Professional Documents
Culture Documents
6. Lot No. 1184 and the remaining portion One of the properties mentioned in the project of
of Lot No. 3416 after taking the portions partition was Lot 1184 or rather one-half thereof
awarded under item (2) and (4) above shall with an area of 15,162.5 sq. meters. This lot, which
be awarded to Luz Reyes Bakunawa, according to the decision was the exclusive
Anacorita Reyes, Ruperto Reyes, Adela property of the deceased Francisco Reyes, was
Reyes and Priscilla Reyes in equal shares, adjudicated in said project of partition to the
provided, however that the remaining plaintiffs Luz, Anacorita Ruperto, Adela, and
portion of Lot No. 3416 shall belong Priscilla all surnamed Reyes in equal shares, and
exclusively to Priscilla Reyes. when the project of partition was approved by the
trial court the adjudicatees caused Lot 1184 to be
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed subdivided into five lots denominated as Lot 1184-
that the Project of Partition indicated A to 1184-E inclusive (Exh. V).
above which is made in accordance with
the decision of the Honorable Court be Lot 1184-D was conveyed to Enriqueta D. Anota, a
approved. stenographer in Judge Asuncion's court (Exhs. F,
F-1 and V-1), while Lot 1184-E which had an area
Tacloban City, October 16, 1963. of 2,172.5556 sq. meters was sold on July 31, 1964
to Dr. Arcadio Galapon (Exh. 2) who was issued
transfer certificate of title No. 2338 of the Register
(SGD) BONIFACIO RAMO Atty. for the of Deeds of the city of Tacloban (Exh. 12).
Defendant Tacloban City
On March 6, 1965, Dr. Arcadio Galapon and his
(SGD) ZOTICO A. TOLETE Atty. for the wife Sold a portion of Lot 1184-E with an area of
Plaintiff Tacloban City around 1,306 sq. meters to Judge Asuncion and his
wife, Victoria S. Asuncion (Exh. 11), which
While the Court thought it more desirable particular portion was declared by the latter for
for all the parties to have signed this taxation purposes (Exh. F).
Project of Partition, nevertheless, upon
assurance of both counsels of the On August 31, 1966, spouses Asuncion and
respective parties to this Court that the spouses Galapon conveyed their respective shares
Project of Partition, as above- quoted, had and interest in Lot 1184-E to "The Traders
been made after a conference and Manufacturing and Fishing Industries Inc." (Exit
agreement of the plaintiffs and the 15 & 16). At the time of said sale the stockholders
defendant approving the above Project of of the corporation were Dominador Arigpa Tan,
Humilia Jalandoni Tan, Jaime Arigpa Tan, Judge On November 2, 1970, Judge Jose D. Nepomuceno of the Court of First
Asuncion, and the latter's wife, Victoria S. Instance of Leyte, who was directed and authorized on June 2, 1969 by
Asuncion, with Judge Asuncion as the President the then Secretary (now Minister) of Justice and now Minister of
and Mrs. Asuncion as the secretary (Exhs. E-4 to E- National Defense Juan Ponce Enrile to hear and decide Civil Case No.
7). The Articles of Incorporation of "The Traders 4234, rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc." which follows:
we shall henceforth refer to as "TRADERS" were
registered with the Securities and Exchange
A. IN THE CASE AGAINST JUDGE ELIAS B.
Commission only on January 9, 1967 (Exh. E) [pp.
ASUNCION
378-385, rec.].
Respondent Judge Asuncion filed on September 24, 1968 his answer to (b) the sum of TWO
which a reply was filed on October 16, 1968 by herein complainant. In HUNDRED THOUSAND
Our resolution of October 28, 1968, We referred this case to then Justice PESOS [P200,000.001 for
Cecilia Muñoz Palma of the Court of Appeals, for investigation, report exemplary damages;
and recommendation. After hearing, the said Investigating Justice
submitted her report dated May 27, 1971 recommending that (c) the sum of FIFTY
respondent Judge should be reprimanded or warned in connection THOUSAND PESOS
with the first cause of action alleged in the complaint, and for the [P50,000.00] for nominal
second cause of action, respondent should be warned in case of a damages; and
finding that he is prohibited under the law to engage in business. On
the third and fourth causes of action, Justice Palma recommended that
respondent Judge be exonerated. (d) he sum of TEN
THOUSAND PESOS
[PI0,000.00] for Attorney's
The records also reveal that on or about November 9 or 11, 1968 (pp. Fees.
481, 477, rec.), complainant herein instituted an action before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte, entitled "Bernardita R. Macariola, plaintiff,
versus Sinforosa R. Bales, et al., defendants," which was docketed as Civil B. IN THE CASE AGAINST
Case No. 4235, seeking the annulment of the project of partition made THE DEFENDANT
pursuant to the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and the two orders MARIQUITA VILLASIN, FOR
issued by respondent Judge approving the same, as well as the HERSELF AND FOR THE
partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances with damages. HEIRS OF THE DECEASED
It appears, however, that some defendants were dropped from the civil GERARDO VILLASIN —
case. For one, the case against Dr. Arcadio Galapon was dismissed
because he was no longer a real party in interest when Civil Case No. (1) Dismissing the complaint against the
4234 was filed, having already conveyed on March 6, 1965 a portion of defendants Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of the
lot 1184-E to respondent Judge and on August 31, 1966 the remainder deceased Gerardo Villasin;
was sold to the Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc.
Similarly, the case against defendant Victoria Asuncion was dismissed
on the ground that she was no longer a real party in interest at the time (2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendants
the aforesaid Civil Case No. 4234 was filed as the portion of Lot 1184 Mariquita Villasin and the heirs of Gerardo
acquired by her and respondent Judge from Dr. Arcadio Galapon was Villasin the cost of the suit.
already sold on August 31, 1966 to the Traders Manufacturing and
Fishing industries, Inc. Likewise, the cases against defendants Serafin C. IN THE CASE AGAINST
P. Ramento, Catalina Cabus, Ben Barraza Go, Jesus Perez, Traders THE DEFENDANT
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., Alfredo R. Celestial and SINFOROSA R. BALES, ET
Pilar P. Celestial, Leopoldo Petilla and Remedios Petilla, Salvador AL., WHO WERE
Anota and Enriqueta Anota and Atty. Zotico A. Tolete were dismissed PLAINTIFFS IN CIVIL CASE
with the conformity of complainant herein, plaintiff therein, and her NO. 3010 —
counsel.
(1) Dismissing the complaint against defendants
Sinforosa R. Bales, Adela R. Herrer, Priscilla R.
Solis, Luz R. Bakunawa, Anacorita R. Eng and Reyes, and Luz R. Bakunawa after the finality of the decision in Civil
Ruperto O. Reyes. Case No. 3010. It may be recalled that Lot 1184 or more specifically
one-half thereof was adjudicated in equal shares to Priscilla Reyes,
Adela Reyes, Luz Bakunawa, Ruperto Reyes and Anacorita Reyes in
D. IN THE CASE AGAINST
the project of partition, and the same was subdivided into five lots
DEFENDANT BONIFACIO
denominated as Lot 1184-A to 1184-E. As aforestated, Lot 1184-E was
RAMO —
sold on July 31, 1964 to Dr. Galapon for which he was issued TCT No.
2338 by the Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, and on March 6, 1965
(1) Dismissing the complaint against Bonifacio he sold a portion of said lot to respondent Judge and his wife who
Ramo; declared the same for taxation purposes only. The subsequent sale
on August 31, 1966 by spouses Asuncion and spouses Galapon of their
(2) Directing the plaintiff to pay the defendant respective shares and interest in said Lot 1184-E to the Traders
Bonifacio Ramo the cost of the suit. Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc., in which respondent was
the president and his wife was the secretary, took place long after the
finality of the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 and of the subsequent
SO ORDERED [pp. 531-533, rec.] two aforesaid orders therein approving the project of partition.
It is further disclosed by the record that the aforesaid decision was While it appears that complainant herein filed on or about November 9
elevated to the Court of Appeals upon perfection of the appeal on or 11, 1968 an action before the Court of First Instance of Leyte
February 22, 1971. docketed as Civil Case No. 4234, seeking to annul the project of
partition and the two orders approving the same, as well as the
WE find that there is no merit in the contention of complainant partition of the estate and the subsequent conveyances, the same,
Bernardita R. Macariola, under her first cause of action, that however, is of no moment.
respondent Judge Elias B. Asuncion violated Article 1491, paragraph 5,
of the New Civil Code in acquiring by purchase a portion of Lot No. The fact remains that respondent Judge purchased on March 6, 1965 a
1184-E which was one of those properties involved in Civil Case No. portion of Lot 1184-E from Dr. Arcadio Galapon; hence, after the
3010. 'That Article provides: finality of the decision which he rendered on June 8, 1963 in Civil Case
No. 3010 and his two questioned orders dated October 23, 1963 and
Article 1491. The following persons cannot acquire November 11, 1963. Therefore, the property was no longer subject of
by purchase, even at a public or judicial action, litigation.
either in person or through the mediation of
another: The subsequent filing on November 9, or 11, 1968 of Civil Case No.
4234 can no longer alter, change or affect the aforesaid facts — that the
xxx xxx xxx questioned sale to respondent Judge, now Court of Appeals Justice,
was effected and consummated long after the finality of the aforesaid
decision or orders.
(5) Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of
superior and inferior courts, and other officers and
employees connected with the administration of Consequently, the sale of a portion of Lot 1184-E to respondent Judge
justice, the property and rights in litigation or having taken place over one year after the finality of the decision in
levied upon an execution before the court within Civil Case No. 3010 as well as the two orders approving the project of
whose jurisdiction or territory they exercise their partition, and not during the pendency of the litigation, there was no
respective functions; this prohibition includes the violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code.
act of acquiring by assignment and shall apply to
lawyers, with respect to the property and rights It is also argued by complainant herein that the sale on July 31, 1964 of
which may be the object of any litigation in which Lot 1184-E to Dr. Arcadio Galapon by Priscilla Reyes, Adela Reyes and
they may take part by virtue of their profession Luz R. Bakunawa was only a mere scheme to conceal the illegal and
[emphasis supplied]. unethical transfer of said lot to respondent Judge as a consideration for
the approval of the project of partition. In this connection, We agree
The prohibition in the aforesaid Article applies only to the sale or with the findings of the Investigating Justice thus:
assignment of the property which is the subject of litigation to the
persons disqualified therein. WE have already ruled that "... for the And so we are now confronted with this all-
prohibition to operate, the sale or assignment of the property must take important question whether or not the acquisition
place during the pendency of the litigation involving the property" (The by respondent of a portion of Lot 1184-E and the
Director of Lands vs. Ababa et al., 88 SCRA 513, 519 [1979], Rosario subsequent transfer of the whole lot to
vda. de Laig vs. Court of Appeals, 86 SCRA 641, 646 [1978]). "TRADERS" of which respondent was the
President and his wife the Secretary, was
In the case at bar, when the respondent Judge purchased on March 6, intimately related to the Order of respondent
1965 a portion of Lot 1184-E, the decision in Civil Case No. 3010 which approving the project of partition, Exh. A.
he rendered on June 8, 1963 was already final because none of the
parties therein filed an appeal within the reglementary period; hence, Respondent vehemently denies any interest or
the lot in question was no longer subject of the litigation. Moreover, at participation in the transactions between the
the time of the sale on March 6, 1965, respondent's order dated October Reyeses and the Galapons concerning Lot 1184-E,
23, 1963 and the amended order dated November 11, 1963 approving and he insists that there is no evidence whatsoever
the October 16, 1963 project of partition made pursuant to the June 8, to show that Dr. Galapon had acted, in the
1963 decision, had long become final for there was no appeal from said purchase of Lot 1184-E, in mediation for him and
orders. his wife. (See p. 14 of Respondent's
Memorandum).
Furthermore, respondent Judge did not buy the lot in question on
March 6, 1965 directly from the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 3010 but xxx xxx xxx
from Dr. Arcadio Galapon who earlier purchased on July 31, 1964 Lot
1184-E from three of the plaintiffs, namely, Priscilla Reyes, Adela
On this point, I agree with respondent that there is Counsel for complainant stresses the view,
no evidence in the record showing that Dr. however, that the latter sold her one-fourth share
Arcadio Galapon acted as a mere "dummy" of in Lot 1154 by virtue of the decision in Civil Case
respondent in acquiring Lot 1184-E from the 3010 and not because of the project of partition,
Reyeses. Dr. Galapon appeared to this investigator Exh. A. Such contention is absurd because from
as a respectable citizen, credible and sincere, and I the decision, Exh. C, it is clear that one-half of one-
believe him when he testified that he bought Lot fourth of Lot 1154 belonged to the estate of
1184-E in good faith and for valuable Francisco Reyes Diaz while the other half of said
consideration from the Reyeses without any one-fourth was the share of complainant's mother,
intervention of, or previous understanding with Felisa Espiras; in other words, the decision did not
Judge Asuncion (pp. 391- 394, rec.). adjudicate the whole of the one-fourth of Lot 1154
to the herein complainant (see Exhs. C-3 & C-4).
Complainant became the owner of the entire one-
On the contention of complainant herein that respondent Judge acted
fourth of Lot 1154 only by means of the project of
illegally in approving the project of partition although it was not
partition, Exh. A. Therefore, if Mrs. Macariola sold
signed by the parties, We quote with approval the findings of the
Lot 1154 on October 22, 1963, it was for no other
Investigating Justice, as follows:
reason than that she was wen aware of the
distribution of the properties of her deceased
1. I agree with complainant that respondent father as per Exhs. A and B. It is also significant at
should have required the signature of the parties this point to state that Mrs. Macariola admitted
more particularly that of Mrs. Macariola on the during the cross-examination that she went to
project of partition submitted to him for approval; Tacloban City in connection with the sale of Lot
however, whatever error was committed by 1154 to Dr. Decena (tsn p. 92, November 28, 1968)
respondent in that respect was done in good faith from which we can deduce that she could not have
as according to Judge Asuncion he was assured by been kept ignorant of the proceedings in civil case
Atty. Bonifacio Ramo, the counsel of record of 3010 relative to the project of partition.
Mrs. Macariola, That he was authorized by his
client to submit said project of partition, (See Exh.
Complainant also assails the project of partition
B and tsn p. 24, January 20, 1969). While it is true
because according to her the properties
that such written authority if there was any, was
adjudicated to her were insignificant lots and the
not presented by respondent in evidence, nor did
least valuable. Complainant, however, did not
Atty. Ramo appear to corroborate the statement of
present any direct and positive evidence to prove
respondent, his affidavit being the only one that
the alleged gross inequalities in the choice and
was presented as respondent's Exh. 10, certain
distribution of the real properties when she could
actuations of Mrs. Macariola lead this investigator
have easily done so by presenting evidence on the
to believe that she knew the contents of the project
area, location, kind, the assessed and market value
of partition, Exh. A, and that she gave her
of said properties. Without such evidence there is
conformity thereto. I refer to the following
nothing in the record to show that there were
documents:
inequalities in the distribution of the properties of
complainant's father (pp. 386389, rec.).
1) Exh. 9 — Certified true copy of OCT No. 19520
covering Lot 1154 of the Tacloban Cadastral
Finally, while it is. true that respondent Judge did not violate
Survey in which the deceased Francisco Reyes
paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the New Civil Code in acquiring by
holds a "1/4 share" (Exh. 9-a). On tills certificate of
purchase a portion of Lot 1184-E which was in litigation in his court, it
title the Order dated November 11, 1963, (Exh. U)
was, however, improper for him to have acquired the same. He should
approving the project of partition was duly
be reminded of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics which
entered and registered on November 26, 1963
requires that: "A judge's official conduct should be free from the
(Exh. 9-D);
appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only upon
the bench and in the performance of judicial duties, but also in his
2) Exh. 7 — Certified copy of a deed of absolute everyday life, should be beyond reproach." And as aptly observed by
sale executed by Bernardita Reyes Macariola the Investigating Justice: "... it was unwise and indiscreet on the part of
on October 22, 1963, conveying to Dr. Hector respondent to have purchased or acquired a portion of a piece of
Decena the one-fourth share of the late Francisco property that was or had been in litigation in his court and caused it to
Reyes-Diaz in Lot 1154. In this deed of sale the be transferred to a corporation of which he and his wife were ranking
vendee stated that she was the absolute owner of officers at the time of such transfer. One who occupies an exalted
said one-fourth share, the same having been position in the judiciary has the duty and responsibility of maintaining
adjudicated to her as her share in the estate of her the faith and trust of the citizenry in the courts of justice, so that not
father Francisco Reyes Diaz as per decision of the only must he be truly honest and just, but his actuations must be such
Court of First Instance of Leyte under case No. as not give cause for doubt and mistrust in the uprightness of his
3010 (Exh. 7-A). The deed of sale was duly administration of justice. In this particular case of respondent, he
registered and annotated at the back of OCT 19520 cannot deny that the transactions over Lot 1184-E are damaging and
on December 3, 1963 (see Exh. 9-e). render his actuations open to suspicion and distrust. Even if
respondent honestly believed that Lot 1184-E was no longer in
In connection with the abovementioned litigation in his court and that he was purchasing it from a third person
documents it is to be noted that in the project of and not from the parties to the litigation, he should nonetheless have
partition dated October 16, 1963, which was refrained from buying it for himself and transferring it to a corporation
approved by respondent on October 23, 1963, in which he and his wife were financially involved, to avoid possible
followed by an amending Order on November 11, suspicion that his acquisition was related in one way or another to his
1963, Lot 1154 or rather 1/4 thereof was official actuations in civil case 3010. The conduct of respondent gave
adjudicated to Mrs. Macariola. It is this 1/4 share cause for the litigants in civil case 3010, the lawyers practising in his
in Lot 1154 which complainant sold to Dr. Decena court, and the public in general to doubt the honesty and fairness of his
on October 22, 1963, several days after the actuations and the integrity of our courts of justice" (pp. 395396, rec.).
preparation of the project of partition.
II prerogatives of the former government
immediately cease upon the transfer of
sovereignty. (Opinion, Atty. Gen., July 10, 1899).
With respect to the second cause of action, the complainant alleged
that respondent Judge violated paragraphs 1 and 5, Article 14 of the
Code of Commerce when he associated himself with the Traders While municipal laws of the newly acquired
Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. as a stockholder and a territory not in conflict with the, laws of the new
ranking officer, said corporation having been organized to engage in sovereign continue in force without the express
business. Said Article provides that: assent or affirmative act of the conqueror, the
political laws do not. (Halleck's Int. Law, chap. 34,
par. 14). However, such political laws of the prior
Article 14 — The following cannot engage in
sovereignty as are not in conflict with the
commerce, either in person or by proxy, nor can
constitution or institutions of the new sovereign,
they hold any office or have any direct,
may be continued in force if the conqueror shall so
administrative, or financial intervention in
declare by affirmative act of the commander-in-
commercial or industrial companies within the
chief during the war, or by Congress in time of
limits of the districts, provinces, or towns in which
peace. (Ely's Administrator vs. United States, 171
they discharge their duties:
U.S. 220, 43 L. Ed. 142). In the case of American
and Ocean Ins. Cos. vs. 356 Bales of Cotton (1 Pet.
1. Justices of the Supreme Court, judges and [26 U.S.] 511, 542, 7 L. Ed. 242), Chief Justice
officials of the department of public prosecution in Marshall said:
active service. This provision shall not be
applicable to mayors, municipal judges, and
On such transfer (by cession)
municipal prosecuting attorneys nor to those who
of territory, it has never been
by chance are temporarily discharging the
held that the relations of the
functions of judge or prosecuting attorney.
inhabitants with each other
undergo any change. Their
xxx xxx xxx relations with their former
sovereign are dissolved, and
5. Those who by virtue of laws or special new relations are created
provisions may not engage in commerce in a between them and the
determinate territory. government which has
acquired their territory. The
same act which transfers their
It is Our considered view that although the aforestated provision is country, transfers the
incorporated in the Code of Commerce which is part of the commercial allegiance of those who
laws of the Philippines, it, however, partakes of the nature of a political remain in it; and the law
law as it regulates the relationship between the government and which may be denominated
certain public officers and employees, like justices and judges. political, is necessarily
changed, although that which
Political Law has been defined as that branch of public law which regulates the intercourse and
deals with the organization and operation of the governmental organs general conduct of
of the State and define the relations of the state with the inhabitants of individuals, remains in force,
its territory (People vs. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]). It may be until altered by the newly-
recalled that political law embraces constitutional law, law of public created power of the State.
corporations, administrative law including the law on public officers
and elections. Specifically, Article 14 of the Code of Commerce Likewise, in People vs. Perfecto (43 Phil. 887, 897 [1922]), this Court
partakes more of the nature of an administrative law because it stated that: "It is a general principle of the public law that on
regulates the conduct of certain public officers and employees with acquisition of territory the previous political relations of the ceded
respect to engaging in business: hence, political in essence. region are totally abrogated. "
It is significant to note that the present Code of Commerce is the There appears no enabling or affirmative act that continued the
Spanish Code of Commerce of 1885, with some modifications made by effectivity of the aforestated provision of the Code of Commerce after
the "Commission de Codificacion de las Provincias de Ultramar," the change of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and then to
which was extended to the Philippines by the Royal Decree of August the Republic of the Philippines. Consequently, Article 14 of the Code of
6, 1888, and took effect as law in this jurisdiction on December 1, 1888. Commerce has no legal and binding effect and cannot apply to the
respondent, then Judge of the Court of First Instance, now Associate
Upon the transfer of sovereignty from Spain to the United States and Justice of the Court of Appeals.
later on from the United States to the Republic of the Philippines,
Article 14 of this Code of Commerce must be deemed to have been It is also argued by complainant herein that respondent Judge violated
abrogated because where there is change of sovereignty, the political paragraph H, Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019, otherwise known as
laws of the former sovereign, whether compatible or not with those of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which provides that:
the new sovereign, are automatically abrogated, unless they are
expressly re-enacted by affirmative act of the new sovereign.
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In
addition to acts or omissions of public officers
Thus, We held in Roa vs. Collector of Customs (23 Phil. 315, 330, 311 already penalized by existing law, the following
[1912]) that: shall constitute corrupt practices of any public
officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
By well-settled public law, upon the cession of
territory by one nation to another, either following x x x x x x x x x
a conquest or otherwise, ... those laws which are
political in their nature and pertain to the
(h) Directly or indirectly In addition, although Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules
having financial or pecuniary made pursuant to the Civil Service Act of 1959 prohibits an officer or
interest in any business, employee in the civil service from engaging in any private business,
contract or transaction in vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
connection with which he agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission
intervenes or takes part in his from the head of department, the same, however, may not fall within
official capacity, or in which the purview of paragraph h, Section 3 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
he is prohibited by the Practices Act because the last portion of said paragraph speaks of a
Constitution or by any Iaw prohibition by the Constitution or law on any public officer from having
from having any interest. any interest in any business and not by a mere administrative rule or
regulation. Thus, a violation of the aforesaid rule by any officer or
employee in the civil service, that is, engaging in private business
Respondent Judge cannot be held liable under the aforestated
without a written permission from the Department Head may not
paragraph because there is no showing that respondent participated or
constitute graft and corrupt practice as defined by law.
intervened in his official capacity in the business or transactions of the
Traders Manufacturing and Fishing Industries, Inc. In the case at bar,
the business of the corporation in which respondent participated has On the contention of complainant that respondent Judge violated
obviously no relation or connection with his judicial office. The Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Civil Service Rules, We hold that the Civil
business of said corporation is not that kind where respondent Service Act of 1959 (R.A. No. 2260) and the Civil Service Rules
intervenes or takes part in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First promulgated thereunder, particularly Section 12 of Rule XVIII, do not
Instance. As was held in one case involving the application of Article apply to the members of the Judiciary. Under said Section 12: "No
216 of the Revised Penal Code which has a similar prohibition on officer or employee shall engage directly in any private business,
public officers against directly or indirectly becoming interested in any vocation, or profession or be connected with any commercial, credit,
contract or business in which it is his official duty to intervene, "(I)t is agricultural or industrial undertaking without a written permission
not enough to be a public official to be subject to this crime; it is from the Head of Department ..."
necessary that by reason of his office, he has to intervene in said
contracts or transactions; and, hence, the official who intervenes in
It must be emphasized at the outset that respondent, being a member
contracts or transactions which have no relation to his office cannot
of the Judiciary, is covered by Republic Act No. 296, as amended,
commit this crime.' (People vs. Meneses, C.A. 40 O.G. 11th Supp. 134,
otherwise known as the Judiciary Act of 1948 and by Section 7, Article
cited by Justice Ramon C. Aquino; Revised Penal Code, p. 1174, Vol. 11
X, 1973 Constitution.
[1976]).
President
DONE in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our
Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Six.
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
MALACAÑANG
PROCLAMATION NO. 2
LAWYERS LEAGUE V AQUINO G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986 G.R. No. 76180 October 24, 1986
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES vs. AQUINO
(G.R. No. 73748 - May 22, 1986)
IN RE: SATURNINO V. BERMUDEZ, petitioner.
------------------------
(There is no "Full-Text" of this case. This is a Minute Resolution made
by the SC.) R E S O L U T IO N
Minute Resolutions
EN BANC
LAWYERS LEAGUE FOR A BETTER PHILIPPINES AND/OR In a petition for declaratory relief impleading no respondents,
OLIVER A. LOZANO VS. PRESIDENT CORAZON C. AQUINO, ET petitioner, as a lawyer, quotes the first paragraph of Section 5 (not
AL. Section 7 as erroneously stated) of Article XVIII of the proposed 1986
SIRS/MESDAMES: Constitution, which provides in full as follows:
The three petitions obviously are not impressed with merit. Petitioners The petition is dismissed outright for lack of jurisdiction and for lack
have no personality to sue and their petitions state no cause of action. for cause of action.
For the legitimacy of the Aquino government is not a justiciable matter.
It belongs to the realm of politics where only the people of the
Prescinding from petitioner's lack of personality to sue or to bring this
Philippines are the judge. And the people have made the judgment;
action, (Tan vs. Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677), it is elementary that this
they have accepted the government of President Corazon C. Aquino
Court assumes no jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief.
which is in effective control of the entire country so that it is not merely
More importantly, the petition amounts in effect to a suit against the
a de factogovernment but is in fact and law a de jure government.
incumbent President of the Republic, President Corazon C. Aquino,
Moreover, the community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of
and it is equally elementary that incumbent Presidents are immune
the present government. All the eleven members of this Court, as
from suit or from being brought to court during the period of their
reorganized, have sworn to uphold the fundamental law of the
incumbency and tenure.
Republic under her government.
In view of the foregoing, the petitions are hereby dismissed. The petition furthermore states no cause of action. Petitioner's
allegation of ambiguity or vagueness of the aforequoted provision is
manifestly gratuitous, it being a matter of public record and common
Very truly yours, public knowledge that the Constitutional Commission refers therein to
incumbent President Corazon C. Aquino and Vice-President Salvador
(Sgd.) GLORIA C. PARAS H. Laurel, and to no other persons, and provides for the extension of
Clerk of Court their term to noon of June 30, 1992 for purposes of synchronization of
elections. Hence, the second paragraph of the cited section provides for
The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new the holding on the second Monday of May, 1992 of the first regular
government. elections for the President and Vice-President under said 1986
Constitution. In previous cases, the legitimacy of the government of
President Corazon C. Aquino was likewise sought to be questioned
with the claim that it was not established pursuant to the 1973
Constitution. The said cases were dismissed outright by this court
which held that:
Petitioner now alleges that the change in his seniority ranking could Moreover, since the last sentence of Section 2 of Executive Order No.
only be attributed to inadvertence for, otherwise, it would run counter 33 virtually re-enacted the last sentence of Sec. 3, Chapter 1 of B.P. Blg.
to the provisions of Section 2 of Executive Order No. 33, which 129, statutory construction rules on simultaneous repeal and re-
reads:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary enactment mandate, according to petitioner, the preservation and
enforcement of all rights and liabilities which had accrued under the
"SECTION 2. Section 3, Chapter 1 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, is original statute. 13 Furthermore, petitioner avers that, although the
hereby amended to read as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph power of appointment is executive in character and cannot be usurped
by any other branch of the Government, such power can still be
regulated by the Constitution and by the appropriate law, in this case, The three (3) clauses that precede the text of the Provisional (Freedom)
by the limits set by Executive Order NO. 33 14 for the power of Constitution, 24 read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
appointment cannot be wielded in violation of law. 15
"WHEREAS, the new government under President Corazon C. Aquino
Justices Javellana and Campos were required by the Court to file their was installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino
reply to Justice Puno’s comment on their motion for reconsideration of people assisted by units of the New Armed Forces of the Philippines;
the resolution of the Court en banc dated 24 January
1991.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red "WHEREAS, the heroic action of the people was done in defiance of
the provisions of the 1973 Constitution, as amended;
In their Reply and Supplemental Reply, Associate Justices Javellana
and Campos submit that the appeal or request for correction filed by "WHEREFORE, I, Corazon C. Aquino, President of the Philippines, by
the petitioner was addressed to the wrong party. They aver that as virtue of the powers vested in me by the sovereign mandate of the
petitioner himself had alleged the mistake to be an "inadvertent error" people, do hereby promulgate the following Provisional
of the Office of the President, ergo, he should have filed his request for Constitution."25cralaw:red
correction also with said Office of the President and not directly with
the Supreme Court. 16 Furthermore, they point out that petitioner had These summarize the Aquino government’s position that its mandate
indeed filed with the Office of the President a request or petition for is taken from "a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people." 26
correction of his ranking, (seniority) but the same was not approved
such that his recourse should have been an appropriate action before Discussions and opinions of legal experts also proclaim that the
the proper court and impleading all parties concerned. The aforesaid Aquino government was "revolutionary in the sense that it came into
non-approval by the Office of the President they argue, should be existence in defiance of the existing legal processes" 27 and that it was
respected by the Supreme Court "not only on the basis of the doctrine a revolutionary government "instituted by the direct action of the
of separation of powers but also their presumed knowledge ability and people and in opposition to the authoritarian values and practices of
even expertise in the laws they are entrusted to enforce" 17 for it (the the overthrown government." 28
non-approval) is a confirmation that petitioner’s seniority ranking at
the time of his appointment by President Aquino was, in fact, A question which naturally comes to mind is whether the then existing
deliberate and not an "inadvertent error" as petitioner would have the legal order was overthrown by the Aquino government. "A legal order
Court believe. 18 is the authoritative code of a polity. Such code consists of all the rules
found in the enactments of the organs of the polity. Where the state
The resolution of this controversy is not a pleasant task for the Court operates under a written constitution, its organs may be readily
since it involves not only members of the next highest court of the land determined from a reading of its provisions. Once such organs are
but persons who are close to members of this Court. But the ascertained, it becomes an easy matter to locate their enactments. The
controversy has to be resolved. The core issue in this case is whether rules in such enactments, along with those in the constitution,
the present Court of Appeals is a new court such that it would negate comprise the legal order of that constitutional state." 29 It is assumed
any claim to precedence or seniority admittedly enjoyed by petitioner that the legal order remains as a "culture system" of the polity as long
in the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate Court existing as the latter endures 30 and that a point may be reached, however,
prior to Executive Order No. 33 or whether the present Court of where the legal system ceases to be operative as a whole for it is no
Appeals is merely a continuation of the Court of Appeals and longer obeyed by the population nor enforced by the officials. 31
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to said Executive Order
No. 33. It is widely known that Mrs. Aquino’s rise to the presidency was not
due to constitutional processes; in fact, it was achieved in violation of
It is the holding of the Court that the present Court of Appeals is a new the provisions of the 1973 Constitution as a Batasang Pambansa
entity, different and distinct from the Court of Appeals or the resolution had earlier declared Mr. Marcos at the winner in the 1986
Intermediate Appellate Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33, presidential election. 32 Thus it can be said that the organization of
for it was created in the wake of the massive reorganization launched Mrs. Aquino’s Government which was met by little resistance and her
by the revolutionary government of Corazon C. Aquino in the control of the state evidenced by the appointment of the Cabinet and
aftermath of the people power (EDSA) revolution in 1986. other key officers of the administration, the departure of the Marcos
Cabinet officials, revampt of the Judiciary and the Military signalled
A resolution has been defined as "the complete overthrow of the the point where the legal system then in effect, had ceased to be
established government in any country or state by those who were obeyed by the Filipino.
previously subject to it" 19 or as "a sudden, radical and fundamental
change in the government or political system, usually effected with The Court holds that the Court of Appeals and Intermediate Appellate
violence or at least some acts of violence." 20 In Kelsen’s book, General Court existing prior to Executive Order No. 33 phased out as part of
Theory of Law and State, it is defined as that which "occurs whenever the legal system abolished by the revolution and that the Court of
the legal order of a community is nullified and replaced by a new Appeals established under Executive Order No. 33 was an entirely
order . . . a way not prescribed by the first order itself." 21 new court with appointments thereto having no relation to earlier
appointments to the abolished courts, and that the reference to
It was through the February 1986 revolution, a relatively peaceful one, precedence in rank contained in the last sentence of Sec. 2, BP Blg. No.
and more popularly known as the "people power revolution" that the 129 as amended by Executive Order No. 33 refers to prospective
Filipino people tore themselves away from an existing regime. This situations as distinguished from retroactive ones.
revolution also saw the unprecedented rise to power of the Aquino
government. But even assuming, arguendo, that Executive Order No. 33 did not
abolish the precedence or seniority ranking resulting from previous
From the natural law point of view, the right of revolution has been appointment to the Court of Appeals or Intermediate Appellate Court
defined as "an inherent right of a people to cast out their rulers, change existing prior to the 1986 revolution, it is believed that President
their policy or effect radical reforms in their system of government or Aquino as head of then revolutionary government, could disregard or
institutions by force or a general uprising when the legal and set aside such precedence or seniority in ranking when she made her
constitutional methods of making such change have proved appointments to the reorganized Court of Appeals in 1986.
inadequate or are so obstructed as to be unavailable." 22 It has been
said that "the locus of positive law-making power lies with the people It is to be noted that, at the time of the issuance of Executive Order No.
of the state" and from there is derived "the right of the people to 33, President Aquino was still exercising the powers of a revolutionary
abolish, to reform and to alter any existing form of government government, encompassing both executive and legislative powers,
without regard to the existing constitution." 23 such that she could, if she so desired, amend, modify or repeal any
part of B.P. Blg. 129 or her own Executive Order No. 33. It should also SECTION 1. The provisions of ARTICLE I (National Territory),
be remembered that the same situation was still in force when she ARTICLE III (Citizenship), ARTICLE IV (Bill of Rights), ARTICLE V
issued the 1986 appointments to the Court of Appeals. In other words, (Duties and Obligations of Citizens), and ARTICLE VI (Suffrage) of the
President Aquino, at the time of the issuance of the 1986 appointments, 1973 Constitution, as amended, remain in the force and effect and are
modified or disregarded the rule embodied in B.P. Blg. 129 as hereby adopted in toto as part of this Provisional Constitution.
amended by Executive Order No. 33, on precedence or seniority in the
case of the petitioner, for reasons known only to her. Since the
SECTION 2. The provision of ARTICLE II (Declaration of Principles
appointment extended by the President to the petitioner in 1986 for
and State Policies), ARTICLE VII (The President), ARTICLE X (The
membership in the new Court of Appeals with its implicit ranking in
Judiciary), ARTICLE XI (Local Government), ARTICLE XIII
the roster of justices, was a valid appointment anchored on the
(Accountability of Public Officers), ARTICLE XIV (The National
President’s exercise of her then revolutionary powers, it is not for the
Economy and Patrimony of the Nation), ARTICLE XV (General
Court at this time to question or correct that exercise.
Provisions) of the 1973 Constitution, as amended, are hereby adopted
as part of this Provisional Constitution, as amended, are hereby
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Reconsideration
adopted as part of this Provisional Constitution, insofar as they are not
and the seniority rankings of members of the Court of Appeals,
inconsistent with the provisions of this Proclamation.
including that of the petitioner, at the time the appointments were
made by the President in 1986, are recognized and upheld.
ARTICLE II
SO ORDERED. THE PRESIDENT,
THE VICE-PRESIDENT, AND THE CABINET
MANILA The President shall give priority to measures to achieve the mandate of
the people to:
BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
a) Completely reorganize the government and eradicate unjust and
oppressive structures, and all iniquitous vestiges of the previous
PROCLAMATION NO. 3
regime;
SECTION 2. All elective and appointive officials and employees under SECTION 2. Local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by
the 1973 Constitution shall continue in the office until otherwise the President which shall be held on a date to be determined by the
provided by proclamation or executive order or upon the designation President which shall not be earlier than the date of the plebiscite for
or appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is made the ratification of the New Constitution.
within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.
ARTICLE VII
SECTION 3. Any public office or employees separated from the service EFFECTIVE DATE
as a result of the reorganization effected under this Proclamation shall,
if entitled under the laws then in force, receive the retirement and
SECTION 1. This Proclamation shall take effect upon its promulgation
other benefits accuring thereunder.
by the President.
DONE in the City of Manila, the 25 th of March, in the year of Our Lord,
ARTICLE IV
Nineteen Hundred and Eighty-Six.
EXISTING LAWS
(Sgd.) CORAZON C. AQUINO
SECTION 1. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders,
proclamations, letters of instruction, implementing rules and
regulations, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this By the President:
Proclamation shall remain operative until amended, modified, or
repealed by the President or the regular legislative body to be (Sgd.) JOKER P. ARROYO
established under a New Constitution. Executive Secretary
SECTION 2. The President may review all contracts, concessions, B.) Adoption and Effectivity of the Present Constitution
permits, or other forms of privileges for the exploration, development,
exploitation, or utilization of natural resources entered into, granted,
issued, or acquired before the date of this proclamation and when the Article V of the Provisional Constitution
national interest requires, amend, modify, or revoke them.
Section 27, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution
ARTICLE V
ADOPTION OF A NEW CONSTITUTION MALACAÑANG
MANILA
SECTION 1. Within sixty (60) days from date of this Proclamation, a
Commission shall be appointed by the President to draft a New BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE PHILIPPINES
Constitution. The Commission shall be composed of not less than
thirty (30) nor more than fifty (50) natural born citizens of the
Philippines, of recognized probity, known for their independence, PROCLAMATION NO. 58
nationalism and patriotism. They shall be chosen by the President after
consultation with various sectors of society. PROCLAIMING THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES ADOPTED BY THE
SECTION 2. The Commission shall complete its work within as short a CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION OF 1986, INCLUDING THE
period as may be consistent with the need both to hasten the return of ORDINANCE APPENDED THERETO
normal constitutional government to draft a document truly reflective
of the ideals and aspirations of the Filipino people. WHEREAS, the Constitutional Commission of 1986 adopted the
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines on October 15, 1986,
SECTION 3. The Commission shall conduct public hearings to insure together with the Ordinance appended thereto, which shall become
that the people will have adequate participation in the formulation of valid and effective upon ratification by a majority of the votes cast in a
the New Constitution. plebiscite called for the purpose;
(1) The Commission on Elections canvassed the returns from 83,288 On February 9, 1987, petitioner Alfredo M, de Leon received a
voting precincts throughout the country involving 21,785,216 votes Memorandum antedated December 1, 1986 but signed by respondent
cast; and OIC Governor Benjamin Esguerra on February 8, 1987 designating
respondent Florentino G. Magno as Barangay Captain of Barangay
Dolores, Taytay, Rizal. The designation made by the OIC Governor
(2) On the basis of the canvass made by the Commission on Elections,
was "by authority of the Minister of Local Government."
the results thereof are as follows:
g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the
360- 378, 380-433, 436-439. general rule insisted upon by counsel for the
respondent. The circumstances which surround
this case are different from those in the United
The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case
States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal
party to these proceedings no other person could
personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is
be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the
submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are
law officer of the Government to appear and
personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-
represent the people in cases of this character.
publication of the presidential issuances in question 2 said petitioners
are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus
proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal
of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote: personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present
petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein
is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the
SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.—When any
land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the
neglects the performance of an act which the law
same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an
generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his
office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
appearance for respondents in this case.
another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus
court alleging the facts with certainty and praying submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain
that judgment be rendered commanding the special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in
defendant, immediately or at some other specified the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point
time, to do the act required to be done to Protect stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:
the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the
damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days
the wrongful acts of the defendant.
following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise
Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the provided, ...
petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the
performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest
The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's
for their petition to be given due course.
construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, 4 this Court has
ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases
The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for
of Severino vs. Governor General, 3 this Court held that while the general then the date of publication is material for determining its date of
rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not
individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.
interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is
Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it
for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public
equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered
rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469],"
in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the
nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of
conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the
the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself
people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at
provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of law of the land, the requirement of due process
Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows: and the Rule of Law demand that the Official
Gazette as the official government repository
promulgate and publish the texts of all such
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official
decrees, orders and instructions so that the people
Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and
may know where to obtain their official and
resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of
specific contents.
the Philippines; [2] all executive and
administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general
or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and application, which have not been published, shall have no force and
the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the
courts of sufficient importance to be so published; possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in
[4] such documents or classes of documents as reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were
may be required so to be published by law; and [5] published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
such documents or classes of documents as the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to
President of the Philippines shall determine from P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their
time to time to have general applicability and legal publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the
effect, or which he may authorize so to be past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth
published. ... in Chicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank 8 to wit:
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general The courts below have proceeded on the theory
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their that the Act of Congress, having been found to be
actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was
there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no
legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or duties, and hence affording no basis for the
otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118
had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett,
228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that
such broad statements as to the effect of a
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic
determination of unconstitutionality must be
has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time
taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a
when the people have bestowed upon the President a power
statute, prior to such a determination, is an
heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept
operative fact and may have consequences which
abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always
Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready access to the
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect
legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no
to be considered in various aspects-with respect to
means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been
particular conduct, private and official. Questions
promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the
of rights claimed to have become vested, of status,
specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of
of prior determinations deemed to have finality
Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden
and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the
tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y
light of the nature both of the statute and of its
Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el
previous application, demand examination. These
Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
questions are among the most difficult of those
which have engaged the attention of courts, state
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: and federal and it is manifest from numerous
"There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a
used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot
That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be justified.
be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the
Consistently with the above principle, this Court in Rutter vs.
Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no
Esteban 9 sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law,
discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from
albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared
such publication.
unconstitutional by this Court.
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of
be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those general application, for strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in
which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2 example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a
relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It
surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any made in the Official Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited
member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of general circulation could
he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without better perform the function of communicating, the laws to the people
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy as such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership,
or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be and come out regularly. The trouble, though, is that this kind of
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might publication is not the one required or authorized by existing law. As
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil
only, and t to the public as a whole. Code. The Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have
no information that it exists. If it does, it obviously has not yet been
published.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application
and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity,
which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. law or to repeal or modify it if we find it impractical. That is not our
function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our task is merely to
interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed
promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers
procedure. Consequently, we have no choice but to pronounce that
whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at
under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws must be made
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. administrative rules
in the Official Gazett and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their
and regulations must a also be published if their purpose is to enforce
effectivity after fifteen days from such publication or after a different
or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
period provided by the legislature.
We agree that publication must be in full or it is no publication at all Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of
since its purpose is to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of the pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding
number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to
effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint
satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General
Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree undeniably of
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall
general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
immediately upon their approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be
administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than
published in full in the Official Gazette, to become effective only after
disclose information on this vital law.
fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices
were categorically for publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six
SO ORDERED.
others felt that publication could be made elsewhere as long as the
people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without
indicating where it should be made. 11 It is therefore necessary for the
present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear consensus on this
matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary
vote.
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 200 June 18, 1987 D.) Classification of Constitutions
Since petitioner has already matched the bid price tendered by Renong The Manila Hotel or, for that matter, 51% of the MHC, is not just any
Berhad pursuant to the bidding rules, respondent GSIS is left with no commodity to be sold to the highest bidder solely for the sake of
alternative but to award to petitioner the block of shares of MHC and privatization. We are not talking about an ordinary piece of property
to execute the necessary agreements and documents to effect the sale in in a commercial district. We are talking about a historic relic that has
hosted many of the most important events in the short history of the DIONISIO P. LIM, SR., respondent, LUCILLE CHIONGBIAN-
Philippines as a nation. We are talking about a hotel where heads of SOLON, intervenor.
states would prefer to be housed as a strong manifestation of their
desire to cloak the dignity of the highest state function to their official
visits to the Philippines. Thus the Manila Hotel has played and
continues to play a significant role as an authentic repository of
twentieth century Philippine history and culture. In this sense, it has DAVIDE, JR., CJ.:
become truly a reflection of the Filipino soul — a place with a history of
grandeur; a most historical setting that has played a part in the shaping of a Challenged in this case for certiorari with a prayer for preliminary
country. 51 injunction are the Resolution of 6 May 1998 1 of the Second Division of
the Commission on Elections (hereafter COMELEC), declaring
This Court cannot extract rhyme nor reason from the determined petitioner Juan Domino (hereafter DOMINO) disqualified as candidate
efforts of respondents to sell the historical landmark — this Grand Old for representative of the Lone Legislative District of the Province of
Dame of hotels in Asia — to a total stranger. For, indeed, the Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections, and the Decision of 29 May
conveyance of this epic exponent of the Filipino psyche to alien hands 19982 of the COMELEC en banc denying DOMINO's motion for
cannot be less than mephistophelian for it is, in whatever manner reconsideration.
viewed, a veritable alienation of a nation's soul for some pieces of
foreign silver. And so we ask: What advantage, which cannot be The antecedents are not disputed.1âwphi1.nêt
equally drawn from a qualified Filipino, can be gained by the Filipinos
Manila Hotel — and all that it stands for — is sold to a non-Filipino?
How much of national pride will vanish if the nation's cultural heritage On 25 March 1998, DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the
is entrusted to a foreign entity? On the other hand, how much dignity position of Representative of the Lone Legislative District of the
will be preserved and realized if the national patrimony is safekept in Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that
the hands of a qualified, zealous and well-meaning Filipino? This is the he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one
plain and simple meaning of the Filipino First Policy provision of the (1) year and two (2) months immediately preceding the election.3
Philippine Constitution. And this Court, heeding the clarion call of the
Constitution and accepting the duty of being the elderly watchman of On 30 March 1998, private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B.
the nation, will continue to respect and protect the sanctity of the Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr.,
Constitution. fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy, which was docketed as SPA No. 98-022 and
WHEREFORE, respondents GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC. Private respondents
SYSTEM, MANILA HOTEL CORPORATION, COMMITTEE ON alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
PRIVATIZATION and OFFICE OF THE GOVERNMENT candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the
CORPORATE COUNSEL are directed to CEASE and DESIST from province of Sarangani where he seeks election. To substantiate their
selling 51% of the shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation to RENONG allegations, private respondents presented the following evidence:
BERHAD, and to ACCEPT the matching bid of petitioner MANILA
PRINCE HOTEL CORPORATION to purchase the subject 51% of the 1. Annex "A" — the Certificate of Candidacy of
shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation at P44.00 per share and respondent for the position of Congressman of the
thereafter to execute the necessary clearances and to do such other acts Lone District of the Province of Sarangani filed
and deeds as may be necessary for purpose. with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor of Sarangani on March 25, 1998, where
SO ORDERED. in item 4 thereof he wrote his date of birth as
December 5, 1953; in item 9, he claims he have
resided in the constituency where he seeks election
for one (1) year and two (2) months; and, in item
10, that he is registered voter of Precinct No. 14A-
1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani;
1. Annex "1" — Copy of the Contract of Lease 6. Annex "6" — same as Annex "5"
between Nora Dacaldacal as Lessor and
Administrator of the properties of deceased spouses
7. Annex "6-a" — Copy of the Sworn Application for
Maximo and Remedios Dacaldacal and respondent
Cancellation of Voter's Previous Registration (Annex
as Lessee executed on January 15, 1997, subscribed
"I", Petition);
8. Annex "7" — Copy of claim card in the name of incredible, for respondent who previously ran for
respondent showing his VRR No. 31326504 dated the same position in the 3rd Legislative District of
October 20, 1997 as a registered voter of Precinct No. Quezon City during the elections of 1995 to
14A1, Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani; unwittingly forget the residency requirement for
the office sought.
9. Annex "7-a" — Certification dated April 16, 1998,
issued by Atty. Elmer M. Kayanan, Election Officer Counting, therefore, from the day after June 22,
IV, District III, Quezon City, which reads: 1997 when respondent registered at Precinct No.
4400-A, up to and until the day of the elections on
May 11, 1998, respondent clearly lacks the one (1)
This is to certify that the spouses JUAN and
year residency requirement provided for
ZORAYDA DOMINO are no longer registered
candidates for Member of the House of
voters of District III, Quezon City. Their registration
Representatives under Section 6, Article VI of the
records (VRR) were transferred and are now in the
Constitution.
possession of the Election Officer of Alabel,
Sarangani.
All told, petitioner's evidence conspire to attest to
respondent's lack of residence in the constituency
This certification is being issued upon the request of
where he seeks election and while it may be
Mr. JUAN DOMINO.
conceded that he is a registered voter as
contemplated under Section 12 of R.A. 8189, he
10. Annex "8" — Affidavit of Nora Dacaldacal and lacks the qualification to run for the position of
Maria Lourdes Dacaldacal stating the circumstances Congressman for the Lone District of the Province
and incidents detailing their alleged acquaintance of Sarangani.6
with respondent.
On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued
11. Annexes "8-a", "8-b", "8-c" and "8-d" — Copies of Supplemental Omnibus Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes
the uniform affidavits of witness Myrna Dalaguit, cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the proclamation if
Hilario Fuentes, Coraminda Lomibao and Elena V. winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as
Piodos subscribed and sworn to before Notary candidate had not yet become final and executory.7
Public Bonifacio F. Doria, Jr., on April 18, 1998,
embodying their alleged personal knowledge of
The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the
respondent's residency in Alabel, Sarangani;
Chairman of the Provincial Board of Canvassers, 8shows that DOMINO
garnered the highest number of votes over his opponents for the
12. Annex "8-e" — A certification dated April 20, position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.
1998, subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Bonifacio, containing a listing of the names of fifty-
On 15 May 1998, DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the
five (55) residents of Alabel, Sarangani, declaring
Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was denied by the COMELEC en
and certifying under oath that they personally know
banc in its decision dated 29 May 1998. Hence, the present Petition
the respondent as a permanent resident of Alabel,
for Certiorari with prayer for Preliminary Mandatory Injunction
Sarangani since January 1997 up to present;
alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that
13. Annexes "9", "9-a" and "9-b" — Copies of he did not meet the one-year residence requirement.
Individual Income Tax Return for the year 1997, BIR
form 2316 and W-2, respectively, of respondent; and,
On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order, the Court directed the parties to
14. Annex "10" — The affidavit of respondent maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the instant
reciting the chronology of events and circumstances petition.9
leading to his relocation to the Municipality of
Alabel, Sarangani, appending Annexes "A", "B", "C",
On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter
"D", "D-1", "E", "F", "G" with sub-markings "G-1" and
INTERVENOR), the candidate receiving the second highest number of
"G-2" and "H" his CTC No. 111`32214C dated
votes, was allowed by the Court to Intervene. 10 INTERVENOR in her
September 5, 1997, which are the same as Annexes
Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in Intervention 11 is
"1", "2", "4", "5", "6-a", "3", "7", "9" with sub-markings
asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan
"9-a" and "9-b" except Annex "H".5
Domino and to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of
Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.
On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution
declaring DOMINO disqualified as candidate for the position of
Before us DOMINO raised the following issues for resolution, to wit:
representative of the lone district of Sarangani for lack of the one-year
residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy, on the basis of the following findings: a. Whether or not the judgment of the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City declaring petitioner as resident of Sarangani and
not of Quezon City is final, conclusive and binding upon the
What militates against respondent's claim that he
whole world, including the Commission on Elections.
has met the residency requirement for the position
sought is his own Voter's Registration Record No.
31326504 dated June 22, 1997 [Annex "B", Petition] b. Whether or not petitioner herein has resided in the subject
and his address indicated as 24 Bonifacio St., congressional district for at least one (1) year immediately
Ayala Heights, Old Balara, Quezon City. This preceding the May 11, 1998 elections; and
evidence, standing alone, negates all his
protestations that he established residence at
c. Whether or not respondent COMELEC has jurisdiction over the
Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani, as early as
petition a quo for the disqualification of petitioner.12
January 1997. It is highly improbable, nay
The first issue. qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to
order the change or transfer of registration from one place of residence
The contention of DOMINO that the decision of the Metropolitan Trial
to another for it is the function of the election Registration Board as
Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings declaring him a
provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189. 17 The only effect of the
resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon City is final
decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list
and conclusive upon the COMELEC cannot be sustained.
of voters, is for the Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the
final decision, to remove the voter's registration record from the
The COMELEC has jurisdiction as provided in Sec. 78, Art. IX of the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
Omnibus Election Code, over a petition to deny due course to or cancel thereafter place the record in the inactive file.18
certificate of candidacy. In the exercise of the said jurisdiction, it is
within the competence of the COMELEC to determine whether false
Finally, the application of the rule on res judicata is unavailing. Identity
representation as to material facts was made in the certificate of
of parties, subject matter and cause of action are indispensable
candidacy, that will include, among others, the residence of the
requirements for the application of said doctrine. Neither herein
candidate.
Private Respondents nor INTERVENOR, is a party in the exclusion
proceedings. The Petition for Exclusion was filed by DOMINDO
The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in himself and his wife, praying that he and his wife be excluded from the
the exclusion proceedings as to the right of DOMINO to be included or Voter's List on the ground of erroneous registration while the Petition
excluded from the list of voters in the precinct within its territorial to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy was filed by
jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of private respondents against DOMINO for alleged false representation
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of in his certificate of candidacy. For the decision to be a basis for the
compliance with the residency requirement. dismissal by reason of res judicata, it is essential that there must be
between the first and the second action identity of parties, identity of
The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of subject matter and identity of causes of action. 19 In the present case, the
voters are summary in character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial aforesaid essential requisites are not present. In the case of Nuval
court and its resultant conclusions in the exclusion proceedings on v. Guray, et al., 20 the Supreme Court in resolving a similar issue ruled
matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its territorial that:
jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the
court in inclusion or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any The question to be solved under the first
question necessary to decide the issue raised including the questions of assignment of error is whether or not the
citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to judgment rendered in the case of the petition for
order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily the exclusion of Norberto Guray's name from the
caries with it the power to inquire into and settle all matters essential election list of Luna, is res judicata, so as to prevent
to the exercise of said authority. However, except for the right to the institution and prosecution of an action
remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the in quo warranto, which is now before us.
particular election in relation to which the proceedings had been held,
a decision in an exclusion or inclusion proceeding, even if final and
The procedure prescribed by section 437 of the
unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res judicata.13 In this sense,
Administrative Code, as amended by Act No.
it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take
3387, is of a summary character and the judgment
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding. 14Thus, a
rendered therein is not appealable except when
decision in an exclusion proceeding would neither be conclusive on the
the petition is tried before the justice of the peace
voter's political status, nor bar subsequent proceedings on his right to
of the capital or the circuit judge, in which case it
be registered as a voter in any other election.15
may be appealed to the judge of first instance,
with whom said two lower judges have concurrent
Thus, in Tan Cohon v. Election Registrar16 we ruled that: jurisdiction.
. . . It is made clear that even as it is here held that The petition for exclusion was presented by
the order of the City Court in question has become Gregorio Nuval in his dual capacity as qualified
final, the same does not constitute res adjudicata as voter of the municipality of Luna, and as a duly
to any of the matters therein contained. It is registered candidate for the office of president of
ridiculous to suppose that such an important and said municipality, against Norberto Guray as a
intricate matter of citizenship may be passed upon registered voter in the election list of said
and determined with finality in such a summary municipality. The present proceeding
and peremptory proceeding as that of inclusion of quo warranto was interposed by Gregorio Nuval
and exclusion of persons in the registry list of in his capacity as a registered candidate voted for
voters. Even if the City Court had granted the office of municipal president of Luna, against
appellant's petition for inclusion in the permanent Norberto Guray, as an elected candidate for the
list of voters on the allegation that she is a Filipino same office. Therefore, there is no identity of
citizen qualified to vote, her alleged Filipino parties in the two cases, since it is not enough that
citizenship would still have been left open to there be an identity of persons, but there must be
question. an identity of capacities in which said persons
litigate. (Art. 1259 of the Civil Code; Bowler vs.
Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 Estate of Alvarez, 23 Phil., 561; 34 Corpus Juris, p.
January decision exceeded its jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a 756, par. 1165)
resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and ordered the
transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of In said case of the petition for the exclusion, the
Barangay Old Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay object of the litigation, or the litigious matter was
Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within the competence of the the exclusion of Norberto Guray as a voter from
trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter the election list of the municipality of Luna, while
a resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court in the present que warranto proceeding, the object
over exclusion cases is limited only to determining the right of voter to of the litigation, or the litigious matter is his
remain in the list of voters or to declare that the challenged voter is not exclusion or expulsion from the office to which he
has been elected. Neither does there exist, then, affidavits and certifications under oath of the residents of that place
any identity in the object of the litigation, or the that they have seen petitioner and his family residing in their locality.
litigious matter.
While this may be so, actual and physical is not in itself sufficient to
In said case of the petition for exclusion, the cause show that from said date he had transferred his residence in that place.
of action was that Norberto Guray had not the six To establish a new domicile of choice, personal presence in the place
months' legal residence in the municipality of must be coupled with conduct indicative of that intention. While
Luna to be a qualified voter thereof, while in the "residence" simply requires bodily presence in a given place,
present proceeding of quo warranto, the cause of "domicile" requires not only such bodily presence in that place but also
action is that Norberto Guray has not the one a declared and probable intent to make it one's fixed and permanent
year's legal residence required for eligibility to the place of abode, one's home.28
office of municipal president of Luna. Neither
does there exist therefore, identity of causes of
As a general rule, the principal elements of domicile, physical presence
action.
in the locality involved and intention to adopt it as a domicile, must
concur in order to establish a new domicile. No change of domicile will
In order that res judicata may exist the following result if either of these elements is absent. Intention to acquire a
are necessary: (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of domicile without actual residence in the locality does not result in
things; and (c) identity of issues (Aquino v. acquisition of domicile, nor does the fact of physical presence without
Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 850). And as in the case intention.29
of the petition for excluision and in the
present quo warranto proceeding, as there is no
The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not
identity of parties, or of things or litigious matter,
adequately support a change of domicile. The lease contract may be
or of issues or causes of action, there is no res
indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in Sarangani but it does
judicata.
not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment
of one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his
The Second Issue. permanent residence, no matter how long, without the intention to
abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. 30 Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot
Was DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one
located in the province of Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be
year immediately preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his
used, in the absence of other circumstances, as the reckoning period of
certificate of candidacy?
the one-year residence requirement.
Issue raised by INTERVENOR. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED. The resolution dated
6 May 1998 of the COMELEC 2nd Division and the decision dated 29
After finding that DOMINO is disqualified as candidate for the May 1998 of the COMELEC En Banc, are hereby
position of representative of the province of Sarangani, may AFFIRMED.1âwphi1.nêt
INTERVENOR, as the candidate who received the next highest
number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate? SO ORDERED.
It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second
highest number of votes may not be proclaimed winner in case the
winning candidate is disqualified. 43 In every election, the people's
choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at
all times, be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into
office a candidate by giving the highest number of votes cast in the
election for that office, no one can be declared elected in his place. 44
Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those
who have received the highest number of votes cast in the election for
that office, and it is fundamental idea in all republican forms of
government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the
legal votes cast in the election.47
Petitioner Rev. Elly Velez Pamatong filed his Certificate of Candidacy for
President on December 17, 2003. Respondent Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) refused to give due course to petitioner’s Certificate of
Candidacy in its Resolution No. 6558 dated January 17, 2004. The
decision, however, was not unanimous since Commissioners
Luzviminda G. Tancangco and Mehol K. Sadain voted to include
petitioner as they believed he had parties or movements to back up his
candidacy.
x-----------------------x
The question of whether a candidate is a nuisance candidate or not is
both legal and factual. The basis of the factual determination is not
before this Court. Thus, the remand of this case for the reception of G.R. No. 197221
further evidence is in order.
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, Petitioner,
A word of caution is in order. What is at stake is petitioner’s aspiration vs.
and offer to serve in the government. It deserves not a cursory PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his capacity as the Executive
treatment but a hearing which conforms to the requirements of due Secretary, and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,Respondents.
process.
x-----------------------x
As to petitioner’s attacks on the validity of the form for the certificate
of candidacy, suffice it to say that the form strictly complies with G.R. No. 197280
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code. This provision specifically
enumerates what a certificate of candidacy should contain, with the
required information tending to show that the candidate possesses the ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH, DATU CASAN CONDING CANA, and
minimum qualifications for the position aspired for as established by PARTIDO DEMOKRATIKO PILIPINO LAKAS NG BAYAN (PDP-
the Constitution and other election laws. LABAN), Petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, through its Chairman,
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, COMELEC Case No. SPP (MP) No. SIXTO BRILLANTES, JR., HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., in his
04-001 is hereby remanded to the COMELEC for the reception of capacity as Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, JR., in
further evidence, to determine the question on whether petitioner Elly his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Budget and
Velez Lao Pamatong is a nuisance candidate as contemplated in Management, and HON. ROBERTO B. TAN, in his capacity as
Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code. Treasurer of the Philippines, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 196271 February 28, 2012
G.R. No. 197392
DATU MICHAEL ABAS KIDA, in his personal capacity, and in
representation of MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner,
AUTONOMOUS IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HADJI vs.
MUHMINA J. USMAN, JOHN ANTHONY L. LIM, JAMILON T. THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and EXECUTIVE
ODIN, ASRIN TIMBOL JAIYARI, MUJIB M. KALANG, ALIH AL- SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Respondents.
SAIDI J. SAPI-E, KESSAR DAMSIE ABDIL, and BASSAM ALUH
SAUPI, Petitioners, x-----------------------x
vs.
SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, thru SPEAKER G.R. No. 197454
FELICIANO BELMONTE, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, thru its
JACINTO V. PARAS, Petitioner, THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS (LGUs) BECAUSE (A)
vs. THERE IS NO EXPLICIT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., and THE ON SUCH PARITY; AND (B) THE ARMM IS MORE
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, Respondents. SUPERIOR THAN LGUs IN STRUCTURE, POWERS AND
AUTONOMY, AND CONSEQUENTLY IS A CLASS OF ITS
OWN APART FROM TRADITIONAL LGUs.
MINORITY RIGHTS FORUM, PHILIPPINES, INC., Respondents-
Intervenor.
II. THE UNMISTAKABLE AND UNEQUIVOCAL
CONSTITUTIONAL MANDATE FOR AN ELECTIVE AND
RESOLUTION
REPRESENTATIVE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT AND
LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY IN ARMM INDUBITABLY
BRION, J.: PRECLUDES THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT
OF OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE (OICs), ALBEIT MOMENTARY
We resolve: (a) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners Datu OR TEMPORARY, FOR THE POSITIONS OF ARMM
Michael Abas Kida, et al. in G.R. No. 196271; (b) the motion for GOVERNOR, VICE GOVERNOR AND MEMBERS OF THE
reconsideration filed by petitioner Rep. Edcel Lagman in G.R. No. REGIONAL ASSEMBLY.
197221; (c) the ex abundante ad cautelam motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Basari Mapupuno in G.R. No. 196305; (d) the motion III. THE PRESIDENT’S APPOINTING POWER IS LIMITED
for reconsideration filed by petitioner Atty. Romulo Macalintal in G.R. TO APPOINTIVE OFFICIALS AND DOES NOT EXTEND
No. 197282; (e) the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners TO ELECTIVE OFFICIALS EVEN AS THE PRESIDENT IS
Almarim Centi Tillah, Datu Casan Conding Cana and Partido ONLY VESTED WITH SUPERVISORY POWERS OVER THE
Demokratiko Pilipino Lakas ng Bayan in G.R. No. 197280; (f) the ARMM, THEREBY NEGATING THE AWESOME POWER
manifestation and motion filed by petitioners Almarim Centi Tillah, et TO APPOINT AND REMOVE OICs OCCUPYING
al. in G.R. No. 197280; and (g) the very urgent motion to issue ELECTIVE POSITIONS.
clarificatory resolution that the temporary restraining order (TRO) is
still existing and effective.
IV. THE CONSTITUTION DOES NOT PROSCRIBE THE
HOLDOVER OF ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS PENDING
These motions assail our Decision dated October 18, 2011, where we THE ELECTION AND QUALIFICATION OF THEIR
upheld the constitutionality of Republic Act (RA) No. 10153. Pursuant SUCCESSORS.
to the constitutional mandate of synchronization, RA No. 10153
postponed the regional elections in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
V. THE RULING IN OSMENA DOES NOT APPLY TO
Mindanao (ARMM) (which were scheduled to be held on the second
ARMM ELECTED OFFICIALS WHOSE TERMS OF OFFICE
Monday of August 2011) to the second Monday of May 2013 and
ARE NOT PROVIDED FOR BY THE CONSTITUTION BUT
recognized the President’s power to appoint officers-in-charge (OICs)
PRESCRIBED BY THE ORGANIC ACTS.
to temporarily assume these positions upon the expiration of the terms
of the elected officials.
VI. THE REQUIREMENT OF A SUPERMAJORITY OF ¾
VOTES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND THE
The Motions for Reconsideration
SENATE FOR THE VALIDITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE
AMENDMENT OR REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS
The petitioners in G.R. No. 196271 raise the following grounds in DOES NOT IMPOSE AN IRREPEALABLE LAW.
support of their motion:
VII. THE REQUIREMENT OF A PLEBISCITE FOR THE
I. THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING EFFECTIVITY OF A SUBSTANTIVE AMENDMENT OR
THAT THE ARMM ELECTIONS ARE LOCAL ELECTIONS, REVISION OF THE ORGANIC ACTS DOES NOT UNDULY
CONSIDERING THAT THE CONSTITUTION GIVES THE EXPAND THE PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT OF THE
ARMM A SPECIAL STATUS AND IS SEPARATE AND CONSTITUTION.
DISTINCT FROM ORDINARY LOCAL GOVERNMENT
UNITS.
VIII. SYNCHRONIZATION OF THE ARMM ELECTION
WITH THE NATIONAL AND LOCAL ELECTIONS IS NOT
II. R.A. 10153 AND R.A. 9333 AMEND THE ORGANIC MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
ACT.
IX. THE COMELEC HAS THE AUTHORITY TO HOLD
III. THE SUPERMAJORITY PROVISIONS OF THE AND CONDUCT SPECIAL ELECTIONS IN ARMM, AND
ORGANIC ACT (R.A. 9054) ARE NOT IRREPEALABLE THE ENACTMENT OF AN IMPROVIDENT AND
LAWS. UNCONSTITUTIONAL STATUTE IS AN ANALOGOUS
CAUSE WARRANTING COMELEC’S HOLDING OF
IV. SECTION 3, ARTICLE XVII OF R.A. 9054 DOES NOT SPECIAL ELECTIONS.2 (italics supplied)
VIOLATE SECTION 18, ARTICLE X OF THE
CONSTITUTION. The petitioner in G.R. No. 196305 further asserts that:
V. BALANCE OF INTERESTS TILT IN FAVOR OF THE I. BEFORE THE COURT MAY CONSTRUE OR INTERPRET
DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLE[.]1 A STATUTE, IT IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON THAT
THERE BE DOUBT OR AMBIGUITY IN ITS LANGUAGE.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 raises similar grounds, arguing that:
THE TRANSITORY PROVISIONS HOWEVER ARE CLEAR
I. THE ELECTIVE REGIONAL EXECUTIVE AND AND UNAMBIGUOUS: THEY REFER TO THE 1992
LEGISLATIVE OFFICIALS OF ARMM CANNOT BE ELECTIONS AND TURN-OVER OF ELECTIVE OFFICIALS.
CONSIDERED AS OR EQUATED WITH THE
TRADITIONAL LOCAL GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS IN
IN THUS RECOGNIZING A SUPPOSED "INTENT" OF THE THE HOLDOVER PRINCIPLE ADOPTED IN R.A. NO. 9054
FRAMERS, AND APPLYING THE SAME TO ELECTIONS DOES NOT VIOLATE THE CONSTITUTION, AND
20 YEARS AFTER, THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT BEFORE THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN EITHER
MAY HAVE VIOLATED THEFOREMOST RULE IN AN ELECTION TO BE HELD AT THE SOONEST POSSIBLE
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION. TIME OR IN MAY 2013, THE SAID INCUMBENT ARMM
REGIONAL OFFICIALS MAY VALIDLY CONTINUE
FUNCTIONING AS SUCH IN A HOLDOVER CAPACITY
xxxx
IN ACCORDANCE WITH SECTION 7, ARTICLE VII OF
R.A. NO. 9054.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT SHOULD HAVE
CONSIDERED THAT RA 9054, AN ORGANIC ACT, WAS
D.
COMPLETE IN ITSELF. HENCE, RA 10153 SHOULD BE
CONSIDERED TO HAVE BEEN ENACTED PRECISELY TO
AMEND RA 9054. WITH THE CANCELLATION OF THE AUGUST 2011
ARMM ELECTIONS, SPECIAL ELECTIONS MUST
IMMEDIATELY BE HELD FOR THE ELECTIVE
xxxx
REGIONAL OFFICIALS OF THE ARMM WHO SHALL
SERVE UNTIL THEIR SUCCESSORS ARE ELECTED IN
III. THE HONORABLE COURT MAY HAVE COMMITTED THE MAY 2013 SYNCHRONIZED ELECTIONS.4
A SERIOUS ERROR IN DECLARING THE 2/3 VOTING
REQUIREMENT SET FORTH IN RA 9054 AS
Finally, the petitioners in G.R. No. 197280 argue that:
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
xxxx
c) RA No. 10153 amends the Organic Act (RA No. 9054) and,
thus, has to comply with the 2/3 vote from the House of
V. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS Representatives and the Senate, voting separately, and be
ERROR IN DECLARING THE HOLD-OVER OF ARMM ratified in a plebiscite;
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
d) if the choice is between elective officials continuing to
xxxx hold their offices even after their terms are over and non-
elective individuals getting into the vacant elective positions
VI. THE HONORABLE COURT COMMITTED A SERIOUS by appointment as OICs, the holdover option is the better
ERROR IN UPHOLDING THE APPOINTMENT OF choice;
OFFICERS-IN-CHARGE.3 (italics and underscoring
supplied) e) the President only has the power of supervision over
autonomous regions, which does not include the power to
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 contends that: appoint OICs to take the place of ARMM elective officials;
and
A.
f) it would be better to hold the ARMM elections separately
from the national and local elections as this will make it
ASSUMING WITHOUT CONCEDING THAT THE easier for the authorities to implement election laws.
APPOINTMENT OF OICs FOR THE REGIONAL
GOVERNMENT OF THE ARMM IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL TO BEGIN WITH, SUCH In essence, the Court is asked to resolve the following questions:
APPOINTMENT OF OIC REGIONAL OFFICIALS WILL
CREATE A FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE IN THE BASIC (a) Does the Constitution mandate the synchronization of
STRUCTURE OF THE REGIONAL GOVERNMENT SUCH ARMM regional elections with national and local elections?
THAT R.A. NO. 10153 SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUBMITTED
TO A PLEBISCITE IN THE ARMM FOR APPROVAL BY ITS
(b) Does RA No. 10153 amend RA No. 9054? If so, does RA
PEOPLE, WHICH PLEBISCITE REQUIREMENT CANNOT
No. 10153 have to comply with the supermajority vote and
BE CIRCUMVENTED BY SIMPLY CHARACTERIZING
plebiscite requirements?
THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 10153 ON APPOINTMENT
OF OICs AS AN "INTERIM MEASURE".
(c) Is the holdover provision in RA No. 9054 constitutional?
B.
(d) Does the COMELEC have the power to call for special
elections in ARMM?
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE APPOINTMENT BY THE PRESIDENT OF OICs FOR
THE ARMM REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IS NOT (e) Does granting the President the power to appoint OICs
VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTION. violate the elective and representative nature of ARMM
regional legislative and executive offices?
C.
(f) Does the appointment power granted to the President I proposed this because of the proposed section of the Article on
exceed the President’s supervisory powers over autonomous Transitory Provisions giving a term to the incumbent President and
regions? Vice-President until 1992. Necessarily then, since the term provided by
the Commission for Members of the Lower House and for local
officials is three years, if there will be an election in 1987, the next
The Court’s Ruling
election for said officers will be in 1990, and it would be very close to
1992. We could never attain, subsequently, any synchronization of
We deny the motions for lack of merit. election which is once every three years.
Synchronization mandate includes ARMM elections So under my proposal we will be able to begin actual
synchronization in 1992, and consequently, we should not have a local
The Court was unanimous in holding that the Constitution mandates election or an election for Members of the Lower House in 1990 for
the synchronization of national and local elections. While the them to be able to complete their term of three years each. And if we
Constitution does not expressly instruct Congress to synchronize the also stagger the Senate, upon the first election it will result in an
national and local elections, the intention can be inferred from the election in 1993 for the Senate alone, and there will be an election for 12
following provisions of the Transitory Provisions (Article XVIII) of the Senators in 1990. But for the remaining 12 who will be elected in 1987,
Constitution, which state: if their term is for six years, their election will be in 1993. So,
consequently we will have elections in 1990, in 1992 and in 1993. The
later election will be limited to only 12 Senators and of course to the
Section 1. The first elections of Members of the Congress under this local officials and the Members of the Lower House. But, definitely,
Constitution shall be held on the second Monday of May, 1987. thereafter we can never have an election once every three years,
therefore defeating the very purpose of the Commission when we
The first local elections shall be held on a date to be determined by the adopted the term of six years for the President and another six years
President, which may be simultaneous with the election of the for the Senators with the possibility of staggering with 12 to serve for
Members of the Congress. It shall include the election of all Members six years and 12 for three years insofar as the first Senators are
of the city or municipal councils in the Metropolitan Manila area. concerned. And so my proposal is the only way to effect the first
synchronized election which would mean, necessarily, a bonus of
two years to the Members of the Lower House and a bonus of two
Section 2. The Senators, Members of the House of Representatives, and years to the local elective officials.
the local officials first elected under this Constitution shall serve until
noon of June 30, 1992.
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Rodrigo). What does the committee
say?
Of the Senators elected in the elections in 1992, the first twelve
obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for six years and the
remaining twelve for three years. MR. DE CASTRO. Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. DAVIDE. Before going to the proposed amendment, I would only MR. GUINGONA. What will be synchronized, therefore, is the election
state that in view of the action taken by the Commission on Section 2 of the incumbent President and Vice-President in 1992.
earlier, I am formulating a new proposal. It will read as follows: "THE
SENATORS, MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
AND THE LOCAL OFFICIALS FIRST ELECTED UNDER THIS MR. DAVIDE. Yes.
CONSTITUTION SHALL SERVE UNTIL NOON OF JUNE 30, 1992."
MR. GUINGONA. Not the reverse. Will the committee not
synchronize the election of the Senators and local officials with the
election of the President?
MR. DAVIDE. It works both ways, Mr. Presiding Officer. The attempt as local governments, it follows that elections held in autonomous
here is on the assumption that the provision of the Transitory regions are also considered as local elections.
Provisions on the term of the incumbent President and Vice-President
would really end in 1992.
The petitioners further argue that even assuming that the Constitution
mandates the synchronization of elections, the ARMM elections are not
MR. GUINGONA. Yes. covered by this mandate since they are regional elections and not local
elections.
MR. DAVIDE. In other words, there will be a single election in 1992
for all, from the President up to the municipal officials.5 (emphases In construing provisions of the Constitution, the first rule is verba
and underscoring ours) legis, "that is, wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution
must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are
employed."9 Applying this principle to determine the scope of "local
The framers of the Constitution could not have expressed their
elections," we refer to the meaning of the word "local," as understood
objective more clearly – there was to be a single election in 1992 for all
in its ordinary sense. As defined in Webster’s Third New International
elective officials – from the President down to the municipal officials.
Dictionary Unabridged, "local" refers to something "that primarily
Significantly, the framers were even willing to temporarily lengthen or
serves the needs of a particular limited district, often a community or
shorten the terms of elective officials in order to meet this objective,
minor political subdivision." Obviously, the ARMM elections, which
highlighting the importance of this constitutional mandate.
are held within the confines of the autonomous region of Muslim
Mindanao, fall within this definition.
We came to the same conclusion in Osmeña v. Commission on
Elections,6 where we unequivocally stated that "the Constitution has
To be sure, the fact that the ARMM possesses more powers than other
mandated synchronized national and local elections." 7 Despite the
provinces, cities, or municipalities is not enough reason to treat the
length and verbosity of their motions, the petitioners have failed to
ARMM regional elections differently from the other local elections. Ubi
convince us to deviate from this established ruling.
lex non distinguit nec nos distinguire debemus. When the law does not
distinguish, we must not distinguish.10
Neither do we find any merit in the petitioners’ contention that the
ARMM elections are not covered by the constitutional mandate of
RA No. 10153 does not amend RA No. 9054
synchronization because the ARMM elections were not specifically
mentioned in the above-quoted Transitory Provisions of the
Constitution. The petitioners are adamant that the provisions of RA No. 10153, in
postponing the ARMM elections, amend RA No. 9054.
That the ARMM elections were not expressly mentioned in the
Transitory Provisions of the Constitution on synchronization cannot be We cannot agree with their position.
interpreted to mean that the ARMM elections are not covered by the
constitutional mandate of synchronization. We have to consider that
A thorough reading of RA No. 9054 reveals that it fixes the schedule
the ARMM, as we now know it, had not yet been officially organized
for only the first ARMM elections;11 it does not provide the date for the
at the time the Constitution was enacted and ratified by the people.
succeeding regular ARMM elections. In providing for the date of the
Keeping in mind that a constitution is not intended to provide merely
regular ARMM elections, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 clearly do
for the exigencies of a few years but is to endure through generations
not amend RA No. 9054 since these laws do not change or revise any
for as long as it remains unaltered by the people as ultimate sovereign,
provision in RA No. 9054. In fixing the date of the ARMM elections
a constitution should be construed in the light of what actually is a
subsequent to the first election, RA No. 9333 and RA No. 10153 merely
continuing instrument to govern not only the present but also the
filled the gap left in RA No. 9054.
unfolding events of the indefinite future. Although the principles
embodied in a constitution remain fixed and unchanged from the time
of its adoption, a constitution must be construed as a dynamic process We reiterate our previous observations:
intended to stand for a great length of time, to be progressive and not
static.8 This view – that Congress thought it best to leave the determination of
the date of succeeding ARMM elections to legislative discretion – finds
To reiterate, Article X of the Constitution, entitled "Local Government," support in ARMM’s recent history.
clearly shows the intention of the Constitution to classify autonomous
regions, such as the ARMM, as local governments. We refer to Section To recall, RA No. 10153 is not the first law passed that rescheduled the
1 of this Article, which provides: ARMM elections. The First Organic Act – RA No. 6734 – not only did
not fix the date of the subsequent elections; it did not even fix the
Section 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of specific date of the first ARMM elections, leaving the date to be fixed in
the Philippines are the provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays. another legislative enactment. Consequently, RA No. 7647, RA No.
There shall be autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and the 8176, RA No. 8746, RA No. 8753, and RA No. 9012 were all enacted by
Cordilleras as hereinafter provided. Congress to fix the dates of the ARMM elections. Since these laws did
not change or modify any part or provision of RA No. 6734, they were
not amendments to this latter law. Consequently, there was no need to
The inclusion of autonomous regions in the enumeration of political
submit them to any plebiscite for ratification.
subdivisions of the State under the heading "Local Government"
indicates quite clearly the constitutional intent to consider autonomous
regions as one of the forms of local governments. The Second Organic Act – RA No. 9054 – which lapsed into law on
March 31, 2001, provided that the first elections would be held on the
second Monday of September 2001. Thereafter, Congress passed RA
That the Constitution mentions only the "national government" and the
No. 9140 to reset the date of the ARMM elections. Significantly, while
"local governments," and does not make a distinction between the
RA No. 9140 also scheduled the plebiscite for the ratification of the
"local government" and the "regional government," is particularly
Second Organic Act (RA No. 9054), the new date of the ARMM
revealing, betraying as it does the intention of the framers of the
regional elections fixed in RA No. 9140 was not among the
Constitution to consider the autonomous regions not as separate forms
provisions ratified in the plebiscite held to approve RA No. 9054.
of government, but as political units which, while having more powers
Thereafter, Congress passed RA No. 9333, which further reset the date
and attributes than other local government units, still remain under the
category of local governments. Since autonomous regions are classified
of the ARMM regional elections. Again, this law was not ratified We also highlight an important point raised by Justice Antonio T.
through a plebiscite. Carpio in his dissenting opinion, where he stated: "Section 1, Article
XVII of RA 9054 erects a high vote threshold for each House of
Congress to surmount, effectively and unconstitutionally, taking RA
From these legislative actions, we see the clear intention of Congress to
9054 beyond the reach of Congress’ amendatory powers. One Congress
treat the laws which fix the date of the subsequent ARMM elections as
cannot limit or reduce the plenary legislative power of succeeding
separate and distinct from the Organic Acts. Congress only acted
Congresses by requiring a higher vote threshold than what the
consistently with this intent when it passed RA No. 10153 without
Constitution requires to enact, amend or repeal laws. No law can be
requiring compliance with the amendment prerequisites embodied in
passed fixing such a higher vote threshold because Congress has no
Section 1 and Section 3, Article XVII of RA No. 9054. 12 (emphases
power, by ordinary legislation, to amend the Constitution."19
supplied)
The petitioners are one in defending the constitutionality of Section Neither do we find any merit in the contention that the Commission on
7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054, which allows the regional officials to Elections (COMELEC) is sufficiently empowered to set the date of
remain in their positions in a holdover capacity. The petitioners special elections in the ARMM. To recall, the Constitution has merely
essentially argue that the ARMM regional officials should be allowed empowered the COMELEC to enforce and administer all laws and
to remain in their respective positions until the May 2013 elections regulations relative to the conduct of an election. 24 Although the
since there is no specific provision in the Constitution which prohibits legislature, under the Omnibus Election Code (Batas Pambansa Bilang
regional elective officials from performing their duties in a holdover [BP] 881), has granted the COMELEC the power to postpone elections
capacity. to another date, this power is confined to the specific terms and
circumstances provided for in the law. Specifically, this power falls
within the narrow confines of the following provisions:
The pertinent provision of the Constitution is Section 8, Article X
which provides:
Section 5. Postponement of election. - When for any serious cause such
as violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except
records, force majeure, and other analogous causes of such a nature
barangay officials, which shall be determined by law, shall be three
that the holding of a free, orderly and honest election should become
years and no such official shall serve for more than three consecutive
impossible in any political subdivision, the Commission, motu
terms. [emphases ours]
proprio or upon a verified petition by any interested party, and after
due notice and hearing, whereby all interested parties are afforded
On the other hand, Section 7(1), Article VII of RA No. 9054 provides: equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election therein to a
date which should be reasonably close to the date of the election not
Section 7. Terms of Office of Elective Regional Officials. – (1) Terms of held, suspended or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later
Office. The terms of office of the Regional Governor, Regional Vice than thirty days after the cessation of the cause for such postponement
Governor and members of the Regional Assembly shall be for a period or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
of three (3) years, which shall begin at noon on the 30th day of
September next following the day of the election and shall end at noon Section 6. Failure of election. - If, on account of force
of the same date three (3) years thereafter. The incumbent elective majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous causes the
officials of the autonomous region shall continue in effect until their election in any polling place has not been held on the date
successors are elected and qualified. fixed, or had been suspended before the hour fixed by law for the
closing of the voting, or after the voting and during the preparation
The clear wording of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution expresses and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or
the intent of the framers of the Constitution to categorically set a canvass thereof, such election results in a failure to elect, and in any
limitation on the period within which all elective local officials can of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the
occupy their offices. We have already established that elective ARMM result of the election, the Commission shall, on the basis of a verified
officials are also local officials; they are, thus, bound by the three-year petition by any interested party and after due notice and hearing, call
term limit prescribed by the Constitution. It, therefore, becomes for the holding or continuation of the election not held, suspended or
irrelevant that the Constitution does not expressly prohibit elective which resulted in a failure to elect on a date reasonably close to the
officials from acting in a holdover capacity. Short of amending the date of the election not held, suspended or which resulted in a failure
Constitution, Congress has no authority to extend the three-year term to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
limit by inserting a holdover provision in RA No. 9054. Thus, the term such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect.
of three years for local officials should stay at three (3) years, as fixed [emphases and underscoring ours]
by the Constitution, and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.
As we have previously observed in our assailed decision, both Section
Admittedly, we have, in the past, recognized the validity of holdover 5 and Section 6 of BP 881 address instances where elections have
provisions in various laws. One significant difference between the already been scheduled to take place but do not occur or had to be
present case and these past cases22 is that while these past cases all refer suspended because of unexpected and unforeseen circumstances, such
to elective barangay or sangguniang kabataan officials whose terms of as violence, fraud, terrorism, and other analogous circumstances.
office are not explicitly provided for in the Constitution, the present
case refers to local elective officials - the ARMM Governor, the ARMM In contrast, the ARMM elections were postponed by law, in
Vice Governor, and the members of the Regional Legislative Assembly furtherance of the constitutional mandate of synchronization of
- whose terms fall within the three-year term limit set by Section 8, national and local elections. Obviously, this does not fall under any of
Article X of the Constitution. the circumstances contemplated by Section 5 or Section 6 of BP 881.
Even assuming that a holdover is constitutionally permissible, and More importantly, RA No. 10153 has already fixed the date for the next
there had been statutory basis for it (namely Section 7, Article VII of ARMM elections and the COMELEC has no authority to set a different
RA No. 9054), the rule of holdover can only apply as an available election date.
option where no express or implied legislative intent to the contrary
exists; it cannot apply where such contrary intent is evident. 23
Even assuming that the COMELEC has the authority to hold special
elections, and this Court can compel the COMELEC to do so, there is
Congress, in passing RA No. 10153 and removing the holdover option, still the problem of having to shorten the terms of the newly elected
has made it clear that it wants to suppress the holdover rule expressed officials in order to synchronize the ARMM elections with the May
in RA No. 9054. Congress, in the exercise of its plenary legislative 2013 national and local elections. Obviously, neither the Court nor the
powers, has clearly acted within its discretion when it deleted the COMELEC has the authority to do this, amounting as it does to an
holdover option, and this Court has no authority to question the amendment of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, which limits the
wisdom of this decision, absent any evidence of unconstitutionality or term of local officials to three years.
grave abuse of discretion. It is for the legislature and the executive, and
not this Court, to decide how to fill the vacancies in the ARMM
President’s authority to appoint OICs
regional government which arise from the legislature complying with
the constitutional mandate of synchronization.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 197221 argues that the President’s power to where there are offices which have to be filled, but the law does not
appoint pertains only to appointive positions and cannot extend to provide the process for filling them, the Constitution recognizes the
positions held by elective officials. power of the President to fill the office by appointment.
The power to appoint has traditionally been recognized as executive in Any limitation on or qualification to the exercise of the President’s
nature.25 Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution describes in broad appointment power should be strictly construed and must be clearly
strokes the extent of this power, thus: stated in order to be recognized. 29 Given that the President derives his
power to appoint OICs in the ARMM regional government from law, it
falls under the classification of presidential appointments covered by
Section 16. The President shall nominate and, with the consent of the
the second sentence of Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution; the
Commission on Appointments, appoint the heads of the executive
President’s appointment power thus rests on clear constitutional basis.
departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, or
officers of the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in him in this The petitioners also jointly assert that RA No. 10153, in granting the
Constitution. He shall also appoint all other officers of the President the power to appoint OICs in elective positions, violates
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided for by Section 16, Article X of the Constitution, 30 which merely grants the
law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to appoint. The President the power of supervision over autonomous regions.
Congress may, by law, vest the appointment of other officers lower in
rank in the President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of
This is an overly restrictive interpretation of the President’s
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. [emphasis ours]
appointment power. There is no incompatibility between the
President’s power of supervision over local governments and
The 1935 Constitution contained a provision similar to the one quoted autonomous regions, and the power granted to the President, within
above. Section 10(3), Article VII of the 1935 Constitution provides: the specific confines of RA No. 10153, to appoint OICs.
(3) The President shall nominate and with the consent of the The power of supervision is defined as "the power of a superior officer
Commission on Appointments, shall appoint the heads of the to see to it that lower officers perform their functions in accordance
executive departments and bureaus, officers of the Army from the rank with law."31 This is distinguished from the power of control or "the
of colonel, of the Navy and Air Forces from the rank of captain or power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a subordinate
commander, and all other officers of the Government whose officer had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and those whom judgment of the former for the latter."32
he may be authorized by law to appoint; but the Congress may by law
vest the appointment of inferior officers, in the President alone, in the
The petitioners’ apprehension regarding the President’s alleged power
courts, or in the heads of departments. [emphasis ours]
of control over the OICs is rooted in their belief that the President’s
appointment power includes the power to remove these officials at
The main distinction between the provision in the 1987 Constitution will. In this way, the petitioners foresee that the appointed OICs will
and its counterpart in the 1935 Constitution is the sentence be beholden to the President, and act as representatives of the
construction; while in the 1935 Constitution, the various appointments President and not of the people.
the President can make are enumerated in a single sentence, the 1987
Constitution enumerates the various appointments the President is
Section 3 of RA No. 10153 expressly contradicts the petitioners’
empowered to make and divides the enumeration in two sentences.
supposition. The provision states:
The change in style is significant; in providing for this change, the
framers of the 1987 Constitution clearly sought to make a distinction
between the first group of presidential appointments and the second Section 3. Appointment of Officers-in-Charge. — The President shall
group of presidential appointments, as made evident in the following appoint officers-in-charge for the Office of the Regional Governor,
exchange: Regional Vice Governor and Members of the Regional Legislative
Assembly who shall perform the functions pertaining to the said
offices until the officials duly elected in the May 2013 elections shall
MR. FOZ. Madame President x x x I propose to put a period (.) after
have qualified and assumed office.
"captain" and x x x delete "and all" and substitute it with HE SHALL
ALSO APPOINT ANY.
The wording of the law is clear. Once the President has appointed the
OICs for the offices of the Governor, Vice Governor and members of
MR. REGALADO. Madam President, the Committee accepts the
the Regional Legislative Assembly, these same officials will remain in
proposed amendment because it makes it clear that those other officers
office until they are replaced by the duly elected officials in the May
mentioned therein do not have to be confirmed by the Commission on
2013 elections. Nothing in this provision even hints that the President
Appointments.26
has the power to recall the appointments he already made. Clearly, the
petitioners’ fears in this regard are more apparent than real.
The first group of presidential appointments, specified as the heads of
the executive departments, ambassadors, other public ministers and
RA No. 10153 as an interim measure
consuls, or officers of the Armed Forces, and other officers whose
appointments are vested in the President by the Constitution, pertains
to the appointive officials who have to be confirmed by the We reiterate once more the importance of considering RA No. 10153
Commission on Appointments. not in a vacuum, but within the context it was enacted in. In the first
place, Congress enacted RA No. 10153 primarily to heed the
constitutional mandate to synchronize the ARMM regional elections
The second group of officials the President can appoint are "all other
with the national and local elections. To do this, Congress had to
officers of the Government whose appointments are not otherwise
postpone the scheduled ARMM elections for another date, leaving it
provided for by law, and those whom he may be authorized by law to
with the problem of how to provide the ARMM with governance in
appoint."27 The second sentence acts as the "catch-all provision" for the
the intervening period, between the expiration of the term of those
President’s appointment power, in recognition of the fact that the
elected in August 2008 and the assumption to office – twenty-one (21)
power to appoint is essentially executive in nature. 28 The wide latitude
months away – of those who will win in the synchronized elections on
given to the President to appoint is further demonstrated by the
May 13, 2013.
recognition of the President’s power to appoint officials whose
appointments are not even provided for by law. In other words,
In our assailed Decision, we already identified the three possible Secondly, the fact that our previous decision was based on a slim vote
solutions open to Congress to address the problem created by of 8-7 does not, and cannot, have the effect of making our ruling any
synchronization – (a) allow the incumbent officials to remain in office less effective or binding. Regardless of how close the voting is, so long
after the expiration of their terms in a holdover capacity; (b) call for as there is concurrence of the majority of the members of the en banc
special elections to be held, and shorten the terms of those to be elected who actually took part in the deliberations of the case, 37 a decision
so the next ARMM regional elections can be held on May 13, 2013; or garnering only 8 votes out of 15 members is still a decision of the
(c) recognize that the President, in the exercise of his appointment Supreme Court en banc and must be respected as such. The petitioners
powers and in line with his power of supervision over the ARMM, can are, therefore, not in any position to speculate that, based on the
appoint interim OICs to hold the vacated positions in the ARMM voting, "the probability exists that their motion for reconsideration
regional government upon the expiration of their terms. We have may be granted."38
already established the unconstitutionality of the first two options,
leaving us to consider the last available option.
Similarly, the petitioner in G.R. No. 197282, in his Very Urgent Motion
to Issue Clarificatory Resolution, argues that since motions for
In this way, RA No. 10153 is in reality an interim measure, enacted to reconsideration were filed by the aggrieved parties challenging our
respond to the adjustment that synchronization requires. Given the October 18, 2011 decision in the present case, the TRO we initially
context, we have to judge RA No. 10153 by the standard of issued on September 13, 2011 should remain subsisting and effective.
reasonableness in responding to the challenges brought about by He further argues that any attempt by the Executive to implement our
synchronizing the ARMM elections with the national and local October 18, 2011 decision pending resolution of the motions for
elections. In other words, "given the plain unconstitutionality of reconsideration "borders on disrespect if not outright insolence" 39 to
providing for a holdover and the unavailability of constitutional this Court.
possibilities for lengthening or shortening the term of the elected
ARMM officials, is the choice of the President’s power to appoint – for
In support of this theory, the petitioner cites Samad v.
a fixed and specific period as an interim measure, and as allowed
COMELEC,40 where the Court held that while it had already issued a
under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution – an unconstitutional
decision lifting the TRO, the lifting of the TRO is not yet final and
or unreasonable choice for Congress to make?"33
executory, and can also be the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner also cites the minute resolution issued by the Court in
We admit that synchronization will temporarily disrupt the election Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance,41 where the Court reproached the
process in a local community, the ARMM, as well as the community’s Commissioner of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for manifesting its
choice of leaders. However, we have to keep in mind that the adoption intention to implement the decision of the Court, noting that the Court
of this measure is a matter of necessity in order to comply with a had not yet lifted the TRO previously issued.42
mandate that the Constitution itself has set out for us. Moreover, the
implementation of the provisions of RA No. 10153 as an interim
We agree with the petitioner that the lifting of a TRO can be included
measure is comparable to the interim measures traditionally practiced
as a subject of a motion for reconsideration filed to assail our decision.
when, for instance, the President appoints officials holding elective
It does not follow, however, that the TRO remains effective until after
offices upon the creation of new local government units.
we have issued a final and executory decision, especially considering
the clear wording of the dispositive portion of our October 18, 2011
The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs in place of the decision, which states:
elective members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is neither novel
nor innovative. The power granted to the President, via RA No. 10153,
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DISMISS the consolidated
to appoint members of the Regional Legislative Assembly is
petitions assailing the validity of RA No. 10153 for lack of merit, and
comparable to the power granted by BP 881 (the Omnibus Election
UPHOLD the constitutionality of this law. We likewise LIFT the
Code) to the President to fill any vacancy for any cause in the Regional
temporary restraining order we issued in our Resolution of September
Legislative Assembly (then called the Sangguniang Pampook).34
13, 2011. No costs.43 (emphases ours)
Firstly, the principle of judicial courtesy is based on the hierarchy of As a final point, we wish to address the bleak picture that the
courts and applies only to lower courts in instances where, even if petitioner in G.R. No. 197282 presents in his motion, that our Decision
there is no writ of preliminary injunction or TRO issued by a higher has virtually given the President the power and authority to appoint
court, it would be proper for a lower court to suspend its proceedings 672,416 OICs in the event that the elections of barangay and
for practical and ethical considerations. 35 In other words, the principle Sangguniang Kabataan officials are postponed or cancelled.
of "judicial courtesy" applies where there is a strong probability that
the issues before the higher court would be rendered moot and
We find this speculation nothing short of fear-mongering.
moribund as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the
lower court or court of origin. 36Consequently, this principle cannot be
applied to the President, who represents a co-equal branch of This argument fails to take into consideration the unique factual and
government. To suggest otherwise would be to disregard the principle legal circumstances which led to the enactment of RA No. 10153. RA
of separation of powers, on which our whole system of government is No. 10153 was passed in order to synchronize the ARMM elections
founded upon. with the national and local elections. In the course of synchronizing the
ARMM elections with the national and local elections, Congress had to the 1987 Constitution allows more than one (1) member of Congress to
grant the President the power to appoint OICs in the ARMM, in light sit in the JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2) representatives
of the fact that: (a) holdover by the incumbent ARMM elective officials from each House of Congress with one (1) vote each is sanctioned by
is legally impermissible; and (b) Congress cannot call for special the Constitution.
elections and shorten the terms of elective local officials for less than
three years.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the assailed subject decision,
disposing the same in the following manner:
Unlike local officials, as the Constitution does not prescribe a term
limit for barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan officials, there is no
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The current numerical
legal proscription which prevents these specific government officials
composition of the Judicial and Bar Council is declared
from continuing in a holdover capacity should some exigency require
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
the postponement of barangay or Sangguniang Kabataan elections.
enjoined to reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of Congress
Clearly, these fears have neither legal nor factual basis to stand on.
will sit as a representative in its proceedings, in accordance with
Section 8(1), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
For the foregoing reasons, we deny the petitioners’ motions for
reconsideration.
This disposition is immediately executory.
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration 1 filed by the Office of the Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of appointments to the
Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the respondents, Senator Francis Judiciary of the evils of political pressure and partisan activities, 15 the
Joseph G. Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents), members of the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create a
duly opposed2 by the petitioner, former Solicitor General Francisco I. separate, competent and independent body to recommend nominees to
Chavez (petitioner). the President.
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed from the Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the stakeholders in
unexpected departure of former Chief Justice Renato C. Corona on the judicial appointment process, and called it the Judicial and Bar
May 29, 2012, and the nomination of petitioner, as his potential Council (JBC). The Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of
successor. In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court to the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
determine 1] whether the first paragraph of Section 8, Article VIII of
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the JBC. Had the intention been otherwise, the Constitution could have, in
supervision of the Supreme Court composed of the Chief Justice as ex no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be read in its other provisions.
officio Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a representative of the
Congress as ex officio Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar,
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that several
a professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme Court, and a
provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in tune with the shift to
representative of the private sector.
bicameralism. One example is Section 4, Article VII, which provides
that a tie in the presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of
From the moment of the creation of the JBC, Congress designated one all the Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
(1) representative to sit in the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof which requires the nominee
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision that Congress is to replace the Vice-President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
entitled to one (1) representative, each House sent a representative to Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
the JBC, not together, but alternately or by rotation. separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the proclamation of martial
law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may
be revoked or continued by the Congress, voting separately, by a vote
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC was substantially
of at least a majority of all its Members." 22 In all these provisions, the
altered.1âwphi1 An eighth member was added to the JBC as the two (2)
bicameral nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
representatives from Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC,
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a matter would be
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
handled and voted upon by its two Houses.
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust Section 8, Article
Senate and the House of Representatives one full vote each.18 It has
VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their decision to shift to a bicameral
been the situation since then.
form of the legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents cannot
just lean on plain oversight to justify a conclusion favorable to them. It
Grounds relied upon by Respondents is very clear that the Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision
on congressional representation in the JBC because it was not in the
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that the Court exercise of its primary function – to legislate. JBC was created to
reconsider its decision and dismiss the petition on the following support the executive power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole
grounds: 1] that allowing only one representative from Congress in the body, was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative function.
JBC would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral nature; 2] that
the failure of the Framers to make the proper adjustment when there The underlying reason for such a limited participation can easily be
was a shift from unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight; discerned. Congress has two (2) Houses. The need to recognize the
3] that two representatives from Congress would not subvert the existence and the role of each House is essential considering that the
intention of the Framers to insulate the JBC from political partisanship; Constitution employs precise language in laying down the functions
and 4] that the rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member which particular House plays, regardless of whether the two Houses
composition would provide a solution should there be a stalemate is consummate an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether in
not exactly correct. the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-legislative functions such as
inter alia, the power of appropriation, 24 the declaration of an existence
While the Court may find some sense in the reasoning in amplification of a state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the President and
of the third and fourth grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds Vice-President,26 and impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House
itself unable to reverse the assailed decision on the principal issues must be acknowledged and recognized considering the interplay
covered by the first and second grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, between these two Houses. In all these instances, each House is
the conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and second grounds, constitutionally granted with powers and functions peculiar to its
carries greater bearing in the final resolution of this case. nature and with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the other
chamber; and 2) in consonance with the principle of checks and
balances, as to the other branches of government.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall discuss them
jointly.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no interaction between the
two Houses in their participation in the JBC. No mechanism is
Ruling of the Court required between the Senate and the House of Representatives in the
screening and nomination of judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the Filipino people by the JBC, the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to the four
which the fundamental powers of government are established, limited (4) regular members, three (3) representatives from the major branches
and defined and by which those powers are distributed among the of government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio Chairman (representing
several departments for their safe and useful exercise for the benefit of the Judicial Department), the Secretary of Justice (representing the
the body politic.19 The Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on Executive Department), and a representative of the Congress
one suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the principles and the (representing the Legislative Department). The total is seven (7), not
framework upon which government and society were to operate. Thus, eight. In so providing, the Framers simply gave recognition to the
in the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the Court firmly Legislature, not because it was in the interest of a certain constituency,
relies on the basic postulate that the Framers mean what they say. The but in reverence to it as a major branch of government.
language used in the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every word employed in On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon A. Datumanong,
the Constitution must be interpreted to exude its deliberate intent from the Second District of Maguindanao, submitted his well-
which must be maintained inviolate against disobedience and considered position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
defiance. What the Constitution clearly says, according to its text,
compels acceptance and bars modification even by the branch tasked
to interpret it. I humbly reiterate my position that there should be only one
representative of Congress in the JBC in accordance with Article VIII,
Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution x x x.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the argument of plain
oversight in order to justify constitutional construction. As stated in
the July 17, 2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a" to The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous and does not need
describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino people through the any further interpretation. Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-
Framers intended that Congress be entitled to only one (1) seat in the repeated doctrine that "construction and interpretation come only after
it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inadequate scheme. While the latter justifies and, in fact, necessitates the
without them." separateness of the two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no
such dichotomy need be made when Congress interacts with the other
two co-equal branches of government.
Further, to allow Congress to have two representatives in the Council,
with one vote each, is to negate the principle of equality among the
three branches of government which is enshrined in the Constitution. It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the three
governmental branches to assign the same weight to considerations
that any of its representatives may have regarding aspiring nominees
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition that the Council
to the judiciary. The representatives of the Senate and the House of
should adopt the rule of single representation of Congress in the JBC in
Representatives act as such for one branch and should not have any
order to respect and give the right meaning to the above-quoted
more quantitative influence as the other branches in the exercise of
provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the three. Sound reason and
principle of equality among the three branches support this conclusion.
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice Leonardo A. Quisumbing, [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
also a JBC Consultant, submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
The argument that a senator cannot represent a member of the House
of Representatives in the JBC and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and citations above: the JBC, any member of Congress, whether from the Senate or the House
creation of the JBC is intended to curtail the influence of politics in of Representatives, is constitutionally empowered to represent the
Congress in the appointment of judges, and the understanding is that entire Congress. It may be a constricted constitutional authority, but it
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such, the interpretation of is not an absurdity.
two votes for Congress runs counter to the intendment of the framers.
Such interpretation actually gives Congress more influence in the
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone representative of
appointment of judges. Also, two votes for Congress would increase
Congress is entitled to one full vote. This pronouncement effectively
the number of JBC members to eight, which could lead to voting
disallows the scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2), between
deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership, and a clear
two representatives of Congress. Not only can this unsanctioned
violation of 7 enumerated members in the Constitution. (Emphases
practice cause disorder in the voting process, it is clearly against the
and underscoring supplied)
essence of what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally done directly cannot
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of Justice Agnes VST be done indirectly. To permit or tolerate the splitting of one vote into
Devanadera opined: two or more is clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the Constitution
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional provision, the JBC is envisioned one member of Congress sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to
composed of seven (7) representatives coming from different sectors. presume that this representation carries with him one full vote.
From the enumeration it is patent that each category of members
pertained to a single individual only. Thus, while we do not lose sight It is also an error for respondents to argue that the President, in effect,
of the bicameral nature of our legislative department, it is beyond has more influence over the JBC simply because all of the regular
dispute that Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is explicit members of the JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
and specific that "Congress" shall have only "xxx a representative." balances is still safeguarded because the appointment of all the regular
Thus, two (2) representatives from Congress would increase the members of the JBC is subject to a stringent process of confirmation by
number of JBC members to eight (8), a number beyond what the the Commission on Appointments, which is composed of members of
Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and underscoring Congress.
supplied)
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular composition of the
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter by retired Justice JBC should be accepted, simply because it was only questioned for the
Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a former JBC consultant, is worth first time through the present action, deserves scant consideration.
reiterating.31 Thus: Well-settled is the rule that acts done in violation of the Constitution
no matter how frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional Commission reveals that acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches, because once an
the composition of the JBC reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in act is considered as an infringement of the Constitution it is void from
the Council a representation for the major elements of the community." the very beginning and cannot be the source of any power or authority.
xxx The ex-officio members of the Council consist of representatives
from the three main branches of government while the regular It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a general rule, an
members are composed of various stakeholders in the judiciary. The unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII, Section 8(1) was to treat each ex- duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if
officio member as representing one co-equal branch of government. it has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not absolute. Under
xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven voting members with the doctrine of operative facts, actions previous to the declaration of
the three ex-officio members having equal say in the choice of judicial unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are not nullified. This
nominees. is essential in the interest of fair play. To reiterate the doctrine
enunciated in Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
xxx
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only
No parallelism can be drawn between the representative of Congress applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an
in the JBC and the exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII of the to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may
Constitution. Congress, in relation to the executive and judicial have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot
branches of government, is constitutionally treated as another co-equal always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is
branch in the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the other hand, applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an
the exercise of legislative and constituent powers requires the Senate undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it
and the House of Representatives to coordinate and act as distinct was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under our constitutional unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or
would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a
law creating it.33
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the sensibilities of the Court
tasked to guard the Constitution against usurpation. The Court
remains steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere granted by the
Constitution itself. Judicial activism should never be allowed to
become judicial exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of practical
logic or convenience can convince the Court to perform either an
excision or an insertion that will change the manifest intent of the
Framers. To broaden the scope of congressional representation in the
JBC is tantamount to the inclusion of a subject matter which was not
included in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor constitutional provisions in
order to accommodate all of situations no matter how ideal or
reasonable the proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this
intrusion, the Court declines.
SO ORDERED.