NOTE: Highlighted parts are the doctrines of each case.

No
highlighted part in a case? Pakikopya na lang yong ruling. 😊
Under Canon 1
A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS
OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW OF AND LEGAL
PROCESSES.

1.Brion, Jr. v. Brillantes, Jr., Adm Case No. 5305, 2003

FACTS:
Petitioner now avers that respondent violated our decree of perpetual
disqualification imposed upon him from assuming any post in government
service, including any posts in government-owned and controlled
corporations, when he accepted a legal consultancy post at the Local
Water Utilities Administration (LWUA), from 1998 to 2000. Said consultancy
included an appointment by LWUA as 6th member of the Board of
Directors of the Urdaneta (Pangasinan) Water District. Upon expiration of
the legal consultancy agreement, this was subsequently renewed as a
Special Consultancy Agreement.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent is guilty of Gross Immorality and
Appearance of Impropriety during his incumbency as presiding judge of the
Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
RULING:
Yes. The lawyer’s primary duty as enunciated in the Attorney’s Oath is to
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
law and legal processes. That duty in its irreducible minimum entails
obedience to the legal orders of the courts. Respondent’s disobedience to
this Court’s order prohibiting his reappointment to any branch,
instrumentality, or agency of government, including government owned and
controlled corporations, cannot be camouflaged by a legal consultancy or a
special consultancy contract. By performing duties and functions of a
contractual employee of LWUA, by way of a consultancy, and receiving
compensation and perquisites as such, he displayed acts of open defiance
of the Court’s authority, and a deliberate rejection of his oath as an officer
of the court. It is also destructive of the harmonious relations that should
prevail between Bench and Bar, a harmony necessary for the proper
administration of justice. Such defiance not only erodes respect for the
Court but also corrodes public confidence in the rule of law.

2.Feliciano v. Bautista-Lozada, Adm. Case No. 7593 2015

FACTS:
On December 13, 2005, the Court en banc promulgated a Resolution in
A.C. No. 6656 entitled “Bobie Rose V. Frias vs. Atty. Carmencita Bautista
Lozada” suspending Atty. Lozada for violation of Rules 15.03 and 16.04 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Complainant was one of the respondents, complainant lamented that Atty.
Lozada appeared as counsel for the plaintiff and her husband, Edilberto
Lozada, and actively participated in the proceedings of the case before
Branch 75 of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela City. To prove his
allegation, complainant submitted certified true copies of the minutes of the
hearings, dated June 12, 2007, July 3, 2007 and July 6, 2007, wherein Atty.
Lozada signed her name as one of the counsels, as well as the transcript of
stenographic notes showing that Atty. Lozada conducted direct
examination and cross-examination of the witnesses during the trial
proceedings.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Lozada is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 & 1.02, Rule
18.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING:
In the instant case, Atty. Lozada's guilt is undisputed. Based on the
records, there is no doubt that Atty. Lozada's actuations, that is, in
appearing and signing as counsel for and in behalf of her husband,
conducting or offering stipulation/admission of facts, conducting direct and
cross-examination, all constitute practice of law. Furthermore, the findings
of the IBP would disclose that such actuations of Atty. Lozada of actively
engaging in the practice of law in June-July 2007 were done within the
period of her two (2)-year suspension considering that she was suspended
from the practice of law by this Court in May 4, 2006. It would then appear
that, at the very least, Atty. Lozada cannot practice law from 2006 to 2008.
Thus, it is clear that when Atty. Lozada appeared for and in behalf of her
husband in Civil Case No. 101-V-07 and actively participated in the
proceedings therein in June-July 2007, or within the two (2)-year
suspension, she, therefore, engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.

3.Bautista v. Gonzales, Adm. Matter No. 1625 1990

FACTS:

On July 15, 1976, complainant submitted an amended complaint for

disbarment, alleging that respondent committed the following acts:

1. Accepting a case wherein he agreed with his clients, namely, Alfaro

Fortunado, Nestor Fortunado and Editha Fortunado [hereinafter
referred to as the Fortunados] to pay all expenses, including court
fees, for a contingent fee of fifty percent (50%) of the value of the
property in litigation.
2. Acting as counsel for the Fortunados in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
wherein Eusebio Lopez, Jr. is one of the defendants and, without said
case being terminated, acting as counsel for Eusebio Lopez, Jr. in
Civil Case No. Q-15490;
3. Transferring to himself one-half of the properties of the Fortunados,
which properties are the subject of the litigation in Civil Case No. Q-
15143, while the case was still pending;
4. Inducing complainant, who was his former client, to enter into a
contract with him on August 30, 1971 for the development into a
residential subdivision of the land involved in Civil Case No. Q-15143,
covered by TCT No. T-1929, claiming that he acquired fifty percent
(50%) interest thereof as attorney's fees from the Fortunados, while
knowing fully well that the said property was already sold at a public
auction on June 30, 1971, by the Provincial Sheriff of Lanao del Norte
and registered with the Register of Deeds of Iligan City;
5. Submitting to the Court of First Instance of Quezon City falsified
documents purporting to be true copies of "Addendum to the Land
Development Agreement dated August 30, 1971" and submitting the
same document to the Fiscal's Office of Quezon City, in connection
with the complaint for estafa filed by respondent against complainant
designated as I.S. No. 7512936;
 6. Committing acts of treachery and disloyalty to complainant who was
his client;
7. Harassing the complainant by filing several complaints without legal
basis before the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's Office of
Quezon City;
8. Deliberately misleading the Court of First Instance and the Fiscal's
Office by making false assertion of facts in his pleadings;
9. Filing petitions "cleverly prepared (so) that while he does not
intentionally tell a he, he does not tell the truth either."

ISSUE:
Whether or not respondent committed the acts of malpractice, deceit, gross
misconduct and violation of lawyer's oath.
RULING:
The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and
legal process", moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court
requires every lawyer to take an oath to 44 obey the laws of the Republic of
the Philippines as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities
therein." And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of
Court]. All of this underscore the role of the lawyer as the vanguard of our
legal system. The transgression of any provision of law by a lawyer is a
repulsive and reprehensible act which the Court will not countenance. In
the instant case, respondent, having violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,
must be held accountable both to his client and to society.
Rule 1.01
 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct.
4.Arciga v. Maniwang AC 1608 1981
FACTS:
Magdalena T. Arciga in her complaint of February 24, 1976 asked for the
disbarment of lawyer Segundino D. Maniwang (admitted to the Bar in 1975)
on the ground of grossly immoral conduct because he refused to fulfill his
promise of marriage to her. Their illicit relationship resulted in the birth on
September 4, 1973 of their child, Michael Dino Maniwang.
ISSUE:
In his opinion, respondent’s cohabitation with the complainant and his
reneging on his promise of marriage do not warrant his disbarment.
RULING:
This Court found that respondent’s refusal to marry the complainant was
not so corrupt nor unprincipled as to warrant disbarment.

There is an area where a lawyer’s conduct may not be in consonance with

the canons of the moral code but he is not subject to disciplinary action
because his misbehavior or deviation from the path of rectitude is not
glaringly scandalous. It is in connection with a lawyer’s behavior to the
opposite sex where the question of immorality usually arises. Whether a
lawyer’s sexual congress with a woman not his wife or without the benefit
of marriage should be characterized as "grossly immoral conduct" will
depend on the surrounding circumstances.

This Court in a decision rendered in 1925, when old-fashioned morality still

prevailed, observed that "the legislator well knows the frailty of the flesh
and the ease with which a man, whose sense of dignity, honor and morality
is not well cultivated, falls into temptation when alone with one of the fair
sex toward whom he feels himself attracted. An occasion is so inducive to
sin or crime that the saying `A fair booty makes many a thief’ or `An open
door may tempt a saint’ has become general." (People v. De la Cruz, 48
Phil. 533, 535).
5.Zaguirre v. Castillo AC 4921 2003
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent met sometime in 1996 when the two became
officemates at the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). Respondent
courted complainant and promised to marry her while representing himself
to be single. Soon they had an intimate relationship that started sometime
in 1996 and lasted until 1997. 3 During their affair, respondent was
preparing for the bar examinations which he passed. On May 10, 1997, he
was admitted as a member of the Philippine Bar. It was only around the
first week of May 1997 that complainant first learned that respondent was
already married when his wife went to her office and confronted her about
her relationship with respondent. On September 10, 1997, respondent, who
by now is a lawyer, executed an affidavit, admitting his relationship with the
complainant and recognizing the unborn child she was carrying as his. On
December 9, 1997, complainant gave birth to a baby girl, Aletha Jessa. By
this time however, respondent had started to refuse recognizing the child
and giving her any form of support.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Alfredo Castillo guilty of gross immoral conduct.
RULING:
Respondent repeatedly engaged in sexual congress with a woman not his
wife and now refuses to recognize and support a child whom he previously
recognized and promised to support. Clearly therefore, respondent violated
the standards of morality required of the legal profession and should be
disciplined accordingly.
6.Mortel v. Aspiras 100 PHIL. 586, 592N (1956)
FACTS:
Sometime in August, 1952, the respondent, representing himself as single,
courted her and eventually won her affection; 2. on December 22, 1952,
following his instructions, she came to Manila so they could get married,
and she stayed with her sister at No. 10 Espiritu, Pasay City; 3. on and
after December 31, 1952, upon being assured of marriage she allowed him
to live with her as her husband; 4. on January 3, 1953, a marriage license
was applied for, with the son of the respondent, Cesar Aspiras, as one of
the applicants; 5. upon suggestion of respondent, she was married to said
Cesar Aspiras, although she was not in love with the latter; 6. after the
marriage, she and respondent continued cohabiting together, the ceremony
being a mere formality performed at the indication of respondent, who was
a married man and who used his knowledge and education to abuse and
destroy her.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent be disbarred form practice of law.
RULING:
As stated by Mr. Justice Owen of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
“One of the requisite qualifications for one who holds the office of an
attorney at law is that he or she shall be of good moral character, in so far
as it relates to the discharge of the duties and responsibilities of an attorney
at law. This is a continuing qualification necessary to entitle one to
admission to the bar, and the loss of such qualification requires his
suspension. The respondent is a member of the bar of this court. The
charges preferred against him challenge his moral integrity. Just as it was
the duty of this court to refuse him admission in the first instance upon a
showing that he lacked the necessary qualifications, so is it Its duty now to
remove him upon like proof.”
Perhaps mere moral transgression not amounting to crime will not disbar,
as some cases hold 6 and on this we do not decide. But respondent’s
moral delinquency having been aggravated by a mockery of the inviolable
social institution of marriage, and by corruption of his minor son or
destruction of the latter’s honor, the undersigned all agree he is unfit to
continue exercising the privileges and responsibilities of members of the
bar.
7.Cordova v. Cordova, AC 3249 1989
FACTS:
Complainant and respondent Cordova were married on 6 June 1976 and
out of this marriage, two (2) children were born. In 1985, the couple lived
somewhere in Quirino Province. In that year, respondent Cordova left his
family as well as his job as Branch Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino Province, and went to Mangagoy, Bislig,
Surigao del Sur with one Fely G. Holgado. Fely G. Holgado was herself
married and left her own husband and children to stay with respondent.
Respondent Cordova and Fely G. Holgado lived together in Bislig as
husband and wife, with respondent Cordova introducing Fely to the public
as his wife, and Fely Holgado using the name Fely Cordova. Respondent
Cordova gave Fely Holgado funds with which to establish a sari-sari store
in the public market at Bislig, while at the same time failing to support his
legitimate family.
ISSUE:
What is the requirement to the admission to the bar?
RULING:
After a review of the record, we agree with the findings of fact of the IBP
Board. We also agree that the most recent reconciliation between
complainant and respondent, assuming the same to be real, does not
excuse and wipe away the misconduct and immoral behavior of the
respondent carried out in public, and necessarily adversely reflecting upon
him as a member of the Bar and upon the Philippine Bar itself. An applicant
for admission to membership in the bar is required to show that he is
possessed of good moral character. That requirement is not exhausted and
dispensed with upon admission to membership of the bar. On the contrary,
that requirement persists as a continuing condition for membership in the
Bar in good standing.
In the instant case, respondent Cordova maintained for about two (2) years
an adulterous relationship with a married woman not his wife, in full view of
the general public, to the humiliation and detriment of his legitimate family
which he, rubbing salt on the wound, failed or refused to support. After a
brief period of "reform" respondent took up again with another woman not
his wife, cohabiting with her and bringing along his young daughter to live
with them. Clearly, respondent flaunted his disregard of the fundamental
institution of marriage and its elementary obligations before his own
daughter and the community at large.

WHEREFORE, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent from the

practice of law indefinitely and until farther orders from this Court. The
Court will consider lifting his suspension when respondent Cordova submits
proof satisfactory to the Commission and this Court that he has and
continues to provide for the support of his legitimate family and that he has
given up the immoral course of conduct that he has clung to.

8.In re Basa
FACTS:
Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars
of Calif ornia and the Philippine Islands. Recently he was charged in the
Court of First Instance of the city of Manila with the crime of abduction with
consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M. V.
del Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and was sentenced to be imprisoned
for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prisión
correccional. On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed
down by the second division of the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of abduction with consent, as punished by article 446 of
the Penal Code, involves moral turpitude.
RULING:
"Moral turpitude," it has been said, "includes everything which is done
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals." (Bouvier's Law
Dictionary, cited by numerous courts.) Although no decision can be found
which has decided the exact question, it cannot admit of doubt that crimes
of this character involve moral turpitude. The inherent nature of the act is
such that it is against good morals and the accepted rule of right conduct.
It is the order of the court that beginning with the day when Carlos S. Basa
shall be discharged from prison, he be suspended from his office of lawyer
for one year.

9.PP vs. Tuanda (supra)

FACTS:
On 17 December 1983, respondent received from one Herminia A.
Marquez several pieces of jewelry, with a total stated value of P36,000.00,
for sale on a commission basis, with the condition that the respondent
would turn over the sales proceeds and return the unsold items to Ms.
Marquez on or before 14 February 1984. Sometime in February 1984,
respondent, instead of returning the unsold pieces of jewelry which then
amounted to approximately P26,250.00, issued three checks:
(a) a check dated 16 February 1984 for the amount of P5,400.00;
(b) a check dated 23 February 1984 also for the amount of P5,400.00; and
(c) a check dated 25 February 1984 for the amount of P15,450.00.
Upon presentment for payment within ninety (90) days after their issuance,
all three (3) checks were dishonored by the drawee bank, Traders Royal
Bank, for insufficiency of funds. Notwithstanding receipt of the notice of
dishonor, respondent made no arrangements with the bank concerning the
honoring of checks which had bounced and made no effort to settle her
obligations to Ms. Marquez.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the respondent violated her oath as a member of the
Philippine Bar.
RULING:
Respondent was thus correctly suspended from the practice of law
because she had been convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude.
We should add that the crimes of which respondent was convicted also
import deceit and violation of her attorney's oath and the Code of
Professional Responsibility under both of which she was bound to "obey
the laws of the land." Conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude might
not (as in the instant case, violation of B.P. Blg. 22 does not) relate to the
exercise of the profession of a lawyer; however, it certainly relates to and
affects the good moral character of a person convicted of such offense.

10.In re Al Argosino (BM 712 1995)

FACTS:
A criminal information was filed on 4 February 1992 with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 101, charging Mr. A.C. Argosino along with
thirteen (13) other individuals, with the crime of homicide in connection with
the death of one Raul Camaligan on 8 September 1991. The death of Raul
Camaligan stemmed from the infliction of severe physical injuries upon him
in the course of “hazing” conducted as part of university fraternity initiation
rites. Mr. Argosino and his co-accused then entered into plea bargaining
with the prosecution and as a result of such bargaining, pleaded guilty to
the lesser offense of homicide through reckless imprudence.
Eleven (11) days later, Mr. Argosino and his colleagues filed an application
for probation with the lower court. The application for probation was
granted in an Order dated 18 June 1993 issued by Regional Trial Court
Judge Pedro T. Santiago.
Less than a month later, on 13 July 1993, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition for
Admission to Take the 1993 Bar Examinations. In this Petition, he
disclosed the fact of his criminal conviction and his then probation status.
He was allowed to take the 1993 Bar Examinations in this Court’s En Banc
Resolution dated 14 August 1993.1 He passed the Bar Examination. He
was not, however, allowed to take the lawyer’s oath of office.
On 15 April 1994, Mr. Argosino filed a Petition with this Court to allow him
to take the attorney’s oath of office and to admit him to the practice of law,
averring that Judge Pedro T. Santiago had terminated his probation period
by virtue of an Order dated 11 April 1994.

ISSUE:
Whether applicant A.C. Argosino has purged himself of the obvious
deficiency in moral character.

RULING:
We stress that good moral character is a requirement possession of which
must be demonstrated not only at the time of application for permission to
take the bar examinations but also, and more importantly, at the time of
application for admission to the bar and to take the attorney’s oath of office.
Mr. Argosino must, therefore, submit to this Court, for its examination and
consideration, evidence that he may be now regarded as complying with
the requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking
admission to the bar. His evidence may consist, inter alia, of sworn
certifications from responsible members of the community who have a
good reputation for truth and who have actually known Mr. Argosino for a
significant period of time, particularly since the judgment of conviction was
rendered by Judge Santiago. He should show to the Court how he has tried
to make up for the senseless killing of a helpless student to the family of
the deceased student and to the community at large. Mr. Argosino must, in
other words, submit relevant evidence to show that he is a different person
now, that he has become morally fit for admission to the ancient and
learned profession of the law.

11.Teves v. comelec GR 180363 2009 (list of crimes involving moral

turpitude)
FACTS:
Petitioner was a candidate for the position of Representative of the 3rd
legislative district of Negros Oriental during the May 14, 2007 elections. On
March 30, 2007, respondent Herminio G. Teves filed a petition to
disqualify2 petitioner on the ground that in Teves v. Sandiganbayan, he was
convicted of violating Section 3(h), Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, or the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, for possessing pecuniary or financial
interest in a cockpit, which is prohibited under Section 89(2) of the Local
Government Code (LGC) of 1991, and was sentenced to pay a fine of
P10,000.00. Respondent alleged that petitioner is disqualified from running
for public office because he was convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification
from public office.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of which petitioner Edgar Y. Teves was convicted in
Teves v. Sandiganbayan involved moral turpitude.
RULING:

The Sandiganbayan found that the charge against Mayor Teves for causing
the issuance of the business permit or license to operate the Valencia
Cockpit and Recreation Center is "not well-founded."

Petitioner, as then Mayor of Valencia, did not use his influence, authority or
power to gain such pecuniary or financial interest in the cockpit. Neither did
he intentionally hide his interest in the subject cockpit by transferring the
management thereof to his wife considering that the said transfer occurred
before the effectivity of the present LGC prohibiting possession of such
interest.

Second, while possession of business and pecuniary interest in a cockpit

licensed by the local government unit is expressly prohibited by the present
LGC, however, its illegality does not mean that violation thereof necessarily
involves moral turpitude or makes such possession of interest inherently
immoral. Under the old LGC, mere possession by a public officer of
pecuniary interest in a cockpit was not among the prohibitions.

The downgrading of the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of nine

years and twenty-one days as minimum to twelve years as maximum to a
lighter penalty of a fine of P10,000.00 is a recognition that petitioner’s
violation was not intentionally done contrary to justice, modesty, or good
morals but due to his lack of awareness or ignorance of the prohibition.
12.Atty. Roldolfo D. Pactolin (Adm. Case No. 7940, 2012)
FACTS:

In May 1996, Elmer Abastillas, the playing coach of the Ozamis City
volleyball team, wrote Mayor Benjamin A. Fuentes of Ozamis City,
requesting financial assistance for his team. Mayor Fuentes approved the
request and sent Abastillas’ letter to the City Treasurer for processing.
Mayor Fuentes also designated Mario R. Ferraren, a city council member,
as Officer-in-Charge (OIC) of the city while Mayor Fuentes was away.
Abastillas eventually got the ₱10,000.00 assistance for his volleyball team.

Meanwhile, respondent lawyer, Atty. Rodolfo D. Pactolin, then a

Sangguniang Panlalawigan member of Misamis Occidental, got a
photocopy of Abastillas’ letter and, using it, filed on June 24, 1996 a
complaint with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman-Mindanao against
Ferraren for alleged illegal disbursement of ₱10,000.00 in public funds.
Atty. Pactolin attached to the complaint a copy of what he claimed was a
falsified letter of Abastillas, which showed that it was Ferraren, not Mayor
Fuentes, who approved the disbursement.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conviction of a lawyer for a crime involving moral
turpitude constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment from the practice
of law under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.
RULING:

This Court has ruled that the crime of falsification of public document is
contrary to justice, honesty, and good morals and, therefore, involves moral
turpitude. Moral turpitude includes everything which is done contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. It involves an act of baseness,
vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes his
fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary
rule of right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to
justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.

Here, Atty. Pactolin’s disbarment is warranted. The Sandiganbayan has

confirmed that although his culpability for falsification has been indubitably
established, he has not yet served his sentence. His conduct only
exacerbates his offense and shows that he falls short of the exacting
standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

13.In re: Lontok, 43 Phil. 293 (1922)

FACTS:
The Attorney-General asks that an order issue for the removal of Marcelino
Lontok from his office of lawyer in the Philippine Islands, because of having
been convicted of the crime of bigamy. The respondent lawyer, in answer,
prays that the charges be dismissed, and bases his plea principally on a
pardon issued to him by former Governor-General Harrison.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent lawyer be disbarred from bigamy offense given the
fact that he was pardoned.
RULING:
Where proceedings to strike an attorney's name from the rolls are founded
on, and depend alone, on a statute making the fact of a conviction for a
felony ground for disbarment, it has been held that a pardon operates to
wipe out the conviction and is, a bar to -any proceeding for the disbarment
of the attorney after the pardon has been granted. But where proceedings
to disbar an attorney are founded on the professional misconduct involved
in a transaction which has culminated in a conviction of felony, it has been
held that while the effect of the pardon is to relieve him of the penal
consequences of his act, it does not operate as a bar to the disbarment
proceeding, inasmuch as the criminal acts may nevertheless constitute
proof that the attorney does not possess a good moral character and is not
a fit or proper person to retain his license to practice law.
We do this with the more grace when we recall that according to article 130
of the Penal Code, one of the different ways by which criminal liability is
extinguished is by pardon. We must also remember that the motion for
disbarment is based solely on the judgment of conviction for a crime of
which the respondent has been pardoned, and that the language of the
pardon is not such as to amount to a conditional pardon similar in nature to
a parole. It may be mentioned, however, in this connection, that if
Marcelino Lontok should again be guilty of any misconduct, the condition of
his pardon would be violated, and he would then become subject to
disbarment.

14.In re: Vailoces AC 439 1982

FACTS:

This concerns the disbarment of Quinciano Vailoces as member of the

Philippine bar.

It appears that as member of the bar and in his Capacity as a notary public,
Vailoces, on December 14, 1950, acknowledged the execution of a
document purporting to be the last will and testament of one Tarcila
Visitacion de Jesus. Presented for probate before the Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, the will was impugned by her surviving spouse
and daughter. Consequently, the probate court, finding that the will was a
forgery, rendered decision denying probate to the will. 

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is guilty and convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude.
RULING:
Under Section 25, Rule 127, of the Rules of Court, a member of the bar
may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney if it appears that
he has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude,
as used in this section, includes any act deemed contrary to justice,
honesty or good morals. Among the examples given of crimes of this
nature by former Chief Justice Moran are the crime of seduction and the
crime of concubinage.The crime of which respondent was convicted is
falsification of public document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is
clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals. Hence, such crime
involves moral turpitude. Indeed, it is well-settled that "embezzlement,
forgery, robbery, and swindling are crimes which denote moral turpitude
and, as a general rule, all crimes of which fraud is an element are looked
on as involving moral turpitude"

15.In re: Revero, Adm Case No. 126 December 1980

FACTS:
Petition of respondent Tranquilino Rovero for reinstatement in the Roll of
Attorneys.
The record shows that on October 24, 1952, the Court, upon a finding that
the respondent Tranquilino Rovero had been found guilty by a competent
court of a violation of Section 2703 of the Revised Administrative Code, as
amended, (Smuggling) and sentenced to pay a fine of P2,500.00, ordered
his disbarment and the surrender of the lawyer’s certificate issued to him.1
Almost four (4) years thereafter, or on July 7, 1956, the said respondent
filed a petition for reinstatement, claiming, among others, that his
disbarment had caused him untold misery and mental anguish, and that he
had been granted an absolute and unconditional pardon for his crime and
restored to full civil and political rights, and pledged, “on bended knees”,
“not to commit the same or similar mistake in the future nor to involve
himself further in any transaction which might tend to drag down his name
as lawyer and as an ordinary dignified citizen.”
ISSUE:
Whether the petitioner be reinstated to the practice of law.
RULING:
To be reinstated to the practice of law, it is necessary that the respondent
must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court
that he is a person of good moral character—a fit and proper person to
practice law.
An absolute pardon not only blots out the crime committed, but removes all
disabilities resulting from the conviction.
Under the circumstances, and considering that more than 28 years had
already passed since he was disbarred, the respondent Tranquilino Rovero
has been sufficiently punished and disciplined.
WHEREFORE, the order of disbarment is lifted and Attorney Tranquilino
Rovero is hereby reinstated in the legal profession and restored to the
practice of law.
16.In re: Gutierrez AC 363 1962
FACTS:

Respondent Diosdado Q. Gutierrez is a member of the Philippine Bar,

admitted to it on October 5, 1945. He was convicted of the murder of
Filemon Samaco, former municipal mayor of Calapan, and together with his
co-conspirators was sentenced to the penalty of death. After serving a
portion of the sentence respondent was granted a conditional pardon by
the President on August 19, 1958. The unexecuted portion of the prison
term was remitted "on condition that he shall not again violate any of the
penal laws of the Philippines."

On October 9, 1958 the widow of the deceased Filemon Samaco, victim in

the murder case, filed a verified complaint before this Court praying that
respondent be removed from the roll of lawyers pursuant to Rule 127,
section 5.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the conditional pardon extended to respondent places him
beyond the scope of the rule on disbarment aforecited
RULING:

The pardon granted to respondent here is not absolute but conditional, and
merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach the
offense itself, unlike that in Ex parte Garland, which was "a full pardon and
amnesty for all offense by him committed in connection with rebellion (civil
war) against government of the United States."

The foregoing considerations rendered In re Lontok are inapplicable here.

Respondent Gutierrez must be judged upon the fact of his conviction for
murder without regard to the pardon he invokes in defense. The crime was
qualified by treachery and aggravated by its having been committed in
hand, by taking advantage of his official position (respondent being
municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle. The degree
of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from the
profession.

17.Lizaso v. ante AC 2019, June 3, 1991

FACTS:
On August 7, 1978, complainant handed to respondent Prudential Bank
Check No. 655615 dated August 4,1978 in the amount of P5,000.00 (Exh.
'A') payable to the latter and which, per agreement between the two of
them, was to be invested in respondent's business venture in the
casino.  Complainant was enticed into investing in the business by
respondent's proposition that the business will guarantee her an interest of
10% percent profit a day.  Complainant was further convinced because she
knows of her sister's friend who deals in the same business in the casino
and who even accepts jewelries from gamblers who have lost heavily.  The
check was encashed by respondent as shown by his signature appearing
at the back of the check.
On 27 March 1979, Shirley Cuyugan-Lizaso filed a sworn Complaint for
disbarment against respondent Atty. Sergio G. Amante charging the latter
with deceitful and grossly immoral conduct.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Sergio G. Amante acted with deceitful and grossly immoral
conduct.
RULING:
Finally, we should refer to Rule 101 set out in Chapter I entitled "The
Lawyer and Society" of the "Code of Professional Responsibility" which
requires that "a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct." We emphasize here that "conduct," as used in this rule,
is not limited to conduct exhibited in connection with the performance of
professional duties.
In the case at bar, it is clear to the Court that the
conduct of respondent Amante in failing to account for and return the
P5,000.00 delivered to him for investment purposes by complainant,
constituted dishonest and immoral conduct.  We are compelled to conclude
that respondent attorney converted complainant's monies to his personal
uses.  This dishonest conduct was compounded by the efforts of
respondent attorney to deny and dissimulate the transaction that he had
entered into with complainant.  As far as the records of this case show,
respondent has not to date returned complainant's monies.
18.Piat v. Abordo 58 Phil. 350 (1933)
FACTS:
On February 19, 1932, Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
accepted the offer of two individuals to sell him a quantity of opium, a
prohibited drug, and agreed to pay P1.50 per tin for the opium. A can was
disclosed to Abordo as containing opium, and believing that it was opium,
he delivered to one Cabrales the amount of P600 in payment of the stuff.
The can was loaded in the automobile which brought Abordo to the scene
of the delivery, but in returning to Manila another automobile overtook them
and the parties riding therein, pretending to be constabulary soldiers, told
Abordo to stop. Instead Abordo drew his revolver and commanding the
driver of the car to turn into Calle Vito Cruz was able to evade his pursuers
and to arrive safely at his home in Pasay. Once in his home Abordo
examined the contents of the can and found it to contain fake opium and
sand. Thereupon Abordo reported to the Luneta Police Station of Manila
that he had been robbed of P600. Abordo admits that he entered into the
transaction detailed above, adding that "he is sincerely sorry for it and vows
not to repeat.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent be disbarred from the practice of law.
RULING:
Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer. Nevertheless, it is well settled that a
member of the bar may be suspended or removed from his office as lawyer
for other than statutory grounds. However, as a general rule, a court will not
assume jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for misconduct alleged to
be committed in his private capacity. The exception to the rule is that an
attorney will be removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty in his
profession, but also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy
of the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him.
It will be recalled that Perfecto Abordo, a member of the Philippine Bar,
attempted to engage in an opium deal in direct contravention of the criminal
law of the Philippine Islands. All that kept the nefarious plan from
succeeding was the treacherous conduct of his co-conspirators. The
intention to flaunt the law was present even if consummation of the overt
act was not accomplished. In the eyes of the canons of professional ethics
which govern the conduct if attorneys, the act was as reprehensible as if it
had been brought to a successful culmination. "
It is the order of the court that the respondent Perfecto Abordo be
suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year to begin on
September 1, 1933.

19.Toledo v. Abalos AC 5141 1999

FACTS:
This is a case of a lawyer who borrowed money without paying it back.
On July 9, 1981, Atty. Erlinda Abalos obtained a loan of P20,000.00 from
Priscila Toledo, payable within six months from date, plus interest of 5%
per month. To guarantee the payment of said obligation, respondent
executed a Promissory Note (Exhibit "B"). After the lapse of six months,
and despite repeated demands, respondent failed to pay her obligation.
Afraid that she will not recover her money, Ms.Toledo sought the help of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), which referred the matter to the
Commission on Bar Discipline.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Abalos may be disciplined by the IBP.
RULING:
We agree with the Commission that respondent may not be disciplined
either by the IBP or by this Court for failing to pay her obligation to
complainant. Complainant's remedy is to file a collection case before a
regular court of justice against respondent. The general rule is that a lawyer
may not be suspended or disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily
assume jurisdiction to discipline him, for misconduct in his non-professional
or private capacity.

It was, however, still necessary for respondent to acknowledge the orders

of the Commission in deference to its authority over her as a member of the
IBP. Her wanton disregard of its lawful orders subjects her to disciplinary
sanction. Thus, her suspension from the practice of law for one month is
warranted.

20.Sebastian v. Calis AC 5118 b1999

FACTS:
On December 1, 1992 the complainant made a partial payment of the
required fee in the amount of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), which
was received by Ester Calis, wife of the respondent for which a receipt was
issued.

From the period of January 1993 to May 1994 complainant had several
conferences with the respondent regarding the processing of her travel
documents. To facilitate the processing, respondent demanded an
additional amount of Sixty-Five Thousand Pesos (P65,000.00) and
prevailed upon complainant to resign from her job as stenographer with the
Commission on Human Rights.
When complainant inquired about her passport, Atty. Calis informed the
former that she will be assuming the name Lizette P. Ferrer married to
Roberto Ferrer, employed as sales manager of Matiao Marketing, Inc. the
complainant was furnished documents to support her assumed identity.

Realizing that she will be travelling with spurious documents, the

complainant demanded the return of her money, however she was assured
by respondent that there was nothing to worry about for he has been
engaged in the business for quite some time; with the promise that her
money will be refunded if something goes wrong.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Dorotheo Calis committed unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct as well as violation of his oath as
lawyer.
RULING:
We concur with the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution, that herein
respondent is guilty of gross misconduct by engaging in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct contrary to Canon 1, Rule 101 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility. Respondent deceived the
complainant by assuring her that he could give her visa and travel
documents; that despite spurious documents nothing untoward would
happen; that he guarantees her arrival in the USA and even promised to
refund her the fees and expenses already paid, in case something went
wrong. All for material gain.
WHEREFORE, respondent Dorotheo Calis is hereby DISBARRED and his
name is ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. 

21.Reyes v. Gaa AM 1048 1995

FACTS:
On March 30, 1971, at around 9:00 A.M. complainant reported to the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) that he had been the victim of
extortion by respondent, an Assistant City Fiscal of Manila, who was
investigating a complaint for estafa filed by complainant's business rival.
According to complainant, he had given respondent P500.00 on March 1,
1971 and a total of P500.00 on three other occasions. He said that another
"payoff" was scheduled at 11:00 A.M. that day in respondent's office at the
City Hall.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent will be disbarred from practice of law.
RULING:
We agree with the recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors.

Where the misconduct of a lawyer as a government official is of such a

character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such
grounds.

The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public

official, which also constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
lawyer's oath , imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for
money or malice. The lawyer's oath is a source of his obligations and its
violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary
action.

22.Nadayag v. Grageda AC 3232 1994

FACTS:
Respondent prepared and notarized a PACTO DE RETRO sale with
complainant as the Vendee-a-Retro last January 21, 1987 in this City using
Original Certificate of Land Title stolen from the Office of the Register of
Deeds herein in Iligan as a result of which complainant was swindled in
One hundred eight thousand pesos (P108,000.00) because the said land
sold to her by Pacto de Retro was already sold ahead of time to another
party, using the owner's duplicate copy of the title. During pacto de
retro sale, complainant was suspicious already of the appearance of the
Original Certificate of Title, having many annotations and old patches
thereof, when she brought the matter to the attention of Atty. Jose A.
Grageda, notarizing the same, he simply answered me that the title was all
right and that he told further not to worry as he is an attorney and besides
he knew very well the Vendor-a- Retro whose business transactions
especially notarial matter has been and in fact always handled by him.
That said stolen Original Certificate of Land Title was confiscated by Iligan
City Register of Deeds, Attorney Reynaldo Baguio on the occasion when
complainant applied for registration of my Pacto de Retro. Findings showed
that many other cased of stolen original certificates of land titles have taken
place in the said office but the said Attorney as the Register of Deeds did
not prosecute the thieves thereof.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. A. Grageda, a practicing attorney and notary public in Iligan
City, conducted unbecoming of a lawyer in connection with a "Pacto de
Retro"
RULING:

Generally, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct,

whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, in honesty, probity, and good demeanor or
unworthy to continue as an officer of the court.

In the case at bar, respondent should have been conscientious in seeing to

it that justice permeated every aspect of a transaction for which his
services had been engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties of a
worthy member of the Bar. He should have fully explained the legal
intricacies and consequences of the subject transaction as would aid the
parties in making an informed decision. Such responsibility was plainly
incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he must now face the
commensurate consequences of his professional indiscretion. After all,
notarization is not an empty routine. Notarization of a private document
converts such document into a public one and renders it admissible in court
without further proof of its authenticity.

ACCORDINGLY, and as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, the

Court Resolved to SUSPEND respondent Atty. Jose A. Grageda from the
practice of law for a period of three (3) months commencing from receipt of
this Resolution, with the warning that a repetition of the same or any other
misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

23.Nunga v. Viray AC 4758 1999

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that in May 1996, he was appointed by the board of
directors of Masantol Rural Bank after his father’s resignation as its
president.
A few month, thereafter, he allegedly discovered that one of the bank’s
assets consisting of 250 square meters house and lot in Kalookan City was
sold without proper bidding by its manager Jesus B. Manansala to Jesus
Carlo Gerard M. Viray, a minor born February 2, 1969 during the
transaction on May 22, 1987. The deed of absolute sale was notarized by
the respondent who is not only the father of the buyer minor but also a
stockholder and legal counsel of the vendor bank and was not duly
commissioned as notary public as of that date.
Complainant further alleged that the said minor vendee wasn’t capable to
buy the said property at its value of FOUR HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P400,000.00) but his parents Atty. and Mrs. Venancio Viray,
respondent herein. After the title was allegedly issued in the name of the
minor vendee Jesus Carlo M. Viray, the same title was allegedly used by
Respondent and his wife in mortgaging the property to Crown Savings and
Loan Association for THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS
(P300,000.00) on July 15, 1991 both by virtue of Special Powers of
Attorney annotated at the back of the TCT No. 362813 PR 9907. The
annotation of the cancellation of the THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (P300,000.00) loan in favor of Crown Savings and Loan
Association under entry number 1226 was allegedly entered in the notarial
registry of the Respondent for 1991 when he wasn’t commissioned as
notary public.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated the provisions of the notarial law by having
affixed his official signatures to the aforesaid documents with the intent to
impart the appearance of notarial authenticity thereto when in fact as of
those dates 1987 and 1991 he was not commissioned as notary public.
RULING:
We concur with the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that
respondent Atty. Venancio Viray did not have a commission as notary
public in 1987 and 1991 when he notarized the assailed documents.
Respondent knew that he could not exercise the powers or perform the
duties of a notary public unless he was duly appointed as such pursuant to
the Notarial Law
Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the
Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do
so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one,
performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer’s
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by
making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all
legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the
lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the
prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."
As modified, respondent ATTY. VENANCIO VIRAY is hereby BARRED
from being commissioned as notary public for THREE (3) years and his
present commission, if any, is revoked, and SUSPENDED from the practice
of law also for THREE (3) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this
Resolution.

24.Villarin, et al. v. Sabate, Jr. AC 3324 2000

FACTS:
Complainants alleged that the signature of Paterno Diaz was not his, but
that of a certain Lilian Diaz; that with regard to the signatures of Levi
Pagunsan and Alejandro Bofetiado, it was Atty. Sabate, Jr. who signed for
them; and that herein respondent Sabate, Jr. made it appear that said
persons participated in the said act when in fact they did not do so.
Complainants averred that respondent's act undermined the public's
confidence for which reason administrative sanctions should be imposed
against him.
ISSUE:
Whether respondent failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty
as a notary public.
RULING:
As a lawyer commissioned as notary public, respondent is mandated to
subscribe to the sacred duties pertaining to his office, such duties being
dictated by public policy impressed with public interest. Faithful observance
and utmost respect of the legal solemnity of the oath in an acknowledgment
or jurat is sacrosanct. Simply put, such responsibility is incumbent upon
and failing therein, he must now accept the commensurate consequences
of his professional indiscretion.

That respondent acted the way he did because he was confronted with an
alleged urgent situation is no excuse at all. As an individual, and even more
so as a member of the legal profession, he is required to obey the laws of
the land at all times. For notarizing the Verification of the Motion to Dismiss
with Answer when three of the affiants thereof were not before him and for
notarizing the same instrument of which he was one of the signatories, he
failed to exercise due diligence in upholding his duty as a notary public.

WHEREFORE, for lack of diligence in the observance of the Notarial Law,

respondent Atty. Restituto Sabate, Jr. is SUSPENDED from his
Commission as Notary Public for a period of one (1) year.

25.Isenhardt v. Real AC 8254 2012

FACTS:
Complainant alleged that on 14 September 2000 respondent notarized a
Special Power Attorney (SPA) supposedly executed by her. The SPA
authorizes complainant’s brother to mortgage her real property located in
Antipolo City. Complainant averred that she never appeared before
respondent. She maintained that it was impossible for her to subscribe to
the questioned document in the presence of respondent on 14 September
2000 since she was in Germany at that time.

To support her contention, complainant presented a certified true copy of

her German passport and a Certification from the Bureau of Immigration
and Deportation (BID) indicating that she arrived in the Philippines on 22
June 2000 and left the country on 4 August 2000. The passport further
indicated that she arrived again in the Philippines only on 1 July 2001.
Complainant submitted that because of respondent’s act, the property
subject of the SPA was mortgaged and later foreclosed by the Rural Bank
of Antipolo City.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent guilty of gross negligence as a notary public.
RULING:
The duties of a notary public is dictated by public policy and impressed with
public interest. It is not a meaningless ministerial act of acknowledging
documents executed by parties who are willing to pay the fees for
notarization. It is of no moment that the subject SPA was not utilized by the
grantee for the purpose it was intended because the property was allegedly
transferred from complainant to her brother by virtue of a deed of sale
consummated between them. What is being penalized is respondent’s act
of notarizing a document despite the absence of one of the parties. By
notarizing the questioned document, he engaged in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. A notarized document is by law entitled to full
credit upon its face and it is for this reason that notaries public must
observe the basic requirements in notarizing documents. Otherwise, the
confidence of the public in notarized documents will be undermined.
WHEREFORE, the notarial commission of respondent Atty. Leonardo M.
Real is hereby REVOKED. He is disqualified from reappointment as notary
public for a period of two (2) years and SUSPENDED from the practice of
law for a period of one (1) year, effective immediately. He is WARNED that
a repetition of the same or similar offense in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.

26.Agbulos v. Viray AC 7350 2013

FACTS:
In his Complaint-Affidavit, Sappayani alleged that Atty. Gasmen notarized
documents which he purportedly executed, particularly, a Special Power of
Attorney (SPA) in favor of one Newtrade Goodwill Corporation (NGC)
through Romeo N. Maravillas (Maravillas) and an Application for Loan and
Promissory Note (loan application) with Air Materiel Wing Savings and
Loan Association, Inc. (AMWSLAI). The SP A, which was notarized by Atty.
Gasmen on March 29, 2000, authorized NGC through Maravillas to
complete the loan application with AMWSLAI and thereafter, receive its
proceeds. Thus, by virtue of said notarized documents, AMWSLAI released
to Maravillas, as representative of NGC, a loan amounting to ₱157,301.43.

However, Sappayani denied executing said documents, claiming that his

signature found on the SP A was forged as he did not know Mara villas.
Neither did he authorize Maravillas to enter into any transaction on his
behalf. Sappayani added that it was physically impossible for him to
personally appear before Atty. Gasmen and execute the documents at the
AMWSLAI office in Quezon City, as he was then training as a new recruit at
the Bureau of Fire Protection at General Santos City.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the IBP correctly found Atty. Gasmen liable for violation of
the Notarial Rules and the CPR.
RULING:
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.
In this case, while the IBP Commissioner found the absence of bad faith
and considered Atty. Gasmen as a first time offender, the Court finds that
the penalties of disqualification from being commissioned as notary public
for a period of two (2) years and suspension from the practice of law for
one (1) year are proper. On this score, the Court observes that Atty.
Gasmen did not deny notarizing the documents without the presence of
Sappayani and indirectly admitted doing the same with other similar
documents and affiants. Thus, such practice, he evidently countenanced
fraud.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Atty. Renato G. Gasmen
GUILTY of violation of the Notarial Law and the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Accordingly, the Court hereby SUSPENDS him from the
practice of law for one (1) year; REVOKES his incumbent commission as a
notary public; and PROHIBITS him from being commissioned as a notary
public for two (2) years, effective immediately. He is WARNED that a
repetition of the same offense or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more severely.
27.Flores v. Chua AC 4500 1999
FACTS:
Complainant Ban Hua U. Flores seeks the disbarment of respondent Atty.
Enrique S. Chua, a practicing lawyer in the City of Bacolod for various
offenses amounting to "malpractice, gross misconduct, violation of his
lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Conduct and Responsibility, as well
as the provisions of the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to wit:

ISSUE:

I. FRAUD AGAINST A DEFENSELESS WIDOW BY THE

DEATHBED OF HER DECEASED SPOUSE THROUGH
FALSIFICATION AND FORGERY OF PUBLIC DOCUMENT.
II. FOISTING FALSEHOOD AND FABRICATED PUBLIC
DOCUMENT TO MOLEST AND HARASS PARTIES DEPRIVED
CONCERNED AND DEPRIVED THEM OF THEIR PROPERTY
RIGHTS TO THEIR PREJUDICE AND DETRIMENT.
III. LIBEL, MISREPRESENTATION AND UNLAWFUL
ADVERTISEMENT THROUGH THE PREMATURE
PUBLICATION OF PORTION OF A QUESTIONABLE DECISION
WHICH IS PENDING APPEAL.

RULING:

I.On the first charge that responding was guilty of fraud against a person in
his deathbed by falsification and forgery of a deed of sale, there is no
evidence that he actively conspired with any party, or actively participated,
in the forgery of the signature of one Chua Beng, a purported party to the
contract. However, complainant's evidence supports the conclusion that the
signature of Chua Beng on a Deed of Sale was forged. 

II. Ignorance of a pending action on the properties subject of the SEC case
cannot, therefore, be invoked by respondent. Respondent is answerable for
misconduct under Canon 12.02.
III. Here, we cannot excuse him from such misconduct for it behooves him
to even exert earnest efforts towards the settlement of family disputes and
certainly he should be the last to exacerbate and complicate the
controversial situation in which family members are embroiled. By his
publication, respondent has violated the canons of professional ethics and
professional responsibility, particularly Canon 19, 27, 3.01, 13.02, 1.03 and
1.04.
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, we find respondent ENRIQUE S.
CHUA guilty of grave misconduct rendering him unworthy of continuing
membership in the legal profession. He is thus ordered DISBARRED from
the practice of law and his name stricken off the Roll of Attorneys, effective
immediately.

28.Imson-Souwelha v. Rondez AC 3961  1997

FACTS:
In a nutshell, complainant Souweha charged respondent Atty. Rondez of
being a privy, or instrumental, in the forgery of her signature appearing in
the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of her deceased parents
purportedly agreed upon by her father's (Anastacio Imson) two sets of
children with his first and second wives. She claimed that she could not
have signed (nor has she authorized anybody to sign in her behalf) said
agreement as she was in the United States. Complainant Souweha thus
accused respondent Atty. Rondez, in having notarized the extrajudicial
settlement despite her absence, of failing in his legal duties and
responsibilities and violating his lawyer's oath, by (1) causing it to appear
that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not
in fact so participate; (2) attributing to persons who have participated in any
act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made by them; and
(3) making untruthful statements in a narration of facts.
ISSUE:
WON respondent be absolved from the complainant's charge of violating
his notarial duties and responsibility.
RULING:
The Court agrees with, and hereby adopts, the IBP's finding that
respondent, in essence, acted in good faith in connection with his
participation in/approval of the extrajudicial settlement.
From the foregoing premises, herein respondent could not have been at
fault or deemed to have violated his oath as a commissioned notary public
on account of complainant's non-appearance or absence when she
acknowledged the deed of settlement as her voluntary act and deed.
Because of respondent's close relationship with the Imson family and the
assurances of the complainant's sisters Flora Imson-Elvina and Lydia
Imson-Salud (sic) that they have the written authority of the complainant to
sign on her behalf, respondent thus notarixed (sic) the questioned
document believing in good faith the respresentations (sic) of complainant's
sisters Flora Imson-Elvina and Lydia Imson-Sinlao that they have the
written authority of their sister Salud Imson-Souweha. If respondent is to be
faulted at all, it is simply because of his complete trust and confidence on
the heirs of Anastacio, particularly Flora Imson-Elvina and Lydia Imson-
Sinlao whom the respondent never suspected would commit the grievous
scheme of misrepresenting themselves as the representatives of the
complainant in the matter of the settlement deed.
We note, however, that the penalty of Reprimand was imposed on
respondent not on the basis of the acts complained of by complainant
involved in this case, but on account of the motu proprio finding of the
investigating commissioner that respondent is guilty of having represented
the conflicting interests of the late Anastacio Imson's two sets of children.

Rule 1.02
A lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at defiance of the law or
at lessening confidence in the legal system.
29. In re: Terrell GR 1203 1903 / 2 Phil. 266
FACTS:
Howard D. Terrell, an attorney-at-law, first, had assisted in the organization
of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club, after he had been notified that the said
organization was made for the purpose of evading the law then in force in
said city; and,

Secondly, for acting as attorney for said "Centro Bellas Artes" during the
time of and after its organization, which organization was known to him to
be created for the purpose of evading the law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Terrell guilty of violating Rule 1.02.

RULING:
We have carefully considered these facts, and have reached the
conclusion that they were such as to justify the court below in arriving at the
conclusion that the knowledge and acts of the accused in connection with
the organization of the "Centro Bellas Artes" Club were of such a nature
and character as to warrant his suspension from practice.

30. Donton v. Tansingco AC 6057 2006

FACTS:
Complainant averred that respondent’s act of preparing the Occupancy
Agreement, despite knowledge that Stier, being a foreign national, is
disqualified to own real property in his name, constitutes serious
misconduct and is a deliberate violation of the Code. Complainant prayed
that respondent be disbarred for advising Stier to do something in violation
of law and assisting Stier in carrying out a dishonest scheme.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent violated the Rule 1.02 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:
Respondent had sworn to uphold the Constitution. Thus, he violated his
oath and the Code when he prepared and notarized the Occupancy
Agreement to evade the law against foreign ownership of lands.
Respondent used his knowledge of the law to achieve an unlawful end.
Such an act amounts to malpractice in his office, for which he may be
suspended.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Atty. Emmanuel O.

Tansingco GUILTY of violation of Canon 1 and Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, we SUSPEND respondent Atty.
Emmanuel O. Tansingco from the practice of law for SIX
MONTHS effective upon finality of this Decision.

31. Oronce v. CA GR 125766 1998

FACTS:
During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the
property in litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her
husband, a lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending
in the CA & while a writ of preliminary injunction was in force.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Flaminiano should be held liable.

RULING:
Atty. Flaminiano’s acts of entering the property without the consent of its
occupants & in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction &
making utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are
unbecoming of a member of the Bar. Although he says that they
“peacefully” took over the property, such “peaceful” take-over cannot justify
defiance of the writ of preliminary injunction that he knew was still in force.
Through his acts, he has flouted his duties as a member of the legal
profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he is prohibited
from counseling or abetting “activities aimed at defiance of the law or at
lessening confidence in the legal system.”
Doctrine:
As the law now stands, inferior courts retain jurisdiction over ejectment
cases even if the question of possession cannot be resolved without
passing upon the issue of ownership; but this is subject to the same caveat
that the issue posed as to ownership could be resolved by the court for the
sole purpose of determining the issue of possession.
32. Guarin v. Limpin AC 10576 2015
FACTS:
On July 22, 2009, Guarin filed this complaint with the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) claiming that Atty.
Limpin violated Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR by knowingly listing him
as a stockholder, Chairman of the Board and President of LCI when she
knew that he had already resigned and had never held any share nor was
he elected as chairperson of the BOD or been President of LCI.  He also
never received any notice of meeting or agenda where his appointment as
Chairman would be taken up.  He has never accepted any appointment as
Chairman and President of LCI.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Limpin violated Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

RULING:
After going through the submissions and stipulations of the parties, we
agree with the IBP that there is no indication that Guarin held any share to
the corporation and that he is therefore ineligible to hold a seat in the BOD
and be the president of the company.  It is undisputed that Atty. Limpin filed
and certified that Guarin was a stockholder of LCI in the GIS.  While she
posits that she had made the same in good faith, her certification also
contained a stipulation that she made a due verification of the statements
contained therein.  That Atty. Limpin believed that Guarin would sign a
Deed of Assignment is inconsequential: he never signed the instrument. 
We also note that there was no submission which would support the
allegation that Guarin was in fact a stockholder.  We thus find that in filing a
GIS that contained false information, Atty. Limpin committed an infraction
which did not conform to her oath as a lawyer in accord with Canon 1 and
Rule 1.01 of the CPR.

We also agree with the IBP that in allowing herself to be swayed by the
business practice of having Mr. de los Angeles appoint the members of the
BOD and officers of the corporation despite the rules enunciated in
the Corporation Code with respect to the election of such officers, Atty.
Limpin has transgressed Rule 1.02 of the CPR.

33. Coronel v. Cunanan AC 6738 2015

FACTS:
Complainant recounts that sometime in October 2003, she engaged the
services Respondent to transfer to her name and her co-heirs the parcels
of land covered under TCT No. T-72074 and OCT. No. 9616, which
certificates of title are both registered under the name of Complainant's
deceased grandparents. Respondent advised Complainant that for the
registration of TCT. No. T-72074, the transfer may be effected by two
means namely: first, by way of "ordinary procedure"; and second, by way of
"direct registration".

It appears that Complainant and Respondent agreed on the direct

registration approach because sometime thereafter, Respondent billed
Complainant with the following fees: Php50,000.00 as package deal for the
direct transfer of title for TCT. No. T-72074; another Php50,000 as package
deal for the transfer of title for OCT No. 9616; Php5,000 for litigation
expenses for issuance of duplicate copy of OCT 9616 and another
Phpl5,000 as professional fees, to which Complainant agreed.

On October 28, 2003, Complainant paid Respondent Php70,000.00 pesos.

According to Complainant, she thereafter tried to contact Respondent but

the latter cannot be contacted. Thus, she was constrained to write
Respondent a letter dated March 5, 2004 asking the latter to contact her.

Subsequently, Respondent sent to Complainant an Extra-judicial

Settlement Agreement. Complainant had it signed and sent back to
Respondent. Thereafter, Respondent asked Complainant for the owner's
duplicate copy of TCT. No. T-72074, which complainant, likewise, sent to
Respondent.

Afterwards, Complainant heard nothing from Respondent.

ISSUE:
Whether the proposal of "direct registration" was unquestionably unlawful,
immoral and deceitful all at once.

RULING:
A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes. He shall not engage in
unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct; or counsel or abet
activities aimed at a defiance of the law or at a lessening of confidence in
the legal system. He should advise his client to uphold the law, not to
violate or disobey it. Conversely, he should not recommend to his client any
recourse or remedy that is contrary to law, public policy, public order, and
public morals.

Although the respondent outlined to the complainant the "ordinary

procedure" of an extrajudicial settlement of estate as a means of
transferring title, he also proposed the option of "direct registration" despite
being fully aware that such option was actually a shortcut intended to
circumvent the law, and thus patently contrary to law. The transfer under
the latter option would bypass the immediate heirs of their grandparents
(i.e., the complainant's parent and her co-heirs parents), and consequently
deprive the Government of the corresponding estate taxes and transfer
fees aside from requiring the falsification of the transfer documents. He
assured that he could enable the direct transfer with the help of his
contacts in the Office of the Register of Deeds and other relevant agencies
of the Government, which meant that he would be bribing some officials
and employees of those offices. The proposal of "direct registration" was
unquestionably unlawful, immoral and deceitful all at once.

Rule 1.03
Rule 1.03 - A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage
any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause.

34. Delos Santos II v. Barbosa, Adm. Case 6681 2015

FACTS:
On February 22, 2005, the complainant filed a Petition for Disbarment with
the Court, charging the respondent with multiple gross violations of his oath
as a lawyer and Canons of Professional Ethics for unlawfully obstructing
and delaying the proceedings in Criminal Case No. 111152 against
Canaco.

The complainant alleged that the respondent’s act of sending out the letters
dated May 24, 2004 was criminally and maliciously done to delay, impeded,
obstruct, or otherwise frustrate the prosecution of Canaco, who is the
respondent’s client.

The complainant further contended that the respondent’s letters were not
justified by any tenable and lawful defense 11 and were made to suppress
and conceal the subject birth record to impair its availability, authenticity,
verity, or admissibility as evidence in Criminal Case No. 111152 before the
MeTC.

Lastly, the complainant submitted that the acts of respondent constituted

multiple gross violations of his oath as a lawyer, of the Canons of
Professional Ethics, and of his duties as an attorney under the Rules of
Court.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is guilty of Rule 1.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:

Under Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers should

uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land, and promote respect for
the law and legal processes. Specifically, Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 states that
"[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Rule 1.03 also provides that "[a] lawyer shall not, for any corrupt
motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s
cause."

In the present case, in disregard of the METC’s intent to expedite the

proceedings through its Order of October 19, 2004, the respondent sent
letters to the Office of the Civil Registrar of Quezon City, the National
Census and Statistics Office, and St. Luke’s Hospital to prevent the
prosecution from obtaining a certified true copy of the birth certificate of
Victor Canaco Delos Santos. The preliminary conference of May 24, 2004
was precisely postponed to allow the prosecution to secure this certified
true copy. Thus, the respondent committed willful disobedience to a lawful
order of the court intended to avoid any further delay of the proceedings in
the criminal case.

Rule 1.04
Rule 1.04 - A lawyer shall encourage his clients to avoid, end or settle a
controversy if it will admit of a fair settlement.

35. Castaneda v. Ago GR 28546 1975

FACTS:
- 1955 – Castaneda and Henson filed a replevin suit against Ago in the CFI
of Manila to recover certain machineries.
-1957 – judgment in favor of Castaneda and Henson
- 1961 – SC affirmed the judgment; trial court issued writ of execution;
Ago’s motion denied, levy was made on Ago’s house and lots; sheriff
advertised the sale, Ago moved to stop the auction; CA dismissed the
petition; SC ffirmed dismissal
- Ago thrice attempted to obtain writ of preliminary injunction to restrain
sheriff from enforcing the writ of execution; his motions were denied
- 1963 – sheriff sold the house and lots to Castaneda and Henson; Ago
failed to redeem
- 1964 – sheriff executed final deed of sale; CFI issued writ of possession
to the properties
- 1964 – Ago filed a complaint upon the judgment rendered against him in
the replevin suit saying it was his personal obligation and that his wife ½
share in their conjugal house could not legally be reached by the levy
made; CFI of QC issued writ of preliminary injunction restraining Castaneda
the Registed of Deeds and the sheriff from registering the final deed of
sale; the battle on the matter of lifting and restoring the restraining order
continued
- 1966 – Agos filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition to enjoin sheriff
from enforcing writ of possession; SC dismissed it; Agos filed a similar
petition with the CA which also dismissed the
petition; Agos appealed to SC which dismissed the petition
- Agos filed another petition for certiorari and prohibition with the CA which
gave due course to the petition and granted preliminary injunction.

ISSUE:
Whether the Ago’s lawyer, encourage his clients to avoid controversy.

RULING:
No. Despite the pendency in the trial court of the complaint for the
annulment of the sherrif’s sale, justice demands that the petitioners long
denied the fruits of their victory on the replevin suit, must now enjoy them,
for, the respondents Agos abetted by their lawyer Atty. Luison, have
misused legal remedies and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgement, to the extended prejudice of the petitioners.

Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant and his exalted
position as an officer of the court, Atty. Luison has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliatory for compromise, a virtuoso of
technicality in the conduct of litigation instead of a true exponent of the
primary of truth and moral justice.

A counsel’s assertiveness in espousing with candor and honesty his client’s

cause his client’s cause must be encouraged and is to be commended;
what the SC does not and cannot countenance is a lawyer’s insistence
despite the patent futility of his client’s position.

It is the duty of the counsel to advice his client on the merit of lack of his
case. If he finds his client’s cause as defenseless, then he is his duty to
advice the latter to acquiesce and submit rather than traverse the
incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client,
and temper his client’s propensity to litigate.

36. De Ysasi III v LNRC GR 104599 1994

FACTS:
Atty. De Ysasi and De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The father
owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental. Son is employed in the hacienda as
the farm administrator. Son III underwent surgery and so he missed work.
He was confined and while he’s nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. Son filed against his father
for illegal dismissal before the NLRC. His father invoked that his son
actually abandoned his work.

ISSUE:
Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
Whether they failed to settle without resorting to the courts.

RULING:
No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence
without valid or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the
employer-employee relationship, with the second element as the more
determinative factor and being manifested by some overt acts. No such
intent was proven in this case.

Yes. Once again, we reiterate that the useful function of a lawyer is not only
to conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising
settlement or withholding suit. Their relationship allows them to settle the
case even without resorting to the court.

CANON 2
A lawyer shall make his legal services available in an efficient and convenient manner compatible
with the independence, integrity and effectiveness of the profession.
37. LEDESMA vs. CLIMACO G.R. No. L-23815, 28 June 1974

FACTS:
Atty. Ledesma, a counsel de parte for one of the parties in a case pending before the sala of Judge
Rafael Climaco, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de parte in light of his appointment as an election
registrar. Judge Climaco, instead of granting his withdrawal, appointed him as counsel de oficio of the
two defendants in the criminal case. Ledesma then filed a motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio but it
was denied.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Ledesma should be allowed to withdraw as counsel de officio considering his
appointment as Election Registrar.

RULING:
No. Membership in the Bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its exacting standards. Law
is a profession and not a trade or craft. Those enrolled in its ranks aid the courts in the administration of
justice. As such, an attorney may be called or appointed as counsel de oficio to aid indigents for the
realization of their constitutional right to counsel especially in criminal cases like this where a person may
be convicted not because of his or her guilt but because he or she lacks competent legal representation.
Petitioner is admonished for not being mindful of his obligation where he is expected to exercise due
diligence, not mere perfunctory representation, to the case of his clients. He must be reminded that a
member of the bar is a vanguard in the bastion of justice and is therefore expected to have a bigger dose
of social conscience and a little less self-interest.
 38. IN RE: TAGORDA 53 Phil. 37, 23 March 1929

FACTS:
Tagorda, a practising attorney and a member of the provincial board of Isabela, admits that he made
use of a card advertising unethical legal services and is the author of a letter solicitating by stating his
intent to charge legal fees lower than that customarily prescribed.

ISSUE:
Whether Tagorda violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. Solicitation of business by circulars or advertisements, or by personal communications or
interviews not warranted by personal relations, is unprofessional, and the commission of offenses of this
character amply justifies permanent elimination from the bar. But as mitigating circumstances working in
favor of the respondent there are, first, his intimation that he was unaware of the impropriety of his acts,
second, his youth and inexperience at the bar, and, third, his promise not to commit a similar mistake in
the future As a result the respondent attorney is suspended from the practice as an attorney-at-law for the
period of one month.

39. LINSANGAN vs. TOLENTINO A.C. No. 6672, 4 September 2009

FACTS:
Linsangan alleged that Tolentino, with the help of a paralegal, convinced his clients to transfer
legal representation. Tolentino promised them financial assistance and expeditious collection on their
claims. To induce them to hire his services, he persistently called them and sent them text messages.

ISSUE:
Whether the means employed by Tolentino constituted distinct violations of ethical rules.

RULING:
Yes. Rule 2.03 of the Code states that “A lawyer shall not do or permit to be done any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.” Lawyers are prohibited from soliciting cases for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or brokers. Such actuation constitutes malpractice, a ground for
disbarment. Lawyers are only allowed to announce their services by publication in reputable law lists or
use of simple professional cards. Professional calling cards may only contain the following details:
lawyers name; name of the law firm with which he is connected; address; telephone number and special
branch of law practiced.

CANON 3
A lawyer in making known his legal services shall use only true, honest, fair, dignified and object
information or statement of facts.

40. ULEP vs. THE LEGAL CLINIC B.M. No. 553, 17 June 1993

FACTS:
Ulep files a complaint against The Legal Clinic because of its advertisements stating undignified
phrases which are champertous, unethical, demeaning of the law profession, and destructive of the
confidence of the community in the integrity of the members of the bar.
ISSUE:
Whether the services offered by the Legal Clinic can properly be the subject of the advertisements
herein complained of.

RULING:
Yes. A lawyer cannot advertise his talents or skills as in a manner similar to a merchant advertising
his goods. The proscription against advertising of legal services or solicitation of legal business rests on
the fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession. The canons of the profession tell us that
the best advertising possible for a lawyer is a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and
fidelity to trust, which must be earned as the outcome of character and conduct.

41. DACANAY vs. BAKER & MCKENZIE A.C. No. 2131, 10 May 1985

FACTS:
Torres, using the letterhead of Baker & McKenzie, which contains the names of the ten lawyers,
asked a certain Rosie Clurman for the release of 87 shares of Cathay Products International, Inc. to
Gabriel, a client. Attorney Dacanay, in his reply, denied any liability of Clurman to Gabriel. He requested
that he be informed whether the lawyer of Gabriel is Baker & McKenzie “and if not, what is your purpose
in using the letterhead of another law office.” Not having received any reply, Atty. Dacanay sought to
enjoin Juan Collas and nine other lawyers from practicing law under the name Baker and McKenzie, a
law firm organized in Illinois.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents should enjoin from practicing law under the firm name Baker & McKenzie.

RULING:
Yes. Respondents' use of the firm name Baker & McKenzie constitutes a representation that being
associated with the firm they could "render legal services of the highest quality to multinational business
enterprises and others engaged in foreign trade and investment" which the Court finds unethical because
Baker & McKenzie is not authorized to practice law here.
Who may practice law: Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or hereafter
admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this rule, and who is in good and regular standing,
is entitled to practice law.

CANON 5
A lawyer shall keep abreast of legal development, participate in continuing legal education
programs, support efforts to achieve high standards in law schools as well as in the practical
training of law students and assist in disseminating information regarding the law and
jurisprudence.

42. PEOPLE vs. GACOTT G.R. No. 116049, 20 March 1995

FACTS:
For failure to check citations of the prosecutions, the order of respondent RTC Judge Eustaquio
Gacott Jr. dismissing a criminal case was annulled by the Supreme Court. The respondent judge was also
sanctioned with a reprimand and a fine of PHP 10k for gross ignorance of law.

ISSUE:
Whether counsel for respondents committed gross ignorance of the law.
RULING:
Yes. The responsibility to keep abreast with the changes in the law espoused in Canon 5 is
applicable with equal force to counsel for private respondents, Atty. Bermejo. By insisting upon the
authority of an already abolished Anti-Dummy Board, counsel displayed blatant irresponsibility, not to
mention ignorance of the law. She should be reminded that the law is a progressive science. There is less
than full compliance with the demands of professional competence, if a member of a bar does not keep
himself abreast of the trend of authoritative pronouncements.

43. PAYOD vs. METILA A.C. No. 3944, 27 July 2007

FACTS:
Atty. Metila failed to submit important documents to the Court of Appeals and the serious
consequences brought by such act became prejudicial to the case of Payod. Payod said they made
sufficient follow ups with Atty. Metila but the latter failed to show up in appointed meetings at the Court.
Pagod thereafter charged Atty. Romeo P. Metila for willful neglect and gross misconduct in the discharge
of her duties. Atty. Metila denied the charges and insisted that there was no attorney-client relationship
between him and Payod for there was no Special Power of Attorney authorizing Payod’s mother to hire
him as a lawyer.

ISSUE:
Whether the failure of Atty. Metila to submit documents to the CA constitute gross negligence.

RULING:
No. In failing to comply with the requirements in initiating complainant’s appeal even after his
attention to it was called by this Court, respondent fell short of the standards required in the Canon of
Professional Responsibility for a lawyer to “keep abreast of legal developments” and “serve his client
with competence and diligence.” However, the circumstances attendant to respondent’s initial handle of
the case do not warrant a finding of gross negligence, or sheer absence of real effort on his part to defend
her cause. Neither do the circumstances warrant a finding that respondent was motivated by ill-will. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, a lawyer enjoys a presumption of good faith in his favor.

44. SANCHEZ vs. AGUILOS A.C. No. 10543, 16 March 2016

FACTS:
Sanchez charged Atty. Aguilos with misconduct for the latter’s refusal to return the amount she had
paid for his professional services despite his not having performed the contemplated professional
services. Clearly, the respondent misrepresented his professional competence and skill to the complainant.
He did not know the distinction between the grounds for legal separation and for annulment of marriage.
His explanation is that the client initially intended to pursue the action for legal separation.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable for misconduct.

RULING:
Yes. Respondent was liable for misconduct, and he should be ordered to return the entire amount
received from the client. Lawyers shall keep abreast of the legal developments and participate in
continuing legal education program (Canon 5 of the Code) in order to prevent repetition of such kind of
advise that respondent gave to the complainant. In giving an advise, he should be able to distinguish
between the grounds for legal separation and grounds for annulment of marriage. But as the respondent
stated in his answer, it appears that he is mixed up with the basic provisions of the law.

45. CABILES vs. CEDO A.C. No. 10245, 16 August 2017

FACTS:
Cabiles filed an administrative complaint seeking the disbarment of Atty. Cedo for neglecting two
cases, a labor case and a criminal case. According to Cabiles, Cedo misled her by claiming that it was
Danilo who was absent during the said hearing. Aside from this, Cedo failed to file a Reply and
negligently handled the appeal before the NLRC. Anent the second case, Cabiles claimed that Cedo did
not exert any effort to seasonably file her Complaint for unjust vexation before the City Prosecutor's
Office, causing it to be dismissed on the ground of prescription.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Cedo violated Canon 5 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. Bar Matter 850 mandates continuing legal education for IBP members as an additional
requirement to enable them to practice law. This is ‘‘to ensure that throughout their career, they keep
abreast with law and jurisprudence, maintain the ethics of the profession and enhance the standards of the
practice of law.” Noncompliance with the MCLE requirement subjects the lawyer to be listed as a
delinquent IBP member.
In the present case, respondent lawyer failed to indicate in the pleadings filed in the said labor case
the number and date of issue of his MCLE Certificate of Compliance for the Third Compliance Period. In
fact, upon checking with the MCLE Office, it was discovered that respondent lawyer had failed to comply
with the three MCLE compliance periods. For this reason, there is no doubt that respondent lawyer
violated Canon 5.

CANON 6
These canons shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their official tasks.

46. COLLANTES vs. RENOMERON A.C. No. 3056, 16 August 1991

FACTS:
Complainant, house counsel for V&G, filed a disbarment complaint against Atty. Vincent
Renomeron, Register of Deeds of Tacloban City, for the latter’s irregular actuations with regards to the
application of V&G for registration of 163 pro forma. Deeds of Absolute Sale with Assignment of lots in
its subdivision.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent register of deeds, as a lawyer, may also be disciplined by this Court for his
malfeasances as a public official.

RULING:
Yes, for his misconduct as a public official also constituted a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The
lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s
oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a ground for his suspension, disbarment or other
disciplinary action.
 The Code of Professional Responsibility applies to lawyers in government service in the discharge
of their official tasks (Canon 6). Just as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
requires public officials and employees to process documents and papers expeditiously and prohibits them
from directly or indirectly having a financial or material interest in any transaction requiring the approval
of their office, and likewise bars them from soliciting gifts or anything of monetary value in the course of
any transaction which may be affected by the functions of their office, the Code of Professional
Responsibility forbids a lawyer to engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, or delay
any man’s cause “for any corrupt motive or interest.”

47. REYES vs. GAA A.M. No. 1048, 14 July 1995

FACTS:
Reyes reported to the NBI that he had been the victim of extortion by Atty. Gaa, an Assistant City
Fiscal of Manila, who was investigating a complaint for estafa filed by Reyes’ business rival. The NBI
agents then apprehended Atty. Gaa in an entrapment operation set up by them.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent should be disbarred on the grounds of malpractice and willful violation of
lawyer’s oath.

RULING:
Yes. The extortion committed by respondent constitutes misconduct as a public official, which also
constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer. The lawyer’s oath imposes upon every lawyer the duty to
delay no man for money or malice. The lawyer’s oath is a source of his obligations and its violation is a
ground for his suspension, disbarment or other disciplinary action.

48. PIMENTEL vs. LLORENTE, et al., A.C. No. 4680, 29 August 2000

FACTS:
Pimentel filed a complaint against Atty. Llorente and Atty. Salayon, in their capacity as members
of the Pasig City Board of Canvassers, for gross misconduct, serious breach of trust, and violation of the
lawyer’s oath for tampering with the votes received by them, with the result that other senatorial
candidates were credited with votes which were above the number of votes they actually received while
petitioner’s votes were reduced. Respondents denied the allegations, claiming that the errors pointed out
by Pimentel could be attributed to honest mistake, oversight, and/or fatigue.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents are guilty of misconduct.

RULING:
Yes. Now, a lawyer who holds a government position may not be disciplined as a member of the
bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if the misconduct
also constitutes a violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility or the lawyer’s oath or is of such
character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such individual
may be disciplined as a member of the bar for such misconduct.
Here, by certifying as true and correct the SoVs in question, respondents committed a breach of
Rule 1.01 of the Code which stipulates that a lawyer shall not engage in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct.” By express provision of Canon 6, this is made applicable to lawyers in the
government service.
 49. BERENGUER-KANDERS vs. FLORIN A.C. No. 5119, 17 April 2013

FACTS:
Rosario and Pablo Berenguer filed a disbarment case against Atty Florin, Atty Jornales and Atty
Pedro. Petitioners as an owner of agricultural land situated in Bicol Province was subjected their property
under CARP. Respondents being officer of the DAR rendered unjust judgment, orders, and resolution
adverse and prejudicial to the interest of petitioners, issued order and granting a writ of execution ex-parte
knowing fully well that they had no authority to do so.

ISSUE:
Whether respondents violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility was not meant to govern the conduct of private
practitioners alone, but of all lawyers including those in government service. This is clear from Canon 6
of said Code. A lawyer in government service is a keeper of the public faith and is burdened with high
degree of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her brethren in private practice.

RULE 6.01
The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice
is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witness capable of establishing the
innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

50. SUAREZ vs. PLATON G.R. No. 46371, 7 February 1940

FACTS:
Respondent Lieutenant Orais of the Philippine Constabulary filed a complaint charging petitioner
Suarez with sedition, which was subsequently dismissed.  In turn, Suarez charged Orais and Jimenez with
the crime of arbitrary detention. Judge Planton dismissed the case. Thus, the petition for writ of
mandamus, compelling Judge Platon to reinstate the criminal case.

ISSUE:
Whether there is sufficient ground to proceed with the criminal case for arbitrary detention against
Lieutenant Orais and Justice of the Peace Jimenez.

RULING:
No. The prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and
whose interest, therefore, in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be
done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the twofold aim of which
is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer. He may prosecute with earnestness and vigor—indeed,
he should do so. But, while he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much
his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use
every legitimate means to bring about a just one.
Considering all the circumstances, we cannot say that Judge Platon, in granting the motion for the
dismissal of the case for arbitrary detention, abused his discretion so flagrantly as to justify a departure
from the well-settled rule that an inferior tribunal in the performance of a judicial act within the scope of
its jurisdiction and discretion cannot be controlled by mandamus.

RULE 6.02
 A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
51. LAHM v. MAYOR A.C. No. 7430, 15 February 2012

FACTS:
Toze filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against the members of the Board of Trustees of the
International School, Manila. The case was raffled to the sala of the respondent Labor Arbiter Mayor.
During the proceedings, Toze filed a Verified Motion for the Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order
and/or Preliminary Injunction, to which Lahm and Concepcion opposed. Thereafter, the respondent issued
an Order directing the parties to maintain the status quo ante, which consequently reinstated Toze to his
former position as superintendent of the International School Manila. Despite the complainants’ motion
for an early resolution of their motion to dismiss the said case, respondent maintained his Order. Thus, the
complaint praying for the respondent’s disbarment for alleged gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s
oath.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent is guilty for the gross misconduct and violation of lawyer’s oath.

RULING:
Yes. The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because
he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof, the rules
governing the conduct of lawyers “shall apply to lawyers in government service in the discharge of their
official tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government official is of such nature as to affect
his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the
bar on such grounds.
The respondent, being part of the quasi-judicial system of our government, performs official
functions that are akin to those of judges, hence, administrative cases against him may be likened to
administrative cases against judges.

 
RULE 6.03
A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

52. PCCG v. SANDIGANBAYAN G.R. Nos. 151809-12, 12 April 2005

FACTS:
The Central Bank declared GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business. A public bidding
of GENBANK’s assets was held where Lucio Tan group submitted the winning bid. Solicitor General
Mendoza filed a petition for the assistance and supervision of the court in GENBANK’s liquidation. After
EDSA Revolution I, Pres. Aquino established the PCGG to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former
Pres. Marcos. Pursuant to this, the PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion,
reconveyance, restitution against Tan, et. al. for properties acquired by them by taking advantage of their
close relationship and influence with former Pres. Marcos. PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent
Mendoza as counsel for Tan et. al. with Sandiganbayan. It was alleged that Mendoza as then Sol Gen and
counsel to Central Bank actively intervened in the liquidation of GENBANK subsequently acquired by
Tan et. al. The Sandiganbayan denied PCGG’s motion.

ISSUE:
Whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to Mendoza.

The prohibition states: “A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service.”

RULING:
No. Rule 6.03 of the cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while
SolGen is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in the Civil case of
sequestration. In the metes and bounds of the “intervention”. The applicable meaning as the term is used
in the Code of Professional Ethics is that it is an act of a person who has the power to influence the
subject proceedings. The evil sought to be remedied by the Code do not exist where the government
lawyer does not act which can be considered as innocuous such as “drafting, enforcing, or interpreting
government or agency procedures, regulations or laws or briefing abstract principles of law.” The court
rules that the intervention of Mendoza is not significant and substantial. He merely petitions that the court
gives assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The role of court is not strictly as a court of justice but
as an agent to assist the Central Bank in determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding the role
of the SolGen is not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics: “ A lawyer, having once
held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement accept employment
in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ.”
Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or
advance his private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a
public official. Rule 6.03 makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public
office.” A plain reading shows that the interdiction 1. applies to a lawyer who once served in the
government and 2. relates to his accepting “engagement or employment” in connection with any matter in
which he had intervened while in the service.

53. PASOK vs. ZAPATOS A.C. No. 7388, 19 October 2016

FACTS:
Zapatos was the Presiding Judge of the MTC where he presided over a Forcible Entry case entitled
“Rupinta vs. Sps. Conol,” Atty. Pasok being the counsel of Rupinta. Later on, Zapatos was appointed
Presiding Judge of RTC. Atty. The defendants are now represented by Zapatos, the former judge who
once presided over the aforesaid case. Atty. Pasok alleged that the appearance of Zapatos is highly illegal,
immoral, unethical and adverse to the interest of the public, Zapatos, being the previous presiding judge,
continued on with his appearance for the appellees. Zapatos raised as his defense that he cannot be
charged nor penalized of any violation because when he rendered the first in the Forcible Entry case, he
believes he was completely in absolute neutrality.

ISSUE:
Whether the respondent lawyer is guilty for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. To come within the ambit of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, the
respondent must be shown to have accepted the engagement or employment in relation to a matter that,
by virtue of his judicial office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of the
proceedings. That showing was sufficiently made herein.

The respondent, in his capacity as the judge of the MTCC, presided over the case before eventually
inhibiting himself from further proceedings. His act of presiding constituted intervention within the
meaning of the rule whose text does not mention the degree or length of the intervention in the particular
case or matter. It is also plain and unquestionable that Canon 36, prohibited him as a former member of
the Bench from handling any case upon which he had previously acted in a judicial capacity. In this
context, he not only exercised the power to influence the outcome of the proceedings but also had a direct
hand in bringing about the result of the case by virtue of his having the power to rule on it.

CANON 7
A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the
activities of the integrated bar.
54. SANTOS JR. vs. LLMAS A.C. No. 4749, 20 January 2000

FACTS:
A Complaint for misrepresentation and non-payment of bar membership dues was filed against
Atty. Llamas, who has not indicated the proper PTR and IBP OR Nos. and data in his pleadings for at
least three years already. He averred that he is only engaged in a “limited” practice of law and as a senior
citizen he is exempted from payment of income taxes and included in this exemption is the payment of
membership dues.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Llamas is guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. By indicating “IBP-Rizal 259060” in his pleadings and thereby misrepresenting to the public
and the courts that he had paid his IBP dues to the Rizal Chapter, respondent is guilty of violating the
Code of Professional Responsibility.

55. LEDA vs. TABANG A.C. No. 2505, 21 February 1992

FACTS:
Leda prayed for Tabang‘s disbarment on grounds of using his legal knowledge to contract an
invalid marriage with her, misrepresenting himself in the bar exam as single, and for lack of good moral
character. He contended that he and Leda agreed not to disclose that their marriage was void from the
beginning because he wanted to finish his studies and take the bar first. He also believed that when he
applied for the Bar, he honestly believed that in the eyes of the law, he was single.

ISSUE:
Whether Tabang committed gross misrepresentation of his status

RULING:
 Yes. His declaration in his application for admission to the 1981 Bar Examinations that he was
“single” was a gross misrepresentation of a material fact made in utter bad faith, for which he should be
made answerable. Rule 7.01, Canon 7, Chapter II of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly
provides: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppression of a
material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.” That false statement, if it had
been known, would have disqualified him outright from taking the Bar Examinations as it indubitably
exhibits lack of good moral character.

56. IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S.

MELING IN THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS
MEMBER OF THE PHILIPPINE SHARI’A BAR, ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ,
B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004

FACTS:
MELENDREZ filed a Petition to disqualify Meling from taking the Bar Examinations and to
impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Shari’a Bar for
allegedly not disclosing that he has 3 pending criminal cases, for allegedly using the title “Attorney” in
his communications despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. MELING explains that he did not
disclose the criminal cases because he believed in good faith that the case would be settled.

ISSUE:
Whether Meling’s act of concealing cases constitutes dishonesty.

RULING:
Yes. Rule 7.01: “A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or
suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.” He is aware that
he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as “attorney” whoever may have
typed the letters. Unauthorized use of the appellation “attorney” may render a person liable for indirect
contempt of court.

Application form of 2002 Bar Examinations requires the applicant that applicant to aver that he or she
“has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by law, rule or regulation before a fiscal,
judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or convicted by any court or tribunal of,
any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending case or charge against
him/her.” Meling did not reveal that he has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes
concealment, done under oath at that.

57. IN RE: PARAZO G.R. No. 120348, 3 December 1948

FACTS:
Parazo, a duly accredited reporter of the Star Reporter, a local daily of general circulation,
manifested a story with the headline— "CLAIM 'LEAK' IN LAST BAR TESTS," "Applicants In Uproar,
Want Anomaly Probed; One School Favored." He stated in said report that students of a private university
in Sampaloc had been seen with copies of the mimeographed questions one week prior to the exams.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Parazo may be compelled by the court to reveal his source within the purview of the
exemption “interest of the state.”
HELD:
Yes, As the conduct of Bar Examinations and the Legal Profession is imbued with General Interest
and National Importance, it is but just that the immunity of newspapermen be disregarded as to protecting
its sources from investigation as to any anomaly that may be alleged in the conduct of the Bar
Examinations.

58. TAPUCAR vs. TAPUCAR A.C. No. 4148, 30 July 1998

FACTS:
Complainant Tapucar and respondent Atty. Tapucar were married with 11 children. When
respondent became a CFI judge, he cohabited with Elena of whom he had 2 children. He was penalized
with suspension for immorality. Despite this, Atty. Tapucar still continued to cohabit with Elena, giving
rise to another charge of immorality and other administrative cases. He continued living with Elena and
completely abandoned complainant and his children. Atty. Tapucar later contracted marriage with Elena
while his marriage to complainant subsists. Complainant filed the present petition for disbarment under
the compulsion of the maternal impulse to shield and protect her children from the despotic and cruel acts
of their own father.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent violated the code of professional responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. Rule 7.03 states that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession. Members of the Bar must live up to the standards and norms expected of
the legal profession, by upholding the ideals and tenets embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility always. Lawyers must maintain a high standard of legal proficiency, as well as morality
including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. For they are at all times subject to the scrutinizing eye of
public opinion and community approbation. Needless to state, those whose conduct—both public and
private—fails this scrutiny would have to be disciplined and, after appropriate proceedings, penalized
accordingly.

In the case at bar, keeping a mistress, entering into another marriage while a prior one still subsists, as
well as abandoning and/or mistreating complainant and their children, show his disregard of family
obligations, morality and decency, the law and the lawyer's oath. Such gross misbehavior over a long
period of time clearly shows a serious flaw in respondent's character, his moral indifference to scandal in
the community, and his outright defiance of established norms. All these could not but put the legal
profession in disrepute and place the integrity of the administration of justice in peril, hence the need for
strict but appropriate disciplinary action.

59. VICTORY vs. MERCADO A.C. No. 10580, 12 July 2017

FACTS:
Spouses Victory were enticed by respondent to enter into a financial transaction with her with a
promise of good monetary returns. As respondent is a lawyer and a person of reputation, Spouses Victory
entrusted their money to respondent to earn good profit for the parties. Later on, respondent failed to
settle and account the money entrusted to her by Spouses Victory. Spouses Victory filed a criminal
complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22.
ISSUE:
Whether the respondent should be held administratively liable.

RULING:
Yes. Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 provides that a lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous
manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Good character is an essential qualification for the
admission to and continued practice of law. Thus, any wrongdoing, whether professional or
nonprofessional, indicating unfitness for the profession justifies disciplinary action.

In this case, it is without dispute that respondent has an outstanding obligation with Spouses Victory, as
the latter’s investments which they coursed through the respondent fell through. To make matters worse,
respondent issued several checks to settle her obligation; unfortunately, said checks bounced. As a
lawyer, respondent is expected to act with the highest degree of integrity and fair dealing. She is expected
to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. She must, at all times,
faithfully perform her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her clients, which include prompt
payment of financial obligations.

CANON 8
A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics opposing counsel.

60. BUGARIN vs. ESPANOL G.R. No. 133090, 19 January 2001

FACTS:
Atty. Bugaring was counsel for Royal Bechtel Builders against Spouses Alvaran. In one of the
hearings, he was cited for contempt for allegedly bringing an assistant in court to document the hearing
on video tape and being disrespectful to the court. Atty. Bugaring would interrupt the court by insisting
that he be allowed to present his evidence. The Court told him a few times to listen and yet he would
speak up, often in a sarcastic manner anytime he feels like. He alsomentioned about he is more rather
knowledgeable on the rules of Court. He also accused the Judge of being antagonistic towards his client.

ISSUE:
Whether RTC erred in citing petitioner in direct contempt of court.

RULING:
No. The conduct of petitioner in persisting to have his documentary evidence marked to the extent
of interrupting the opposing counsel and the court showed disrespect to said counsel and the court, was
defiant of the court’s system for an orderly proceeding, and obstructed the administration of justice. The
power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and mandates of the court, and
consequently, to the due administration of justice. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so
near a court or judge, as in the case at bar, and can be punished summarily without hearing. Hence,
petitioner cannot claim that there was irregularity in the actuation of respondent Judge in issuing the
contempt order inside her chamber without giving the petitioner the opportunity to defen himself or make
an immediate reconsideration. The records show that petitioner was cited in contempt of court during the
hearing in the sala of respondent judge, and he even filed a motion for reconsideration of the contempt
order on the same day.
 61. NOBLE III vs. AILES A.C. No. 10628, 1 July 2015

FACTS:
Maximino alleged that Orlando, a lawyer, filed a complaint for damages against his own brother,
Marcelo O. Ailes, Jr., whom Maximino represented. Later on, Maximino learned from Marcelo that the
latter had filed a separate case for grave threats and estafa against Orlando. When Maximino was
furnished a copy of the complaint, he discovered that, through text messages, Orlando had been
maligning him and dissuading Marcelo from retaining his services as counsel, claiming that he was
incompetent and that he charged exorbitant fees. Maximino filed a complaint charging Orlando with
violation of Rule 7.03 of Canon 7, the entire Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Bar
Matter Nos. 850 and 1922, and prayed for the disbarment of respondent as well as the award of damages.
Orlando insisted that the allegedly offensive language in his text messages sent to Marcelo was used in a
“brother-to-brother communication” and were uttered in good faith.

ISSUE:
Whether the IBP correctly dismissed the complaint against Orlando.

RULING:
No. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions such that a lawyer’s words and
actions directly affect the public’s opinion of the legal profession. Lawyers are expected to observe such
conduct of nobility and uprightness which should remain with them, whether in their public or private
lives, and may be disciplined in the event their conduct falls short of the standards imposed upon them.

Thus, in this case, it is inconsequential that the statements were merely relayed to Orlando’s brother in
private. As a member of the bar, Orlando should have been more circumspect in his words, being fully
aware that they pertain to another lawyer to whom fairness as well as candor is owed. It was highly
improper for Orlando to interfere and insult Maximino to his client.

Indulging in offensive personalities in the course of judicial proceedings, as in this case, constitutes
unprofessional conduct which subjects a lawyer to disciplinary action. While a lawyer is entitled to
present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive
language. The Court has consistently reminded the members of the bar to abstain from all offensive
personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor and reputation of a party. Considering the
circumstances, it is glaringly clear how Orlando transgressed the CPR when he maligned Maximino to his
client.

62. BUENVIAJE vs. MAGDAMO A.C. No. 11616, 23 August 2017

FACTS:
Buenviaje alleged that he was married to the late Fe Gonzalo-Buenviaje. Meanwhile, Atty.
Magdamo was the counsel of Fe's sisters, Lydia and Florenia Gonzalo, who filed a criminal case for
bigamy against Buenviaje. They claimed that Buenviaje was married to a certain Amalia Ventura. Atty.
Magdamo sent a Notice of Death of Depositor to the BPI Branch where Buenviaje and Fe appeared to
have a joint account. Buenviaje prays that considering Atty. Magdamo's actuations, he should be
disbarred or suspended from the practice of law.

ISSUE:
 Whether Atty. Magdamo shall be suspended for for violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. The records show that he referred to Buenviaje as a “swindler.” He made this imputation with
pure malice for he had no evidence that Buenviaje is committing swindling activities. Atty. Magdamo’s
malicious imputation against Buenviaje is further aggravated by the fact that said imputation was made in
a forum which is not a party to the legal dispute between Fe’s siblings and Buenviaje. He could have just
informed BPI-Dagupan of the death of its client and that there is a pending litigation regarding their
client’s estate, and he did not have to resort to name-calling and make unnecessary commentaries in order
to support his cause.

CANON 8 — A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor towards his professional
colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against the opposing counsel. Rule 8.01. — A lawyer shall
not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.

RULE 8.02
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment of another
lawyer; however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.
 
63. IN RE: CLEMENTE M. SORIANO G.R. No. L-24114, 30 June 1970

FACTS:
Atty. Soriano entered his appearance in the present case as "chief counsel of record" for the
respondents Tiburcio, et al. This act in itself would have been innocuous were it not for the fact that it
was done one year and eight months after the decision in this case became final. Atty. Soriano asked the
Court to exhume the case from the archives. Atty. Soriano's subsequent explanation did not, however,
serve to dissuade this Court from requiring him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him for entering an appearance at such a late date. He alleged that the respondent Tiburcio, in his
own behalf and as attorney-in-fact of the other respondents, went to him to engage his professional
services in two cases, to wit: this terminated case (L-24114) and the Varsity Hills case (L-30546). Atty.
Soriano allegedly relied upon the assurance of a mutual acquaintance and representation of Tiburcio that
the two cases were pending in the Court. He then agreed to render professional services in the two cases
in consideration of a contingent fee of 143.33 hectares of land out of the 430 hectares involved in the two
cases.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Soriano is guilty of negligence.

RULING:
Yes. Legal ethics; Legal ethics; Attorneys; Appearance; Filing an appearance after case is
terminated is censurable.—The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case Which has long been sealed
and terminated by a final judgment, besides being an unmitigated absurdity in itself and an unwarranted
annoyance to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a sore deviation from normal judicial
processes. It detracts heavily from the faith which should be accorded final judgments of courts of justice,
generating as it does in the minds of the litigants, as well as of the public, an illusory belief that
something more can be done toward overturning a final judicial mandate. Attorney so offending is
severely censured. Before taking over a case handled by a peer in the Bar, a lawyer is enjoined to obtain
the conformity of the counsel whom he would substitute. And if this cannot be had, then he should, at the
very feast, give notice to such lawyer of the contemplated substitution.

Attorney in the case at bar is found guilty of gross negligence in the performance of his duties as a lawyer
and as an officer of this Court. This inexcusable negligence would merit no less than his suspension from
the practice of the law profession, were it not for his candor, at the hearing of this incident, in owning his
mistake and the apology he made to this Court. It is the sense of this Court, however, that he must be as
he is hereby severely censured.

64. LIKONG vs. LIM A.C. No. 3149, 17 August 1994

FACTS:
Complainant Likong executed a promissory note and a deed of assignment assigning to Yap
pension checks which she regularly receives from the US government as a widow of a US pensioner.
Cerina executed a special power of attorney authorizing Yap to get her pension checks from the post
office, which was later on revoked by Likong. Yap filed a complaint for injunction against Cerina, Atty.
Lim appearing as counsel for the former. Cerina filed a complaint for disbarment of Atty. Lim, alleging
that in all the motions, she was prevented from exhibiting fully her case by means of fraud, deception and
some other form of mendacity practiced on her by Atty. Lim who assumed to represent complainant and
connived in her defeat. Atty. Lim argued that Cerina‘s counsel had abandoned her and it was upon her
request that he made the compromise agreement.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent is guilty of misconduct under the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. The terms of the compromise agreement are indeed grossly loaded in favor of Atty. Lim’s
client. No great amount of mathematical prowess is required to see that the terms of the compromise
agreement are grossly prejudicial to complainant. There is no showing that respondent even tried to
inform opposing counsel of the compromise agreement. Neither is there any showing that respondent
informed the trial court of the alleged abandonment of the complainant by her counsel. Undoubtedly,
respondent’s conduct is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. Such acts constituting malpractice
and grave misconduct cannot be left unpunished for not only do they erode confidence and trust in the
legal profession, they likewise prevent justice from being attained.

Rule 8.02 states that a lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional employment
of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor, to give proper advice and
assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or neglectful counsel.

65. CAMACHO vs. PANGULAYAN A.C. No. 4807, 22 March 2000

FACTS:
9 students of AMA were expelled for having apparently caused to be published objectionable
features or articles in the school paper. While the civil case was still pending, letters of apology and Re-
admission Agreements were separately executed by the expelled students without the knowledge of Atty.
Camacho, their lawyer. without his knowledge the PANGULAYAN AND ASSOCIATES Law Firm
(lawyers of AMA) procured compromise agreements his clients waived all kinds of claims they may have
with AMA.

ISSUE:
Whether respondent violates Canon 9 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. Although aware that the students were represented by counsel, respondent attorney proceeded,
nonetheless, to negotiate with them and their parents without at the very least communicating the matter
to their lawyer, herein complainant. This failure of respondent, whether by design or because of oversight,
is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague. Respondent fell short of the demands required of him as a lawyer and as a member of the Bar.

Lawyer should not communicate upon subject of controversy with a party represented by counsel, much
less should he undertake to negotiate or compromise the matter with him, but should only deal with his
counsel. Lawyer must avoid everything that may tend to mislead party not represented by counsel and
should not advise him as to law.

CANON 9
A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, assist in the unauthorized practice of law.

66. BONIFACIO vs. ERA A.C. No. 11754, 3 October 2017

FACTS:
An illegal dismissal case was lodged against Bonifacio and his company, Solid Engine Rebuilders
Corporation. Complainants therein, Abucejon Group, were represented by Era and Associates Law Office
through Atty. Era. Meanwhile, an administrative complaint was filed against Atty. Era for representing
conflicting interests. The Court found Atty. Era guilty of the charge and imposed the penalty of
suspension from the practice of law for two years effective upon his receipt of this decision, with a
warning that his commission of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely. Later, the scheduled
public auction over Bonifacio's and/or the corporation's properties in the business establishment was
conducted to implement the alias writ. Atty. Era actively participated therein. He attended the public
auction and tendered a bid for his clients who were declared the highest bidders. On the same day, a
certificate of sale was issued, which Atty. Era presented to the corporation's officers and employees who
were there at that time.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Bragas is guilty of directly or indirectly assisting Atty. Era in his illegal practice of
law.

RULING:
Yes. It is a lawyer’s duty to prevent, or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of
law. Such duty is founded upon public interest and policy, which requires that law practice be limited
only to individuals found duly qualified in education and character.

Atty. Bragas ought to know that Atty. Era’s acts constitutive of law practice could be performed only by a
member of the Bar in good standing, which Atty. Era was not at that time. Hence, she should have not
participated to such transgression. Being an associate in Atty. Era’s law firm cannot be used to
circumvent the suspension order. The factual circumstances of the case clearly shows that Atty. Bragas
did not act to replace Atty. Era as counsel for his and/or the law firm’s clients during the latter’s
suspension. Atty. Bragas merely assisted Atty. Era, who admittedly was the one actively performing all
acts pertaining to the labor case he was handling.

67. US vs. C. W. NEY and JUAN GARCIA BOSQUE G.R. No. 3593, 23 March 1907

FACTS:
The Court ruled that Bosque was not entitled to admission to the practice of law in the Philippines
as he chose to remain a Spanish subject after sovereignty, hence not qualified for admission to the bar.
Later, Bosque and Ney, a practicing attorney, put up a law office. Bosque said he would devote himself to
consultation and office work relating to Spanish law. Bosque has not personally appeared in courts, and
except for one oversight, papers from the office were signed not with the firm name alone nor with any
designation of the firm as attorneys, but with the words “Ney & Bosque - C.W. Ney, abogado.” The Court
sent the papers to the Attorney-General to take appropriate action, which resulted to the filing of this case.

ISSUE:
Whether either of the defendants should be punished for contempt.

RULING:
Yes. A person not admitted to the bar may not hold himself out to the public as engaged in the
practice of law, either alone or as associated with a practicing attorney under a firm name. An attempt to
practice law by a person who has by order of this court been refused admission to the bar, is a
disobedience of such order and is contempt of court, not qualified by the fact that an appeal has been
taken from the order.

Atty. Ney is liable for his conduct amounting to misbehavior. In the offense of Bosque in holding himself
out as a general practitioner Ney participated, and for the improper signature of the pleadings be was
chiefly and personally responsible.

68. TAPAY vs. BANCOLO A.C. No. 9604, 20 March 2013

FACTS:
Tapay and Rustia filed a complaint to disbar Attys. Bancolo and Jarder. The complainants alleged
that they were subjected to a harassment Complaint filed before the Office of the Ombudsman with the
forged signature of Atty. Bancolo. It was also alleged that Atty. Bancolo has his forged signature attached
in other letter-complaints for other clients. Attys. Bancolo and Jarder admitted that their law office
accepted Divinagracia’s case which was assigned to Atty. Bancolo. Due to some minor lapses in the
assignment of cases, Atty. Bancolo permitted that pleadings and communications be signed in his name
by the secretary of the law office.

ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Bancolo may be held administratively liable for violating Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING:
Yes. The admission of Atty. Bancolo that the Complaint he filed for a former client was signed in
his name by a secretary of his law office is in clear violation of Rule 9.01 of Canon 9 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
The lawyer’s duty to prevent or at the very least not to assist in, the unauthorized practice of law is
founded on public interest and policy. Public policy required that the practice of law be limited to those
individuals found duly qualified in education and character. The purpose is to protect the public, the
court, the client, and the bar from incompetence or dishonesty of those unlicensed to practice law and not
subject to the disciplinary control of the Court. It devolves upon a lawyer to see that this purpose is
attained.

69. REPUBLIC vs. KENRICK DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. 149576. August
8, 2006

FACTS:
Kenrick built a concrete fence around some parts of the land behind the Civil Aviation Training
Center of the Air Transportation Office claiming ownership over those lands. Kenrick justified its action
by presenting TCTs registered in the name of Alfonso Concepcion. When ATO verified the TCTs, it was
found that it has no record of them and that their ascendant title was non-existent in their office. Kenrick
filed an answer which was allegedly signed by its counsel Atty. Garlitos Jr. Apparently, the signature
appearing above Garlitos’ name was not his, he did not authorized anyone to sign it in his behalf, and he
did not know who finally signed it.

ISSUE:
Whether Kenrick failed to file a valid answer on the ground that its pleading was unsigned by its
counsel Atty. Garlitos.

RULING:
Yes. The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice of law
which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel may delegate the signing
of a pleading to another lawyer but cannot do so in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional
Responsibility provides: Rule 9.01—A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the
performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just anyone to sign the answer.
The trial court correctly ruled that respondent’s answer was invalid and of no legal effect as it was an
unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to
present evidence ex parte.

70. ALAWI vs. ALAUYA A.M. No. SDC-97-2-P, 24 February 1997

FACTS:
Alauya transacted with Alawi to avail of a contract for the purchase of one housing unit from a real
estate and housing company. Shortly thereafter Alauya wrote to the company expressing his intent to
render the contract void ab initio. Several correspondences ensued, all of which were signed by Alauya as
ATTY. ASHARY M. ALAUYA. Alauya is a member of the Sharia Bar and for that matter he is a
counselor-at-law. Alauya claims that he does not use the title of counselor-at-law for fear of being
mistaken as a local legislator. Hence, he affixed the title of attorney before his name. Alawi filed a
verified complaint against Alauya, alleging, among others, that Alawi usurped the title of an attorney
which is reserved only for the members of the Philippine Bar.

ISSUE:
 Whether the respondent who passed the Shari’a Bar can use the Title Attorney.

RULING:
No, that persons who pass the Shari’a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar,
hence may only practice law before Shari’a courts. While one who has been admitted to the Shari’a Bar,
and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered “counsellors,” in the sense
that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an “attorney.” The title of
“attorney” is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and
successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and
remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this
jurisdiction.
Alauya is hereby reprimanded for usurping the title of an attorney reserved for those who, having
obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and had successfully passed the bar examinations, have
been admitted ti the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing.

Rule 9.01
A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law ay only performed by a member of the Bar in good standing.

71. Five J. Taxi v. NLRC GR 111474 1994

72. Amalgamated Laborers Assn. v. CIR GR L-23467 1968

Facts: Amalgamated Laborers’ Association won a case of unfair labor practice against
Binalbagan Sugar Central Company, Inc. (Biscom). Upon motion of the complainants, CIR sent
the Chief Examiner to go to Biscom and compute the backwages. Total net backwages amounted
to P79,755.22. Appeals were made against this decision. In the interim, Atty. Leonardo C.
Fernandez (herein respondent), in the same case, filed a “Notice of Attorney’s Lien” over the
amount to be awarded. He alleged therein that he had been the attorney of record for the said
case since the inception of the preliminary hearings of said case up to the Supreme Court in
Appeal, as chief counsel. He claimed that the labourers have voluntarily agreed to give him as
attorney’s fees on contingent basis 25% of the award. He further averred that this is already a
discounted fee out of the plea of the union’s president to reduce it from 30% for them to also
satisfy Atty. Jose Ur Carbonell. Meanwhile, CIR decided the appeals still in favour of the
petitioners and ordered Biscom to deposit the amount representing 25% of P79,755.22 with the
cashier of the court to be awarded and granted to Atty. Fernandez. Atty. Carbonell and ALA
appealed from the decision contending that 1) CIR is bereft of jurisdiction to adjudicate
contractual disputes over attorney’s fees averring that a dispute arising from contracts for
attorney’s fees is not a labor dispute and is not one among the cases ruled to be within CIR’s
authority and to consider such a dispute to be a mere incident to a case over which CIR may
validly assume jurisdiction is to disregard the special and limited nature of said court’s
jurisdiction; 2) the award of 25% as attorney’s fees to Atty. Fernandez is excessive, unfair and
illegal. This and a subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition.
Issue: 1. Is CIR bereft of jurisdiction over the claim for attorney’s fees?
2. Is 25% of the award a reasonable attorney’s fee?
Ruling:
No. Court may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction.
In the absence of such express grant, and in the absence of prohibitive legislation, it shall also be
impliedly granted. In the case at bench, to direct that the present dispute be lodged in another
court as petitioners advocate would only result in multiplicity of suits, a situation abhorred by the
rule. Since the court of Industrial Relations obviously had the jurisdiction over the main cases, it
likewise had jurisdiction to consider and decide all matters collateral thereto, such as claims for
attorney’s fees made by the members of the bar who appeared therein.
Yes. An examination of the record of the case will readily show that an award of 25% attorney’s
fees reasonably compensates the whole legal services rendered in the case. This must however be
shared by petitioner Atty. Carbonell and respondent Atty. Fernandez. Afterall, they are the
counsel of record of the complainants. Though common effort is presumed, the rightful shares of
both must be ascertained. As such, the case has been remanded to the CIR for the sole
determination of shares.
Doctrine: Legal Ethics condemns this arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says: "No
division of fees for legal services is proper, except with another lawyer, based upon a division of
service or responsibility." The union president is not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek
compensation only as such president. An agreement whereby a union president is allowed to
share in attorneys' fees is immoral. Such a contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be justified.

73. Heirs of Carlos v. Linsangan AC 11494 2017

FACTS:
Complainants are children of the late Juan Carlos who presently seek to disbar Atty. Linsangan.
Respondent acted as counsel for their late father in several cases, one of which involving the
recovery of a parcel of land. During the pendency of about 6 cases likewise involving the same
subject property, Atty. Linsangan and Juan executed a Contract for Professional
Servicesenumerating the cases being handled by Atty. Linsangan for Juan. A Supplemental
Compromise Agreement was submitted by the heirs of Juanand Atty. Linsangan, dividing among
them the 7,500 square meter portion of the property as follows: 3,750 square meters to the heirs
of Juan and 3,750 squaremeters to Atty. Linsangan pursuant to the Contract of Professional
Services. In said Supplemental Compromise Agreement, Atty. Linsangan waived in favor of his
wife and children his 3,750 square meter share. In 2015, Atty. Linsangan executed a Deed of
Absolute Sale with a certain Helen Perez covering the entire 12,000 sqm. of the subject property
for P150 million. Complainants filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty.
Linsangan accusing the latter of selling the subject property and apportioned his share in the
subject property to his wife and children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Linsangan violated Art. 1491 of the Civil Code.
HELD:
Yes. The record shows and Atty. Linsangan does not deny, that while the cases involving the
subject property were still pending resolution and final determination, Atty. Linsangan entered
into a Contract for Professional Services with Juan wherein his attorney's fees shall be that
equivalent to 50% of the value of the property, or a portion thereof that may be recovered. It is
likewise not denied by Atty. Linsangan that he apportioned upon himself, and to his wife and
children, halfof the property awarded to complainants as heirs of Juan, through a Supplemental
Compromise Agreement Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5) of the
Civil Code which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that
has been the subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession.
Doctrine: Plainly, these acts are in direct contravention of Article 1491(5)45 of the Civil Code
which forbids lawyers from acquiring, by purchase or assignment, the property that has been the
subject of litigation in which they have taken part by virtue of their profession. While Canon 10
of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that "[t]he lawyer should not purchase any
interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is conducting," is no longer reproduced
in the new Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), such proscription still applies considering
that Canon I of the CPR is clear in requiring that "a lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey
the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process" and Rule 138, Sec. 3 which
requires every lawyer to take an oath to "obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly
constituted authorities therein."46 Here, the law transgressed by Atty. Linsangan is Article
1491(5) of the Civil Code, in violation of his lawyer's oath.

Canon 10
A lawyer owes, candor, fairness and good faith to the court.
74. Masinsin v. Albano GR 86421 1994
Facts: The petitioners made use of delaying tactics through the filing of groundless suits and
petitions to prevent the MTC from acting on its eviction decision against the petitioners. The
counsel for petitioners is strictly warned and censured for violating the Lawyer’s Oath regarding
the promotion or suit of groundless, false or unlawful suits.
Issue: Whether or not the counsel for petitioners is blatantly delaying the judgement of the MTC
and; such should be disciplined.
Ruling:
Yes. The NHA filed a report to the Supreme Court saying that the land is question is not among
the lands being claimed by the NHA. Counsel for petitioners is obviously using dilatory tactics.
The lawyer’s oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating ourselves
to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that we
must uphold and keep inviolable. Perhaps, it is time we are here reminded of that pledge.
Doctrine: The lawyer's oath to which we have all subscribed in solemn agreement in dedicating
ourselves to the pursuit of justice, is not a mere fictile of words, drift and hollow, but a sacred
trust that we must uphold and keep inviolable.
We have since emphasized in no uncertain terms that any act on the part of a lawyer, an officer
of the court, which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, impede and degrade the administration of
justice is contumacious calling for both an exercise of disciplinary action and warranting
application of the contempt power.

Rule 10.1
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; nor shall he
mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.

75 Libit v. Oliva AC 2837 1994

Facts: Judge Domingo Panis in Pedro Cutingting v. Alfredo Tan ordered the NBI Director to
conduct an investigation to determine the author of the falsified Sheriff’s return in said case. As a
result of which, the NBI charged respondents Attys. Edelson Oliva and Florando Umali for
obstruction of justice.
The case was referred to the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP.
In view of NBI’s report that Umali’s signature in the complaint in the civil case was not his, the
case was dismissed with respect to him.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Code of Ethics

Ruling:
Yes.  After the careful review of the record of the case and the report and recommendation of the
IBP, the Court finds that respondent Atty. Edelson G. Oliva committed acts of misconduct which
warrant the exercise by the Court of its disciplinary powers. The facts, as supported by the
evidence, obtaining in this case indubitably reveal respondent’s failure to live up to his duties as
a lawyer in consonance with the strictures of the lawyer’s oath, the Code of Professional
Responsibility, and the Canons of Professional Ethics. A lawyer’s responsibility to protect and
advance the interests of his client does not warrant a course of action propelled by ill motives
and malicious intentions against the other party.
In this case, respondent Atty. Edelson Oliva has manifestly violated that part of his oath as a
lawyer that he shall not do any falsehood. He has likewise violated Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides:
 A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court nor shall he
mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice.
Accordingly, the Court resolved to impose upon Atty. Edelson Oliva the supreme penalty of
DISBARMENT. His license to practice law in the Philippines is CANCELLED and the Bar
Confidant is ordered to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys.

Doctrine:   The practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on those who
show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the
conferment of such privilege. One of these requirements is the observance of honesty and
candor. It can not be gainsaid that candidness, especially towards the courts, is essential for the
expeditious administration of justice. Courts are entitled to expect only complete candor and
honesty from the lawyers appearing and pleading before them. A lawyer, on the other hand, has
the fundamental duty to satisfy the expectation. It is essential that lawyers bear in mind at all
times that their first duty is not to their clients but rather to the courts, that they are above all
court officers sworn to assist the courts in rendering justice to all and sundry, and only
secondarily are they advocates of the exclusive interests of their clients.

Rule 10.02
A lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a paper, the language or
the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as law
a provision already rendered in operative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which
has not been proved.

76. Insular life Assurance Co. Employees Assn. V. Insular life Assurance Co. GR L-25291
1971
Facts:
Two of the lawyers and officers of the Unions namely Felipe Enaje and Ramon Garcia, tried to
dissuade the Unions from disaffiliating with the FFW and joining the National Association of
Trade Unions (NATU), to no avail. Enaje and Garcia soon left the FFW and secured
employment with the Anti-Dummy Board of the Department of Justice and were thereafter hired
by the companies - Garcia as assistant corporate secretary and legal assistant, and Enaje as
personnel manager and chairman of the negotiating panel for the Companies in the collective
bargaining with the Unions.
On October 1957, negotiations for the collective bargaining was conducted but resulted to a
deadlock. From April 25 to May 6, 1958, the parties negotiated on the labor demands but with no
satisfactory results due to the stalemate on the matter of salary increases. This prompted the
Unions to declare a strike in protest against what they considered the Companies’ unfair labor
practices. On May 20, 1958, the Unions went on strike and picketed the offices of the Insular
Life Building at Plaza Moraga.
Issue:
Whether or not the Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice when they sent individual
letters to the strikers with the promise of additional benefits, and notifying them to either return
to work, or lose their jobs.
RULING:
The Companies contended that by sending those letters, it constituted a legitimate exercise of
their freedom of expression. That contention is untenable. The Companies are guilty of unfair
labor practice when they sent individual letters to the strikers. It is an act of interference with the
right to collective bargaining through dealing with the strikers individually instead of through
their collective bargaining representatives. Although the Unions are on strike, the employer is
still obligated to bargain with the union as the employees’ bargaining representative. Further, it is
also an act of interference for the employer to send individual letters to the employees notifying
them to return to their jobs, otherwise, they would be replaced. Individual solicitation of the
employees urging them to cease union activity or cease striking consists of unfair labor practice.
Furthermore, when the Companies offered to “bribe” the strikers with “comfortable cots, free
coffee, and movies, overtime work pay” so they would abandon their strike and return to work, it
was guilty of strike-breaking and/or union busting which constitute unfair labor practice.
Doctrine: We must articulate our firm view that in citing this Court's decisions and rulings, it is
the bounden duty of courts, judges and lawyers to reproduce or copy the same word-for-word
and punctuation mark-for-punctuation mark. Indeed, there is a salient and salutary reason why
they should do this. Only from this Tribunal's decisions and rulings do all other courts, as well as
lawyers and litigants, take their bearings. This is because the decisions referred to in article 8 of
the Civil Code which reads, "Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines," are only those enunciated
by this Court of last resort. We said in no uncertain terms in Miranda, et al. vs. Imperial, et al.
(77 Phil. 1066) that "[O]nly the decisions of this Honorable Court establish jurisprudence or
doctrines in this jurisdiction." Thus, ever present is the danger that if not faithfully and exactly
quoted, the decisions and rulings of this Court may lose their proper and correct meaning, to the
detriment of other courts, lawyers and the public who may thereby be misled. But if inferior
courts and members of the bar meticulously discharge their duty to check and recheck their
citations of authorities culled not only from this Court's decisions but from other sources and
make certain that they are verbatim reproductions down to the last word and punctuation mark,
appellate courts will be precluded from acting on misinformation, as well as be saved precious
time in finding out whether the citations are correct.
77. Comelec v. Noynay GR 132365 1998
Facts. COMELEC charged some public teachers with violations of Omnibus Election in their
engagement in partisan political activities. COMELEC then filed these criminal cases in RTC.
RTC, through Judge Noynay directed COMELEC to file the cases in MTC as RTC supposedly
had no jurisdiction. COMELEC filed an MR arguing that RTC has jurisdiction following Alberto
v. Lavilles where the court supposedly ruled that RTC has jurisdiction over election cases.
Noynay dismissed MR. COMELEC appeals in present court.
Issue. Did RTC Judge Noynay err in remanding the case to MTC? -Yes
Ratio. He did because the present case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC, not MTC. In this
issue, two laws should be juxtaposed. On the one hand, the Omnibus Election Code states that
RTC has jurisdiction for violations of the code, except on cases of failure to register or vote. One
the other, a BP states that MTC has jurisdiction for cases with penalties of one year to six years.
In this case, the RTC implemented the BP. However, the present court finds his ruling mistaken
in that in the same BP providing MTC jurisdiction, it is stated that MTC has jurisdiction only in
cases that does not fall within RTC jurisdiction. Omnibus Election Code gives jurisdiction to
RTC on violates of the code. The violation presented in this case is a violation of the code. This
provided, RTC has jurisdiction, regardless if the penalty is less than six years. Thus, Judge
Noynay erred in ruling that RTC has no jurisdiction.
Doctrine. In relation to Legal Research, this case is relevant in that it zoomed in on the judge’s
misreading of the law and on the petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration.
Canons 4 and 18 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics mandate that judges should be studious in the
principles of law and office administration in due regard of legal system integrity, respectively.
As well, Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates them to be faithful to the
law and to maintain professional competence. The above actions of Hon. Noynay contradicts
these provisions.
Similarly, Rule 10.02, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that
lawyers should not misquote or represent court rulings. In its MR, COMELEC through its
counsel Atty. Balbuena cited Alberto v. Judge Lavilles. In this citation, however, the present
court finds that errors persist. One, that the plaintiff in the case is Alberto Naldoza not Alberto
Naldeza or Alberto as used by the COMELEC lawyer. Two, that that case is 254 of SCRA not
245. And third, in its ascription of a Court Administrator’s Memo as the Court’s ruling. Atty.
Balbuena is admonished.
78. Alez Realty, Inc. v. CA GR 100643 1992
FACTS:
In a resolution of the Supreme Court, Atty Dacanay was required to show cause why he should n
ot be disciplinary dealt with by intercalating a material fact in the quoted judgment of the Court o
f Appeals, inserting “without notice to the actual occupants of the property, Adez Realty” when i
n fact it did not make such finding.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty Dacanay, by inserting phrase which is in fact not true, should be disbarred.
RULING:
YES. In the case at bar, the Supreme Court held that the inserted phase “without notice to the act
ual occupants of the property, Adez Realty,” was just the right phrase intercalated at the right pla
ce, making it highly improbable to be unintentionally, making it appear that respondent Court of 
Appeals found that no notice was given to the occupants of subject property –– when in fact it di
d not make such a finding –– is a clear indication not merely of carelessness in lifting a portion o
f the assailed decision but a malicious attempt to gain undue advantage in the sporting arena of fa
irplay and, more importantly, to deceive and misguide this Court, which is the final arbiter of liti
gations.
He then violated Rule 10.02, Canon 10, Chapter III, of the Code of Professional Responsibility w
hich directs that “[a] lawyer shall not knowingly misquote or misrepresent the contents of a pape
r, the language 
or the argument of opposing counsel, or the text of a decision or authority, or knowingly cite as a 
law a 
provision already rendered inoperative by repeal or amendment, or assert as a fact that which has 
not  been proved”
Assuming it was the carelessness of his secretary,
it is the duty of lawyers to check, review and recheck the allegation in their pleadings, more parti
cularly the quoted portions, and ensure that the statements therein are accurate and the reproducti
ons faithful, down to the last word and even punctuation mark. The legal profession demands tha
t lawyers thoroughly go over pleadings, motions and other documents dictated or prepared by the
m, type or transcribed by their secretaries or clerks, before filing them with the court. If a client i
s bound by the acts of his counsel, with more reason should counsel be bound the acts of his secr
etary who merely follow his orders.
79. Torres v. Dalangin AC 10758 2017
Facts: Atty. Dalangin was accused of maintaining an illicit and immoral affair with one Julita
Pascual, a clerk at the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) in Talavera, Nueva Ecija. Upon review,
however, the alleged amorous relationship was not adequately proved (The quantum of proof in
administrative cases is substantial evidence). Also, Atty. Dalangin was said to be misquoting
jurisprudence in a pleading he filed in court. In addition, he took an immediate recourse to the
Court via a petition for review that questioned the IBP Board of Governors’ resolve to affirm the
Investigating Commissioner’s recommendation on his administrative liability, notwithstanding
the fact that the Court had not yet taken a final action on the complaints.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Dalangin should be held administratively liable.
Held: Yes. While he vehemently denied any romantic relationship with Pascual, he admitted
demonstrating closeness with the latter’s family, including her children. It was such display of
affection that could have sparked in the minds of observers the idea of a wrongful relationship
and belief that Julienne was a product of the illicit affair. Atty. Dalangin should have been more
prudent and mindful of his actions and the perception that his acts built upon the public,
particularly because he and Pascual were both married. The fault, nonetheless, does not warrant
Atty. Dalangin’s suspension, much less disbarment. An admonition should suffice under the
circumstances. Also, while the Court detests Atty. Dalangin’s failure to properly indicate that the
statement was not a verbatim reproduction of the cited jurisprudence and, accordingly, calls his
attention on the matter, it finds the admonition to be adequate. A suspension for the lone incident
would be too harsh a penalty. Lastly, the filing of the petition for review on the issue of Atty.
Dalangin’s suspension from the practice of law was as yet not among his remedies, considering
that the Court still had to release its final action on the matter.
Atty. Bayani P. Dalangin is ADMONISHED to be more prudent and cautious in handling his
personal affairs and dealings with courts and the public, with a STERN WARNING that any
repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Rule 10.3
A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends
of justice.
80. Cobb-Perez v. Lantin GR L-22320 1968
Facts: A Civil case was filed by Ricardo Hermoso against Damaso Perez for the latter’s failure to
pay a debt of P17,000. Hermoso won and a writ of execution was issued in his favor. The sheriff
was to conduct a public sale of a property owned by Perez worth P300,000. This was opposed by
Perez as he claimed the amount of said property was more than the amount of the debt.
Respondent Judge Lantin, issuing Judge, found merit on this, hence he amended his earlier
decision and issued a second writ this time directing the sheriff to conduct a public sale of Perez’
210 shares of stock approximately worth P17,000.
Subsequently, Perez and his wife filed five more petitions for injunction trying to enjoin the
public sale. The case eventually reached the Supreme Court where the SC ruled that the petition
of the Perez spouses is without merit; that their numerous petitions for injunction are
contemplated for delay. In said decision, the Supreme Court ordered petitioners to pay the cost of
the suit but said cost should be paid by their counsels, Atty. Baizas and Atty. Bolinao. The
counsels now appeal said decision by the Supreme Court as they claimed that such decision
reflected adversely against their professionalism; that “If there was delay, it was because
petitioners’ counsel happened to be more assertive a quality of the lawyers which is not to be
condemned.”
Issue: Whether or not the counsels for the Spouses Perez are excused.
Ruling:
No. It is the duty of a counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to the intricacies and
vagaries of the law, on the merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that his client's cause is
def enseless, then it is his bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than
traverse the incontrovertible. A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his client, and
temper his client's propensity to litigate. A lawyer's oath to uphold the cause of justice is superior
to his duty to his client; its primacy is indisputable. A counsel's assertiveness in espousing with
candour and honesty his client's cause must be encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyer's insistence despite the patent futility of his client's
position.
81. Avida Land V. Argosino, AC 7437 2016
Facts: Complainant is a Philippine Corporation engaged in the development and sale of
subdivision houses and lots. Respondent was counsel for Rodman Construction & Development
Corporation.
Complainant entered into a Contract to Sell with Rodman, under which the latter was to acquire
from the former a subdivision house and lot in Santa Rosa, Laguna through bank financing.
In the event that such financing would be disapproved, Rodman was supposed to pay the full
contract price of P4,412,254.00, less the down payment of P1,323,676.20, within 15 days from
its receipt of the loan disapproval.
Rodman filed a complaint before the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board seeking the
nullification of the contract to sell. The MTC took cognizance of Rodman’s HLURB Complaint,
and dismissed the unlawful detainer case on the ground of lack of Jurisdiction.
Issue: Whether or not respondent's act of filing numerous pleadings, that caused delay in the
execution of a final judgment, constitutes professional misconduct in violation of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and the Lawyer's Oath.
Ruling:
Yes. Under the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline's Guidelines for Imposing Lawyer Sanctions
(IBP Guidelines), reprimand is generally appropriate as a penalty when a lawyer's negligence
causes injury or potential injury to a client or a party.69 In this case, respondent's injurious acts
were clearly not caused by his negligence in following procedures or court orders. He knowingly
abused the legal process and violated orders of the HLURB Board and Regional Office with the
intent of delaying the execution of a judgment that had long been final and executory. That he
continued to do so even if a Complaint was already filed against him proved that his acts were
deliberate.
Doctrine: Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, lawyers are required to exert every
effort and consider it their duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of Justice. The
code also obliges lawyers to employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of
their client.
82. Festin V. Zubiri AC No. 11600 2017
Facts: Complainant alleged that he was elected as Mayor of the Municipality of San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro in the May 2013 elections. His opponent, Jose Tapales Villarosa (Villarosa),
filed an election protest against him before the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, Branch 46 (RTC).2 After deciding in favor of Villarosa, the RTC issued an
Order3 dated January 15, 2014 (January 15, 2014 Order), granting his motion for execution
pending appeal, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Execution Pending Appeal is GRANTED.
The OIC-Branch Clerk of Court [(COC)] is hereby directed to issue a Writ of Execution Pending
Appeal after the lapse of twenty (20) working days to be counted from the time [complainant's]
counsel receives a copy of this Special Order, if no restraining order or status quo order is
issued pursuant to Section 11 (b),4 Rule 14 of A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Distressed, complainant filed a petition for certiorari6 before the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), seeking a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) against the issuance of the writ of
execution pending appeal. 
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for his violations of the
CPR.
Ruling:
Yes. After a judicious review of the case records, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent
should be held administratively liable for his violations of the CPR. However, the Court finds it
proper to impose a lower penalty.
Canon 1 of the CPR mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution and promote respect for the
legal processes. Additionally, Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the CPR require lawyers to
conduct themselves with fairness towards their professional colleagues, to observe procedural
rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.
Contrary to these edicts, respondent improperly filed the five (5) motions as "manifestations" to
sidestep the requirement of notice of hearing for motions. In effect, he violated his professional
obligations to respect and observe procedural rules, not to misuse the rules to cause injustice, and
to exhibit fairness towards his professional colleagues.
Doctrine:
Code of Professional Responsibility; Canon 8 and Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR) require lawyers to conduct themselves with fairness towards
their professional colleagues, to observe procedural rules, and not to misuse them to defeat the
ends of justice.
Rule 11.01
A lawyer shall appear in court properly attired.
83. Peck v. Stone, 304 NYS2d 881
Facts:
This is an appeal from a judgement of the Supreme Court at Special Term, entered March 4,
1969, which dismissed petitioner’s application, in a proceeding under Article 78 of the CPLR, to
vacate an order made by respondent as Judge of the City of Court of Syracause, Onondaga
County.
Petitioner, a young female attorney, appeared before respondent as counsel for an indigent
defendant. Prior to the commencement of any proceedings on behalf of the client, respondent
made an order prohibiting petitioner from appearing as an attorney in his court until petitioner's
mode of dress was "suitable, conventional and appropriate". The record discloses that petitioner
was wearing a dress, the hemline of which was approximately five inches above the knee. We
are called upon to determine whether respondent's order was arbitrarily made and whether he
exceeded his authority in prohibiting petitioner from reappearing in his court in similar attire.
Issue: Whether or not (1) that the Judge lacked jurisdiction to issue the directive and that his
action was arbitrary and capricious.
Ruling:
In answer to the petition, respondent states that on both occasions when she appeared before him
petitioner's dress was "extremely and excessively short", was unconventional and not consistent
with the dignity of the court. He attached minutes of both proceedings and a photograph which
accurately depicts her appearance at the times in question, showing the hemline to be much more
than five inches above the knee.
As an officer of the court, petitioner was subject to certain rules of conduct stated in the Canons
of Professional Ethics. Her "co-operation with the court was due whenever justice would be
imperilled if co-operation was withheld."

Rule 11.02
A lawyer shall punctually appear at court hearings.
84. De Gracia v. Warden of Makati GR L-42032 1976
Facts:
De Gracia was charged for frustrated homicide, which later amended to a lesser offense of
serious physical injuries. To this charge, petitioner pleaded guilty. After serving his sentence he
was not released on the ground the prosecutor opposed it because the victim already died,
making him liable to homicide. Writ of Habeas Corpus was petitioned.
On the date of the hearing, petitioner and his counsel failed to appear, but left a manifestation
that petitioner was already released, and consequently, the petition is now moot and academic.
Issue:
Whether or not petitioner’s counsel violated his duties to the court?
Ruling:
Yes. It would appear, therefore, that with the release of petitioner, the matter had indeed become
moot and academic. That disposes of this petition, except for one final note. There was a lapse in
judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not even take the trouble of appearing
in Court on the very day his own petition was reset  for hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be
assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of practice before this Tribunal. It suffices
to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance for his future actuations as a member of
the bar.
Doctrine: There was a lapse In judicial propriety by counsel Salvador N. Beltran who did not
even take the trouble of appearing in Court on the very day his own petition was reset for
hearing, a lapse explicable, it may be assumed, by his comparative inexperience and paucity of
practice before this Tribunal. It suffices to call his attention to such failing by way of guidance
for his future actuations as a member of the Bar.

Rule 11.03
A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or menacing language or behavior before the
courts.
85. JOSE D. SANGALANG and LUTGARDA D. SANGALANG, petitioners, FELIX C.
GASTON and DOLORES R. GASTON, JOSE V. BRIONES and ALICIA R. BRIONES,
and BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., intervenors-petitioners, vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and AYALA CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 71169 August 30, 1989
FACTS
The incident before the Court refers to charges for contempt against Atty. J. Cezar Sangco,
counsel for the petitioners Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. In rendering its judgment, the
Court yielded to the records before it, and to the records alone, and not to outside influences,
much less, the influence of any of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former judge of an inferior
court, should know better that in any litigation, one party prevails, but his success will not justify
indictments of bribery by the other party. 
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Sangco violated Canon 11 of Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING
Yes. Atty. Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to argumenta ad hominem. In that event, it is the Court’s
duty “to act to preserve the honor and dignity ... and to safeguard the morals and ethics of the
legal profession.”
Doctrine: In our “show-cause” Resolution, we sought to hold Atty. Sangco in contempt,
specifically, for resort to insulting language amounting to disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act also
constitutes malpractice as the term is defined by Canon 11 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.
86. PRUDENCIO S. PENTICOSTES, complainant, vs. JUDGE RAFAEL
HIDALGO, respondent.
A.M. Nos. RTJ-89-331, 355, 361, 362, 438, 439 September 28, 1990
FACTS
Complainant Prudencio S. Penticostes has filed a series of administrative charges against Judge
Rafael B. Hidalgo of Regional Trial Court Branch 68 of Tarlac, Tarlac. In the resolution dated
June 20, 1989 dismissing RTJ-89-294, the Court admonished the complainant "to exercise more
care and decorum in filing unfounded and unsubstantiated charges against officers of the court in
order to maintain and uphold the dignity of the same of which he is a part" (also dismissed was
RTJ-88213 in a Resolution dated July 18, 1989.) Complainant did not heed this admonition.
ISSUE
Whether or not complainant failed to comply his responsibilities to the judiciary.
RULING
Yes. Canon 11 provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court and
to judicial officers. Through his imprudent filing of administrative cases against respondent
judge, complainant has transgressed the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility
and miserably failed to observe conduct expected of a member of the bar under the Code and in
accordance with his lawyer's oath.

Doctrine: As a member of the bar, the complainant has responsibilities to the judiciary. The Code
of Professional Responsibility and the rules thereunder impose obligations on the lawyer, in
relation to the court: Canon 10 states that a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the
court. Canon 11 provides that a lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the court
and to judicial officers, while Canon 12 mandates that a lawyer shall exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Through his
imprudent filing of administrative cases against respondent judge, complainant has transgressed
the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility and miserably failed to observe
conduct expected of a member of the bar under the Code and in accordance with his lawyer's
oath.
87. LILY MOCLES, Complainant, v. JUDGE MABINI M. MARAVILLA, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-93-873 December 14, 1994
FACTS
Complainant charged the respondent, the presiding judge of Branch 3 thereof, with ignorance of
law and bribery in that the respondent (a) issued a writ of execution with respect to the
restoration of possession in the said case despite the fact that it was already on appeal with
Branch 36 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City, and (b) was rumored to
have received P20,000.00 in connection with such execution.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent judge must be administratively sanctioned for issuing the writ of
execution.
RULING
Yes. He knew that his court had lost jurisdiction over the case and, moreover, he ought to have
known that pursuant to the clear language of Section 8 of Rule 70 and the pronouncements of
this Court, it was beyond his court's authority to issue the writ. He should have informed the
RTC, through appropriate means, of this constraint.
Doctrine: A complainant is grossly irresponsible when she imputes upon a judge the commission
of a grave offense solely on the basis of a rumor with the full awareness that she could not prove
it, and the lawyer who assists her in the preparation of the complaint should, under his oath as a
lawyer, prevent her from making the wild accusation.
88. KELLY R. WICKER and ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS, Petitioners, v. HON. PAUL
T. ARCANGEL, as Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch 134, Respondent.
G.R. No. 112869 January 29, 1996
FACTS
Kelly Wicker, with his wife Wynee Dieppe and the Tectonics Asia Architects and Engineering
Co., brought suit in the Regional Trial Court of Makati against the LFS Enterprises, Inc. and
others, for the annulment of certain deeds by which a house and lot at Forbes Park, which the
plaintiffs claimed they had purchased, was allegedly fraudulently titled in the name of the
defendant LFS Enterprises and later sold by the latter to codefendant Jose Poe.
Atty. Rayos claimed that the allegations in the motion did not necessarily express his views
because he merely signed the motion "in a representative capacity, in other words, just
lawyering.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Rayos observed and maintained his responsibility as a lawyer.
RULING
No. As a lawyer, he is not just an instrument of his client. His client came to him for professional
assistance in the representation of a cause, and while he owed him whole-souled devotion, there
were bounds set by his responsibility as a lawyer which he could not overstep. A lawyer’s duty
to the courts is not secondary to that of his client.

Doctrine: A lawyer is not just an instrument of his client—he bears as much responsibility for
the contemptuous allegations in the motion for inhibition as his client.
89. RET. JUDGE VIRGILIO ALPAJORA, Complainant, v. ATTY. RONALDO
ANTONIO V. CALAYAN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 8208, January 10, 2018
FACTS
Respondent was President and Chairman of the Board of Trustees of CEFI. He signed and filed
pleadings as "Special Counsel pro se" for himself. Court proceedings ensued despite several
inhibitions by judges to whom the case was re-raffled until it was finally re-raffled to
complainant.
The administrative case against complainant was dismissed. The Court, however, referred the
comment/opposition with counter-complaint filed by complainant in the administrative case
against him to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for appropriate action.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent escaped his liability
RULING
Yes. The Court, however, reiterates that a lawyer’s duty, is not to his client but primarily to the
administration of justice. To that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate. His conduct
ought to, and must always, be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics. Any means, not
honorable, fair and honest which is resorted to by the lawyer, even in the pursuit of his devotion
to his client’s cause, is condemnable and unethical.
Doctrine: The filing of cases by respondent against the adverse parties and their counsels, as
correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner, manifests his malice in paralyzing the
lawyers from exerting their utmost effort in protecting their client’s interest. As officers of the
court, lawyers are duty-bound to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and judicial
officers. They are to abstain from offensive or menacing language or behavior before the court
and must refrain from attributing to a judge motives that are not supported by the record or have
no materiality to the case.
A lawyer does not have an unbridled right to file pleadings, motions and cases as he pleases.

Rule 11.05
A lawyers shall submit grievances against a Judge to the proper authorities only.

90. BONIFACIO SANZ MACEDA, Presiding Judge, Branch 12, Regional Trial Court,
Antique, petitioner, vs. HON. OMBUDSMAN CONRADO M. VASQUEZ AND ATTY.
NAPOLEON A. ABIERA, respondents.
G.R. No. 102781 April 22, 1993
FACTS
Respondent of the Public Attorney's Office alleged that petitioner had falsified his Certificate of
Service, by certifying "that all civil and criminal cases which have been submitted for decision or
determination for a period of 90 days have been determined and decided on or before January 31,
1998," when in truth and in fact, petitioner knew that no decision had been rendered in five (5)
civil and ten (10) criminal cases that have been submitted for decision.
Respondent further alleged that petitioner similarly falsified his certificates of service for the
months of February, April, May, June, July and August, all in 1989; and the months beginning
January up to September 1990, or for a total of seventeen (17) months.
ISSUE
Whether or not Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over said case.
RULING
Yes. It is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judges’ and court personnel’s compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation
thereof No other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul by the
doctrine of separation of powers.

Doctrine: A judge who falsifies his certificate of service is administratively liable to the Supreme
Court for serious misconduct and inefficiency under Section 1, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court,
and criminally liable to the State under the Revised Penal Code for his felonious act.

Canon 12
A lawyer shall not exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient
administration of justice.

91. CONCORDIA B. GARCIA, complainant, vs. ATTY. CRISANTO L. FRANCISCO,

respondent.
A.C. No. 3923 March 30, 1993
FACTS
Concordia B. Garcia and her husband Godofredo, the Dionisio spouses, and Felisa and
Magdalena Baetiong leashed a parcel of land to Sotero Baluyot Lee for a period of 25 years.
Despite repeated verbal and written demands, Lee refused to vacate.
Complainant claims that Lee's counsel, respondent Francisco, commenced various suits before
different courts to thwart Garcia's right to regain her property and that all these proceedings were
decided against Lee. The proceedings stemmed from the said lease contract and involved the
same issues and parties, thus violating the proscription against forum-shopping.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent deserves to be sanctioned, not only as a punishment for his
misconduct.
RULING
Yes. By grossly abusing his right of recourse to the courts for the purpose of arguing a cause that
had been repeatedly rebuffed, he was disdaining the obligation of the lawyer to maintain only
such actions or proceedings as appear to him to be just and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law.
Doctrine: A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client but not at the expense of truth and the
administration of justice.
Practice of law must not serve as an instrument for the harassment of the complainant and the
misuse of judicial processes.
92. BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC. complainant, vs. ATTY. ERNESTO B.
FLORES, Respondent.
A.C. No. 4058 March 12, 1998
FACTS
Investigating Commissioner Plaridel C. Jose recommended, and the IBP Board of Governors
concurred, that respondent be suspended from the bar for six months for:
1. Falsehood, for stating in his comment before this Court that the order of the RTC dismissing
the complaint in Civil Case No. 2738-R was not appealed on time
2. Failure to comply with Supreme Court Circular No. 28-91 on forum shopping.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the provisions of Canon[s] 10 and 12 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
RULING
Yes. A lawyer must be a disciple of truth. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility, he
owes candor, fairness and good faith to the courts. He shall neither do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any. He also has a duty not to mislead or allow the courts to be misled by any
artifice.

Doctrine:
The rule against forum shopping has long been established and subsequent circulars of the Court
merely formalized the prohibition and provided the appropriate penalties against transgressors.
Forum-shopping constituted direct contempt of court and could subject the offending lawyer to
disciplinary action.
93. ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR M. ALCANTARA, VICENTE P. MERCADO,
SEVERINO P. MERCADO AND SPOUSES JESUS AND ROSARIO
MERCADO, Complainants, vs. ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 5859 November 23, 2010
FACTS
Pursuant to a favorable decision, a writ of execution pending appeal was issued in favor of
Rosario P. Mercado. Herein respondent, as her legal counsel, garnished the bank deposits of the
defendant, but did not turn over the proceeds to Rosario. Rosario demanded that the respondent
turn over the proceeds of the garnishment, but the latter refused claiming that he had paid part of
the money to the judge while the balance was his, as attorney’s fees. Such refusal prompted
Rosario to file an administrative case for disbarment against the respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent should be disbarred.
RULING
Yes. Information as to the structure and operations of the family corporation, private documents,
and other pertinent facts and figures used as basis or in support of the cases filed by the
respondent in pursuit of his malicious motives were all acquired through the attorney-client
relationship with herein complainants. Such act is in direct violation of the Canons and will not
be tolerated by the Court. Confidential information obtained cannot be disclosed.
Doctrine: It is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by
the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications
required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right to practice law only during good
behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by judgment of
the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any
constitutional privilege or right, an attorney’s right to practice law may be resolved by a
proceeding to suspend or disbar him, based on conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to
exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be understood that the purpose of
suspending or disbarring an attorney is to remove from the profession a person whose
misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to
an office of an attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration
of justice, rather than to punish the attorney.
94. PABLO R. OLIVARES and/or OLIVARES REALTY
CORPORATION, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ARSENIO C. VILLALON, JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 6323 April 13, 2007
FACTS
In his complaint, Olivares alleged that respondent’s client, Sarah Divina Morales Al-Rasheed,
repeatedly sued him for violations of the lease contract which they executed over a commercial
apartment in Olivares Building in Parañaque.
Respondent, on the other hand, asserts that he was only performing his legal obligation as a
lawyer to protect and prosecute the interests of his client. He denied that he was forum shopping
as his client, in her certificate of non-forum shopping, disclosed the two previous cases involving
the same cause of action which had been filed and dismissed.
ISSUE
Whether or not a lawyer should file multiple actions arising from the same cause.
RULING
No. Filing multiple actions constitutes an abuse of the Court’s processes. It constitutes improper
conduct that tends to impede, obstruct and degrade justice. Those who file multiple or repetitive
actions subject themselves to disciplinary action for incompetence or willful violation of their
duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions
that appear to be just and consistent with truth and honor.

Doctrine: Those who file multiple or repetitive actions subject themselves to disciplinary action
for incompetence or willful violation of their duties as attorneys to act with all good fidelity to
the courts, and to maintain only such actions that appear to be just and consistent with truth and
honor.

Rule 12.03
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda or briefs, let
the period lapse without submitting the same or explaining his failure to do so.

95. ARSENIA T. BERGONIA, complainant, v. Atty. ARSENIO A.

MERRERA, respondent.
A.C. No. 5024 February 20, 2003
FACTS
Since the disputed land was still in the possession of complainant, the Paraynos to recover
possession. After the Answer was filed, respondent became her counsel of record. After due trial,
RTC rendered its Decision ordering her to vacate the premises and to surrender possession
thereof to the Parayno spouses. Thereafter, complainant appealed the RTC judgment to the CA.
Respondent, as counsel, received a Notice to File Brief.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent acted act with the highest standard of truthfulness, fair play and
nobility in the conduct of litigation and in their relations with his clients.
RULING
No. Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in
the legal profession. They are bound by their oath to speak the truth and to conduct themselves
according to the best of their knowledge and discretion, and with fidelity to the courts and their
clients. Canon 13.03 of the Code requires that “a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith renders him liable.”
Doctrine:
From time to time, a request for extension becomes necessary when an advocate needs more time
to study the client’s position. Generally, such request is addressed to the sound discretion of the
court. Lawyers who, for one reason or another, decide to dispense with the filing of the required
pleading, should promptly manifest this intent to the court. It is necessary for them to do so in
order to prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file motions for extension in bad
faith misuse the legal process, obstruct justice, and thus become liable to disciplinary action.
Candor in all their dealings is the very essence of a practitioner’s honorable membership in the
legal profession.
96. ECONOMIC INSURANCE CO., INC., Petitioner, v. UY REALTY COMPANY,
HONORABLE GAUDENCIO CLORIBEL, in his capacity as Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VI, and THE SHERIFF OF MANILA, Respondents.
G.R. No. L-28056 August 31, 1970
FACTS
Petitioner would impute a grave jurisdictional defect to an order of the then respondent Judge
Gaudencio Cloribel granting a motion of the other respondent Uy Realty Company for a writ of
execution against petitioner for the amount represented by its supersedes bond "covering rentals
rightfully due" the other respondent as plaintiff in the ejectment case.
Respondent Judge, however, limited his first order to ordering the dismissal, apparently
overlooking the prayer for the payment of the back rentals guaranteed by the supersedes bond.
ISSUE
Whether or not the judge erred in granting the inclusion of the writ of execution.
RULING
No. Unfortunately, through hassle or inadvertence, respondent ignored that portion of the prayer
for execution and merely ordered that the appealed case be dismissed. Within the period,
however, before such order attained the stage of finality, a modification thereof was secured as a
result of a manifestation and a motion of respondent Uy Realty Co. to execute on the bond filed
by petitioner. Under the circumstances, what respondent Judge did was clearly within his
authority, and the challenged order can stand the test of the most exacting scrutiny. Hence, this
petition should fail.

Doctrine: It is understandable for a party to make full use of every conceivable legal defense the
law allows it. In the appraisal, however, of such attempts to evade liability to which a party
should respond, it must ever be kept in mind that procedural rules are intended as an aid to
justice, not as a means for its frustration. Technicalities should give way to the realities of the
situation.
97. Afurong v. Aquino AC 1571 1999
Facts: Thus, on December 22, 1975, Paraluman Afurong filed a complaint 6 with this Court for
disbarment against Atty. Angel G. Aquino.
According to complainant, appropriate punitive sanction should be meted to Atty. Angel G.
Aquino for filing frivolous harassment cases in the form of Civil Case Nos. 97265 and 97976,
and for giving false allegations in his Urgent Motion for Postponement.
Complainant emphasized that when Civil Case No. 97976 was set for pre-trial on December 12,
1975, at 9:00 a.m., respondent falsely represented that on the same date and hour, he would
attend the hearing also on said date and time of Special Proceedings No. D-00326, entitled "In
the Matter of the Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus of Lordeliza V. Sohnrey".
Complainant further contended that Atty. Angel G. Aquino misrepresented himself as an
attorney of the Citizens Legal Assistance Office, using the name and address of said Office to
postpone the pre-trial hearing of Civil Case No. 97976, on December 12, 1975, despite the fact
that he had been separated from office at the time.
Issue:
Whether or not Aquino failed to perform his duties expected of an attorney as provided under the
existing Canons of Professional Ethics.
Ruling:
The Revised Rules of Court provides that it is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such
actions or proceedings only as appear to him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to
be honestly debatable under the law. The decision in Civil Case No. 231552 had reached finality
and execution of such decision was being effected. Respondent Atty. Aquino should not have
filed a petition for certiorari considering that there was no apparent purpose for it than to delay
the execution of a valid judgment.
Doctrine:
It is the duty of an attorney to counsel or maintain such actions or proceedings only as appear to
him to be just, and such defenses only as he believes to be honestly debatable under the law.
A lawyer is mandated not to mislead the court in any manner.

Rule 12.09
98. PNB v Lu Teng Piao 57 Phil. 337 1932
Facts:
Uy Teng Piao was ordered by the CFI Manila to pay the sum of P17,232.42 with interest at 7%
per annum, plus 10% of the sum amount for attorney's fees and costs in favor of PNB. However,
he failed to comply and so the sheriff sold in a public auction 2 of his mortgaged properties to
PNB. Subsequently, PNB obtained a waiver of his right to redeem the 2nd parcel of land before
selling it to another. After selling both properties, and crediting the sum of 11,300 PHP to
Uy Teng Piao, PNB brought the present action before the court to revive the judgment for the
rest of the balance. Uy Teng Piao opposed and argued that there was an agreement of
condonation of the remaining balance between PNB and him, which is why he agreed to sign the
waiver. CFI ruled in favor of him and so the appeal. In reversing its previous decision, the Court
held that Uy Teng Piao failed to substantiate his claim of an agreement. Plus, one of the
attorneys of PNB testified that Uy Teng Piao only waived his right because a friend of his was
willing to pay the land. The court believed this testimony but still invoked Canon 19 of the Code
of Legal Ethics to remind lawyers that they should withdraw from handling the case when they
choose to testify
Issue: Whether or not the trial court erred in finding that the consideration of document Exhibit 1
is the condonation of the balance of the judgment rendered in said civil case No. 26328.
Ruling:
The trial court absolved the defendant on the ground that he had waived his right to redeem the
property in question in consideration of an understanding between him and an employee of the
bank that the latter would not collect from the defendant the remainder of a prior judgment.
That even conceding that there was such agreement, it was not shown that said employee was
authorized to make it, and that only the board of directors or the persons empowered by it could
bind the bank.
Doctrine:
The trial court absolved the defendant on the ground that he had waived his right to redeem the
property in question in consideration of an understanding between him and an employee of the
bank that the latter would not collect from the defendant the remainder of a prior judgment.
Held: That even conceding that there was such agreement, it was not shown that said employee
was authorized to make it, and that only the board of directors or the persons empowered by it
could bind the bank.

Canon13
A lawyer shall rely upon the merits of his cause and refrain from any impropriety which tends to
influence, or gives the appearance of influencing the court.
99. Nestle’ Philippines v. Sanchez, GR No. L-75209 1987
Facts: During the period July 8-10. 1987, respondent in G.R. No. 75029, Union of Filipro
Employees, and petitioner in G.R. No. 78791, Kimberly Independent Labor Union for Solidarity,
Activism and Nationalism-Olalia intensified the intermittent pickets they had been conducting
since June 17, 1987 in front of the Padre Faura gate of the Supreme Court building. They set up
pickets' quarters on the pavement in front of the Supreme Court building, at times obstructing
access to and egress from the Court's premises and offices of justices, officials and employees.
They constructed provisional shelters along the sidewalks, set up a kitchen and littered the place
with food containers and trash in utter disregard of proper hygiene and sanitation. They waved
their red streamers and placards with slogans, and took turns haranguing the court all day long
with the use of loud speakers.
Issue: Whether or not the act of respondent is contemptuous.
Ruling:
Yes. We accept the apologies offered by the respondents and at this time, forego the imposition
of the sanction warranted by the contemptuous acts described earlier. The liberal stance taken by
this Court in these cases as well as in the earlier case of AHS/PHILIPPINES EMPLOYEES
UNION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, et al., G.R. No. 73721, March
30, 1987, should not, however, be considered in any other light than an acknowledgment of the
euphoria apparently resulting from the rediscovery of a long-repressed freedom. The Court will
not hesitate in future similar situations to apply the full force of the law and punish for contempt
those who attempt to pressure the Court into acting one way or the other in any case pending
before it. Grievances, if any, must be ventilated through the proper channels, i.e., through
appropriate petitions, motions or other pleadings in keeping with the respect due to the Courts as
impartial administrators of justice entitled to "proceed to the disposition of its business in an
orderly manner, free from outside interference obstructive of its functions and tending to
embarrass the administration of justice."
Doctrine: Abuse of rights of free speech and of assembly not within the ambit of constitutional
protection; Counsel of record and all members of the legal profession are reminded to apprise
their clients on matters of decorum and proper attitude toward courts of justice.

Rule 13.01
A lawyer shall not extend extraordinary attention or hospitality to, nor seek opportunity for,
cultivating familiarity with Judges.
100. Lantoruia v. Bunyi AC 1769 1992
Facts: This is an administrative complaint filed by Cesar L. Lantoria, seeking disciplinary action
against respondent Irineo L. Bunyi, member of the Philippine Bar, on the ground that respondent
Bunyi allegedly committed acts of "graft and corruption, dishonesty and conduct unbecoming of
a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and corruption of the judge and bribery", in
connection with respondent's handling of Civil Case Nos. 81, 83 and 88 then pending before the
Municipal Court of Experanza, Agusan del Sur, presided over by Municipal Judge Vicente
Galicia 1 in which respondent Bunyi was the counsel of one of the parties, namely, Mrs.
Constancia Mascarinas.
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated Code of Professional Responsibility.
Ruling:
The respondent did not deny the allegation that he demanded and was given by the complainant
the sum of P18.10 for which no receipt was issued. There is absolutely no justification for this
act of the respondent considering that there are only two defendants to be served with summons.
The respondent is guilty of an illegal exaction. The amount of P11.90 for which the respondent
had issued two official receipts was more than enough to pay for the sheriff’s fees. For having
demanded the amount of P18.10 for which he did not issue a receipt, the respondent should be
suspended for three (3) months without pay. A more severe penalty would have been imposed
were it not for the fact that his personal record shows that the respondent has been a deputy
sheriff since November 15, 1956. During the twenty-two (22) years that he occupied the
position, he was never administratively held to account for any official misconduct.
WHEREFORE, the respondent Deputy Sheriff is hereby suspended for a period of three (3)
months without pay effective from this receipt of this resolution, and he is ordered to refund to
the complainant the P18.10 and is warned that a repetition of the same offense will be dealth
with more severely.
Doctrine: Act of sheriff in demanding money from a person without issuing receipt is illegal
exaction; Penalty is suspension for 3 months; More severe penalty was not imposed considering
respondent’s long service and that this is his first offense.

Rule 13.02
A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to
arouse public opinion for or against a party.

101. In re Almacen GR L-27654 1970

FACTS:
Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen filed a “Petition to Surrender the Lawyer’s Certificate of Title” to
the Supreme Court as a sign of his protest as against to what he call a tribunal “peopled by
people who are calloused to our pleas for justice…”. He also expressed strong words as against
the judiciary like “justice… is not only blind, but also deaf and dumb.” . The petition rooted from
the case he lost due to the absence of time and place in his motion in the trial court. His appeal
was dismissed in the Court of Appeals by reason of jurisprudence. In a petition for certiorari in
the Supreme Court, it was again dismissed thru a minute resolution. With the disappointments,
he thought of this sacrificial move. He claimed that this petition to surrender his title is only in
trust, and that he may obtain the title again as soon as he regained confidence in the justice
system.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Almacen should be given disciplinary actions for his acts.
HELD:
YES. Indefinite suspension imposed.
RATIO:
It has been pointed out by the Supreme Court that there is no one to blame but Atty. Almacen
himself because of his negligence. Even if the intentions of his accusations are so noble, in
speaking of the truth and alleged injustices, so as not to condemn the sinners but the sin, it has
already caused enough damage and disrepute to the judiciary. Since this particular case is sui
generis in its nature, a number of foreign and local jurisprudence in analogous cases were cited
as benchmarks and references. Between disbarment and suspension, the latter was imposed.
Indefinite suspension may only be lifted until further orders, after Atty. Almacen may be able to
prove that he is again fit to resume the practice of law.

Rule 13.03
A lawyer shall not brook or invite interference by another branch or agency of the government in
the normal course of judicial proceedings.

102. Maglasang v. People GR 90083 1990

FACTS:
A petition for certiorari entitled Maglasang vs . People was filed with the Court. Due to non-
compliance with the requirements of the Court, specifically the non- payment legal fees and the
non-attachment of with the requirements of the Court, specifically the non- payment legal fees
and the non-attachment of the copies of the questioned decision, the Court dismissed the petition.
Atty. Castellano, as counsel of the copies of the questioned decision, the Court dismissed the
petition. Atty. Castellano, as counsel of the petitioner, moved for a reconsideration of the
resolution dismissing the petition. However, the motion for reconsideration was denied “with
FINALITY.”
Thereafter, the Court received from Atty. Castellano a copy of a complaint filed with the Office
of the President whereby Maglasang, through his lawyer, Atty. Castellano, as complainant,
accused all the five Justices of the Court’s Second Division with “biases and/or ignorance of the
law or knowingly rendering unjust judgments or resolution. By reason of the strong language of
the with the Office of the President, complaint and its improper filing Atty. Castellano was
required to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt or administratively dealt
with for improper conduct. Atty. Castellano claimed that the complaint “was a constructive
criticism intended to correct in good faith the erroneous and very strict practices of the Justices
concerned, as Respondents.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Castellano should be punished for contempt.
RULING:
Yes, notwithstanding his claim that the complaint was a “constructive criticism,” the Court finds
the various statements made by Atty. Castellano in the complaint scurrilous and contumacious. It
went beyond the bounds of “constructive criticism.” They are not relevant to the cause of his
client. On the contrary, they cast aspersion on the Court’s integrity as a neutral and final arbiter
of all justiciable controversies brought before it. Atty. Castellano should know that the Court in
resolving complaints yields only to the records before it and not to any extraneous influence as
he disparagingly intimates. To be sure, the Court does not pretend to be immune from criticisms.
After all, it is composed of fallible mortals, hopes to correct whatever mistake it may have
unwittingly committed. But then again, it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it
shall be bona fide and shall not spill over the walls of decency and propriety. Intemperate and
unfair criticism is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts.
Doctrine:
A lawyer's duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client's
success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously
observant of law and ethics.
103. Fajardo v. Alvarez AC 9018 2016
Facts:
This administrative case involves the determination of whether a lawyer working in the Legal
Section of the National Center for Mental Health under the Department of Health is authorized to
privately practice law, and consequently, whether the amount charged by respondent for
attorney's fees is reasonable under the principle of quantum meruit.

Complainant Teresita P. Fajardo (Teresita) was the Municipal Treasurer of San Leonardo, Nueva
Ecija. She hired respondent Atty. Nicanor C. Alvarez (Atty. Alvarez) to defend her in criminal
and administrative cases before the Office of the Ombudsman.

The parties have differing versions of the facts as summarized by the Investigating
Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
Issue:
Whether or not a lawyer working in the Legal Section of the National Center for Mental Health
under the Department of Health is authorized to privately practice law.
Ruling:
Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic Act No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series
of 1986, government officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of
their profession unless authorized by their department heads. More importantly, if authorized, the
practice of profession must not conflict nor tend to conflict with the official functions of the
government official or employee.
By assisting and representing complainant in a suit against the Ombudsman and against
government in general, respondent put himself in a situation of conflict of interest.
Doctrine: Practice of Profession; Government Employees; Under Section 7(b)(2) of Republic
Act (RA) No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees, and Memorandum Circular No. 17, Series of 1986, government
officials or employees are prohibited from engaging in private practice of their profession unless
authorized by their department heads.

Canon 15
A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

104. Santiago, et al v. Fojas CA 4103 1995

Facts:
The complainants is the former clients of the respondent Fojas. The
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) declared complainants’ illegal
expulsion of Salvador from Far Easter University Faculty Association. Salvador
sought for damages but Atty. Fojas moved to dismiss it for res judicata and
lack of jurisdiction because it was already decided by Med-Arbiter and it is only
cognizable by the DOLE.

Complainants were directed to file their answer within a non-extendible period

of fifteen days from notice. Instead of filing an answer, the respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration and dismissal of the case.

The complainants were declared in default, and Salvador was authorized to

present his evidence ex-parte and won damages and attorney’s fees.

Issue: Whether Respondent Atty. Fojas committer culpable negligence in failing

to file for the complainants an answer in Civil Case.

Ruling/Doctrine:
Yes. Every case a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence and
competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for free.
It is axiomatic that no lawyer is obliged to act either as adviser or advocate for
every person who may wish to become his client. He has the right to decline
employment, subject, however, to Canon 14 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes
fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence
reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and
champion the latter’s cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion.
Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the interest of the client, warm zeal
in the maintenance and defense of his client’s rights, and the exertion of his
utmost learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from
his client, save by the rules of law, legally applied.
This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and
every remedy and defense that is authorized by the law of the land and he may
expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is demanded
from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries
with it the correlative duties not only to the client but also to the court, to the
bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence and
candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of
justice, does honor to the bar, and helps maintain the respect of the
community to the legal profession.
Therefore, Reprimanded Only.
105. Llunar v. Ricafort Ac 6484 2015

Facts
The complainant, as attorney-in-fact of Severina Bafiez, hired the respondent
to file a case against father and son Ricardo and Ard Cervantes (Ard) for the
recovery of a parcel of land. The said property had mortgaged with the Rural
Bank. Atty. Ricafort received a partial payment of the redemption price of the
property and attorney’s fees from the complainant. After a year, the
complainant learned that no case involving the subject property was ever filed
by the respondent .Thus, the complainant demanded that the respondent
return to her the amount of P95,000.00.

The complainant refused to recognize the complaint for annulment of title filed
by Atty. Abitria and claimed that she had no knowledge of Atty. Abitria's
engagement as counsel. Besides, the complaint was filed three (3) years late
and the property could no longer be redeemed from the bank. Also, the
complainant discovered that the respondent had been suspended indefinitely
from the practice of law.

IBP Investigating Commissioner found the respondent to have been grossly

negligent in handling the complainant's case and to have gravely abused the
trust and confidence reposed in him by the complainant, thereby, violating
Canons 15 and 17, and Rules 1.01, 16.03, 18.03, and 18.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Ricafort should be held administratively liable.

Ruling:
The court found that respondent guilty of Grave Misconduct in his dealings
with his client and in engaging in the practice of law while under indefinite
suspension, and thus impose upon him the ultimate penalty of DISBARMENT.

The respondent in this case committed several infractions making him liable
for grave misconduct. First, the respondent did not exert due diligence in
handling the complainant's case. He failed to act promptly in redeeming the
complainant's property within the period of redemption. What is worse is the
delay of three years before a complaint to recover the property was actually
filed in court. The respondent clearly dilly-dallied on the complainant's case
and wasted precious time and opportunity that were then readily available to
recover the complainant's property. Under these facts, the respondent violated
Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR), which states that
"a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence
in connection therewith shall render him liable."

106. 7325Villahermosa Sr. v. Caracol  AC 7325 2015

Facts
Villahermosa is respondent in two land cases involving cancellation of
emancipation patents and transfer certificates of title, cancellation of special
power of attorney and deeds of absolute sale and recovery of ownership and
possession of parcels of land When the agrarian reform law was enacted
emancipation patents and titles were issued to Hermogena and Danilo
Nipotnipot, beneficiaries of the program, who in turn sold the parcels of land to
complainant's spouse Raymunda Villahermosa filed this complaint alleging
that Atty. Caracol had no authority to file the motions since he obtained no
authority from the plaintiffs and the counsel of record. Villahermosa posited
that Efren could not have authorized Atty. Caracol to file the second motion
because Efren had already been dead for more than a year.

He claimed that Atty. Caracol's real client was a certain Ernesto I. Aguirre, who
had allegedly bought the same parcel of land.
They state that the signature in the waiver was different from his usual
signature. Villahermosa averred that Atty. Caracol committed deceit and gross
misconduct
In its Report and Recommendation the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP CBD) found that Atty. Caracol committed
deceitful acts and misconduct. 

Issues: Atty. Caracol clearly misled and misrepresented to the DARAB that he
was counsel of Efren to protect the interest of Ernesto Aguirre, his real client,
violating his oath as a lawyer.

Ruling
The court adopt the findings of the IBP. The Rules of Court under Rule 138,
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear. – An attorney is presumed to be
properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and no
written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his
client, but the presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on
reasonable grounds therefor being shown, require any attorney who assumes
the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority under which he
appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the
person who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice
requires.  An attorney willfully appearing in court for a person without being
employed, unless by leave of the court, may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.
Lawyers must be mindful that an attorney has no power to act as counsel for a
person without being retained nor may he appear in court without being
employed unless by leave of court.
If a lawyer corruptly or willfully appears as an attorney for a party to a case
without authority, he may be disciplined or punished for contempt as an officer
of the court who has misbehaved in his official transaction.

Rule 15.03
A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interest except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.

107. Camilla, et al v. Marino jr. AC 4763 2003

Facts
This disbarment case emanated from an intra-union leadership dispute some
seventeen (17) years ago that spilled over to the instant complaint alleging
impropriety and double-dealing in the disbursement of sums of money
entrusted by the University of Sto. Tomas to respondent Atty. Eduardo J.
Mariño Jr. as president of the UST Faculty Union and his core of officers and
directors for distribution among faculty members of the university.
The secretary of Labor prescribed the retroactivity of the collective bargaining
agreement. In 1986 the agreement has expired. The administration of UST and
UST Faculty Union also entered into a compromise agreement for the payment
to settle backwages.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Marino should be reprimanded for negotiated with
the UST as union attorney, even though he was an interested party since he
was one of the officers who were dismissed.

Ruling
Yes. Atty. Marino failed to avoid conflict of interest when he negotiated for the
compromise agreement wherein he was the president of the union. Atty.
Marino, both as a lawyer and president of the union was duty bound to protect
and advance the interest of the union members and the bargaining unit above
his own. The court said this obligation was jeopardized when his personal
interest complicated the negotiation process and eventually resulted in the
lopsided compromise agreement that rightly or wrongly brought money to him
at the expense of the other faculty members.
108. Abragan, et al v. Rodriguez AC 4346 2002

Facts
Sometime in 1986, complainants hired the services of the respondent to
represent in a case before the MTCC of Cagayan de Oro City. The case was won
by the complainants. Subsequently, when the lawyer allegedly surreptitiously
dealt with the subject property with other persons, the petitioner severed the
lawyer – client relationship.

On August 1991, complainants filed a case of indirect contempt against Sheriff

Fernando Loncion et al. Much to their surprise, respondent represented the
sheriff. Since the counsel employed by the complainants was a former student
of respondent, said counsel, egged by the suggestions of respondent withdrew
the case without the petitioner’s consent. That as a result of such withdrawal,
subsequent events occurred to the prejudice of the complainants.

Issue: Whether or not Atty. Rodriguez should be disbarred.

Ruling

Yes. In the present case, respondent clearly violated Rule 15.03 of Canon 15 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that “a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after full disclosure of the facts.”
The court said that respondent falls short of the integrity and good moral
character required from all lawyers. They are expected to uphold the dignity of
the legal profession at all times. The trust and confidence clients repose in
them require a high standard and appreciation of the latter's duty to the
former, the legal profession, the courts and the public.  Indeed, the bar must
maintain a high standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair
dealings. To this end, lawyers should refrain from doing anything that might
tend to lessen the confidence of the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity
of their profession.

109. GLORITO V. MATURAN, petitioner, vs. ATTY. CONRADO S. GONZALES,

respondent. [A.C. No. 2597. March 12, 1998]

FACTS
Spouses Antonio and Gloria Casquejo instituted their son-in-law, Glorito V.
Maturan as their attorney-in-fact, through a Special Power of Attorney to file
ejectment cases against squatters occupying there parcel lot.

Atty. Gonzales, prepared and notarized said Special Power of Attorney.

Subsequently, Glorito Maturan engaged the services of respondent in
ejecting several squatters .While said lot was registered in the name of
Celestino Yokingco, Antonio Casquejo had, however, instituted a case for
reconveyance of property and declaration of nullity against the former Civil
Case.
Respondent, in a comment denied having committed any malicious, unethical,
unbecoming, immoral, or anomalous act against his client. Respondent
declared that he was of the belief that filing a motion for issuance of a writ of
execution was the last and final act in the lawyer-client relationship
between himself and petitioner, and that his formal Withdrawal as
counsel for the Casquejos was unnecessary in order to sever the lawyer-client
relationship between them. Furthermore, he alleged that his acceptance of
employment from was for him, an opportunity to honestly earn a little more for
his children’s sustenance.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent committed malicious, unethical,

immoral or anomalous acts against his client.

Ruling
This Court adopts the findings of the investigating commissioner finding
respondent guilty of representing conflicting interests. It is improper for a
lawyer to appear as counsel for one party against the adverse party who is his
client in a related suit, as a lawyer is prohibited from representing conflicting
interests or discharging inconsistent duties. He may not, without being guilty
of professional misconduct, act as counsel for a person whose interest conflicts
with that of his present or former client.

The reason for the prohibition is found in the relation of attorney and client,
which is one of trust and confidence of the highest degree. A lawyer becomes
familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his
client the weak points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such
knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with care.

This Court finds respondent’s actuations violative of Canon 6 of the

Canons of Professional Ethics which provide in part: “It is unprofessional to
represent conflicting interests, except by express consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of this canon, a lawyer
represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is his duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires him to oppose.”
Moreover, respondent’s justification for his actions reveal a patent
ignorance of the fiduciary obligations which a lawyer owes to his client. A
lawyer-client relationship is not terminated by the filing of a motion for a writ
of execution. His acceptance of a case implies that he will prosecute the case
to its conclusion. He may not be permitted to unilaterally terminate the same
to the prejudice of his client.

As to the recommendation that the term of suspension be reduced from three

years to one year, we find the same to be unwarranted. In similar cases
decided by the Supreme Court, the penalty of two or three year’s suspension
has been imposed where respondent was found guilty of representing
conflicting interests.
The Court resolves to MODIFY the IBP recommendation to suspend respondent
for one year and modifies it to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for TWO
(2)
YEARS.

110. Pormento Sr., v. Pontevedra AC 5128 2005

Facts
Atty. Pontevedra is his family’s legal counsel having represented him and
memmbers of his family in all legal proceedings in which they are involved.
Complainant also claims that his family’s relationship with respondents
extends beyond mere lawyer-client relations as they gave respondent moral,
spiritual, physical and financial support in his different endeavors.
Complainant claims that respondent, who was his lawyer in the said case,
deliberately failed to inform him of the dismissal of his counterclaim despite
receipt of the order of dismissal by the trial court, complainanet was deprived
of his right to appeal said order.

Complainant also claims that in order to further protect his rights and
interests over the said parcel of land, he was forced to initiate a criminal case
for qualified theft against the relatives of the alleged new owner of the said
land. Respondent is the counsel of the accused in said case.

Issue: Whether or not Respondent committed malpractice and misconduct for

representing interests which conflict with those of his former client and for
taking advantage of the information and knowledge that he obtained from the
complainant.

Ruling
It is unprofessional to represent conflicting interests, except by express consent
of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Within the meaning of
this canon, a lawyer represents conflicting interests when, in behalf of one
client, it is his duty to contend for that which duty to another client requires
him to oppose.
The obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and not to divulge
his secrets or confidences forbids also the subsequent acceptance of retainers
or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the
client with respect to which confidence has been reposed.

Jurisprudence instructs that there is a representation of conflicting interests if

the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to do anything
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation, to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test
to determine if there is a representation of conflicting interests is whether the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an attorney from the full discharge of
his duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double dealing in the performance thereof.

111. Pacana v. Pascual-Lopez Ac 8243 2009

FACTS
Rolando Pacana, Jr. filed an administrative complaint against Atty.
Maricel Pascual-Lopez charging the latter with flagrant violation of the
provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Complainant worked for
Multitel and earned the ire of investors after becoming the assignee of majority
of the shares of stock of Precedent and after being appointed as trustee of a
fund amounting to Thirty Million Pesos (P30,000,000.00) deposited at Real
Bank.
Complainant sought the advice of respondent but no Retainer Agreement
was executed. Atty. Lopez gave regular advice, helped prepare standard
quitclaims, solicited money and properties from complainant to pay the
creditors and even discussed a collection case for the company. Soon,
complainant noticed that respondent began to avoid communicating with him.
Complainant then wrote to respondent a letter formally asking for a full
accounting of all the money, documents and properties given to the latter but
respondent failed to provide a clear audited financial report of all the properties
turned over by the complainant to the respondent. Complainant filed an
affidavit-complaint against respondent before the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) seeking the disbarment
of respondent.

ISSUE: Whether or not a lawyer-client relationship was created

RULING
YES. After due hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Patrick M. Velez
issued a Report and Recommendation finding that a lawyer-client relationship
was established between respondent and complainant despite the absence of a
written contract.
The absence of a written contract will not preclude the finding that there was a
professional relationship between the parties. Documentary formalism is not
an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may be
express or implied. To establish the relation, it is sufficient that the advice and
assistance of an attorney is sought and received in any matter pertinent to his
profession. Given the situation, the most decent and ethical thing which
respondent should have done was either to advise complainant to engage the
services of another lawyer since she was already representing the opposing
parties, or to desist from acting as representative of Multitel investors and
stand as counsel for complainant. She cannot be permitted to do both because
that would amount to double-dealing and violate our ethical rules on conflict of
interest.
112. Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation Inc. v. Funk AC 9094 2012

Facts
Complainant Santos Ventura Hocorma Foundation, Inc. filed a complaint for d
isbarment against Atty. Richard Funk. It alleged that Atty. Funk used to work 
as corporate secretary, counsel, chief executive officer, and trustee of the foun
dation from 1983 to 1985.
Hocorma Foundation further alleged that in 2006 Atty. Funk filed an action for 
quieting of title and damages against Hocorma Foundation on behalf of a client
.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Funk betrayed the trust and confidence of a former client 
in violation of the CPR when he filed several actions against such client on 
Behalf of a new one.

Ruling:
Yes. Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of the CPR provides that a lawyer cannot represent 
conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a ful
l disclosure of the facts. Here, it is undeniable that Atty. Funk was formerly th
e legal counsel of Hocorma Foundation. Years after terminating his relationshi
p with the foundation, he filed a complint against it on behalf of another client, 
without the foundation’s written consent.
This rule is so absolute that good faith and honest intention on the erring lawy
er’s part does not make it inoperative.
Atty. Richard Funk was suspended from the practice of law for one year.
113. LOLITA ARTEZUELA VS. ATTY. RICARTE B. MADERAZO,
A.C. NO. 4354. APRIL 22, 2002

Facts
Artezuela filed before the Supreme Court a verified complaint for
disbarment against the respondent. She alleged that respondent grossly
neglected his duties her lawyer in a damage suit and failed to represent her
interests with zeal and enthusiasm. According to her, when her case was
scheduled for pre-trial conference, respondent asked for its postponement
although all the parties were present. Notwithstanding complainant’s
persistent and repeated follow-up, respondent did not do anything to keep the
case moving. He withdrew as counsel without obtaining complainant’s consent.

Complainant also claimed that respondent engaged in activities inimical

to her interests. While acting as her counsel, respondent prepared Echavia’s
Answer to the Amended Complaint. The said document was even printed in
respondent’s office. Complainant further averred that it was respondent who
sought the dismissal of the case, misleading the trial court into thinking that
the dismissal was with her consent.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Ruling
Yes. He is guilty of representing conflicting interests prohibited by Rule 15.03
of Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
To be guilty of representing conflicting interests, a counsel-of-record of one
party need not also be counsel-of-record of the adverse party. He does not have
to publicly hold himself as the counsel of the adverse party, nor make his
efforts to advance the adverse party’s conflicting interests of record--- although
these circumstances are the most obvious and satisfactory proof of the charge.
It is enough that the counsel of one party had a hand in the preparation of the
pleading of the other party, claiming adverse and conflicting interests with that
of his original client. To require that he also be counsel-of-record of the adverse
party would punish only the most obvious form of deceit and reward, with
impunity, the highest form of disloyalty.

114. Bernardino v.Santos AC 10583 and 10584 2015

FACTS
Atty. Santos drafted Mariano Turla’s Affidavit of Self-Adjudication which states
that Mariano Turla is the sole heir of Rufina Turla knowing this to be false.
Mariano and Rufina Turla had a daughter. Years later Atty. Santos, on behalf
of Marilu Turla, daughter of Rufina and Mariano Turla, filed a Complaintfor
sum of money with prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction and temporary
restraining order against the complainant, Bernardino. The Complaint alleged
that Marilu Turla is an heir of Mariano Turla, which allegedly contradicts the
Affidavit of Self-Adjudication that Atty. Santos drafted.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Santos represented clients with conflicting interests
thereby violating the Code of Professional Responsibility.

RULING
YES. Respondent violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03. There is conflict of interest
when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing
parties.

The test is “whether or not in behalf of one client, it is the lawyer’s duty
to fight for an issue or claim, but it is his duty to oppose it for the other client.
In brief, if he argues for one client, this argument will be opposed by him when
he argues for the other client.” This rule covers not only cases in which
confidential communications have been confided, but also those in which no
confidence has been bestowed or will be used. Also, there is conflict of interests
if the acceptance of the new retainer will require the attorney to perform an act
which will injuriously affect his first client in any matter in which he represents
him and also whether he will be called upon in his new relation to use against
his first client any knowledge acquired through their connection. Another test
of the inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation will
prevent an attorney from the full discharge of his duty of undivided fidelity and
loyalty to his client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double dealing in
the performance thereof.
However, Rule 15.03 provides for an exception, specifically, “by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.” The
respondent failed to present evidence that he obtained the written consent of
Mariano Turla and Marilu Turla.
He also violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility by failing to thwart his client Mariano Turla from filing the
Affidavit of Adjudication despite his knowledge of the existence of Marilu Turla
as a possible heir to the estate of Rufina Turla. As officers of the court, lawyers
have the duty to uphold the rule of law. The respondent failed to uphold his
obligation as a member of the bar to be the stewards of justice and protectors
of what is just, legal and proper.
115. Anglo v. Valencia AC 10567 2015

Facts:
    Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the
respondents for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent the complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon
the agreement of both parties. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed
against the complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law
which handled the complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved. Complainant filed
disbarment case against the respondents, alleging that they violated the rule
on conflict of interest.

    IBP Commissioner found the respondents to have violated the rule on
conflict of interest and recommended that the respondents be reprimanded.

Issue
    Whether or not the respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Ruling
    There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The Supreme Court found the respondents
guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
and Canon 21 of the CPR and are therefore reprimanded for said violations,
with a Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would
be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
dismissed in view of his death.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability
is not altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long
been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
116.Mabino Colleges v. Pajarillo AC 10687 2015

Facts
Atty. Pajarillo is the Corporate Secretary of Mabini Colleges, Inc. When
Mabini Colleges, Inc. applied for a loan with Rural Bank of Paracale (RBP),
Atty. Pajarillo sent letters to the RBP stating the financial capabilities of Mabini
Colleges, Inc. The loan was granted. RBP then decided to foreclose the
mortgage due to the failure of Mabini Colleges, Inc. to pay. Thus, an action for
Annulment of Mortgage with a Prayer for Preliminary Injunction was filed by
Mabini Colleges, Inc. against RBP. RBP as respondent in the said case was
represented by Atty. Pajarillo as counsel. The SC ruled that Atty. Pajarillo
should be suspended for violating the CPR. He represented conflicting
interests. Atty. Pajarillo appeared as counsel of RBP in a case filed by Mabini
Colleges, Inc. his former client. This makes the respondent guilty of
representing conflicting interests since the respondent failed to show any
written consent of all concerned (particularly the complainant) given after a full
disclosure of the facts representing conflicting interests.

Issue
Whether Atty. Pajarillo is guilty of representing conflicting interests when he
entered his appearance as counsel for RBP in the case for annulment of
mortgage filed by Mabini Colleges, Inc. against RBP.

Ruling
Yes. he represented conflicting interests in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "a lawyer shall not
represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given
after a full disclosure of the facts."
This rule prohibits a lawyer from representing new clients whose
interests oppose those of a former client in any manner, whether or not they
are parties in the same action or on totally unrelated cases. Based on the
principles of public policy and good taste, this prohibition on representing
conflicting interests enjoins lawyers not only to keep inviolate the client’s
confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and double-dealing
for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyer, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
The rule prohibiting conflict of interest applies to situations where in a
lawyer would be representing a client whose interest is directly adverse to any
of his present or former clients. It also applies when the lawyer represents a
client against a former client in a controversy that is related, directly or
indirectly, to the subject matter of the previous litigations in which he
appeared for the former client. This rule applies regardless of the degree of
adverse interests. What a lawyer owes his former client is to maintain inviolate
the client’s confidence or to refrain from doing anything which will injuriously
affect him in any matter in which he previously represented him.
A lawyer may only be allowed to represent a client involving the same or
a substantially related matter that is materially adverse to the former client
only if the former client consents to it after consultation.

117. Aninon v. Sabitsana AC 5098 2012

Facts
 In her complaint, Josefina M. Aniñon related that she previously engaged
the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her
favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law
husband Brigido Caneja, Jr.. Respondent allegedly violated her confidence
when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the
Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr.
The complainant accused Respondent of using the confidential information he
obtained from her in filing the civil case.

Issue
Whether Respondent is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting
interests.

Ruling
Yes, the court agree with the findings and recommendations of the IBP
Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors.
The relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be
imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of
confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most
confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of
information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust
confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the
lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound
to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the
client.
Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting
interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility  which a lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except
by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
“The proscription against representation of conflicting interests applies to a
situation where the opposing parties are present clients in the same action or
in an unrelated action.”
The prohibition also applies even if the “lawyer would not be called upon
to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other
client, or that there would be no occasion to use the confidential information
acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions are
wholly unrelated.” To be held accountable under this rule, it is “enough that
the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are present
clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with
each of them would affect the performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to
both clients.”
Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a
violation of the above rule is present in a given case.  One test is whether a
lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and,
at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s
argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for
the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of
interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance of that
duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new
relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired
through their connection or previous employment.

118. Nakpil v. Valdez AC 2040 1998

Facts
The husband of the complainant was interested in purchasing a summer
residence in Moran Street, Baguio City.he requested respondent to purchase
the Moran property for him. They agreed that respondent would keep the
property in thrust for the Nakpils until the latter could buy it back. Pursuant
to their agreement, respondent obtained two (2) loans from a bank which he
used to purchase and renovate the property. Title was then issued in
respondent’s name.
The ownership of the Moran property became an issue in the intestate
proceedings when Jose Nakpil died. Respondent acted as the legal counsel and
accountant of his widow. Respondent excluded the Moran property from the
inventory of Jose’s estate and transferred his title to the Moran property to his
company, the Caval Realty Corporation.

Issue
Whether or not there was conflict of interest between the respondent Atty.
Valdes and the complainant.

Ruling
YES. Respondent was suspended from practice of law for one (1) year.

There is no question that the interests of the estate and that of its
creditors are adverse to each other. Respondent’s accounting firm prepared the
list of assets and liabilities of the estate and, at the same time, computed the
claims of two creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between the
interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and that of the two claimants
who are creditors of the estate.
Respondent undoubtedly placed his law firm in a position where his
loyalty to his client could be doubted. In the estate proceedings, the duty of
respondent’s law firm was to contest the claims of these two creditors but
which claims were prepared by respondent’s accounting firm. Even if the
claims were valid and did not prejudice the estate, the set-up is still
undesirable. The test to determine whether there is a conflict of interest in the
representation is probability, not certainty of conflict. It was respondent’s duty
to inhibit either of his firms from said proceedings to avoid the probability of
conflict of interest.
Public confidence in law and lawyers may be eroded by the irresponsible
and improper conduct of a member of the bar. Thus, a lawyer should
determine his conduct by acting in a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Members of the bar are
expected to always live up to the standards embodied in the Code of
Professional Responsibility as the relationship between an attorney and his
client is highly fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.
In the case at bar, respondent exhibited less than full fidelity to his duty to
observe candor, fairness and loyalty in his dealings and transactions with his
clients.

119. PNB v. Cedo AC 3701 1995

Facts
After having arranged the sale of steel sheets for Mrs Siy the
latter became implicated in a civil case with the complainant PNB. After
having stop employment with PNB, respondent Atty. Telesforo Cedo
appeared as counsel for Mrs. Siy. A similar situatio also happened when
spouses
Almeda were implicated to a case with complainant PNB counsel for Sps.
Almeda is the Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo & Associates. Atty. Cedo was AVP of
the Asset Management group of complainant bank, where such loan
transaction of Sps. Almeda came under his purview. Respondent asserted
that in the former case, he did not participate in the litigation before the
court, while the latter, it was
another partner of the firm that handle the case. IBP made its report
and recommendation for suspension for having deliberate intent to devise
ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of complainant
bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his
former employer

Issue
Whether or not respondent Atty. Cedo be held administratively liable.

Ruling
Yes, he is administratively liable.
According to Canon 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, “A
lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement
or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.”Having been an executive of complainant bank,
respondent sought to litigate as counsel for the opposite side, a case against
his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled
while still an employee of complainant, violated said Canon.
The Court suspended respondent Atty. Telesforo s. Cedo from the practice of
law for three (3) years.
120. Anglo v. Valencia AC 10567 2015

Facts:
    Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the
respondents for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the law firm, was
assigned to represent the complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon
the agreement of both parties. A criminal case for qualified theft was filed
against the complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law
which handled the complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved. Complainant filed
disbarment case against the respondents, alleging that they violated the rule
on conflict of interest.

    IBP Commissioner found the respondents to have violated the rule on
conflict of interest and recommended that the respondents be reprimanded.

Issue
    Whether or not the respondents are guilty of representing conflicting
interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of Code of Professional
Responsibility (CPR).

Ruling
    There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests
of two or more opposing parties. The Supreme Court found the respondents
guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15
and Canon 21 of the CPR and are therefore reprimanded for said violations,
with a Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would
be dealt with more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is
dismissed in view of his death.
As a final point, the Court clarifies that respondents' pronounced liability
is not altered by the fact that the labor cases against complainant had long
been terminated. Verily, the termination of attorney-client relation provides no
justification for a lawyer to represent an interest adverse to or in conflict with
that of the former client. The client's confidence once reposed should not be
divested by mere expiration of professional employment.
121. Coveney v. Tannahil 37 am Dec. 287 (1841)

Facts
The defendants were partners under the name of John Tannahill & Co.,
and, in this action of assumpsit, the plaintiff gave in evidence an account
stated in writing on the 3d September, 1839, with an acknowledgment at the
end, signed John Tannahill & Co., in the handwriting of Tannahill, by which
a balance was admitted to be due the plaintiff. The defendants, Edwards &
McKibben, proposed to show that Tannahill had made this written
acknowledgment, after an injunction out of chancery at the suit of his
partners had been served upon him, restraining him from interfering with the
partnership accounts; and that Tannahill signed the acknowledgment for the
purpose of defrauding his said copartners. They called Seth E. Sill as a
witness, who acted as counsel for the plaintiff on the hearing,

Issue
Whether he was present when the account stated was signed.

Ruling
The principle is the same in whatever way the information passes. The
policy of the law allows a man to make the, best defense in his power.
Whatever may be his delinquency, he is permitted to confer freely with his
counsel, and to place in his hands any paper touching the matter in
question, without the peril of having his confidence betrayed under the forms
of law. The attorney may be called to prove the existence of a paper, and that
it is in his possession, for the purpose of enabling the other party to give
parol evidence of its contents. But he cannot be compelled to produce or
disclose the contents of a paper which has been deposited with him by his
client.
The referees decided that the witness should not answer the questions
put to him they said the facts which the defendants offered to show were
admissible, and they would hear them if proved by any' other witness. The
defendants then offered to prove a set-off exceeding the amount of the
plaintiff’s demand; but this was rejected, on the ground that the defendants
were concluded by the settlement, unless it could be proved that there was
some mistake in it. A report was made in favor of the plaintiff.
122. Dee v. CA GR 77439 1989

Facts
Petitioner and his father went to the residence of private respondent,
accompanied by the latter’s cousin, to seek his advice regarding the problem of
the alleged indebtedness of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, to Caesar’s Palace,
a well-known gambling casino at Las Vegas, Nevada, U.S.A. Private respondent
personally talked with the president of Caesar’s Palace at Las Vegas, Nevada.
He advised the president that for the sake and in the interest of the casino it
would be better to make Ramon Sy answer for the indebtedness. The president
told him that if he could convince Ramon Sy to acknowledge the obligation,
Dewey Dee would be exculpated from liability for the account. Upon private
respondent’s return to Manila, he conferred with Ramon Sy and the latter was
convinced to acknowledge the indebtedness. In August, 1981, private
respondent brought to Caesar’s Palace the letter of Ramon Sy owning the debt
and asking for a discount. Thereafter, the account of Dewey Dee was cleared
and the casino never bothered him.
Having thus settled the account of petitioner’s brother, private respondent sent
several demand letters to petitioner demanding the balance of P50,000.00 as
attorney’s fees. Petitioner, however, ignored said letters.

Issue
Whether or not there is an attorney-client relationship between parties.

Ruling
YES. Court affirmed the decision of the defendant Court of Appeals. Costs
against the petitioner.
 There is no question that professional services were actually rendered by
private respondent to petitioner and his family. Through his efforts, the
account of petitioner’s brother, Dewey Dee, with Caesar’s Palace was assumed
by Ramon Sy and petitioner and his family were further freed from the
apprehension that Dewey might be harmed or even killed by the so-
called mafia. For such services, respondent Mutuc is indubitably entitled to
receive a reasonable compensation and this right cannot be concluded by
petitioner’s pretension that at the time private respondent rendered such
services to petitioner and his family, the former was also the Philippine
consultant of Caesar’s Palace.
A lawyer is entitled to have and receive the just and reasonable
compensation for services rendered at the special instance and request of his
client and as long as he is honestly and in good faith trying to serve and
represent the interests of his client, the latter is bound to pay his just fees.

123. In re Atty. Melchor E. Ruste AC 632 1940 (70 Phil 243)

Facts
Atty. Ruste appeared for and represented, as counsel of spouses San
Juan. Atty. Ruste demanded for his fees but the spouse did not have enough
money to pay him so he asked them to execute in his favor a contract of lease
and contract of sale of their share of lot as payment of his fees. Spouses san
juan compiled, though in fact and in truth they received neither of the
considerations in said contracts. The payment of Chua of the lot through Atty.
Ruste never reached the hands of the Spouses San Juan.
Issue
Whether or not Atty. Ruste committed malpractice.

Ruling
Yes. He committed malpractice
There is evidence to show that the respondent has failed to account to
the aggrieved spouses for the various amounts received by him on account of
the transactions effected by him pertaining to the portion of lot. However, as
the evidence is conflicting and the statements of the parties are contradictory
on this point, it is believed that the determination of the exact amount due
them by the respondent should better elucidated and determined in an
appropriate action which the complaint and his spouse may institute against
the respondent for this purpose.
Respondent is found guilty of malpractice and is hereby suspended for a
period of one year, reserving to the complainant and his spouse such action as
may by proper for the recovery of such amount or amounts as may be due from
the respondent.
124. Hernandez v. Villanueva 40 Phil. 775

Facts
A disbarment complaint against Atty. Francisco Villanueva on the
grounds of a simulation of a contract, and the second to his acceptance of
retainers in two suits involving the same property from parties having adverse
interests. The respondent has filed a written argument in his own behalf and
an oral argument has been made for him by counsel. Counsel argues that
when Attorney Villanueva purchased the interest of his client he did so in good
faith, believing that the last paragraph of article 1459 of the Civil Code had
been abrogated by the Common Law.

Issue
Is this a breach of professional ethics and does it violate any of the regulations
laid down for the guidance of attorneys-at-law?

Ruling
Yes. This is a breach of professional ethics and a violation of the regulations
laid down by the Civil Code for the guidance of attorneys-at-law.
While the case involving the property of his client A was pending before the
Supreme Court, purchased from her, in consideration of five hundred pesos
and the value of his professional services, a parcel of land that was the subject-
matter of the litigation which he was conducting.
Ignorance of the law or error of judgment as to the attorney’s rights may
possibly slightly condone, but certainly can not entirely pardon the action of an
attorney who is guilty of a breach of professional ethics.
The last paragraph of division 5 of article 1459 of the Civil Code making the
prohibition against persons who cannot take by purchase either in person or
through the mediation of another to include lawyers "with respect to any
property or rights involved in any litigation in which they may take part by
virtue of their profession and office," is held to be in full force and effect.
Suspension in six month.
125. Ordonio v. Eduarte AM 3216 1992

Facts
In one civil case involved, Antonia Ulibari through her counsel Atty.
Eduarte, obtained a favorable decision from the RTC. While the case was
pending appeal, Antonia Ulibari conveyed 20 hectares of land to Atty. Eduarte
as her attorney’s fees. All the titles of the lands subject of the deeds of absolute
sale and the deed of conveyance, however remained in the name of Antonia
Ulibari. Later pon, Dominga Velasco-Ordonio filed a complaint for disbarment
against Atty. Eduarte on the basis of an affidavit executed by her mother
Antonia stating that affiant never conveyed the subject parcel of a land to Atty.
Eduarte as her attorney’s fees.
The commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP to which the case was referred for
investigation atty. Eduarte found guilty of violation of article 1491 of the Civil
Code and part of the Oath of Office.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Eduarte violated the law in this case.

Ruling
The court agree with the Investigating Commissioner’s opinion that the
prohibition applies when the lawyer has not paid money for it and the property
was merely assigned to him in consideration of legal services rendered at a time
when the property is still the subject of a pending case. respondent admitted
that Antonia Ulibari did not actually sell the parcels of land to her children for
the considerations stated in the deeds of sale and that she (respondent)
"utilized the form of deed of sale as the most convenient and appropriate
document to effect the transfer of the parcels of land to Antonia Ulibari’s
children in accordance with her wish that said parcels of land be given to
them." In so doing, respondent has manifestly violated that part of her oath as
a lawyer that she shall not do any falsehood.
For having improperly acquired the subject property, under the foregoing
circumstances, respondent has violated not only Art. 1491 of the Civil Code but
also Rule 10 of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provides that "the
lawyer should not purchase any interest in the subject matter of the litigation
which he is conducting." For having violated Article 1491 of the Civil Code,
respondent is hereby ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period of
six (6) months.

126. Licuanan v. Melo AC 2361 1989

Facts
An affidavit complaint, was filed by Leonila J. Licuanan with the
Office of the Court Administrator against respondent, Atty. Manuel L.
Melo, for breach of professional ethics, alleging that respondent,
who was her counsel in an ejectment case filed against her tenant,
failed to remit to her the rentals collected by respondent on different
dates over a twelve month period, much less did he report to her the receipt
of said amounts. It was only after approximately a year from actual
receipt that respondent turned over his collections to complainant
after the latter, through another counsel, acquired knowledge of the
payment and had demanded the same.
Respondent admitted having received the payment of rentals from
complainant's tenant, Aida Pineda, as alleged in the complaint, but
explained that he kept this matter from the complainant for the
purpose of surprising her with his success in collecting the rentals.

Thus, the Court find it hard to believe respondent's defense that he kept the
money of complainant for a year merely because he wanted to surprise
her with his success in collecting the rental payments from Pineda. On
the contrary, it is very much discernible that he did not surrender
immediately the money to complainant because he was using it for his own
benefit.

Issue
Whether there was unreasonable delay on the part of the respondent in
accounting for the funds collected by him for his former client,
the complainant herein, for which unprofessional conduct respondent
should be disciplined.

Ruling
A lawyer, under his oath, pledges himself not to delay any man for money
or malice and is bound to conduct himself with all good fidelity to his
clients.
He is obligated to report promptly the money of his clients that has come
into his possession. He should not commingle it with his private property
or use it for his personal purposes without his client's consent. He should
maintain a reputation for honesty and fidelity to private trust.
Respondent's unprofessional actuations considered, we are constrained to find
him guilty of deceit, malpractice and gross misconduct office. He has displayed
lack of honesty and good moral character. He has violated his oath not to
delay any man for money or malice, besmirched the name of an honorable
profession and has proven himself unworthy of the trust reposed in him
by law as an
Officer of the Court. He deserves the severest punishment.

Consistent with the crying need to maintain the high traditions and standards
of the legal profession and to preserve undiminished public faith in
attorneys at law. The Court Resolved to DISBAR respondent, Atty.
Manuel L. Melo, from the practice of law.
127. Dumadag v. Lumaya Ca 2614 1991

Facts
A Report finding respondent culpable for infidelity and disloyalty to his
client, negligence of duty, unethical practices and violation of his lawyers
oath. As penalty, the OSG recommended that after due hearing, "respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for not less than five (5) years.
The records show that thereafter, respondent sent a letter Stressing in the said
letter that he was not seeking a reconsideration of the denial of his petition for
reinvestigation, respondent averred in sum that he was a "not very healthy"
sixty-two (62) year old who merely wanted to know how long he would stay
suspended and if he was disqualified to be issued a commission as a notary
public considering that his commission was not renewed.
Respondent filed a Manifestation where he prayed that the Court issue a
resolution or decision on his averments that; he has been suspended from the
practice of law and denied a notarial commission for more than one (1) year
already;  for lack of practicing lawyers and notaries public in the Municipality
of Baganga, Davao Oriental where Branch VII of the Regional Trial Court and
the Second Municipal Court set a popular public clamor which constrained the
undersigned to file the manifestation.

Issue
Whether or not Atty. Lumaya is guilty for the breach of contract of the canons
of professional responsibility and entitled to suspension.

Ruling
Yes. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.
Adherence to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest
degree of morality and faithful compliance with the rules of the legal profession
are the conditions required for remaining a member of good standing of the bar
and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. The Supreme Court, as guardian
of the legal profession, has ultimate disciplinary power over attorneys. This
authority to discipline its members is not only a right but a bounden duty as
well. That is why respect and fidelity to the Court is demanded of its members.
As has been stated earlier, the indefiniteness of respondent suspension puts in
his hands the key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer.
Until such time as he has purged himself of his misconduct and acknowledged
the same by exhibiting appropriate repentance and demonstrating his
willingness and capacity to live up to the exacting standards of conduct
demanded from every member of the bar and officer of the court, respondent
suspension must deservingly be fixed at ten (10) years. Consequently, the same
may only be lifted after the expiration of the said period, counted from the time
when his suspension actually commenced.

128. DOMINADOR P. BURBE VS. ATTY. ALBERTO C. MAGULTA

AC NO. 99-634. JUNE 10, 2002

Facts
Petitioner engaged the services of the respondent to help him recover a claim of
money against a creditor. Respondent prepared demand letters for the
petitioner, which were not successful and so the former intimated that a case
should already be filed. As a result, petitioner paid the lawyer his fees and
included also amounts for the filing of the case.

A couple of months passed but the petitioner has not yet received any feedback
as to the status of his case. Petitioner made several follow-ups in the lawyer’s
office but to no avail. The lawyer, to prove that the case has already been filed
even invited petitioner to come with him to the Justice Hall to verify the status
of the case. Petitioner was made to wait for hours in the prosecutor’s office
while the lawyer allegedly went to the Clerk of Court to inquire about the case.
The lawyer went back to the petitioner with the news that the Clerk of Court
was absent that day.

Suspicious of the acts of the lawyer, petitioner personally went to the office of
the clerk of court to see for himself the status of his case. Petitioner found out
that no such case has been filed.

Petitioner confronted Atty. Magulta where he continued to lie to with the

excuse that the delay was being caused by the court personnel, and only when
shown the certification did he admit that he has not at all filed the complaint
because he had spent the money for the filing fee for his own purpose; and to
appease petitioner’s feelings, he offered to reimburse him by issuing two (2)
checks, postdated June 1 and June 5, 1999, in the amounts of P12,000.00 and
P8,000.00, respectively.

Issue: Whether or not the lawyer should be disbarred.

Ruling
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld the decision of the Commission on Bar
Discipline of the IBP as follows: “It is evident that the P25,000 deposited by
complainant with the Respicio Law Office was for the filing fees of the Regwill
complaint. With complainant’s deposit of the filing fees for the Regwill
complaint, a corresponding obligation on the part of respondent was created
and that was to file the Regwill complaint within the time frame contemplated
by his client.

The failure of respondent to fulfill this obligation due to his misuse of the filing
fees deposited by complainant, and his attempts to cover up this misuse of
funds of the client, which caused complainant additional damage and
prejudice, constitutes highly dishonest conduct on his part, unbecoming a
member of the law profession. The subsequent reimbursement by the
respondent of part of the money deposited by complainant for filing fees, does
not exculpate the respondent for his misappropriation of said funds.
129. HONORIO MANALANG and FLORENCIO CIRILLO, complainants, vs.
ATTY. FRANCISCO F. ANGELES, respondent.
A.C. No. 1558 March 10, 2003

Facts
Complainants said they made several demands upon respondent to turn
over to them the amount collected minus the agreed upon attorney's fees of
thirty percent (30%), but Atty. Angeles refused and offered to give them only
the sum of P2,650. Complainants then instituted the instant case, with the
assistance of the then Citizens Legal Assistance Office (CLAO) of the
Department of Justice.
respondent stated that he offered to give complainants their money, but they
insisted that he "deduct from this attorney's fees the amount of P2,000,
representing the amount discounted by the counsel of the Philippine Racing
Club Restaurant, together with sheriff legal fees and other administrative
expenses."

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Angeles should be suspended from practice of law.
RULING
Yes. His act of holding on to his clients’ money without their acquiescence is
conduct indicative of lack of integrity and propriety. He was clinging to
something which was not his, and to which he had no right. He appears
oblivious of the admonition that a member of the legal fraternity should refrain
from any act or omission which might lessen the trust and confidence reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the legal profession.

130. HILARIA TANHUECO, complainant, vs. JUSTINIANO G. DE

DUMO, respondent.
A.M. No. 1437 April 25, 1989
FACTS
Hilaria Tanhueco filed before the Court a Petition for Disbarment against
respondent Justiniano G. de Dumo for having violated the Canons of
Professional Ethics by his (a) refusal to remit to her money collected by him
from debtors of the complainant; and (b) refusal to return documents entrusted
to him as counsel of complainant in certain collection cases.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility.
RULING
Yes. While Section 37, Rule of the Rules of Court grants the lawyer a lien upon
the funds, documents and papers of his client, which have lawfully come into
his possession, such that he may retain the same until his lawful fees and
disbursements have been paid, and apply such funds to the satisfaction
thereof, the lawyer still has the responsibility to promptly account to his client
for such moneys received. Failure to do so constitutes professional misconduct
Rule 16.04
A lawyer shall not borrow money from his clients unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither
shall a lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he
has to advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the
client.

131. ANGEL L. BAUTISTA, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAMON A.

GONZALES, respondent.
A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990
FACTS
In a verified complaint filed by Angel L. Bautista on May 19, 1976, respondent
Ramon A. Gonzales was charged with malpractice, deceit, gross misconduct
and violation of lawyer's oath. Required by this Court to answer the charges
against him, respondent filed on June 19, 1976 a motion for a bill of
particulars asking this Court to order complainant to amend his complaint by
making his charges more definite.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is guilty of serious misconduct.
RULING
Yes. The Court finds clearly established in this case that on four counts the
respondent violated the law and the rules governing the conduct of a member
of the legal profession. Sworn to assist in the administration of justice and to
uphold the rule of law, he has "miserably failed to live up to the standards
expected of a member of the Bar."

132. JBP Holdings Corp. v. US 166 F sup. 324 1958

Facts
Petitioner is an accountant, an attorney and a member of the Bar of the
State of New York. He maintains an office in the City of New York. J B P by
Joseph Shapiro its president, retained petitioner as an attorney, to prosecute a
claim for a tax refund against the United States of America. Petitioner prior
thereto had served as the accountant for J B P. By a written agreement of
retainer J B P consented to pay petitioner 50% of the total recovery.
This present action stems from the attorney-client relationship in the tax
refund action. Kamerman, petitioner here, was attorney for the plaintiff in the
original action. J B P maintains that this written agreement was submitted on
petitioner's accountant stationery and therefore the retainer was entered into
by petitioner as an accountant and not as an attorney. Accordingly, J B P
states that petitioner is not entitled to the protection of or to the rights of the
Judiciary Law.
Issue
Whether there was a valid contingent fee contract which petitioner may use as
the basis for his contention that an attorney's lien exists on the check he is
withholding from J B P Holding Corporation.
Ruling
The Court concludes that this contract is void as champertous in that the
client deleted the obligation to pay costs and Kamerman apparently accepted
such deletion. Moreover, the line immediately preceding the deletion states "We
will of course, bear the expense of the expert." This provision that the attorney
undertook to pay part of the expenses of the litigation removes any doubt as to
the champertous nature of the contract. Any agreement whereby an attorney
agrees to pay expenses of the proceedings to enforce the client's rights is
champertous.
However, though the contract of employment is champertous, this does not bar
recovery on a quantum meruit basis. It therefore follows that petitioner's
motion must be denied, and the cross-motion directing petitioner to turn over
the check made by the United States of America must be granted, except that
there shall be no accrual of interest on the amount of the check and it is so
ordered.

133. SPOUSES HENRY A. CONCEPCION and BLESILDA S.

CONCEPCION, Complainants, vs. ATTY. ELMER A. DELA ROSA, Respondent.
A.C. No. 10681 February 3, 2015
FACTS
In this capacity, respondent handled many of their cases and was consulted on
various legal matters, among others, the prospect of opening a pawnshop
business towards the end of 2005. Said business, however, failed to
materialize.
Respondent called Henry to borrow the amount of ₱2,500,000.00, which he
promised to return, with interest, five (5) days thereafter. Henry consulted his
wife, Blesilda, who, believing that respondent would be soon returning the
money, agreed to lend the aforesaid sum to respondent.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is allowed to borrow money from his clients.
RULING
No. In unduly borrowing money from the complainants and by blatantly
refusing to pay the same, respondent abused the trust and confidence reposed
in him by his clients, and, in so doing, failed to uphold the integrity and dignity
of the legal profession. Thus, he should be equally held administratively liable
on this score.

Canon 17
A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him.

134. MA. LIBERTAD SJ CANTILLER, Complainant, v. ATTY. HUMBERTO V.

POTENCIANO, Respondent
A.C. No. 3195 December 19, 1989
FACTS
Complainant paid P 10,000.00 to Potenciano by virtue of the demand of the
latter. The amount was allegedly to be deposited with the Treasurer’s Office of
Pasig as purchase price of the apartment and P1,000.00 to cover the
expenses of the suit needed in order for the complainant to retain the
possession of the property. But later on Cantiller found out that the amounts
were not necessary to be paid. A demand was made against Potenciano but the
latter did not answer and the amounts were not returned.
ISSUE
Whether or not failed to exercise due diligence of abandonment of client’s
cause.
RULING
Yes. When a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he thereby covenants that he will
exert all effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. The failure to
exercise due diligence or the abandonment of a client’s cause makes such
lawyer unworthy of the trust which the client had reposed on him. The acts of
respondent in this case violate the most elementary principles of professional
ethics.

135. GEORGE C. SOLATAN, Complainant, vs. ATTYS. OSCAR A. INOCENTES

and JOSE C. CAMANO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6504 August 9, 2005
FACTS
Attys. Jose C. Camano and Oscar A. Inocentes responded to the efforts of
complainant, George C. Solatan, to lease a certain Quezon City apartment
belonging to the attorneys’ clients. On the basis of acts branded by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) as "bordering on technical extortion,"
accepting funds and giving unsolicited advice to an adverse party, and casting
doubts as to the procedure of levy, the IBP resolved 1 to recommend the
suspension of Atty. Camano from the practice of law for one (1) year.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent failed to accord even a token attention to Atty.
Camano’s conduct
RULING
Yes. It does not constitute indifference and neglect for a senior partner to fail to
accord even a token attention to an associate lawyer’s conduct which could
have brought an impending problem to light, but such is not equivalent to the
proximate responsibility for his associate’s acts.
136. ARSENIO A. VILLAFUERTE, complainant, vs. ATTY. DANTE H.
CORTEZ, Respondent.
A.C. No. 3455 April 14, 1998
FACTS
Complainant requested respondent to accept the case, paying to the latter the
sum of P1,750.00 representing the acceptance fee of P1,500.00 and P250.00
retainer fee for January 1987. Respondent averred that he accepted the money
with much reluctance and only upon the condition that complainant would get
the records of the case from, as well as secure the withdrawal of appearance of,
Atty. Jose Dizon, the former counsel of complainant.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent neglect a legal matter entrusted to him.
RULING
Yes. A lawyer's fidelity to the cause of his client requires him to be ever mindful
of the responsibilities that should be expected of him. He is mandated to exert
his best efforts to protect, within the bounds of the law, the interests of his
client.

Canon 18
A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence.

137. FELIX E. EDQUIBAL, complainant, vs. ATTY. ROBERTO FERRER,

JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 5687 February 03, 2005

FACTS
Complainant alleged that he engaged the services of respondent to assist his
mother Ursula Edquibal in cases she filed against his sister Delia Edquibal-
Garcia involving a certain real property in Masinloc, Zambales. His mother
obtained favorable judgments in four (4) out of the five (5) cases handled by
respondent. However, the trial judge rendered a decision averse to his mother.
Respondent then advised complainant to appeal to the Court of Appeals and
that the cost involved is ₱4,000.00. When complainant informed respondent
that he does not have enough money, the latter said ₱2,000.00 would be
sufficient for the moment. After receiving the money from complainant,
respondent told him just to wait for the result. 

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated Canon 17 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

RULING
Yes. Diligence is “the attention and care required of a person in a given
situation and is the opposite of negligence.” A lawyer serves his client with
diligence by adopting that norm of practice expected of men of good intentions.
It is axiomatic in the practice of law that the price of success is eternal
diligence to the cause of the client.

138. ROBERTO P. NONATO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. EUTIQUIO M. FUDOLIN,

JR., Respondent.
A.C. No. 10138 June 16, 2015

FACTS
The complainant alleged that although his father Restituto paid the respondent
his acceptance fees, no formal retainer agreement was executed. The
respondent also did not issue any receipts for the acceptance fees paid. The
respondent, on the other hand, averred that Restituto, and not the
complainant, engaged his services on Restituto’s representation that they were
relatives.
The complainant asserted that during the pendency of the ejectment
proceedings before the MTC, the respondent failed to fully inform his father
Restituto of the status and developments in the case. Restituto could not
contact the respondent despite his continued efforts. The respondent also
failed to furnish Restituto copies of the pleadings, motions and other
documents filed with the court.

ISSUE
Whether or not respondent exercised diligence.

RULING
No. His failure to file the position paper, and to inform his client of the status
of the case, not only constituted inexcusable negligence; but it also amounted
to evasion of duty. All these acts violate the Code of Professional Responsibility
warranting the court’s imposition of disciplinary action.

Rule 18.03
A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his
negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.
139. ELMO S. MOTON, Complainant, v. ATTY. RAYMUNDO D. CADIAO, Respondent.
Administrative Case No. 5169 November 24, 1999
FACTS
On May 5, 1991, upon motion of Atty. Cadiao, the court declared the defendant Castillo in default and allowed plaintiffs to
present their evidence ex-parte before a Commissioner. It turned out that the court appointed Commissioner was on official
leave. 
Atty. Raymundo D. Cadiao liable for negligence in handling the complainant’s case and recommended that Atty. Cadiao be fined
Two Thousand (P2,000.00) Pesos with a warning that any similar negligence will be dealt with more severely. 
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Cadiao is liable for negligence in handling the complaint’s case.
RULING
Yes. In this case, by reason of Atty. Cadiao’s negligence, actual loss has been caused to his client Elmo S. Moton. He should give
adequate attention, care and time to his cases. This is why a practising lawyer may accept only so many cases that he can
efficiently handle. Otherwise, his clients will be prejudiced. Once he agrees to handle a case, he should undertake the task with
dedication and care. If he should do any less, then he is not true to his lawyer’s oath
DOCTRINE/PRICIPLE
Canon 18, Rule 18.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted
to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.

140. PROVIDENT INSURANCE CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and NORTHERN

MINDANAO TRANSPORT CO., INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 110504 October 27, 1994
FACTS
Atlas Fertilizer Corporation (ATLAS for brevity) shipped 13,000 bags of fertilizer from Sangi, Toledo City, to Iloilo City
through MV Ana Alexandria owned by private respondent Northern Mindanao Transport Co., Inc. (NORTHERN for brevity).
Petitioner Provident Insurance Corp. (PROVIDENT for brevity) insured the shipment against damage or loss.
When the shipment reached Iloilo City, one bag of fertilizer was missing and 188 bags sustained unrecovered spillage of 887.50
kgs. Additional unrecovered spillage of 1,712.50 kgs. from 118 torn bags was incurred while the shipment was being transported
from the vessel to the warehouse of ATLAS by broker Benny Espinosa Trucking Services (BENNY for brevity).
ISSUE
Whether or not RTC erred in affirming the dismissal of the MeTC considering the alleged valid and meritorious claims of
plaintiff.
RULING
No. MeTC was correct in dismissing the case grounded on prescription and, corollary, whether the dismissal on such ground may
be had without going into the merits, are questions of law which do not require an examination of the facts on record.

DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Every attorney is bound to make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, whether these be of fact or of law.

141. CORAZON T. REONTOY, complainant, vs. ATTY. LIBERATO R. IBADLIT, respondent.

A.C. CBD No. 190 January 28, 1998
FACTS
This is a complaint filed by Corazon T. Reontoy for the disbarment of her counsel, Atty. Liberato R. Ibadlit, for having been
negligent in handling her case for partition, accounting and conveyance.
Respondent alleges in his defense that after he received the adverse decision he immediately contacted complainant's brother
Proculo Tomazar and requested the latter to inform complainant that they lost the case and that after going over the decision he
(respondent) was convinced that appeal was futile.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent is administratively liable.
RULING
Yes. Indeed, it was his fault in not appealing within the elementary period in the belief that appeal would be useless. It was highly
improper for him to adopt such opinion without any clear instruction from his client not to appeal the adverse verdict.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer owes entire devotion in protecting the interest of his client, warmth and zeal in the defense of his rights. He must use all
his learning and ability to the end that nothing can be taken or withheld from his client except in accordance with the law. 
142. ERNESTO M. RAMOS, complainant, vs. ATTY. MARIANO A. DAJOYAG, JR., respondent.
A.C. No. 5174 February 28, 2002
FACTS
Our motion for last extension of time within which to file [a] petition for review on certiorari [was] DENIED, petitioner having
been previously warned in the resolution of July 24, 1996 that no further extension will be given per resolution of the First
Division of [the] Honorable Court dated August 26, 1996.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent has failed to show that he exercised that degree of competence and diligence required of him in
prosecuting complainants.
RULING
Yes. His reliance on good faith cannot be credited fully in his favor. Lawyers should not presume that the courts would grant
their motion for extension of time to file the required pleading or brief nor expect that the extension that may be granted shall be
counted from notice. They should file their brief or pleadings within the extended period requested.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer shall not, after obtaining extensions of time to file pleadings, memoranda of briefs, let the period lapse without
submitting the same or offering an explanation for his failure to do so. Pressure and large volume of legal work do not excuse
respondent for filing the petition for certiorari out of time.

143. EMILIA R. HERNANDEZ, Complainant, vs. ATTY. VENANCIO B. PADILLA, Respondent.

A.C. No. 9387 June 20, 2012
FACTS
Complainant claims that because respondent ignored the Resolution, he acted with "deceit, unfaithfulness amounting to
malpractice of law." Complainant and her husband failed to file an appeal, because respondent never informed them of the
adverse decision. Complainant further claims that she asked respondent "several times" about the status of the appeal, but
"despite inquiries he deliberately withheld response," to the damage and prejudice of the spouses.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent should be disbarred.
RULING
Yes . Atty. Venancio Padilla is found guilty of violating Rules 18.02, 18.03, 18.04, as well as Canon 5 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. Hence, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for SIX (6) MONTHS and STERNLY
WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them, otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them
liable for disciplinary action.
144. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. GAUDENCIO INGCO, defendant-appellant. IN RE
ALFREDO R. BARRIOS, respondent.
G.R. No. L-32994 October 29, 1971
FACTS
Respondent Alfredo R. Barrios, a member of the Philippine Bar, who was appointed counsel de oficio for the accused in this
case, Gaudencio Ingco, sentenced to death on September 28, 1970 for the crime of rape with homicide, was required to show
cause within ten days why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for having filed fifteen days late a motion for the
extension of time for submitting the brief for appellant Ingco. 
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent should be reprimanded.
RULING
Yes. It is clearly unworthy of membership in the Bar which requires dedication and zeal in the defense of his client's rights, a
duty even more exacting when one is counsel de oficio. On such an occasion, the honor and respect to which the legal profession
is entitled demand the strictest accountability of one called upon to defend an impoverished litigant.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The mere fact that counsel de oficio has an extensive practice, requiring his appearance in courts in Manila and environs as well
as the provinces of Bulacan and Pampanga does not lessen that degree of care required of him in defending an impoverished
litigant.
 145. LUCILA S. BARBUCO, complainant, vs. ATTY. RAYMUNDO N. BELTRAN, respondent.
A.C. No. 5092 August 11, 2004
FACTS
Lucila S. Barbuco filed a Sworn Complaint3 against Atty. Raymundo N. Beltran for malpractice of law, negligence and
dishonesty. It appears that complainant, through her son, Benito B. Sy, engaged the services of respondent for the purpose of
filing an appeal before the Court of Appeals from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cavite, Branch 21, in the case
entitled, "Alexander Bermido, Plaintiff versus Lucila Barbuco, Defendant." On August 6, 1998, complainant, through Benito B.
Sy, gave respondent the total sum of P3,500.00 for payment of the docket fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent’s accident is a valid excuse from filing his pleadings
RULING
No. The fact that respondent was involved in a vehicular accident and suffered physical injuries as a result thereof cannot serve to
excuse him from filing his pleadings on time considering that he was a member of a law firm composed of not just one lawyer;
As such, respondent could have asked any of his partners in the law office to file the Appellant’s Brief for him, or, at least, to file
a Motion for Extension of Time to file the said pleading.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Every member of the Bar should always bear in mind that every case that a lawyer accepts deserves his full attention, diligence,
skill and competence, regardless of its importance and whether he accepts it for a fee or for free.

146. VICTORIA LEGARDA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, NEW CATHAY HOUSE, INC. and REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 94, respondents.
G.R. No. 94457 June 10, 1992
FACTS
Petitioner Victoria Legarda was the defendant in a complaint for specific performance with damages filed by private respondent
New Cathay House, Inc. before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. The complaint was aimed at compelling Victoria
Legarda to sign a lease contract involving her house and lot at 123 West Avenue, Quezon City which New Cathay House, Inc.
intended to use in operating a restaurant.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Coronel violated Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly Rule 18.03 of the same
Code.
RULING
Yes. Atty. Coronel's failure to exercise due diligence in protecting and attending to the interest of his client caused the latter
material prejudice. It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he covenants that he will exert all
effort for its prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause
makes him unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
It should be remembered that the moment a lawyer takes a client's cause; he covenants that he will exert all effort for its
prosecution until its final conclusion. A lawyer who fails to exercise due diligence or abandons his client's cause makes him
unworthy of the trust reposed on him by the latter.

147. ROMINA M. SUAREZ, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT, BRANCH LXI, ANGELES CITY, respondents.
G.R. No. 91133 March 22, 1993
FACTS
At the trial, Suarez did not appear in court despite notices sent to her residence. Her counsel de parte, Atty. Vicente San Luis,
appeared in her behalf during the time when prosecution was presenting its evidence. Atty. San Luis had left for the U.S. and has
not returned since without informing Suarez or withdrawing his appearance.
The RTC issued an order forfeiting the bonds posted by Suarez for her provisional liberty in view of the failure of her bondsmen
to produce her at the scheduled hearings.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner was denied her day in court.
RULING
Yes. Petitioner was deprived of her right to present and prove her defense due to the negligence of her counsel. We rule,
therefore, that under the facts of the case, petitioner was deprived of due process of law. It is abhorrent to the judicial conscience
to consign petitioner to the ordeals of imprisonment without affording her full opportunity to present her evidence including, of
course, the assistance of competent counselling.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer owes his client full devotion to his genuine interest, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights and the
exertion of his utmost learning and ability. A client may reasonably expect that his counsel will make good his representations
and has the right to expect that his lawyer will protect his interests during the trial of his case.

Rule 19.01
A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present, participate in
presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or proceeding.

148. ALEX ONG, complainant, vs. ATTY. ELPIDIO D. UNTO, respondent.

Adm. Case No. 2417 February 6, 2002
FACTS
It was alleged that the real father of Ms. Garganians son was the complainants brother and that the complainant merely assumed
his brother’s obligation to appease Ms. Garganian who was threatening to sue them. The complainant then did not comply with
the demands against him.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent’s tactic is unethical.
RULING
Yes. The records show that the respondent offered monetary rewards to anyone who could provide him any information against
the complainant just so he would have a leverage in his actions against the latter. His tactic is unethical and runs counter to the
rules that a lawyer shall not, for corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding and he shall not do any act designed
primarily to solicit legal business.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for any misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity; Every lawyer
should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession.

149. VERLEEN TRINIDAD, FLORENTINA LANDER, WALLY CASUBUAN, MINERVA MENDOZA, CELEDONIO
ALOJADO, ROSENDO VILLAMIN and AUREA TOLENTINO, Complainants,vs. ATTY. ANGELITO
VILLARIN, Respondent.
A.C. No. 9310 February 27, 2013
FACTS
The HLURB ordered the owner and the developer to deliver the Deeds of Sale and the Transfer Certificates of Title to the
winning litigants. The Decision did not evince any directive for the buyers to vacate the property. It was at this point that
respondent Villarin entered his special appearance to represent Purence Realty. Respondent sent demand letters to herein
complainants.5 In all of these letters, he demanded that they immediately vacate the property and surrender it to Purence Realty
within five days from receipt. 
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent disregarded the HLURB Decision.
RULING
Yes. Given that respondent knew that the aforementioned falsity totally disregarded the HLURB Decision, he thus advances the
interest of his client through means that are not in keeping with fairness and honesty.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility requires that a lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain
lawful objectives. Lawyers must not present and offer in evidence any document that they know is false.
Canon 20
A lawyer shall charge only fair and reasonable fees.

150. METROPOLITAN BANK AND TRUST COMPANY, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS
and ARTURO ALAFRIZ and ASSOCIATES, respondents.
G.R. No. 86100-03 January 23, 1990
FACTS
Petitioner Metrobank filed a petition for review on certiorari after the Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner should pay the
certain amount based on the charging lien on the civil case filed against them which resulted to dismissal. In the dismissed case,
private respondent filed a motion to fix its attorney’s fees, based on quantum meruit, which precipitated an exchange of
arguments between the parties.
Petitioner manifested that it had fully paid private respondent, Arturo Alafriz and Associates. Private respondent countered and
attempted to arrange a compromise with petitioner in order to avoid suit, but the negotiations were unsuccessful.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is entitled to the enforcement of its charging lien for payment of its attorney’s fees.
RULING
No. A charging lien, to be enforceable as security for the payment of attorney’s fees, requires as a condition sine qua non a
judgment for money and execution in pursuance of such judgment secured in the main action by the attorney in favor of his client
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
In the case at bar, the civil cases were dismissed upon the initiative of the plaintiffs “in view of the full satisfaction of their
claims.” This being so, private respondent’s supposed charging lien is without any legal basis.

151. ANGEL ALBANO, complainant, vs. ATTY. PERPETUA COLOMA, respondent.

A.C. No. 528 October 11, 1967
FACTS
This proceeding for disbarment was filed by complainant Angel Albano against respondent Perpetua Coloma, a member of the
Philippine Bar. After which came the accusation that after liberation and long after the courts had been reorganized, respondent
failed to expedite the hearing and termination of the case, as a result of which they had themselves represented by another lawyer.
This notwithstanding, it was claimed that respondent intervened in the case to collect her attorney's fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent failed to comply with her obligations.
RULING
No. The Solicitor General could thus rightfully assert that if there was anyone guilty of bad faith in this case "it is complainant
and his co-plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 4147 who, after benefiting from the valuable services of respondent in said case, tried to
renege on their agreement for the payment of the latter's contingent attorney's fees by dismissing her as their counsel after she had
already won for them.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The good name of counsel was traduced by an accusation made in reckless disregard of the truth, an action prompted by base
ingratitude, the severest censure is called for.
152. R. MARINO CORPUS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and JUAN T. DAVID, respondents
G.R. No. L-40424 June 30, 1980
FACTS
The defendant was charged administratively by several employee of the Central Bank Export Department of which the defendant
is the director and was suspended from the office. The defendant, thru Atty. Alvarez, filed the Court of First Instance of Manila a
petition for certiorari, mandamus and quo warranto. Atty. Alverez received a copy of the order of dismissal It was at this state
that the plaintiff entered into the case under circumstances about which the parties herein have given divergent versions.
ISSUE
Whether or not the petitioner is liable for an attorney’s fee.
RULING
Yes. Respondent David would seem to imply that his claim for attorney's fees should be given preference over the other claims.
Hence, petitioner must pay respondent the sum of twenty thousand pesos.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The payment of attorney's fees to respondent David may be justified by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and
you give which is based on the principle that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another.")
 153. SUSANITA E. MENDOZA-PARKER, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, RODOLFO TAN NG and TERESITA
S. RIOSA, respondents.
G.R. No. 109219 March 11, 1994
FACTS
Tan Ng and Teresita S. Riosa, represented by Atty. Efren Barangan, filed an action for collection of a sum of money with
foreclosure of real estate mortgage against Demetrio G. Alcaras and Julieta Alcaras. Defendants filed a petition for relief from
judgment.
While said case was still pending, petitioner filed a motion to withdraw her appearance with a prayer for the payment of her
attorney's fees, stating that she demanded from private respondents the amount of P73,199.75 as her contingent fees.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Court of Appeals can interfere with the orders of the trial court, fixing the attorney’s fees awarded to a lawyer
for legal services rendered to the client.
RULING
Yes. The Court of Appeals in the exercise of its jurisdiction to review the decisions of lower courts fixing the attorney’s fees, can
and did determine whether the attorney’s fees fixed by said courts are reasonable under the circumstances.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Jurisdiction to issue the special writs after the finality of the judgment of the trial court. The reason for this is that said
jurisdiction was based on the existence of a right of appeal to the appellate court from the judgment of the trial court on the merits
in the main case. However, under Section 9(1) of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals to issue the special writs was expanded to include special writs.
154. RESEARCH and SERVICES REALTY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MANUEL S. FONACIER,
JR., Respondents.
G.R. No. 124074 January 27, 1997
FACTS
Petitioner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Jose, Fidel, and Antonia Carreon. Under the said agreement, the petitioner
undertook to develop, subdivide, administer, and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned by the Carreons. The Carreons
and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before the RTC of Makati City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint
Venture Agreement.
ISSUE
Whether or not the lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable.
RULING
Yes. Over the years and through numerous decisions, this Court has laid down guidelines in ascertaining the real worth of a
lawyer’s services. These factors are now codified in Rule 20.01, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and should
be considered in fixing a reasonable compensation for services rendered by a lawyer on the basis of quantum meruit.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration of the services
contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed to pay for the services which he has retained him to perform.

155. JAYNE Y. YU, Complainant, v. RENATO LAZARO BONDAL, Respondent.

A.C. NO. 5534 January 17, 2005
FACTS
Atty. Renato Lazaro Bondal stands charged in a complaint filed by Jayne Y. Yu for gross negligence and violation of Canon
16 and Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility arising from his alleged failure to attend to the five cases she
referred to him and to return, despite demand, the amount of P51,716.54 she has paid him.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent must return all the records in his possession.
RULING
Yes. That complainant was dissatisfied with the outcome of the four cases does not render void the above retainer agreement for
respondent appears to have represented the interest of complainant.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Rule 22.02- A lawyer who withdraws or is discharged shall, subject to a retainer lien, immediately turn over all papers and
property to which the client is entitled, and shall cooperate with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
 156. TRADERS ROYAL BANK EMPLOYEES UNION-INDEPENDENT, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION and EMMANUEL NOEL A. CRUZ, respondents.
G.R. No. 120592 March 14, 1997
FACTS
Petitioner Traders Royal Bank Employees Union and private respondent Atty. Emmanuel Noel A. Cruz, head of the E.N.A. Cruz
and Associates law firm, entered into a retainer agreement. During the existence of that agreement, petitioner union referred to
private respondent the claims of its members for holiday, mid-year and year-end bonuses against their employer, Traders Royal
Bank (TRB).
The NLRC rendered a decision in the foregoing case in favor of the employees, awarding them holiday pay differential, mid-year
bonus differential, and year-end bonus differential.
ISSUE
Whether or not a lawyer can have compensation without an agreement.
RULING
Yes. Whether there is an agreement or not, the courts can fix a reasonable compensation which lawyers should receive for their
professional services. The measure of compensation for private respondent’s services as against his client should properly be
addressed by the rule of quantum meruit long adopted in this jurisdiction.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Where a lawyer is employed without a price for his services being agreed upon, the courts shall fix the amount on quantum
meruit basis. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services.

157. JOHN C. QUIRANTE and DANTE CRUZ, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE
COURT, MANUEL C. CASASOLA, and ESTRELLITA C. CASASOLA, respondents.
G.R. No. 73886 January 31, 1989
FACTS
Dr. Casasola’s claim against its erring building contractor, the trial court ruled in favor of the former who eventually died.Here,
petitioner Atty. Quirante filed a motion in the trial court for the confirmation of his attorney’s fees. According to him, there was
an oral agreement between him and the late Dr. Casasola with regard to his attorney’s fees, as confirmed in writing by the latter’s
surviving spouse and two daughters to be computed as follows:
1. In case of recovery of the P120,000.00 surety bond, the attorney’s fees of the undersigned counsel (Atty. Quirante)
shall be P30,000.00;
2. In case the Honorable Court awards damages in excess of the P120,000.00 bond, it shall be divided equally
between the Heirs of Dr. Casasola, Atty. John C. Quirante and Atty. Dante Cruz.

ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Quirante is entitled of the attorney’s fees.
RULING
No. With regard to the effect of the alleged confirmation of the attorney's fees by some of the heirs of the deceased. We,
therefore, take exception to and reject that portion of the decision of the respondent court which holds that the alleged
confirmation to attorney's fees should not adversely affect the non-signatories thereto.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The orderly administration of justice dictates that such issue be likewise determined by the court a quo inasmuch as it also
necessarily involves the same contingencies in determining the propriety and assessing the extent of recovery of attorney’s fees.
158. VALENTIN C. MIRANDA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. MACARIO D. CARPIO, Respondent.
A.C. No. 6281 September 26, 2011
FACTS
In complainant's Affidavit,2 complainant and respondent agreed that complainant was to pay respondent Twenty Thousand Pesos
(PhP20,000.00) as acceptance fee and Two Thousand Pesos (PhP2,000.00) as appearance fee. Complainant did not accede to
respondent's demand for it was contrary to their agreement. Moreover, complainant co-owned the subject property with his
siblings, and he could not have agreed to the amount being demanded by respondent without the knowledge and approval of his
co-heirs.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Caprio charged respondent with higher fees.
RULING
Yes. It is highly improper for a lawyer to impose additional professional fees upon his client which were never mentioned nor
agreed upon at the time of the engagement of his services. At the outset, respondent should have informed the complainant of all
the fees or possible fees that he would charge before handling the case and not towards the near conclusion of the case. 
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
"Quantum meruit, meaning `as much as he deserved' is used as a basis for determining the lawyer's professional fees in the
absence of a contract but recoverable by him from his client." 12 The principle of quantum meruit applies if a lawyer is employed
without a price agreed upon for his services. In such a case, he would be entitled to receive what he merits for his services, as
much as he has earned.

159. AUGUSTO M. AQUINO, Petitioner, vs. HON. ISMAEL P. CASABAR, as Presiding Judge Regional Trial Court-
Guimba, Nueva Ecija, Branch 33 and MA. ALA F. DOMINGO and MARGARITA IRENE F. DOMINGO, substituting
Heirs of the deceased ANGEL T. DOMINGO, Respondents.
G.R. No. 191470 January 26, 2015
FACTS
Atty. Angel T. Domingo (now deceased) verbally contracted petitioner to represent him in Agrarian Case No. 1217-G on a
contingency fee basis. The case was for the determination of the just compensation for the expropriation and taking of Atty.
Domingo's ricelands. Atty. Domingo died. Petitioner filed a Manifestation dated December 11, 2007 of the fact of Atty.
Domingo's death and the substitution of the latter by his legal heirs, Ma. Ala F. Domingo and Margarita Irene F. Domingo.
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioner is entitled of attorney’s fees.
RULING
Yes. With his capital consisting of his brains and with his skill acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in expenditure
of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of his client to escape
payment of his just compensation.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer is as much entitled to judicial protection against injustice, imposition or fraud on the part of his client as the client
against abuse on the part of his counsel. The duty of the court is not alone to see that a lawyer acts in a proper and lawful manner;
it is also its duty to see that a lawyer is paid his just fees.
160. TEODORO R. REGALA, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, AVELINO V. CRUZ, JOSE C. CONCEPCION, ROGELIO A.
VINLUAN, VICTOR P. LAZATIN and EDUARDO U. ESCUETA, petitioners, vs. THE HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, First Division, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, ACTING THROUGH THE PRESIDENTIAL
COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, and RAUL S. ROCO, respondents.
G.R. No. 105938 September 20, 1996
FACTS
The Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG), raised a complaint before the Sandiganbayan (SB) against Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. and Teodoro Regala and his partners in the ACCRA law firm, for the recovery of alleged ill-gotten wealth,
which includes shares of stocks in the named corporations in PCGG.
ISSUE
Whether or not client’s identity in a case involving and acquiring companies allegedly sourced from ill-gotten wealth is
privileged and disclosure of such is unethical.
RULING
The court held that the client identity in this case is privileged. As a matter of public policy, a client's identity should not be
shrouded in mystery. This general rule is however qualified by some important exceptions:
1) Client identity is privileged where a strong probability exists that revealing the client's name would implicate that client in the
very activity for which he sought the lawyer's advice.
2) Where disclosure would open the client to civil liability.
3) Where the government's lawyers have no case against an attorney's client unless, by revealing the client's name, the said name
would furnish the only link that would form the chain of testimony necessary to convict an individual of a crime.
The circumstances involving the engagement of lawyers in the case at bench, therefore, clearly reveal that the instant case falls
under the first and third exception.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The attorney-client privilege, as currently worded in the Rules of Court provides the disqualification by reason of privileged
communication. Rule 138 of the Rules of Court further emphasizes the importance of maintaining client confidence.

161. BLANDINA GAMBOA HILADO, petitioner, vs. JOSE GUTIERREZ DAVID, VICENTE J. FRANCISCO, JACOB
ASSAD and SELIM JACOB ASSAD, respondents.
G.R. No. L-961 September 21, 1949
FACTS
Blandina Hilado filed a complaint to have some deeds of sale annulled against Selim Assad. Attorney Delgado Dizon represented
Hilado. Assad was represented by a certain Atty. Ohnick. Atty. Vicente Francisco replaced Atty. Ohnick as counsel for Assad .
Four months later, Atty. Dizon filed a motion to have Atty. Francisco be disqualified because Atty. Dizon found out that Hilado
approached Atty. Francisco to ask for additional legal opinion regarding her case and for which Atty. Francisco sent Hilado a
legal opinion letter.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Francisco should be disqualified in the said civil case.
RULING
Yes. There already existed an attorney-client relationship between Hilado and Atty. Francisco. Hence, Atty. Francisco cannot act
as counsel against Hilado without the latter’s consent.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
As ruled by the Supreme Court, to constitute an attorney-client relationship, it is not necessary that any retainer should have been
paid, promised, or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which
the consultation was had.
162. UY CHICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE UNION LIFE ASSURANCE SOCIETY, LIMITED, ET AL., Defendants-
Appellees.
G.R. No. 9231 January 6, 1915
FACTS
The plaintiff seeks to recover the face value of two insurance policies upon a stock of dry goods destroyed by fire. The plaintiff
now brings this action, maintaining that the policies and goods insured belong to him and not to the estate of his deceased father
and alleges that he is not bound by the compromise effected by the administrator of his father’s estate.
ISSUE
Whether or not the attorney-client privilege was violated by the attorney’s act.
RULING
Yes. A lawyer must strictly maintain inviolate the confidence and preserve the secrets of his client. He shall not be permitted in
any court, without the consent of his client, to testify to any facts imparted to him by his client in professional consultation, or for
the purpose of obtaining advice upon legal matters.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Communications made by a client to his attorney for the purpose of being communicated to others are not privileged after they
have been so communicated, and may be proved by the testimony of the attorney.

163. ROSA F. MERCADO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JULITO D. VITRIOLO, Respondent.

A.C. NO. 5108 May 26, 2005
FACTS
Rosa F. Mercado filed the instant administrative complaint against Atty. Julito D. Vitriolo, seeking his disbarment from the
practice of law. The complainant alleged that respondent maliciously instituted a criminal case for falsification of public
document against her, a former client, based on confidential information gained from their attorney-client relationship.
ISSUE
 Whether or not the respondent violated the complainant’s attorney-client privilege by filing a criminal case against the latter.
RULING
No. The court held that the evidence on record fails to substantiate complainant’s allegations. The court note that complainant did
not even specify the alleged communication in confidence disclosed by respondent. All her claims were couched in general terms
and lacked specificity. 
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The relation is of such delicate, exacting and confidential nature that is required by necessity and public interest. The mere
relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality.
164. REBECCA J. PALM, Complainant, v. ATTY. FELIPE ILEDAN, JR., Respondent.
A.C. NO. 8242 October 2, 2009
FACTS
Complainant is the President of Comtech, a corporation engaged in the business of computer software development, complainant
became uncomfortable with the close relationship between respondent and Elda Soledad (Soledad), a former officer and director
of Comtech, who resigned and who was suspected of releasing unauthorized disbursements of corporate funds. 
Respondent alleged that there was no conflict of interest when he represented Soledad in the case for Estafa filed by Comtech. He
alleged that Soledad was already a client before he became a consultant for Comtech. 
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent violated the Confidentiality of Lawyer-Client Relationship
RULING
No. There was nothing in the records that would show that respondent used against Comtech any confidential information
acquired while he was still Comtech's retained counsel. Further, respondent made the representation after the termination of his
retainer agreement with Comtech. 
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer's immutable duty to a former client does not cover transactions that occurred beyond the lawyer's employment with the
client. The intent of the law is to impose upon the lawyer the duty to protect the client's interests only on matters that he
previously handled for the former client and not for matters that arose after the lawyer-client relationship has terminated.

165. ELISA V. VENTEREZ, GENARO DE VERA, INOCENCIA V. RAMIREZ, PACITA V. MILLS, ANTONINA V.
PALMA and RAMON DE VERA, Complainants, v. ATTY. RODRIGO R. COSME, Respondent.
A.C. NO. 7421 October 10, 2007
FACTS
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court ruled against the complainants. They wanted
to file a motion of reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, the complainants were constrained
to contact another lawyer to prepare the motion for reconsideration.
Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that the complainants were withdrawing the case from
him because he (the son) engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme further explained that he even turned over
the records of the case to the son, ceased to be counsel of the complainants.
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of the Professional Responsibility.
RULING
Yes. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his client or by permission of the court after due
notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the name of the new attorney is recorded in the
case. Respondent did not comply with these obligations. Therefore, he remains the counsel of record for the complainants in Civil
Case No. 981 with the duty to protect complainants' interest.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which states that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter
entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable." Respondent is reminded that the practice of
law is a special privilege bestowed only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally.
166. ELOISA, CARLOS, JR., ARCHIMEDES, CAROLINE, and MA. CARLOTA, all surnamed
ARAMBULO, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ENGR. DANILO G. FERRERAS, respondents.
G.R. No. 105818 September 17, 1993
FACTS
Petitioners and private respondent are parties to a contract for the construction of a 4-storey dormitory building. Private
respondent, as the contractor, filed an action against the petitioners-spouses Carlos S. Arambulo and Eloisa I. Arambulo to claim
the balance of the contract price and the increase in the construction cost due to additional scope of work done and increase in the
cost of materials.
Arambulos, through Atty. Jimenez, filed their notice of appeal informing the trial court that they are appealing the decision to the
Court of Appeals. Atty. Jimenez filed a Withdrawal of Appearance with the express conformity of the defendants, while Atty.
Pineda entered his Appearance as their new counsel.
ISSUE
Whether or not the withdrawal of Atty. Jimenez was valid or not?
RULING
Yes. Since the withdrawal was with the client’s consent, no approval thereof by the trial court was required because a court
approval is indispensable only if the withdrawal is without the client’s consent.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Rule 138, Section 26, the retirement is completed once the withdrawal is filed in court. No further action thereon by the court is
needed other than the mechanical act of the clerk of court of entering the name of the new counsel in the docket and of giving
notice thereof to the adverse party. The failure of the clerk of court to do either does not affect the validity of the retirement.

167. ANGELITA C. ORCINO, Complainant, v. ATTY. JOSUE GASPAR, Respondent

A.C. No. 3773 September 24, 1997
FACTS
Complainant engaged the services of respondent to prosecute a criminal case she intended to file against several suspects in the
slaying of her husband. In consideration thereof, complainant bound herself to pay respondent legal fees. He interviewed
witnesses and gathered evidence to build a case against the suspects.
Respondent however failed to attend the hearing scheduled in August 1991. It was at this nearing that the court, over
complainant’s objections, granted bail to all the accused. Complainant became belligerent and started accusing him of
jeopardizing the case by his absence. 
ISSUE
Whether or not the respondent lawyer has the liberty to withdraw his services anytime.
RULING
No, unlike the client-complainant which has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation at any time with or without
cause. The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who undertakes to conduct an action impliedly
stipulates to carry it to its conclusion.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the client’s written consent or from a good
cause. Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. A lawyer may retire at any time from any action special proceeding
with the written consent of his client filed in court and copy thereof served upon the adverse party.
168. CASIANO U. LAPUT, Petitioner, v. ATTY. FRANCISCO E. F. REMOTIGUE, ATTY. FORTUNATO R.
PATALINGHUG, Respondents.
A.C. No. 219. September 29, 1962
FACTS
Complainant here alleges that the appearances of respondents were unethical and improper for the reason that they had nursed the
desire to replace the petitioner as attorney for the estate and the administratrix and, taking advantage of her goodwill, intrigued
against the preparation of the final inventory and accounting.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent’s appearance incurred irregularity.
RULING
No. With respect to the preparation Atty. Patalinghug of the revocations of power of attorney as complained of by petitioner, the
Solicitor General found that the same does not appear to be prompted by malice or intended to hurt petitioner’s feelings, but
purely to safeguard the interest of the administratrix. 
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
The appearance of the second lawyer is not unprofessional, unethical or improper; the first lawyer’s voluntary withdrawal as
counsel and his filing of a motion for the payment of his fees amounted to an acquiescence to the appearance of the second
lawyer.

169. NAPOLEON R. GONZAGA and RICARDO R. GONZAGA, complainants, vs. ATTY. EUGENIO V.

VILLANUEVA, JR., respondent.
A.C. No. 1954 July 23, 2004
FACTS
The complainants claimed that they did not pursue the case for some time because of Christian charity.  They wanted to give the
respondent a chance to have a complete medical treatment. 8 For his part, the respondent alleged that it was complainants' gross
negligence and patent lack of interest that caused the delay in the proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not respondent is subject for disciplinary action.
RULING
Yes. Respondent's obstinate refusal to withdraw from the intestate proceedings was improper.  Since his unauthorized appearance
was willful, he could have been cited in contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions. 30 In
addition, he may be disciplined for professional misconduct.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious deportment
unbecoming an attorney.  Among the grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit; malpractice;
gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct; conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of the oath
which he is required to take before admission to the practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court;
corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so. 
170. MUNICIPALITY OF PILILLA, RIZAL, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ARTURO A.
MARAVE, as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Morong, Rizal, and PHILIPPINE PETROLEUM
CORPORATION, respondents.
 G.R. No. 105909 June 28, 1994
FACTS
Regional Trial Court of Tanay, Rizal, rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff, now herein petitioner Municipality of Pililla, Rizal,
against defendant, now herein private respondent Philippine Petroleum Corporation (PPC, for short), ordering therein defendant
to pay said plaintiff the amount of P5,301,385.00 representing the tax on business, storage permit fee, mayor’s permit fee,
sanitary inspection fee and the costs of suit.
ISSUE
Whether or not Atty. Mendiola has authority to file a petition in behalf of and in the name of the Municipality of Pililla.
RULING
No. Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision
is mandatory. The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent it.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
Only the provincial fiscal and the municipal attorney can represent a province or municipality in their lawsuits. The provision is
mandatory. The municipality’s authority to employ a private lawyer is expressly limited only to situations where the provincial
fiscal is disqualified to represent it.

171. DANTE NACURAY, ANGELITO ACOSTA and LARRY CLEMENTE, Petitioners, v. NATIONAL LABOR

RELATIONS COMMISSION and BMC-BENGUET MANAGEMENT CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. Nos. 114924-27 March 18, 1997
FACTS
BMC-Benguet Management Corporation (BMC for short) employed petitioners as helpers. They were assigned at the Finishing
Section of BMC's Production Department and worked as "air-grinder operators." Their employment contracts were nonetheless
renewed several times; thrice for Dante Nacuray and Larry Clemente, and twice for Angelito Acosta. Later, however, their
services were terminated by the non-extension of their respective contracts. According to BMC, their "performance during the
contractual period did not meet the company's standards."
ISSUE
Whether or not petitioners’ termination is constitutional.
RULING
Yes. While petitioners have the right to terminate their relations with their counsel and make substitution or change at any stage
of the proceedings, the exercise of such right is subject to compliance with the prescribed requirements.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
There is only one Supreme Court from whose decisions all other courts should take their bearings. Consequently, a Division
cannot and should not review a case already passed upon by another Division of this Court. It is only proper to allow the case to
take its rest after having attained finality.
172. INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED LUIS C. DOMINGO, SR., CONSUELO DOMINGO DE
LOPEZ, administratrix-petitioner, vs. PEDRO A. AQUINO, deceased, substituted by SALVACION YUSAY AQUINO,
ETC., and the HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
G.R. No. L-28078 April 29, 1971
FACTS
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan rendered judgment approving the money claim of respondent Pedro A. Aquino against the
petitioner estate by ordering the then special administratrix, Asuncion Domingo Sta. Maria, "to pay from the available funds of
the estate the sum of P20,000.00 with 12% interest per annum from June 10, 1954 to Pedro A. Aquino."
According to the present petition itself, the estate's counsel of record in the appellate court, Atty. Jose A. Unson, did not receive
the notice and copy of the appellate court's judgment sent to him by registered mail; but the estate's attorneys in the intestate
proceedings pending in the lower court, Attys. Primicias, Del Castillo and Macaraeg, were verbally informed by respondent's
counsel of the judgment rendered on appeal by the appellate court.
ISSUE
Whether or not petition is valid.
RULING
The petition is ordered dismissed and petitioner's counsel shall pay treble costs. Petitioner's counsel is reminded of this Court's
admonition in Pajares vs. Abad Santos, 6 and other cases cited therein, to wit, that "the cooperation of litigants and their attorneys
is needed so that needless clogging of the court dockets with unmeritorious cases may be avoided.
DOCTRINE/PRINCIPLE
There must be more faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court which provides that 'the signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is
good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay' and expressly admonishes that 'for a willful violation of this rule,
an attorney may be subjected to disciplinary action.'"