SOLOMON

1. BRION, JR. vs. FRANCISCO BRILLANTES, JR. (A.C. No. 5305)

FACTS:
In this petition for disbarment, complainant Marciano Brion, Jr., charges the respondent,
Atty. Francisco Brillantes, Jr., of having willfully violated a lawful order of this Court in
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706, entitled Lupo Almodiel Atienza v. Judge Francisco F. Brillantes,
Jr, whereby the court therein ordered respondent to be dismissed from the judiciary,
with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including GOCCs. Respondent’s dismissal in the aforesaid case was
ordered after he was found guilty of Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety
during his incumbency as presiding judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20,
Manila.
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated the court’s order when he accepted a
legal consultancy post at the Local Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to
2000. Said consultancy included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board
of Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of the legal
consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a Special Consultancy
Agreement.
In his comment, respondent admits the existence of the Legal Consultancy Contract as
well as the Special Consultancy Contract. However, he raises the affirmative defense
that under Civil Service Commission (CSC) Memorandum Circular No. 27, Series of
1993, services rendered pursuant to a consultancy contract shall not be considered
government services, and therefore, are not covered by Civil Service Law, rules and
regulations.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the court’s order?

RULING:
Yes, respondent violated the court’s order prohibiting him from reappointment in the
government.
An adviser does not exercise supervisory powers over LWUA employees nor does he
issue written instructions to them. An adviser is not entitled to a seat in such vital LWUA
committees like PBAC and the BOT Committee. Also, respondent’s continuous receipt
of honoraria for sitting as a member of certain LWUA Committees, particularly the BOT
Committee, belies his claim that he is a mere consultant for the LWUA. The evidence on
record clearly shows that the LWUA Office Order implementing National Compensation
Circular No. 75-95 refers to payments of honoraria to officials/employees in
consideration of services rendered.
Most telling, in our view, is respondent’s acceptance of his 1998 Productivity Incentive
Bonus (PIB). The Board of Trustees Resolution No. 26, Series of 1999, of the
LWUA, which governed the release of the PIB, limited the entitlement to said bonus only
to "officials" and "employees" (permanent, temporary, casual, or contractual) of LWUA.
In sum, we find that for all intents and purposes, respondent performed duties and
functions of a non-advisory nature, which pertain to a contractual employee of LWUA.
By performing duties and functions, which clearly pertain to a contractual employee,
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albeit in the guise of an advisor or consultant, respondent has transgressed both letter
and spirit of this Court’s decree in Atienza.
The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for law and legal
processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails obedience to the legal orders of
the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to this Court’s order prohibiting his
reappointment to any branch, instrumentality, or agency of government, including
government owned and controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal
consultancy or a special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a
contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving compensation
and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance of the Court’s authority,
and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer of the court. It is also destructive of
the harmonious relations that should prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony
necessary for the proper administration of justice. Such defiance not only erodes
respect for the Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.
What aggravates respondent’s offense is the fact that respondent is no ordinary lawyer.
Having served in the judiciary for eight (8) years, he is very well aware of the standards
of moral fitness for membership in the legal profession.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for one year and ordered to
pay a fine of 10,000 pesos.
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2. FELICIANO vs. ATTY. LOZADA (A.C. NO. 7593)

FACTS:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in A.C. No. 6656
entitled "Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista Lozada" suspending Atty.
Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04, for two years.
However, on June 5, 2007, in an action for injunction with prayer for issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction docketed as Civil Case
no. 101-V-07 entitled "Edilberto Lozada, et.al. vs. Alvin S. Feliciano, et al.," where
complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty. Lozada
appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto Lozada, and actively
participated in the proceedings of the case. Complainant argued that the act of Atty.
Lozada in appearing as counsel while still suspended from the practice of law
constitutes willfull disobedience to the resolutions of the Court which suspended her
from the practice of law for two (2) years.
In her Comment dated November 19, 2007, Atty. Lozada explained that she was forced
by circumstances and her desire to defend the rights of her husband who is embroiled
in a legal dispute. She claimed that she believed in good faith that her appearance as
wife of Edilberto Lozada is not within the prohibition to practice law, considering that she
is defending her husband and not a client.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the court’s order?

RULING:
Yes, respondent violated the court’s order.
Suffice it to say that practice of law embraces "any activity, in or out of court, which
requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience." It
includes "[performing] acts which are characteristics of the [legal] profession" or
"[rendering any kind of] service [which] requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill."
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the records, there is no
doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in appearing and signing as counsel for and
in behalf of her husband, conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts,
conducting direct and cross- examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the
findings of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the period of her two
(2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended from the practice of law by
this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada
cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008. Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada
appeared for and in behalf of her husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively
participated in the proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year
suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Atty. Lozada would have deserved a harsher penalty, but this Court recognizes the fact
that it is part of the Filipino culture that amid an adversity, families will always look out
and extend a helping hand to a family member, more so, in this case, to a spouse.
Thus, considering that Atty. Lozada's actuation was prompted by her affection to her
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husband and that in essence, she was not representing a client but rather a spouse, we
deem it proper to mitigate the severeness of her penalty.
As such, respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of six
months.
SOLOMON

3. BAUTISTA vs. GONZALES (A.M. No. 1625)

FACTS:
Angel Bautista filed a verified complaint against respondent, charging the latter with
malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct, and violation of lawyer’s oath. In his amended
complaint, complainant charged respondent with acts such as transferring properties of
clients while the properties are in litigation, fraudulently inducing complainant into
entering into a void complaint, harassing complainant, misleading the courts by making
false assertions in pleadings, etc.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed serious misconduct?

RULING:
Yes, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws [of the Republic of the
Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein." And
for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred by the Supreme
Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. All of these underscore the role of
the lawyer as the vanguard of our legal system. The transgression of any provision of
law by a lawyer is a repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not
countenance. In the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code, must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil
Code are prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their
existing trust relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by
purchase the property and rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with
such property and rights, as well as with the client. And it cannot be claimed that the
new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to emphasize the nature and
consequences of such relationship. Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the
cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him."
On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and
properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence, notwithstanding the
absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court, considering
the abovequoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his
client's property in litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a
disciplinary action may be brought against him.
The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the respondent
violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member of the legal
profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to uphold the rule of law,
he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards expected of a member of the Bar."
[Artiaga v. Villanueva, Adm. Matter No. 1892, July 29, 1988, 163 SCRA 638, 647]. The
Court agrees with the Solicitor General that, considering the nature of the offenses
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committed by respondent and the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent
lawyer should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months.
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4. ZAGUIRRE vs. ATTY. CASTILLO (A.C. No. 4921)

FACTS:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became officemates
at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent courted complainant and
promised to marry her while representing himself to be single. Soon they had an
intimate relationship that started sometime in 1996 and lasted until 1997. During their
affair, respondent was preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10,
1997, he was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. It was only around the first
week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was already married
when his wife went to her office and confronted her about her relationship with
respondent. On September 10, 1997, respondent, who by now is a lawyer, executed an
affidavit, admitting his relationship with the complainant and recognizing the unborn
child she was carrying as his. On December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby
girl, Aletha Jessa. By this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing
the child and giving her any form of support.
Respondent claims that: he never courted the complainant; what transpired between
them was nothing but mutual lust and desire; he never represented himself as single
since it was known in the NBI that he was already married and with
children; complainant is almost 10 years older than him and knew beforehand that he is
already married; the child borne by complainant it not his, because the complainant was
seeing other men at the time they were having an affair. He admits that he signed the
affidavit dated September 10, 1997 but explains that he only did so to save complainant
from embarrassment. Also, he did not know at the time that complainant was seeing
other men.
As such, complainant filed a disbarment petition against respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct?

RULING:
Yes.
Siring a child with a woman other than his wife is a conduct way below the standards of
morality required of every lawyer.
Moreover, the attempt of respondent to renege on his notarized statement recognizing
and undertaking to support his child by Carmelita demonstrates a certain
unscrupulousness on his part which is highly censurable, unbecoming a member of a
noble profession, tantamount to self-stultification.
This Court has repeatedly held:
"as officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but
must also be seen to be of good moral character and leading lives in accordance with
the highest moral standards of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar
and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or the
keeping of mistresses but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the
public by creating the belief that he is flouting those moral standards."
We agree with the IBP that the defense of in pari delicto is not feasible. The Court held
in Mortel vs. Aspiras:
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"In a disbarment proceeding, it is immaterial that the complainant is in pari delicto

because this is not a proceeding to grant relief to the complainant, but one to purge the
law profession of unworthy members, to protect the public and the courts."
The illicit relationship with Carmelita took place while respondent was preparing to take
the bar examinations. Thus, it cannot be said that it is unknown to him that an applicant
for admission to membership in the bar must show that he is possessed of good moral
character, a requirement which is not dispensed with upon admission to membership of
the bar. This qualification is not only a condition precedent to admission to the legal
profession, but its continued possession is essential to maintain one's good standing in
the profession; it is a continuing requirement to the practice of law and therefore
admission to the bar does not preclude a subsequent judicial inquiry, upon proper
complaint, into any question concerning his mental or moral fitness before he became a
lawyer. This is because his admission to practice merely creates a rebuttable
presumption that he has all the qualifications to become a lawyer.
As consistently held by this Court, disbarment shall not be meted out if a lesser
punishment could be given. Records show that from the time he took his oath in 1997,
he has severed his ties with complainant and now lives with his wife and children in
Mindoro. As of now, the Court does not perceive this fact as an indication of
respondent's effort to mend his ways or that he recognizes the impact of his offense on
the noble profession of law. Nevertheless, the Court deems it more appropriate under
the circumstances that indefinite suspension should be meted out than disbarment. The
suspension shall last until such time that respondent is able to show, to the full
satisfaction of the Court, that he has instilled in himself a firm conviction of maintaining
moral integrity and uprightness required of every member of the profession.
The rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct,
even if it pertains to his private activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.
As such, respondent is ordered suspended to suffer indefinite suspension from the
practice of law.
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5. JIMENEZ vs. ATTY. FRANCSICO (A.C. No. 10548)

FACTS:
Respondent is the corporate secretary of Clarion Corporation. Mark Jimenez is the
alleged true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in the corporation, which were
to be used to purchase a residential property in Makati City. According to complainant,
Mark Jimenez, with the cooperation of respondent, filed an estafa case against
complainant for the fraudulent purchase of the residential lot and undervaluing of the
shares of stock of Jimenez. Complainant alleges that respondent is her personal
attorney and that respondent’s act of preparing the estafa complaint against her was a
conflict of interest.
On 6 September 2007, the Commission on Bar Discipline received a complaint filed by
petitioner against respondent for multiple violations of the CPR. Respondent answered
the allegations by stating that complainant was not his client, but that he was the lawyer
of Mark Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR and lawyer’s oath?

RULING:
Yes.
In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his
sworn duty. He is guilty of engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he
admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to actively misrepresent to the
SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of
assignment and the GIS, Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the
validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that these were done for
consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged
orders of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this
ran counter to the deeds of assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his
long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to assume that Atty. Francisco is
knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the
SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid
transfers of stocks. Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with
patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have
simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the consideration of
the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the
government of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series
of grave legal infractions and was content to have granted the requests of the persons
involved.
Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to
complainant’s misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s
act of drafting, or at the very least, permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in
public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice for the specious
reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and
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machinations, the Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would
undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the court.
In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a
scrutiny of the parties’ submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to
establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.
Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on
record fails to demonstrate the claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant
failed to establish the professional relationship between her and Atty. Francisco. The
records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a
demonstration of what she had communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of
circumstances under which the confidential communication was relayed. All that
complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from respondent
in various occasions." Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the
IBP, there was no testimony as to the specific confidential information allegedly divulged
by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to
determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in
Mercado, such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the
rule on privileged communication between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely
assert the attorney-client privilege. It cannot be gainsaid then that complainant, who has
the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.
As such, for violating Canons 1 and 10 of the CPR, respondent is suspended from the
practice of law for a period of six months.
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6. SPS. ANAYA vs. ATTY. ALVAREZ, JR. (A.C. No. 9436)

FACTS:
Sps. Anaya filed a disbarment complaint against respondent. In their Complaint,
Spouses Anaya alleged that: (1) Atty. Alvarez prepared and notarized the deeds of sale
of the three (3) properties they sold; (2) Atty. Alvarez asked them for cash in exchange
for his four (4) Allied Bank checks with the assurance that the checks would be honored
upon presentment to the drawee bank once they fell due as they would be fully funded
on due date; (3) they eventually agreed to give cash to Atty. Alvarez in exchange for the
said checks relying on his assurance and professional stature; (4) they withdrew from
their Philippine National Bank account the amounts corresponding to the four (4) checks
issued by Atty. Alvarez, as follows: [a] ₱50,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No.
35836, dated December6, 2011; [b] ₱95,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35835, dated
December 20, 2011; [c] P50,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35838, dated January 8,
2011; and [d] ₱200,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35837,  dated January 15, 2012;
(e) the said checks, except Check No. 35838, which appeared stale due to an
erroneous entry of the date, were dishonored by the drawee bank by reason ACCOUNT
CLOSED; (6) they made repeated verbal and written demands on Atty. Alvarez but
these remained unheeded; and (7) after receipt of the second demand letter, Atty.
Alvarez went to spouses Anaya and offered the amount of P20,000.00 as partial
payment but they refused to accept the same as they wanted the return of the full
amount due.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?

RULING:
Yes.
Time and again, this Court has repeatedly held that the act of a lawyer in issuing a
check without sufficient funds to cover them or, worst, drawn against a closed account,
constitutes willful dishonesty and unethical conduct that undermines the public
confidence in the law and the members of the bar. It shows a lawyer's low regard to his
commitment to the Oath, which he swore to uphold and respect when he joined the
legal profession.
Without a quibble, Atty. Alvarez's failure to pay his debts despite several demands, and
his act of issuing numerous checks which were dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account, puts his moral character in serious doubt. It demonstrates his
lack of reverence to the lawyer's oath, and seriously and irreparably tarnished the image
of the profession he promised to hold in high esteem.  Atty. Alvarez's contention that he
offered to pay his debts on a monthly basis but was refused by Spouses Anaya fails to
persuade. He should have known that a mere offer to pay a debt is insufficient unless
accompanied by an actual tender of payment. Moreover, the Court notes that the loan
was obtained by Atty. Alvarez in 2011 but up to date, no payment has been made.
Likewise, his defense that he merely issued the checks as collateral to the loan is
untenable. They could not have been used to secure a loan as it was not only unfunded,
but the account to which these checks were drawn was also already closed.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
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SOLOMON

7. MADRIA vs. ATTY. RIVERA (A.C. No. 11256)

FACTS:
In November 20002, complainant consulted respondent regarding the process of
annulling her marriage. Respondent guaranteed obtaining the decree of annulment, and
upon return, complainant gave respondent a down payment. When complainant
returned, respondent informed her that he had obtained the decree of annulment and
gave her a copy of the trial court’s decision signed by Judge Aquino of RTC Branch 4 in
Tuguegarao City.
When complainant applied for the renewal of her passport, with the decree of
annulment, she became the object of an investigation of the NBI because her former
partner had filed a complaint charging that she had fabricated the decision annulling her
marriage. Only then did she learn that the decision and the certificate of finality given by
the respondent did not exist in the court records, as borne out by the letter signed by the
Clerk of Court of the RTC.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?

RULING:
Yes.
The respondent acknowledged authorship of the petition for annulment of marriage, and
of the simulation of the decision and certificate of finality. His explanation of having done
so only upon the complainant's persistent prodding did not exculpate him from
responsibility. For one, the explanation is unacceptable, if not altogether empty.
Simulating or participating in the simulation of a court decision and a certificate of finality
of the same decision is an outright criminal falsification or forgery. One need not be a
lawyer to know so, but it was worse in the respondent's case because he was a lawyer.
Thus, his acts were legally intolerable. Specifically, his deliberate falsification of the
court decision and the certificate of finality of the decision reflected a high degree of
moral turpitude on his part, and made a mockery of the administration of justice in this
country.
Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, a lawyer may be disbarred on any of
the following grounds, namely: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice; (3) gross misconduct in office;
(4) grossly immoral conduct; (5) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (6)
violation of the lawyers oath; (7) willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior
court; and (8) corruptly or willfully appearing as a lawyer for a party to a case without
authority so to do.
Falsifying or simulating the court papers amounted to deceit, malpractice or misconduct
in office, any of which was already a ground sufficient for disbarment under Section 27,
Rule 38 of the Rules of Court. The moral standards of the Legal Profession expected
the respondent to act with the highest degree of professionalism, decency, and nobility
in the course of their practice of law. That he turned his back on such standards
exhibited his baseness, lack of moral character, dishonesty, lack of probity and general
unworthiness to continue as an officer of the Court.
We note that the respondent was previously sanctioned for unprofessional conduct.
In Cruz-Villanueva v. Rivera, he was suspended from the practice of law because he
SOLOMON

had notarized documents without a notarial commission. This circumstance shows his
predisposition to beguile other persons into believing in the documents that he had
falsified or simulated. It is time to put a stop to such proclivity. He should be quickly
removed through disbarment.
As such, the court orders respondent’s disbarment.
SOLOMON

8. KUPERS vs. ATTY. HONTANOSAS (A.C. No. 5704)

FACTS:
Complainant Kupers filed an administrative case against respondent and alleged that
respondent had: (1) prepared and notarized contracts that are both invalid and illegal as
these contracts violated the limitations on aliens leasing private lands; (2) served
conflicting interests since he performed legal services for adverse parties; (3) refused to
furnish copies of the contracts he notarized to the parties thereof; (4) notarized
documents without keeping copies thereof and (5) failed to properly discharge his duty
to his client Karl Novak, particularly when respondent allegedly refused to accept his
dismissal as counsel for Novak, failed to turn over Novak’s documents thereafter,
handled legal matters without adequate preparation, betrayed Novak’s trust and refused
to see Novak with a translator of Novak’s choice.
Complainant claimed that as counsel for Hans and Vivian Busse, respondent had
prepared a memorandum of agreement and a contract of lease between the spouses
Busse and Hochstrasser, a Swiss national. Under said agreement, Hochstrasser would
lease Vivian Busse’s property in Alcoy, Cebu for fifty (50) years, renewable for another
fifty (50) years. Complainant added that respondent had acted despite conflict of
interest on his part since the Spouses Busse and Hochstrasser were both his clients.
Respondent prepared a similar agreement and lease contract between the spouses
Busse and Karl Emberger, a Swiss national, over another parcel of land in Alcoy, Cebu.
This time the lease contract was for a period of forty nine (49) years renewable for
another forty nine (49) years. All four (4) documents were notarized by respondent. It
was also averred that respondent drafted two deeds of sale over the leased properties
of Spouses Busse to Naomie Melchior, a Filipina, and Karl Novak, a German National.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
Respondent, by drafting the questioned lease agreements, caused his clients to violate
Section 7 of R.A. No. 7652 which states:
Sec. 7. Penal Provision. — Any contract or agreement made or executed in
violation of any of the following prohibited acts shall be null and void  ab
initio and both contracting parties shall be punished by a fine of not less than
One Hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000) nor more than One million pesos
(₱1,000,000), or imprisonment of six (6) months to (6) years, or both, at the
discretion of the court:
(1) Any provision in the lease agreement stipulating a lease period in excess of
that provided in paragraph (1) of Section 4;
(2) Use of the leased premises for the purpose contrary to existing laws of the
land, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs;
(3) Any agreement or agreements resulting is the lease of land in excess of the
area approved by the DTI: Provided, That, where the excess of the totality of
the area leased is due to the acts of the lessee, the lessee shall be held solely
liable therefor: Provided, further, That, in the case of corporations, associations,
SOLOMON

or partnerships, the president, manager, director, trustee, or officers

responsible for the violation hereof shall bear the criminal liability. (Emphasis
ours)
In preparing and notarizing the illegal lease contracts, respondent violated the
Attorney’s Oath and several canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility. One of
the foremost sworn duties of an attorney-at-law is to "obey the laws of the Philippines."
This duty is enshrined in the Attorney’s Oath and in Canon 1, which provides that "(a)
lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for
law and legal processes." Rule 1.02 under Canon 1 states: "A lawyer shall not counsel
or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or at decreasing confidence in the legal
systems."
Aside from that, respondent also violated Canons 15.07 and 17 of the CPR, and Sec.
27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
The supreme penalty of disbarment is meted out only in clear cases of misconduct that
seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court. While
we will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of
lawyers, where the evidence calls for it, we will also not disbar him where a lesser
penalty will suffice to accomplish the desired end.
As such, respondent is suspended fro the practice of law for six months.
SOLOMON

9. ADVINCULA vs. ADVINCULA (A.C. No. 9226)

FACTS:
This administrative case for disbarment was filed by complainant against her husband,
respondent. In her complaint, Dr. Advincula has averred that Atty. Advincula committed
unlawful and immoral acts; that while Atty. Advincula was still married to her, he had
extra-marital sexual relations with Ma. Judith Ortiz Gonzaga (Ms. Gonzaga); that the
extra-marital relations bore a child in the name of Ma. Alexandria Gonzaga Advincula
(Alexandria); that Atty. Advincula failed to give financial support to their own children,
namely: Ma. Samantha Paulina, Ma. Andrea Lana, and Jose Leandro, despite his
having sufficient financial resources; that he admitted in the affidavit of late registration
of birth of Alexandria that he had contracted another marriage with Ms. Gonzaga; that
even should Atty. Advincula prove that his declaration in the affidavit of late registration
of birth was motivated by some reason other than the fact that he truly entered into a
subsequent marriage with Ms. Gonzaga, then making such a declaration was in itself
still unlawful; that siring a child with a woman other than his lawful wife was conduct way
below the standards of morality required of every lawyer; that contracting a subsequent
marriage while the first marriage had not been dissolved was also an unlawful
conduct; that making a false declaration before a notary public was an unlawful conduct
punishable under the Revised Penal Code; and that the failure of Atty. Advincula to
provide proper support to his children showed his moral character to be below the
standards set by law for every lawyer. Dr. Advincula prayed that Atty. Advincula be
disbarred.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable?

RULING:
Yes.
The good moral conduct or character must be possessed by lawyers at the time of their
application for admission to the Bar, and must be maintained until retirement from the
practice of law. Accordingly, it is expected that every lawyer, being an officer of the
Court, must not only be in fact of good moral character, but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards
of the community. More specifically, a member of the Bar and officer of the Court is
required not only to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping mistresses but also
to conduct himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards. If the practice of law is to remain an honorable
profession and attain its basic ideals, whoever is enrolled in its ranks should not only
master its tenets and principles but should also, in their lives, accord continuing fidelity
to them. The requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as
the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Immoral conduct
has been described as conduct that is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. To be
the basis of disciplinary action, such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly
immoral, that is, it must be so corrupt as to virtually constitute a criminal act or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed under such
SOLOMON

scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of

decency.chanrobleslaw

On different occasions, we have disbarred or suspended lawyers for immorality based

on the surrounding circumstances of each case. In Bustamante-Alejandro v.
Alejandro, the extreme penalty of disbarment was imposed on the respondent who had
abandoned his wife and maintained an illicit affair with another woman. Likewise,
disbarment was the penalty for a lawyer who carried on an extra-marital affair with a
married woman prior to the judicial declaration that her marriage was null and void,
while he himself was also married. In another case we have suspended for two years, a
married attorney who had sired a child with a former client. In Samaniego v.
Ferrer, suspension of six months from the practice of law was meted on the
philandering lawyer.

Yet, we cannot sanction Atty. Advincula with the same gravity. Although his siring the
child with a woman other than his legitimate wife constituted immorality, he committed
the immoral conduct when he was not yet a lawyer. The degree of his immoral conduct
was not as grave than if he had committed the immorality when already a member of
the Philippine Bar. Even so, he cannot escape administrative liability. Taking all the
circumstances of this case into proper context, the Court considers suspension from the
practice of law for three months to be condign and appropriate.

As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of three months.
SOLOMON

10. VALIN vs. ATTY. RUIZ (A.C. No. 10564)

FACTS:
Complainants filed an administrative complaint against respondent for committing
forgery and falsification of a deed of absolute sale, in breach of his lawyer's oath and in
violation of the laws. Complainants allege that several years after their parents died,
they discovered that a parcel of land registered in their father’s name had been
conveyed to respondent, using forged signatures.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is liable?

RULING:
Yes.
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR) states that "[a] lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Lawyers must conduct
themselves beyond reproach at all times, whether they are dealing with their clients or
the public at large, and a violation of the high moral standards of the legal profession
justifies the imposition of the appropriate penalty, including suspension and disbarment.
Further, the lawyer's oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but
also to refrain from doing any falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the
doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an
exemplar worthy of emulation by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that
the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness are emphatically reiterated by
the CPR. In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the CPR provides that "[a] lawyer shall
not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or
allow the Court to be misled by any artifice."
It bears stressing that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A
lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law during good behavior and can only be
deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of the court after
opportunity to be heard has afforded him. Without invading any constitutional privilege
or right, and attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend
or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the
duties and responsibilities of an attorney. In disbarment proceedings, the burden of
proof rests upon the complainant, and for the court to exercise its disciplinary powers,
the case against the respondent must be established by clear, convincing and
satisfactory proof.
In this case, the complainants allege that respondent breached his lawyer's oath and
violated the law because he falsified the subject deed of sale in 1996 to acquire the land
of Pedro even though the latter died in 1992. On the other hand, respondent claims that
he had nothing to do with the sale in 1996; rather, he imputes the execution of the
subject deed and its registration to Rogelio, brother of the complainants.
The Court finds that respondent violated the lawyer's oath, Rule 1.01 and 10.01 of the
CPR.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for two years.
SOLOMON
SOLOMON

11. BELO-HENARES vs. ATTY. GUEVARRA (A.C. No. 11394)

FACTS:
The instant case arose from a verified complaint for disbarment filed by complainant
against respondent for alleged violations of Rules 1.01 and 1.02, Canon 1; Rule 7.03,
Canon 7; Rule 8.01 of Canon 8; and Rule 19.01, Canon 19 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Respondent is the lawyer of a certain Norcio, who filed criminal cases
against complainant for an allegedly botched surgical procedure on her buttocks in 2002
and 2005, purportedly causing infection and making her ill in 2009.
In 2009, respondent wrote a series of posts on his Facebook account, a popular online
social networking site, insulting and verbally abusing complainant, such as calling
complainant a “quack doctor” and “reckless” and other insults.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guily?

RULING:
Yes.
In view of the foregoing, respondent's inappropriate and obscene language, and his act
of publicly insulting and undermining the reputation of complainant through the subject
Facebook posts are, therefore, in complete and utter violation of the following provisions
in the Code of Professional Responsibility:
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to
practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 19.01 - A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in presenting or threaten to
present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
By posting the subject remarks on Facebook directed at complainant and BMGI,
respondent disregarded the fact that, as a lawyer, he is bound to observe proper
decorum at all times, be it in his public or private life. He overlooked the fact that he
must behave in a manner befitting of an officer of the court, that is, respectful, firm, and
decent. Instead, he acted inappropriately and rudely; he used words unbecoming of an
officer of the law, and conducted himself in an aggressive way by hurling insults and
maligning complainant's and BMGI's reputation.
That complainant is a public figure and/or a celebrity and therefore, a public personage
who is exposed to criticism does not justify respondent's disrespectful language. It is the
cardinal condition of all criticism that it shall be bona fide, and shall not spill over the
walls of decency and propriety. In this case, respondent's remarks against complainant
breached the said walls, for which reason the former must be administratively
sanctioned.
"Lawyers may be disciplined even for any conduct committed in their private capacity,
as long as their misconduct reflects their want of probity or good demeanor, a good
character being an essential qualification for the admission to the practice of law and for
SOLOMON

continuance of such privilege. When the Code of Professional Responsibility or the

Rules of Court speaks of conduct or misconduct, the reference is not confined to one's
behavior exhibited in connection with the performance of lawyers' professional duties,
but also covers any misconduct, which—albeit unrelated to the actual practice of their
profession—would show them to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges
which their license and the law invest in them." Accordingly, the Court finds that
respondent should be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year,
as originally recommended by the IBP-CBD, with a stem warning that a repetition of the
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
SOLOMON

12. VAFLOR-FABROA vs. PAGUINTO (A.C. No. 6273)

FACTS:
An information for estafa was filed against complainant based on an affidavit-complaint
which respondent prepared and notarized. Respondent also filed six other criminal
complaints against complainant for violation of Act. 6938.
A few months later, complainant, who was Chairperson of GEMASCO, received a
notice of special general assembly, to consider removal of members of the board,
including her. This notice was signed by respondent. Thereafter, the general assembly
was presided by respondent and Gerangco, who were not members of the current
board. They removed complainant as Chair, and Gerangco placed himself as Chair and
placed respondent as Board Secretary. As such, respondent and his group took over
GEMASCO.
This led complainant to file for disbarment of respondent, alleging that respondent is
liable for promoting groundless suits, disobeying laws, and violating the CPR.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
The Court finds that by conniving with Gerangco in taking over the Board of Directors
and the GEMASCO facilities, respondent violated the provisions of the Cooperative
Code of the Philippines and the GEMASCO By-Laws. He also violated the Lawyer’s
Oath, which provides that a lawyer shall support the Constitution and obey the laws.
When respondent caused the filing of baseless criminal complaints against complainant,
he violated the Lawyer’s Oath that a lawyer shall "not wittingly or willingly promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."
When, after obtaining an extension of time to file comment on the complaint, respondent
failed to file any and ignored this Court’s subsequent show cause order, he violated
Rule 12.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "A lawyer shall
not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let the
period lapse without submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do
so." Sebastian v. Bajar teaches:
x x x Respondent’s cavalier attitude in repeatedly ignoring the orders of the Supreme
Court constitutes utter disrespect to the judicial institution. Respondent’s conduct
indicates a high degree of irresponsibility. A Court’s Resolution is "not to be construed
as a mere request, nor should it be complied with partially, inadequately, or selectively".
Respondent’s obstinate refusal to comply with the Court’s orders "not only betrays a
recalcitrant flaw in her character; it also underscores her disrespect of the Court’s lawful
orders which is only too deserving of reproof.
Lawyers are called upon to obey court orders and processes and respondent’s
deference is underscored by the fact that willful disregard thereof will subject the lawyer
not only to punishment for contempt but to disciplinary sanctions as well. In fact, graver
responsibility is imposed upon a lawyer than any other to uphold the integrity of the
courts and to show respect to their processes. (Citations omitted).
SOLOMON

The Court notes that respondent had previously been suspended from the practice of
law for six months for violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, he having
been found to have received an acceptance fee and misled the client into believing that
he had filed a case for her when he had not. It appears, however, that respondent has
not reformed his ways. A more severe penalty this time is thus called for.
As such, respondent is suspended for two years.
SOLOMON

13. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. TOLENTINO (A.C. No. 6672)

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan
& Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, through the help of his paralegal Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his
allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant
and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.
Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.
Rule 1.03 of the CPR proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection
to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
SOLOMON

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the
client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with
a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling
cards.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
SOLOMON

14. LETTER OF ATTY. AREVALO, JR., REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM

PAYMENT OF IBP DUES (B.M. NO. 1370)
FACTS:
This is a request for exemption from payment of the IBP dues filed by Atty. Arevalo, Jr.
in the amount of P12,035 as alleged unpaid accountability for the years 1977-2005. He
alleged that after being admitted to the Philippine Bar in 1961, he became part of the
Philippine Civil Service from July 1962 until 1986, then migrated to, and worked in, the
USA in December 1986 until his retirement in the year 2003. He maintained that he
cannot be assessed IBP dues for the years that he was working in the Philippine Civil
Service since the Civil Service law prohibits the practice of one's profession while in
government service, and neither can he be assessed for the years when he was
working in the USA.

ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner is entitled to exemption?

RULING:
No.
The rationale for prescribing dues has been explained in the Integration of the Philippine
Bar, thus:
For the court to prescribe dues to be paid by the members does not mean that the Court
is attempting to levy a tax.
A membership fee in the Bar association is an exaction for regulation, while tax purpose
of a tax is a revenue. If the judiciary has inherent power to regulate the Bar, it follows
that as an incident to regulation, it may impose a membership fee for that purpose. It
would not be possible to put on an integrated Bar program without means to defray the
expenses. The doctrine of implied powers necessarily carries with it the power to
impose such exaction.
The only limitation upon the State's power to regulate the privilege of law is that the
regulation does not impose an unconstitutional burden. The public interest promoted by
the integration of the Bar far outweighs the slight inconvenience to a member resulting
from his required payment of the annual dues.
Thus, payment of dues is a necessary consequence of membership in the IBP, of which
no one is exempt. This means that the compulsory nature of payment of dues subsists
for as long as one's membership in the IBP remains regardless of the lack of practice of,
or the type of practice, the member is engaged in.
There is nothing in the law or rules which allows exemption from payment of
membership dues. At most, as correctly observed by the IBP, he could have informed
the Secretary of the Integrated Bar of his intention to stay abroad before he left. In such
case, his membership in the IBP could have been terminated and his obligation to pay
dues could have been discontinued.
As abovementioned, the IBP in its comment stated that the IBP Board of Governors is in
the process of discussing the situation of members under inactive status and the
nonpayment of their dues during such inactivity. In the meantime, petitioner is duty
bound to comply with his obligation to pay membership dues to the IBP.
SOLOMON

Petitioner also contends that the enforcement of the penalty of removal would amount to
a deprivation of property without due process and hence infringes on one of his
constitutional rights.
This question has been settled in the case of In re Atty. Marcial Edillon, in this wise:
. . . Whether the practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here pause to
consider at length, as it [is] clear that under the police power of the State, and under the
necessary powers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's
right to practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to
regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize[d], then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty may be
avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary.
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right but a mere
privilege, and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact
compliance with the lawyer's public responsibilities.
As a final note, it must be borne in mind that membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions, one of which is the payment of membership dues. Failure to
abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof warrants
such drastic move.
As such, petitioner’s request for exemption is denied.
SOLOMON

15. ATTY. BARANDON, JR., vs. ATTY. FERRER, SR. (A.C. No. 5768)
FACTS:
Complainant filed a complaint-affidavit with the IBP seeking the disbarment, suspension
from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against
respondent for hurling invectives upon complainant and filing a baseless suit against
him:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiff’s counsel in Civil Case
7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained
abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty.
Barandon presented a falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon in Civil Case
7040 for alleged falsification of public document when the document
allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23,
1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document.
3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court (MTC)
Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened
Atty. Barandon saying, "Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama
ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines
Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa
Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-rito."
4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document
without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of Court and,
with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document
is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against
repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual
harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a
related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel
and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000,
Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son
who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems,
Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer
repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty of misconduct and violation of the CPR?

RULING:
Yes.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel.
Atty. Ferrer’s actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he
imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil
SOLOMON

Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the
affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and
without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer.
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings
despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all
times.
Though a lawyer’s language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified
and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate
language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty.
Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the
legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral
righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his
indignation.
All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer’s display of improper attitude, arrogance,
misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and
officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the
very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
As such, the court orders the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one
year.
SOLOMON

16. LINSANGAN vs. ATTY. TOLENTINO (A.C. No. 6672)

FACTS:
This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Pedro Linsangan of the Linsangan Linsangan
& Linsangan Law Office against Atty. Nicomedes Tolentino for solicitation of clients and
encroachment of professional services.
Complainant alleged that respondent, through the help of his paralegal Labiano,
convinced his clients to transfer legal representation. Respondent promised them
financial assistance and expeditious collection on their claims. To induce them to hire
his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages. To support his
allegations, complainant presented the sworn affidavit of James Gregorio attesting that
Labiano tried to prevail upon him to sever his lawyer-client relations with complainant
and utilize respondent’s services instead, in exchange for a loan of ₱50,000.
Complainant also attached "respondent’s" calling card.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent is guilty?

RULING:
Yes.
Time and time again, lawyers are reminded that the practice of law is a profession and
not a business; lawyers should not advertise their talents as merchants advertise their
wares. To allow a lawyer to advertise his talent or skill is to commercialize the practice
of law, degrade the profession in the public’s estimation and impair its ability to
efficiently render that high character of service to which every member of the bar is
called.
Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment.
Rule 1.03 of the CPR proscribes "ambulance chasing" (the solicitation of almost any
kind of legal business by an attorney, personally or through an agent in order to gain
employment) as a measure to protect the community from barratry and champerty.
Based on the foregoing, respondent clearly solicited employment violating Rule 2.03,
and Rule 1.03 and Canon 3 of the CPR and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
With regard to respondent’s violation of Rule 8.02 of the CPR, settled is the rule that a
lawyer should not steal another lawyer’s client nor induce the latter to retain him by a
promise of better service, good result or reduced fees for his services. Again the Court
notes that respondent never denied having these seafarers in his client list nor receiving
benefits from Labiano’s "referrals." Furthermore, he never denied Labiano’s connection
to his office. Respondent committed an unethical, predatory overstep into another’s
legal practice. He cannot escape liability under Rule 8.02 of the CPR.
Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers,
respondent violated Rule 16.04.
The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when
in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees,
stenographer’s fees for transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for
surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is handling for the client.
SOLOMON

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free
exercise of his judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided
attention to the case he is handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the
client’s cause. If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s
case, the lawyer in effect acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an
additional stake in its outcome. Either of these circumstances may lead the lawyer to
consider his own recovery rather than that of his client, or to accept a settlement which
may take care of his interest in the verdict to the prejudice of the client in violation of his
duty of undivided fidelity to the client’s cause.
As previously mentioned, any act of solicitation constitutes malpractice which calls for
the exercise of the Court’s disciplinary powers. Violation of anti-solicitation statutes
warrants serious sanctions for initiating contact with a prospective client for the purpose
of obtaining employment. Thus, in this jurisdiction, we adhere to the rule to protect the
public from the Machiavellian machinations of unscrupulous lawyers and to uphold the
nobility of the legal profession.
A final word regarding the calling card presented in evidence by petitioner. A lawyer’s
best advertisement is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to
trust based on his character and conduct. For this reason, lawyers are only allowed to
announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or use of simple
professional cards.
Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
(a) lawyer’s name;
(b) name of the law firm with which he is connected;
(c) address;
(d) telephone number and
(e) special branch of law practiced.
Labiano’s calling card contained the phrase "with financial assistance." The phrase was
clearly used to entice clients (who already had representation) to change counsels with
a promise of loans to finance their legal actions. Money was dangled to lure clients
away from their original lawyers, thereby taking advantage of their financial distress and
emotional vulnerability. This crass commercialism degraded the integrity of the bar and
deserved no place in the legal profession. However, in the absence of substantial
evidence to prove his culpability, the Court is not prepared to rule that respondent was
personally and directly responsible for the printing and distribution of Labiano’s calling
cards.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year.
SOLOMON

17. SPS. ANAYA vs. ATTY. ALVAREZ, JR. (A.C. No. 9436)
FACTS:
Sps. Anaya filed a disbarment complaint against respondent. In their Complaint,
Spouses Anaya alleged that: (1) Atty. Alvarez prepared and notarized the deeds of sale
of the three (3) properties they sold; (2) Atty. Alvarez asked them for cash in exchange
for his four (4) Allied Bank checks with the assurance that the checks would be honored
upon presentment to the drawee bank once they fell due as they would be fully funded
on due date; (3) they eventually agreed to give cash to Atty. Alvarez in exchange for the
said checks relying on his assurance and professional stature; (4) they withdrew from
their Philippine National Bank account the amounts corresponding to the four (4) checks
issued by Atty. Alvarez, as follows: [a] ₱50,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No.
35836, dated December6, 2011; [b] ₱95,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35835, dated
December 20, 2011; [c] P50,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35838, dated January 8,
2011; and [d] ₱200,000.00 for Allied Bank Check No. 35837,  dated January 15, 2012;
(e) the said checks, except Check No. 35838, which appeared stale due to an
erroneous entry of the date, were dishonored by the drawee bank by reason ACCOUNT
CLOSED; (6) they made repeated verbal and written demands on Atty. Alvarez but
these remained unheeded; and (7) after receipt of the second demand letter, Atty.
Alvarez went to spouses Anaya and offered the amount of P20,000.00 as partial
payment but they refused to accept the same as they wanted the return of the full
amount due.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent violated the CPR?

RULING:
Yes.
Time and again, this Court has repeatedly held that the act of a lawyer in issuing a
check without sufficient funds to cover them or, worst, drawn against a closed account,
constitutes willful dishonesty and unethical conduct that undermines the public
confidence in the law and the members of the bar. It shows a lawyer's low regard to his
commitment to the Oath, which he swore to uphold and respect when he joined the
legal profession.
Without a quibble, Atty. Alvarez's failure to pay his debts despite several demands, and
his act of issuing numerous checks which were dishonored for having been drawn
against a closed account, puts his moral character in serious doubt. It demonstrates his
lack of reverence to the lawyer's oath, and seriously and irreparably tarnished the image
of the profession he promised to hold in high esteem.  Atty. Alvarez's contention that he
offered to pay his debts on a monthly basis but was refused by Spouses Anaya fails to
persuade. He should have known that a mere offer to pay a debt is insufficient unless
accompanied by an actual tender of payment. Moreover, the Court notes that the loan
was obtained by Atty. Alvarez in 2011 but up to date, no payment has been made.
Likewise, his defense that he merely issued the checks as collateral to the loan is
untenable. They could not have been used to secure a loan as it was not only unfunded,
but the account to which these checks were drawn was also already closed.
As such, respondent is suspended from the practice of law for one year.
SOLOMON
SOLOMON

18. ZUZUARREGUI vs. ZUZUARREGUI (B.M. No. 2796)

FACTS:
This bar matter refers to the complaint filed by complainant Enrique against Anthony,
his nephew and one of the bar applicants for the 2013 Bar Examinations, for being a
person of questionable moral character given the four criminal charges that the latter
was facing before the QC OCP, for estafa and falsification of public documents. It
appears that respondent himself had disclosed in his Petition to Take the 2013 Bar
Examinations that there were four pending criminal cases against him.
The court provisionally allowed him to take the 2013 bar exams, subject to the condition
that, should he pass, he shall not be allowed to take the lawyer’s oath and sign the roll
until he is cleared of the charges against him.
Respondent thereafter passed the bar exams and consequently filed a verified petition
to take the lawyer’s oath. In his petition, he claimed that the pending criminal cases
against him had already been dismissed by the OCP, as evidenced by the orders of
dismissal attached thereto. To prove that he was morally fit to become a lawyer,
respondent also submitted numerous certifications of good moral character. The OBC
however, recommended that the respondent’s petition be held in abeyance in view of
the other criminal charges still pending against him.
Three years later, respondent filed his verified second motion most respectfully praying
that he be allowed to take the oath and sign the roll as he had notified the court of the
dismissal of all the criminal charges against him. He averred that while he was able to
clear all of the charges against him, he feared that a new round of fabricated criminal
complaints will be forthcoming to further prevent him from becoming a full-fledged
lawyer.

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent should be allowed to take the oath and sign the roll?

RULING:
In this case, respondent's admission to the Philippine Bar has long been held in
abeyance due to the criminal cases pending against him before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. Per the rollo, it appears that all criminal charges against him
has been dismissed except for the most. recent one filed in 2019. The timing of the filing
of this case, however, is highly suspect as it came just as the other criminal charges
against respondent were dismissed on June 28, 2018, 45 January 4, 2019, 46 and
October 15, 2019. 47 Thus, it can no longer be denied that the manifest intention of
complainant in successively filing these criminal cases against respondent is to prevent
him from taking the Lawyer's Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys -the last two steps
needed to be undertaken by respondent to become a full-fledged lawyer.
The dismissal of all the other criminal charges against respondent, coupled with the
various certifications of good moral character in his favor, is sufficient for the Court to
conclude that respondent possesses the moral qualifications required of lawyers.
Though it is true that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege, the Court will not
unjustifiably withhold this privilege from respondent, who has clearly shown that he is
both intellectually and morally qualified to join the legal profession.48 And so, after
SOLOMON

almost six years of waiting, the Court finally grants respondent's prayer for admission to
the Philippine Bar.
As such, the court allowed respondent to take the lawyer’s oath and sign the roll of
attorneys.