G.R. No.
225442
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),*
JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA,
RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, and CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, minor, for herself and as represented by her
father, JULIAN VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners,  While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain
vs.
QUEZON CITY, as represented by MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY OF MANILA, as represented by MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA,
and NAVOTAS CITY, as represented by MAYOR JOHN REY
TIANGCO,, Respondents,
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of
the curfew ordinances issued by the local governments of Quezon City,
Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary restraining
order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph
Estrada, and John Rey Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local
governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from implementing and
enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and
eventually, declare the City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for
being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344, 2 or the "Juvenile Justice
and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as
unconstitutional for violating the constitutional right of minors to travel,
as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to
implement a nationwide curfew for minors, several local governments
in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of
"Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances
were respondents: (a) Navotas City, through Pambayang Ordinansa
Blg. 99- 02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled
"Nagtatakdang 'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing
Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas, Kalakhang Maynila,"
as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6,
2002 (Navotas Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No.
80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours from 10:00 P.M. to
4:00 A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for
Children and Youths Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing
Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated October 14, 2002
(Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-
2301,7 Series of 2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic]
Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00 P.M. to 5:00
A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof
and for Other Purposes" dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance;
collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
9
Petitioners,  spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong
Kabataan (SPARK) - an association of young adults and minors that
aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of
the rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present
petition, arguing that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b)suffer from
overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents
of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that the
Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances
encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement as there are no
clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew
violators.13 They further argue that the law enforcer's apprehension
depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and
based only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged
curfew violator.14
provisions indicating the activities exempted from the operation of the
imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students with
evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover
the range and breadth of legitimate activities or reasons as to why
minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair the
legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are
unconstitutional as they deprive minors of the right to liberty and the
right to travel without substantive due process; 16 and (b) fail to pass the
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing
means that bear no reasonable relation to their purpose. 17 They argue
that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will not per
se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the
community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly
Section 419 thereof, contravenes Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as
amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend
that the imposition of penalties contravenes RA 9344's express
command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to
impose curfews contrary to the parents' prerogative to impose them in
the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of the
youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive
means are available to achieve the same. In this regard, they suggest
massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTV s (closed-circuit
televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law
enforcers as other viable means of protecting children and preventing
crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and
education seminars informing the parents of the reasons behind the
curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or
not the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this
case. Respondents seek the dismissal of the petition,
questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew
Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to the Court, contrary to the
hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for 
Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the
courts of justice not only "to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of the 1987 with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over
Constitution reads: petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, and habeas corpus. While this jurisdiction is shared with the
Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct
ARTICLE VIII
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
special and important reasons therefor, clearly and especially set
out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the issue of
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is
and in such lower courts as may be established by law. of paramount importance and immediately affects the social,
economic, and moral well-being of the people," 33 as in this case.
Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act
may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be
concept of judicial power, which up to then was confined to its an actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial
traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that power; (b) the person challenging the act must have the standing to
were legally demandable and enforceable."25 question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c)the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the
issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the case."34 In this
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
prohibition filed before the Court "are the remedies by which the grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the
part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be 1. Actual Case or Controversy.
determined under the Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith
respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power - whether under the traditional
necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or
or in the expanded setting - is the presence of an actual case or
prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not
controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves a
only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial,
conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims,
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,]
susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or
and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to
abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on
the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial,
the basis of existing law and jurisprudence."36 According to recent
quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded jurisdiction under
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, [Article
the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely
VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28
requiring a prima facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in
the assailed governmental act."37
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC
Approved Medical Centers Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the
"[ m ]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been promulgated to
requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for adjudication when the
enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and
act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
because of the commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it
for review under Rule 65 and the courts' expanded jurisdiction, the
is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65
performed by either branch before a court may come into the
to be used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an
jurisdiction[. ]"30
immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the
challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the
Ordinances by the legislative councils of Quezon City, Manila, and act complained of."38
Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the
ground that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual
provisions pertaining to the right to travel of minors, and the right of
justiciable controversy in this case given the evident clash of the
parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila
parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances
Ordinance, by imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA
impair the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the
9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of penalties on
Manila Ordinance goes against the provisions of RA 9344. Based on
minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse
their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave
law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or
abuse of discretion, which perforce impels this Court to exercise its
arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias. " 31 In light of the
expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
foregoing, petitioners correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and
considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until
prohibition, although these governmental actions were not made
the Court issued the TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported
pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely speculative or
hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
2. Legal Standing.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to
assail the constitutionality of legislative and executive enactments, the
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the
next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners' direct resort
determination of whether those assailing the governmental act have
to this Court is justified.
the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first interest in the case, such that they have sustained or are in
be made to the lower-ranked court exercising concurrent jurisdiction immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental
act."40 "' [I]nterest' in the question involved must be material - an
interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act- as
distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for
illumination of difficult constitutional questions. Unless a person is
injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of
two (2) constitutional rights, namely: (1) the right of minors to freely
travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary right of
parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported
conflict between RA 9344, as amended, and the penal provisions of
the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas
(Clarissa) has legal standing to raise the issue affecting the minor's
right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the
petition was filed before this Court, 44 and, hence, a proper subject of
the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as alleged, she travels from Manila to
Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand,
petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim, John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua,
Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo)
admitted in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore,
beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they are not proper subjects
of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury
as a consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the
Curfew Ordinances violate the parents' right to rear their children as
they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been
infringed. It should be noted that Clarissa is represented by her father,
Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr.
Villegas did not question the Curfew Ordinances based on his primary
right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his minor
child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently,
has no legal personality to bring an action in court. 45 Even assuming
that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed
to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by
the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal
interest in the controversy. More particularly, Clarissa has standing
only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel,
but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing
requirement insofar as all the petitioners are concerned, in view of the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case. "In a
number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the
requirement of legal standing, especially when paramount interest is
involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act are
able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people,
the Court may exercise its sound discretion and take cognizance
of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the petitioners to
show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law
or any other government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of
juvenile curfew ordinances is placed under judicial review. Not only is
this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the
right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it
is also requested to determine the extent of the State's authority to
regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly, this
case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore,
impels a relaxation of procedural rules, including, among others, the
standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of
this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel
and of parents to rear their children, this Court must first tackle
petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
not containing sufficient enforcement parameters, which leaves the
enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out their
provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these
issuances led to the questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo,
even though they were already of legal age. They maintain that the
enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders
based only on their physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily.
Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon City Ordinance
requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that
nowhere does the said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for
proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks
comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due
process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties
targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves
law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions
and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is
improper, considering that they do not properly identify any provision in
any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of
what is prohibited or required so that one may act accordingly.49 The
void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one
case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty,"
which may involve "procedural due process uncertainty cases" and
"substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due process
uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so
obscure that it failed to give adequate warning to those subject to its
prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for adjudication.
Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This
perspective rightly integrates the vagueness doctrine with the due
process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-
vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters
to guide the local authorities in the proper apprehension of suspected
curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to what
conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only
point to the ordinances' lack of enforcement guidelines. The
mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew Ordinances
are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political
branches of government to resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing
unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for
vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived
danger of unbridled enforcement stems from an ambiguous provision
in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that
ambiguous provision of law contravenes due process because agents
of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct the law
permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown, 51 it was
ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to
policemen, judges, and juries for resolution on ad hoc and subjective
basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application
based on individual impressions and personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous
standard in any of the provisions of the Curfew Ordinances, but rather,
lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision,
the Curfew Ordinances cannot be stricken down under the void for
vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no
sufficient standards to identify suspected curfew violators. While it is
true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these
parameters, law enforcement agents are still bound to follow the
prescribed measures found in statutory law when implementing
ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be
determined from the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate
or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child
himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the physical
appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with · the Curfew
Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that amended RA 9344)
repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54 minors caught
in violation of curfew ordinances are children at risk and,
therefore, covered by its provisions. 55 It is a long-standing principle that
"[c]onformity with law is one of the essential requisites for the
validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence, by necessary
implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction
with related statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and
Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a minor violating the curfew, may
therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification
establishing their majority age. In the absence of such proof, the law
authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and
judiciously under the circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard
these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate action against the
erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void
for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their 
Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional
because they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in the
rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard,
they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether
minors will be required to go home at a certain time or will be allowed
to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily
with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing
curfews cannot logically be compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's
policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of
the unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty
of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the
development of moral character shall receive the support of the
Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children
(i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development
of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given
the privilege of exercising their authority over their children; they are
equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty
aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent
interest to ensure that the youth would eventually grow into free,
independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it
is during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations
to society. "[T]he duty to prepare the child for these [obligations]
must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship." 58 "This
affirmative process of teaching, guiding, and inspiring by precept and
example is essential to the growth of young people into mature,
socially responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial
measure of authority over one's children." 60 In Ginsberg v. New
York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the
parents' claim to authority in their own household to direct the rearing
of their children is basic in the structure of our society." 62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not
only described as "natural," but also as "primary." The qualifier
"primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's
deference to parental control over their children was explained by the
US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies
limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its
youth from adverse governmental action and from their own immaturity
by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions
by minors. But an additional and more important justification for
state deference to parental control over children is that "the child
is not [a) mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to
recognize and prepare him for additional obligations." 65 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be
stressed that "when actions concerning the child have a relation to
the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the [Sltate may
act to promote these legitimate interests." 66 Thus, "[i]n cases in
which harm to the physical or mental health of the child or to
public safety, peace, order, or welfare is demonstrated, these
legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right
to control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated
to support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary
to parental supervision.  In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court
acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae in protecting minors,
viz. :
[Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it
is cast the duty of protecting the rights of persons or individual
who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a-vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care
of what concerns them, they have the political community to look after
their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United
States Supreme Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is
inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x x."69(Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
that the Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.

As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the
parents in the moral development of their children, 70 and, thus,
overbreadth doctrine, considering that petitioners have not claimed any
assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their parental
transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-
obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[I]egal restriction on minors,
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v.
especially those supportive of the parental role, may be important to
AntiTerrorism Council(Southern Hemisphere),80 this Court explained
the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual
that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial
Constitution, the State can properly conclude that parents and
challenge, applicable only to free speech cases,"81 viz.:
others, teachers for example, who have the primary responsibility
for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71 By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a
facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of protected
speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the court,
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed
that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation.
to aid parents in their role of promoting their children's well-being. As
Otherwise stated, a statute cannot be properly analyzed for being
will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances further
substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to facts as
compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety
applied to the litigants.
and the prevention of juvenile crime), which necessarily entail
limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children. Minors,
because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it
only more exposed to potential physical harm by criminal elements that marks an exception to some of the usual rules of constitutional
operate during the night; their moral well-being is likewise imperiled as litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the
time.72 courts carve away the unconstitutional aspects of the law by
invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances
third parties and can only assert their own interests. In overbreadth
apply only when the minors are not - whether actually or constructively
analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
(as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This serves
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its
as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature
face," not merely "as applied for" so that the overbroad law becomes
of parental authority and the importance of parents' role in child-
unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it more
rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over their
narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the
children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise
normal adjudicatory rules is the concern with the "chilling;"
them. Thus, in all actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the
deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an
minors to remain in public places without parental
overbroad law's "very existence may cause others not before the court
accompaniment during the curfew hours. 73 In this respect, the
to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of discipline for the
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on
parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their
the speech of those third parties. 82 (Emphases and underscoring
authority to influence or control their minors' activities. 74 As such,
supplied)
the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit reasonable -
infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the
overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims, the Court, in at least two
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances
[(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized
positively influence children to spend more time at home.
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First
Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities
Amendment,83 and that claims of facial overbreadth have been
to take a more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v.
entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to
City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US court observed that the city
regulate only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that
government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-
efforts of parents who desire to protect their children from the perils of
related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the
the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of those
'transcendent value to all society of constitutionally protected
children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer
expression. "'85
their children to spend time on their studies than on the
streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are
no less applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional In the more recent case of SpousesImbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was
reasons which justify the impact of the nocturnal curfews on parental opined that "[f]acial challenges can only be raised on the basis of
rights. overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern
Hemisphere demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due
process rights, whereas facial challenges are raised on the basis of
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional
overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression." 87
for violating the parents' right to rear their children.

That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an

C. Right to Travel.
overbreadth analysis in this case, there being no claimed curtailment of
free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
based on the minors' right to travel. They claim that the liberty to travel
is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the application of
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental
the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a
right88 under Section 6, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
compelling State interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and
the protection of minors from crime, there are other less restrictive
means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the
limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order
of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in
the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as
may be provided by law. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely
from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. 89 It is a
right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty - a
birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion 91 and the
right of citizens to be free to use their faculties in lawful ways and to
live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue the
ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and
exercise their other rights, such as the rights to education, free
expression, assembly, association, and religion. 93 The inter-relation of
the right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized
in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech,
assembly, and association require one to move about, such movement
must necessarily be protected under the First Amendment.
Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that
First Amendment Rights cannot be exercised without violating the
law is equivalent to a denial of those rights. One court has
eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by
the First Amendment to freedom of travel and movement. If, for
any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church, their freedom
to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive
to the meeting hall, freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for
any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or drive the
streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are
sharply limited. Freedom of movement is inextricably involved with
freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest
justify restrictions even if made against fundamental rights. Specifically
on the freedom to move from one place to another, jurisprudence
provides that this right is not absolute. 95 As the 1987 Constitution itself
reads, the State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right,
provided that they: (1) serve the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the
promotion of juvenile safety and prevention of juvenile crime,
inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the
minor's movement and activities within the confines of their residences
and their immediate vicinity during the curfew period is perceived to
reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting
involved in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second
requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by law," our legal
system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford
special protection to children, i.e., RA 7610, 98 as amended, RA
977599 RA 9262100 RA 9851101RA 9344102 RA 10364103 RA
9211104 RA8980,105 RA9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603, 107 as
amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which
explicitly authorizes local government units, through their city or
municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils
may prescribe such curfew hours for children as may be
warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local
authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew
ordinances (as what respondents have done in this case) and enforce
the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict
the minors' exercise of the right to travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to
minors are likewise constitutionally permissible. In this relation, this
Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108 but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as
those of adults.109 They are always subject to the authority or custody
of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent,
restricts the minors' exercise of their rights, such as in their affairs
concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and the
right to engage in gainful employment. 113 With respect to the right to
travel, minors are required by law to obtain a clearance from the
Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can travel
to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their
parents.114 These limitations demonstrate that the State has broader
authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of
adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-
being of minors.116 Thus, the State may impose limitations on the
minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not
generally apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for
the differential treatment of the minors' constitutional rights. These
are: first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature
manner; and third, the importance of the parental role in child
rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally
are protected by the same constitutional guarantees against
governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and
their needs for 'concern, ... sympathy, and ... paternal attention.x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the
recognition that, during the formative years of childhood and
adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and
judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could be
detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of
their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of minors. The State
commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and
from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or
involvement in important decisions by minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of
the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the
full growth and maturity that make eventual participation in a free
society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court
acknowledged the heightened dangers on the streets to minors, as
compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all
that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and dangers
within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for
such action are the crippling effects of child employment, more
especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from
other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the
[streets]. It is too late now to doubt that legislation appropriately
designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious
scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the
primary use of highways. But even in such use streets afford dangers
for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in work
or in other things, this difference may be magnified. 121 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the
minors' exercise of their travel rights, provided, they are singled out on
reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial
scrutiny to determine the reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict
scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i) interferes with the
exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed
under the Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect
classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights,
but requires heightened scrutiny, such as in classifications based on
gender and legitimacy.124Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal
system guaranteed no less by our Constitution, the strict scrutiny
test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that
the State has broader authority over minors than over adults does not
trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny. 128 In Nunez v. City of
San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
unconstitutional.131 Thus, the government has the burden of proving
that the classification (1) is necessary to achieve a compelling
State interest, and (i1) is the least restrictive means to protect
such interest or the means chosen is narrowly tailored to
accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.
Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include
constitutionally declared policies.133 This Court has ruled that
children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for
them as parenspatriaeconstitute compelling interests to justify
regulations by the State.134 It is akin to the paramount interest of the
state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As explained
in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling
interest in imposing greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The
limitations on minors under Philippine laws also highlight this
compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
objective of the Curfew Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors
during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as to reduce -
if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate
them against criminal pressure and influences which may even include
themselves. As denoted in the "whereas clauses" of the Quezon City
Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors,
recognizes that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of
their proper care and guidance, education, and moral development,
which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;

Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews
implicate the fundamental rights of minors, the parties dispute whether
strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches that
rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that
the analysis of those rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically
only when one attains the state-defined age
majority.1âwphi1 Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the
Constitution and possess constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed,
however, [has long] recognized that the State has somewhat broader
authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. xxx. Thus,
minors' rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because
the state has a greater range of interests that justify the
infringement of minors' rights.
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school
youth, unproductive by-standers, street children, and member of
notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private
roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups
without lawful purpose or justification;
of
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal
that minor children roaming around, loitering or wandering in the
evening are the frequent personalities involved in various infractions of
city ordinances and national laws;

The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when
applicable, warrant differential analysis of the constitutional rights of
minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of
minors in the context of a juvenile curfew. Rather,
the Bellottiframework enables courts to determine whether the state
has a compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors
than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in
regulating minors differently than adults, we do not believe that
[a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens on
minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
According, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x
x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration
of the peculiar circumstances of minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-
vis the State's duty as parenspatriae to protect and preserve their well-
being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed
government act. Under the strict scrutiny test, a legislative
classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate
the movement of minor children during night time by setting disciplinary
hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children,
there is a need to put a restraint on the tendency of growing number of
youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in the
face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident
elements of society are not provided with potent avenues for furthering
their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the
information gathered by the City Council to support its passage of the
curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our
own eatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US
court recognized the entitlement of elected bodies to implement
policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left
unsupervised during the late hours of night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew
would materially assist its first stated interest-that of reducing juvenile
violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of information
from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police
department, a survey of public opinion, news reports, data from the
United States Department of Justice, national crime reports, and police
reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected
bodies are entitled to conclude that keeping unsupervised
juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a safer
community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less
wholesome character at night than during the day. Alone on the
streets at night children face a series of dangerous and
potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to
use narcotics or aid in their sale. Gangs may pressure them into
membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative years
of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience,
perspective, and judgment to recognize and avoid choices that could
be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these criminal
influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as
adults. Whether we as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the
point. Those elected officials with their finger on the pulse of their home
community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the
opportunities for children to come into contact with criminal
influences, the City was directly advancing its first objective of
reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and
underscoring supplied; citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments
of Quezon City and Manila presented statistical data in their respective
pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes involving
juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective
localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact
curfew ordinances pursuant to their police power under the general
welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to
substantiate legitimate concerns on public welfare, especially
with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State interest exists for
the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court
now proceeds to determine if the restrictions set forth in· the Curfew
Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive means
to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement
of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the
fundamental premise that citizens should not be hampered from
pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional
rights. While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal
or only to the extent necessary to achieve the purpose or to address
the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for governmental
regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with
constitutional rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn. 141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies
to regulations on minors as they are still accorded the freedom to
participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or
civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be
narrowly tailored as to ensure minimal constraint not only on the
minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance
unconstitutional impliedly for not being narrowly drawn, resulting in
unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their
religion and to free speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone
Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at the local Roman Catholic Church
or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant
Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New
[Year's] Eve watch services at the various churches. Likewise it would
prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters from
taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned
services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not
even attend the city council meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which
they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to repeal
the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of
Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly drawn ordinance of
many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in
an attempt to pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted
[the] exercise of First Amendment rights, travel in a motor vehicle
and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or
voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions,
this Court finds that only the Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-
discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas Ordinances do
not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage
of the curfew, namely: (a) minors accompanied by their parents, family
members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running lawful errands
such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for
emergency purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those
who, by virtue of their employment, are required in the streets or
outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at
night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit:
(a) minors with night classes; (b) those working at night; (c) those who
attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew
hours; (e) those running errands under the supervision of their parents,
guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them; (j) those
involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors
from the curfew during these specific occasions: Christmas eve,
Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night before the
barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day,
Holy Thursday, Good Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn
in that their exceptions are inadequate and therefore, run the risk of
overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be fair, both
ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and
to travel at night from school or work.148 However, even with those
safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater extent, the Manila
Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the
minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, rights to
peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus,
unduly trample upon protected liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is
apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as
discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities,
it hinders them from engaging in legitimate non-school or nonchurch
activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus, their
freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that
participation in legitimate activities of organizations, other than school
or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional, and
intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under
the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew
during Christmas Eve and Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors
from attending traditional religious activities (such as simbang gabi) at
night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right
to freely exercise their religion is therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for
minors to engage in political rallies or attend city council meetings to
voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble
and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage
in these activities outside curfew hours, but the Court finds no reason
to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities during
curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's
compelling interest to protect minors from the dangers of the streets at
night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal activity. These
legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable
relation to the State's interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not
narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its limited
exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely
stricken down since their exceptions, which are essentially
determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are
inadequate to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental
rights. While some provisions may be valid, the same are merely
ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite
the presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2)
ordinances as it sufficiently safeguards the minors' constitutional rights.
It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following
circumstances shall not be covered by the provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or
guardian;
(b) Those on their way to or from a party,
graduation ceremony, religious mass, and/or
other extra-curricular activities of their school
or organization wherein their attendance are
required or otherwise indispensable, or when
such minors are out and unable to go home
early due to circumstances beyond their
control as verified by the proper authorities
concerned; and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an
emergency situation such as conflagration,
earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized
employment activity, or going to or returning home
from the same place of employment activity
without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other
travel accompanied by an adult in no violation of
this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence
attending an official school, religious,
recreational, educational, social, community or
other similar private activity sponsored by the
city, barangay, school, or other similar private
civic/religious organization/group (recognized
by the community) that supervises the activity
or when the minor is going to or returning
home from such activity, without any detour or
stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying
that he/she is a student and was dismissed from
his/her class/es in the evening or that he/she is a
working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under
the Quezon City Ordinance is more narrowly drawn to sufficiently
protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion, travel,
to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions
guarantees the protection of these aforementioned rights. These items
uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend both
official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or
church but also of other legitimate organizations. The rights to
peaceably assemble and of free expression are also covered by
these items given that the minors' attendance in the official
activities of civic or religious organizations are allowed during the
curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the right to the free
exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City
Ordinance by exempting attendance at religious masses even during
curfew hours. In relation to their right to ravel, the ordinance allows the
minor-participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the
Quezon City Ordinance, in truth, only prohibits unsupervised
activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who
publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is
perceivably more prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes
his/her minor child to run lawful errands or engage in legitimate
activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate
Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen during the deliberations on this case,
parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found in
Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose
accompanied by their parents or guardian", as accompaniment should
be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive sense.
As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this
exception so as to reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic
premise that State interference is not superior but only complementary
to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes,
the parents' right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing
judgment on these ordinances, is dealing with the welfare of minors
who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent due
to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of
their actions. In one case it was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is
on the rationale that she can easily be the victim of fraud as she is not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parenspatriae, is under the obligation to
minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their minority, are
as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of
full rational capacity, and balancing the same against the State's
compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent juvenile
crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City
Ordinance is reasonably justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions
and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions are in no
way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful
exercise of its police power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or
modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as long as the
regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this
case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it
was raised - to further discuss the validity of its penal provisions in
relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parent/s
or guardian under Section 8 thereof, 154 does not impose any penalty on
the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the minor,
along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty
and community service either in lieu of - should the parent/s or
guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or in
addition to the fine imposed therein.155 Meanwhile, the Manila
Ordinance imposed various sanctions to the minor based on the
age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth
violating this ordinance shall be sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and
ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian
or person exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and
under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST
OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition;
2. For the SECOND
OFFENSE, Reprimand and
Admonition, and a warning about the
legal impostitions in case of a third and
subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT
OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1)
day to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO
THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or
both at the discretion of the
Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint
shall be filed by
the PunongBarangay with the office of
156
the City Prosecutor.  (Emphases and
underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly
impose on minors these sanctions - i.e., (a) community . service; (b)
reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d) imprisonment. Pertinently,
Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as
curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. - Any conduct not considered an offense
or not penalized if committed by an adult shall not be considered
an offense and shall not be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. - Ordinances enacted by
local governments concerning juvenile status offenses such
as but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental
disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light
offenses and misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but
not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism,
gambling, mendicancy, littering, public urination, and trespassing, shall
be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed on
children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their
residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to be
released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention
programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall
also be recorded as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with
the law." The ordinance shall also provide for intervention programs,
such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for
the parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases
and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment
of regulations that curtail the conduct of minors, when the similar
conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized
(i.e., status offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition
of penalties on minors for violations of these regulations.
Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without
penalizing them for violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty"157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer
usually in the form of imprisonment or fine";158 "[p ]unishment imposed
by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or
negligent act."159 Punishment, in tum, is defined as "[a] sanction - such
as fine, penalty, confinement, or loss of property, right, or privilege -
assessed against a person who has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean
that all the actions of the minor in violation of the regulations are
without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such
as community-based programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of
the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a
valid form of intervention program that a local government (such as
Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service
programs provide minors an alternative mode of rehabilitation as they
promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention.
In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and
compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give
them the opportunity to become productive members of society and
thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise
consistent with Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a
formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the
minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or
friendly reproof' or "counsel or warning against fault or
oversight."163The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure"; 164 while the Philippine Law
Dictionary defines it as a "gentle or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke,
warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an
expression of authoritative advice or warning." 165 Notably, the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our
jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a warning
or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based
programs and admonition are clearly not penalties - as they are not
punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and
conduct of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform
and educate the minor, and for the latter to understand, what actions
must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand
and fines and/or imprisonment imposed by the City of Manila on the
minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of
lawyer discipline that does not restrict the lawyer's ability to practice
law";168while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public and
formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by
his superior officer or body to which he belongs. It is more than just a
warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a formal and
public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation
committed, to sharply criticize and rebuke the erring individual, and to
sternly warn the erring individual including the public against repeating
or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring
individual or violator to unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from
others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence explicitly indicate
that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA
9344, as amended.

Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute

penalties - as provided in our various criminal and administrative laws
and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.

As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and

unambiguous. It states that "[n]o penalty shall be imposed on
children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus,
for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on
minors for curfew violations, portions of Section 4 of the Manila
Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language of
Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the
other hand, the impositions of community service programs and
admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute
penalties.

CONCLUSION

In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have
passed the first prong of the strict scrutiny test - that is, that the State
has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile safety
and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon
City Ordinance has passed the second prong of the strict scrutiny test,
as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for the least
restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City
Ordinance provides for adequate exceptions that enable minors to
freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed curfew
hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose.
Section 4 (a) of the said ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their
parents or guardian", has also been construed to include parental
permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an
allowable exception to the curfew measure; the manner of
enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government
unit.

In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared

unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while the Quezon City
Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance
with this Decision.

For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's
penal provisions imposing reprimand and fines/imprisonment on
minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence,
following the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law,
these provisions must be struck down as invalid.

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLYGRANTED. The Court hereby

declares Ordinance No. 8046, issued by the local government of the
City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as amended
by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local
government of Navotas City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and,
thus, NULLand VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014,
issued by the local government of the Quezon City is
declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, VALID in accordance with this
Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196005               October 1, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, 
vs.
CHARLIE FIELDAD, RYAN CORNISTA, and EDGAR
PIMENTEL, Appellants.
DECISION
CARPIO, Acting C.J.:
The Case
On appeal is the Decision1 dated 22 October 2010 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943, affirming with modification the
Joint Decision2 dated 3 November 2008 of the Regional Trial Court of
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan (trial court) in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053,
U-10054, and U-10055.
The Facts
Appellants Charlie Fieldad (Fieldad), Ryan Comista (Comista) and
Edgar Pimentel (Pimentel) were charged in conspiracy with others for
the murder of two jail guards and for camapping.
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10053 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD,
MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN PASCUA, and ELMO MEJIA of the
crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as
follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP
Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners
armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intentto kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring
with one another did then and there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and
feloniously grab, hold and shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO2
Reynaldo Gamboa inflicting upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds
which caused his instant death, thereafter, accused escaped from their
detention, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said JO2
Reynaldo Gamboa.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7956 and R.A. 8294.3 The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10054
reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD,
MIGUEL BUCCAT, JESUS GELIDO, FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN
CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, FEDERICO DELIM, JEFFREY
ADVIENTO, GIL ESPEJO, RUBEN a.k.a. Joven, and ELMO MEJIA of
the crime of Murder with the use of unlicensed firearm committed as
follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 in the morning inside the BJMP
Compound, Anonas, Urdaneta City, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused being detention prisoners
armed with an unlicensed firearm, with intent to kill, treachery, evident
premeditation and taking advantage of superior strength, conspiring
with one another did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot with said unlicensed firearm JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, Jr. inflicting
upon him multiple fatal gunshot wounds which caused his instant
death, thereafter, accused escaped from their detention, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr.
CONTRARY to Article 248, Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A.
7956 and R.A. 8294.4
The Information in Criminal Case No. U-10055 reads:
The undersigned accuses JULIUS CHAN, CHARLIE FIELDAD,
FLORANTE LEAL, RYAN CORNISTA, EDGAR PIMENTEL, and
FEDERICO DELIM of the crime of carnapping committed as follows:
That on or about March 9, 1999 at Brgy. Anonas, Urdaneta City and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, having just escaped from the BJMP Compound, Anonas
Urdaneta, in order to expedite their escape armed with unlicensed
firearm with intent to gain, conspiring with one another, did then and
there wil[l]fully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal, and carry away
one (1) Tamaraw Jeep with Plate No. CDY-255 belonging to Benjamin
J. Bau[z]on without the latter’s knowledge and consent, which accused
used as a get away vehicle. CONTRARY to R.A. 6539, as amended.5
Upon arraignment, appellants pled not guilty.
Version of the Prosecution
The prosecution presented the testimonies of Jail Officer (JO) 2 Marlon
Niturada, Dr. Constante Parayno, Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr., Senior
Police Officer (SPO) 4 Ernesto Ganceña, Dionisio Badua, Police
Senior Inspector Philip Campti Pucay, PO3 Jimmy Garcia, PO3
Roberto Reyes, SPO1 Joselito Sagles, Pitz Dela Cruz, PO2 Danny
Torres, Police Inspector Pamfilo Regis, Police Inspector Reyland
Malenab, Theresa Bacolor, Julie Gamboa, Benjamin Bauzon, JO1
Victor A. Sidayen, Warden Romeo Jacaban, SPO4 Cirilo Lagmay and
Col. Theresa Ann B. Cid.
The prosecution established that at around 7:00 a.m. on 9 March 1999,
JO2 Reynaldo Gamboa (JO2 Gamboa), JO1 Juan Bacolor, Jr. (JO1
Bacolor) and JO2 Marlon Niturada (JO2 Niturada) were inside the nipa
hut searching area near the main gate of the district jail. JO2 Gamboa
summoned inmate Dionisio Badua (Badua). JO2 Gamboa gave Badua
the keys to the prison cells and instructed the latter to open all the cells
for the routine headcount.
Julius Chan (Chan) went to the nipa hut to ask JO2 Gamboa regarding
the time of his hearing scheduled for that day. While JO2 Gamboa and
Chan were conversing, the telephone in the administration building
rang. JO2 Niturada ran from the nipa hut to the administration building
to answer the phone.
After the phone call, JO2 Niturada proceeded towards the basketball
court. On his way there, he turned his head towards the nipa hut and
saw Chan place an arm on the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa, who was
seated, and shoot the latter with a short firearm. JO2 Gamboa fell.
Meanwhile, Fieldad and Cornista grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the
possession of an armalite. Cornista struck JO1 Bacolor at the back of
the head, which caused the latter to fall down. Fieldad, armed with JO2
Gamboa’s gun, shot JO1 Bacolor twice. Florante Leal (Leal) took the
armalite from JO1 Bacolor and shot at JO2 Niturada. JO2 Niturada
returned fire with his .38 caliber handgun.
Cornista opened the main gate with keys taken from JO2 Gamboa.
Twelve inmates went out the main gate. After seeing the inmates run
out, Badua padlocked the main gateand returned to his cell.
Once outside the jail compound, Fieldad, Leal, Cornista, and Pimentel
boarded a parked Tamaraw jeep with plate number CDY-255
belonging to Benjamin Bauzon, without the latter’sknowledge and
consent. They picked up Federico Delim (Delim) and Chan along the
way. Before they reached Asingan, Pangasinan, the group alighted
from the Tamaraw jeep and transferred to a Mazda pick-up truck.
When they reached San Miguel, Tarlac, the Mazda pick-up truck
turned turtle. The group abandoned the vehicle and ran towards a cane
field. Police authorities surrounded the cane field and arrested
appellants and their companions.
Dr. Constante Parayno conducted anautopsy on the body of JO1
Bacolor, and concluded that the death was caused by shock and
hemorrhage due to gunshot wound of the right lung. Dr. Parayno also
testified that based on the injuries sustained by JO1 Bacolor, it was
possible that the shooting was preceded by a fight between the shooter
and the victim.
Dr. Ramon Gonzales, Jr. conducted an autopsy on the body of JO2
Gamboa, and concluded that the death was caused by cardiac
tamponade due to the gunshot wound that damaged the heart.
Versions of Appellants
Appellants denied any criminal liability.
Fieldad’s Testimony
At around 6:00 in the morning on 9 March 1999, JO2 Gamboa brought
Fieldad out of his cell and ordered him to clean the administrative
offices. After cleaning the offices, he was told to fix a vehicle parked
inside the jail compound. He needed to prop the vehicle on a jack, but
he could not find the jack handle. He went back toJO2 Gamboa, who
was in the nipa hut with JO2 Niturada and JO1 Bacolor. JO2 Gamboa
told him to look for Badua. When he came back with Badua, JO2
Gamboa handed Badua the key of the jail compound. Badua went out
of the compound, while Fieldad continued to look for the jack handle.
While JO2 Niturada talked to him regarding the vehicle, Fieldad noticed
Elmo Mejia (Mejia) and the other inmates playing basketball. The ball
rolled towards the nipa hut and Mejia went to retrieve it.
Then Fieldad heard gunshots from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2
Niturada got his gun and fired towards the nipa hut. Fieldad got
nervous and took cover in the outpost. He peeped through the
windows and saw Mejia pointing a firearm toward JO2 Niturada. He hid
again when he heard the exchange of fire between Mejia and JO2
Niturada. He went out of the outpost when he heard people calling for
help to push the parked vehicle. The vehicle did not start, and the
people pushing it dispersed. Intending to return to his cell, he followed
JO2 Niturada, who was proceeding towards the main building.
However, JO2 Niturada pointed a gun towards him, so Fieldad ran
away and took cover.
While still inside the jail compound, Leal told Fieldad that he needed
the latter to go with him. Fieldad, along with other inmates, left the jail
compound. He followed Leal to a Tamaraw jeep parked outside. Leal
pointed a long firearm toward Fieldad,and ordered the latter to drive
the vehicle. Frightened, Fieldad drove the vehicle. On their way, they
picked up Delim and Chan.
Pimentel’s Testimony
At around 7:30 in the morning of 9 March 1999, Pimentel was allowed
to go out of his cell. He proceeded to the basketball court for the
headcount. He heard two or three gunshots, but did not immediately
mind it because he was used to the guards firing their guns in the
morning. When he saw Leal with an armalite, running after and
shooting at JO2 Niturada, Pimentel ran to a house outside the
jailcompound. He was afraid to go back to his cell because of the
exchange of fire. Inmates were running in different directions.
Leal arrived at the place where Pimentel was hiding, and motioned to
the latter by pointing his armalite downward several times. Pimentel
approached Leal, who ordered him to remove the stone blocking the
tire of the jeep parked near the house. Pimentel obliged. Pimentel
boarded the jeep because Leal told him at gun point to do so. Fieldad
drove the jeep. He did not notice who their other companions were.
Along the way, they passed a parked vehicle. Leal ordered everyone to
alight from the jeep, and to board the other vehicle. The vehicle turned
turtle in Tarlac.
Cornista’s Testimony
Cornista was 17 years old on 9 March 1999. Between 6:00 and 6:45
that morning, he was cleaning the jail compound. He was shocked and
confused when he heard three rapid gunfires followed by consecutive
gunfires coming from the direction of the nipa hut. JO2 Gamboa, JO1
Bacolor, Leal and Mejia were at the nipa hut. Leal was chasing JO2
Niturada, both of them armed. Then he saw the jail guards lying down.
Out of fear, he ran towards the already opened main gate.
Cornista hid in a Tamaraw jeep parked behind the jail compound. Then
he saw Leal, Fieldad and Pimentel board the jeep. He tried to alight but
Leal threatened to shoot him if he did. Fieldad drove the Tamaraw
jeep. Delim flagged the jeep down and boarded.Chan also joined them
along the way. Upon seeing a parked Mazda pick up, Leal ordered
Fieldad to stop the jeep and the inmates to transfer to the other
vehicle. Fieldad also drove the Mazda pick up until it turned turtle in
Tarlac.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The dispositive portion of the trial court’s Joint Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered as follows:
1. In Criminal Case No. U-10053, accused Julius Chan,
Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, Php47,845.00 as actual damages and
Php153,028.00 for loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim,
Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
2. In Criminal Case No. U-10054, accused Julius Chan,
Charlie Fieldad and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER and each
is sentenced to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
 PERPETUA. They are also ordered to pay the heirs of the
deceased the amounts of Php75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
Php50,000.00 as moral damages, Php25,000.00 as
exemplary damages, Php87,349.45 for the actual damages,
and Php178,500.00 for the loss of earning capacity.
Accused Jesus Gelido, Edgar Pimentel, Federico Delim,
Jeffrey Adviento, Miguel Buccat and Ruben Pascua are
ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt.
3. In Criminal Case No. U-10055, accused Charlie Fieldad,
Edgar Pimentel and Ryan Cornista are declared GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of CARNAPPING and
each is sentenced to suffer imprisonment from FOURTEEN
YEARS AND EIGHT MONTHS to SIXTEEN YEARS AND
TWO MONTHS, and to pay nominal damages of
Php15,000.00 and moral damages of Php25,000.00.
For insufficiency of evidence, accused Julius Chan and
Federico Delim are ACQUITTED.
xxxx
SO ORDERED.6
Appeal was interposed only by Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel since
Chan had died.7 They assigned the following errors:
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE
TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING
CONSPIRACY AND TREACHERY IN THE ALLEGED KILLINGS OF
JO2 REYNALDO GAMBOA AND JO1 JUAN BACOLOR, JR.
III
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPRECIATE THE MINORITY OF THE ACCUSED RYAN CORNISTA
AT THE TIME THE ALLEGED CRIMES WERE COMMITTED.
IV
THE COURT A QUOGRAVELY ERRED IN DISREGARDING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANTS’ TESTIMONIES.8
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court only with
respect to the penalties imposed upon Cornista in Criminal Case Nos.
U-10053 and U-10054, taking into account the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the Joint Decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED WITH
MODIFICATION as to the penalties of imprisonment imposed on Ryan
Cornista in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and U-10054. Accordingly the
penalties of reclusion perpetua imposed on him are reduced to eight
(8) years and one (1) day of prision mayoras minimum to fourteen (14)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, per each information.
IT IS SO ORDERED.9
The appellate court held that "it ismanifest that Cornista acted with
discernment, being able to distinguish between right and wrong and
knowing fully well the consequences of his acts." 10 The Court of
Appeals enumerated the following acts of Cornista that clearly
establish discernment:
x x x. His act of grappling for possession of an armalite with Bacolor
and hitting the latter’s head clearly demonstrated his discernment. He
took advantage of the situation where Fieldad was also grappling with
JO1 Bacolor by striking the head of JO1 Bacolor which he obviously
knew would weaken the latter’s defenses. Moreover, his act of getting
the keys from JO2 Gamboa which he usedin opening the main gate
clearly demonstrates the idea of escape and thus established
discernment on his part. Cornista, having acted with discernment may
not be excused from criminal liability.11
Fieldad, Cornista and Pimentel appealed from the Court of Appeals’
decision. In the interim, Cornistafiled a Motion to Withdraw
Appeal12 dated 15 June 2011, which the Court granted in a
Resolution13 dated 15 August 2011. The case became final and
executory as to Cornista on 5 October 2011. 14 The instant appeal thus
pertainsto Fieldad and Pimentel only.
Appellants and appellee adopted their respective briefs15 filed before
the Court of Appeals as their supplemental briefs in this case.16
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal is unmeritorious.
Nature of the Killings
Fieldad argues that there can be notreachery since "the jail guards
were all issued with firearms to protect themselves from danger and to
maintain peace and order within the compound."17 This argument is
untenable.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes
against the person, employing means, methods, or forms in the
execution thereof which tend directly and speciallyto insure its
execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might take.18
In People v. Escote, Jr.,19 where an armed off-duty police officer was
killed, we held:
x x x. There is treachery when the following essential elements are
present, viz: (a) at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a
position to defend himself; and (b) the accused consciously and
deliberately adopted the particular means, method or form of attack
employed by him. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack by an aggressor on the unsuspecting victim,
depriving the latter of any chance to defend himself and thereby
ensuring its commission withour risk of himself. Treachery may also be
appreciated even if the victim was warned of the danger to his life
where he was defenseless and unable to flee atthe time of the infliction
of the coup de grace. In the case at bar, the victim suffered six
wounds, one on the mouth, another on the right ear,one on the
shoulder, another on the right breast, one on the upper right cornea of
the sternum and one above the right iliac crest. Juan and Victor were
armed with handguns. They first disarmed SPO1 Manio, Jr. and then
shot him even as hepleaded for dear life. When the victim was shot, he
was defenseless. He was shot at close range, thus insuring his
death.20 (Boldfacing and underscoring supplied)
In the case of People v. Tabaco,21 treachery was appreciated in the
killing of three peace officers, one of whom was armed and assigned to
maintain the peace and order. They were attending an event where
many armed peace officers were present to maintain peace and order.
In that case, the victims were completely taken by surprise and had no
means of defending themselves against the sudden attack.
In the instant case, despite being armed, the jail officers were not A This one, sir. (Witness is pointing to the accused, Charlie Fieldad).
afforded any chance of defending themselves. Without warning,
Fieldad and his cohorts disabled the defenses of the jail officers. Chan
COURT
held the shoulder of JO2 Gamboa as he shot the latter. Meanwhile,
Fieldad teamed-up with Cornista to divest JO1 Bacolor of his armalite,
and to knock him down. Then Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and Warden what is the name?
shot JO1 Bacolor.
BJMP WARDEN JACABAN
Fieldad’s Identity was Established
Felmer Fieldad and the nickname is Charlie, Your Honor.
According to Fieldad, since JO2 Niturada did not identify him as a
participant in the killings of JO1 Bacolor and JO2 Gamboa, his identity
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
and complicity in the killings were not established. However, contrary
to his contention, Fieldad’s identity in Criminal Case Nos. U-10053 and
U-10054 was proven by the prosecution. Fieldad disregarded the How about Cornista is he inside the courtroom?
testimony of Badua, who categorically identified Fieldad and recounted
in detail his participation in the incident:
A Yes, sir.

Q What happened when you bring (sic) water to the kubo?

Q Will you please point to him?

A At the time when I brought water to the place where (sic) the guards
used to take a bath there were persons grappling possession of the A (The witness is pointing to one ofthe accused who when asked his
armalite, sir. name he answered Ryan Cornista).

Q With whom? Q What happened next when you saw Charlie and Cornista grappling
possession of the armalite of Jail Guard Bacolor?

A Charlie and Cornista, sir.

A They struck the back of the head of Bacolor, sir.

Q You were told to fetch water, then you returned and brought the
water to the place where (sic) the guards used to take a bath and you Q Who struck the back head (sic) of Bacolor?
saw Charlie and Cornista grappling with whom?
A Cornista, sir.
A Bacolor, sir.
Q What happened to Bacolor when Cornista struck the back of his
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO head?

You are referring to Jail Guard Bacolor? A Bacolor fell down, sir.

A Yes, sir. xxxx

Q Is this Charlie inside the courtroom right now? Q What happened when Gamboa was shot by Julius?

A Yes, sir. A He fell down, sir.

Q Will you please point to him, you step down? Q What else happened when Gamboa fell down?

A This one, sir. (Witness pointed (sic) and shaked (sic) hand (sic) with A They got his gun, sir.
accused and who when asked his name he answered Felmer Fieldad).
Q Who got the gun of Gamboa?
Q Is he the same Charlie you are referring to?
A Charlie, sir.
A Yes, sir.
COURT
COURT
What kind of firearm?
Do you know Charlie?
A 9 MM, sir.
A Yes, sir.
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
Q Is he in the courtroom?
What did Charlie do with the gun taken from Gamboa?
A Yes, sir.
A Charlie shot Bacolor, sir.
Q You go to him, where is Charlie there?
Q How many times did Charlie shoot Bacolor?
A Two (2) times, sir.22 (Emphasis supplied)
It is a settled rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and
their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because
of its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note
their demeanor, conduct and attitude under grilling
examination.23 Positive identification of the accused is entitled to
greater weight than the bare denial and explanation by the accused.24
In light of the positive testimony of Badua, Fieldad’s self-serving
defense of denial and alibi must fail. Alibi is the weakest of all
defenses, as it is easy to contrive and difficult to disprove.25 True, the
conviction of an accused must rest not on the weakness of the defense
but on the strength of the prosecution evidence. Hence, whenthe
prosecution evidence has firmly established the guilt of accused
beyondreasonable doubt, conviction is in order.
Sufficiency of the Prosecution Evidence
Moreover, the positive identification of Fieldad by Badua is
corroborated by circumstantial evidence. A careful examination of the
record reveals that the following evidence establish Fieldad’s active
participation in the conspiracy to kill the jail guards:
1. Badua testified that Fieldad, together with Cornista,
grappled with JO1 Bacolor for the possession of the latter’s
armalite gun, and JO1 Bacolor finally fell when Cornista
struck him at back of the head;26
2. Badua also testified that after Chan shot JO2 Gamboa,
Fieldad took JO2 Gamboa’s gun and usedit to shoot JO1
Bacolor;27
3. Dr. Constante F. Parayno, the medical doctor who
conducted the autopsy on JO1 Bacolor, testified that
because of the abrasions, the shooting of the victim may
have been preceded by a fight between the victim and the
shooter;28
4. JO2 Niturada testified that he saw Fieldad confederating
with Leal and Chan by the nipa hut before heading out the
main gate;29
5. JO Sidayen testified that he saw Fieldad with Leal, Chan
and Cornista at the nipa hut but moments before the gun
shots rang;30
6. P/Insp. Pamfilo Regis testified that he took the paraffin
casts31 of the hands of Fieldad;32 and
7. Forensic chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong-Cid testified that
the paraffin test done on Fieldad’s hands was positive for the
presence of gun powder nitrates,33 as contained in her
report.34 In addition, Fieldad failed to controvert the paraffin
evidence. We note that Fieldad’s counsel manifested
duringtrial that the paraffin casting was performed without
the assistance of counsel, contrary to the right of the
accused.35 However, all the exhibits offered by the
prosecution, including the paraffin casts and test results,
wereadmitted in the Order dated 3 March 2000. 36 To be sure,
the taking of paraffin casts does not violate the right of the
accused against self incrimination. In People v.
Gamboa,37 we held:
As to the paraffin test to which the appellant was subjected to he raises
the question, under the sixth assigned error, that it was not conducted
in the presence of his lawyer. This right is afforded to any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense whose confession or
admission may not be taken unless he is informed of his right to remain
silent and to havecompetent and independent counsel of his own
choice. His right against self incrimination is not violated by the taking
of the paraffin test of his hands. This constitutional right extends only to
testimonial compulsion and not when the body of the accused is
proposed to be examined as in this case. Indeed, the paraffin test
proved positively thathe just recently fired a gun. Again, this kind of
evidence buttresses the case of the prosecution.38 (Emphasis supplied)
Conspiracy in the Killings
A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit
it.39 Conspiracy can be inferred from and established by the acts of the
accused themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and
design, concerted action and community of interest.40 Once conspiracy
is shown the act of one is the act of all the conspirators.
Contrary to his contentions, the acts of Fieldad before, during and after
the attacks on JOs Bacolor, Jr. and Gamboa disclose his agreement
with the joint purpose and design in the commission of the felonies.
The positive testimony of Badua is corroborated by a web of
circumstantial evidence that points to no other conclusion than that
Fieldad was complicit in the conspiracy to murder the jail guards.
Penalty and Damages for Murder
Since treachery qualified the killingsto murder and there being no
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua was properly imposed. However, it must be stated that
Fieldad is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of Republic Act
No. 9346 or the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty.
Consistent with prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court correctly
ordered appellant to pay to the heirs of each deceased the amounts of
₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
however, the amount of exemplary damages must be increased to
₱30,000.00.41 Exemplary damages are recoverable due to the
presence of the qualifying aggravating circumstance of treachery in the
commission of the crimes.42
The award of actual damages for the expenses incurred in connection
with the funerals of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor in the amounts of
₱47,845.00 and ₱87,349.45, respectively, are supported by receipts
and are in order.
The trial court awarded the amounts of ₱153,028.00 and ₱178,500.00
to the heirs of JO2 Gamboa and JO1 Bacolor, respectively, for loss of
earning capacity, applying the formula
Net earning {2/3 x [80 – age at the time of death] x
capacity = [gross
annual income– reasonable and
necessary living
expenses]}43
However, instead of using the annual income, the trial court computed
the net earning capacity using the monthlyincome. Hence, we multiply
the amounts by twelve in order to arrive at the amounts of
₱1,836,336.00 for JO2 Gamboa and ₱2,142,000.00 for JO1 Bacolor.
Elements of Carnapping
Carnapping is the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without consent, or by means of violence against
or intimidation of persons, or by using force upon things. 44 The
elements of the crime of carnapping are that: (1) there is an actual
taking of the vehicle; (2) the offender intends to gain from the taking of
the vehicle; (3) the vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; and (4) the taking is without the consent of the owner thereof,
or it was committed by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things.45
All the elements of carnapping are present in this case. Both appellants A Yes, sir.46 (Emphasis supplied)
admitted that they boarded the Tamaraw jeep and drove away in it.
The owner of the vehicle, BenjaminBauzon, testified that he did not
As for intent to gain, we held in People v. Bustinera:47
consent to the taking of his vehicle by appellants.

Intent to gain or animus lucrandiis an internal act, presumed from the

Appellants argue that the testimony of the vehicle owner, Benjamin
Bauzon, cannot be considered for being hearsay because he was
merely informed that his Tamaraw jeep was missing.
Appellants’ argument is misplaced. Bauzon had personal knowledge
that when he arrived home, his Tamaraw jeep was no longer at the
place where he parked it, and that he had to retrieve it from Bactad:
PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO
When you arrived in your house where a tamaraw jeep was parked
what did you do?
unlawful taking of the motor vehicle. Actual gain is irrelevant as the
important consideration is the intent to gain. The term "gain" is not
merely limited to pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which
in any other sense may be derived orexpected from the act which is
performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing which was taken without
the owner’s consent constitutes gain.48
Defense of Uncontrollable Fear
To escape liability for the crime of carnapping, appellants claim that
Leal forced them to take the Tamaraw jeep to facilitate his flight from
jail.

A The tamaraw is no longer there, sir. Under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, a person is exempt from
criminal liability if he acts under the impulse of an uncontrollable fear of
an equal or greater injury.49 For such defense to prosper the duress,
xxxx
force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending,
and of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
COURT death or serious bodily harm if the act be done. 50 A person invoking
uncontrollable fear must show that the compulsion was such that it
reduced him to a mere instrument acting not only without will but
What is the description of your tamaraw? against his will as well.51 It is necessary that the compulsion be of such
a character asto leave no opportunity to escape or self-defense in
A Old fashioned tamaraw, sir. equal combat.52

PROSECUTOR AMBROSIO In this case, appellants had ample opportunity to escape. In the first
place, Leal was already armed when Fieldad voluntarilyfollowed him to
the place where the Tamaraw jeep was parked. The vehicle stopped
What is the color of your tamaraw jeep? three times: to board Delim; to board Chan; and when they stopped to
transfer vehicles. In addition, according to appellants’ testimonies, only
A Red, sir. Leal was armed. The following discussion of the Court ofAppeals is
quoted with approval:
Q Plate number?
x x x. Considering, however, that there were five of them who boarded
the Tamaraw jeep, they could have easily overpowered Leal, who was
A CDY 255, sir. then alone, had they wanted to. Thus, there could not have been any
appreciable imminent danger to their lives. In fact, they had every
Q In whose name was that tamaraw jeep registered? opportunity to escape individually. Bynot availing of this chance to
escape, accused-appellants’ allegation of fear or duress becomes
untenable.53
A In my name, sir.

To be believed, testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a

Q What did you do when you learned that your tamaraw jeep was in credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
Bactad? experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable
under the circumstance.54The circumstances under which appellants
A Somebody told me that the tank was emptied so I went to buy gas participated in the commission of the carnapping would notjustify in any
and then I went to Bactad, sir. way their claim that they acted under an uncontrollable fear of being
killed by their fellow carnapper. Rather, the circumstances establish the
fact that appellants, in their flight from jail, consciously concurred with
COURT the other malefactors to take the Tamaraw jeep without the consent of
its owner.
Did you leave the key?
Penalty and Damages for Carnapping
A Yes, sir, at the ignition.
The penalty for carnapping is provided in Section 14 of Republic Act
Q Is it visible? No. 6539:

A Yes, sir. SECTION 14.Penalty for Carnapping.— Any person who is found guilty
of carnapping, as this term is defined in Section Two of this Act, shall,
irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by
xxxx imprisonment for not less than fourteen years and eight months and
not more than seventeen years and four months, when the carnapping
COURT is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon
things; and by imprisonment for not less than seventeen years and four
months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is
Did you find your tamaraw jeep at Bactad? committed by means of violence against or intimidation of any person,
or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped
motor vehicle is killed or raped in the course of the commission of the
carnapping or on the occasion thereof. (Emphasis supplied)

In this case, the imposable penalty is imprisonment for not less than
fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years
and four months. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as applied to
an offense punishable by a special law, the court shall sentence the
accused to an indeterminate sentence expressed at a range whose
maximum term shall not exceed the maximum fixed by the special law,
and the minimum term not be less than the minimum
prescribed.55 Hence, the penalty imposed by the trial court of
imprisonment from fourteen years and eight months to sixteen years
and two months is in order.

The trial court awarded nominal damages in the amount of ₱15,000.00

and moral damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00 to the owner of the
vehicle.

No proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that nominal or moral

damages may be adjudicated.56 Nominal damages are adjudicated in
order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been violated or invaded by
the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not for the
purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by
him.57Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright,
serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, social humiliation, and similar injury.58

The trial court's award of nominal damages is in

order.1âwphi1 However, we delete the award of moral damages since
there was no showing that Benjamin Bauzon experienced any physical
suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, or any
similar injury.

Finally, in addition to the damages awarded in the murder cases and in

the carnapping case, we also impose on all the ·amounts of damages
an interest at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the date of finality of
this judgment until fully paid.59

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the appeal. The Decision dated 22

October 2010 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03943,
affirming with modification the 3 November 2008 Joint Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Urdaneta City, Pangasinan is AFFIRMED with
the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. Fieldad is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion

perpetua without eligibility for parole in Criminal Case Nos.
U-10053 and U-10054;

2. The award of exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-

10053 is increased to ₱30,000.00; 3. The award of
exemplary damages in Criminal Case No. U-10054 is
increased to ₱30,000.00; 4. The amount of Pl 53,028.00 for
loss of earning capacity awarded to the heirs of JO2
Gamboa in Criminal Case No. U-10053 is increased to
₱1,836,336.00;

5. The amount of Pl 78,500.00 for loss of earning capacity

awarded to the heirs of JO1 Bacolor in Criminal Case No. U-
10054 is increased to ₱2,142,000.00;

6. The award of moral damages in Criminal Case No. U-

10055 is deleted; and

7. Interest is imposed on all the damages awarded at the

legal rate of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment
until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 203961               July 29, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,  Let copies of this Resolution be personally served on the Office of the
vs.
RODERICK LICAYAN, ROBERTO LARA AND ROGELIO "NOEL"
DELOS REYES, Accused-Appellants.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
On August 15, 2001, this Court affirmed the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (R TC) of Marikina City convicting two of herein accused-
appellants, Roderick Licayan (Licayan) and Roberto Lara (Lara), of the
crime of Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing them to death. The
dispositive portion of this Court's August 15, 2001 Decision states:
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 272,
Marikina City finding accused-appellant RODERICK LICA YAN and
ROBERTO LARA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom and sentencing each of them to death is
AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that each of the accused-appellants
is ORDERED to pay ₱50,000.00 as moral damages to each of the
complainants. The award of ₱20,000.00 as actual damages made in
favor of complainant Joseph Co is deleted. Costs against accused-
appellants.
In accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, amending Art. 83 of the
Revised Penal Code, upon the finality of this decision, let the records
of this case be forthwith forwarded to the President of the Philippines
for the possible exercise of the pardoning power.1
The Motion for Reconsideration of Licayan and Lara was denied by this
Court in a Resolution dated October 9, 2001. The Decision became
final and executory on November 9, 2001. On November 18, 2003, the
trial court issued a Writ of Execution ordering the execution of Licayan
and Lara on January 30, 2004 at 3 :00 p.m.
Before the date of Licayan and Lara's scheduled execution, and with
the torrent of initiatives sparked by the passionate national debate on
the morality of capital punishment, two of their co-accused in the
original Information were arrested. On January 9, 2004, Pedro
Mabansag (Mabansag), a double arm amputee and suspected
mastermind of the kidnapping of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda
Manaysay, was arrested at Sitio Lanipga, Barangay Magsaysay,
Escalante City. On January 12, 2004, Rogelio Delos Reyes (Delos
Reyes) was arrested at Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Agusan del Sur.
In light of these arrests, the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) filed with
this Court on January 15, 2004 (which was 15 days before the
scheduled execution of Licayan and Lara) an Urgent Motion to Reopen
the Case with Leave of Court. Pending resolution of the Urgent Motion,
this Court, by a vote of 7-6, issued a Resolution on January 26, 2004
ordering the temporary suspension of the execution of Licayan and
Lara for a period of 30 calendar days.2 On February 17, 2004, this
Court, voting 8-6, issued a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which
states:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court resolves to GRANT pro hac
vice the Urgent Motion to Re-Open the Case with Leave of Court.
Accordingly, the execution of the Decision of this Court dated August
15, 2001 is suspended. The records of the case are hereby
REMANDED to the lower court for further reception of evidence
pursuant to Section 2 (b), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court, together with
the trial of accused Rogelio delos Reyes and Pedro Mabansag. In
accordance with Section 6(b) and (c), Rule 121 of the Rules of Court,
insofar as the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan is
concerned, the evidence already taken shall stand and the additional
evidence as the trial court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be
introduced shall be taken and considered with the evidence already in
record. Towards this end, the Court directs Hon. Reuben P. dela Cruz,
Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Marikina City, Branch 272,
to hear the case of the accused Roberto Lara and Roderick Licayan,
and thereafter report to this Court with deliberate dispatch.
President and the Director of the Bureau of Corrections.3
On April 19, 2005, Mabansag and Delos Reyes were finally arraigned
and pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged in the Informations under
which their co-accused Lara and Licayan were previously indicted. We
quote the material portions of said Informations here:
Crim. Case No. 98-2605-MK
That on or about August 10, 1998 at around 1:45 a.m., the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one
another, armed with a handgun and with evident premeditation, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of force
and intimidation kidnap JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA MANA YSA
Y for the purpose of extorting ransom in the amount of P 10 million at
Goodies Pares Marni House located at Loyola cor. Constancia St.,
Sampaloc, Manila, owned and managed by the aforementioned victim
Co and thereafter took them with the use of Toyota Tamaraw FX
likewise owned by Co as getaway vehicle to a house in Daang Bakal,
Parang, Marikina and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court
where they were kept under detention against their will until they were
able to escape the following day at around 4:30 in the afternoon on
August 11, 1998.4
Crim. Case No. 98-2606-MK
That on or about August 10 and 11, 1998 at Daang Bakal, Parang,
Marikina City and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, armed with a handgun and with intent to gain,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, by means
of force and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take and divested (sic) JOSEPH TOMAS CO and LINDA
MANA YSA Y of the following personal properties after forcibly taking
them as hostages for ransom, to wit:
1. Wallet of Co containing his driver's license, original copy
of official receipt (OR), certificate of registration (CR) of his
two (2) L-300 vans;
2. Bank time deposit certificate at Metrobank, Valenzuela
Branch;
3. Casio G-Shock watch;
4. Necklace and earrings of Manaysay; and
5. ₱10,000.00 cash
to the damage and prejudice of said victims as owners
thereof against their will.5
Lara, Licayan, Mabansag and Delos Reyes had five other co-accused
in said Informations, namely Alex Placio, Jojo Sajorgo, Allan Placio,
Dodong Adolfo and Benjie Mabansag, all of whom remain at-large.
On November 15, 2005, Mabansag died while detained at the Marikina
City Jail. The trial against Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes proceeded.
On February 17, 2009, the RTC of Marikina City rendered its Decision
finding Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes guilty of the crime of
Kidnapping for Ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered
finding accused RODERICK LICA YAN, ROBERTO LARA and
ROGELIO 'NOEL' DELOS REYES in Criminal Case No. 98-2605-MK,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of KIDNAPPING FOR
RANSOM as defined and penalized under Article 267 of the Revised
Penal Code and hereby sentences them to reclusion perpetua and
each of them is also ordered to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral
damages to each of the complainants.
The period during which the herein accused were in detention during
the pendency of this case shall be credited to them in full provided that
they agree to abide by and comply with the rules of the City Jail of
Marikina.
However, in Criminal Case No. 98-2606-MK of the crime of ROBBERY,
for lack of sufficient evidence presented by the Prosecution to prove
the guilt of the said accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is
hereby rendered ACQUITTING them of the said offense charged in the
Information.
These two (2) cases against the other accused, ALEX PLACIO @
"Tata Pandak," JOJO SAJORGO, ALLAN PLACIO, DODONG
ADOLFO and BENJIE MABANSAG who remain at-large up to the
present are ordered archived and let an (sic) alias warrants of arrests
be issued.6
The RTC Decision was appealed to the Court of Appeals, which, on
July 4, 2012, affirmed the conviction of Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes
in toto.7 Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes filed a Notice of Appeal,8 thus
allowing this Court another hard look into the events surrounding the
captivity of Joseph Tomas Co and Linda Manaysay on August 10-11,
1998.
In this Court's February 17, 2004 Resolution granting accused-
appellants' Motion to Reopen the Case, we held that insofar as the
accused Lara and Licayan are concerned, the evidence already taken
shall stand, although additional evidence may be introduced to be
taken and considered with the evidence already in record. This Court
summarized said evidence in its August 15, 2001 Decision, thus:6
Complainant Joseph Tomas Co owns a restaurant called Goodies
Pares Marni House with branches in Valenzuela, Cubao, and
Sampaloc. Co's regular routine was for him and the other complainant,
Linda Manaysay, the restaurant's cashier and accounting officer, to
make the rounds of the three branches for inspection and collection of
left-over food and cash sales. The rounds would normally begin late in
the evening and last until early in the morning of the next day.
The prosecution evidence shows that on August 9, 1998, complainants
went to the Goodies Valenzuela branch where they stayed until
midnight. From there, they proceeded to the Cubao branch where they
stayed until about 12:45 a.m., August 10, 1998. Their last stop was at
the Sampaloc branch which they visited at 1:30 a.m.
While Co was at the Sampaloc branch, supervising the loading of left-
over food into the back of his Tamaraw FX. service vehicle, three men
approached him from behind. When Co saw the men, he asked what
they wanted. The men were armed with two caliber .45 pistols and a .
38 revolver. None of the men wore any mask.
Co told the men that if they wanted money, they could get it from the
store. The men refused to get money from the store. Without any
warning, one of the men's guns went off. When Manaysay heard the
shot, she came out and asked the men what they wanted. She· told
them that they could get money from the store, but they refused to do
so. Instead, complainants were made to board the rear of the Tamaraw
FX. Two of the men's companions were already seated in the front
seat. The man in the driver's seat asked Co for the key to the vehicle.
The three other men also boarded the vehicle with the complainants.
Co identified accused-appellant Roderick Licayan as one of his five
abductors.
Co said their hands were tied and their eyes taped, and that they were
made to wear caps over their heads as the vehicle reached Quezon
Avenue in Quezon City. After 45 minutes, Co said he felt the vehicle
stop. The rear door was opened and he heard the voices of people
approaching the vehicle.
Complainants were brought inside a room of a house made of light
materials and which had no ceiling. They were made to sit on the floor.
Then, they were transferred to another room where the covers of their
eyes were removed and their feet were tied. Manaysay testified that
she saw accused-appellants in the house after the masking tape was
removed from their eyes. Co's wallet which contained ₱5,000.00 in
cash and his watch and Manaysay's necklace and earrings were taken
from them. A person was left to guard them inside the room, whom
both complainants identified as accused-appellant Roberto Lara.
After about two hours, Manaysay told Co that she wanted to urinate.
Hence, Co asked their guard if Manaysay could go outside to do it. The
guard left and came back with a half-gallon container which he gave
Manaysay to urinate in.
Co tried talking to the guard 9 and pleaded with him to let them go. But
the guard replied that he was just following orders. Co offered him
some money which he had, but the guard did not accept the money
and instead threw it away.
[On August 11, 1998, at around 4:30 p.m., Licayan 10 who was guarding
them at that time] fell asleep and Co and Manaysay somehow
managed to escape without being noticed by the look-out outside their
room. After running for several meters, complainants took refuge in a
house. An old woman living in the house allowed them to use the
telephone from which Co was able to call the Marikina Police
Headquarters. The woman told them that they were in Kaolin St.,
Twinriver Subdivision, Parang, Marikina. Two police officers from the
Marikina police arrived, followed by a police SWAT team.
Complainants' case was later turned over to the Presidential Anti-
Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) for investigation.
On August 11, 1998, at around 6:30 p.m., members of the PAOCTF
raided the safehouse at Daang Bakal, Parang, Marikina where Co and
Manaysay had been held captive. A man seen running away was
arrested by SPO3 Ismael Fajardo Jr. Upon being questioned, the man
identified himself as accused-appellant Roberto Lara. SP03 Fajardo
identified accused-appellant Lara from photographs shown to him in
court as the man he arrested. Lara pointed to accused-appellant
Licayan as one of his companions and told the PAOCTF members that
Lara was hiding in his (Lara's) uncle's house at the back of the San
Mateo Rizal Municipal Hall. The P AOCTF members thereafter
proceeded to the house and were able to arrest accused-appellant
Licayan.
Lara and Licayan were thereafter brought to the PAOCTF
headquarters in Camp Crame where they were identified by Co and
Manaysay in a line-up consisting of Lara, Licayan, and eight PAOCTF
members.
Benjamin Co, complainant Joseph Tomas Co's brother, testified that
he was twice called in his office by unidentified persons who
demanded P 10 million for the release of complainants. The
kidnappers were of course frustrated as complainants were able to
escape.
Accused-appellants' defense is alibi. Accused-appellant Licayan
claimed that on August 11, 1998, at around 7:00 p.m., he was at home
in Sta. Cecilia Village, San Mateo Rizal, having dinner with Nicolas
Salvivia, a dump truck driver; that on the next day, August 12, 1998, he
was arrested by members of the PAOCTF while he was having drinks
with Salvivia and Salvivia's father at the latter's residence in Sta.
Cecilia Village; and that when he was arrested, he was not informed of
the charges against him. He said he only learned that he was arrested
for the kidnapping of complainants after he had been brought to Camp
Crame.
In Camp Crame, he and his co-accused were handcuffed and made to
stand in a police-line up. They were not assisted by counsel. The
complainants pointed to him and Lara as part of the group who
kidnapped complainants. Licayan claimed he only saw complainant Co
for the first time when he (Licayan) was brought to Camp Crame.
On the other hand, accused-appellant Lara, a construction worker,
testified that from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998, he was in
his place of work in Antipolo. At 7:00 a.m. of August 11, 1999, he went
home to Novaliches, stopping by the house of his uncle, Pedro
Mabansag, in Parang, Marikina. Mabansag had driven Lara's family
out of his house and Lara had gone there to get his child's belongings.
However, before he could do so, he was arrested by the Marikina
Police at Greenheights.
Lara wanted to ask his cousin Nicolas Salvivia for help. The police beat
him up and told him that they would go to Salvivia's house.
He was made to board a van where his head was covered with a
plastic bag and he was again beaten up. The police found Salvivia and
Licayan in Salvivia's house and ordered the two to drop to the ground.
The police poked a gun to Lara's head and told him to identify his
companions, otherwise he would be killed. Thus, according to Lara, he
pointed to Licayan.
Lara claimed that at Camp Crame, after he and Licayan were identified
by complainants in a police line-up, they were forced to sign a
statement. They were not informed of their right to remain silent and to
be assisted by counsel. Lara denied that Atty. Confesor B. Sansano,
who appeared to have assisted him in making his statement, actually
assisted him.11
In subsequent proceedings, the prosecution presented as rebuttal
witness Confessor Sansano, the lawyer whom Lara had claimed did
not really assist him. Sansano testified that as IBP governor and
chairman, he gave free legal assistance to all persons who could not
afford the services of a lawyer. On August 12, 1998, Police Chief
Inspector Trampe brought Lara to Sansano's office at the Justice Hall
of Quezon City. Sansano required the police agents to step out of the
room when he personally interviewed Lara for 10 minutes. He apprised
Lara of his constitutional rights. He was assured that Lara will tell the
truth, and that La1:"a was not harmed. He even examined the upper
torso of Lara and found no signs of maltreatment. He was present
throughout the investigation held in his office, until Lara affixed his
signature in the sworn statement. On cross-examination, Sansano
admitted that he cannot remember the number of persons brought to
him by Trampe for legal assistance. He testified that he warned Lara
about the implication of the statement that he will give to the police.12
During the second trial, Prosecutor Nestor Gapuzan stated that the
prosecution is adopting the direct testimony given by the prosecution
witnesses during the first trial. Co, however, was recalled for additional
direct examination on the alleged participation of Delos Reyes.
Joseph Tomas Co testified that Delos Reyes was one of the five men
who abducted him and Manaysay. Delos Reyes was the person who
sat at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX at the back of the driver,
while Co and Manaysay were forced to sit in the rear portion of the
Tamaraw FX with two of their abductors, who later tied their hands. Co
identified Delos Reyes in court. He was not sure whether Licayan was
one of the five men who abducted them. Delos Reyes, while seated at
the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX, faced Co and demanded from
him with a forceful voice, "Nasaan ang susi?" and "Akina ang susi." He
did not notice any hint of Manilefio or regional accent in the voice of
Delos Reyes and was not aware of said accents. He did not
immediately give the key to Delos Reyes, but the latter repeated "Akina
ang susi." The man beside him pointed a gun at him, so he gave the
key to Delos Reyes, who then handed the key to the man seated at the
driver's seat.13
During the time Co and Manaysay were detained in the safehouse, Co
identified Licayan and Lara on different occasions but was not able to
see Delos Reyes.14 He reiterated that he tried to bribe Lara to get the
remaining money inside his pocket but Lara said that he could not do it
because he will be killed. Co explained that he did not identify Licayan
and Lara by their feet. Even before he pointed to their feet, he had
already identified them by their faces which he was positive about and
he was just even more assured of their identities when he saw their
feet.15The defense presented Radio Veritas reporter Corazon Zony
Esguerra, New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, Lara's
co-worker Abelardo Ramirez, Lara's employer Florencia Lavarro
Salvador, and accused-appellant Delos Reyes. Licayan was likewise
recalled to the witness stand.
Radio Veritas reporter Zony Esguerra testified that she was able to
interview Mabansag at the airport after he was arrested. Mabansag
told her that his nephew, Lara, had nothing to do with the incident.
Esguerra also interviewed Delos Reyes at the PACER Office in Camp
Crame around two hours after he arrived from the airport. Delos Reyes
told her that "talaga wala akong kasalanan pinilit lang nila akong
tagabantay sa victim." According to Delos Reyes, the real culprits are
"Tata Placio and Allan Placio."16
New Bilibid Prison Chaplain Msgr. Roberto Olaguer, knowing that
Licayan and Lara were scheduled for execution in January 2004, told
them before Christmas in December 2003 that he will personally attend
to their case more intensely. When he learned from .Lara that his
relatives did not know the schedule of his execution, he told Lara that
he will personally inform his parents. On January 6, 2004, Lara finally
gave Msgr. Olaguer the address of his parents, but warned him about
his uncle Pedro Mabansag: there was a warrant for the arrest of
Mabansag at the Marikina Police Station. It occurred to Msgr. Olaguer
that if Mabansag would be arrested, the execution of Lara and Licayan
may be postponed. He immediately called Mayor Marides Fernando of
Marikina City and told her about the possibility of helping him get a
copy of the warrant. He was able to secure a copy of the warrant at
around 8:00 p.m. of January 7, 2004. He called the station manager of
Radio Veritas, who told him to go to the station as he will contact the
chief of the PAO. He asked PAO Chief Atty. Acosta if there is a
possibility that the lives of Lara and Licayan would be saved if
Mabansag is arrested, and she told him about the possibility of
reopening the case and suspending the execution.17
Before going to Bacolod, he told Lara about having secured the
warrant. Lara warned him that even though his uncle "Putol"
(Mabansag) had both arms a,mputated, he can still drive a car, fire a
shotgun, and ride a horse. He relayed this warning to Col. A venido,.
who organized two to three teams to arrest Mabansag.18
In Bacolod on January 8, 2004, Msgr. Olaguer, Col Avenido and his
group of around 20 men went to the house of Lara's mother, and told
her that her son will be executed on January 30, 2004. He invited her
to go to Manila and offered to shoulder her travel costs. She told him
that BOMBO Radyo and ABS-CBN already offered to pay for her
expenses. During this time, the police were searching the area and
conducting interviews. The police told him that they have to go to a
certain sugar plantation to look for Mabansag. They arrived at the
sugar plantation at 2:00 p.m. The people at the plantation, however,
were not cooperative and appeared to be afraid of Mabansag, except
for a little child who gave them a lead. Msgr. Olaguer was regularly
updated as regards the search for Mabansag. At around 2:00 a.m. the
following day, January 9, 2004, CoL Inocentes Capuno called him and
said that they were able to apprehend Mabansag.19
On August 21, 1998, Ramirez secured a certification from their
employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador to prove that during the
kidnapping, Lara was with him. He placed the certification in a small
brown envelope and kept it for five years. He retrieved the certification
in 2003 when he saw on television that Lara will be executed.26
Florencia Lavarro Salvador testified that Ramirez, whom she calls
"Mang Bado," recommended Lara to work in the construction of her
house. On August 9, 1998, she supervised the work of Ramirez and
Lara, who both arrived at 7:00 a.m. and worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00
p.m. On August 10, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived at 7:30 a.m.,
worked from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., and left at around 5:30 p.m. On
August 11, 1998, Ramirez and Lara arrived past 8:00 a.m., worked
until 5:00 p.m., and left at around 6:00 p.m.
On August 12, 1998, Ramirez told her that Lara was arrested, and
requested for a certification to prove the whereabouts of Lara during
the kidnapping incident. Salvador executed such certification.27
PAO lawyer Howard Areza testified that he assisted in the execution of
the Sinumpaang Salaysay of Delos Reyes and Mabansag. The latter
was already deceased at the time of Atty. Areza's testimony. Since
Mabansag had no arms, he stamped his right toe on the document.28

Atty. Areza confirmed Mabansag's answers in Questions 17 and 18 of

At the police station, Msgr. Olaguer introduced himself to Mabansag.
the Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he narrated that a TV reporter
They were allowed to talk in private, wherein Msgr. Olaguer told
interviewed him upon arrival at the airport in Manila. He said in the
Mabansag that his nephew, Lara, will be executed by lethal injection on
interview that Lara is not liable ("walang kasalanan") because Lara was
January 30, 2004. Mabansag cried and said many things in Ilonggo.
working in a construction in Cavite and Antipolo. Atty. Areza also
Msgr. Olaguer asked his companion to translate what Mabansag was
confirmed Mabansag's answers in Question 30 and 31 wherein he
saying. He understood Mabansag saying "inosente man si Tungkoy,"
stated that he drove away (''pinalayas") Joy, Lara's wife, from Daang
referring to Lara. When he informed Mabansag about Licayan,
Bakal one week before August 10, 1998. Mabansag did not know
Mabansag was so surprised and told him that he had not seen Licayan
whether Joy and Lara lived in Novaliches after he drove Joy away.29
for a long time. Mabansag said that he knew that he was one of the
accused in the case, but he was innocent. Mabansag denied that the
house where the kidnap victims were brought was his, but clarified that Atty. Areza likewise confirmed Delos Reyes's answers in Questions 36
it was his daughter's house. The kidnappers offered money if he could and 37 of the Sinumpaang Salaysay wherein he stated that, on August
lend the house to them. He accepted because he needed money at 10, 1998, he saw Mabansag in the safehouse. According to a certain
that time. Mabansag told him that he somehow participated in the Tata Alex Placio, Mabansag was the financier of the operation as he
safekeeping of the victims.20 was the owner of the house. Atty. Areza also confirmed the answers of
Delos Reyes in Questions 15, 16, 18 and 20 that Delos Reyes was
interviewed by reporter Zony Esguerra when he was in the PACER
Upon their arrival in the airport in Manila, they were brought to the VIP
Office. He stated in said interview that Lara is not liable ("walang
room. When Mabansag was interviewed by reporter Gus Abelgas,
kasalanan"). Delos Reyes also stated that he guarded the victims and
Msgr. Olaguer was surprised to hear Mabansag say that he did not
did not report the matter to the police because of his fear of Tata Alex
know anything about the kidnapping. Mabansag also said that he was
Placio, Allan Placio, Jojo Sajorgo and Benjie. 30 Recalled to the witness
being threatened by the police and the media people in Bacolod by
stand, Roderick Licayan testified that, in the police line-up, he was at
telling him "lkaw ang ipapalit kay Roberto Lara."21
first identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Co did not
mention any specific identifying mark on their feet. Licayan heard Co
On cross-examination, Msgr. Olaguer testified that Lara told him say that whenever anybody enters the room in the safehouse, he looks
exactly "Kung pupunta po kayo sa Nanay ko, mag-ingat po kayo sa at their feet. Licayan cannot recall how many of his companions in the
tiyo ko. Yung uncle ko, putol po ang dalawang kamay niyan pero kaya line-up were wearing shoes and how many were wearing slippers.
pa na bumaril." Lara further told him that Mabansag was one of the Licayan testified that a police officer in civilian clothes instructed Co to
masterminds in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay. Msgr. Olaguer point to his face. It took a few minutes before the victims pointed to
observed that the people at the sugar plantation in Bacolod seemed to their faces. Co identified him and Lara from among several persons
be afraid of Mabansag as they told him that Mabansag had a close (more than five; not sure if 10) who were in the line-up.31
connection with the rebels who were somehow controlling the sugar
plantation.22 Abelardo Ramirez testified that he had known Lara for five
At the time he and Lara were arrested, Licayan already knew Delos
years since 1995 because they were neighbors at Daang Bakal,
Reyes because the latter was his townmate. . Delos Reyes was not in
Bagong Silang, Parang, Marikina. Lara's house was two houses away
the police line-up.32
from his. Everytime he gets a job, he gets Lara as his co-worker. Lara
worked as a ''piyon," who mixes cement.23
Accused-appellant Rogelio "Noel" delos Reyes was arrested on
January 12, 2004 in Barangay Bayang Marihatag, Surigao del Sur, and
On August 10, 1998, he was in his house in Daang Bakal at 6:00 a.m.,
was taken to Camp Crame where he was detained. Delos Reyes
waiting for Lara. At 7:00 a.m., Lara arrived. They took two jeepney
confirmed the radio interview he had with Zony Esguerra, and that he
rides to their place of work in Antipolo where they were constructing a
said therein that he was forced to guard the victims (''pinilit na
residential house. They arrived at the construction site at 8:00 a.m. and
magbantay") by Tata Placio, which the latter did by pointing a gun at
worked there until 5 :00 p.m. They parted ways on Kaolin Street
him.33
because Lara said he would go to his grandparent's house in
Novaliches. Ramirez arrived home at 6:30 p.m.24
Delos Reyes testified that on August 10, 1998, he went to the house of
Mabansag to accompany a friend who wanted to buy a fighting cock.
On August 11, 1998, Lara arrived at Ramirez's house past 8:00 a.m.
He had previously met Mabansag at the "manukan" sometime that
They proceeded to the same construction site where they worked until
same year, 1998. Delos Reyes stated that he met Tata and Alex for the
5 :00 p.m. They left the site at 6:00 p.m. and they parted ways at
first time in Mabansag's house. The sale of the two fighting cocks was
Kaolin.25
done outside Mabansag's house but, with Mabansag's permission, he
entered said house to drink water. Inside the house, Tata and Jojo
pointed a gun at him. He then saw a man and a woman seated near
the kitchen. The couple saw him through the curtain. Mabansag told
him, "Noel, magmadali ka lumabas, may mangungupahan na mag-
asawa." Tata, however, said "Dito ka Zang, huwag kang aalis." Delos
Reyes answered that he will leave and that he does not want to stay
any longer.34
The court noted at this point of Delos Reyes's testimony that he
mentioned Tata as if he knew him prior to the time he entered the
house. Delos Reyes then admitted that he already knew Tata and Jojo
two months before the incident and that his earlier statement that he
did not know Tata and Jojo when he entered the house was not true.35
Delos Reyes did not ask Tata and Jojo why they were pointing a gun at
him.36 He saw the hands of the woman were tied, and suspected that
Tata and Jojo were engaged in bad activities. He stayed in the place
from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. He did not help the victims because he was
afraid that Allan, Jojo, Tata and Benjie might shoot him. After leaving
the place, he stayed in the house of his godmother, Emelita Alcober, in
Concepcion for two weeks.37
Delos Reyes knows both Licayan and Lara. He visited Lara in his
residence every Sunday. Licayan was his neighbor in the province.
Delos Reyes affirmed his statement in the Sinumpaang Salaysay that
Licayan and Lara were not liable ("walang kasalanan"). Lara was not in
the safehouse, while Licayan just happened to pass by. When Delos
Reyes entered Mabansag's house, Mabansag told him that there were
kidnap victims inside.38
During cross-examination, Delos Reyes stated that the friend he
accompanied to buy fighting cocks was named Luisito. He did not
know Luisito' s surname because he had known him for only two
weeks. He had known Tata for around two months because Tata
accompanied Mabansag when the latter went to Delos Reyes' s
residence three times to bring fighting cocks to sell. Delos Reyes
learned from a neighbor about Mabansag's trade of selling fighting
cocks. Mabansag usually brings the fighting cocks to Delos Reyes, at
the latter's godmother's house. Delos Reyes did not know why this
changed on August 10, 1998, when. Mabansag told him to get the
fighting cocks at the latter's house. When Delos Reyes entered the
safehouse, his companion, Luisito, had already left to drive a tricycle;
Delos Reyes will just give Luisito the fighting cocks they bought at a
later time. Answering a query from the court, Delos Reyes affirmed that
after he and Luisito arrived. at the place, Luisito immediately left.39
Delos Reyes asked permission from Benjie Mabansag to go inside the
house. He did not ask permission from Pedro Mabansag to go inside
the house since he had already gone to the place four times. 40 When
asked by the court for clarification, Delos Reyes said he did not ask for
permission from Benjie.41 He asked Tata why he was pointing a gun at
him, to which Tata replied that he should stay and that Tata will kill him
if he reports the matter to the police.42When Delos Reyes went near
the kitchen, he saw a man and a woman. He noticed that the woman's
hands were tied, but it did not occur to him that their captivity was the
matter that Tata warned him not to tell the police. Delos Reyes did not
consider it unusual to see a woman's hands tied. 43 Despite what was
happening, he stayed in the house for one hour and merely sat on the
floor near the door where the man and the woman were kept. He was
also allowed to leave after one hour. He did not notice the persons
inside the room except for the man and the woman. Even after Tata
pointed a gun at him and he saw a woman tied, it did not occur to him
after he left the place that something was wrong.44
In the appeal now before the Court, accused-appellant Delos Reyes
reiterates his defense that the exempting circumstance of
uncontrollable fear was present in his case while accused-appellants
Licayan and Lara seek to overturn their conviction on the basis of the
newly discovered evidence presented during their retrial.
Whether or not the exempting
circumstance of uncontrollable fear
should be considered in favor of
Delos Reyes
Delos Reyes, who was still at-large during the first trial, was found
guilty at the conclusion of the retrial. The trial court held:
With respect to accused DELOS REYES, he did not refute the
testimony of MR. CO that he was one (1) of his abductors who [was]
seated at the middle portion of the Tamaraw FX and who demanded
from him the key of said vehicle. Instead he admitted going to the
house of Pedro Mabansag on August 10, 1998 accompanying a friend
who would buy a fighting cock. According to DELOS REYES, after he
asked permission from Pedro Mabansag, he entered his house to drink
water, but he was met by a certain "TATA" and "JOJO" and they
pointed a gun at him and he was told not to leave. He claimed that
Tata Placio and his companion after poking a gun at him threatened
him that they would kill him if he reports the matter to the police. He
admitted that he saw two (2) persons inside the house near the kitchen
and the woman was hand tied. After he arrived at the said safehouse
at 3 :00 p.m., of August 10, 1998, he was allowed to leave at 4:00 p.m.,
of said date. And after he left the safehouse, he admitted that he feels
not anymore being threatened by the group of Tata Placio, but still he
did not report what he witnessed in the house of Pedro Mabansag to
the police authorities. Said accused also claimed that when "TAT A"
and "JOJO" poked a gun at him and was told not to leave and not to
report to the police, he acted under the "compulsion of an irresistible
force, hence, one of the exempting circumstances under Article 12,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code. The Court begs to disagree.
DELOS REYES testified that even before August 10, 1998, he knows
already TATA and JOJO because they went to the house of his Ninang
together with Pedro Mabansag for three (3) times. Since they all know
each other, then the court cannot comprehend why TATA and JOJO
still need to poke a gun at DELOS REYES and threatened him. This is
only a last ditch effort of said accused to deny any participation in the
conspiracy in kidnapping the two (2) victims. As could clearly be
gleaned from the testimony, DELOS REYES made inconsistent and
improbable statements. The Court also observed the demeanor of said
accused when he testified and he is obviously lying [through] his teeth.
Manifest falsehood and discrepancies in the witnesses' testimony
seriously impair their probative value and cast serious doubts on their
credibility.45
The Court of Appeals affirmed these findings, adding that the testimony
of Delos Reyes was self-serving and could not stand on its own to
prove the elements of the exempting circumstance relied
upon.46 Before this Court, Delos Reyes again pursues that he is
exempt from criminal liability based on Article 12 of the Revised Penal
Code, which provides:
Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. -The
following are exempt from criminal liability:
xxxx
5. A.ny person who act under the compulsion of irresistible force.
Delos Reyes claims exemption from criminal liability under Article 12,
paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code, because he allegedly acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force, specifically the fact that a
co-accused, who is still at-large up to this date, pointed a gun at him.
Delos Reyes has been invoking practically the same defense even
before the trial: in his Radio Veritas interview by reporter Zony
Esguerra, he insisted that "wala akong kasalanan" and that he was
merely forced to guard the victims.47
In People v. Dansal,48 this Court held that a person invoking the
exempting circumstance of compulsion due to irresistible force admits
in effect the commission of a punishable act, and must therefore prove
the exempting circumstance by clear and convincing evidence.
Specifically: He must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a
mere instrument that acted not only without will but also against his
will. The compulsion must be of such character as . to leave the
accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and
impending; and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-
grounded apprehension of death or serious bodily harm if the act is not
done. A threat of future injury is not enough. A speculative, fanciful or
remote fear, even fear of future injury, is insufficient.49
The appellate court did not err when it relied on the doctrine that the
matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge, who had the
unmatched opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their
credibility by the various indicia available but not reflected on the
record. It is the trial judge that can capture the truth from the "forthright
answer or the hesitant pause, the quivering voice or the angry tone, the
flustered look or the sincere gaze, the modest blush or the guilty
blanch."50 In the case at bar, the trial court even expressly stated that it
observed the demeanor of Delos Reyes when he testified and found
that he is obviously lying through his teeth.51 This is in contrast to the
testimony of Co which the trial court described as very clear, positive
and straightforward.52 Even without the advantage of being able to
observe the demeanor of Delos Reyes, however, a mere examination
of the transcript of his testimony convinces us of the hesitation and
untruthfulness of his testimony. Delos Reyes kept on changing details
and correcting himself even without inducement from opposing
counsel. The content of the testimony was itself incredible. This Court
finds it hard to believe that a person who accidentally discovers kidnap
victims would be held at gunpoint by the kidnappers to guard said
victims; or that a mastermind of a kidnapping syndicate, instead of
conducting his fighting cock selling activities in the regular meeting
place, would invite a recent affiliate to the place where he is holding
prisoners; or that Delos Reyes did not find it unusual to see a woman
with her hands tied.
In all, we find no reason to doubt that Delos Reyes was part of the plan
to abduct and detain Co and Manaysay.
Whether or not Licayan and Lara
should be acquitted based on
purportedly newly discovered
evidence
The pro hac vice resolution of this Court on January 15, 2004 allows
this Court an unusual, though not unprecedented, 53 task to revisit our
own final and executory Decision. It should be stressed that a new trial
based on newly discovered evidence may only be granted by the court
on motion of the accused, or motu proprio with the consent of the
accused "(a)t any time before a judgment of conviction becomes
final.54 Furthermore, the affidavits of Mabansag and Delos Reyes
cannot be considered newly discovered in that the affiants are the
movants' co-accused who were already identified as such during the
trial.55 Nevertheless, the Court, alluding to its power to suspend its own
rules or to except a particular case from its operations whenever the
purposes of justice require it,56and noting the support of the Office of
the Solicitor General to Licayan and Lara's motion, voted 8-6 to order
the suspension of the Rules of Court itself and remand the case to the
trial court for further reception of evidence.57
On June 24, 2006, more than two years after the pro hac vice
Resolution of this Court, Republic Act No. 934658 was approved,
irrevocably sparing Licayan and Lara from the severest and most
permanent of penalties. In the meantime, both the R TC and the Court
of Appeals were unmoved by the new evidence presented for the
accused-appellants. Thus, for the second time, Licayan and Lara were
convicted by the trial court and their appeals denied by the Court of
Appeals.
To put things in perspective, the pro hac vice Resolution expressly
granted the effects of Rule 121, Section 6(b} of the Rules of Court,
which provides:
SEC. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. – The effects
of granting a new trial or reconsideration are the following:
xxxx
(b) when a new trial is granted on the ground of newly-discovered
evidence, the evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-
discovered and such other evidence as the court may, in .the interest
of justice, allow to be introduced shall be taken and considered
together with
the evidence already in the record.
In general, the "new" evidence adduced in the second trial consists in
(1) allegations that the identification of Licayan and Lara by Co and
Manaysay was unreliable; (2) testimonies and affidavits of the recently
apprehended Mabansag and Delos Reyes, both of whom allege that
Licayan and Lara were not involved in the crime; and (3) testimonies
purporting to establish that Lara was at work in Antipolo during the
kidnapping incident.
While the second trial was meant to give Licayan and Lara the
opportunity to present newly-discovered evidence that were not
available during the first trial, the focus of their defense was to show
that the identification made by the victims was unreliable. Licayan was
recalled to the witness stand to testify that in the police line-up, he was
identified by Co by pointing at his and Lara's feet. Licayan emphasizes
that Co did not mention any specific identifying mark on their feet, and
that he heard Co say that whenever anybody enters the room in the
safehouse, he looks at their feet. Likewise, when Co was recalled to
the witness stand to testify as regards the participation of Delos Reyes
in the crime, the cross-examination concentrated on trying to establish
that Co was not certain about the identity of Licayan and Lara. This
Court observes that the defense was not successful in doing so as
borne out by the following portions of the transcript:
ATTY AREZA
Q But the reason why you were pointing to the feet of the accused was
to assure yourself about the footwear they were wearing, that was the
reason you were pointing to their feet and not to their faces?
A I was positive with their faces, sir. The feet I was more assured of
their identities when I saw their feet.
COURT
Q You already identified them through their faces?
A Yes, your honor.
Q You told the investigator?
A Yes, your honor.
Q As a support to their identification you pointed to their feet?
A Can I say something Your Honor. On the second day, there was a
time that they would come and enter the room with their faces covered,
but there are times that they would forget to cover their faces so I was
able to identify them, that is the reason why I took an extra effort in
remembering their feet and what they were wearing. Your Honor.
ATTY AREZA:
Q What you are trying to say is that you are 100% sure of their
identities and you were more assured by looking at their feet?
PROSECUTOR GAPUZAN:
Misleading. There was no testimony that the witness ...
COURT
Witness may answer.
A I am sure with their faces. I was able to talk to them face to face, sir.
I was more assured when I saw their feet, sir.59
Even though Co was able to positively identify Licayan and Lara
through their faces, prudence requires that he at least check on the
other details from his captivity to identify his abductors. His certainty is
not negated by his meticulosity.
The defense brings up several instances of supposed inconsistencies
in Co's testimony, apparently to prove that Co's memory was
unreliable: (1) that Co was uncertain as to whether or not Licayan was
among the armed men who abducted them; (2) that Co was
inconsistent as to who asked for the keys to his Tamaraw FX, which
was used to transport them; (3) that Co inaccurately described in his
affidavit what Mabansag looks like and omitted that he was a double
arm amputee; ( 4) that Co saw a family picture of Lara in the safehouse
which might have been the basis of his identification of Lara; and (5)
that Co corrected himself about whether there was light in the room
where he and Manaysay were held captive.
We have, on numerous occasions, held that discrepancies in
testimonies concerning minor details and not actually touching upon
the central fact of the crime do not impair their credibility. Instead of
weakening the testimonies, these inconsistencies tend to strengthen
their credibility, because they discount the possibility of their being
rehearsed.60
While Co may have been uncertain as to whether Licayan was among
the armed men who abducted him and Manaysay, he nevertheless
positively identified Licayan as the person with medium built, fair
complexion and thin hairline whom he talked with regarding the
ransom, and who fell asleep in the afternoon of August 11, 1998,
allowing them to escape.61 Manaysay also identified Licayan as one of
the persons she saw upon arriving at the safehouse,62 as the person
who removed the masking tape from her eyes,63 and the person
guarding them who fell asleep, allowing them to escape.64
Co and Manaysay had no reason to lie. We find it hard to believe that
Co and Manaysay, the victims of a heinous crime, would use the
picture of Lara at the safehouse and make up the following statements
just to pin an innocent person for an offense he did not commit. Co
identified Lara as the short, tiny black man who guarded them shortly
after they arrived at the safehouse and brought the plastic container for
Manaysay,65 the guard with whom he tried to plead with for their lives
but who told them that he was just following orders, and refused the
money that Manaysay managed to keep to herself during their
captivity.66 Manaysay identified Lara as one of the persons she saw
upon arriving at the safehouse,67 and as the one who guarded them
shortly after they arrived at the safehouse, who gave her a plastic
container, and with whom Co pleaded with to help them escape.68
It bears to stress that both Co and Manaysay had several opportunities
to see the faces of Lara and Licayan.1avvphi1 Co and Manaysay each
identified Lara and Licayan in both the police line-up and the trial
proper in open court. In the line-up, they were chosen from a group of
10 persons, the other members of which have appearances that do not
offer any clue that differentiate them from Lara and Licayan.69
As regards Co's allegedly faulty identification of Mabansag in his
affidavit,70 wherein he described Mabansag as "matangkad at medyo
matanda na ang tawag nila ay Putol"71 it was clear that Co was merely
being asked to describe in general the persons he saw during his
captivity: "Doon sa bahay na sinabi mong pinagdalhan sa inyo
mayroon ka bang napansin na ibang tao doon maliban sa limang tao
na tumangay sa inyo?"72 We examined Mabansag's picture in the
records73 and observe that even in said picture, Mabansag's allegedly
short stature and his being an amputee was not immediately apparent
because of what appears to be a jacket he was wearing. If he was
wearing similar clothes at the time Co saw him, it is very possible that
he simply did not notice Mabansag's handicap.
The new evidence alluded to by this Court in its pro hac vice resolution
to grant a new trial was supposed to be the testimonies of the then
recently captured Mabansag and Delos Reyes, who both denied that
Licayan and Lara participated in the crime. The statements of
Mabansag and Delos Reyes, however, would have been given more
weight had they personally admitted their own involvement in the
crime. As testified by Msgr. Olaguer, witness for the defense,
Mabansag stated in his interview with Gus Abelgas that he (Mabansag)
does not know anything about the kidnapping. 74 We cannot give weight
to his denial that Licayan and Lara participated in the crime if he,
himself, claims that he does not know anything about the kidnapping.
On the other hand, Delos Reyes swears that he was merely forced at
gunpoint to guard the victims, and was at the scene of the crime only
from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of August 10, 1998. 75 Delos Reyes claims
that Lara was not in the safehouse, while Licayan just happened to
pass by.76 Co and Manaysay, however, placed Lara at the scene of the
crime in the early morning of August 10, 1998, 77making the testimony
as regards his absence from 3:00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. of same day
irrelevant. Licayan, on the other hand, denies having been in the
safehouse on August 10 and 11, 1999, and claims that he was at home
in San Mateo, Rizal.78 The testimony of Delos Reyes that Licayan
passed by the safehouse sometime from 3 :00 p.m. to 4:00 p.m. was
therefore even unintentionally inculpating as to Licayan.
Finally, with respect to Lara's witnesses, namely co-worker Abelardo
Ramirez and employer Florencia Lavarro Salvador, their combined
testimonies account for Lara's whereabouts during the following dates
and times:
August 9, 1998 (Sunday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 10, 1998 (Monday)-from 7:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.
August 11, 1998 (Tuesday)-from 8:00 a.m. to 6:00 p.m.
Co79 and Manaysay,80 however, testified that Lara was at the scene of
the crime during the early morning of August 10, 1998, which was
shortly after they were abducted at 1 :30 a.m. of the same day. We
have repeatedly held that for alibi to prosper, it is not enough to prove
that the accused was somewhere else when the crime was committed;
he must also demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its
commission.81 Ramirez's house, where he was fetched by Lara at 7:00
a.m. on August 10, 1998 is at Daang Bakal, Bagong Silang, Parang,
Marikina - the very same area where the safehouse was located. It was
certainly not physically impossible for Lara to have been at the scene
of the crime at around 2:00 a.m. of August 10, 1998 and still be able to
arrive. at Ramirez's house within the same vicinity at 7:00 a.m.
Furthermore, on both August 10 and 11, Ramirez testified that he and
Lara parted ways on Kaolin Street, which was the very same street Co
and Manaysay ran to when they escaped from the safehouse.82
In sum, the new evidence presented by Licayan and Lara not only
failed to prove that either of them was in another place during their
alleged participation in the kidnapping of Co and Manaysay, but
likewise failed to discredit the positive identification made by both Co
and Manaysay.
Criminal and Civil Liability for
Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara
The guilt of Delos Reyes, Licayan and Lara for the crime of Kidnapping
for Ransom, having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, would
have warranted the imposition of the death penalty under Article 267 of
the Revised Penal Code. With the passage, however, of Republic Act
No. 9346, the imposition of the death penalty has been prohibited. The
RTC thus correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on Delos
Reyes, Licayan and Lara.
Nevertheless, we have to modify the amount of damages to be
awarded to conform to recent jurisprudence. In the similar case of
People v. Gambao83 for Kidnapping for Ransom, the Court set the
minimum indemnity and damages where facts warranted the imposition
of the death penalty if not for prohibition thereof by Republic Act No.
9346, to wit: (1) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; (2) ₱100,000.00 as
moral damages which the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus
needs no proof; and (3) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good.

Licayan, Lara and Delos Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these
amounts awarded in favor of each of the victims. These amounts shall
accrue interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the date
of the finality of the Court's Resolution until fully paid.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-

H.C. No. 03797 dated July 4, 2012, which affirmed in toto the
disposition of the Regional Trial Court of Marikina in Criminal Case No.
98-2605-MK and 98-2606-MK dated February 17, 2009, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) Roderick Licayan, Roberto Lara and Rogelio Delos

Reyes are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. They are also ordered to jointly and
severally indemnify each of the victims in the following
amounts:

(a) ₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity;

(b) ₱100,000.00 as moral damages; and

(c) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages,

(2) All of these amounts shall earn interest at the rate of six
percent (6%) per annum from the date of the finality of the
Court's Resolution until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.