
which is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
 Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. As such, it cannot be a substitute for a lost appeal.

Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the interest of
substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition for review on
certiorari, particularly
(1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari;
(2) when errors of judgment are averred; and
(3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the rules.

Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a petition
for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred, and because of the
significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and justified to relax the rules and,
thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review on certiorari.

Having disposed of the procedural aspect, we now turn to the central issue in this case. The basic question
posed before this Court is whether or not the CTA has jurisdiction over a special civil action for certiorari
assailing an interlocutory order issued by the RTC in a local tax case.

This Court rules in the affirmative.

RA 1125 is the law creating the CTA and giving to the said court jurisdiction over tax cases.

Later, Republic Act No. 9282 amended RA 1125 by expanding the jurisdiction of the CTA, enlarging its
membership and elevating its rank to the level of a collegiate court with special jurisdiction. Section 7 of which
provides:

Sec. 7. Jurisdiction. – The CTA shall exercise:

Exclusive appellate jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided:

xxx

Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax cases originally
decided by them, in their respected territorial jurisdiction.

Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial
Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective jurisdiction.

xxx

Exclusive original jurisdiction in tax collection cases involving final and executory assessments for taxes, fees,
charges and penalties: Provides, however, that collection cases where the principal amount of taxes and fees,
exclusive of charges and penalties, claimed is less than One million pesos (₱1,000,000.00) shall be tried by the
proper Municipal Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court and Regional Trial Court.

xxx

Over appeals from the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in tax collection cases
originally decided by them, in their respective territorial jurisdiction.

Over petitions for review of the judgments, resolutions or orders of the Regional Trial Courts in the Exercise of
their appellate jurisdiction over tax collection cases originally decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal
Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, in their respective jurisdiction.

The prevailing doctrine is that the authority to issue writs of certiorari involves the exercise of original jurisdiction
which must be expressly conferred by the Constitution or by law and cannot be implied from the mere existence
of appellate jurisdiction.

With respect to the CTA, Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides, nonetheless, that judicial
power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law and that
judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.

On the strength of the above constitutional provisions, it can be fairly interpreted that the power of the CTA
includes that of determining whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of the RTC in issuing an interlocutory order in cases falling within the exclusive
appellate jurisdiction of the tax court. It, thus, follows that the CTA, by constitutional mandate, is vested with
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari in these cases.

It is more in consonance with logic and legal soundness to conclude that the grant of appellate jurisdiction to the
CTA over tax cases filed in and decided by the RTC carries with it the power to issue a writ of certiorari when
necessary in aid of such appellate jurisdiction. The supervisory power or jurisdiction of the CTA to issue a writ of
certiorari in aid of its appellate jurisdiction should co-exist with, and be a complement to, its appellate jurisdiction
to review, by appeal, the final orders and decisions of the RTC.

Based on the foregoing disquisitions, it can be reasonably concluded that the authority of the CTA to take
cognizance of petitions for certiorari questioning interlocutory orders issued by the RTC in a local tax case is
included in the powers granted by the Constitution as well as inherent in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

6) Quarto v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 169042, October 5, 2011

FACTS

Petitioner

Chief of the Central Equipment and Spare Parts Division (CESPD), Bureau of Equipment (BOE), Department of
Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Port Area, Manila. As CESPD Chief, he is also the Head of the Special
Inspectorate Team (SIT) of the DPWH.

Respondents

Members of the SIT

On 2002, DPWH Secretary Simeon Datumanong created a committee to investigate alleged anomalous
transactions involving the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH service vehicles in 2001. The DPWH
Internal Audit Service (IAS) as its Technical Working Group to conduct the actual investigation. The DPWH-IAS
discovered that from March to December 2001, several emergency repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of
hundreds of DPWH service vehicles, which were approved and paid by the government, did not actually take
place, resulting in government losses of approximately P143 million for this ten-month period alone. Thus, Atty.
Irene D. Ofilada of the DPWH-IAS filed before the Office of the Ombudsman a Complaint charging several high-
ranking DPWH officials and employees—including the petitioner, the respondents, and other private individuals
who purportedly benefited from the anomalous transactions —with Plunder, Money Laundering, Malversation,
and violations of RA No. 3019 and the Administrative Code.

Atty, Ofilada imputed the following acts:

Against Petitioner

“With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [the petitioner] x x x approved four (4) job orders for [the] repairs
[and/or] purchase of spare parts of [the vehicle assigned to Atty. Ofilada,] noted the certificate of urgency of said
repairs [and/or] purchase[,] concurred with both the pre-repair and post repair inspection reports thereon,
participated in the accomplishment of the supporting Requisition for Supplies and Equipment (RSE) x x x

Against Respondents

“With dishonesty and grave misconduct, [respondents] as members of the [SIT] xxx accomplished and signed
Pre- Repair Inspection and Post Repair Inspection Reports in support of the four job orders [and made]
it appear that the vehicle was inspected prior and after the alleged repair [although they knew that the
vehicle was never turned over for inspection].

Petitioner’s Answer

Denied the allegations against him, claiming that he merely relied on his subordinates when he signed the job
orders and the inspection reports.
Respondents’ Answer

The respondents admitted the existence of irregularities in the repairs and/or purchase of spare parts of DPWH
service vehicles, and offered to testify and to provide evidence against the DPWH officials and employees
involved in the anomaly in exchange for their immunity from prosecution.

After conducting preliminary investigation, the Ombudsman filed with the Sandiganbayan several informations
charging a number of DPWH officials and employees with plunder, estafa through falsification of
official/commercial documents and violation of Section 3(e), RA No. 3019. On the other hand, the Ombudsman
granted the respondents’ request for immunity in exchange for their testimonies and cooperation in the
prosecution of the cases filed. Petitioner filed a certiorari petition with the Sandiganbayan, questioning the
questioning the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity in the respondents’ favor. The Sandiganbayan, however,
dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and advised the petitioner to instead question the Ombudsman’s
actions before this Court. Hence, this present petition.

Petitioner’s Arguments

1. The Ombudsman should have included the respondents in the informations since it was their inspection
reports that actually paved the way for the commission of the alleged irregularities.

2. By excluding the respondents in the informations, the Ombudsman is engaged in “selective prosecution”
which is a clear case of grave abuse of discretion.

3. Petitioner claims that before the Ombudsman may avail of the respondents as state witnesses, they must be
included first in the informations filed with the court. Thereafter, the Ombudsman can ask the court for their
discharge so that they can be utilized as state witnesses under the conditions laid down in Section 17, Rule 119
of the Rules of Court since the court has the “sole province” to determine whether these conditions exist.

4. These conditions require, inter alia, that there should be “absolute necessity” for the testimony of the
proposed witness and that he/she should not appear to be the “most guilty.” The petitioner claims that the
respondents failed to comply with these conditions as the Ombudsman’s “evidence,” which became the basis of
the informations subsequently filed, shows that the respondents’ testimony is not absolutely necessary; in fact,
the manner of the respondents’ participation proves that they are the “most guilty” in the premises.

Ombudsman’s Counter Arguments

1. RA No. 6770 (the Ombudsman Act of 1989) expressly grants him the power to grant immunity from
prosecution to witnesses. He then asserts that Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which presupposes
that the witness is originally included in the information, is inapplicable to the present case since the decision on
whom to prosecute is an executive, not a judicial, prerogative.

2. The Ombudsman invokes this Court’s policy of non- interference in the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
discretion in matters involving his investigatory and prosecutorial powers.

3. The petitioner’s claim that the respondents are the “most guilty” is a matter of defense which the petitioner
may raise not in this proceeding, but in the trial proper.

ISSUE

Whether the Ombudsman has the authority to grant immunity from prosecution to witnesses.
RULING

Yes. We Dismiss the Petition on two grounds:

1. The petitioner did not avail of the remedies available to him before filing this present petition;

2. Within the context of the Court’s policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers, the petitioner failed to establish that the grant of immunity to the
respondents was attended by grave abuse of discretion.

RATIO:

I. Petitioner did not exhaust remedies available in the ordinary course of law

As extraordinary writs, both Sections 1 (certiorari) and 3 (mandamus), Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
require, as a pre-condition for these remedies, that there be no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. In the present case, the petitioner has not shown that he moved for a reconsideration of
the assailed resolutions based substantially on the same grounds stated in this present petition. Neither did the
petitioner file a motion for the inclusion of the respondents in the informations before filing the present petition.
These are adequate remedies that the petitioner chose to forego; he bypassed these remedies and proceeded
to seek recourse through the present petition.

II. The respondents’ exclusion in the information is grounded on the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity

In the exercise of his investigatory and prosecutorial powers, the Ombudsman is generally no different
from an ordinary prosecutor in determining who must be charged. He also enjoys the same latitude of discretion
in determining what constitutes sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause (that must be
established for the filing of an information in court) and the degree of participation of those involved or the lack
thereof. His findings and conclusions on these matters are not ordinarily subject to review by the courts except
when he gravely abuses his discretion, i.e., when his action amounts to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual
refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or when he acts outside the contemplation of law.

If, on the basis of the same evidence, the Ombudsman arbitrarily excludes from an indictment some individuals
while impleading all others, the remedy of mandamus lies since he is duty-bound, as a rule, to include in the
information all persons who appear responsible for the offense involved.

Guiao and Castro Rulings

We ruled that mandamus lies to compel a prosecutor who refuses:

(i) To include in the information certain persons, whose participation in the commission of a crime clearly
appears: and

(ii) To follow the proper procedure for the discharge of these persons in order that they may be utilized as
prosecution witnesses.

These cited cases, however, did not take place in the same setting as the present case as they were actions by
the public prosecutor, not by the Ombudsman. In the present case, the Ombudsman granted the respondents
immunity from prosecution pursuant to RA No. 6770 which specifically empowers the Ombudsman to grant
immunity “in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in
the performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives.”

“Sec. 17. Immunities.—x x x.

Under such terms and conditions as it may determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court, the Ombudsman may grant immunity from criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony
or whose possession and production of documents or other evidence may be necessary to determine the truth
in any hearing, inquiry or proceeding being conducted by the Ombudsman or under its authority, in the
performance or in the furtherance of its constitutional functions and statutory objectives. The immunity granted
under this and the immediately preceding paragraph shall not exempt the witness from criminal prosecution for
perjury or false testimony nor shall he be exempt from demotion or removal from office.”

To briefly outline the rationale for this provision, among the most important powers of the State is the power to
compel testimony from its residents; this power enables the government to secure vital information necessary to
carry out its myriad functions. This power though is not absolute. The constitutionally-enshrined right against
compulsory self-incrimination is a leading exception. The state’s power to compel testimony and the production
of a person’s private books and papers run against a solid constitutional wall when the person under
compulsion is himself sought to be penalized. In balancing between state interests and individual rights in this
situation, the principles of free government favor the individual to whom the state must yield.

Immunity statutes seek a rational accommodation between the imperatives of an individual’s constitutional right
against self- incrimination (considered the fount from which all statutes granting immunity emanate) and the
legitimate governmental interest in securing testimony. By voluntarily offering to give information on the
commission of a crime and to testify against the culprits, a person opens himself to investigation and
prosecution if he himself had participated in the criminal act. To secure his testimony without exposing him to
the risk of prosecution, the law recognizes that the witness can be given immunity from prosecution. In this
manner, the state interest is satisfied while respecting the individual’s constitutional right against self-
incrimination.

III. Nature of the power to grant immunity

The power to grant immunity from prosecution is essentially a legislative prerogative. The exclusive power of
Congress to define crimes and their nature and to provide for their punishment concomitantly carries the power
to immunize certain persons from prosecution to facilitate the attainment of state interests, among them, the
solution and prosecution of crimes with high political, social and economic impact.

In the exercise of this power, Congress possesses broad discretion and can lay down the conditions and the
extent of the immunity to be granted. RA No. 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989 was formulated along these
lines and reasoning with the vision of making the Ombudsman the protector of the people against inept, abusive
and corrupt government officers and employees. Congress saw it fit to grant the Ombudsman the power to
directly confer immunity to enable his office to effectively carry out its constitutional and statutory mandate of
ensuring effective accountability in the public service.

IV. Consideration in the grant of immunity

While the legislature is the source of the power to grant immunity, the authority to implement is lodged
elsewhere. The authority to choose the individual to whom immunity would be granted is a constituent part of
the process and is essentially an executive function.

Mapa v. Sandiganbayan
“The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the prosecution process. It is
essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person for government to achieve a higher objective. It
is a deliberate renunciation of the right of the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed
a crime. Its justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more guilty
criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or not the delicate power
should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the timing of its grant, are questions
addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution. The power to prosecute includes the right
to determine who shall be prosecuted and the corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute.

RA No. 6770 fully recognizes this prosecutory prerogative by empowering the Ombudsman to grant immunity,
subject to “such terms and conditions” as he may determine. The only textual limitation imposed by law on this
authority is the need to take “into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court,”—i.e., Section 17, Rule
119 of the Rules of Court. This provision requires that:

(a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested;

(b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the
testimony of said accused;

(c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points;

(d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and(e) Said accused has not at any time been
convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude.

This rule clarifies that in cases already filed with the courts,65 the prosecution merely makes a proposal and
initiates the process of granting immunity to an accused-witness in order to utilize him as a witness against his
co-accused.

Webb v. De Leon

“The right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion—the discretion of whether, what
and whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981
vesting in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and
who shall be granted immunity from prosecution. Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the
power to choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court
is given the power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over
the crime and the accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not
a recognition of an inherent judicial function.”

Thus, it is the trial court that determines whether the prosecution’s preliminary assessment of the accused-
witness’ qualifications to be a state witness satisfies the procedural norms. This relationship is in reality a
symbiotic one as the trial court, by the very nature of its role in the administration of justice, largely exercises its
prerogative based on the prosecutor’s findings and evaluation.

V. Extent of Judicial review of bestowed immunity

An immunity statute does not, and cannot, rule out a review by this Court of the Ombudsman’s exercise of
discretion. Like all other officials under our constitutional scheme of government, all their acts must adhere to
the Constitution. The parameters of our review, however, are narrow. In the first place, what we review are
executive acts of a constitutionally independent Ombudsman. Also, we undertake the review given the
underlying reality that this Court is not a trier of facts. Since the determination of the requirements under Section
17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court is highly factual in nature, the Court must, thus, generally defer to the
judgment of the Ombudsman who is in a better position (than the Sandiganbayan or the defense) to know the
relative strength and/or weakness of the evidence presently in his possession and the kind, tenor and source of
testimony he needs to enable him to prove his case. It should not be forgotten, too, that the grant of immunity
effectively but conditionally results in the extinction of the criminal liability the accused- witnesses might have
incurred, as defined in the terms of the grant. This point is no less important as the grant directly affects the
individual and enforces his right against self-incrimination. These dynamics should constantly remind us that we
must tread softly, but not any less critically, in our review of the Ombudsman’s grant of immunity.

Our room for intervention only occurs when a clear and grave abuse of the exercise of discretion is shown.
Necessarily, this limitation similarly reflects on the petitioner who comes to us on the allegation of grave abuse
of discretion; the petitioner himself is bound to clearly and convincingly establish that the Ombudsman
gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity in order to fully establish his case.

VA. Absolute necessity for testimony of respondents

Under the factual and legal situation before us, we find that the petitioner miserably failed to clearly and
convincingly establish that the Ombudsman gravely abused his discretion in granting immunity to the
respondents. While he claims that both conditions (a) and (d) of Section 17, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court are
absent, we observe his utter lack of argument addressing the “absolute necessity” of the respondents’
testimony. In fact, the petitioner simply concluded that the requirement of “absolute necessity” does not exist
based on the Ombudsman’s “evidence,” without even attempting to explain how he arrived at this conclusion.

We note in this regard that the respondents’ proposed testimony tends to counteract the petitioner’s personal
defense of good faith (i.e., that he had no actual participation and merely relied on his subordinates) in
approving the job orders and in his concurrence with the inspection reports. Particularly telling is the
respondents’ statement that a number of pre-repair inspection reports for a particular month in 2001 bear the
petitioner’s signature despite the fact that these reports are not supported by findings from the respondents as
SIT members. This kind of statement cannot but impact on how the Ombudsman viewed the question of
“absolute necessity” of the respondents’ testimony since this testimony meets the defense of good faith head-on
to prove the prosecution’s allegations. Under these circumstances, we cannot preempt, foreclose, nor replace
with our own the Ombudsman’s position on this point as it is clearly not without basis.

VB. The respondents do not appear to be most guilty

The fact that the respondents had previously been found administratively liable, based on the same set of facts,
does not necessarily make them the “most guilty.” An administrative case is altogether different from a criminal
case, such that the disposition in the former does not necessarily result in the same disposition for the latter,
although both may arise from the same set of facts.

VI. The policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s investigatory and prosecutor powers cautions
a stay of judicial hand

The Constitution and RA No. 6770 have endowed the Office of the Ombudsman with a wide latitude of
investigatory and prosecutory powers, freed, to the extent possible within our governmental system and
structure, from legislative, executive, or judicial intervention, and insulated from outside pressure and improper
influence. Consistent with this purpose and subject to the command of paragraph 2, Section 1, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, the Court reiterates its policy of non-interference with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers (among them, the power to grant immunity to witnesses), and respects
the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of
the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.”

Ocampo IV v. Ombudsman

The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutory powers granted by the
Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the functions of the courts
will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of investigatory proceedings
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed before it, in much the same way that
the courts would be extremely swamped if they could be compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the
part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a
complaint by a private complainant.

7) In re Save the Supreme Court, 746 SCRA 352

FACTS:
This is a Special Civil Action in the SC for Mandamus. This case involves the abolition of the JDF and replacing
it with the Judiciary Support Fund (JSF).

Petitioner prays for the issuance of a Writ of Mandamus in order to compel this Court to exercise its
Judicial Independence and Fiscal Autonomy against the perceived hostility of Congress. Petitioner alleged that
he is a Filipino citizen and a taxpayer and that he filed this Petition as part of his “continuing crusade to defend
and uphold the Constitution” and that he is concerned about the threats against the Judiciary after the
promulgation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) case and the Disbursement Acceleration
Program case. House Bill No. 4738 was filed as “The Act Creating the JSF under the National Treasury,
repealing for the purpose P.D. No. 1949”, which required this court to remit its JDF collections to the National
Treasury. On the same day of the filing of H.B. No. 4738, President Aquino gave his SONA stating his message
to the SC, “We do not want 2 equal branches of government to go head to head, needing a 3rd branch to step
in to intervene...”
Petitioner argues that:
> Congress gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal autonomy
of the SC.
>Congress exercises its power in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility by
abolishing the JDF of the SC.
>Congress should not act as “wreckers of the law” by threatening “to clip the powers of the High Tribunal.”
>Congress committed a “blunder of monumental proportions” when it reduced the Judiciary’s 2015 budget.

Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to revoke/abrogate and expunge whatever irreconcilable
contravention of existing laws affecting judicial independence and fiscal autonomy.

ISSUE:
Whether Petitioner has sufficiently shown grounds for this Court to grant the Petition and issue a Writ of
Mandamus — NO
RULING:

The power of Judicial Review is subject to certain limitations. Petitioner must comply the following requisites for
Judicial Review before this Court takes cognizance of the case: a) There must be an actual case/controversy; b)
locus standi; c) Question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and d) Issue of constitutionality must be the
very lis mota of the case. Petitioner failed to comply with the 1st and 2nd requisite which warrants the outright
dismissal of the Petition. This Court is not empowered to review proposed bills because a bill is not a law, thus,
the striking down of proposed bills abolishing JDF is not included in the powers vested to the SC. Even
assuming that there is an actual controversy, Petitioner has no legal standing to question the validity of the
proposed bill because he has not shown that he has or will sustain a direct injury if the proposed bill is passed
into law. Mandamus will not lie “to compel an official to do anything which is not his duty to do or which it is his
duty not to do, or to give to the applicant anything to which he is not entitled by law.” Petitioner has not shown
how he is entitled to the relief prayed for so this Court cannot be compelled to exercise its power of judicial
review since there’s no actual case. Courts do not have the power of the purse. Except for a Constitutional
provision that requires that the budget of the Judiciary should not go below the appropriation for the previous
year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how low the budget is. The entire budget of the Judiciary
does not only come from the National Government, the Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the Judiciary to
maintain its independence.

8) Macalintal v. PET, 635 SCRA 783

FACTS
Petitioner Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal, through a Motion for Reconsideration reiterates his arguments that
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution does not provide for the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal
(PET) and that the PET violates Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution. In order to strengthen his position,
petitioner cites the concurring opinion of Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-de Castro in “Barok” C. Biraogo v. The
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a public office which cannot
be created by the president, the power to do so being lodged exclusively with Congress. Thus, petitioner
submits that if the President, as head of the Executive Department, cannot create the PTC, the Supreme Court,
likewise, cannot create the PET in the absence of an act of legislature.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is Constitutional

RULING:
Motion for Reconsideration DENIED.
Judicial power granted to the Supreme Court by the same Constitution is plenary. And under the
doctrine of necessary implication, the additional jurisdiction bestowed by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article
VII of the Constitution to decide presidential and vice-presidential elections contests includes the means
necessary to carry it into effect.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which provides
that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law."
Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of "dealing with the settlement of disputes,
controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" is
apportioned to courts of justice. With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to
include "the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally
demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government." The
power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal is going to town under the misplaced assumption that the text of the provision
itself was the only basis for this Court to sustain the PET’s constitutionality.
The Court reiterates that the PET is authorized by the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution and as supported by the discussions of the Members of the Constitutional Commission, which
drafted the present Constitution.
The explicit reference by the framers of our Constitution to constitutionalizing what was merely statutory
before is not diluted by the absence of a phrase, line or word, mandating the Supreme Court to create a
Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
Suffice it to state that the Constitution, verbose as it already is, cannot contain the specific wording
required by petitioner in order for him to accept the constitutionality of the PET.
“The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral contests as
essentially an exercise of judicial power.
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is vested in the
municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels - city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial - exclusive and
original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives and Senate Electoral
Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although not courts of law, they are,
nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in essence, an exercise of judicial power,
because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and
Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the
COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review -
via a petition for certiorari filed by the proper party - if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with
grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-presidential
election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case of Angara v. Electoral
Commission, Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the Constitution had not
provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of government along constitutional channels." In fact,
Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the
1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in conjunction with
latter's exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts, the task of deciding presidential and vice-presidential
election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The power wielded by PET is a derivative of the
plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law, expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the
Constitution draws a thin, but, nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House Electoral
Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII. Surely, the petitioner will
be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly
provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively,
effectively exempts the Justices-Members thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same
vein, it is the Constitution itself, in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting
the PET, from the same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court were
designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an institution
independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court. McCulloch v. State of
Maryland proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this
power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during
the discussions on the grant of power to this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner's,
should not constrict an absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power”
Finally, petitioner’s application of the Court’s decision in Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission to the
present case is an unmitigated quantum leap.
The decision therein held that the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) “finds justification under Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution.” A plain reading of the constitutional provisions, i.e., last paragraph of Section
4 and Section 17, both of Article VII on the Executive Branch, reveals that the two are differently worded and
deal with separate powers of the Executive and the Judicial Branches of government. And as previously
adverted to, the basis for the constitution of the PET was, in fact, mentioned in the deliberations of the Members
of the Constitutional Commission during the drafting of the present Constitution.

Section 2: The Congress shall have the power to define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of the
various courts but may not deprive the Supreme Court of its jurisdiction over cases enumerated in
Section 5 hereof.

No law shall be passed reorganizing the Judiciary when it undermines the security of tenure of its
Members.

1) Vivas v. Monetary Board, G. R. No. 191424, August 7, 2013

FACTS
The Rural Bank of Faire, Incorporated (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution that the corporate
life expired on May 2005. Vivas and the new management team conducted internal audit and introduced
measures to revitalize the dismal operation of the bank. BSP on December 2006 extended RBFI corporate life
for another 50 years and approve the change of its name to EuroCredit Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI).

General examination of ECBI from 2007 to 2009 were conducted by BSP and was placed under Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA) by the Monetary Board in 2008 because of the serious findings and supervisory
concerns noted during the general examination. The MB posited that ECBI unjustly refused to allow the BSP
examiners from examining and inspecting its books and records and hence issued Resolution No. 726 imposing
monetary penalty/fine and referred it to the Office of the Special Investigation for filing of appropriate legal
action.

The MB issued Resolution No. 823 on June 2009, approving the issuance of a cease and desist order against
ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were considered unsafe or unsound
banking practices, and from doing such other acts or transactions constituting fraud or might result in the
dissipation of its assets. It was also prohibited from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and
affairs under receivership through OSI recommendation.

Vivas filed petition for prohibition ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from
continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:
The petitioner presents the following ARGUMENTS:

(a) It is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general law embodied in Section
30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sections 11 and 14 of the Rural
Banks Act of 1992.

(b) Even if it is assumed that Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act is applicable, it is still the gravest abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction to execute the law with manifest arbitrariness, abuse of
discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to further execute a mandate well in excess of its
parameters.

(c) The power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under receiverships is
unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2,
Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.

Respondent/s’ contention/s:

The MB issued Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership in accordance with the recommendation of
the ISD II which reads:

On the basis of the examination findings as of 30 September 2009 as reported by the Integrated Supervision
Department (ISD) II, in its memorandum dated 17 February 2010, which findings showed that the Eurocredit
Community Bank, Inc. – a Rural Bank (Eurocredit Bank) (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in
the ordinary course of business; (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities; (c) cannot continue in
business without involving probable losses to its depositors and creditors; and (d) has willfully violated a cease
and desist order of the Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound
banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the assets of the institution,
and considering the failure of the Board of Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s
financial health and viability despite considerable time given to address the bank’s financial problems, and that
the bank had been accorded due process, the Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653
(The New Central Bank Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II as follows:

To prohibit the Eurocredit Bank from doing business in the Philippines and to place its assets and affairs under
receivership; and

To designate the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation as Receiver of the bank.

ISSUES

1. WON there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to loss of jurisdiction to apply the general law embodied in
Section 30 of the New Central Bank Act as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sections 11 and 14 of the
Rural Banks Act of 1992.

2. WON the power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural banks under
receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the powers of the Supreme Court, in
violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine Constitution.

RULING
1. No grave abuse of discretion can be attributed to the MB for the issuance of the assailed Resolution
No. 276.

The thrust of Vivas’ argument is that ECBI did not commit any financial fraud and, hence, its placement under
receivership was unwarranted and improper. He asserts that, instead, the BSP should have taken over the
management of ECBI and extended loans to the financially distrained bank pursuant to Sections 11 and 14 of
R.A. No. 7353 because the BSP’s power is limited only to supervision and management take-over of banks, and
not receivership.
Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith,
stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A.
No. 7353 which states that the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing.33 He
adds that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should prevail over R.A. No. 7653 which is a
general law.

The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that ECBI was given every
opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing. The records disclose that BSP officials and
examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas, and discussed their findings.34 There were
also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that
failure to submit them and a written explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary
penalty.35 More importantly, ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration. For failure of ECBI to comply,
the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726.
Having been heard on its motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right under
the Rural Bank Act.

Close Now, Hear Later

At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing. Accordingly, there is no conflict which would call for the
application of the doctrine that a special law should prevail over a general law. It must be emphasized that
R.A .No. 7653 is a later law and under said act, the power of the MB over banks, including rural banks, was
increased and expanded. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653, has been invested with more power of closure and
placement of a bank under receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in
business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas
Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela, the Court reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating
that it was justified as a measure for the protection of the public interest. Thus:

The "close now, hear later" doctrine has already been justified as a measure for the protection of the public
interest. Swift action is called for on the part of the BSP when it finds that a bank is in dire straits. Unless
adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against distressed and mismanaged banks,
public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to
mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors, and stockholders, who all deserve the protection
of the government.

In the case at bench, the ISD II submitted its memorandum, dated February 17, 2010, containing the findings
noted during the general examination conducted on ECBI with the cut-off date of September 30, 2009. The
memorandum underscored the inability of ECBI to pay its liabilities as they would fall due in the usual course of
its business, its liabilities being in excess of the assets held. Also, it was noted that ECBI’s continued banking
operation would most probably result in the incurrence of additional losses to the prejudice of its depositors and
creditors. On top of these, it was found that ECBI had willfully violated the cease-and-desist order of the MB
issued in its June 24, 2009 Resolution, and had disregarded the BSP rules and directives. For said reasons, the
MB was forced to issue the assailed Resolution No. 276 placing ECBI under receivership. In addition, the MB
stressed that it accorded ECBI ample time and opportunity to address its monetary problem and to restore and
improve its financial health and viability but it failed to do so.

In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective measures enunciated in
Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified. Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A. No.
7353 was no longer feasible considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions
of insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would effectively put a stop to the further
draining of its assets.

2. No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power

The rationale for the constitutional proscription is that "legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the
law cannot be delegated. What can be delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced,
not what the law shall be. The ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This
prerogative cannot be abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate."

"There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative power, viz,
the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its
terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will
have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the
law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running riot. Both
tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to
step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative."

In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative authority in the issuance of R.A.
No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered
the MB to effectively monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances warrant, to
forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place them under receivership. The legislature
has clearly spelled out the reasonable parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the
manner of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and latitude only as to how
the law should be implemented in order to attain its objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking
industry and the economy.

Section 3: The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Appropriations for the Judiciary may not be
reduced by the legislature below the amount appropriated for the previous year and, after approval,
shall be automatically and regularly released.

1) In re Save the Supreme Court, supra.

FACTS
This case involves the proposed bills (House Bills 4690 and 4738) abolishing the Judiciary Development Fund
and replacing it with the “Judiciary Support Fund.” Funds collected from the proposed Judiciary Support Fund
shall be remitted to the national treasury and Congress shall determine how the funds will be used.

Petitioner Rolly Mijares (Mijares) prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus in order to compel this court to
exercise its judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as provided by Section 3, Article 8 of the 1987
Constitution against the perceived hostility of Congress.

The complaint implied that certain acts of members of Congress and the President after the promulgation of
these cases show a threat to judicial independence.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:
a. Congress “gravely abused its discretion with a blatant usurpation of judicial independence and fiscal
autonomy of the Supreme Court.

b. Congress is exercising its power “in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
hostility by abolishing the ‘Judiciary Development Fund’ (JDF) of the Supreme Court.”

c. Congress should not act as “wreckers of the law” by threatening “to clip the powers of the High Tribunal.
Congress committed a “blunder of monumental proportions” when it reduced the judiciary’s 2015 budget.

Petitioner prays that this court exercise its powers to “REVOKE/ABROGATE and EXPUNGE whatever
irreconcilable contravention of existing laws affecting the judicial independence and fiscal autonomy as
mandated under the Constitution to better serve public interest and general welfare of the people.

ISSUE
W/N The Court should grant the Petitioner’s prayer

RULING
No.

The judiciary is the weakest branch of government. It does not have an army to enforce its writs. Courts do not
have the power of the purse. “Except for a constitutional provision that requires that the budget of the judiciary
should not go below the appropriation for the previous year, it is beholden to the Congress depending on how
low the budget is.”

Despite being the third co-equal branch of the government, the judiciary enjoys less than 1% of the total budget
for the national government.

Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE) which pays for sundry matters such as utility payments,
paper, gasoline and others was only P1, 220,905,000.00 in 2014. Although the amount in itself seems large, it
significantly dwindles when divided among all lower courts in the country.

In comparison, the 2014 MOOE allocation for the House of Representatives was P3,386,439,000.00 or about
P282.2 million per month for the maintenance and operation of the House of Representatives compound. Even
if this amount was divided equally among the 234 legislative districts, a representative’s office space would still
have a monthly MOOE allocation of approximately P1.2 million, which is significantly higher than the average
P46,000.00 allocated monthly to each trial court.

It was only in 2013 that the budget allocated to the judiciary included an item for the construction, rehabilitation,
and repair of the halls of justice in the capital outlay. The amount allocated was P1 million.

In 2014, there was no item for the construction, rehabilitation, and repair of the halls of justice. This allocation
would have been used to help fund the repair of existing halls of justice and the construction of new halls of
justice in the entire country, including those courts destroyed by Typhoon Yolanda and the 2013 earthquake.

The entire budget for the judiciary, however, does not only come from the national government. The
Constitution grants fiscal autonomy to the judiciary to maintain its independence. In Bengzon v. Drilon:62

The Judiciary, the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman must have the independence and flexibility
needed in the discharge of their constitutional duties. The imposition of restrictions and constraints on the
manner the independent constitutional offices allocate and utilize the funds appropriated for their operations is
anathema to fiscal autonomy and violative not only of the express mandate of the Constitution but especially as
regards the Supreme Court, of the independence and separation of powers upon which the entire fabric of our
constitutional system is based.

Courts, therefore, must also be accountable with their own budget. The Judiciary Development Fund, used to
augment the expenses of the judiciary, is regularly accounted for by this court on a quarterly basis. The financial
reports are readily available at the Supreme Court website.

These funds, however, are still not enough to meet the expenses of lower courts and guarantee credible
compensation for their personnel. The reality is that halls of justice exist because we rely on the generosity of
local government units that provide additional subsidy to our judges. If not, the budget for the construction,
repair, and rehabilitation of halls of justice is with the Department of Justice.

As a result, our fiscal autonomy and judicial independence are often undermined by low levels of budgetary
outlay, the lack of provision for maintenance and operating expenses, and the reliance on local government
units and the Department of Justice.

“Courts are not constitutionally built to do political lobbying. By constitutional design, it is a co-equal department
to the Congress and the Executive. By temperament, our arguments are legal, not political. We are best when
we lay down all our premises in the finding of facts, interpretation of the law and understanding of precedents.
We are not trained to produce a political statement or a media release.”
“Because of the nature of courts, that is – that it has to decide in favor of one party, we may not have a political
base. Certainly, we should not even consider building a political base. All we have is an abiding faith that we
should do what we could to ensure that the Rule of Law prevails. It seems that we have no champions when it
comes to ensuring the material basis for fiscal autonomy or judicial independence.”

For this reason, we appreciate petitioner’s concern for the judiciary. It is often only through the vigilance of
private citizens that issues relating to the judiciary can be discussed in the political sphere. Unfortunately, the
remedy he seeks cannot be granted by this court. But his crusade is not a lost cause. Considering that what he
seeks to be struck down is a proposed bill, it would be better for him to air his concerns by lobbying in
Congress. There, he may discover the representatives and senators who may have a similar enthusiastic
response to truly making the needed investments in the Rule of Law.

Section 4:
1. The Supreme Court shall be composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. It may sit
en banc or in its discretion, in division of three, five, or seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence thereof.

2. All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law,
which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court
are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part
in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon.

3. Cases or matters heard by a division shall be decided or resolved with the concurrence of a majority
of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon,
and in no case without the concurrence of at least three of such Members. When the required number is
not obtained, the case shall be decided en banc: Provided, that no doctrine or principle of law laid down
by the court in a decision rendered en banc or in division may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.

1) Republic v. Garcia, 527 SCRA 495

FACTS

Republic filed a petition for forfeiture of unlawfully acquired properties, with a verified urgent ex-parte application
for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment, before the Sandiganbayan, against Maj. Gen. Carlos F.
Garcia, his wife.

Sandiganbayan issued a resolution ordering the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment against the
properties of the Garcias upon the filing by the Republic of a P1 million attachment bond. To avoid delay, the
petitioner complied it under protest.

Republic filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the October 29, 2004 resolution claiming that it was exempt
from filing an attachment bond and praying for the release thereof.

Sandiganbayan ruled that there was nothing in the Rules of Court that exempted the Republic from filing an
attachment bond. It reexamined the case of Tolentino v. Carlos, which was invoked by the Republic to justify its
claimed exemption and ruled that said case was decided under the old Code of Civil Procedure enacted more
than a century ago.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has the authority to re-examine cases decided by the Supreme Court? (SB
has no authority to do so.)

RULING

The Sandiganbayan transgressed the Constitution and arrogated upon itself a power that it did not by law
possess. All courts must take their bearings from the decisions and rulings of this Court. Tolentino has not been
superseded or reversed. Thus, it is existing jurisprudence and continues to form an important part of our legal
system. Surprisingly, the Sandiganbayan declared that Tolentino “needed to be carefully re-examined in the
light of the changes that the rule on attachment had undergone through the years.”

2) In re Letterts of Atty. E. Mendoza, A.M. No. 11-10-1-SC, March, 13, 2012

FACTS
Petitioner/s’ contention/s:
Respondent/s’ contention/s:

ISSUE

RULING

3) Lorenzo v. GSIS, G.R. No. 188385, October 3, 2013

FACTS

This case emanates from a simple claim for Employees’ Compensation death benefits filed by the
petitioner, surviving spouse of Rosario D. Lorenzo, an elementary teacher and a member of the GSIS.
The records show that she was previously diagnosed for Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia which
caused her death. Petitioner, being the surviving spouse, claimed for Employees Compensation death
benefits from the GSIS which was denied on the ground that her Leukemia is a non-occupational
disease contemplated under PD 626. The claim was raised before the ECC which was also denied.
Appeal before the CA was also denied which ruled that while Leukemia is a listed disease, it can be
compensable only among operating room personnel due to exposure to anesthetics, which was not
the case of Rosario.

When the case reached the Supreme Court, it ruled that the disease is uncompensable. The nature of
her occupation does not indicate exposure to anesthetics nor does it increase the risk of developing
Chronic Myelogenous Leukemia. There was no showing that her work involved frequent and sufficient
exposure to substances established as occupational risk factors of the disease. The petitioner must
have at least provided sufficient basis, if not medical information which could help determine the
causal connection between Rosario’s ailment and her exposure to muriatic acid, floor wax and paint as
well as the rigors of her work. The Supreme Court find such factors insufficient to demonstrate the
probability that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions of Rosario as
a public school teacher; enough to support the claim of petitioner that his wife is entitled to employees
compensation.

Note: The issue that relates to the discussion on the Judiciary under the Constitution is discussed
under the separate concurring decision of Justice Brion. His basis of his concurring decision on the
ground that the supreme court cannot review the uniform factual findings of the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS), the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC) and the Court of
Appeals (CA) that there is no reasonable connection between Rosario’s leukemia and her employment
as a teacher in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari.

Justice Brion’s opinion stated:

While I agree with the ponencia’s conclusion, I am of the position that this Court should have denied
the petition on the mere ground that it cannot review questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition. As a
general rule, the factual findings of the appellate court are conclusive and binding on the parties when
supported by substantial evidence, and are not reviewable by this Court. “Moreover, findings of fact of
administrative agencies and quasi-judicial bodies, which have acquired expertise because their
jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally accorded not only respect but finality when
affirmed by the [CA].”
However, we may probe and resolve questions of fact in a Rule 45 petition as exceptions to the
general rule, to wit:
(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures;
(2) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;

(3) when there is grave abuse of discretion;

(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts;

(5) when the findings of facts are conflicting;

(6) when in making its findings, the CA went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary
to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee;

(7) when the findings are contrary to the trial court;

(8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;

(9) when the facts set forth in the petition, as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs, are not
disputed by the respondent;

(10) when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by
the evidence on record; and

(11) when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties, which, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.
None of these exceptions are present in this case. Thus, the ponencia should have restrained itself
from reviewing the factual issue at hand because this is beyond the Court’s scope of review. The
ponencia should not have reviewed and evaluated the pieces of evidence all over again in the present
case.

Section 5: The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:

1. Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls,
and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.

2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:

a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation is
in question.

b. All cases involving the legality of any tax, impost, assessment, or toll, or any penalty imposed in
relation thereto.

c. All cases in which the jurisdiction of any lower court is in issue.

d. All criminal cases in which the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua or higher.

e. All cases in which only an error or question of law is involved.

3. Assign temporarily judges of lower courts to other stations as public interest may require. Such
temporary assignment shall not exceed six months without the consent of the judge concerned.

4. Order a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice.

5. Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the integrated bar, and legal
assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a simplified and inexpensive procedure for
the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for all courts of the same grade, and shall not
diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial
bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.

6. Appoint all officials and employees of the Judiciary in accordance with the Civil Service Law.

1) Republic v. Sereno, G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018

DOCTRINE:
Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may be availed of when the subject act or
omission was committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an official’s qualifications to
hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it relates to the
qualification of integrity being a continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a
validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or to disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

FACTS:
From 1986 to 2006, Sereno served as a member of the faculty of the University of the Philippines-College of
Law. While being employed at the UP Law, or from October 2003 to 2006, Sereno was concurrently employed
as legal counsel of the Republic in two international arbitrations known as the PIATCO cases, and a Deputy
Commissioner of the Commissioner on Human Rights.

The Human Resources Development Office of UP (UP HRDO) certified that there was no record on Sereno’s
file of any permission to engage in limited practice of profession. Moreover, out of her 20 years of employment,
only nine (9) Statement of Assets, Liabilities, and Net Worth (SALN) were on the records of UP HRDO. In a
manifestation, she attached a copy of a tenth SALN, which she supposedly sourced from the “filing cabinets” or
“drawers of UP”. The Ombudsman likewise had no record of any SALN filed by Sereno. The JBC has certified
to the existence of one SALN. In sum, for 20 years of service, 11 SALNs were recovered.

On August 2010, Sereno was appointed as Associate Justice. On 2012, the position of Chief Justice was
declared vacant, and the JBC directed the applicants to submit documents, among which are “all previous
SALNs up to December 31, 2011” for those in the government and “SALN as of December 31, 2011” for those
from the private sector. The JBC announcement further provided that “applicants with incomplete or out-of-date
documentary requirements will not be interviewed or considered for nomination.” Sereno expressed in a letter to
JBC that since she resigned from UP Law on 2006 and became a private practitioner, she was treated as
coming from the private sector and only submitted three (3) SALNs or her SALNs from the time she became an
Associate Justice. Sereno likewise added that “considering that most of her government records in the academe
are more than 15 years old, it is reasonable to consider it infeasible to retrieve all of those files,” and that the
clearance issued by UP HRDO and CSC should be taken in her favor. There was no record that the letter was
deliberated upon. Despite this, on a report to the JBC, Sereno was said to have “complete requirements.” On
August 2012, Sereno was appointed Chief Justice.

On August 2017, an impeachment complaint was filed by Atty. Larry Gadon against Sereno, alleging that
Sereno failed to make truthful declarations in her SALNs. The House of Representatives proceeded to hear the
case for determination of probable cause, and it was said that Justice Peralta, the chairman of the JBC then,
was not made aware of the incomplete SALNs of Sereno. Other findings were made: such as pieces of jewelry
amounting to P15,000, that were not declared on her 1990 SALN, but was declared in prior years’ and
subsequent years’ SALNs, failure of her husband to sign one SALN, execution of the 1998 SALN only in 2003

On February 2018, Atty. Eligio Mallari wrote to the OSG, requesting that the latter, in representation of the
Republic, initiate a quo warranto proceeding against Sereno. The OSG, invoking the Court’s original jurisdiction
under Section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution in relation to the special civil action under Rule 66, the
Republic, through the OSG filed the petition for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of quo warranto to declare
as void Sereno’s appointment as CJ of the SC and to oust and altogether exclude Sereno therefrom.
[yourlawyersays]

Capistrano, Sen. De Lima, Sen. Trillianes, et. al., intervened. Sereno then filed a Motion for Inhibition against AJ
Bersamin, Peralta, Jardeleza, Tijam, and Leonardo-De Castro, imputing actual bias for having testified against
her on the impeachment hearing before the House of Representatives.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:
Office of the Solicitor General (petitioner):

OSG argues that the quo warranto is an available remedy because what is being sought is to question the
validity of her appointment, while the impeachment complaint accuses her of committing culpable violation of
the Constitution and betrayal of public trust while in office, citing Funa v. Chairman Villar, Estrada v. Desierto
and Nacionalista Party v. De Vera. OSG maintains that the phrase “may be removed from office” in Section 2,
Article XI of the Constitution means that Members of the SC may be removed through modes other than
impeachment.

OSG contends that it is seasonably filed within the one-year reglementary period under Section 11, Rule 66
since Sereno’s transgressions only came to light during the impeachment proceedings. Moreover, OSG claims
that it has an imprescriptible right to bring a quo warranto petition under the maxim nullum tempus occurit regi
(“no time runs against the king”) or prescription does not operate against the government. The State has a
continuous interest in ensuring that those who partake of its sovereign powers are qualified. Even assuming that
the one-year period is applicable to the OSG, considering that SALNs are not published, the OSG will have no
other means by which to know the disqualification.

Moreover, OSG maintains that the SC has jurisdiction, citing A.M. No. 10-4-20-SC which created a permanent
Committee on Ethics and Ethical Standards, tasked to investigate complaints involving graft and corruption and
ethical violations against members of the SC and contending that this is not a political question because such
issue may be resolved through the interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, laws, JBC rules, and
Canons of Judicial Ethics.

OSG seeks to oust Sereno from her position as CJ on the ground that Sereno failed to show that she is a
person of proven integrity which is an indispensable qualification for membership in the Judiciary under Section
7(3), Article VIII of the Constitution. According to the OSG, because OSG failed to fulfill the JBC requirement of
filing the complete SALNs, her integrity remains unproven. The failure to submit her SALN, which is a legal
obligation, should have disqualified Sereno from being a candidate; therefore, she has no right to hold the
office. Good faith cannot be considered as a defense since the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA No.
3019) and Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA No. 6713) are
special laws and are thus governed by the concept of malum prohibitum, wherein malice or criminal intent is
completely immaterial.

Respondent/s’ contention/s:
Sereno contends that an impeachable officer may only be ousted through impeachment, citing Section 2 of
Article XI of the Constitution, and Mayor Lecaroz v. Sandiganbayan, Cuenca v. Hon. Fernan, In Re: First
lndorsement from Hon. Gonzales, and Re: Complaint-Affidavit for Disbarment Against SAJ Antonio T. Carpio.
Sereno contends that the clear intention of the framers of the Constitution was to create an exclusive category
of public officers who can be removed only by impeachment and not otherwise. Impeachment was chosen as
the method of removing certain high-ranking government officers to shield them from harassment suits that will
prevent them from performing their functions which are vital to the continued operations of government. Sereno
further argues that the word “may” on Section 2 of Article XI only qualifies the penalty imposable after the
impeachment trial, i.e., removal from office. Sereno contends that the since the mode is wrong, the SC has no
jurisdiction.

Sereno likewise argues that the cases cited by OSG is not in all fours with the present case because the
President and the Vice President may, in fact, be removed by means other than impeachment on the basis of
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution vesting in the Court the power to be the “sole judge” of all contests
relating to the qualifications of the President and the Vice-President. There is no such provision for other
impeachable officers. Moreover, on the rest of the cases cited by the OSG, there is no mention that quo
warranto may be allowed.

Sereno also argues that since a petition for quo warranto may be filed before the RTC, such would result to a
conundrum because a judge of lower court would have effectively exercised disciplinary power and
administrative supervision over an official of the Judiciary much higher in rank and is contrary to Sections 6 and
11, Article VIII of the Constitution which vests upon the SC disciplinary and administrative power over all courts
and the personnel thereof.

Sereno likewise posits that if a Member of the SC can be ousted through quo warrantoinitiated by the OSG, the
Congress’ “check” on the SC through impeachment would be rendered inutile.

Furthermore, Sereno argues that it is already time-barred. Section 11, Rule 66 provides that a petition for quo
warranto must be filed within one (1) year from the “cause of ouster” and not from the “discovery” of the
disqualification.

Moreover, Sereno contends that the Court cannot presume that she failed to file her SALNs because as a public
officer, she enjoys the presumption that her appointment to office was regular. OSG failed to overcome the
presumption created by the certifications from UP HRDO that she had been cleared of all administrative
responsibilities and charges. Her integrity is a political question which can only be decided by the JBC and the
President.

Regarding her missing SALNs, Sereno contends that the fact that SALNs are missing cannot give rise to the
inference that they are not filed. The fact that 11 SALNs were filed should give an inference to a pattern of filing,
not of non-filing.

Intervenors’ arguments:

The intervenors argue that it is not incumbent upon Sereno to prove to the JBC that she possessed the integrity
required by the Constitution; rather, the onus of determining whether or not she qualified for the post fell upon
the JBC. Moreover, submission of SALNs is not a constitutional requirement; what is only required is the
imprimatur of the JBC. The intervenors likewise contend that “qualifications” such as citizenship, age, and
experience are enforceable while “characteristics” such as competence, integrity, probity, and independence
are mere subjective considerations.

ISSUE RELATED TO SECTION 5:

1. Whether the Court can assume jurisdiction and give due course to the instant petition for quo
warranto.

OTHER ISSUES:
2. Whether the Court should entertain the motion for intervention.
3. Whether the Court should grant the motion for the inhibition of Sereno against five Justices.
 4. Whether Sereno may be the respondent in a quo warranto proceeding notwithstanding the fact
that an impeachment complaint has already been filed with the House of Representatives.
5. Whether Sereno, who is an impeachable officer, can be the respondent in a quo warranto
proceeding, i.e., whether the only way to remove an impeachable officer is impeachment.
6. Whether to take cognizance of the quo warranto proceeding is violative of the principle of
separation of powers
7. Whether the petition is outrightly dismissible on the ground of prescription
8. Whether the determination of a candidate’s eligibility for nomination is the sole and exclusive
function of the JBC and whether such determination. partakes of the character of a political question
outside the Court’s supervisory and review powers;
9. Whether the filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement for the position of Chief
Justice.
10. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno failed to file her SALNs as mandated
by the Constitution and required by the law and its implementing rules and regulations
11. If answer to ninth issue is in the affirmative, whether Sereno filed SALNs are not filed properly
and promptly.
12. Whether Sereno failed to comply with the submission of SALNs as required by the JBC
13. If answer to the twelfth issue is in the affirmative, whether the failure to submit SALNs to the
JBC voids the nomination and appointment of Sereno as Chief Justice;
14. In case of a finding that Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice, whether the
subsequent nomination by the JBC and the appointment by the President cured such ineligibility.
15. Whether Sereno is a de jure or a de facto officer.

RULINGS:
1. A quo warranto petition is allowed against impeachable officials and SC has jurisdiction.

The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to issue the extraordinary writs, including quo
warranto. A direct invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is allowed when there are
special and important reasons therefor, and in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the petition is likewise of transcendental importance
and has far-reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its power of judicial review. To exercise
restraint in reviewing an impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a judicial duty. an outright
dismissal of the petition based on speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is a clear
abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy squarely presented before it. Quo warranto
proceedings are essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the Supreme Court’s constitutional
duty and power to decide cases and settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be abdicated or
transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other branch of the government including the Congress, even as it
acts as an impeachment court through the Senate.

To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of
the election or appointment of a public official based on predetermined rules while impeachment is a political
process to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto proceedings referring to offices filled by
appointment, what is determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public office may not be
contested collaterally but only directly, by quo warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a
public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall be commenced by a verified petition brought
in the name of the Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor. The SolGen
is given permissible latitude within his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only by the
national interest and the government policy on the matter at hand.

2. The intervention is improper.

Intervention is a remedy by which a third party, not originally impleaded in the proceedings, becomes a litigant
therein for a certain purpose: to enable the third party to protect or preserve a right or interest that may be
affected by those proceedings. The remedy of intervention is not a matter of right but rests on the sound
discretion of the court upon compliance with the first requirement on legal interest and the second requirement
that no delay and prejudice should result. The justification of one’s “sense of patriotism and their common desire
to protect and uphold the Philippine Constitution”, and that of the Senator De Lima’s and Trillanes’ intervention
that their would-be participation in the impeachment trial as Senators-judges if the articles of impeachment will
be filed before the Senate as the impeachment court will be taken away is not sufficient. The interest
contemplated by law must be actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent or
expectant. Moreover, the petition of quo warranto is brought in the name of the Republic. It is vested in the
people, and not in any private individual or group, because disputes over title to public office are viewed as a
public question of governmental legitimacy and not merely a private quarrel among rival claimants.

3. There is no basis for the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to inhibit in the case.

It is true that a judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the duty of doing it in a manner
completely free from suspicion as to its fairness and as to his integrity. However, the right of a party to seek the
inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and
independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of
repression. Bias must be proven with clear and convincing evidence. Those justices who were present at the
impeachment proceedings were armed with the requisite imprimatur of the Court En Banc, given that the
Members are to testify only on matters within their personal knowledge. The mere imputation of bias or partiality
is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is without basis. There must be acts or conduct
clearly indicative of arbitrariness or prejudice before it can brand them with the stigma of bias or partiality.
Sereno’s call for inhibition has been based on speculations, or on distortions of the language, context and
meaning of the answers the Justices may have given as sworn witnesses in the proceedings before the House.

Moreover, insinuations that the Justices of the SC are towing the line of President Duterte in entertaining the
quo warranto petition must be struck for being unfounded and for sowing seeds of mistrust and discordance
between the Court and the public. The Members of the Court are beholden to no one, except to the sovereign
Filipino people who ordained and promulgated the Constitution. It is thus inappropriate to misrepresent that the
SolGen who has supposedly met consistent litigation success before the SG shall likewise automatically and
positively be received in the present quo warranto action. As a collegial body, the Supreme Court adjudicates
without fear or favor. The best person to determine the propriety of sitting in a case rests with the magistrate
sought to be disqualified.

4. Simultaneous quo warranto proceeding and impeachment proceeding is not forum shopping and is
allowed.
Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently of each other as these remedies are distinct as to
(1) jurisdiction (2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and dismissal, and (4) limitations.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts,
simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts
and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either pending in or already resolved
adversely by some other court, to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then
in another. The test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is
identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of the controversy in this quo warranto
proceedings is the determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief Justice position to be
considered as an impeachable officer in the first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue
in quo warranto proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno legally holds the public office
and thus, is an impeachable officer, the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable offenses to
warrant her removal from office.

Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease
from holding a public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover, impeachment, a conviction for the
charges of impeachable offenses shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office that he/she
is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first
place, does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to
be initiated by the filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at the moment, there is no
pending impeachment case against Sereno. The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely
a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with a crime.

5. Impeachment is not an exclusive remedy by which an invalidly appointed or invalidly elected

impeachable official may be removed from office.

The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not foreclose a quo warranto action against
impeachable officers: “Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Supreme Court, the
Members of the Constitutional Commissions, and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on
impeachment for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution, treason, bribery, graft and corruption,
other high crimes, or betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term “may” which denote
discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an
opportunity, or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the express provision for removal by
impeachment ought not to be taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when there are other
adequate reasons to account for this express provision.”

The principle in case law is that during their incumbency, impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted
for an offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are required to be members of the Philippine
Bar to qualify for their positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The proscription does not extend to
actions assailing the public officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the PET Rules expressly
provide for the remedy of either an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of the
President and the Vice-President, both of whom are impeachable officers.
Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made absolute, that is, only those enumerated
offenses are treated as grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the enumeration likewise
purport to be a complete statement of the causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To subscribe to the view that appointments or
election of impeachable officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments or election of any
possible defect pertaining to the Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise be raised in
an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance, he or she has been determined to be of
foreign nationality or, in offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she fraudulently
represented to be a member of the Bar.

6. The Supreme Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo warranto involving a person who would otherwise
be an impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not violative of the core constitutional
provision that impeachment cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again, the difference
between quo warranto and impeachment must be emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a
person’s culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo warranto conclusively pronounce
such culpability. The Court’s exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not preclude
Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and
transmit the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from exercising its constitutionally committed
power of impeachment.

However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even principles of plain arithmetic bear out the
conclusion that an unqualified public official should be removed from the position immediately if indeed
Constitutional and legal requirements were not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal controversy
simply because of perceived availability of another remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the
initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous and compel the entire membership of the
Legislative branch to momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on impeachment proceedings for the
possible removal of a public official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under existing laws and case
law.

For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission committed prior to or at the time of appointment or
election relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such appointment or election invalid is
properly the subject of a quo warrantopetition, provided that the requisites for the commencement thereof are
present. Contrariwise, acts or omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected
official, cannot be the subject of a quo warrantoproceeding, but of something else, which may either be
impeachment if the public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission constitutes an impeachable
offense, or disciplinary, administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

7. Prescription does not lie against the State.

The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an
action against a public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the same be commenced within one
(1) year after the cause of such ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position, arose”.
Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been applied in cases where private individuals asserting their
right of office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims title to the Office of the Chief Justice.
Instead, it is the government itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and puts in issue the
qualification of the person holding the highest position in the Judiciary.

Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a public prosecutor, when directed by the President
of the Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good reason to believe that any case specified
in the preceding section can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may be stated that
ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce
a public right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action for quo warranto, neither could there
be, for the reason that it was an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead as a defense to
an action by the Government.

That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced from the very purpose of an action for quo
warranto. Because quo warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of limitations applies to the
action. Needless to say, no prudent and just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office, much
more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s
qualification· for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even up to the present, Sereno has
not been candid on whether she filed the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment was
therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately rendered obscure.

8. The Court has supervisory authority over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its
own rules.

Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under
the supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision means “overseeing or the authority of an
officer to see to it that the subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute autonomy from the Court as
to place its non-action or improper· actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the Constitution
contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision
as to place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the Court’s supervisory and corrective powers.
While a certain leeway must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the same does not give it an
unbridled discretion to ignore Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the JBC is not
accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place the JBC’s actions in the same category as political
questions that the Court is barred from resolving.

With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the
JBC, and one of which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity,
probity, and independence. “Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to an applicant’s
good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility, irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the confidence of the litigants in
the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court must be a
person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
9. The filing of SALN is a constitutional and statutory requirement.

Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets,
liabilities, and net worth.” This has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to comply” with the
law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from
service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical standards set for public officials and employees.
The filing of the SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and accountability that failure to comply with
such requirement may result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in criminal liability. Section 11
of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to hold public office.

Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally and statutorily mandated to perform a
positive duty to disclose all of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her dissenting opinion in
one case, those who accept a public office do so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting
its burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby subject themselves to all constitutional and
legislative provisions relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their office. The public has the
right to demand the performance of those duties. More importantly, while every office in the government service
is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual
than a seat in the Judiciary.

Noncompliance with the SALN requirement indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a trivial or
a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not
persuade considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and not malum in se. Thus, it is the
omission or commission of that act as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

10. Sereno chronically failed to file her SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the Code
of Judicial Conduct.

In Sereno’s 20 years of government service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could have
easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the
Court. Yet, Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at all, for no clear reason. The
Doblada case, invoked by Sereno, cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter of the
head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and
received by the OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing SALNs are neither proven to be in
the records of nor was proven to have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the repository
agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of filing thereof were neither established by direct proof
constituting substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the statement of the Ombudsman is
categorical: “based on records on file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to 2009
except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her
SALN.

For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of proof with the certification from UP HRDO and
Ombudsman, and thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of evidence. Further, the
burden of proof in a quo warranto proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the burden rests
upon the respondent.

In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does not exempt her from filing her SALN
because it is not tantamount to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did not receive any
pay for the periods she was on leave does not make her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity”
to be exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken in favor of Sereno. During the period when
Sereno was a professor in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the President or the Ombudsman
had not yet established compliance procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and employees of State
Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order came
about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO could not have been expected to perform its
ministerial duty of issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in existence at that time.
Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money and property accountabilities and from
administrative charges as of the date of her resignation.

Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with complete requirements and in the shortlist
nominated by the JBC confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her inclusion in the shortlist
of candidates for the position of Chief Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of
integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset. Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to
have considered Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to submit her SALNs was
squarely addressed by the body. Her inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment to the
position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises
where the representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due to ignorance founded upon an
innocent mistake

11. Sereno failed to properly and promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the Constitutional and
statutory requirements .

Failure to file a truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to dishonesty if the same is
attended by malicious intent to conceal the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998 SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized
in 1993; 2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she received the bulk of her fees from
PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases were not
reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal properties were seen in her first five months as
Associate Justice. It is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying with the physical act of
filing, but also committed dishonesty betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court does not
hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal against public officials whose SALNs were found to have
contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

12. Sereno failed to submit the required SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.

The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those applicants who are incumbent Associate
Justices, absent which, the applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been considered for
nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest
of the applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for her years of service in UP Law. It is clear
that JBC did not do away with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial compliance. Subsequently, it
appeared that it was only Sereno who was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement, and
instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing justifications why she should no longer be required to file
the SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed government service only in 2009, thus her
government service is not continuous; that her government records are more than 15 years old and thus
infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC
in her 20-year service in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to comply. Moreover,
Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of
integrity especially from a Member of the Supreme Court.

Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with the submission of the SALNs but there was no
compliance at all. Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is dismissal from the service
at the first infraction. A person aspiring to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful compliance
with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability
to perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of a public officer or employee. For these
reasons, the JBC should no longer have considered Sereno for interview.

Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private practice while in UP, her false
representations that she was in private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was counsel for the
government, her false claims that the clearance from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully declare her income in her ITRs for the years
2007-2009, procured a brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused the hiring of Ms.
Macasaet without requisite public bidding, misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation
at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3 rd ASEAN Chief Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of
Associations of Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the Supreme Court’s internal rules,
manipulated the disposition of the DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of Mindanao,
ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue
delay to the release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and Justices, manipulated the
processes of the JBC to exclude then SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential document
involving national security against the latter among others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

13. Sereno’s failure to submit to the JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was not
established at the time of her application

The requirement to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is eyeing the position of Chief
Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the
failure to submit the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are divested of the opportunity to
consider the applicant’s fitness or propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case, for example,
the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits would be practically useless for the years that she failed to
submit her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches the entries indicated in the SALN.

14. Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and subsequent
appointment as Chief Justice.

Well-settled is the rule that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time of appointment and
assumption of office and also during the officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance of the
JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to
be a candidate for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said position follows as a matter of
course. The Court has ample jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC as the Court can
take judicial notice of the explanations from the JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment determining the respective rights in and to the
public office, position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice requires.

Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify Sereno. Although the JBC is an office
constitutionally created, the participation of the President in the selection and nomination process is evident
from the composition of the JBC itself.

An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only
condition that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While the Court surrenders
discretionary appointing power to the President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-negotiable
requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of
which, the appointment is susceptible to attack.

15. Sereno is a de facto officer removable through quo warranto

The effect of a finding that a person appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably valid
appointment will give him color of title that confers on him the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a
Constitutional qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief Justice and is merely holding a
colorable right or title thereto. As such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable official and her
removal from the office, other than by impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo warranto at the
instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from the appointive position of Chief Justice. [yourlawyersays]

DISPOSITIVE PORTION:

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Quo Warranto is GRANTED.

Sereno is found DISQUALIFIED from and is hereby adjudged GUILTY of UNLAWFULLY HOLDING and
EXERCISING the OFFICE OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE. Accordingly, Sereno is OUSTED and EXCLUDED
therefrom.

The position of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court is declared vacant and the Judicial and Bar Council is
directed to commence the application and nomination process.

This Decision is immediately executory without need of further action from the Court.

Sereno is ordered to SHOW CAUSE within ten (10) days from receipt hereof why she should not be sanctioned
for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct for transgressing the sub
judice rule and for casting aspersions and ill motives to the Members of the Supreme Court.

2) Liban v. Gordon, 639 SCRA 709

CASE DIGEST: DANTE V. LIBAN, REYNALDO M. BERNARDO and SALVADOR M. VIARI, Petitioners, vs.
RICHARD J. GORDON, Respondent. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RED CROSS, Intervenor.

FACTS: Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration on a Supreme Court decision which ruled that
being chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) did not disqualify him from being a Senator, and
that the charter creating PNRC is unconstitutional as the PNRC is a private corporation and the Congress is
precluded by the Constitution to create such.The Court then ordered the PNRC to incorporate itself with the
SEC as a private corporation. Respondent takes exception to the second part of the ruling, which addressed the
constitutionality of the statute creating the PNRC as a private corporation. Respondent avers that the issue of
constitutionality was only touched upon in the issue of locus standi. It is a rule that the constitutionality will not
be touched upon if it is not the lis mota of the case.

ISSUE: Was it proper for the Court to have ruled on the constitutionality of the PNRC statute?

HELD: In the case at bar, the constitutionality of the PNRC statute was raised in the issue of standing. As such,
the Court should not have declared certain provisions of such as unconstitutional. On the substantive issue, the
PNRC is sui generis. It is unlike the private corporations that the Constitution wants to prevent Congress from
creating. First, the PNRC is not organized for profit. It is an organization dedicated to assist victims of war and
administer relief to those who have been devastated by calamities, among others. It is entirely devoted to public
service. It is not covered by the prohibition since the Constitution aims to eliminate abuse by the Congress,
which tend to favor personal gain. Secondly, the PNRC was created in order to participate in the mitigation of
the effects of war, as embodied in the Geneva Convention. The creation of the PNRC is compliance with
international treaty obligations. Lastly, the PNRC is a National Society, an auxiliary of the government. It is not
like government instrumentalities and GOCC.

The PNRC is regulated directly by international humanitarian law, as opposed to local law regulating the other
mentioned entities. As such, it was improper for the Court to have declared certain portions of the PNRC statute
as unconstitutional. However, it is the stand of Justice Carpio that there is no mandate for the Government to
create a National Society to this effect. He also raises the fact that the PNRC is not sui generis in being a
private corporation organized for public needs. Justice Abad is of the opinion that the PNRC is neither private or
governmental, hence it was within the power of Congress to create.

It has been consistently held in Jurisprudence that the Court should exercise judicial restraint when it comes to
issues of constitutionality where it is not the lis mota of the case.
3) Serrano v. Gallant, 582 SCRA 254

FACTS

Petitioner Antonio Serrano was hired by respondents Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation
Co., Inc., under a POEA-approved contract of employment for 12 months, as Chief Officer, with the basic
monthly salary of US$1,400, plus $700/month overtime pay, and 7 days paid vacation leave per month.
On the date of his departure, Serrano was constrained to accept a downgraded employment contract upon the
assurance and representation of respondents that he would be Chief Officer by the end of April 1998.
Respondents did not deliver on their promise to make Serrano Chief Officer.
Hence, Serrano refused to stay on as second Officer and was repatriated to the Philippines, serving only two
months and 7 days, leaving an unexpired portion of nine months and twenty-three days.
Upon complaint filed by Serrano before the Labor Arbiter (LA), the dismissal was declared illegal.
On appeal, the NLRC modified the LA decision based on the provision of RA 8042.
Serrano filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, but this time he questioned the constitutionality of the last
clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of RA 8042.

ISSUE

1. Whether or not the subject clause violates Section 10, Article III of the Constitution on non-impairment of
contracts;
2. Whether or not the subject clause violate Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, and Section 18, Article II
and Section 3, Article XIII on labor as a protected sector.

RULING

On the first issue.

The answer is in the negative. Petitioner’s claim that the subject clause unduly interferes with the stipulations in
his contract on the term of his employment and the fixed salary package he will receive is not tenable.
The subject clause may not be declared unconstitutional on the ground that it impinges on the impairment
clause, for the law was enacted in the exercise of the police power of the State to regulate a business,
profession or calling, particularly the recruitment and deployment of OFWs, with the noble end in view of
ensuring respect for the dignity and well-being of OFWs wherever they may be employed.
On the second issue.
The answer is in the affirmative.
To Filipino workers, the rights guaranteed under the foregoing constitutional provisions translate to economic
security and parity.
Upon cursory reading, the subject clause appears facially neutral, for it applies to all OFWs. However, a closer
examination reveals that the subject clause has a discriminatory intent against, and an invidious impact on,
OFWs at two levels:
First, OFWs with employment contracts of less than one year vis-à-vis OFWs with employment contracts of one
year or more;
Second, among OFWs with employment contracts of more than one year; and
Third, OFWs vis-à-vis local workers with fixed-period employment;
The subject clause singles out one classification of OFWs and burdens it with a peculiar disadvantage.
Thus, the subject clause in the 5th paragraph of Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 is violative of the right of petitioner
and other OFWs to equal protection.
The subject clause “or for three months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less” in the 5th
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is DECLARED UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

Note: There’s no express mention of Sec 5, Art VIII in this case but there’s a discussion regarding the
Court’s exercise of power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals:

“When the Court is called upon to exercise its power of judicial review of the acts of its co-equals, such
as the Congress, it does so only when these conditions obtain: (1) that there is an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict of rights susceptible of judicial determination; 47 (2) that the
constitutional question is raised by a proper party 48 and at the earliest opportunity; 49 and (3) that the
constitutional question is the very lis mota of the case, 50 otherwise the Court will dismiss the case or
decide the same on some other ground.51
Without a doubt, there exists in this case an actual controversy directly involving petitioner who is
personally aggrieved that the labor tribunals and the CA computed his monetary award based on the
salary period of three months only as provided under the subject clause.

The constitutional challenge is also timely. It should be borne in mind that the requirement that a
constitutional issue be raised at the earliest opportunity entails the interposition of the issue in the
pleadings before a competent court, such that, if the issue is not raised in the pleadings before that
competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be
considered on appeal.52 Records disclose that the issue on the constitutionality of the subject clause
was first raised, not in petitioner's appeal with the NLRC, but in his Motion for Partial Reconsideration
with said labor tribunal,53 and reiterated in his Petition for Certiorari before the CA.54 Nonetheless, the
issue is deemed seasonably raised because it is not the NLRC but the CA which has the competence to
resolve the constitutional issue. The NLRC is a labor tribunal that merely performs a quasi-judicial
function - its function in the present case is limited to determining questions of fact to which the
legislative policy of R.A. No. 8042 is to be applied and to resolving such questions in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself;55 thus, its foremost function is to administer and enforce R.A.
No. 8042, and not to inquire into the validity of its provisions. The CA, on the other hand, is vested with
the power of judicial review or the power to declare unconstitutional a law or a provision thereof, such
as the subject clause.56 Petitioner's interposition of the constitutional issue before the CA was
undoubtedly seasonable. The CA was therefore remiss in failing to take up the issue in its decision.
The third condition that the constitutional issue be critical to the resolution of the case likewise obtains
because the monetary claim of petitioner to his lump-sum salary for the entire unexpired portion of his
12-month employment contract, and not just for a period of three months, strikes at the very core of the
subject clause.
Thus, the stage is all set for the determination of the constitutionality of the subject clause.”
4) LAMP v. Secretary of Budget and Management, 670 SCRA 373

FACTS: For consideration of the Court is an original action for certiorari assailing the constitutionality and
legality of the implementation of the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF) as provided for in Republic
Act (R.A.) 9206 or the General Appropriations Act for 2004 (GAA of 2004). Lawyers Against Monopoly and
Poverty(LAMP) is a group of lawyers who have banded together with a mission of dismantling all forms of
political, economic or social monopoly in the country. According to LAMP, the above provision is silent and,
therefore, prohibits an automatic or direct allocation of lump sums to individual senators and congressmen for
the funding of projects. It does not empower individual Members of Congress to propose, select and identify
programs and projects to be funded out of PDAF.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s: Petitioner asserts that this situation runs afoul against the principle of separation of
powers because in receiving and, thereafter, spending funds for their chosen projects, the Members of
Congress in effect intrude into an executive function. Further, the authority to propose and select projects does
not pertain to legislation. “It is, in fact, a non-legislative function devoid of constitutional sanction,” and,
therefore, impermissible and must be considered nothing less than malfeasance. By allowing the Members of
Congress to receive direct allotment from the fund, to propose and identify projects to be funded and to perform
the actual spending of the fund, the implementation of the PDAF provision becomes legally infirm and
constitutionally repugnant.

Respondent/s’ contention/s: The respondents contend that the petition miserably lacks legal and factual
grounds. Although they admit that PDAF traced its roots to CDF, they argue that the former should not be
equated with "pork barrel," which has gained a derogatory meaning referring "to government projects affording
political opportunism." In the petition, no proof of this was offered. The perceptions of LAMP on the
implementation of PDAF must not be based on mere speculations circulated in the news media preaching the
evils of pork barrel. Hence, the Court should decline the petitioner’s plea to take judicial notice of the supposed
iniquity of PDAF because there is no concrete proof that PDAF, in the guise of "pork barrel," is a source of "dirty
money" for unscrupulous lawmakers and other officials who tend to misuse their allocations.

ISSUE: Whether or not the mandatory requisites for the exercise of judicial review are met in this case;

RULING: A question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on
the individual challenging it. For the exercise of the power of judicial review, the following must be present: (1)
there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging
the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he must
have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a
result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4)
the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case. In our jurisdiction, the issue of ripeness is
generally treated in terms of actual injury to the plaintiff. Hence, a question is ripe for adjudication when the act
being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it.

In this case, the petitioner contested the implementation of an alleged unconstitutional statute, as citizens and
taxpayers. The petition complains of illegal disbursement of public funds derived from taxation and this is
sufficient reason to say that there indeed exists a definite, concrete, real or substantial controversy before the
Court.

LOCUS STANDI: The gist of the question of standing is whether a party alleges “such a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues
upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Here, the sufficient
interest preventing the illegal expenditure of money raised by taxation required in taxpayers’ suits is established.
According to LAMP, the practice of direct allocation and release of funds to the Members of Congress and the
authority given to them to propose and select projects is the core of the law’s flawed execution resulting in a
serious constitutional transgression involving the expenditure of public funds. Undeniably, as taxpayers, LAMP
would somehow be adversely affected by this. A finding of unconstitutionality would necessarily be tantamount
to a misapplication of public funds which, in turn, cause injury or hardship to taxpayers. This affords "ripeness"
to the present controversy. Thus, in the claim that PDAF funds have been illegally disbursed and wasted
through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law, LAMP should be allowed to sue.

Lastly, the Court is of the view that the petition poses issues impressed with paramount public interest. The
ramification of issues involving the unconstitutional spending of PDAF deserves the consideration of the Court,
warranting the assumption of jurisdiction over the petition.

5) Villafuerte v. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390. December 10, 2014

This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Court filed by former
Governor Luis Raymund F. Villafuerte, Jr. (Villafuerte) and the Province of Camarines Sur (petitioners), seeking
to annul and set aside the following issuances of the late Honorable Jesse M. Robredo (respondent), in his
capacity as then Secretary of the Department of the Interior and Local Government (DILG), to wit:
(a) Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83dated August 31, 2010, pertaining to the full disclosure of local
budget and finances, and bids and public offerings;
(b) MC No. 2010-138 dated December 2, 2010, pertaining to the use of the 20% component of the annual
internal revenue allotment shares; and
(c) MC No. 2011-08 dated January 13, 2011, pertaining to the strict adherence to Section 90 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 10147 or the General Appropriations Act of 2011.
The petitioners seek the nullification of the foregoing issuances on the ground of unconstitutionality and for
having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

FACTS:
In 1995, the Commission on Audit (COA) conducted an examination and audit on the manner the local
government units utilized their Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) for the calendar years 1993-1994. The
examination yielded an official report, showing that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some
LGUs was not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses properly chargeable
against the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE), in stark violation of Section 287 of R.A. No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). In 2010, Jesse Robredo, in his capacity
as DILG Secretary, issued the assailed Memorandum Circular (MC) No. 2010-83, entitled “Full Disclosure of
Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offerings,” which aims to promote good governance through
enhanced transparency and accountability of LGUs. The MC requires the posting within 30 days from the end of
each fiscal year in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit a
summary of all revenues collected and funds received including the appropriations and disbursements of such
funds during the preceding fiscal year. The foregoing circular also states that non- compliance will be meted
sanctions in accordance with pertinent laws, rules and regulations. On December 2, 2010, the Robredo issued
another MC, reiterating that 20% component of the IRA shall be utilized for desirable social, economic and
environmental outcomes essential to the attainment of the constitutional objective of a quality of life for all. It
also enumerated a list for which the fund must not be utilized.

Villafuerte, then Governor of Camarines Sur, joined by the Provincial Government of Camarines Sur, filed the
instant petition for certiorari, seeking to nullify the assailed issuances of the respondent for being
unconstitutional for violating the principles of local and fiscal autonomy enshrined in the Constitution and the
LGC.

ISSUE
1. WON the present petition is subject for judicial review?
2. Did the assailed memorandum circulars violate the principles of local and fiscal autonomy? (Main issue)

RULING
1. The present petition is ripe for judicial review.

At the outset, the respondent is questioning the propriety of the exercise of the Court’s power of judicial review
over the instant case. He argues that the petition is premature since there is yet any actual controversy that is
ripe for judicial determination. He points out the lack of allegation in the petition that the assailed issuances had
been fully implemented and that the petitioners had already exhausted administrative remedies under Section
25 of the Revised Administrative Code before filing the same in court.

It is well-settled that the Court’s exercise of the power of judicial review requires the concurrence of the
following elements: (1) there must be an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2)
the person challenging the act must have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance;
otherwise stated, he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or
will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case.

The respondent claims that there is yet any actual case or controversy that calls for the exercise of judicial
review. He contends that the mere expectation of an administrative sanction does not give rise to a justiciable
controversy especially, in this case, that the petitioners have yet to exhaust administrative remedies available.

The Court disagrees.

In La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, the Court characterized an actual case or controversy, viz:
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
The power does not extend to hypothetical questions since any attempt at abstraction could only lead to
dialectics and barren legal questions and to sterile conclusions unrelated to actualities.
The existence of an actual controversy in the instant case cannot be overemphasized. At the time of filing of the
instant petition, the respondent had already implemented the assailed memorandum circulars. In fact, on May
26, 2011, Villafuerte received Audit Observation Memorandum (AOM) No. 2011-009 dated May 10, 201127
from the Office of the Provincial Auditor of Camarines Sur, requiring him to comment on the observation of the
audit team, which states:
The Province failed to post the transactions and documents required under Department of Interior and Local
Government (DILG) Memorandum Circular No. 2010-83, thereby violating the mandate of full disclosure of
Local Budget and Finances, and Bids and Public Offering.

The issuance of AOM No. 2011-009 to Villafuerte is a clear indication that the assailed issuances of the
respondent are already in the full course of implementation. The audit memorandum specifically mentioned of
Villafuerte’s alleged non-compliance with MCNo. 2010-83 regarding the posting requirements stated in the
circular and reiterated the sanctions that may be imposed for the omission. The fact that Villafuerte is being
required to comment on the contents of AOM No. 2011-009 signifies that the process of investigation for his
alleged violation has already begun. Ultimately, the investigation is expected to end in a resolution on whether a
violation has indeed been committed, together with the appropriate sanctions that come with it. Clearly,
Villafuerte’s apprehension is real and well-founded as he stands to be sanctioned for non-compliance with the
issuances.

There is likewise no merit in the respondent’s claim that the petitioners’ failure to exhaust administrative
remedies warrants the dismissal of the petition. It bears emphasizing that the assailed issuances were issued
pursuant to the rule-making or quasi-legislative power of the DILG. This pertains to "the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute." Not to
be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of an administrative agency is its quasi-judicial or
administrative adjudicatory power. This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down by the law itself in
enforcing and administering the same law. In challenging the validity of an administrative issuance carried out
pursuant to the agency’s rule-making power, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies does not
stand as a bar in promptly resorting to the filing of a case in court.

In questioning the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party
need not exhaust administrative remedies before going to court. This principle applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when the
assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power.

Considering the foregoing clarification, there is thus no bar for the Court to resolve the substantive issues raised
in the petition.

2. No, a reading of MC No. 2010-138 shows that it is a mere reiteration of an existing provision in the LGC. It
was plainly intended to remind LGUs to faithfully observe the directive stated in Section 287 of the LGC to utilize
the 20% portion of the IRA for development projects. It was, at best, an advisory to LGUs to examine
themselves if they have been complying with the law. It must be recalled that the assailed circular was issued in
response to the report of the COA that a substantial portion of the 20% development fund of some LGUs was
not actually utilized for development projects but was diverted to expenses more properly categorized as
MOOE, in violation of Section 287 of the LGC.

Contrary to the Villafuerte, et al.’s posturing, however, the enumeration was not meant to restrict the discretion
of the LGUs in the utilization of their funds. LGUs remain at liberty to map out their respective development
plans solely on the basis of their own judgment and utilize their IRAs accordingly, with the only restriction that
20% thereof be expended for development projects. They may even spend their IRAs for some of the
enumerated items should they partake of indirect costs of undertaking development projects.

Villafuerte, et al. likewise misread the issuance by claiming that the provision of sanctions therein is a clear
indication of the President’s interference in the fiscal autonomy of LGUs. Significantly, the issuance itself did not
provide for sanctions. It did not particularly establish a new set of acts or omissions which are deemed violations
and provide the corresponding penalties therefor. It simply stated a reminder to LGUs that there are existing
rules to consider in the disbursement of the 20% development fund and that non-compliance therewith may
render them liable to sanctions which are provided in the LGC and other applicable laws.

Villafuerte, et al. claim that the requirement to post other documents in the mentioned issuances went beyond
the letter and spirit of Section 352 of the LGC and R.A. No. 9184, otherwise known as the Government
Procurement Reform Act, by requiring that budgets, expenditures, contracts and loans, and procurement plans
of LGUs be publicly posted as well. Pertinently, Section 352 of the LGC reads that Local treasurers,
accountants, budget officers, and other accountable officers shall, within thirty (30) days from the end of the
fiscal year, post in at least three (3) publicly accessible and conspicuous places in the local government unit.
R.A. No. 9184, on the other hand, requires the posting of the invitation to bid, notice of award, notice to
proceed, and approved contract in the procuring entity’s premises, in newspapers of general circulation, and the
website of the procuring entity. In particular, the Constitution commands the strict adherence to full disclosure of
information on all matters relating to official transactions and those involving public interest. Pertinently, Section
28, Article II and Section 7, Article III of the Constitution.

6) Diocese of Bacolod v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 205728, January 21, 2015

FACTS

On February 21, 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within a private compound housing the San
Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately six feet (6′) by ten feet (10′) in size. They
were posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view. The first tarpaulin contains the message
“IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second
tarpaulin is the subject of the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists
candidates as either “(Anti-RH) Team Buhay” with a check mark, or “(Pro-RH) Team Patay” with an “X” mark.
The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of Republic Act No. 10354,
otherwise known as the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay.”

Respondents conceded that the tarpaulin was neither sponsored nor paid for by any candidate. Petitioners also
conceded that the tarpaulin contains names of candidates for the 2013 elections, but not of politicians who
helped in the passage of the RH Law but were not candidates for that election.

ISSUE
WHETHER THE 22 FEBRUARY 2013 NOTICE/ORDER BY ELECTION OFFICER MAJARUCON AND THE 27
FEBRUARY 2013 ORDER BY THE COMELEC LAW DEPARTMENT ARE CONSIDERED JUDGMENTS/FINAL
ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC WHICH WOULD WARRANT A REVIEW OF THIS COURT VIA
RULE 65 PETITION
A. WHETHER PETITIONERS VIOLATED THE HIERARCHY OF COURTS DOCTRINE AND
JURISPRUDENTIAL RULES GOVERNING APPEALS FROM COMELEC DECISIONS;
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE AFOREMENTIONED ORDERS ARE NOT CONSIDERED
JUDGMENTS/FINAL ORDERS/RESOLUTIONS OF THE COMELEC, WHETHER THERE ARE
EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH WOULD ALLOW THIS COURT TO TAKE
COGNIZANCE OF THE CASE[;]

RULING
I.A
This court’s jurisdiction over COMELEC cases
Respondents ask that this petition be dismissed on the ground that the notice and letter are not final orders,
decisions, rulings, or judgments of the COMELEC En Banc issued in the exercise of its adjudicatory powers,
reviewable via Rule 64 of the Rules of Court.

Rule 64 is not the exclusive remedy for all acts of the COMELEC. Rule 65 is applicable especially to raise
objections relating to a grave abuse of discretion resulting in the ouster of jurisdiction. As a special civil action,
there must also be a showing that there is no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the
law.

Respondents contend that the assailed notice and letter are not subject to review by this court, whose power to
review is "limited only to final decisions, rulings and orders of the COMELEC En Banc rendered in the exercise
of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power." Instead, respondents claim that the assailed notice and letter are
reviewable only by COMELEC itself pursuant to Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution on COMELEC’s
power to decide all questions affecting elections. Respondents illustrate how judicial intervention is limited to
final decisions, orders, rulings and judgments of the COMELEC En Banc.

Ambil, Jr., Repol, Soriano, Jr., Blanco, and Cayetano cited by respondents do not operate as precedents to oust
this court from taking jurisdiction over this case. All these cases cited involve election protests or disqualification
cases filed by the losing candidate against the winning candidate.

In the present case, petitioners are not candidates seeking for public office. Their petition is filed to assert their
fundamental right to expression.

Furthermore, all these cases cited by respondents pertained to COMELEC’s exercise of its adjudicatory or
quasi-judicial power. This case pertains to acts of COMELEC in the implementation of its regulatory powers.
When it issued the notice and letter, the COMELEC was allegedly enforcing election laws.
I.B
Rule 65, grave abuse of discretion, and limitations on political speech
The main subject of this case is an alleged constitutional violation: the infringement on speech and the "chilling
effect" caused by respondent COMELEC’s notice and letter.

On the other hand, respondents relied on its constitutional mandate to decide all questions affecting elections.
Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution, provides:
Sec. 2. The Commission on Elections shall exercise the following powers and functions:
(3) Decide, except those involving the right to vote, all questions affecting elections, including determination of
the number and location of polling places, appointment of election officials and inspectors, and registration of
voters.
Respondents’ reliance on this provision is misplaced.

We are not confronted here with the question of whether the COMELEC, in its exercise of jurisdiction, gravely
abused it. We are confronted with the question as to whether the COMELEC had any jurisdiction at all with its
acts threatening imminent criminal action effectively abridging meaningful political speech.

It is clear that the subject matter of the controversy is the effect of COMELEC’s notice and letter on free speech.
This does not fall under Article IX-C, Section 2(3) of the Constitution. The use of the word "affecting" in this
provision cannot be interpreted to mean that COMELEC has the exclusive power to decide any and all
questions that arise during elections. COMELEC’s constitutional competencies during elections should not
operate to divest this court of its own jurisdiction.

The more relevant provision for jurisdiction in this case is Article VIII, Section 5(1) of the Constitution.
This provision provides for this court’s original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari and prohibition.
This should be read alongside the expanded jurisdiction of the court in Article VIII, Section 1 of the
Constitution.

Certainly, a breach of the fundamental right of expression by COMELEC is grave abuse of discretion. Thus, the
constitutionality of the notice and letter coming from COMELEC is within this court’s power to review.
During elections, we have the power and the duty to correct any grave abuse of discretion or any act tainted
with unconstitutionality on the part of any government branch or instrumentality. This includes actions by the
COMELEC. Furthermore, it is this court’s constitutional mandate to protect the people against the government's
infringement of their fundamental rights. This constitutional mandate outweighs the jurisdiction vested with the
COMELEC.
It will, thus, be manifest injustice if the court does not take jurisdiction over this case.
I.C
Hierarchy of courts

This brings us to the issue of whether petitioners violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts in directly filing their
petition before this court.

Respondents contend that petitioners’ failure to file the proper suit with a lower court of concurrent jurisdiction is
sufficient ground for the dismissal of their petition. They add that observation of the hierarchy of courts is
compulsory, citing Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor. While respondents claim that while there are exceptions
to the general rule on hierarchy of courts, none of these are present in this case.

On the other hand, petitioners cite Fortich v. Corona on this court’s discretionary power to take cognizance of a
petition filed directly to it if warranted by "compelling reasons, or [by] the nature and importance of the issues
raised. . . Petitioners submit that there are "exceptional and compelling reasons to justify a direct resort [with]
this Court."

First, a direct resort to this court is allowed when there are genuine issues of constitutionality that must be
addressed at the most immediate time. A direct resort to this court includes availing of the remedies of certiorari
and prohibition to assail the constitutionality of actions of both legislative and executive branches of the
government.

In this case, the assailed issuances of respondents prejudice not only petitioners’ right to freedom of expression
in the present case, but also of others in future similar cases. The case before this court involves an active effort
on the part of the electorate to reform the political landscape. This has become a rare occasion when private
citizens actively engage the public in political discourse.

A second exception is when the issues involved are of transcendental importance. In these cases, the
imminence and clarity of the threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the necessity for prudence.
The doctrine relating to constitutional issues of transcendental importance prevents courts from the paralysis of
procedural niceties when clearly faced with the need for substantial protection.

In the case before this court, there is a clear threat to the paramount right of freedom of speech and freedom of
expression which warrants invocation of relief from this court. The principles laid down in this decision will likely
influence the discourse of freedom of speech in the future, especially in the context of elections. The right to
suffrage not only includes the right to vote for one’s chosen candidate, but also the right to vocalize that choice
to the public in general, in the hope of influencing their votes. It may be said that in an election year, the right to
vote necessarily includes the right to free speech and expression. The protection of these fundamental
constitutional rights, therefore, allows for the immediate resort to this court.

Third, cases of first impression warrant a direct resort to this court. In cases of first impression, no
jurisprudence yet exists that will guide the lower courts on this matter. In Government of the United States v.
Purganan, this court took cognizance of the case as a matter of first impression that may guide the lower courts:
In the interest of justice and to settle once and for all the important issue of bail in extradition proceedings, we
deem it best to take cognizance of the present case. Such proceedings constitute a matter of first impression
over which there is, as yet, no local jurisprudence to guide lower courts.

This court finds that this is indeed a case of first impression involving as it does the issue of whether the right of
suffrage includes the right of freedom of expression. This is a question which this court has yet to provide
substantial answers to, through jurisprudence. Thus, direct resort to this court is allowed.

Fourth, the constitutional issues raised are better decided by this court. In Drilon v. Lim, this court held that:
. . . it will be prudent for such courts, if only out of a becoming modesty, to defer to the higher judgment of this
Court in the consideration of its validity, which is better determined after a thorough deliberation by a collegiate
body and with the concurrence of the majority of those who participated in its discussion. (Citation omitted)

In this case, it is this court, with its constitutionally enshrined judicial power, that can rule with finality on whether
COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion or performed acts contrary to the Constitution through the
assailed issuances.

Fifth, the time element presented in this case cannot be ignored. This case was filed during the 2013 election
period. Although the elections have already been concluded, future cases may be filed that necessitate urgency
in its resolution. Exigency in certain situations would qualify as an exception for direct resort to this court.

Sixth, the filed petition reviews the act of a constitutional organ. COMELEC is a constitutional body. In Albano
v. Arranz, cited by petitioners, this court held that "[i]t is easy to realize the chaos that would ensue if the Court
of First Instance of each and every province were [to] arrogate itself the power to disregard, suspend, or
contradict any order of the Commission on Elections: that constitutional body would be speedily reduced to
impotence.”

In this case, if petitioners sought to annul the actions of COMELEC through pursuing remedies with the lower
courts, any ruling on their part would not have been binding for other citizens whom respondents may place in
the same situation. Besides, thiscourt affords great respect to the Constitution and the powers and duties
imposed upon COMELEC. Hence, a ruling by this court would be in the best interest of respondents, in order
that their actions may be guided accordingly in the future.

Seventh, petitioners rightly claim that they had no other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law that could free them from the injurious effects of respondents’ acts in violation of their right to
freedom of expression.

In this case, the repercussions of the assailed issuances on this basic right constitute an exceptionally
compelling reason to justify the direct resort to this court. The lack of other sufficient remedies in the course of
law alone is sufficient ground to allow direct resort to this court.

Eighth, the petition includes questions that are "dictated by public welfare and the advancement of public
policy, or demanded by the broader interest of justice, or the orders complained of were found to be patent
nullities, or the appeal was considered as clearly an inappropriate remedy." In the past, questions similar to
these which this court ruled on immediately despite the doctrine of hierarchy of courts included citizens’ right to
bear arms, government contracts involving modernization of voters’ registration lists, and the status and
existence of a public office.

This case also poses a question of similar, if not greater import. Hence, a direct action to this court is permitted.
It is not, however, necessary that all of these exceptions must occur at the same time to justify a direct resort to
this court. While generally, the hierarchy of courts is respected, the present case falls under the recognized
exceptions and, as such, may be resolved by this court directly.
7) League of Provinces v. DENR, 696 SCRA 190

LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES v. DENR and Secretary

GR. No. 175368 April 11, 2013

Petitioner: League of Provinces - a duly organized league of local governments incorporated under the
Local Government Code; it is composed of 81 provincial governments, including the Province of
Bulacan

Respondent: DENR and DENR Secretary Angelo Reyes

Other parties:

Golden Falcon Mineral Exploration Corporation (Golden Falcon) – applicant for a Financial and
Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA); filed before Mines and Geosciences Bureau, Regional Office
No. III (MGB-RO); application was denied twice
Mercado, Cruz, Cruz and Sembrano (MCCS) – applicants for Quarry Permit; filed before the Provincial
Environment and Natural Resources Office (PENRO) of Bulacan
Atlantic Mines and Trading Corporation (AMTC) – applicant for Exploration Permit; filed before the
PENRO of Bulacan

FACTS

Golden Falcon applied for FTAA before the MGB-RO. On April 29, 1998, MGB-RO denied Golden Falcon’s
application for FTAA on for failure to secure the required area clearances from the Forest Management Sector
and Lands Management Sector of the DENR-RO. Golden Falcon appealed the denial with the Mines and
Geosciences Bureau-Central Office (MGB-CO).

On February 10, 2004, pending Golden Falcon's appeal to the MGB-CO, MCCS filed with the PENRO of
Bulacan their applications for quarry permit covering the same area subject of Golden Falcon's FTAA
application. MGB-CO finally denied Golden Falcon’s appeal on July 16, 2004.

AMTC filed with the PENRO of Bulacan an application for exploration permit covering the same subject area on
September 13, 2004. Confusion of rights resulted from the overlapping applications of AMTC and the persons
applying for quarry permits – the contention was the date the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open
to other permit applications from other parties

On October 19, 2004, upon query by MGB-RO Director Cabantog, DENR-MGB Director Ramos stated that the
denial of Golden Falcon’s application became final on August 11, 2004, or fifteen days after Golden Falcon
received the order of denial of its application. Hence, the area of Golden Falcon’s application became open to
permit applications only on that date.
Subsequently, the Provincial Legal Officer of Bulacan issued a legal opinion on the issue, stating that the
subject area became open for new applications on the date of the first denial on April 29, 1998 (MGB-RO’s
order of denial), as MGB-CO’s order of denial on July 16, 2004 was a mere reaffirmation of the MGB-RO’s April
29 order; hence, the reckoning period should be April 29.

Based on this legal opinion, MGB-RO Director Cabantog endorsed the applications for quarry permit, now
apparently converted to applications for small-scale mining permit, to the Governor of Bulacan. PENRO of
Bulacan recommended to the Governor the approval of said applications. Eventually, the Governor issued the
small-scale mining permits. AMTC appealed to the DENR Secretary.

The DENR Secretary decided in favor of the AMTC and nullified and cancelled the governor’s issuance of
small-scale mining permits. It agreed with DENR-MGB Director Ramos that the area was open to mining
location only on August 11, 2004 (15 days after the MGB-CO denial). Hence, the applications for quarry permit
filed on February 10, 2004 were null as these were filed when the area was still closed to mining location. On
the other hand, AMTC filed its application when the area was already open to other mining applicants, hence, its
application was valid. The small-scale mining permits were also issued in violation of Section 4 of R.A. No. 7076
and beyond the authority of the Governor pursuant to Sec. 43 of RA 7942 because the area was never
proclaimed to be under the small-scale mining program.

The petitioner League of the Provinces of the Philippines filed this petition saying that that this is not an action of
one province alone, but the collective action of all provinces through the League, as a favorable ruling will not
only benefit one province, but all provinces and all local governments.

ISSUES
1. Whether DENR’s act of nullifying the small-scale mining permits amounts to executive control, not merely
supervision and usurps the devolved powers of all provinces, as the DENR Secretary substituted the judgment
of the Provincial Governor of Bulacan.
2. Whether or not Section 17, b(3)(III) of the Local Government Code and Section 24 of the Small-Scale Mining
Act, which confer upon DENR and the DENR Secretary the power of control are unconstitutional, as the
Constitution states that the President (and Exec Depts) has the power of supervision only, not control over acts
of LGUs

RULING

[The Court finds that petitioner has legal standing to file this petition because it is tasked under Section 504 of
the Local Government Code of 1991 to promote local autonomy at the provincial level; adopt measures for the
promotion of the welfare of all provinces and its officials and employees; and exercise such other powers and
perform such other duties and functions as the league may prescribe for the welfare of the provinces.]

DENR Sec’s act was valid and authorized pursuant to its power of review under the RA 7076 and its IRR;
Assailed statutes did not overcome the presumption of constitutionality, hence, are not unconstitutional.

Control of the DENR/DENR Secretary over small-scale mining in the provinces is granted by three statutes: (1)
R.A. 7061 or The Local Government Code of 1991; (2) R.A. 7076 or the People's Small Scale Mining Act of
1991; and (3) R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
Control is the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the
performance of his/her duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for the latter. Supervision is the
power of a superior officer to see to it that lower officers perform their function in accordance with law.

The Constitutional guarantee of local autonomy in the Article X, Sec. 2 of the Constitution refers to the
administrative autonomy of the LGUs or the decentralization of government authority. It does not make local
governments within the State. Administrative autonomy may involve devolution of powers, but it is still subject to
limitations, like following national policies or standards and those provided by the Local Government Code, as
the structuring of LGUs and the allocation of powers/responsibilities/resources among the LGUs and local
officials are placed by the Constitution to Congress under Article X Section 3.

It is the DENR which is in-charge of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and supervise the
exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources, pursuant to the provisions of Section
17, b(3)(III) of the LGC. Hence, the enforcement of the small-scale mining law by the provincial government is
subject to the supervision, control and review of the DENR. The LGC did not fully devolve to the provincial
government the enforcement of the small-scale mining law.

RA 7076 or the People’s Small-Scale Mining program was established to be implemented by the DENR
Secretary in coordination with other government agencies (Section 4, RA 7076). Section 24 of the law makes
the Provincial/ Mining Regulatory Board under the direct supervision and control of the Secretary, its powers
and functions subject to review by the same.

Under Section 123 of DENR AO No. 23, small-scale mining applications should be filed with the PMRB and the
permits shall be issued by the provincial governor, for applications outside the mineral reservations.

DENR Administrative Order No. 34 (1992) which contains the IRR of RA 7076 likewise provides that the DENR
Secretary shall exercise direct supervision and control over the People’s Small-Scale Mining Program, and that
the Provincial/City Mining Regulatory Board’s (PMRB) powers and functions shall be subject to review by the
DENR Secretary. DENR Administrative Order No. 96-40 or the Revised IRR of the Philippine Mining Act of 1995
provides that applications for Small-Scale Mining Permits shall be filed with the Provincial Governor/City Mayor
through their respective Mining Regulatory Boards for areas outside the Mineral Reservations, and further, that
the LGUs in coordination with the Bureau/Regional Offices shall approve applications for small-scale mining,
sand and gravel, quarry xxx and gravel permits not exceeding 5 hectares.

Petitioner’s contention that the aforementioned laws and rules did not confer upon DENR and DENR Secretary
the power to reverse, abrogate, nullify, void, cancel the permits issued by the Provincial Governor or small-scale
mining contracts entered into by the Board are without merit because the DENR Secretary was granted the
power of review in the PMRB’s resolution of disputes under Sec. 24 of RA 7076 and Section 22 of its IRR. The
decision of the DENR Secretary to nullify and cancel the Governor’s issuance of permits emanated from its
power of review under RA 7076 ad its IRR. Its power to review and decide on the validity of the issuance of the
Small-Scale Mining Permits by the Provincial Governor is a quasi-judicial function which involves the
determination of what the law is and what the legal rights of the contending parties are, with respect to the
matter in controversy and on the basis thereof and the facts obtaining, the adjudication of their respective rights.
The DENR Secretary exercises quasi-judicial function under RA 7076 and its IRR to the extent necessary in
settling disputes, conflicts, or litigations over conflicting claims. This quasi-judicial power of the DENR can
neither be equated with “substitution of judgment” of the Provincial Governor in issuing Small-Scale Mining
Permits nor “control” over the said act of the Provincial Governor as it is a determination of the rights of the
AMTC over conflicting claims based on the law.

In Beltran v. Secretary of Health, the Court held that every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution. The ground for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, the grounds
raised by the petitioner to challenge the constitutionality of Sec. 17 b(3)(iii) of the LGC and Section 24 of RA
7076 has failed to overcome the constitutionality of the said provisions of the law.

Petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

8) Land Bank of the Philippines v. Cacayuran, 696 SCRA 861

FACTS: Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the March 26, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 89732 which affirmed with modification the April 10, 2007 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Agoo, La Union, Branch 31, declaring inter alia the nullity of the loan agreements entered
into by petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (Land Bank) and the Municipality of Agoo, La Union
(Municipality).

From 2005 to 2006, the Municipality’s Sangguniang Bayan (SB) passed certain resolutions to implement a
multi-phased plan (Redevelopment Plan) to redevelop the Agoo Public Plaza (Agoo Plaza) where the Imelda
Garden and Jose Rizal Monument were situated. To finance phase 1 of the said plan, the SB initially passed
Resolution No. 68-2005 on April 19, 2005, authorizing then Mayor Eufranio Eriguel (Mayor Eriguel) to obtain a
loan from Land Bank and incidental thereto, mortgage a 2,323.75 square meter lot situated at the southeastern
portion of the Agoo Plaza (Plaza Lot) as collateral. To serve as additional security, it further authorized the
assignment of a portion of its internal revenue allotment (IRA) and the monthly income from the proposed
project in favor of Land Bank.

On March 7, 2006, the SB passed Resolution No. 58-2006, approving the construction of a commercial center
on the Plaza Lot as part of phase II of the Redevelopment Plan. To finance the project, Mayor Eriguel was again
authorized to obtain a loan from Land Bank, posting as well the same securities as that of the First Loan.

Unlike phase 1 of the Redevelopment Plan, the construction of the commercial center at the Agoo Plaza was
vehemently objected to by some residents of the Municipality. Led by respondent Eduardo Cacayuran
(Cacayuran), these residents claimed that the conversion of the Agoo Plaza into a commercial center, as
funded by the proceeds from the First and Second Loans (Subject Loans), were "highly irregular, violative of the
law, and detrimental to public interests, and will result to wanton desecration of the said historical and public
park. During the pendency of the proceedings, the construction of the commercial center was completed and
the said structure later became known as the Agoo’s People Center (APC).
In its Decision dated April 10, 2007, the RTC ruled in favor of Cacayuran, declaring the nullity of the Subject
Loans. It found that the resolutions approving the said loans were passed in a highly irregular manner and thus,
ultra vires; as such, the Municipality is not bound by the same. Moreover, it found that the Plaza Lot is
proscribed from collateralization given its nature as property for public use. In its Decision dated March 26,
2010, the CA affirmed with modification the RTC’s ruling, excluding Vice Mayor Eslao from any personal liability
arising from the Subject Loans. It held, among others, that: (1) Cacayuran had locus standing to file his
complaint.

ISSUE: Whether Cacayuran has standing to sue. (YES)

RULING: YES. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. Accordingly, the March 26, 2010 Decision of the Court
of Appeals in CAG.R. CV. No. 89732 is hereby AFFIRMED.

RATIO: It is hornbook principle that a taxpayer is allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are
illegally disbursed, or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that there is wastage of
public funds through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law. A person suing as a taxpayer,
however, must show that the act complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement of public funds derived
from taxation. In other words, for a taxpayer’s suit to prosper, two requisites must be met namely, (1) public
funds derived from taxation are disbursed by a political subdivision or instrumentality and in doing so, a law is
violated or some irregularity is committed; and (2) the petitioner is directly affected by the alleged act.
First, although the construction of the APC would be primarily sourced from the proceeds of the Subject Loans,
which Land Bank insists are not taxpayer’s money, there is no denying that public funds derived from taxation
are bound to be expended as the Municipality assigned a portion of its IRA as a security for the foregoing loans.
Needless to state, the Municipality’s IRA, which serves as the local government unit’s just share in the national
taxes, is in the nature of public funds derived from taxation. The Court believes, however, that although these
funds may be posted as a security, its collateralization should only be deemed effective during the incumbency
of the public officers who approved the same, else those who succeed them be effectively deprived of its use.

In any event, it is observed that the proceeds from the Subject Loans had already been converted into public
funds by the Municipality’s receipt thereof. Funds coming from private sources become impressed with the
characteristics of public funds when they are under official custody. ccordingly, the first requisite has been
clearly met.

Second, as a resident-taxpayer of the Municipality, Cacayuran is directly affected by the conversion of the Agoo
Plaza which was funded by the proceeds of the Subject Loans. It is well-settled that public plazas are properties
for public use and therefore, belongs to the public dominion. As such, it can be used by anybody and no one
can exercise over it the rights of a private owner. In this light, Cacayuran had a direct interest in ensuring that
the Agoo Plaza would not be exploited for commercial purposes through the APC’s construction. Moreover,
Cacayuran need not be privy to the Subject Loans in order to proffer his objections thereto. In Mamba v. Lara, it
has been held that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract to challenge its validity; as long as taxes are
involved, people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government. Therefore, as the above-
stated requisites obtain in this case, Cacayuran has standing to file the instant suit.
9) Remulla v. Marks (*Maliksi), 706 SCRA 35

FACTS: On May 7, 1957, Marietta O’Hara de Villa, as administratrix of the estate of her late husband, ceded,
through a deed of donation 134,957 square meters (sq. m.) of 396,622 sq. m. property in favor of the Province
of Cavite.

On December 28, 1981 the Province of Cavite respectively filed a Complaint seeking to expropriate the
remaining 261,665 sq. m. of the property which the former intends to develop as the Provincial Capitol Site.

De Villa, through her Answer, opposed the expropriation proceedings, claiming that there are still areas within
the donated portion which the Province of Cavite failed to develop.

On June 9, 1989, while the expropriation case was still pending, de Villa sold the 261,665 sq. m. portion of the
subject property to Goldenrod, Inc.

On November 4, 2003, respondent then Cavite Governor Erineo S. Maliksi (Maliksi) issued EO No. 00415
authorizing the creation of a committee which recommended the terms and conditions for the proper settlement
of the expropriation case. Thereafter, such recommendations were adopted in the compromise agreement.
Such was then approved by the RTC.

On September 21, 2004, Remulla, in his personal capacity as taxpayer and as then Vice-Governor and filed a
petition for annulment of judgment under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court before the CA, arguing that the subject
compromise is grossly disadvantageous to the government because: (a) the agreed price for the subject
property was excessive as compared to its value at the time of taking in 1981; (b) the government stands to lose
prime lots. Moreover, Maliksi entered into the subject compromise without authority from the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite and sans any certification on the availability of funds as required by law.
Remulla claimed that extrinsic fraud tainted the expropriation proceedings considering that there was collusion
between the parties and that respondent Ignacio deliberately withheld crucial information regarding the property
valuation and certain incidents prior to the expropriation case when he presented the subject compromise for
ratification before the Sangguniang Panlalawigan.3

On motion of respondents, however, the CA rendered a Resolution dismissing Remulla’s petition for annulment
of judgment based on the following grounds: (a) there was yet no disbursement of public funds at the time of its
filing; thus, it cannot be considered as a taxpayer’s suit; and (b) Remulla was not a real party in interest to
question the propriety of the subject compromise as he was not a signatory thereto.

ISSUE: Whether CA properly denied Remulla’s petition for annulment of judgment due to his lack of
legal standing

RULING: No.
Records bear out that Remulla filed his petition for annulment of judgment in two capacities: first, in his personal
capacity as a taxpayer; and, second, in his official capacity as then presiding officer of the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite.
With respect to the first, jurisprudence dictates that a taxpayer may be allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper purpose, or that
public funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or unconstitutional law or ordinance. In this case,
public funds of the Province of Cavite stand to be expended to enforce the compromise judgment. As such,
Remulla — being a resident-taxpayer of the Province of Cavite — has the legal standing to file the petition for
annulment of judgment and, therefore, the same should not have been dismissed on said ground. Notably, the
fact that there lies no proof that public funds have already been disbursed should not preclude Remulla from
assailing the validity of the compromise judgment. Lest it be misunderstood, the concept of legal standing is
ultimately a procedural technicality which may be relaxed by the Court if the circumstances so warrant.

It has also been ruled that a taxpayer need not be a party to the contract in order to challenge its validity, or to
seek the annulment of the same on the ground of extrinsic fraud.38 Indeed, for as long as taxes are involved,
the people have a right to question contracts entered into by the government, as in this case.

Anent the second, Remulla equally lodged the petition for annulment of judgment in his official capacity as then
Vice-Governor and Presiding Officer of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Cavite. As such, he
represents the interests of the province itself which is, undoubtedly, a real party in interest since it stands to be
either benefited or injured40 by the execution of the compromise judgment.

10) Narra Nickel Mining v. Redmont, 722 SCRA 382

FACTS
Sometime in December 2006, respondent Redmont Consolidated Mines Corp. (Redmont), a domestic
corporation organized and existing under Philippine laws, took interest in mining and exploring certain areas of
the province of Palawan. After inquiring with the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR), it
learned that the areas where it wanted to undertake exploration and mining activities were already covered by
Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) applications of petitioners Narra, Tesoro and McArthur.

In the petitions, Redmont alleged that at least 60% of the capital stock of McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are
owned and controlled by MBMI Resources, Inc. (MBMI), a 100% Canadian corporation. Redmont reasoned that
since MBMI is a considerable stockholder of petitioners, it was the driving force behind petitioners’ filing of the
MPSAs over the areas covered by applications since it knows that it can only participate in mining activities
through corporations which are deemed Filipino citizens. Redmont argued that given that petitioners’ capital
stocks were mostly owned by MBMI, they were likewise disqualified from engaging in mining activities through
MPSAs, which are reserved only for Filipino citizens.

On December 14, 2007, the Panel of Arbitartors (POA) issued a Resolution disqualifying petitioners from
gaining MPSAs. It held:
[I]t is clearly established that respondents are not qualified applicants to engage in mining activities. On
the other hand, [Redmont] having filed its own applications for an EPA over the areas earlier covered by
the MPSA application of respondents may be considered if and when they are qualified under the law. The
violation of the requirements for the issuance and/or grant of permits over mining areas is clearly
established thus, there is reason to believe that the cancellation and/or revocation of permits already
 issued under the premises is in order and open the areas covered to other qualified applicants.

WHEREFORE, the Panel of Arbitrators finds the Respondents, McArthur Mining Inc., Tesoro Mining and
Development, Inc., and Narra Nickel Mining and Development Corp. as, DISQUALIFIED for being
considered as Foreign Corporations. Their Mineral Production Sharing Agreement (MPSA) are hereby x x x
DECLARED NULL AND VOID.

With respect to the applications of respondents McArthur, Tesoro and Narra for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreement (FTAA) or conversion of their MPSA applications to FTAA, the matter for its rejection or
approval is left for determination by the Secretary of the DENR and the President of the Republic of the
Philippines.

After a careful review of the records, the CA found that there was doubt as to the nationality of petitioners when
it realized that petitioners had a common major investor, MBMI, a corporation composed of 100% Canadians.
Pursuant to the first sentence of paragraph 7 of DOJ Opinion No. 020, Series of 2005, adopting the 1967 SEC
Rules which implemented the requirement of the Constitution and other laws pertaining to the exploitation of
natural resources, the CA used the "grandfather rule" to determine the nationality of petitioners.

ISSUES
I. The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for mootness despite the fact that the subject
matter of the controversy, the MPSA Applications, have already been converted into FTAA applications and that
the same have already been granted.

II. The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction considering that the
Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to determine the nationality of Narra, Tesoro and McArthur. (I think this
is the most relevant issue to the present topic being discussed)

III. The Court of Appeals’ ruling that Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on the
"Grandfather Rule" is contrary to law, particularly the express mandate of the Foreign Investments Act of 1991,
as amended, and the FIA Rules.

IV. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the conversion of the MPSA Applications into FTAA
Applications were of "suspicious nature" as the same is based on mere conjectures and surmises without any
shred of evidence to show the same.

RULING

I. The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for mootness despite the fact that the
subject matter of the controversy, the MPSA Applications, have already been converted into FTAA
applications and that the same have already been granted.

Petitioner’s Contention: Petitioners propound that the CA erred in ruling against them since the questioned
MPSA applications were already converted into FTAA applications; thus, the issue on the prohibition relating to
MPSA applications of foreign mining corporations is academic.

The filing of the Financial or Technical Assistance Agreement application is a clear admission that the respondents
are not capable of conducting a large scale mining operation and that they need the financial and technical
assistance of a foreign entity in their operation that is why they sought the participation of MBMI Resources, Inc. The
participation of MBMI in the corporation only proves the fact that it is the Canadian company that will provide the
finances and the resources to operate the mining areas for the greater benefit and interest of the same and not the
Filipino stockholders who only have a less substantial financial stake in the corporation.

This case not moot and academic. We of this Court note that a grave violation of the Constitution, specifically
Section 2 of Article XII, is being committed by a foreign corporation right under our country’s nose through a
myriad of corporate layering under different, allegedly, Filipino corporations. The intricate corporate layering
utilized by the Canadian company, MBMI, is of exceptional character and involves paramount public interest
since it undeniably affects the exploitation of our Country’s natural resources. The corresponding actions of
petitioners during the lifetime and existence of the instant case raise questions as what principle is to be applied
to cases with similar issues. No definite ruling on such principle has been pronounced by the Court; hence, the
disposition of the issues or errors in the instant case will serve as a guide "to the bench, the bar and the public."
Finally, the instant case is capable of repetition yet evading review, since the Canadian company, MBMI, can
keep on utilizing dummy Filipino corporations through various schemes of corporate layering and conversion of
applications to skirt the constitutional prohibition against foreign mining in Philippine soil.
the Grandfather Rule or the second part of the SEC Rule applies only when the 60-40 Filipino-foreign equity
ownership is in doubt (i.e., in cases where the joint venture corporation with Filipino and foreign stockholders
with less than 60% Filipino stockholdings [or 59%] invests in other joint venture corporation which is either 60-
40% Filipino-alien or the 59% less Filipino). Stated differently, where the 60-40 Filipino- foreign equity
ownership is not in doubt, the Grandfather Rule will not apply. (emphasis supplied)
the Court finds that this case calls for the application of the grandfather rule since, as ruled by the POA and
affirmed by the OP, doubt prevails and persists in the corporate ownership of petitioners. Also, as found by the
CA, doubt is present in the 60-40 Filipino equity ownership of petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro, since
their common investor, the 100% Canadian corporation––MBMI, funded them. However, petitioners also claim
that there is "doubt" only when the stockholdings of Filipinos are less than 60%.43
The assertion of petitioners that "doubt" only exists when the stockholdings are less than 60% fails to convince
this Court. DOJ Opinion No. 20, which petitioners quoted in their petition, only made an example of an instance
where "doubt" as to the ownership of the corporation exists. It would be ludicrous to limit the application of the
said word only to the instances where the stockholdings of non-Filipino stockholders are more than 40% of the
total stockholdings in a corporation. The corporations interested in circumventing our laws would clearly strive to
have "60% Filipino Ownership" at face value. It would be senseless for these applying corporations to state in
their respective articles of incorporation that they have less than 60% Filipino stockholders since the
applications will be denied instantly. Thus, various corporate schemes and layerings are utilized to circumvent
the application of the Constitution.
Obviously, the instant case presents a situation which exhibits a scheme employed by stockholders to
circumvent the law, creating a cloud of doubt in the Court’s mind. To determine, therefore, the actual
participation, direct or indirect, of MBMI, the grandfather rule must be used.
II. The Court of Appeals erred when it did not dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction considering
that the Panel of Arbitrators has no jurisdiction to determine the nationality of Narra, Tesoro and
McArthur.

We affirm the ruling of the CA in declaring that the POA has jurisdiction over the instant case. The POA has
jurisdiction to settle disputes over rights to mining areas which definitely involve the petitions filed by Redmont
against petitioners Narra, McArthur and Tesoro. It is clear that POA has exclusive and original jurisdiction over
any and all disputes involving rights to mining areas. One such dispute is an MPSA application to which an
adverse claim, protest or opposition is filed by another interested applicant in the case at bar, the dispute arose
or originated from MPSA applications where petitioners are asserting their rights to mining areas subject of their
respective MPSA applications. Since respondent filed 3 separate petitions for the denial of said applications,
then a controversy has developed between the parties and it is POA’s jurisdiction to resolve said disputes.

Moreover, the jurisdiction of the RTC involves civil actions while what petitioners filed with the DENR Regional
Office or any concerned DENRE or CENRO are MPSA applications. Thus POA has jurisdiction.

Furthermore, the POA has jurisdiction over the MPSA applications under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Euro-med Laboratories v. Province of Batangas elucidates:The doctrine of primary jurisdiction holds that if a
case is such that its determination requires the expertise, specialized training and knowledge of an
administrative body, relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before resort to the courts is
had even if the matter may well be within their proper jurisdiction.

Whatever may be the decision of the POA will eventually reach the court system via a resort to the CA and to
this Court as a last recourse.

III. The Court of Appeals’ ruling that Narra, Tesoro and McArthur are foreign corporations based on
the "Grandfather Rule" is contrary to law, particularly the express mandate of the Foreign Investments
Act of 1991, as amended, and the FIA Rules.
We disagree. "Corporate layering" is admittedly allowed by the FIA; but if it is used to circumvent the
Constitution and pertinent laws, then it becomes illegal. Further, the pronouncement of petitioners that the
grandfather rule has already been abandoned must be discredited for lack of basis.

Art. XII, Sec. 2 of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by
the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of
the State. The State may directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture or
production-sharing agreements with Filipino citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of
whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such terms and conditions as may be provided by
law.
The President may enter into agreements with Foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral
oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic
growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and
use of local scientific and technical resources. (emphasis supplied)

The emphasized portion of Sec. 2 which focuses on the State entering into different types of agreements for the
exploration, development, and utilization of natural resources with entities who are deemed Filipino due to 60
percent ownership of capital is pertinent to this case, since the issues are centered on the utilization of our
country’s natural resources or specifically, mining. Thus, there is a need to ascertain the nationality of
petitioners since, as the Constitution so provides, such agreements are only allowed corporations or
associations "at least 60 percent of such capital is owned by such citizens."

Under the above-quoted SEC Rules, there are two cases in determining the nationality of the Investee
Corporation. The first case is the ‘liberal rule’, later coined by the SEC as the Control Test in its 30 May 1990
Opinion, and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph 7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, ‘(s)hares
belonging to corporations or partnerships at least 60% of the capital of which is owned by Filipino citizens shall
be considered as of Philippine nationality.’ Under the liberal Control Test, there is no need to further trace the
ownership of the 60% (or more) Filipino stockholdings of the Investing Corporation since a corporation which is
at least 60% Filipino-owned is considered as Filipino.

The second case is the Strict Rule or the Grandfather Rule Proper and pertains to the portion in said Paragraph
7 of the 1967 SEC Rules which states, "but if the percentage of Filipino ownership in the corporation or
partnership is less than 60%, only the number of shares corresponding to such percentage shall be counted as
of Philippine nationality." Under the Strict Rule or Grandfather Rule Proper, the combined totals in the Investing
Corporation and the Investee Corporation must be traced (i.e., "grandfathered") to determine the total
percentage of Filipino ownership.

Moreover, the ultimate Filipino ownership of the shares must first be traced to the level of the Investing
Corporation and added to the shares directly owned in the Investee Corporation x x x.
Concluding from the above-stated facts, it is quite safe to say that petitioners McArthur, Tesoro and Narra are
not Filipino since MBMI, a 100% Canadian corporation, owns 60% or more of their equity interests. Such
conclusion is derived from grandfathering petitioners’ corporate owners, namely: MMI, SMMI and PLMDC.
Going further and adding to the picture, MBMI’s Summary of Significant Accounting Policies statement– –
regarding the "joint venture" agreements that it entered into with the "Olympic" and "Alpha" groups––involves
SMMI, Tesoro, PLMDC and Narra. Noticeably, the ownership of the "layered" corporations boils down to MBMI,
Olympic or corporations under the "Alpha" group wherein MBMI has joint venture agreements with, practically
exercising majority control over the corporations mentioned. In effect, whether looking at the capital structure or
the underlying relationships between and among the corporations, petitioners are NOT Filipino nationals and
must be considered foreign since 60% or more of their capital stocks or equity interests are owned by MBMI.

IV. The Court of Appeals erred when it concluded that the conversion of the MPSA Applications into
FTAA Applications were of "suspicious nature" as the same is based on mere conjectures and
surmises without any shred of evidence to show the same.
We disagree.
x x x The filing of the FTAA application on June 15, 2007, during the pendency of the case only demonstrate the
violations and lack of qualification of the respondent corporations to engage in mining. The filing of the FTAA
application conversion which is allowed foreign corporation of the earlier MPSA is an admission that indeed the
respondent is not Filipino but rather of foreign nationality who is disqualified under the laws. Corporate
documents of MBMI Resources, Inc. furnished its stockholders in their head office in Canada suggest that they
are conducting operation only through their local counterparts.36
Respondent Redmont, in its Comment dated October 10, 2011, made known to the Court the fact of the OP’s
Decision and Resolution. In their Reply, petitioners chose to ignore the OP Decision and continued to reuse
their old arguments claiming that they were granted FTAAs and, thus, the case was moot. Petitioners filed a
Manifestation and Submission dated October 19, 2012,40 wherein they asserted that the present petition is
moot since, in a remarkable turn of events, MBMI was able to sell/assign all its shares/interest in the "holding
companies" to DMCI Mining Corporation (DMCI), a Filipino corporation and, in effect, making their respective
corporations fully-Filipino owned.

The only thing clear and proved in this Court is the fact that the OP declared that petitioner corporations have
violated several mining laws and made misrepresentations and falsehood in their applications for FTAA which
lead to the revocation of the said FTAAs, demonstrating that petitioners are not beyond going against or around
the law using shifty actions and strategies. Thus, in this instance, we can say that their claim of mootness is
moot in itself because their defense of conversion of MPSAs to FTAAs has been discredited by the OP
Decision.

Selling of MBMI’s shares to DMCI -As stated before, petitioners’ Manifestation and Submission dated October
19, 2012 would want us to declare the instant petition moot and academic due to the transfer and conveyance
of all the shareholdings and interests of MBMI to DMCI, a corporation duly organized and existing under
Philippine laws and is at least 60% Philippine-owned.56 Petitioners reasoned that they now cannot be
considered as foreign-owned; the transfer of their shares supposedly cured the "defect" of their previous
nationality. They claimed that their current FTAA contract with the State should stand since "even wholly-owned
foreign corporations can enter into an FTAA with the State."57 Petitioners stress that there should no longer be
any issue left as regards their qualification to enter into FTAA contracts since they are qualified to engage in
mining activities in the Philippines. Thus, whether the "grandfather rule" or the "control test" is used, the
nationalities of petitioners cannot be doubted since it would pass both tests.The sale of the MBMI shareholdings
to DMCI does not have any bearing in the instant case and said fact should be disregarded. The manifestation
can no longer be considered by us since it is being tackled in G.R. No. 202877 pending before this
Court.1âwphi1 Thus, the question of whether petitioners, allegedly a Philippine-owned corporation due to the
sale of MBMI's shareholdings to DMCI, are allowed to enter into FTAAs with the State is a non-issue in this
case.In ending, the "control test" is still the prevailing mode of determining whether or not a corporation is a
Filipino corporation, within the ambit of Sec. 2, Art. II of the 1987 Constitution, entitled to undertake the
exploration, development and utilization of the natural resources of the Philippines. When in the mind of the
Court there is doubt, based on the attendant facts and circumstances of the case, in the 60-40 Filipino-equity
ownership in the corporation, then it may apply the "grandfather rule."WHEREFORE, premises considered, the
instant petition is DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision dated October 1, 2010 and Resolution dated
February 15, 2011 are hereby AFFIRMED.
11) Film Development Council v. Colon Heritage, 758 SCRA 536

FACTS
City of Cebu, in its exercise of its power to impose amusement taxes under LGC, issued a tax ordinance w/c
requires proprietors, lessees and operators of theatres, cinemas, and other places of amusement to pay an
amusement tax of 30% of their gross receipts.
After a decade, Congress passed RA 9167, creating FDCP. It provided, among others, the imposition of
amusement tax for grade A and B films, to be collected by FDCP.
FDCP demanded the payment of amusement taxes from the Cebu cinemas, but the latter refused. Thus, City of
Cebu filed before the RTC the declaration of Secs. 13 and 14 of RA 9167 as invalid and unconstitutional.
RTC, however, declared the whole RA 9167 invalid and unconstitutional.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s: promotion and support for the development of local film industry
Respondent/s’ contention/s: Taxation as essential and inherent attribute attribute of sovereignty; local fiscal
autonomy

ISSUE
(only that related to Sec. 5 of Art. VIII)
WON RTC erred in declaring the whole RA 9167 invalid and unconstitutional?

RULING
Yes. Only the Sec. 13 and 14 thereof, which allows FDCP to impose amusement taxes against the places of
amusement, shall be declared invalid and unconstitutional.

The constitutionality of the entire law was not put into question in any of the cases. Nowhere in assailed
judgment of the RTC was it explicated why the entire law was being declared as unconstitutional. It is a basic
tenet that courts cannot go beyond the issues in a case, which the RTC Br. 5 did when it declared RA 9167
unconstitutional.

Where a part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the valid portions
separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The exception to this is when the parts of a statute are
mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each
other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, in which case, the nullity of one part
will vitiate the rest.

12) Sameer v. Cabiles, 732 SCRA 531

SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC. vs. JOY C. CABILES

FACTS:

This a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’ decision. This decision partially
affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s resolution declaring respondent’s dismissal illegal,
directing petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00,
and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s
fees.

Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement agency. Joy C. Cabiles was
deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997. She alleged that in her employment
contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy,
without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary
and passport." She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation."
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of NT$9,000. According to
her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila.
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and
Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.

SC in this case ruled that respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary
for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and
reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary.

Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995,
states that overseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full
reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less."

The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award respondent
NT$46,080.00 or the three month equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of NT$300.00, and the
reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for her repatriation.

SC upholds the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the three-month
equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired
term of the employment contract.
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc., SC had ruled that the clause "or
for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" is unconstitutional for violating
the equal protection clause and substantive due process.

A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been passed at all."
However, the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less "was
reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act No. 10022 in 2010.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides: In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or
authorized cause as defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, the
worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the deductions made with interest at
twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three
(3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.

Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the reinstatement of the clause
in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of respondent’s termination from work in 1997.
Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended by Republic Act No. 10022 governs this case.

Petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional. The legislators intended a balance between the employers’ and
the employees’ rights by not unduly burdening the local recruitment agency. Petitioner is also of the view that the
clause was already declared as constitutional in Serrano.

The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and constitutional. However, since the
parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of the clause as reinstated in Republic Act No. 10022,
its contention is that it is beyond judicial review.

On the other hand, respondent argued that the clause was unconstitutional because it infringed on workers’ right to
contract.

ISSUE:

1. WON SC can decide on the constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 10022

2. WON Section 7 of RA 10022 is constitutional

RULING:

1. YES.

When a law is passed, SC awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions in their proper
context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.

However, SC is confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact clause already
declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the circumstances.

This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals.
At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the execution of the judgment in this case,
further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong done to petitioner.

Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.

Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules concerning the
protection and enforcement of constitutional rights." When cases become moot and academic, we do not
hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations where the same violations are capable of
repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to cases where there are millions of Filipinos working
abroad who are bound to suffer from the lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical clause
in a provision previously declared as unconstitutional.

In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government may exercise its
powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the existence of any law that
supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any other law. All laws must be read in light
of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it is a nullity.

Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the Constitution, the nullity
cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a similar law or provision. A law or
provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional remains as such unless circumstances have so
changed as to warrant a reverse conclusion.

2. NO.

We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so changed so as to
cause us to reverse binding precedent (the Serrano v. Gallant Maritime case).

Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these cases. The new
law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were prior to Serrano. Failure to
reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the same untold economic hardships that our
reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further
litigation that will reduce their hard earned wages as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of
the protection of our laws simply because our precedents have not been followed. There is no constitutional
doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional interpretation is
complex, but it is never unreasonable.

We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, violates the
constitutional rights to equal protection and due process. Petitioner as well as the Solicitor General have
failed to show any compelling change in the circumstances that would warrant us to revisit the precedent.

We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an
illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal
protection clauses of the Constitution.

A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class."

The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.

In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished between fixed-period
overseas workers and fixed period local workers. It also distinguished between overseas workers with employment
contracts of less than one year and overseas workers with employment contracts of at least one year. Within the
class of overseas workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those with at
least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally
dismissed.
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a "legislative
classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the
peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."

We also noted in Serrano that before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims of illegally terminated
overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment were computed in the same manner. Their money claims
were computed based on the "unexpired portions of their contracts." The adoption of the reinstated clause in
Republic Act No. 8042 subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of
at least a year to a cap of three months worth of their salary. There was no such limitation on the money claims of
illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.

We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a term of less than one
year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of their employment contracts. Meanwhile, illegally
dismissed overseas workers with employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months
of their salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.

Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates a sub-layer of
discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one year: those who are illegally
dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be entitled to their salaries for the entire
unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally dismissed with one year or more remaining in their
contracts shall be covered by the reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for
three months only."

Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is arbitrary as it deprives
overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable valid purpose.

Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in accordance with
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month equivalence of respondent’s salary must
be modified accordingly. Since she started working on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997,
respondent is entitled to her salary from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be
iniquitous to petitioner and other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers
and recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment contract
embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional provision of law."

13) Kalipunan v. Robredo, 730 SCRA 322

FACTS

The members of petitioners Kalipunan ng Damayang Mahihirap, Inc. and Corazon de Jesus Homeowners’
Association as well as the individual petitioners, were occupying parcels of land in the cities of San Juan,
Navotas and Quezon. These LGUs sent the petitioners notices of eviction and demolition pursuant to RA 7279
(Urban Development Housing Act) in order to give way to the implementation and construction of infrastructure
projects in the areas illegally occupied by the petitioners. RA 7279 authorize evictions and demolitions without
any court order when: (1) persons or entities occupy danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage
dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and
playgrounds; and (2) persons or entities occupy areas where government infrastructure projects with available
funding are about to be implemented. On March 23, 2012, the petitioners directly filed a petition for prohibition
and mandamus before the Court, seeking to compel the Secretary of Interior and Local Government, et al. to
first secure an eviction and/or demolition order from the court prior to their implementation of RA 7279.

Petitioners’ Argument:

- They have no plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.

- They also posit that the respondents gravely abused their discretion in implementing RA 7279 which are
patently unconstitutional.

- They stand to be directly injured by the respondents’ threats of evictions and demolitions. In the
alternative, they contend that the transcendental public importance of the issues raised in this case clothes
them with legal standing.

- RA 7279 offend their constitutional right to due process because they warrant evictions and demolitions
without any court order. The Respondents’ Case

Respondents’ Defense:

- Petitioners ignored the hierarchy of courts when they directly filed a Rule 65 petition before the Court.

- Petitioners incorrectly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus in assailing the
constitutionality of RA 7279.

- Petitioners failed to particularly state the grave abuse of discretion commited by the respondents. Faithful
implementation of RA 7279, which is presumed to be constitutional, cannot be equated to grave abuse of
discretion.

- The petition does not present any justiciable controversy since the LGUs had already successfully evicted
the petitioners.

- Section 10, Article 13 of the 1987 Constitution allows evictions and demolitions to be conducted even
without a court order provided they are done in accordance with the law and in a just and humane manner. RA
7279 provides sufficient safeguards in ensuring that evictions and demolitions are carried out in a just and
humane manner.

- Petitioners’ invocation of their right to freely choose their abode is misplaced since they have no vested
right to occupy properties that they do not own. Liberty of abode is not illimitable and does not include the right
to encroach upon other person properties

ISSUE:

Whether the petition should be dismissed for serious procedural defects; and

(a) Whether the petitioners violated the principle of hierarchy of courts;

(b) Whether the petitioners correctly availed themselves of a petition for prohibition and mandamus;

RULING:

Both Yes.

(a) Section 5, Article VII provides that SC has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus. However, petitioners appear to have forgotten that the SC is a
court of last resort, not a court of first instance. The hierarchy of courts should serve as a general determinant of
the appropriate forum for Rule 65 petitions. The concurrence of jurisdiction among the SC, CA and RTC to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction does not give the
petitioners the unrestricted freedom of choice of forum. By directly filing Rule 65 petitions, the petitioners have
unduly taxed the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted to matters within our exclusive jurisdiction.
Trial court is better equipped to resolve cases of this nature since this Court is not a trier of facts and does not
normally undertake an examination of the contending parties’ evidence. Section 5, Article VII provides that SC
has original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto and habeas corpus.

(b) The petitioners seem to have forgotten that a writ of prohibition only lies against the tribunal, corporation,
board, officer or person’s exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This Court issue a writ of
prohibition to afford the aggrieved party a relief against the respondent’s usurpation or grave abuse of
jurisdiction or power. On the other hand, a petition for mandamus is merely directed against the tribunal,
corporation, board, officer, or person who unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station or who unlawfully excludes another from the use and
enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled. Thus, a writ of mandamus will only issue to compel
an officer to perform a ministerial duty. It will not control a public officer’s exercise of discretion as where the law
imposes upon him the duty to exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act
precisely because it is his judgment that is to be exercised, not that of the court.

A reading of RA 7279 clearly shows that the acts complained of are beyond the scope of a petition for
prohibition and mandamus. The use of the permissive word "may" implies that the public respondents have
discretion when their duty to execute evictions and/or demolitions shall be performed. Where the words of a
statute are clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
attempted interpretation.

14)In the Matter .. the election of the IBP, A.M. 09-05-2-SC, April 11, 2013

FACTS

In 1973, the Philippine Bar was integrated to elevate the standards of the legal profession, to improve the
administration of justice and to enable it to discharge its public responsibility more effectively. Governing the IBP
was the IBP Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), consisting of the governors from each of the nine (9) geographic
regions of the archipelago, namely: Northern Luzon, Central Luzon, Southern Luzon, Greater Manila,
Bicolandia, Eastern Visayas, Western Visayas, Eastern Mindanao, and Western Mindanao. The governors of
the IBP-BOG are, in turn, elected by the House of Delegates which consists of members duly apportioned
among the chapters of each region.

When the Philippine Bar was first integrated, both the IBP-President and the EVP were elected by the IBP-BOG
from among themselves or from other members of the Integrated Bar, with the right of automatic succession by
the EVP to the presidency for the next succeeding full term. The presidency rotated among all the nine regions
in such order as the IBP-BOG had prescribed. Both the IBP-President and the EVP held a term of one (1) year,
with the presidency rotating from year to year among the regions.

Under the December 14, 2010 Resolution, Section 47 of the IBP By-Laws reads:

The Executive Vice President shall be elected on a strict rotation basis by the Board of
Governors from among themselves, by the vote of at least five (5) Governors.

Thereafter, on December 4, 2012, the Court issued a resolution addressing the issues with respect to the
election of governor for IBP-Western Visayas. In clarifying that:

The rotational rule was one by exclusion, the Court explained that in the election of governor
of a region, all chapters of the region should be given the opportunity to have their nominees
elected as governor, to the exclusion of those chapters that had already served in the
rotational cycle. Once a rotational cycle would be completed, all chapters of a region, except
the chapter which won in the immediately preceding elections, could once again have the
equal opportunity to vie for the position of governor of their region. The chapter that won in
the immediately preceding election, under the rotational cycle just completed, could only vie
for the position of governor after the election of the first governor in the new cycle.

This administrative matter was triggered by the Petition for Intervention filed by petitioner-intervenor IBP-
Southern Luzon Region (IBP-Southern Luzon), seeking a declaration that the post of EVP-IBP for the 2011-
2013 term be held open to all regions and that it is qualified to field a candidate for the said position.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:

In support of its bid to qualify in the election for EVP for the 2011-2013 term, IBP-Southern Luzon alleged that it
was effectively deprived of its right to the IBP presidency.

In its Comment, the IBP-BOG prayed that the “IBP-Southern Luzon be allowed to nominate a candidate for EVP
for the 2011-2013 term, without prejudice to the right of other regions except IBP-Eastern Mindanao, to do the
same.”

Respondent/s’ contention/s:

For its part, IBP-Western Visayas advances the following arguments in support of its position that it is the only
region qualified to field a candidate for EVP for the 2011-2013 term. Thus, the Petition in Intervention of IBP-
Southern Luzon should not be entertained as it would be contrary to Section 2, Rule 19, it being filed following
the finality of the December 14, 2010 Resolution of the Court.

ISSUE

Whether the motion for intervention of IBP-Southern Luzon be allowed and admitted.
RULING

YES.

There is no dispute that the Constitution has empowered the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
“the integrated bar.” Pursuant thereto, the Court wields a continuing power of supervision over the IBP and
its affairs like the elections of its officers.

In the exercise of its continuing supervisory power, the Court is allowing the matter to be raised as an issue
because it has not yet been squarely settled. It should be noted that this is merely an administrative
matter, a bar matter to be specific, where technical rules are not strictly applied. In fact, in administrative
cases, there is no rule regarding entry of judgment. Where there is no entry of judgment, finality and
immutability do not come into play.

Section 6: The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel
thereof.

1) Civil Service Commission vs. MERLE RAMONEDA-PITA, Clerk III, MTCC, Danao City. A.M. No. P-08-
2531, April 11, 2013

FACTS:

On March 23, 1998, an anonymous letter informed the CSC and alleged of an irregularity in Ramoneda-
Pita’s taking of the Career Service Sub-Professional Examination held in Cebu City on July 26, 1987.

The CSC retrieved the records for the July 26, 1987 examinations and compared the pictures and
signatures of Ramoneda-Pita as they appeared in the Picture Seat Plan (PSP) for the exam and her PDS
dated October 17, 1990. As the pictures and signatures did not match, the CSC required Ramoneda-Pita
to explain why it seemed that another person took the civil service examination on her behalf.
Ramoneda-Pita denied such allegations and averred that she took the civil service examinations on July
30, 1986 and not July 26, 1987. She explained that there were dissimilarities in the pictures in the PSP
and the PDS because these were not taken on the same year and might have deteriorated in quality over
the years. She accounted for the difference in her signatures to her low educational attainment leading
to her non-development and non-maintenance of a usual signature.

On May 3, 1999, the CSC made the observation that the person who took the exam was not the same
person whose picture and signature appear in the PDS of the real Merle C. Ramoneda and
recommended that Merle C. Ramoneda be adjudged guilty of the charges and meted the penalty of
dismissal with all its accessories. Thus, the CSC issued Resolution No. 010263 dated January 26, 2001
finding Ramoneda-Pita guilty of dishonesty and dismissing her from the service with the imposition of
all its accessory penalties including being perpetually barred from entering the government service and
from taking any civil service examination in the future and the revocation of her Eligibility.
Ramoneda-Pita moved for reconsideration but the CSC denied it in Resolution No. 010880 dated May 3,
2001. Ramoneda-Pita appealed CSC Resolution Nos. 010263 and 010880 to the Court of Appeals and,
subsequently, to this Court. In both instances, her appeal was denied.

On January 14, 2005, Ramoneda-Pita wrote to then President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appealing for
clemency stating that she accepted her fate and turned a new leaf with a solemn commitment to do
good for the rest of her life. The Office of the President referred the matter to Dir. David Cabanag, Jr. of
the CSCRO No. VII for validation and investigation.

While the appeal for clemency was pending and in the course of the CSC’s investigation, the CSC
discovered that, again, Ramoneda-Pita had been declaring in her PDS, particularly the PDS dated June
14, 2005 submitted to the Supreme Court, that she had not been found guilty in any administrative case
and that she was civil service eligible.

Thus, on May 11, 2006, the CSC, in its Investigation Report, found that Ramoneda-Pita had not
sufficiently established moral reformation which is crucial in the grant of executive clemency and
recommended that the same be denied.

On June 23, 2006, Director Cabanag, Jr. wrote a letter to the OCA informing it of the continued
employment of Ramoneda-Pita as Clerk III of the MTCC, Danao City despite the finality of CSC
Resolution No. 010263. On August 18, 2006, the OCA required Ramoneda-Pita to submit her comment
within fifteen (15) days

In her Comment dated September 7, 2006, Ramoneda-Pita asserted that she never concealed that she
had been previously found guilty of dishonesty since her immediate supervisor, Judge Patalinghug,
was furnished a copy of CSC Resolution No. 010263. She explained that she made the entries in her
June 14, 2005 PDS because she wanted to be consistent in her statements in her previous PDS and,
considering her low education, she just copied the data entries contained in her earlier PDS. She said
that it was never her intention to falsify the PDS and she did not understand the legal implications. She
prayed for the Court’s understanding and cited her good record during her years of service.

In its Report dated July 4, 2008, the OCA recommended, among others, that the case be docketed as a
regular administrative matter and that this Court conduct its own investigation on the matter. This Court
noted and adopted the recommendation of the OCA in a Resolution dated August 6, 2008 where it
directed the OCA to conduct its own investigation on the matter and submit a report and
recommendation thereon. Thus, this administrative case.

In its Memorandum dated February 19, 2009, the OCA recommended Ramoneda-Pita’s dismissal from
the service. It found that Ramoneda-Pita fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC never
once questioning its jurisdiction. It stated:

In the instant case, respondent Ramoneda-Pita, who never even questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC,
fully participated in the proceedings before the CSC. Although she was not yet a Supreme Court
employee when the CSC instituted the case against her, she had already become a member of the
judiciary when Resolution No. 01-0263 dated January 26, 2001 finding her guilty and meting her the
penalty of dismissal was issued - having been appointed by the Court to her present position on July
24, 2000. Taking into consideration the pronouncement in the Ampong case, we believe that with all the
more reason the doctrine of estoppel should thus be considered applicable in the instant case as the
respondent went all the way to the Supreme Court to question the CSC Resolution. In addition, the
Court itself has even ruled on the case, effectively upholding CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 when it
explicitly stated that in any event, the petition would still be denied for failure thereof to sufficiently
show that the public respondent committed any reversible error in the challenged decision as to
warrant the exercise by this Court of its discretionary appellate jurisdiction in this case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not implementing CSC Resolution No. 01-0263 and dismissing the respondent outright is
the proper remedy

RULING:

The Court still maintains its administrative jurisdiction over the respondent and should therefore have
the final determination of her administrative liability. Considering, however, that the CSC had already
conducted both fact-finding and formal investigations, we find no reason why the Court should
replicate what the CSC had done more ably.

The standard procedure is for the CSC to bring its complaint against a judicial employee before the
Supreme Court through the OCA as shown in several cases. The Court, however, has made exceptions
in certain cases. In the very recent case of Ampong, the Court, although it declared that it had
administrative jurisdiction over the petitioner, nevertheless upheld the ruling of the CSC based on the
principle of estoppel. In the said case, petitioner Ampong, a court interpreter at the time the CSC
instituted administrative proceedings against her, questioned the jurisdiction of the CSC after it found
her guilty of dishonesty in surreptitiously taking the CSC-supervised Professional Board Examination
for Teachers (PBET) in 1991 in place of another person and dismissed her from the service. The Court
denied the petition on the ground that the previous actions of petitioner estopped her from attacking
the jurisdiction of the CSC which had accorded her due process.

The OCA then proceeded to discuss the merits of Ramoneda-Pita’s contention. It noted Ramoneda-
Pita’s claim that her physical appearance changed over the intervening years since she took the Civil
Service Sub-Professional Examinations. She also posed the possibility that the picture quality had
deteriorated over time. In addition, she also claims that the examiner must have interchanged her
picture with someone else as he was the one who pasted the pictures to the seat plan.

However, the OCA seriously doubted the validity of Ramoneda-Pita’s claim saying that a mere three-
year gap would not bring about drastic changes in a person’s appearance. On the confusion with
respect to the pictures, the OCA said that it was not "likely due to the strict procedure followed during
civil service examinations x x x." The presentation of various explanations and conjectures show the
inconsistent stands taken by the respondent. She insists that the picture in the seat plan was her and
that her physical appearance has changed over the years, yet in the same breath argues that the
examiner must have interchanged her picture with the pictures of other examinees.

The same inconsistency is manifest in all her records. Upon the Court’s resolution of her petition for
review on certiorari, the respondent states in her letter dated January 14, 2005 addressed to President
Arroyo that she fought hard to prove her innocence but had accepted her fate and mistake, with the
solemn commitment that she would never commit the same or similar mistake for the rest of her life. x x
x.
The respondent has a string of dishonest acts which started when she had somebody impersonate her
in taking the Civil Service Subprofessional examination. Upon the discovery of her deception, she
embarked on a series of prevarications to cover it up, the most notable of which is the Personal Data
Sheet dated April 5, 2000 she submitted to the Court as one of the supporting documents for her
appointment to the judiciary. In the Personal Data Sheet, item no. 25 asks "Do you have any pending
administrative case?" while item no. 27 queries "Have you ever been convicted of any administrative
offense?" The respondent answered "no" to both questions. It must be remembered that at the time she
filled out the Personal Data Sheet, she already had a pending administrative case, the CSC having
already filed its formal charge on September 7, 1998. Her fraudulent answers had been instrumental in
the unquestioned approval of her appointment because had she answered truthfully the Court would
have been alerted to her pending administrative case with the CSC and would have surely withheld, if
not denied, her appointment.

Taking judicial notice of the fact-finding and formal investigations conducted by the CSC relative to the
impersonation case of the respondent and given the observations on her subsequent actuations which
were predisposed to deceive, we find that the respondent, is indeed, guilty of dishonesty and
falsification of document. The OCA thus recommended that respondent Merle Ramoneda-Pita, Clerk III,
Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Danao City, be found GUILTY of Dishonesty and Falsification of Official
Document and be DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the
value of her accrued leaves, if any, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government x x x.

We note and adopt the recommendation of the OCA. As a preliminary matter, we address the matter of
propriety of the proceedings against Ramoneda-Pita in the CSC.

We have always maintained that it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court
personnel’s administrative compliance with all laws, rules and regulations. No other branch of
government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, Ramoneda-Pita was afforded the full protection of the law,
that is, afforded due process. She was able to file several affidavits and pleadings before the CSC with
counsel. It may also be noted that the case had been elevated to the Court of Appeals and this Court,
where the Resolution of the CSC was upheld in both instances.

The OCA’s reliance in Ampong v. Civil Service Commission is well taken. As we have stated in Civil
Service Commission v. Andal.

In Ampong, petitioner in that case admitted her guilt. She voluntarily went to the CSC regional office,
admitted to the charges leveled against her and waived her right to the assistance of counsel. She was
given ample opportunity to present her side and adduce evidence in her defense before the CSC. She
filed her answer to the charges against her and even moved for a reconsideration of the adverse ruling
of the CSC. In short, Ampong did not question the authority of the CSC and, in fact, actively participated
in the proceedings before it.

In the present case, while respondent may have filed his Answer to the formal charge of dishonesty
after having been directed to do so, he denied having taken the civil service examination and did not
even appear at the formal investigation conducted by the CSC-NCR. He appealed to the CSC after the
adverse decision of the CSC-NCR was rendered but raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction over his
person. He argued that as an employee in the Judiciary, "the jurisdiction to hear disciplinary action
against him vests with the Sandiganbayan or the Supreme Court." It cannot therefore be said that he
was estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the CSC.

This notwithstanding, we reiterate that we will not and cannot tolerate dishonesty for the judiciary
expects the highest standard of integrity from all its employees. The conduct and behavior of everyone
connected with an office charged with the dispensation of justice is circumscribed with a heavy burden
or responsibility. The Court will not hesitate to rid its ranks of undesirables. (Citations omitted;
emphases ours.)

In any event, the OCA had asked Ramoneda-Pita to comment on the matter. She was therefore given
due notice and fair hearing. It is noteworthy that she only rehashed the arguments that she raised
before the CSC proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Merle C. Ramoneda-Pita is hereby found GUILTY of dishonesty. She is DISMISSED from
the service with forfeiture of all her retirement benefits, except the value of her accrued leave credits, if
any, and with prejudice to re-employment in the government or any of its subdivisions,
instrumentalities or agencies including government-owned and controlled corporations. Let a copy of
this Decision be attached to her records with this Court.

SO ORDERED.

2) Re: Allegations against Justice Ong, A.M. No. Sb 14-21-J, Sep. 23, 2014

Facts:

This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation into certain allegations
that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct by an Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan.

The local media ran an expose involving billions of government funds channeled through bogus
foundations. In the course of the investigation names of certain government officials and other
individuals were identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with or attended Mrs. Napoles'
parties and events, among whom is incumbent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong.

Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an investigation motu proprio under
this Court's power of administrative supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the
legal profession.

The Court resolved to have the administrative matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J and
ASSIGNS the same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for investigation,
report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days from notice hereof.

Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against him.

1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the Sandiganbayan for
he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the Kevlar case;

2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case, respondent claimed
that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division as a collegial
body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice
Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-minded jurists who could not be pressured or
influenced by anybody, not even by their peers;

3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles prior to
the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the fact that Benhur
was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that it is unthinkable for him to
have received money from Napoles considering that her mother, brother, and sister-in-law were
convicted;

4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012, after the
decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what prompted him to do so,
thus:

Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez found that the respondent's acts of allowing
himself to be Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of
accepting money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.

Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds. Being aptly perceived as
the visible personification of law and justice, his personal behavior, not only while in the performance
of official duties but also outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a
personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one has
to pay for holding an exalted position.

SC Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez recommended that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found GUILTY
of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct
for the Philippine Judiciary.

Issue: Whether respondent is guilty of violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippines
Judiciary?

Ruling:

This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Investigating Justice.

Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption or bribery during the
pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account of his dealing and socializing with Napoles
after her acquittal in the said case.

Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a forbidden act, a
dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character, improper or wrong behavior; while
·"gross" has been defined as "out of all measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such
conduct as is not.

Respondent's association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of the decision
in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross misconduct notwithstanding the absence
of direct evidence of corruption or bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.

Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the respondent, we find credible
evidence of his association with Napoles after the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The
totality of the circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt inclinations
that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the decision-making process. By his act of
going to respondent at her office on two occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that
he was partial to Napoles.

Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:

"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a price one has to pay for
occupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must conduct himself in a manner
that gives no ground for reproach."

We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only pending and prospective
litigations.

Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere suggestion of partiality
and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the
appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2
further provides:

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might be
viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
It does not matter that the case is no longer pending when improper acts were committed by the judge.
Because magistrates are under constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution.

The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even before the administrative
complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity)
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud; untrustworthiness; lack of

integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle; lack of fairness and
straightforwardness; disposition to defraud, deceive or betray."28Dishonesty, being a grave
offense, carries the extreme penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement
benefits except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from reemployment in
government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act that has no place in the Judiciary.29

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of
GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY, all in violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture
of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in
any branch, agency or instrumentality of the government including government-owned or -controlled
corporations.

Section 7:
1. No person shall be appointed Member of the Supreme Court or any lower collegiate court unless he
is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. A Member of the Supreme Court must be at least forty years
of age, and must have been for fifteen years or more, a judge of a lower court or engaged in the practice
of law in the Philippines.

2. The Congress shall prescribe the qualifications of judges of lower courts, but no person may be
appointed judge thereof unless he is a citizen of the Philippines and a member of the Philippine Bar.

3. A Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

1) Villanueva v. JBC, G.R. No. 211833, April 7, 2015

FACTS

The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court.
On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial
Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the
petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner
sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered
applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination.

The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level courts to,
among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and since the
petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner
to take recourse to this Court.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:

Petitioner argued that the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC judge, and the JBC could
add no more and that the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection and due process clauses of
the Constitution. He further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the
Constitution and by Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of
law.

Respondent/s’ contention/s:

Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally
infirm and that the assailed policy does not violate the equal protection and due process clauses. the equal
protection clause is not violated because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five
years and those who have served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and
there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature.chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrar

ISSUE

Whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before they can
qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.

RULING

Yes, it is constitutional.

As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary and
only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by the latter as
justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is imbued with public
interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench. While the 1987 Constitution has
provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not preclude the JBC from having its own set
of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively ensure its mandate.

The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal function
of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the President.
However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the authority to set the standards/criteria
in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the minimum qualifications required
by the Constitution and law for every position. The search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a
degree of flexibility in order to determine who is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but
not unbridled license to act in performing its duties.

JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to promote an
effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had to establish a set of
uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum constitutional qualifications and
possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the adoption of the five-year requirement policy
applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution
to the JBC.

Section 8:
1. A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed
of the Chief Justice as ex officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired
Member of the Supreme Court, and a representative of the private sector.

2. The regular members of the Council shall be appointed by the President for a term of four years with
the consent of the Commission on Appointments. Of the Members first appointed, the representative of
the Integrated Bar shall serve for four years, the professor of law for three years, the retired Justice for
two years, and the representative of the private sector for one year.

3. The Clerk of the Supreme Court shall be the Secretary ex officio of the Council and shall keep a
record of its proceedings.

4. The regular Members of the Council shall receive such emoluments as may be determined by the
Supreme Court. The Supreme Court shall provide in its annual budget the appropriations for the
Council.

5. The Council shall have the principal function of recommending appointees to the judiciary. It may
exercise such other functions and duties as the Supreme Court may assign to it.

1.) Chavez v. JBC, 676 SCRA 496

FACTS:
The case is in relation to the process of selecting nominees for the vacant seat of Supreme Court Chief Justice
following Renato Corona’s departure.
Originally, the members of the Constitutional Commission saw the need to create a separate, competent and
independent body to recommend nominees to the President. Thus, it conceived of a body representative of all
the stakeholders in the judicial appointment process and called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC).

In particular, Paragraph 1 Section 8, Article VIII of the Constitution states that “(1) A Judicial and Bar Council is
hereby created under the supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the Congress as ex officio Members, a
representative of the Integrated Bar, a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
representative of the private sector.” In compliance therewith, Congress, from the moment of the creation of the
JBC, designated one representative from the Congress to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex officio members.

In 1994 however, the composition of the JBC was substantially altered. Instead of having only seven (7)
members, an eighth (8th) member was added to the JBC as two (2) representatives from Congress began
sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and one from the Senate, with each having one-half
(1/2) of a vote. During the existence of the case, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel
C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sat in JBC as representatives of the legislature.
It is this practice that petitioner Francisco Chavez (former solicitor general) has questioned in this
petition.
The respondents claimed that when the JBC was established, the framers originally envisioned a unicameral
legislative body, thereby allocating “a representative of the National Assembly” to the JBC. The phrase,
however, was not modified to aptly jive with the change to bicameralism which was adopted by the
Constitutional Commission on July 21, 1986. The respondents also contend that if the Commissioners were
made aware of the consequences of having a bicameral legislature instead of a unicameral one, they would
have made the corresponding adjustment in the representation of Congress in the JBC; that if only one house of
Congress gets to be a member of JBC would deprive the other house of representation, defeating the principle
of balance.
The respondents further argue that the allowance of two (2) representatives of Congress to be members of the
JBC does not render JBC’s purpose of providing balance nugatory; that the presence of two (2) members from
Congress will most likely provide balance as against the other six (6) members who are undeniably presidential
appointees
Supreme Court held that it has the power of review the case herein as it is an object of concern, not just for a
nominee to a judicial post, but for all the citizens who have the right to seek judicial intervention for rectification
of legal blunders.

ISSUE:
Whether the practice of the JBC to perform its functions with eight (8) members, two (2) of whom are members
of Congress, defeats the letter and spirit of the 1987 Constitution.

RULING:
No. The current practice of JBC in admitting two members of the Congress to perform the functions of the JBC
is violative of the 1987 Constitution. As such, it is unconstitutional.
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear, plain,
and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. It is a
well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in the Constitution must be given
their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As such, it can be clearly and
unambiguously discerned from Paragraph 1, Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution that in the phrase, “a
representative of Congress,” the use of the singular letter “a” preceding “representative of Congress” is
unequivocal and leaves no room for any other construction. It is indicative of what the members of the
Constitutional Commission had in mind, that is, Congress may designate only one (1) representative to the JBC.
Had it been the intention that more than one (1) representative from the legislature would sit in the JBC, the
Framers could have, in no uncertain terms, so provided.
Moreover, under the maxim noscitur a sociis, where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is
equally susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering
the company of words in which it is founded or with which it is associated. Every meaning to be given to each
word or phrase must be ascertained from the context of the body of the statute since a word or phrase in a
statute is always used in association with other words or phrases and its meaning may be modified or restricted
by the latter. Applying the foregoing principle to this case, it becomes apparent that the word “Congress” used in
Article VIII, Section 8(1) of the Constitution is used in its generic sense. No particular allusion whatsoever is
made on whether the Senate or the House of Representatives is being referred to, but that, in either case, only
a singular representative may be allowed to sit in the JBC
Considering that the language of the subject constitutional provision is plain and unambiguous, there is no need
to resort extrinsic aids such as records of the Constitutional Commission. Nevertheless, even if the Court should
proceed to look into the minds of the members of the Constitutional Commission, it is undeniable from the
records thereof that it was intended that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only. The underlying
reason leads the Court to conclude that a single vote may not be divided into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress, or among any of the sitting members of the JBC for that matter.
With the respondents’ contention that each representative should be admitted from the Congress and House of
Representatives, the Supreme Court, after the perusal of the records of Constitutional Commission, held that
“Congress,” in the context of JBC representation, should be considered as one body. While it is true that there
are still differences between the two houses and that an inter-play between the two houses is necessary in the
realization of the legislative powers conferred to them by the Constitution, the same cannot be applied in the
case of JBC representation because no liaison between the two houses exists in the workings of the JBC. No
mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and nomination
of judicial officers. Hence, the term “Congress” must be taken to mean the entire legislative department.
The framers of Constitution, in creating JBC, hoped that the private sector and the three branches of
government would have an active role and equal voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary.
Therefore, to allow the Legislature to have more quantitative influence in the JBC by having more than one
voice speak, whether with one full vote or one-half (1/2) a vote each, would “negate the principle of equality
among the three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution.”
It is clear, therefore, that the Constitution mandates that the JBC be composed of seven (7) members only.
Thus, any inclusion of another member, whether with one whole vote or half (1/2) of it, goes against that
mandate. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution, providing Congress with an equal voice with other
members of the JBC in recommending appointees to the Judiciary is explicit. Any circumvention of the
constitutional mandate should not be countenanced for the Constitution is the supreme law of the land. The
Constitution is the basic and paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all persons,
including the highest officials of the land, must defer. Constitutional doctrines must remain steadfast no matter
what may be the tides of time. It cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate the call of situations and
much more tailor itself to the whims and caprices of the government and the people who run it.
Notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the current composition of the JBC, all its prior official actions
are nonetheless valid. In the interest of fair play under the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the
declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified.

2.) Chavez v. JBC, 676 SCRA 579

(MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION)

FACTS:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the
respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), duly
opposed by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez (petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the unexpected departure of former Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor. In his initiatory
pleading, petitioner asked the Court to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of
having two (2) representatives from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the
Constitution.On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is
declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to reconstitute itself so that
only one (1) member of Congress will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1),
Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.

GROUNDS RELIED UPON BY RESPONDENTS:

Through the subject motion for reconsideration, respondents pray that the Court reconsider its decision and
dismiss the petition on the following grounds:
1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the JBC would lead to absurdity considering its
bicameral nature;
2] that the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there was a shift from unilateralism to
bicameralism was a plain oversight;
3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC
from political partisanship; and
4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member composition would provide a solution should
there be a stalemate is not exactly correct.

While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth grounds listed by
respondents, still, it finds itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues covered by the
first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and
second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case.

As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them jointly.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondents are correct.

RULING:
NO.
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the several
departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the body politic. The Framers reposed their
wisdom and vision on one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the framework upon
which government and society were to operate. Thus, in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the
Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The language used in the
Constitution must be taken to have been deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in the
Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must be maintained inviolate against
disobedience and defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text, compels acceptance and
bars modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain oversight in order to justify constitutional
construction. As stated in the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to describe
"representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only
one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in no uncertain terms, so
provided, as can be read in its other provisions.

Respondents cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on congressional representation in the JBC because it was
not in the exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to support the executive power to
appoint, and Congress, as one whole body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.

In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the two Houses in their participation in the
JBC. No mechanism is required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the screening and
nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by
adding to the four (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches of government - the
Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice
(representing the Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress (representing the Legislative
Department). The total is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the
Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government.

The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House of Representatives in the JBC and vice-
versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House of
Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may be a constricted
constitutional authority, but it is not an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of Congress is entitled to one full vote. This
pronouncement effectively disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between two
representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is
clearly against the essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and reasonable is the rule that
what cannot be legally done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into
two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put,
when the Constitution envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this
representation carries with him one full vote.

The Court cannot supply the legislative omission. According to the rule of casus omissus "a case omitted is to
be held as intentionally omitted”. The principle proceeds from a reasonable certainty that a particular person,
object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration." Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot under its
power of interpretation supply the omission even though the omission may have resulted from inadvertence or
because the case in question was not foreseen or contemplated." "The Court cannot supply what it thinks the
legislature would have supplied had its attention been called to the omission, as that would be judicial
legislation.”
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the Constitution against
usurpation. The Court remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the Constitution itself.
Judicial activism should never be allowed to become judicial exuberance. In cases like this, no amount of
practical logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an excision or an insertion that will
change the manifest intent of the Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the JBC is
tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not included in the provision as enacted. True to its
constitutional mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all of
situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this intrusion,
the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondents is hereby DENIED.

3) Jardeleza v. Sereno, G.R. No. 213181, August 19, 2014

FACTS
Associate Justice Roberto Abad was about to retire and the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) announce an
opening for application and recommendation for the said vacancy. Francis H. Jardeleza (Jardeleza), incumbent
Solicitor General of the Republic was included in the list of candidates. Hence, he was interviewed.

However, he received calls from some Justices that the Chief Justice herself – CJ Sereno, will be invoking
unanimity rule against him. It is invoked because Jardeleza’s integrity is in question.

During the meeting, Justice Carpio disclosed a confidential information which characterized Jardeleza’s integrity
as dubious. Jardeleza answered that he would defend himself provided that due process would be observed.
His request was denied and he was not included in the shortlist.

Hence, Jardeleza filed for certiorari and mandamus with prayer for TRO to compel the JBC to include him in the
list on the grounds that the JBC and CJ Sereno acted with grave abuse of discretion in excluding him, despite
having garnered a sufficient number of votes to qualify for the position.

ISSUE
Whether or not the right to due process is available in the course of JBC proceedings in cases where an
objection or opposition to an application is raised.

RULING
Yes.

While it is true that the JBC proceedings are sui generis, it does not automatically denigrate an applicant’s
entitlement to due process.

The Court does not brush aside the unique and special nature of JBC proceedings. Notwithstanding being “a
class of its own,” the right to be heard and to explain one’s self is availing.

In cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualifications is raised, the observance of due process neither
contradicts the fulfillment of the JBC’s duty to recommend. This holding is not an encroachment on its discretion
in the nomination process. Actually, its adherence to the precepts of due process supports and enriches the
exercise of its discretion. When an applicant, who vehemently denies the truth of the objections, is afforded the
chance to protest, the JBC is presented with a clearer understanding of the situation it faces, thereby guarding
the body from making an unsound and capricious assessment of information brought before it. The JBC is not
expected to strictly apply the rules of evidence in its assessment of an objection against an applicant. Just the
same, to hear the side of the person challenged complies with the dictates of fairness because the only test that
an exercise of discretion must surmount is that of soundness.

Consequently, the Court is compelled to rule that Jardeleza should have been included in the shortlist submitted
to the President for the vacated position of Associate Justice Abad. This consequence arose from the violation
by the JBC of its own rules of procedure and the basic tenets of due process.

True, Jardeleza has no vested right to a nomination, but this does not prescind from the fact that the JBC failed
to observe the minimum requirements of due process.

4) Villanueva v. JBC, 755 SCRA 182

FACTS : The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level court. On
September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following Regional Trial Courts
(RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6, Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur In a letter2
dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed the petitioner that he
was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date, the petitioner sent a letter,
through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the list of considered applicants and
protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature examination. The petitioner was
informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that his protest and
reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include his name in the list of
applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance for promotion to second-level
courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their current position for at least five years, and
since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the
petitioner to take recourse to this Court

ISSUE : WON the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal
function under the Constitution to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial function

HELD : The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two special civil
actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial
or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the JBC neither acted in any
judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.
However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including the policy that the petitioner now assails, is
necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on
whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing
and enforcing the said policy.

Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of supervision
over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight, or the authority to
see that subordinate officers perform their duties.

Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC complies
with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then the Court, through
its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and ensure that the JBC complies
with its own rules

The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. It is essential to the
issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act required. The remedy of mandamus, as an
extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly,
the use of discretion and the performance of a ministerial act are mutually exclusive. Clearly, to be included as an
applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus inasmuch as it involves the exercise of
sound discretion by the JBC

The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by a person
interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are affected by a statute,
an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this remedy includes the interpretation
and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the judicial declaration of the parties' rights or
duties thereunder."

In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition specifically
sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of applicants although he
failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that no person possesses a legal
right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant judicial positions. The opportunity of
appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a judicially enforceable right that may be properly
claimed by any person

Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over
a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special civil action of declaratory
relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691

Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded judicial
power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the Court will set aside
procedural infirmities

5) Aguinaldo v. JBC, G.R. No. 224302, November 29, 2017

FACTS

Petition at bar challenged President Aquino’s appointment of respondents Econg and Musngi as
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, which disregarded the clustering by the JBC of the nominees for
the six simultaneous vacancies in said collegiate court into six separate short lists.

JBC’s Contention

The JBC asserts that in submitting six short lists for six vacancies, it was only acting in accordance
with the clear and unambiguous mandate of Article VIII, Section 93 of the 1987 Constitution for the
JBC to submit a list for every vacancy. Considering its independence as a constitutional body, the JBC
has the discretion and wisdom to perform its mandate in any manner as long as it is consistent with
the Constitution. According to the JBC, its new practice of “clustering,” in fact, is more in accord with
the purpose of the JBC to rid the appointment process to the Judiciary from political pressure as the
President has to choose only from the nominees for one particular vacancy. Otherwise, the President
can choose whom he pleases, and thereby completely disregard the purpose for the creation of the
JBC. The JBC clarifies that it numbered the vacancies, not to influence the order of precedence, but
for practical reasons. The JBC posits that clustering is a matter of legal and operational necessity for
the JBC and the only safe standard operating procedure for making short lists. It presents different
scenarios which demonstrate the need for clustering, viz.: (a) There are two different sets of applicants
for the vacancies; (b) There is a change in the JBC composition during the interval in the deliberations
on the vacancies as the House of Representatives and the Senate alternately occupy the ex officio
seat for the Legislature; (c) The applicant informs the JBC of his/her preference for assignment in the
Cebu Station or Cagayan de Oro Station of the Court of Appeals because of the location or the desire
to avoid mingling with certain personalities; (d) The multiple vacancies in newly opened first and
second level trial courts; and (e) The dockets to be inherited in the appellate court are overwhelming
so the JBC chooses nominees for those particular posts with more years of service as against those
near retirement.

ISSUE
Whether The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired
the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-
appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

RULING

YES. The Court DECLARES the clustering of nominees by the Judicial and Bar Council
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

A. The clustering of nominees for the six vacancies in the Sandiganbayan by the JBC impaired the
President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and to determine the seniority of the newly-
appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.

The Court unanimously voted that in this case of six simultaneous vacancies for

Sandiganbayan Associate Justice, the JBC acted beyond its constitutional mandate in clustering the
nominees into six separate short lists and President Aquino did not commit grave abuse of discretion
in disregarding the said clustering. The JBC invokes its independence, discretion, and wisdom, and
maintains that it deemed it wiser and more in accord with Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987
Constitution to cluster the nominees for the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate
Justice into six separate short lists. The independence and discretion of the JBC, however, is not
without limits. It cannot impair the President’s power to appoint members of the Judiciary and his
statutory power to determine the seniority of the newly- appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
The Court cannot sustain the strained interpretation of Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
espoused by the JBC, which ultimately curtailed the President’s appointing power. In its Decision
dated November 29, 2016, the Court ruled that the clustering impinged upon the President’s
appointing power in the following ways: The President’s option for every vacancy was limited to the
five to seven nominees in each cluster. Once the President had appointed a nominee from one cluster,
then he was proscribed from considering the other nominees in the same cluster for the other
vacancies. All the nominees applied for and were found to be qualified for appointment to any of the
vacant Associate Justice positions in the Sandiganbayan, but the JBC failed to explain why one
nominee should be considered for appointment to the position assigned to one specific cluster only.
Correspondingly, the nominees’ chance for appointment was restricted to the consideration of the one
cluster in which they were included, even though they applied and were found to be qualified for all the
vacancies. Moreover, by designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC established the
seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, a power which the law
vest exclusively upon the President.

B. Clustering can be used as a device to favor or prejudice a qualified nominee.

The JBC avers that it has no duty to increase the chances of appointment of every candidate it has
adjudged to have met the minimum qualifications for a judicial post. The Court does not impose upon
the JBC such duty, it only requires that the JBC gives all qualified nominees fair and equal opportunity
to be appointed. The clustering by the JBC of nominees for simultaneous or closely successive
vacancies in collegiate courts can actually be a device to favor or prejudice a particular nominee. A
favored nominee can be included in a cluster with no other strong contender to ensure his/her
appointment; or conversely, a nominee can be placed in a cluster with many strong contenders to
minimize his/her chances of appointment.

C. There are no objective criteria, standards, or guidelines for the clustering of nominees by the JBC.

The Court emphasizes that the requirements and qualifications, as well as the powers, duties, and
responsibilities are the same for all vacant posts in a collegiate court, such as the Sandiganbayan; and
if an individual is found to be qualified for one vacancy, then he/she is found to be qualified for all the
other vacancies — there are no distinctions among the vacant posts. It is improbable that the
nominees expressed their desire to be appointed to only a specific vacant position and not the other
vacant positions in the same collegiate court, when neither the Constitution nor the law provides a
specific designation or distinctive description for each vacant position in the collegiate court. The JBC
did not cite any cogent reason in its Motion for Reconsideration in Intervention for assigning a nominee
to a particular cluster/vacancy. The Court highlights that without objective criteria, standards, or
guidelines in determining which nominees are to be included in which cluster, the clustering of
nominees for specific vacant posts seems to be at the very least, totally arbitrary. The lack of such
criteria, standards, or guidelines may open the clustering to manipulation to favor or prejudice a
qualified nominee.

D. The designation by the JBC of numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts
encroached on the President’s power to determine the seniority of the

justices appointed to the said court.

The JBC contends in its Motion for Reconsideration-inIntervention that its individual members have
different reasons for designating numbers to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts. The
varying reason/s of each individual JBC Members raises the concern whether they each fully
appreciated the constitutional and legal consequences of their act

It also bears to point out that part of the President’s power to appoint members of a collegiate court,
such as the Sandiganbayan, is the power to determine the seniority or order of preference of such
newly appointed members by controlling the date and order of issuance of said members’ appointment
or commission papers. By already designating the numerical order of the vacancies, the JBC would be
establishing the seniority or order of preference of the new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices even
before their appointment by the President and, thus, unduly arrogating unto itself a vital part of the
President’s power of appointment.

The 1987 Constitution itself, by creating the JBC and requiring that the President can only appoint
judges and Justices from the nominees submitted by the JBC, already sets in place the mechanism to
protect the appointment process from political pressure. By arbitrarily clustering the nominees for
appointment to the six simultaneous vacancies for Sandiganbayan Associate Justice into separate
short lists, the JBC influenced the appointment process and encroached on the President’s power to
appoint members of the Judiciary and determine seniority in the said court, beyond its mandate under
the 1987 Constitution. As the Court pronounced in its Decision dated November 29, 2016, the power
to recommend of the JBC cannot be used to restrict or limit the President’s power to appoint as the
latter’s prerogative to choose someone whom he/she considers worth appointing to the vacancy in the
Judiciary is still paramount.

President Aquino validly exercised his discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary when
he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th,
st
17th, 18th, 19th, 20th, and 21 Sandiganbayan Associate Justices. President Aquino merely
maintained the well-established practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential constitutional
prerogative, to appoint the six new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified nominees,
as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution
which requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three nominees submitted by the JBC for
every vacancy.

All the six newly appointed Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of nomination by
the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do
not suffer from any constitutional infirmity.

The declaration of the Court that the clustering of nominees by the JBC for the simultaneous
vacancies that occurred by the creation of six new positions of Associate Justice of the
Sandiganbayan is unconstitutional was only incidental to its ruling that President Aquino is not bound
by such clustering in making his appointments to the vacant Sandiganbayan Associate Justice posts.
Other than said declaration, the Court did not require the JBC to do or to refrain from doing something
insofar as the issue of clustering of the nominees to the then six vacant posts of Sandiganbayan
Associate Justice was concerned.

Section 14: No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly
the facts and the law on which it is based.

No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court shall be refused due
course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor.

1) Flores v. Montemayor, G.R. No. 170146, June 8, 2011

FACTS
This resolves the motion for reconsideration of our Decision dated August 25, 2010 setting aside the October
19, 2005 Decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstating the Decision dated March 23, 2004 of the Office of
the President in O.P. Case No. 03-1-581, which found the respondent administratively liable for failure to
declare in his 2001 and 2002 Sworn Statement of Assets and Liabilities (SSAL) two expensive cars registered
in his name, in violation of Section 7, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019 in relation to Section 8 (A) of R.A. No.
6713.The OP adopted the findings and recommendations of the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission (PAGC),
including the imposition of the penalty of dismissal from service on respondent, with all accessory penalties.
Respondent underscores the dismissal by the Ombudsman of the criminal and administrative complaints
against him, including the charge subject of the proceedings before the PAGC and OP.It is argued that the
Office of the Ombudsman as a constitutional body, pursuant to its mandate under R.A. No. 6770, has primary
jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, as against thePAGC which is not a constitutional
body but a mere creation of the OP.Under said law, it is the Ombudsman who has disciplinary authority over all
elective and appointive officials of the government, such as herein respondent.

ISSUE

Whether or not the Office of the President violated petitioner's right to due process when it rendered its one-
page Decision

RULING

The Office of the President did not violate petitioner's right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. Based on close scrutiny of the Decision of the Office of the President, this Court rules that the said
Decision of the Office of the President fully complied with both administrative due process and Section 14,
Article VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

The OP decision, adopted verbatim the findings and recommendation of the PAGC, with a brief statement
preceding the dispositive portion:

After a circumspect study of the case, this Office fully agrees with the recommendation of PAGC and the
legal premises as well as the factual findings that hold it together. Respondent failed to disclose in his
2001 and 2002 SSAL high-priced vehicles in breach of the prescription of the relevant provisions of RA
No. 3019 in relation to RA No. 6713. He was, to be sure, afforded ample opportunity to explain his
failure, but he opted to let the opportunity pass by.

The relevant consideration is not the brevity of the above disquisition adopting fully the findings and
recommendation of the PAGC as the investigating authority. It is rather the fact that the OP is not a court but an
administrative body determining the liability of respondent who was administratively charged, in the exercise of
its disciplinary authority over presidential appointees.

In Solid Homes, Inc. v. Laserna, this Court ruled that the rights of parties in an administrative proceedings are
not violated by the brevity of the decision rendered by the OP incorporating the findings and conclusions of the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), for as long as the constitutional requirement of due process
has been satisfied. Thus:

It must be stated that Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution need not apply to decisions
rendered in administrative proceedings, as in the case a[t] bar. Said section applies only to decisions
rendered in judicial proceedings. In fact, Article VIII is titled "Judiciary," and all of its provisions have
particular concern only with respect to the judicial branch of government. Certainly, it would be error to
hold or even imply that decisions of executive departments or administrative agencies are oblige[d] to
meet the requirements under Section 14, Article VIII.
 The rights of parties in administrative proceedings are not violated as long as the constitutional
requirement of due process has been satisfied. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. CIR, we laid down
the cardinal rights of parties in administrative proceedings, as follows:

1) The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one's case and submit evidence in support
thereof.
2) The tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
3) The decision must have something to support itself.
4) The evidence must be substantial.
5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the
record and disclosed to the parties affected.
6) The tribunal or body or any of its judges must act on its or his own independent consideration of the
law and facts of the controversy and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a
decision.
7) The board or body should, in all controversial question, render its decision in such a manner that the
parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reason for the decision
rendered.

As can be seen above, among these rights are "the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at
the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected;" and that the decision be
rendered "in such a manner that the parties to the proceedings can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decisions rendered." Note that there is no requirement in Ang Tibay that the decision must
express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. For as long as the administrative
decision is grounded on evidence, and expressed in a manner that sufficiently informs the parties of the factual
and legal bases of the decision, the due process requirement is satisfied.

At bar, the Office of the President apparently considered the Decision of HLURB as correct and sufficient, and
said so in its own Decision. The brevity of the assailed Decision was not the product of willing concealment of
its factual and legal bases. Such bases, the assailed Decision noted, were already contained in the HLURB
decision, and the parties adversely affected need only refer to the HLURB Decision in order to be able to
interpose an informed appeal or action for certiorari under Rule 65.

xxxx

The Office of the President did not violate petitioner's right to due process when it rendered its one-page
Decision. In the case at bar, it is safe to conclude that all the parties, including petitioner, were well-informed as
to how the Decision of the Office of the President was arrived at, as well as the facts, the laws and the issues
involved therein because the Office of the President attached to and made an integral part of its Decision the
Decision of the HLURB Board of Commissioners, which it adopted by reference. If it were otherwise, the
petitioner would not have been able to lodge an appeal before the Court of Appeals and make a presentation of
its arguments before said court without knowing the facts and the issues involved in its case.[20] (Emphasis
supplied.)
Since respondent repeatedly refused to answer the administrative charge against him despite notice and
warning by the PAGC, he submitted his evidence only after an adverse decision was rendered by the OP,
attaching the same to his motion for reconsideration. That the OP denied the motion by sustaining the PAGC's
findings without any separate discussion of respondent's arguments and belatedly submitted evidence only
meant that the OP found the same lacking in merit and insufficient to overturn its ruling on respondent's
administrative liability.

2) Deutsche Bank v. CIR, G.R. No. 188550, August 28, 2013

FACTS

In accordance with Section 28(A)(5) of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) of 1997, petitioner withheld
and remitted to respondent on 21 October 2003 the amount of PHP 67,688,553.51, which represented the
fifteen percent (15%) branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit (RBU) net income remitted
to Deutsche Bank Germany (DB Germany) for 2002 and prior taxable years.

Believing that it made an overpayment of the BPRT, petitioner filed with the BIR Large Taxpayers Assessment
and Investigation Division on 4 October 2005 an administrative claim for refund or issuance of its tax credit
certificate in the total amount of PHP 22,562,851.17. On the same date, petitioner requested from the
International Tax Affairs Division (ITAD) a confirmation of its entitlement to the preferential tax rate of 10%
under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Due to the inaction of the BIR on its administrative claim, petitioner filed a Petition for Review with the CTA.

CTA Second Division Ruling:

We find that petitioner indeed paid the total amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 representing the 15% BPRT on its
RBU profits amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years. Records also disclose that for
the year 2003, petitioner remitted to DB Germany the amount of EURO 5,174,847.38 (or PHP 330,175,961.88
at the exchange rate of PHP 63.804:1 EURO), which is net of the 15% BPRT.

Claim of the petitioner for refund is denied.

On the ground that the application for a tax treaty relief was not filed with ITAD prior to the payment by
the former of its BPRT and actual remittance of its branch profits to DB Germany, or prior to its availment of the
preferential rate of ten percent (10%) under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty provision.

Mirant v. CIR

Where the CTA En Banc ruled that before the benefits of the tax treaty may be extended to a foreign
corporation wishing to avail itself thereof, the latter should first invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and prove
that they indeed apply to the corporation.

CTA En Banc Ruling

Affirmed the CTA Second Division’s Decision.

Citing Mirant, the CTA En Banc held that a ruling from the ITAD of the BIR must be secured prior to the
availment of a preferential tax rate under a tax treaty. Applying the principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere , the CTA took into consideration that this Court had denied the Petition in G.R. No. 168531 filed by
Mirant for failure to sufficiently show any reversible error in the assailed judgment.

The CTA once a case has been decided in one way, any other case involving exactly the same point at issue
should be The court likewise ruled that the 15-day rule for relief application under RMO No. 1-2000 cannot be
relaxed for petitioner, unlike in CBK Power Company Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.

CBK Power Company Limited v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

In that case, the rule was relaxed and the claim for refund of excess final withholding taxes was partially
granted.

While it issued a ruling to CBK Power Company Limited after the payment of withholding taxes, the ITAD did not
issue any ruling to petitioner even if it filed a request for confirmation on 4 October 2005 that the remittance of
branch profits to DB Germany is subject to a preferential tax rate of 10% pursuant to Article 10 of the RP-
Germany Tax Treaty.

Petitioner’s Arguments:

1. Considering that it has met all the conditions under Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, the CTA erred
in denying its claim solely on the basis of RMO No. 1-2000. The filing of a tax treaty relief application is not a
condition precedent to the availment of a preferential tax rate.

2. Petitioner posits that, contrary to the ruling of the CTA, Mirant binding judicial precedent to deny a claim for
refund is not a solely on the basis of non-compliance with RMO No. 1- 2000.

Respondent’s Counter-Arguments

1. The requirement of prior application under RMO No. 1-2000 is mandatory in character. RMO No. 1-2000 was
issued pursuant to the unquestioned authority of the Secretary of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations
for the effective implementation of the NIRC. Thus, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances which
partakes the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality.

ISSUE

Whether the failure to strictly comply with RMO No. 1-2000 will deprive persons or corporations of the benefit of
a tax treaty.

RULING

Petitioner is meritorious.

Under Section 28(A)(5) of the NIRC, any profit remitted to its head office shall be subject to a tax of 15% based
on the total profits applied for or earmarked for remittance without any deduction of the tax component.
However, petitioner invokes paragraph 6, Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, which provides that where
a resident of the Federal Republic of Germany has a branch in the Republic of the Philippines, this branch may
be subjected to the branch profits remittance tax withheld at source in accordance with Philippine law but shall
not exceed 10% of the gross amount of the profits remitted by that branch to the head office.
By virtue of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, we are bound to extend to a branch in the Philippines, remitting to its
head office in Germany, the benefit of a preferential rate equivalent to 10% BPRT.

On the other hand, the BIR issued RMO No. 1-2000, which requires that any availment of the tax treaty relief
must be preceded by an application with ITAD at least 15 days before the transaction. The Order was issued to
streamline the processing of the application of tax treaty relief in order to improve efficiency and service to the
taxpayers. Further, it also aims to prevent the consequences of an erroneous interpretation and/or application of
the treaty provisions (i.e., filing a claim for a tax refund/credit for the overpayment of taxes or for deficiency tax
liabilities for underpayment).

Ratio:

I. A minute resolution is not a binding precedent

At the outset, this Court’s minute resolution on Mirant is not a binding precedent.

Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. v. CIR

It is true that, although contained in a minute resolution, our dismissal of the petition was a disposition of the
merits of the case. When we dismissed the petition, we effectively affirmed the CA ruling being questioned. As a
result, our ruling in that case has already become final. When a minute resolution denies or dismisses a petition
for failure to comply with formal and substantive requirements, the challenged decision, together with its findings
of fact and legal conclusions, are deemed sustained. But what is its effect on other cases?

With respect to the same subject matter and the same issues concerning the same parties, it
constitutes res judicata. However, if other parties or another subject matter (even with the same parties
and issues) is involved, the minute resolution is not binding precedent.

There are substantial, not simply formal, distinctions between a minute resolution and a decision. The
constitutional requirement under the first paragraph of Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution that the facts
and the law on which the judgment is based must be expressed clearly and distinctly applies only to decisions,
not to minute resolutions. A minute resolution is signed only by the clerk of court by authority of the justices,
unlike a decision. It does not. Moreover, unlike decisions, minute resolutions are not published in the Philippine
Reports. Finally, the proviso of Section 4(3) of Article VIII speaks of a decision. Indeed, as a rule, this Court lays
down doctrines or principles of law which constitute binding precedent in a decision duly signed by the members
of the Court and certified by the Chief Justice.

Even if we had affirmed the CTA in doctrine laid down in that Decision cannot bind this Court in cases of a
similar nature. There are differences in parties, taxes, taxable periods, and treaties involved; more importantly,
the disposition of that case was made only through a minute resolution.

II. Tax Treaty v. RMO No. 1-2000

Our Constitution provides for adherence to the general principles of international law as part of the law of the
land. Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties, and obligations under the treaty must be performed by
them in good faith. More importantly, treaties have the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction.

Tax treaties are entered into “to reconcile the national fiscal legislations of the contracting parties and, in turn,
help the taxpayer avoid simultaneous taxations in two different jurisdictions.”

A state that has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its legislations those modifications
that may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertaken.” Thus, laws and issuances must
ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties entitled thereto. The BIR must not
impose additional requirements that would negate the availment of the reliefs provided for under international
agreements. More so, when the RP-Germany Tax Treaty does not provide for any pre-requisite for the
availment of the benefits under said agreement.

Likewise, it must be stressed that there is nothing in RMO No. 1-2000 which would indicate a deprivation of
entitlement to a tax treaty relief for failure to comply with the 15-day period. We recognize the clear intention of
the BIR in implementing RMO No. 1-2000, but the CTA’s outright denial of a tax treaty relief for failure to strictly
comply with the prescribed period is not in harmony with the objectives of the contracting state to ensure that
the benefits granted under tax treaties are enjoyed by duly entitled persons or corporations.

Bearing in mind the rationale of tax treaties, the period of application for the availment of tax treaty relief as
required by RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest entitlement to the relief as it would constitute a
violation of the duty required by good faith in complying with a tax treaty. The denial of the availment of tax relief
for the failure of a taxpayer to apply within the prescribed period under the administrative issuance would impair
the value of the tax treaty. At most, the application for a tax treaty relief from the BIR should merely operate to
confirm the entitlement of the taxpayer to the relief.

The obligation to comply with a tax treaty must take precedence over the objective of RMO No. 1-2000.
Logically, noncompliance with tax treaties has negative implications on international relations, and unduly
discourages foreign investors. While the consequences sought to be prevented by RMO No. 1-2000 involve an
administrative procedure, these may be remedied through other system management processes, e.g., the
imposition of a fine or penalty. But we cannot totally deprive those who are entitled to the benefit of a treaty for
failure to strictly comply with an administrative issuance requiring prior application for tax treaty relief.

III. Prior Application v. Claim

Again, RMO No. 1-2000 was implemented to obviate any erroneous interpretation and/or application of the
treaty provisions. The objective of the BIR is to forestall assessments against corporations who erroneously
availed themselves of the benefits of the tax treaty but are not legally entitled thereto, as well as to save such
investors from the tedious process of claims for a refund due to an inaccurate application of the tax treaty
provisions. However, as earlier discussed, non-compliance with the 15-day period for prior application should
not operate to automatically divest entitlement to the tax treaty relief especially in claims for refund.

The underlying principle of prior application with the BIR becomes moot in refund cases, such as the present
case, where the very basis of the claim is erroneous or there is excessive payment arising from non-availment
of a tax treaty relief at the first instance. In this case, petitioner should not be faulted for not complying with
RMO No. 1-2000 prior to the transaction. It could not have applied for a tax treaty relief within the period
prescribed, or 15 days prior to the payment of its BPRT, precisely because it erroneously paid the BPRT not on
the basis of the preferential tax rate under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty, but on the regular rate as prescribed by
the NIRC. Hence, the prior application requirement becomes illogical. Therefore, the fact that petitioner invoked
the provisions of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty when it requested for a confirmation from the ITAD before filing
an administrative claim for a refund should be deemed substantial compliance with RMO No. 1-2000.

IV. Petitioner is entitled to a refund.

It is significant to emphasize that petitioner applied though belatedly ― for a tax treaty relief, in substantial
compliance with RMO No. 1-2000. A ruling by the BIR would have confirmed whether petitioner was entitled to
the lower rate of 10% BPRT pursuant to the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

Nevertheless, even without the BIR ruling, the CTA Second Division found as follows:

Based on the evidence presented, both documentary and testimonial, petitioner was able to establish the
following facts:

a. That petitioner is a branch office in the Philippines of Deutsche Bank AG, a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Federal Republic of Germany;

b. That on October 21, 2003, it filed its Monthly Remittance Return of Final Income Taxes Withheld
under BIR Form No. 1601-F and remitted the amount of P67,688,553.51 as branch profits remittance tax
with the BIR; and

c. That on October 29, 2003, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas having issued a clearance, petitioner
remitted to Frankfurt Head Office the amount of EUR5,174,847.38 (or P330,175,961.88 at 63.804
Peso/Euro) representing its 2002 profits remittance.

The amount of PHP 67,688,553.51 paid by petitioner represented the 15% BPRT on its RBU net income, due
for remittance to DB Germany amounting to PHP 451,257,023.29 for 2002 and prior taxable years.

Likewise, both the administrative and the judicial actions were filed within the two-year prescriptive period
pursuant to Section 229 of the NIRC. Clearly, there is no reason to deprive petitioner of the benefit of a
preferential tax rate of 10% BPRT in accordance with the RP-Germany Tax Treaty.

3) Agoy v. Araneta, G.R. No. 196358, March 21, 2012

FACTS

This case reiterates the Court’s ruling that the adjudication of a case by minute resolution is an exercise of
judicial discretion and constitutes sound and valid judicial practice.

On June 15, 2011 the Court denied petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s petition for review through a minute resolution
that reads:

"G.R. No. 196358 (Jandy J. Agoy vs. Araneta Center, Inc.).- The Court resolves to GRANT petitioner’s motion
for extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of the reglementary period within which to file a petition for
review on certiorari.

The court further resolves to DENY the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision dated 19 October
2010 and Resolution dated 29 March 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA), Manila, in CA-G.R. SP No. 108234 for
failure to show that the CA committed reversible error when it affirmed the dismissal of petitioner Jandy J. Agoy.
Petitioner’s repeated delays in remitting the excess cash advances and admission that he spent them for other
purposes constitute serious misconduct and dishonesty which rendered him unworthy of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by respondent Araneta Center, Inc."

Apparently, however, Agoy doubted the authenticity of the copy of the above minute resolution that he received
through counsel since he promptly filed a motion to rescind the same and to have his case resolved on its
merits via a regular resolution or decision signed by the Justices who took part in the deliberation. In a related
development, someone claiming to be Agoy’s attorney-in-fact requested an investigation of the issuance of the
resolution of June 15, 2011.

On September 21, 2011 the Court denied Agoy’s motion to rescind the subject minute resolution and confirmed
the authenticity of the copy of the June 15, 2011 resolution. It also treated his motion to rescind as a motion for
reconsideration and denied the same with finality.

Upon receipt of the Court’s September 21, 2011 resolution, Agoy filed a motion to rescind the same or have his
case resolved by the Court En Banc pursuant to Section 13 in relation to Sec. 4(3), Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution. Agoy reiterated his view that the Court cannot decide his petition by a minute resolution. He thus
prayed that it rescind its June 15 and September 21, 2011 resolutions, determine whether it was proper for the
Court to resolve his petition through a minute resolution, and submit the case to the Court en banc for proper
disposition through a signed resolution or decision.

ISSUE/S:

1. Whether or not the copies of the minute resolutions dated June 15, 2011 and September 21, 2011 that Agoy
received are authentic; and

2. Whether or not it was proper for the Court to deny his petition through a minute resolution.

RULING:

One. The notices of the minute resolutions of June 15 and September 21, 2011 sent to Agoy, bearing the
signatures of Assistant Clerk of Court Teresita Aquino Tuazon and Deputy Division Clerk of Court Wilfredo V.
Lapitan, both printed on pink paper and duly received by counsel for petitioner as evidenced by the registry
return cards, are authentic and original copies of the resolutions. The Court has given Tuazon and Lapitan the
authority to inform the parties under their respective signatures of the Court’s actions on the incidents in the
cases.

Minute resolutions are issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions of the Court. While they are the results of
the deliberations by the Justices of the Court, they are promulgated by the Clerk of Court or his assistants
whose duty is to inform the parties of the action taken on their cases by quoting verbatim the resolutions
adopted by the Court. Neither the Clerk of Court nor his assistants take part in the deliberations of the case.
They merely transmit the Court’s action in the form prescribed by its Internal Rules.

As the Court explained in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals, no law or rule requires its members to sign minute
resolutions that deny due course to actions filed before it or the Chief Justice to enter his certification on the
same. The notices quote the Court’s actual resolutions denying due course to the subject actions and these
already state the required legal basis for such denial. To require the Justices to sign all its resolutions
respecting its action on new cases would be unreasonable and unnecessary.

Based on last year’s figures, the Court docketed a total of 5,864 new cases, judicial and administrative. The
United States Supreme Court probably receives lesser new cases since it does not have administrative
supervision of all courts. Yet, it gives due course to and decides only about 100 cases per year. Agoy’s demand
that this Court give due course to and decide all cases filed with it on the merits, including his case, is simply
unthinkable and shows a lack of discernment of reality.

Two. While the Constitution requires every court to state in its decision clearly and distinctly the fact and the law
on which it is based, the Constitution requires the court, in denying due course to a petition for review, merely to
state the legal basis for such denial.

Sec. 14. No decision shall be rendered by any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts
and the law on which it is based. No petition for review or motion for reconsideration of a decision of the court
shall be refused due course or denied without stating the legal basis therefor. (Emphasis supplied)

With the promulgation of its Internal Rules, the Court itself has defined the instances when cases are to be
adjudicated by decision, signed resolution, unsigned resolution or minute resolution. Among those instances
when a minute resolution shall issue is when the Court "denies a petition filed under Rule 45 of the [Rules of
Court], citing as legal basis the absence of reversible error committed in the challenged decision, resolution, or
order of the court below.” The minute resolutions in this case complied with this requirement.

The Court has repeatedly said that minute resolutions dismissing the actions filed before it constitute actual
adjudications on the merits. They are the result of thorough deliberation among the members of the Court. When
the Court does not find any reversible error in the decision of the CA and denies the petition, there is no need
for the Court to fully explain its denial, since it already means that it agrees with and adopts the findings and
conclusions of the CA. The decision sought to be reviewed and set aside is correct. It would be an exercise in
redundancy for the Court to reproduce or restate in the minute resolution denying the petition the conclusions
that the CA reached.1âwphi1

Agoy questions the Court’s act of treating his motion to rescind as a motion for reconsideration, arguing that it
had no basis for doing so. But the Court was justified in its action since his motion to rescind asked the Court to
review the merits of his case again.

The Court DENIED Petitioner Jandy J. Agoy’s motion to rescind dated December 21, 2011 and the Motion for
Clarification and to Resolve Pending Incidents dated January 31, 2012 for lack of merit.

Section 15:
1. All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided or resolved within
twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and, unless reduced by the
Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three months for all other lower
courts.

2. A case or matter shall be deemed submitted for decision or resolution upon the filing of the last
pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the Rules of Court or by the court itself.

3. Upon the expiration of the corresponding period, a certification to this effect signed by the Chief
Justice or the presiding judge shall forthwith be issued and a copy thereof attached to the record of the
case or matter, and served upon the parties. The certification shall state why a decision or resolution
has not been rendered or issued within said period.

4. Despite the expiration of the applicable mandatory period, the court, without prejudice to such
responsibility as may have been incurred in consequence thereof, shall decide or resolve the case or
matter submitted thereto for determination, without further delay.

1) Office of the Court Admin v. Bustamante, A.M. No. MJJ-12-1806, April7, 2014

FACTS:

Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante presided the MTCC of Alaminos, Pangasinan. Prior to his retirement, a judicial
audit was conducted. Initial findings were that there were 35 cases for decision (21 of which were already
beyond the reglementary period) and 23 cases with pending incidents for resolution (19 of which were already
beyond the reglementary period) in Judge Bustamante’s court. The Deputy Court Administrator ordered him to
decide and resolve the cases before the effectivity of his retirement. He was also asked to explain for the delay
on resolving the cases.
Judge Bustamante, upon submitting his reports, also said that the delays were due to the volume of his work.
After which, the Office of the Court Administrator submitted to the Court its Memorandum6 dated March 24,
2011, reporting viz:
(1) Judge Bustamante had decided 33 out of the 35 cases for decision in his court. Of the 33 cases
decided by Judge Bustamante, 13 were still within the reglementary period while 20 were already
beyond the reglementary period. Of the 20 cases Judge Bustamante had decided beyond the
reglementary period, 10 were decided more than a year after their respective due dates (ranging from 1
year and 8 days to 4 years and 7 months beyond the due dates) and 10 were decided within a year after
their respective due dates (ranging from 5 days to 6 months beyond the due dates).
(2) Judge Bustamante had also resolved 6 out of the 23 cases with pending incidents in his court, all of
which were resolved beyond their respective reglementary periods (ranging from 5 days to 3 years, 8
months, and 16 days after the due dates). As for the 17 other cases with pending incidents in his court,
Judge Bustamante reasoned that (a) the motions require further hearing; (b) there is a need to await the
resolution of other cases pending before other courts; and (c) oversight. The OCA noted, though, that
Judge Bustamante failed to submit any order setting the pending incidents for hearing or holding in
abeyance the resolution of the same until the related cases before other courts have already been
decided.
Unconvinced by Judge Bustamante’s explanations/reasons for his delay in deciding cases and resolving
pending incidents, the OCA recommended that:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, we respectfully recommend that retired Judge Borromeo R. Bustamante,

formerly of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Alaminos City, Pangasinan, be FINED in the amount of
₱20,000.00 for gross inefficiency.

In a Resolution dated February 8, 2012, the case was re-docketed as a regular administrative matter.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Judge Borromeo should be held liable for the delay on resolving the cases.
RULING

Yes. The Court held that decision making, among other duties, is the primordial and most important duty of a
member of the bench. The speedy disposition of cases in the courts is a primary aim of the judiciary so the ends
of justice may not be compromised and the judiciary will be true to its commitment to provide litigants their
constitutional right to a speedy trial and a speedy disposition of their cases.
The Constitution, Code of Judicial Conduct, and jurisprudence consistently mandate that a judge must decide
cases within 90 days from submission. A member of the bench cannot pay mere lip service to the 90-day
requirement; he/she should instead persevere in its implementation. Heavy caseload and demanding workload
are not valid reasons to fall behind the mandatory period for disposition of cases. Having failed to decide a case
within the required period, without any order of extension granted by the Court, Judge Bustamante was held
liable for undue delay that merits administrative sanction. He is held guilty of undue delay in rendering decisions
and orders, and imposes upon him a FINE of ₱20,000.00, to be deducted from his retirement benefits.

2) Marcelo v. Picay, A.M. MTJ-13-1838, March 12, 2014

FACTS
Complainants Sps. Marcelo were the plaintiffs in a Civil Case for unlawful detainer before the Metropolitan Trial
Court of Parañaque City, Branch 78. By virtue of a Joint Decision, the defendants were ordered by the MeTC to
vacate and surrender the possession of the subject property to complainant-plaintiffs. A writ of execution was
issued, and later implemented by Branch Sheriff Hildo D. Epres (Sheriff Epres). Thus, Sps. Marcelo obtained
the possession of the subject property on the said date, as shown in the Certificate of Turn-over of Possession.
However, at around 6 o’clock in the evening of the same day, Sps. Magopoy successfully re-entered the subject
property and regained its possession. Sps. Marcelo moved to cite Sps. Magopoy in contempt for
disobedience/resistance to lawful court processes. While finding the act of re-entry by Sps. Magopoy as a clear
defiance of a lawful writ, (i.e., the April 14, 2006 writ of execution) which is a form of indirect contempt
punishable under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, the MeTC, in an Order, did not cite them in contempt but,
instead, ordered them to surrender the subject property to Sps. Marcelo within ten (10) days from receipt of the
order.
Sps. Marcelo filed an Ex-Parte Constancia in view of the continued refusal of Sps. Magopoy to surrender the
subject property. This prompted Judge Pichay to issue an Order giving Sheriff Epres three (3) days within
which to effect Sps. Magopoy’s eviction from the subject property. Consequently, Sps. Magopoy filed a MR,
which was opposed by Sps. Marcelo. The hearing on the aforesaid motion was conducted, wherein Sps.
Magopoy were directed to file their reply. In compliance, Sps. Magopoy filed their Supplemental Motion and
Reply alleging that the miscellaneous sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property had been
denied by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The following day, Sps. Marcelo filed a
motion submitting all incidents for resolution.
Instead of resolving the pending incidents, Judge Pichay, in an Order dated October 1, 2009 (October 1, 2009
Order), directed Sps. Marcelo to file their comment and/or opposition to Sps. Magopoy’s supplemental motion
within five (5) days from receipt of the order, with a warning that upon the expiration of said period, the court will
resolve the pending incidents. The pertinent portions of the October 1, 2009 Order read as follows:
With respect to the Supplemental Motion and Reply, and in the interest of justice, the Court directs [Sps.
Marcelo] to file their Comment and/or Opposition to said Supplemental Motion and Reply within five (5) days
from receipt of this Order with copy furnished the [Sps. Magopoy]. The latter is given three (3) days from the
Comment and/or Opposition within which to file their Reply if necessary.
Considering the Ex-Parte Constancia, the Court makes it clear to the parties that the only pleading left to be
received by this Court is the Comment and/or Opposition of [Sps. Marcelo] on the Supplemental Motion and
Reply of [Sps. Magopoy] and the Reply of [Sps. Magopoy] to said [Sps. Marcelo’s] Comment and/or Opposition.
The Court will no longer conduct a hearing on the pending incidents.
Hence, upon the expiration of the periods given above, the Court will resolve the pending incidents. (Emphases
supplied)

Despite the directive of the court a quo, Sps. Marcelo failed to file their comment and/or opposition.
Nonetheless, Judge Pichay, set Sps. Magopoy’s previous motion for reconsideration as well as their
supplemental motion for hearing.

Petitioner/s’ contention/s:
Disconcerted with Judge Pichay’s continuous inaction, Sps. Marcelo filed an administrative complaint on March
10, 2010 before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), charging him and Sheriff Epres with inordinate
delay in the disposition of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286 relating to the implementation of the
writ of execution of the subject decision.

Respondent/s’ contention/s:
Judge Pichay attributed the delay to the new arguments raised in Sps. Magopoy’s supplemental motion. In
particular, he considered the denial of the sales application of Sps. Marcelo over the subject property, as
brought to his attention by Sps. Magopoy, as a supervening event that may materially change the situation of
the parties and, thus, render the execution of the subject decision inequitable. Therefore, in the interest of
justice and equity, he scheduled the supplemental motion for hearing in order to be better apprised of the
situation of the parties. Unfortunately, the hearing dates therefor were further reset due to the requests of Sps.
Marcelo, and because he went on sick leave from June 8 to 29, 2010.

ISSUE
The essential issue in this case is whether or not Judge Pichay should be held administratively liable for undue
delay in the resolution of the pending incidents in Civil Case No. 2004-286.

RULING
The Constitution requires our courts to conscientiously observe the time periods in deciding
cases and resolving matters brought to their adjudication, which, for lower courts, is three (3)
months from the date they are deemed submitted for decision or resolution. Section 15, Article
VIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution (1987 Constitution) states this rule, viz.:

Section 15. (1) All cases or matters filed after the effectivity of this Constitution must be decided
or resolved within twenty-four months from date of submission for the Supreme Court, and,
unless reduced by the Supreme Court, twelve months for all lower collegiate courts, and three
months for all other lower courts.

In consonance with the foregoing, Section 5, Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct For
the Philippine Judiciary36 states that:

Sec. 5. Judges shall perform all judicial duties, including the delivery of reserved decisions,
efficiently fairly and with reasonable promptness. (Emphasis supplied)

In furtherance of the foregoing mandate, the Court issued Administrative Circular No. 13-8737
[dated July 1, 1987], which states:

The reorganized judiciary is tasked with the tremendous responsibility of assisting parties
litigants in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of their cases and proceedings
as directed in Rule 1, Section 2 of the Rules of Court.38 Delay is a recurring complaint of every
litigant. The main objective of every judge, particularly trial judges, should be to avoid delays, or
if it cannot be totally avoided, to hold them to the minimum and to repudiate manifestly dilatory
tactics.

As correctly observed by the OCA in this case, Judge Pichay failed to resolve the subject
motions, namely the motion for reconsideration and supplemental motion, within the three
(3) month-period prescribed therefor. Records show that Sps. Marcelo’s period to file their
comment/opposition to the supplemental motion and/ or rejoinder to the reply lapsed on October
18, 2009,44 at which time, the pending incidents were, as stated in the Order dated October 1,
2009, already deemed submitted for resolution. This is concordant with Section 15(2), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution which states that "[a] case or matter shall be deemed submitted for
decision or resolution upon the filing of the last pleading, brief, or memorandum required by the
Rules of Court or by the court itself."

Notwithstanding that the matter had already been submitted for resolution, Judge Pichay
continued with the proceedings by setting the motions for hearing to the effect of unreasonably
delaying the execution of the subject decision. Indeed, while it has been held that a presiding
judge shall at all times remain in firm control of the proceedings, he is nevertheless mandated to
adopt a policy against unwarranted delays.45 In this case, Judge Pichay did not sufficiently
explain the reasons as to why he failed to resolve the pending incidents on time, as well as to
why he still had to set the same for hearing and repeatedly grant postponements therefor, either
motu proprio or by motion, despite the summary nature of ejectment proceedings and the
ministerial nature of the subsequent issuance of a writ of execution. These considerations he
should have been fully aware of. As case law instructs, "[e]jectment cases are summary
proceedings intended to provide an expeditious means of protecting actual possession or right
of possession of property,"46 and that "it becomes mandatory or ministerial duty of the court to
issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment which has become executory,"47 as in Civil
Case No. 2004-286. To add, the fact that Judge Pichay required medical attention on June 7,
2010 is no excuse for his default, considering that on such date, the subject motions were
already due for resolution.48 Thus, without having duly applied for any extension before the
Court, Judge Pichay was bound to resolve the pending incidents in the said case within the
three (3) month-period prescribed by the Constitution. This, he, however, failed to do, and, as
such, the imposition of administrative sanctions against him remains in order.

Pursuant to Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, undue delay in rendering a decision or
order is considered as a less serious offense which is punishable by either: (a) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months;
or (b) a fine of more than ₱10,000.00 but not exceeding ₱20,000.00. Considering, however, that
Judge Pichay was held administratively liable for the same offense in A.M. No. MTJ-10-1763
(formerly OCA IPI No. 09-2209-MTJ), and hitherto warned that a repetition of a similar infraction
would warrant a more severe penalty, the Court deems it apt to increase the fine recommended
by the OCA from ₱10,000.00 to ₱12,000.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Ramsey Domingo G. Pichay is found GUILTY of

violating Section 9, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court for undue delay in resolving the
pending incidents relative to Civil Case No. 2004-286 and is thus FINED in the amount of
₱12,000.00. He is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar offense will
be dealt with more severely.