1

People v. Peña
G.R. No. 133964
February 13, 2002

Facts

1. Ramil Peña was charged with murder.

2. In the early morning of December 8, 1995, Peña hired Jimbo Pelagio, a tricycle driver to take him to Paco,
Obando, Bulacan. At the destination, he ordered Pelagio to get off the tricycle.
3. Then, Peña robbed Pelagio of his money and repeatedly struck him on the head with a gun. Pelagio fell on
the ground unconscious. Peña shot him on the head and fled on board his tricycle.
4. That same morning, SPO1 Froilan Bautista got a call from the Valenzuela Emergency Hospital stating
that a man had been shot on the head and was in their hospital. SPO1 Bautista and SPO1 Jose Sta. Ana
rushed to the hospital and found the still conscious Pelagio lying on a stretcher.
5. SPO1 Bautista took the statement of Pelagio where the latter related how Peña inflicted his injuries on
him, which he took down on two sheets of yellow paper. (N.B. Read the statement or declaration made by
Pelagio taken by SPO1 Bautista at the last page)
6. On February 6, 1996, Jimbo Pelagio expired.
7. For his part, Peña claimed that he was in San Isidro, San Luis, Pampanga together with his wife on the
date of the incident. Peña’s testimony was corroborated by his uncle Maximiano Guevarra, the owner of
the house where he stayed.
8. The trial court found Peña guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder. Hence, the Appeal.
9. Peña next claims that the evidence relied upon by the trial court is hearsay and inadmissible. He argues
that said evidence does not constitute res gestae.

Issue
Whether the statement of the victim Jimbo Pelagio as well as the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses on the
victim’s declaration can be considered as part of the res gestae, hence, an exception to the hearsay rule.

Ruling

(A) Dying Declaration

1. The requisites for the admissibility of dying declarations are: (1) at the time the declaration was made,
death was imminent and the declarant was conscious of that fact; (2) the declaration refers to the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death; (3) the declaration relates to facts which the victim was
competent to testify to; (4) the declarant thereafter died; and (5) the declaration is offered in a criminal
case wherein the declarant’s death is the subject of the inquiry.
2. The first element is lacking. It was not established with certainty whether Pelagio uttered his statement
with consciousness of his impending death. While he was in pain when he made his statement, he
expressly stated that Peña only pistol-whipped him and almost shot him.
 3. The crucial factor to consider is the contemporaneity of the moment when the statement was made and
the moment of the realization of death. The time the statement was being made must also be the time the
victim was aware that he was dying.

(B) Res Gestae

4. While it may not qualify as a dying declaration, Pelagio’s statement may nonetheless be admitted in
evidence as part of the res gestae.
5. A declaration made spontaneously after a startling occurrence is deemed as part of the res gestae when
(1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) the statements concern the occurrence in question and
its immediately attending circumstances.
6. Pelagio’s declaration is admissible as part of the res gestae since it was made shortly after a startling
occurrence and under the influence thereof. Under the circumstances, the victim evidently had no
opportunity to contrive his statement beforehand.
7. In People v. Hernandez, the infliction on a person of a gunshot wound on a vital part of the body should
qualify by any standard as a startling occurrence.
8. In this case, it is clear that the pistol-whipping and the gunshot on the head of Pelagio qualified as a
startling occurrence. Notably, Pelagio constantly complained of pain in his head while his statement was
being taken by SPO1 Bautista, so much so that there was no opportunity for him to be able to devise or
contrive anything other than what really happened.

(C) Testimonies or Written Statements of the Prosecution Witnesses

9. As to the testimonies or the written statements of the three prosecution witnesses which were taken into
consideration by the trial court as part of the res gestae, even if there were intervening periods between
the time the victim gave his account of the incident to the prosecution witnesses and the time the latter
first disclosed what the victim told them, the same will not affect the admissibility of the victim’s
declaration or statement as part of res gestae since it is sufficient that such declaration or statement was
made by the victim before he had time to contrive or devise a falsehood.
10. As stated by the trial court found, the straightforward and consistent testimonies of the three vital
prosecution witnesses bear the earmarks of credibility. Further, there exists no ill motive on their part to
prevaricate, hence their testimony is worthy of full faith and credit.

(D) Murder or Homicide

11. However, this Court cannot agree with the trial court that the crime should be murder. While evident
premeditation and treachery were alleged in the information, the trial court did not state why the killing
was qualified to murder. The prosecution failed to establish the attendance of the qualifying
circumstances with concrete proof. The crime proved was only homicide.
12. Aside from the sentence, Peña was also ordered to pay the heirs of the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity in view of prevailing jurisprudence and P26,000.00 as actual damages as supported by
receipts.
 *******************************************************************
The statement or declaration made by Pelagio, taken by SPO1 Bautista, reads:

T: Alam mo ba ang dahilan kung bakit ka naririto sa Valenzuela Emergency T: Dati mo bang kilala si Ramil Peña?
Hospital at kinukunan ka ng salaysay? S: Opo.
S: Opo, dahil pinagpapalo po ako ng baril ni RAMIL PEÑA sa ulo at kinuha T: Ano ba ang tatak ng tricycle mo?
and tricycle kong minamaneho. S: Yamaha RS-100, kulay itim.
T: Taga saan itong si Ramil Peña? T: Sino and may-ari ng tricycle?
S: Sa Dulong Tangke, Valenzuela, (Malinta), M.M. S: Si Rey Dagul.
T: Saan, kailan at anong oras nangyari ito? T: Binaril ka ba ni Ramil?
S: Sa Paco, Obando, Bulacan, kaninang ika-8 ng Disyembre 1995 sa ganap S: Muntik na ho.
na ika-4:15 ng umaga. T: Bakit sa iyo ginawa ni Ramil and bagay na ito?
T: Sakay mo ba itong si Ramil Peña? S: Ewan ko ho.
S: Oho, sumakay sa may gasolinahan ng Petron sa Malinta, Valenzuela, M.M.

People v. Bernabe Palanas

GR No. 214453
June 17, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

A criminal complaint was filed against Palanas before the RTC of Pasig

FACTS:
6:40 in the morning on Block 14, Kenneth St. corner Eusebio Ave. Pasig City. SP02 Ramon Borre (SP02
Borre) brought his 5 month old grandson outside his residence. P03 Leopoldo Zapanta (P03 Zapanta) while was
watching TV in Borre’s house, as he had slept over, he heard 4 successive gunshots and saw 2 men armed with .38
caliber revolvers standing a meter away from Borre. He saw Bernabe Palanas (Palanas) but could not identify the
other shooter. Zapanta and Borre’s stepson Ramil Ranola (Ranola) brought Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital.
On the way, Borre told Ranola and Zapanta that it was “Abe/ Aspog/ Abe Palanas” who shot him. This was repeated to
his wife Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion). 11:00 that day, Borred died in the hospital due to the gunshot wounds.

During the trial, Planas used the defese of alibi and alleged that on the day of the incident he was in Paranaque
city attending his sick father, and attended a baptism in Tondo, whereafter he then went back to his father to
Paranaque. Upon returning to his home in the evening it was only then he knew of such incident due to him being
accused by Resureccion of being the murderer of Borre.

RTC declared that Planas was guity beyond reasonable doubt stating that Borre’s statement was res gestae and
due to positive identification by Zapanta. RTC gave no credence to Palana’s alibi as Paranaque and Pasig could be
travelled to in 1hr. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considered the statement of Borre as a dying
declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether the statement of Borre was a dying declaration

HELD:
YES. The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must
concur:
 (a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
(b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.”

In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
People v. Bernabe Palanas
GR No. 214453
June 17, 2015

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

A criminal complaint was filed against Palanas before the RTC of Pasig

FACTS:
6:40 in the morning on Block 14, Kenneth St. corner Eusebio Ave. Pasig City. SP02 Ramon Borre (SP02
Borre) brought his 5 month old grandson outside his residence. P03 Leopoldo Zapanta (P03 Zapanta) while was
watching TV in Borre’s house, as he had slept over, he heard 4 successive gunshots and saw 2 men armed with .38
caliber revolvers standing a meter away from Borre. He saw Bernabe Palanas (Palanas) but could not identify the
other shooter. Zapanta and Borre’s stepson Ramil Ranola (Ranola) brought Borre to the Pasig City General Hospital.
On the way, Borre told Ranola and Zapanta that it was “Abe/ Aspog/ Abe Palanas” who shot him. This was repeated to
his wife Resurreccion Borre (Resurreccion). 11:00 that day, Borred died in the hospital due to the gunshot wounds.

During the trial, Planas used the defese of alibi and alleged that on the day of the incident he was in Paranaque
city attending his sick father, and attended a baptism in Tondo, whereafter he then went back to his father to
Paranaque. Upon returning to his home in the evening it was only then he knew of such incident due to him being
accused by Resureccion of being the murderer of Borre.

RTC declared that Planas was guity beyond reasonable doubt stating that Borre’s statement was res gestae and
due to positive identification by Zapanta. RTC gave no credence to Palana’s alibi as Paranaque and Pasig could be
travelled to in 1hr. The CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, and considered the statement of Borre as a dying
declaration.

ISSUE:
Whether the statement of Borre was a dying declaration

HELD:
YES. The CA is also correct in admitting SPO2 Borre’s statements on his way to the hospital as evidence, both
as a dying declaration and as part of the res gestae.

For a dying declaration to constitute an exception to the hearsay evidence rule, four (4) conditions must
concur:

(a) the declaration must concern the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant’s death;
(b) that at the time the declaration was made, the declarant is conscious of his impending death;
(c) the declarant was competent as a witness; and
(d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for Homicide, Murder, or Parricide where the declarant is the
victim.

On the other hand, a statement to be deemed to form part of the res gestae, and thus, constitute another
exception to the rule on hearsay evidence, requires the concurrence of the following requisites:
(a) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence;
 (b) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and
(c) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.

In the case at bar, SPO2 Borre’s statements constitute a dying declaration, given that they pertained to the
cause and circumstances of his death and taking into consideration the number and severity of his wounds, it may be
reasonably presumed that he uttered the same under a fixed belief that his own death was already imminent. This
declaration is considered evidence of the highest order and is entitled to utmost credence since no person aware of
his impending death would make a careless and false accusation. Verily, because the declaration was made in
extremity, when the party is at the point of death and when every motive of falsehood is silenced and the mind is
induced by the most powerful considerations to speak the truth, the law deems this as a situation so solemn and
awful as creating an obligation equal to that which is imposed by an oath administered in court.

In the same vein, SPO2 Borre’s statements may likewise be deemed to form part of the res gestae. “Res gestae
refers to the circumstances, facts, and declarations that grow out of the main fact and serve to illustrate its character
and are so spontaneous and contemporaneous with the main fact as to exclude the idea of deliberation and fabrication.
The test of admissibility of evidence as a part of the res gestae is, therefore, whether the act, declaration, or
exclamation is so intimately interwoven or connected with the principal fact or event that it characterizes as to be
regarded as a part of the transaction itself, and also whether it clearly negates any premeditation or purpose to
manufacture testimony.”

In this case, SPO2 Borre’s statements refer to a startling occurrence, i.e., him being shot by Palanas and his
companion. While on his way to the hospital, SPO2 Borre had no time to contrive the identification of his assailants.
Hence, his utterance was made in spontaneity and only in reaction to the startling occurrence. Definitely, such
statement is relevant because it identified Palanas as one of the authors of the crime. Therefore, the killing of SPO2
Borre, perpetrated by Palanas, is adequately proven by the prosecution.
 SPOUSES PAMPLONA vs. SPOUSES CUETO
G.R. No. 204735, February 19, 2018
THIRD DIVISION | BERSAMIN, J.:
NATURE OF THE ACTION: Under review is the decision whereby the Court of Appeals reversed the
decision issued by the Regional Trial Court, dismissing the respondents' complaint and ordering the
petitioners instead to execute a deed of sale on the property in favor of the respondents upon the release of
the consigned amount.
FACTS: On 10 January 1989, plaintiff Lilia and defendants mutually agreed that the former would buy and
the latter would sell on installment, the aforementioned immovable including the house standing thereon for
the total sum of US$25,000.00 payable on a monthly installment of US$300.00. The agreement was verbal
considering that Lilia and defendants are sisters and brother-in-law, respectively, and completely trusted each
other. However, a notebook with the personal inscription of defendant Bibiana was sent to Lilia at the latter's
address in Italy, affirming their oral agreement and wherein the list of all the remittances would be entered.
On even date, defendants voluntarily transferred the peaceful possession of the subject property to Lilia and
from the date of the agreement, the latter had remitted to the former her monthly instalments through
registered mail, with a total payment of US$14,000.00 to date, leaving a balance of US$11,000.00. Since
January 1989, Lilia allowed her son Rolando to reside at the subject property as Lilia had to leave for abroad
due to her employment in Italy. Since January 1989, Lilia through her son, has religiously paid the annual
realty taxes on the premises, including electric and water bills.
On 13 August 1997, defendants filed before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Batangas City, with
malicious intent and to the prejudice of plaintiffs' rights, a case for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case
No. 3429  against plaintiffs son Rolando and his wife Liza. Being indigent, spouses Rolando and Liza failed
to defend themselves resulting in a judgment by default and they were finally evicted in January 1998. Lilia
learned of the eviction case in June 1998 when she returned home from Italy. She executed an Affidavit of
Adverse Claim dated 15 June 1998, and registered the same with the land records of Batangas City.
ISSUE: Whether or not a contract to sell was partially executed
RULING: In our view, the existence of the partially executed contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia was
sufficiently established.
It is uncontested that Lilia sent money to Bibiana. The latter did not deny her receipt of the money.
Moreover, the records showed that the parties further agreed for Vedasto and Roilan to occupy the property
during the period when Lilia was remitting money to Bibiana; and that Lilia immediately took steps to
protect her interests in the property once the petitioners started to deny the existence of the oral contract to
sell by annotating her adverse claim on the petitioners' title and instituting this action against the latter. We
concur with the CA's holding that the respondents adduced enough evidence to establish the existence of the
partially executed contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana.
In Serrano v. Caguiat,12  the Court has explained:
A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price.
The differences between a contract to sell and a contract of sale are well-settled in jurisprudence. As early as
1951, in Sing Yee v. Santos, we held that:
x x x [a] distinction must be made between a contract of sale in which title passes to the buyer upon delivery
of the thing sold and a contract to sell x x x where by agreement the ownership is reserved in the seller and is
not to pass until the full payment, of the purchase price is made. In the first case, non-payment of the price is
a negative resolutory condition; in the second case, full payment is a positive suspensive condition. Being
contraries, their effect in law cannot be identical. In the first case, the vendor has lost and cannot recover the
ownership of the land sold until and unless the contract of sale is itself resolved and set aside. In the second
case, however, the title remains in the vendor if the vendee does not comply with the condition precedent of
making payment at the time specified in the contract.
In other words, in a contract to sell, ownership is retained by the seller and is not to pass to the buyer until
full payment of the price. xxxx
The distinctions delineate why the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto were consistent with the existence of
the oral contract to sell between Lilia and Bibiana. Under the oral contract to sell, the ownership had yet to
pass to Lilia, and Bibiana retained ownership pending the full payment of the purchase price agreed upon.
The contentions of the petitioners are factually and legally unwarranted.

To start with, it was incumbent upon Bibiana to prove her allegation in the answer that the money sent to her
by Lilia was in payment of past debts. This conforms to the principle that each party must prove her
affirmative allegations.[11] Yet, the petitioners presented nothing to establish the allegation. They ought to be
reminded that allegations could not substitute for evidence. Without proof of the allegation, therefore, the
inference to be properly drawn from Bibiana's receipt of the sums of money was that the sums of money
were for the purchase of the property, as claimed by the respondents.

Secondly, the admissions by Roilan and Vedasto of the petitioners' ownership of the property could not be
appreciated in favor of the petitioners. That Bibiana and Lilia had entered into a contract to sell instead of a
contract of sale must be well-noted. The distinctions between these kinds of contracts are settled. In Serrano
v. Caguiat,[12]  the Court has explained:

A contract to sell is akin to a conditional sale where the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendor's
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain event, so that if the
suspensive condition does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed. The suspensive condition is commonly full payment of the purchase price.
the failure of Roilan to raise as a defense in the unlawful detainer suit against him the existence of the
contract to sell between Bibiana and Lilia could not be properly construed as an admission by silence on the
part of Lilia. It is basic that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of
another.[13] Res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. As an exception to the rule, the act or declaration
made in the presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or says nothing may be
admitted as evidence against a party who fails to refute or reject it. This is known as admission by silence,
and is covered by Section 32, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

Section 32. Admission by silence. — An act or declaration made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party who does or says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to do so, may be given in evidence
against him.

For an act or declaration to be admissible against a party as an admission by silence, the following
requirements must be present, namely: (a) the party must have heard or observed the act or declaration of the
other person; (b) he must have had the opportunity to deny it; (c) he must have understood the act or
declaration; (d) he must have an interest to object as he would naturally have done if the act or declaration
was not true; (e) the facts are within his knowledge; and (f) the fact admitted or the inference to be drawn
from his silence is material to the issue.[14]

The first two requirements are lacking in the case of Lilia. She was not shown to have heard or seen the
admissions by Vedasto and Roilan that were in writing because she was then abroad. Also, she was not
shown to have had the opportunity to deny their written admissions simply because she was not a party to the
written admissions. The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing only when the
party to be thereby bound was carrying on a mutual correspondence with the declarant. Without such mutual
correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that although the party would have immediately reacted had
the statements been orally made in his presence, such prompt response can generally not be expected if the  if
the party still has to resort to a written reply.
Dantis vs. Maghinay

FACTS:
* Petitioner Rogelio Dantis filed a complaint for quieting of title and recovery of possession against Respondent Julio Maghinang
Jr. Petitioner alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title. According to
him, he acquired ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of his deceased father, Emilio
Dantis. He had been paying the realty taxes on the said property but Julio, Jr. occupied and built a house on a portion of his
property without any right at al. Rogelio alleged that demands were made upon Julio, Jr. to vacate the premises but the same fell
on deaf ears and that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right of possession of his property.

* In his Answer Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way of an affirmative defense, he claimed that he
was the actual owner said parcel of land. According to him, he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for
almost thirty (30) years; The land was sold by Rogelio’s father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Sr.

* Defendant presented the following evidence to prove the sale of land to his father:
1. Exhibit 3 – affidavit executed by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of the Petitioner of the agreement to sell such land
 2. Exhibit 4 – an undated handwritten receipt evidencing down payment for said lot

* But defendant admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis, the father of petitioner. Also, he
admitted that the receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy.

* RTC ruled that even if these documents were adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only serve as proofs that the
purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the
property to Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. It therefore declared that petitioner is the true
and lawful owner of the aforementioned real property; and ordered defendant and all persons claiming under him to peacefully
vacate the said real property and surrender the possession thereof to Rogelio or latter’s successors-in-interest.

* CA ruled in favor of respondent. It stated that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with the delivery of the res,
gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court declared that the
respondent had an equitable claim over the subject lot which imposed on the petitioner.

ISSUE: WON the affidavit and photocopy of the receipt submitted by the defendant are adequate proofs that there is a perfected
contract of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr.

RULING: NO.

To begin with, Exhibit "3," the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus, cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight.
Evidence is hearsay when its probative force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the witness
by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-
examination; 2) absence of demeanor evidence; and 3) absence of oath.

Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. The
sworn statement of Ignacio is of this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by affiant Ignacio.
Accordingly, Exhibit "3" must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be
deemed a declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the hearsay rule because the
declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father (Ignacio).

Exhibit "4," on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere photocopy which, in this case, cannot be
admitted to prove the contents of the purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the highest
available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the contents of a document are best proved by the
production of the document itself to the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130, Section 3.

A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been
lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated.

In the case, Defendant failed to prove the due execution of the original of Exhibit "4" as well as its subsequent loss. Also, his
testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence.  When asked
where the original was, Defendant’s testimony gave the impression that the original of the document was lost while it was in the
possession of his parents. During cross-examination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession. Further,
Exhibit 4 would not be an adequate proof of the existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide a
description of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or consideration.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V MAGLIAN

G.R. No. 189834 March 30, 2011
FACTS:
Accused and Mary Jay were married. They had a son named Mateo Jay. One evening, while
having dinner accused and Mary Jay had an argument. The accused did not want Mary Jay
to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that
Mary Jay had given him for Christmas and told her he would burn them all and started
pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary Jay tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him
and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife’s plea, the accused
still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire. Accused brought
her to hospital and later on had been trasferred to several hospitals until she soon died.
However before she expired, she told her mother what had happened to her, declaring, "Si
Jay Mandy ang nagsunog sa akin. (Jay Mandy burned me.)"
Accused, in his defense, said the burning incident was completely accidental and claimed
that his late wife made a dying declaration in the presence of PO3 Celestino San Jose and
Atty. Rosemarie Perey-Duque. This allegation was corroborated by PO3 San Jose, who
testified that Mary Jay was a friend and he had visited her at the Medical Center.
The RTC rendered a decision of him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and sentence him to
reclusion perpetua. On appeal, accused-appellant faulted the trial court for not giving
credence to the dying declaration Mary Jay made to her friends who became defense
witnesses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the dying declaration made to her friends by Mary Jay must be admissible.

HELD:
No. While witnesses in general can only testify to facts derived from their own perception, a
report in open court of a dying person’s declaration is recognized as an exception to the
rule against hearsay if it is made under the consciousness of an impending death that is the
subject of inquiry in the case. It is considered asevidence of the highest order and is entitled
to utmost credence since no person aware of his impending death would make a careless
and false accusation.
The Rules of Court states that a dying declaration is admissible as evidence if the following
circumstances are present: "(a) it concerns the cause and the surrounding circumstances of
the declarant’s death; (b) it is made when death appears to be imminent and the declarant is
under a consciousness of impending death; (c) the declarant would have been competent to
testify had he or she survived; and (d) the dying declaration is offered in a case in which the
subject of inquiry involves the declarant’s death. "
In contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did not show that Mary Jay’s death at the
time of said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a consciousness
of impending death. Moreover, we defer to the factual finding that the witnesses for the
prosecution were more credible. Mary Jay’s dying declaration to her mother Lourdes and to
Norma showed that accused-appellant was the one who set her in flames. Lourdes and the
Maglians’ laundrywoman Norma both testified that Mary Jay, moments before her actual
death, told them that it was accused-appellant who was responsible for burning her.
Lourdes and Norma both testified that at the time of May Jay’s declaration, she was lucid
and aware that she was soon going to expire. Furthermore, the so-called dying declaration
made by Mary Jay to defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose suffers from
irregularities. The dying declaration allegedly made to Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose was
handwritten by the latter but he did not have it sworn under oath. We reiterate too that it
was not clear that it was executed with the knowledge of impending death since the
statements were made more than a month before Mary Jay died.

195 Villanueva v. Balaguer

G.R. No. 180197 (2009)
J. Ynares-Santiago / Tita K
Subject Matter: Rule 130 – testimonial evidence; admissions and confessions; admissions by silence
Summary: Petitioner, then assistant manager for operations of IBC, was dismissed from employment for allegedly selling forged
certificates of performance. News articles were published where Balaguer was quoted to have said that anomalies in IBC-13 led to
the dismissal of an ‘operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance. Petitioner then wrote a letter to Balaguer
and IBC-13 asking them if he was the person referred to in the article as the ‘operations executive’. Balaguer and IBC-13 did not
reply to the said letter. WON Balaguer and IBC-13’s failure to respond to petitioner’s letter constitute an admission by silence. SC
held that it does not constitute an admission.
Doctrines:
The rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual correspondence
with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the theory that while the party
would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence, such prompt response can
generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.
As for the publications themselves, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are inadmissible against him,
since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.
Parties:
Petitioner FRANCISCO N. VILLANUEVA
VIRGILIO P. BALAGUER and INTERCONTINENTAL BROADCASTING
Respondent
CORPORATION CHANNEL-13 (IBC-13)
Facts:
 Petitioner Villanueva was then Assistant Manager for Operations of IBC-13.
 Respondent Balaguer was the President of IBC-13.
 Petitioner Villanueva was dismissed from employment on the ground of loss of confidence for allegedly selling forged
certificates of performance.
 News articles about irregularities in IBC-13 were published in The Manila Times and The Philippine Star, and Manila
Bulletin, wherein Balaguer was quoted to have said that he uncovered various anomalies in IBC-13 during his tenure
which led to the dismissal of an operations executive for selling forged certificates of performance.
 In a letter, petitioner urged respondents to confirm or deny if he was the person referred to in the news article as
the ‘operations executive’ of IBC-13 who was dismissed for selling forged certificates of performance.
 None of the respondents replied to the letter.
 Petitioner filed before RTC a complaint for damages against Balaguer and IBC-13. Petitioner claimed that respondents
caused the publication of the said news articles which defamed him by falsely and maliciously referring to him as the
‘IBC-13 operations executive who sold forged certificates of performance’.
 RTC held that petitioner is entitled to an award of damages. However, RTC decision was reversed by the CA.
Issue/s:
1. WON the failure of the addressee to respond to a letter containing statements attributing to him commission of acts
constituting actionable wrong constitute his admission of said statements. (NO)
In other words, WON the failure of Balaguer and IBC-13 to respond to Villanueva’s letter constitute an admission of the act 1 imputed to them in
the letter. (NO)
2. WON the failure of an individual to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source of
defamatory newspaper reports, constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said defamatory news reports.
(NO)
In other words, WON the failure of Balaguer to deny the attribution to him by Manila Times and Philippines Star, as the source of news of
defamatory reports about Villanueva, constitute an admission. (NO)
3. WON the admission by a principal is admissible against its agent. (NO)
Ratio:
NO – Respondents failure to respond to Villanueva’s letter does not constitute an admission to the act imputed in the letter.
Petitioner argues that by not responding to the letter which expressly urged them to reply if the statements therein contained are
untrue, respondents in effect admitted the matters stated therein, pursuant to the rule on admission by silence in Sec. 32, Rule 130,
and the disputable presumption that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law or
fact.
SC held that:
 One cannot prove his claim by placing the burden of proof on the other party.
 Indeed, a man cannot make an evidence for himself by writing a letter containing the statements that he wishes to
prove. He cannot turn a letter into evidence by sending it to the party against whom he wishes to prove the facts stated
therein. He cannot impose a duty to answer a charge just like he cannot impose a duty to pay by sending goods.
Therefore, a failure to answer such adverse assertions in the absence of further circumstances making an answer requisite
or natural has no effect as an admission (Ravago Equipment Rentals, Inc. v. CA, 1997).2”
 Moreover, the rule on admission by silence applies to adverse statements in writing if the party was carrying on a mutual
correspondence with the declarant. However, if there was no such mutual correspondence, the rule is relaxed on the
theory that while the party would have immediately reacted by a denial if the statements were orally made in his presence,
such prompt response can generally not be expected if the party still has to resort to a written reply.

2. NO – Balaguer’s failure to disown the attribution to him by newspaper publications, as the source of defamatory
newspaper reports, does not constitute admission that he, indeed, was the source of the said defamatory news reports.
 The rule on admission by silence is relaxed when the statement is not made orally in one’s presence or when one still has
to resort to a written reply, or when there is no mutual correspondence between the parties.
o In this case, newspaper articles purporting to state what the defendant said are inadmissible against
Balaguer since he cannot be held responsible for the writings of third persons.
o While the subject news items indicated that Balaguer was the source of the columnists, proving that he truly
made such statements is another matter.
o Thus, petitioner failed to prove that Balaguer did make such statements.

3. NO – admission by IBC is not admissible against Balaguer.

Petitioner also argues that IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer wherein it was stated that:
“The acts complained of by the plaintiff were done solely by co-defendant Balaguer. Balaguer resorted to these things in his
attempt to stave off his impending removal from IBC.”
is an admission by IBC-13, which is admissible against Balaguer pursuant to Sec. 29, Rule 130 as an admission by a co-partner or
an agent.
SC held that:
 IBC-13’s cross-claim against Balaguer effectively created an adverse interest between them. Hence, the admission of one
defendant is not admissible against his co-defendant. Besides, the alleged acts imputed to Balaguer were never proven to
have been committed, much less maliciously, by Balaguer.
1

2
Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

[G.R. No. 94545. April 4, 1997.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,  plaintiff-appellee, vs. FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @ PRAN and

VILLAMOR ASUNCION,  accused, FRANCISCO SANTOS y BAINGAN @ PRAN,  accused-appellant.

FACTS:
Corazon Dayao, was visiting at the Ambre residence to see her husband Pedro, who was the driver of Mr. & Mrs. David Ambre.
That evening, she was in the terrace of the victim's house sorting dirty clothing. The night was dark and it was raining, but a
Coleman lamp was placed atop the cement railing (pasamano) of the terrace. Just then, she heard five (5) successive gunshots,
and she saw David fall prostrate to the ground. Seeing that David wanted to say something, she called Lolita's attention and said,
"Manang, adda kayat nga ibaga ni Manong kenka. (Ate, it looks like Kuya has something to tell you.)" 4 She pulled Lolita towards
the victim. Lolita asked her husband who had shot him and the latter answered, "It was Pare Pran." 5 She heard David's words
because, like Lolita, she had also placed her head near David who was still alive at the time. Lolita Ambre, the widow, testified that
her husband was referring to Francisco Santos, the godfather of their youngest child.

Dr. Teodomiro Hufana Jr., conducted an autopsy and declared that the cause of death is “severe internal hemorrhage secondary to
gunshot wound." He further clarified that, although the Certificate of Death he issued indicated that the "Interval Between Onset and
Death" was "instant," he was sure the victim still had "a few seconds or minute" before he actually died. 12 He opined that during
those few seconds or minute, it was possible for a victim to utter "about two or three words," which could be "audible" and
"intelligible."
Testifying in his own behalf, appellant interposed an alibi.

The trial court considered the words of the victim as a dying declaration and a positive identification of appellant and thus convicted
the latter.

ISSUE:
WON the last words of the deceased qualify as a dying declaration sufficient to sustain appellant's conviction.

HELD:
Yes, SC convicted the accused.

We affirm the ruling of the trial court's decision to consider the victim's revelation to Lolita and Corazon as a dying declaration and
as a part of res gestae. A dying declaration is entitled to the highest credence because no person who knows of his impending
death would make a careless and false accusation. 27 As an exception to the hearsay rule, the requisites for its admissibility are as
follows: (1) the declaration is made by the deceased under the consciousness of his impending death; (2) the deceased was at the
time competent as a witness; (3) the declaration concerns the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death; and
(4) the declaration is offered in a criminal case wherein the declarant's death is the subject of injury. 28

It must be shown that a dying declaration was made under a realization by the decedent that his demise or at least, its imminence
— not so much the rapid eventuation of death — is at hand. 29 This may be proven by the statement of the deceased himself or it
may be inferred from the nature and extent of the decedent's wounds, or other relevant circumstances. 30
In the case at bar, the victim's declaration consisted of the words "Pare Pran." Under the circumstances, however, he could not
have been expected to articulate his awareness of something so obvious — the inevitability of his demise — or to have the energy
to do so. The nature and extent of said injuries underscored the seriousness of his condition and they later proved by themselves
that the utterances of the deceased were made under a consciousness of an impending death. 31 That his demise thereafter came
swiftly, although not instantaneously, further emphasized the victim's realization of the hopelessness of his recovery. 32
We stress that when a person is at the point of death, every motive for falsehood is silenced and the mind is induced by the most
powerful consideration to speak the truth. It was the height of jocularity for appellant to have suggested that it was highly possible
that the deceased mentioned his name to Lolita so that she would tell him to come to decedent's succor, or for another reason.
Such conjecture finds no basis on record. On the other hand, this speculation is belied by the clear, straightforward testimonies of
Lolita and Corazon. Despite several attempts, counsel for the defense failed to make Lolita admit that the victim mentioned
appellant's name for a vague and undefined purpose, other than to identify his assailant. 33 Lolita adamantly stuck to her testimony
that her husband told her that he was shot by "Pare Pran." 34 The unrebutted testimony of Corazon further clarified that the victim
said those words in answer to his wife's question as to who shot him. 35

The deceased's condemnatory antemortem statement naming appellant as his assailant deserves full faith and credit and is
admissible in evidence as a dying declaration.

Heirs of Franco vs. CA

GR No. 123924
Date: 11 December 2003
Topic: Declaration Against Interest

FACTS:
• This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to overturn the CA’s decision which reversed that of the RTC
issuing in the name of Miguel Franco a new TCT for half of the lot which originally belonged to Quintin Franco.
• Quintin died intestate and his brother, Miguel, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration, but
Faustina, their sister, opposed the same on the ground that Miguel was unfit.
• Notwithstanding, the RTC appointed Miguel as special admin on 3 Dec. 1969.
• In 1973, Faustina and the other heirs of Quintin filed to remove Miguel as special admin. Later, in lieu of a
General Power of Admin (which transferred in the name of Miguel half of the property) executed by Quintin, Miguel
was issued a new TCT fir the said half of the property, but was later removed as special admin due to his conflicting
interests thereon.
• CA later reverse the same because of the fact that Miguel succeeded in registering the property in his name
thru fraud, surreptious conduct, and bad faith.

ISSUE/S: W/N the CA erred in reversing the RTC’s decision.

RULING: NO

In the original action by Miguel, he explicitly declared that the property wholly belonged to Quintin while staying
silent about his claim to ½ of the same, which he allegedly acquired while the latter was still alive. He asserted his
claim belatedly (4 yrs after making the declaration that the property belonged entirely to the deceased). It wasn’t only a
declaration against interest, but also a judicial admission. However, a judicial admission may still be stricken off if
ther’s showing that it was made thru palpable mistake.

A declaration against interest is the best evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute.31 In the
same vein, a judicial admission binds the person who makes the same, and absent any showing that this was made thru
palpable mistake, no amount of rationalization can offset it.32cräläwvirtualibräry
In the case at bar, there is no showing of palpable mistake on the part of Miguel when he made the admission. In his
Motion to Admit Amended Petition, he merely alleged inadvertence in failing to state his claim of co-ownership. Yet
no evidence was adduced to prove the alleged inadvertence. And even assuming there was indeed such a mistake,
Miguel had ample opportunity to make the rectification in the initial stages of the intestate proceedings.
Bearing on the weight of the combined declaration against interest and judicial admission is the assumption, arising
from his duty as special administrator of the estate of Quintin, that he had full knowledge of the status and extent of the
property holdings of the decedent.
Herein, there’s no showing that Miguel made the admission thru palpable mistake. Hence, from the substantive and
procedural standpoint alike, the statement of Miguel, being both a declaration against his interest (the best evid which
affords the greatest certainty of the facts in dispute) & a judicial admission, should be afforded the full evidentiary
value it deserves. Thusly, the CA didn’t err in reversing the RTC’s decision.

Tecson Vs Comelec

Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides -

Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the
relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree’ includes
relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of
the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree."

For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a
person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be
made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in
question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration.

FACTS:

- On December 31, 2003 Fernandoe Poe, Jr. or Ronald Allan Kelly Poe file a certificate of candidacy for the position of
president of the republic of the Philippines under KNP.
- In his certificate of candidacy FPJ represented himself as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, his date of birth on
August 20, 1939 and his place of birth was Manila.
- Complainant Fornier alleged that made a material representation in his certificate of candidacy claiming to be a natural-
born Filipino citizen. His mother was Bessie Kelly Poe and Father Allan Poe could not have transmitted his Filipino
Citizenship to FPJ.
- Fornier on two assertions - first, Allan F. Poe contracted a prior marriage to a certain Paulita Gomez before his marriage
to Bessie Kelley and, second, even if no such prior marriage had existed, Allan F. Poe, married Bessie Kelly only a year
after the birth of respondent.
- A duly notarized declaration made by Rubby Kelley Mangahas was also part of evidence submitted by FPJ

ISSUE: Is FPJ a natural-born Filipino Citizen?

RULING:
Yes.

In ascertaining, in G.R. No. 161824, whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to
take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father
of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the alleged
illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the
Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan,
his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence
before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected
in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ.
The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers
are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

But while the totality of the evidence may not establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines, the evidence on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to Section 74, of the Omnibus
Election Code. Petitioner has utterly failed to substantiate his case before the Court, notwithstanding the ample opportunity given
to the parties to present their position and evidence, and to prove whether or not there has been material misrepresentation, which,
as so ruled in Romualdez-Marcos vs. COMELEC, must not only be material, but also deliberate and willful.

253 Lazaro v. Agustin

G.R. No. 152364 (2010)
J. Peralta / Tita K
Subject Matter: Rule 130 – Hearsay Rule; exceptions; declaration against interest
Summary:
Basilisa, Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra inherited a parcel of land from their deceased father. The siblings agreed that
the land be titled in the name of Basilisa, the eldest sibling. Such agreement did not intend to make Basilisa the sole
owner of the subject land. When Basilisa died, the land title was transferred to the names of Basilisa’s children
(Modesta, Filemon, Venancia, Marcelina, Monica, Gregorio, Bienvenido). According to Basilisa’s siblings, Basilisa, during her
lifetime, informed them that an affidavit was already executed by her recognizing and specifying that her brothers
Alberto and Leoncio, and her sister Alejandra would each get one fourth (1⁄4) share of the lot. Hence, the siblings filed
a complaint for partiction. The MTCC dismissed the complaint on the ground that affidavit allegedly executed by
Basilisa had no evidentiary value because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such that all the
statements made in her affidavit were hearsay. This was affirmed by the RTC and the CA. Before the SC, the siblings
argued that Basilisa's sworn statement is a declaration against interest, which is a recognized exception to the hearsay
rule. WON the sworn statement of Basilisa is a declaration against interest, the SC said NO, it was not a declaration
against interest. Instead, it was an admission against interest.
Doctrines:
Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in legal
interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a party to the suit,
are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when the declarant is
unavailable as a witness.
In this case, Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and is,therefore, in privity with the latter's legal
interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an
admission against interest.
Parties:
 ALEJANDRA S. LAZARO, assisted by her husband, ISAURO M. LAZARO;
LEONCIO D. SANTOS; ADOLFO SANTOS; NENITA S. LACAR;
Petitioner
ANGELINA S. SAGLES, assisted by her husband, ALBERTO SANTOS, JR.;
REGINA SANTOS and FABIAN SANTOS
MODESTA AGUSTIN, FILEMON AGUSTIN, VENANCIA AGUSTIN,
Respondent MARCELINA AGUSTIN, PAUL A. DALALO, NOEL A. DALALO,
GREGORIO AGUSTIN and BIENVENIDO AGUSTIN
Evidence: affidavit executed by Basilisa Santos – a declaration against interest
Facts:
 Petitioners filed a Complaint for partition against the respondents with the MTCC - Laoag City.
Petitioners made the following allegations:
 Petitioners and respondents were descendants of Simeon Santos (Simeon) who died intestate,
leaving a parcel of land. His children, Basilisa, Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra consented that the parcel
of land be titled in the name of the eldest child, Basilisa, though it was agreed that it did not and
does not necessarily mean that Basilisa is the sole and exclusive owner of the land.
 Subsequently, a residential house was constructed on the lot, for which Alejandra spent Php68,308.60
while Basilisa and her children spent Php3,495. Additional constructions were subsequently made when
Alejandra married Isauro Lazaro.
 The title of the lot was subsequently transferred into another title in the names of Modesta, Filemon,
Venancia, et al. (respondents), children of the late Basilisa.
 During Basilisa’s lifetime, Alejandra informed the former that the transfer of the title would
erroneously imply that the lot is solely owned by Basilisa, but Basilisa replied not to worry as an
affidavit was already executed by her, recognizing and specifying that Alberto and Leoncio and
Alejandra would each get ¼ share of the lot.
 Petitioners initiated a partition in the barangay court, but the children of Basilisa and her grandchildren
refused and opposed the partition.
 Respondents, in their Answer, raised the ff. defenses:
 The land is exclusively owned by them as heirs of Basilisa.
 Some of the petitioners were able to stay on the house because Basilisa was the eldest sibling and she had
to take care of her brother Leoncio and sister Alejadra when the two were not yet employed; Alejandra
stayed in the house up to the present with the agreement that she will spend for the renovation of the house
in lieu of monthly rentals that she had to pay when she already became financially able
 Prior to 1962, subject property was mortgaged by Basilisa Santos Agustin to the Philippine National Bank
and the property was foreclosed by PNB when the loan was not paid, hence, title was issued to PNB.
Thereafter, Basilisa Santos-Agustin, purchased it from the PNB and TCT No. T-5662 was issued under her
name; the property was later on transferred to her direct descendants, the defendants herein as evidenced
by TCT No. T-20695;
 MTCC dismissed the complaint. It ruled that no evidentiary value could be given to the affidavit allegedly
executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly acknowledged her co-ownership of the property with her
siblings Alberto, Leoncio and Alejandra, because the affiant was not presented on the witness stand, such
that all the statements made in her affidavit were hearsay.
 RTC and CA affirmed MTCC decision with modification as to amount of liability and payor.
 Petitioners filed a petition for review on certiorari.
ISSUE: WON the sworn statement of Basilisa is a declaration against interest (one of the eceptions to the hearsay
rule), which establishes the coownership of the lot among the petitioners and respondents as heirs of Simeon. (NO)
PETITIONERS argue that:
 Basilisa's sworn statement, which recognizes her siblings' share in the disputed property, is a
declaration against interest, which is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule;
 Since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court without further proof of its due
execution and authenticity;
 The testimonies of Basilisa's nurse and physician cannot qualify as clear and convincing evidence which could
overthrow such notarized document; that the notary public cannot impugn the same document which he
notarized for to do so would render notarized documents worthless and unreliable resulting in prejudice to the
public.
RATIO:
Basilisa’s alleged sworn statement is not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.
 Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one in privity with or identified in
legal interest with such party, and are admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
 Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a party nor in privity with a
party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are
admissible only when the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
o In this case, Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest. Thus, in privity with the latter's legal
interest, the former's sworn statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as
an admission against interest.
o A reading of the sworn statement also reveals that it refers to a parcel of land denominated as Lot
No. 10678 while the property being disputed is Lot No. 10676. On this basis, it cannot be concluded
with certainty that the property being referred to in the sworn statement is the same property
claimed by petitioners.
Even granting that the sworn statement refers to the property being disputed in this case, it still cannot be given full
faith and credence in view of the issues raised regarding its genuineness and due execution.
 Generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of
regularity. However, this presumption may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
 Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just because it contains a notarial jurat.
The presumptions that attach to notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that
the notarization was regular.
o Petitioners rely heavily on the presumption of regularity accorded by law to notarized documents.
While indeed, a notarized document enjoys this presumption, the fact that a deed is notarized is not a
guarantee of the validity of its contents.
o The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the regularity in the
execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the proceedings below where its prima
facie validity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly
 executed, as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of execution of the
sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the signatory, at the time the questioned
document was supposedly executed. The trial and appellate courts were unanimous in giving credence
to the testimonies of these witnesses. The Court has repeatedly held that it will not interfere with the
trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses, unless there appears on record some fact or
circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has
been misinterpreted.
o Considering the foregoing, the Court finds no reason to reverse the rulings of the MTCC, the RTC and
the CA. Although the questioned sworn statement is a public document having in its favor the
presumption of regularity, such presumption was adequately refuted by competent witnesses.
o The SC agreed with the RTC ruling that the testimony of notary public Atty Respicio did not suffice to
rebut the evidence of the appellees, considering that his admission that the affidavit was already
thumbmarked when presented to him by one who claimed to be Basilisa Santos and whom, the witness
said he did not know personally. Further, what makes the documents suspect is the fact that it was
subscribed on the same date as the financial statement of Alejandra Santos.
o In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence in ascertaining the true
identity of the person executing the said sworn statement. However, the notary public did not comply
with this requirement. He simply relied on the affirmative answers of the person appearing before him
attesting that she was Basilisa Santos; that the contents of the sworn statement are true; and that the
thumbmark appearing on the said document was hers. However, this would not suffice. He could have
further asked the person who appeared before him to produce any identification to prove that she was
indeed Basilisa Santos, considering that the said person was not personally known to him, and that the
thumbmark appearing on the document sought to be notarized was not affixed in his presence. But he
did not. Thus, the lower courts did not commit any error in not giving evidentiary weight to the subject
sworn statement. Wherefore, the petition is DENIED.

NEPOMUCENO VS LOPEZ

Principle: Article 194. Support compromises everything indispensable for sustenance, dwelling, clothing, medical attendance,
education and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling
or training for some profession, trade or vocation, even beyond the age of majority. Transportation shall include
expenses in going to and from school, or to and from place of work.
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
 
      1.   The spouses;
      2.   Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
      3.   Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
      4.   Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
      5.   Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.

Article 196. Brothers and sisters not legitimately related, whether of the full or half-blood, are likewise bound to support
each other to the full extent set forth in Article 194, except only when the need for support of the brother or sister,
being of age, is due to a cause imputable to the claimant's fault or negligence.

Facts: Respondent Arhbencel Ann Lopez (Arhbencel), represented by her mother Araceli Lopez (Araceli), filed a Complaint with
the RTC of Caloocan City for recognition and support against Ben-Hur Nepomuceno (petitioner). Born on June 8, 1999, Arhbencel
claimed to have been begotten out of an extramarital affair of petitioner with Araceli; that petitioner refused to affix his signature
on her Certificate of Birth; and that, by a handwritten note dated August 7, 1999, petitioner nevertheless obligated himself to give
her financial support in the amount of P1,500 on the 15th and 30th days of each month beginning August 15, 1999.
  Arguing that her filiation to petitioner was established by the handwritten note, Arhbencel prayed that petitioner be
ordered to: (1) recognize her as his child, (2) give her support pendente lite in the increased amount of P8,000 a month,
and (3) give her adequate monthly financial support until she reaches the age of majority. Petitioner countered that
Araceli had not proven that he was the father of Arhbencel; and that he was only forced to execute the handwritten note
on account of threats coming from the National People’s Army.
By order of the Caloocan RTC, on the basis of petitioner’s handwritten note which it treated as “contractual support”
since the issue of Arhbencel’s filiation had yet to be determined during the hearing on the merits, granted Arhbencel’s
prayer for support pendente lite in the amount of P3,000 a month. After Arhbencel rested her case, petitioner filed a
demurrer to evidence which the trial court granted by order whereupon the case was dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence. On appeal by Arhbencel, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court’s decision, declared Arhbencel to be
petitioner’s illegitimate daughter and accordingly ordered petitioner to give Arhbencel financial support in the
increased amount of P4,000 every 15th and 30th days of the month, or a total of P8,000 a month. His Motion for
Reconsideration was denied, and petitioner comes before this Court through the present Petition for Review on
Certiorari.
Petitioner contention: Nowhere in the documentary evidence (such as petitioner’s payment of Araceli’s hospital bills
when she gave birth to Arhbencel and his subsequent commitment to provide monthly financial support) presented by
Araceli is an explicit statement made by him that he is the father of Arhbencel; that absent recognition or
acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the putative parent; that the supposed payment
made by him of Araceli’s hospital bills was neither alleged in the complaint nor proven during the trial; and that
Arhbencel’s claim of paternity and filiation was not established by clear and convincing evidence.
Issue: WON in the absent of recognition or acknowledgment, illegitimate children are not entitled to support from the
putative parent.

Held: The petition is impressed with merit.

The relevant provisions of the Family Code that treat of the right to support are Articles 194 to 196 (See the articles above),
thus:
Article 195. Subject to the provisions of the succeeding articles, the following are obliged to support each other to the
whole extent set forth in the preceding article:
1. The spouses;
2. Legitimate ascendants and descendants;
3. Parents and their legitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter;
4. Parents and their illegitimate children and the legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter; and
5. Legitimate brothers and sisters, whether of the full or half-blood.
Arhbencel’s demand for support, being based on her claim of filiation to petitioner as his illegitimate daughter, falls under
Article 195(4). As such, her entitlement to support from petitioner is dependent on the determination of her filiation.
Herrera v. Alba summarizes the laws, rules, and jurisprudence on establishing filiation, discoursing in relevant part as
follows:
Laws, Rules, and Jurisprudence Establishing Filiation
The relevant provisions of the Family Code provide as follows:

      ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same evidence as
legitimate children.
x x x x 
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
      (1)  The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
      (2)  An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and signed by
 the parent concerned.
      In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
      (1)  The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
      (2)  Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

This Court's rulings further specify what incriminating acts are acceptable as evidence to establish filiation.  In Pe Lim
v. CA, a case petitioner often cites, we stated that the issue of paternity still has to be resolved by such conventional
evidence as the relevant incriminating verbal and written acts by the putative father.  Under Article 278 of the
New Civil Code, voluntary recognition by a parent shall be made in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record, or in any authentic writing.  To be effective, the claim of filiation must be made by the putative father
himself and the writing must be the writing of the putative father.  A notarial agreement to support a child whose
filiation is admitted by the putative father was considered acceptable evidence.  Letters to the mother vowing to be
a good father to the child and pictures of the putative father cuddling the child on various occasions, together with the
certificate of live birth, proved filiation.  However, a student permanent record, a written consent to a father's
operation, or a marriage contract where the putative father gave consent, cannot be taken as authentic writing.  
Standing alone, neither a certificate of baptism nor family pictures are sufficient to establish filiation.
In the present case, Arhbencel relies, in the main, on the handwritten note executed by petitioner
The abovequoted note does not contain any statement whatsoever about Arhbencel’s filiation to petitioner.  It is,
therefore, not within the ambit of Article 172(2) vis-à-vis Article 175 of the Family Code which admits as competent
evidence of illegitimate filiation an admission of filiation in a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent
concerned.
The note cannot also be accorded the same weight as the notarial agreement to support the child referred to in Herrera.
For it is not even notarized.  And Herrera instructs that the notarial agreement must be accompanied by the putative
father’s admission of filiation to be an acceptable evidence of filiation.  Here, however, not only has petitioner not
admitted filiation through contemporaneous actions.  He has consistently denied it. The only other documentary
evidence submitted by Arhbencel, a copy of her Certificate of Birth, has no probative value to establish filiation to
petitioner, the latter not having signed the same.
At bottom, all that Arhbencel really has is petitioner’s handwritten undertaking to provide financial support to her
which, without more, fails to establish her claim of filiation.  The Court is mindful that the best interests of the child in
cases involving paternity and filiation should be advanced.  It is, however, just as mindful of the disturbance that
unfounded paternity suits cause to the privacy and peace of the putative father’s legitimate family.   

FRANCISCO L. JISON vs. COURT OF APPEALS and MONINA JISON (G.R. No. 124853
February 24, 1998)

FACTS:

This is a case filed by one Monina Jison for recognition as an illegitimate child of Francisco Jison
who is married to Lilia Lopez Jison. MONINA alleged that she is the daughter of FRANCISCO who
impregnated her mother Esperanza F. Amolar, who was then employed as the nanny of
FRANCISCO's daughter. She claims that she has openly and continuously possessed the status of
an illegitimate child of Francisco and that Francisco had also openly and continuously recognized
her as such.

The trial court categorized Monina’s many evidences as hearsay evidence, incredulous evidence,
or self-serving evidence and ruled against Monina while the Court of Appeals decided in favour of
Monina and declared her to be the illegitimate daughter of Francisco.
The Court of Appeals ruled that the testimonies of Monina’s witnesses were sufficient to establish
MONINA's filiation.

ISSUE: Did Monina successfully establish her filiation under Article 172 par. 2 of the Family Code
(open and continuous possession of the status)?

HELD: Yes. Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation, such as MONINA's, may be
established in the same way and on the same evidence as that of legitimate children. The
Supreme Court sustained the findings of the CA that Monina was able to prove her illegitimate
filiation.

For the success of an action to establish illegitimate filiation under Article 172 par. 2, a "high
standard of proof" is required. To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an
illegitimate child, there must be evidence of the manifestation of the permanent intention of the
supposed father to consider the child as his, by continuous and clear manifestations of parental
affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure charity. Such acts must be of such a nature
that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also the apparent desire to have and treat
the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not accidentally, but continuously.

By "continuous" is meant uninterrupted and consistent, but does not require any particular length of
time.

In deciding paternity suits, the issue of whether sexual intercourse actually occurred inevitably
redounds to the victim's or mother's word, as against the accused's or putative father's
protestations. In the instant case, MONINA's mother could no longer testify as to the fact of
intercourse, as she had already passed away. But the fact of Monina’s birth and her parentage
may be established by evidence other than the testimony of her mother.

The testimonial evidence offered by MONINA, woven by her narration of circumstances and events
that occurred through the years, concerning her relationship with FRANCISCO, coupled with the
testimonies of her witnesses, overwhelmingly established that the following:

1) FRANCISCO is MONINA's father and she was conceived at the time when her mother
was in the employ of the former;

2) FRANCISCO recognized MONINA as his child through his overt acts and conduct like
sending her to school, paying for her tuition fees, school uniforms, books, board and lodging
at the Colegio del Sagrado de Jesus, defraying for her hospitalization expenses, providing
her with monthly allowance, paying for the funeral expenses of her mother, acknowledging
her paternal greetings and calling appellant his "Hija" or child, instructing his office
personnel to give appellant's monthly allowance, recommending her to use his house in
Bacolod and paying for her long distance telephone calls, having her spend her long
distance telephone calls, having her spend her vacation in his apartment in Manila and also
at his Forbes residence, allowing her to use his surname in her scholastic and other
records.
 3) Such recognition has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the years
publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an uninterrupted manner.

The totality of the evidence on record established Monina’s filiation.

Appeal filed by Francisco Jison was dismissed.

Civil Service Commission v. Belagan

October 19, 2004 | Sandoval-Gutierrez, J. | Impeachment of a Witness

SUMMARY: Magdalena filed a case against Belagan for sexual indignities. Belagan attacked Magdalena’s
credibility using 22 crimincal cases and 23 barangay complainsts filed against Magdalena in the 70s and 80s.
Despite this, the SC held that she is a credible witness.

DOCTRINE: Evidence of one's character or reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the
time in question. What is to be determined is the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial
and prior thereto, but not at a period remote from the commencement of the suit. 3. Character evidence
must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.

FACTS:
Magdalena Gapuz, founder/directress of Mother and Child Learning center and Ligaya Anawi, public school
teacher at Fort del Pilar Elementary, filed a case against Dr Allyson Belagan Superintendent of DECS sexual
indignities and harassment and various malfeasances

Magdalena
When applying for a permit to operate a pre-school, Belagan, who offered to conduct the inspection,
suddenly placed his arms around her shoulders and kissed her cheek. Upon follow-up of her application,
Belagan told her," Mag-date muna tayo." When they reported the incident, Belagan merely denied any
personal relationship with Magdalena

Ligaya
On 4 separate occasions, Belagan touched her breasts, kissed her cheek, touched her groins, embraced her
from behind, pulled her close to him with his organ pressing against her. Aside from this, Ligaya charged
 him with delaying teachers' salaries, failing to release differentials to substitutes, refusing to release teachers'
uniforms and allowances, and failing to constitute the Selection and Promotion Board, as required by the
DECS rules and regulations

DECS Secretary: Belagan guilty of sexual indignities and ordered dismissed. He was absolved of charges of
administrative malfeasance or dereliction of duty

CSC: Guilty of grave misconduct. His position is that which requires a high degree of moral uprightness

Belagan filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that he has never been charged of any offense
in his thirty-seven (37) years of service. By contrast, Magdalena was charged with numerous offenses
before MTC Baguio, which casts a doubt on her character, integrity, and credibility
- 22 Criminal Cases for light and grave oral defamation, slight and serious physical injuries, grave
threats, malicious mischief, light threats, unjust vexation
- Also, 23 complaints filed with the Brgy Chairman for unjust vexation, grave threats, rumor
mongering, oral defamation, false accusation, harassment, habitual trouble maker

CSC denied MR: The character of a woman who was the subject of a sexual assault is of minor significance
in the determination of the guilt or innocence of the person accused of having committed the offense

CA reversed: Magdalena is an unreliable witness, her character being questionable, while Belagan has an
unblemished service record for 37 years.

ISSUE/HELD/RATIO:
W/N Magdalena is a credible witness --YES

1. Magdalena's derogatory record is NOT sufficient to discredit her credibility. Evidence of one's character or
reputation must be confined to a time not too remote from the time in question. What is to be determined is
the character or reputation of the person at the time of the trial and prior thereto, but not at a period remote
from the commencement of the suit. Most of the twenty-two (22) cases filed with the MTC of Baguio City
relate to acts committed in the 70s and 80s and one was in 1994. Surely, those cases and complaints are no
longer reliable proofs of Magdalenas character or reputation. Every person can change

2. Belagan also failed to prove that Magdalena was convicted of any of the criminal cases. It is not permissible
to show that a witness has been arrested or that he has been charged with or prosecuted for a criminal
offense, or confined in jail for the purpose of impairing his credibility.

3. Character evidence must be limited to the traits and characteristics involved in the type of offense charged.
Thus, on a charge of rape - character for chastity, on a charge of assault - character for peaceableness or
violence, and on a charge of embezzlement - character for honesty. In the present administrative case for
sexual harassment, respondent did not offer evidence that has a bearing on Magdalenas chastity. What he
presented are charges for grave oral defamation, grave threats, unjust vexation, physical injuries, malicious
mischief, etc. filed against her. Certainly, these pieces of evidence do not establish the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
4. Section 11, Rule 132: Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be impeached by the party
against whom he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth,
honesty, or integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony, but not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an offense.
- Such evidence is rejected because of the confusion of issues and the waste of time that would be
involved, and because the witness may not be prepared to expose the falsity of such wrongful acts.[28]
As it happened in this case, Magdalena was not able to explain or rebut each of the charges against her
listed by respondent.
- However, Magdalena testified in a straightforward, candid and spontaneous manner. Her testimony is
replete with details, such as the number of times she and respondent inspected the pre-school, the specific
part of the stairs where respondent kissed her, and the matter about her transient boarders during summer.
Magdalena would not have normally thought about these details if she were not telling the truth.
- Even a witness who has been convicted a number of times is worthy of belief, when he testified in a
straightforward and convincing manner.

Dispositive: Belagan is suspended for 1 year without pay because of the mitigating circumstance of length of
service and unblemished record.