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VOL. 53, OCTOBER 23, 1973 309

Impeachment of Witness

ANNOTATION

IMPEACHMENT OF WITNESS
By
DOMINGO LUCENARIO

§ I. Concept, p. 309.
§ 2. Statement of the Rule, p. 310.
§ 3. Subject Matter, p. 310.
§ 4. Modes of lmpeachment, p. 310.

1. Contradictory Evidence, p. 310.

2. Questions Relating to Character, p. 313.
3. Evidence of falsehood or Perjury, p. 314.
4. Exaggeration, p. 314
5. Grievance. p. 315.

§ 5. Laying Foundation for Impeachment, p. 315.

________________

§ 1. Concept

“Impeach”, as applied to the contradiction of a witness in

a legal proceeding, is capable of two significations. One is
the charge or accusation of want of veracity, and the other
is the establishment of the charge (White v. McLean, N.Y.,
47 How. Prac. 193, 199). Impeachment imports
destruction of the witness’ testimony, but, as generally
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used, it comprehends also the attempt to establish such a

charge, whether unsuccessful or successful in whole or in
part. It not only means destruction, but it means attack,
and it includes disparagement and discredit
(Commonwealth v Welch, 63 S.W. 984, 986). It is an attack
against the credibility of a witness (Sheppard v. State,
145 S.E. 654; Words & Phrases, 1940 ed., Vol. 20, pp. 195,
196). It constitutes then a grave challenge to a witness’
veracity

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(People v. Kali, 82 Phil. 461).

§ 2. Statement of the Rule

A witness may be impeached by the party against whom

he was called, by contradictory evidence, by evidence that
his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is
bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but
not by evidence of particular wrongful acts, except that it
may be shown by the examination of the witness, or the
record of the judgment, that he has been convicted of an
offense (Sec. 15, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court).

§ 3. Subject Matter

A witness may be impeached only on matters which are

material, competent, specific, and relevant. He may not be
impeached on matters which are immaterial and only
collateral to the real issue (Underhill’s Criminal Evidence,
4th ed., pp. 848–849).

§ 4. Modes of Impeachment

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1. Contradictory Evidence.—A witness may be impeached

by evidence contrary to his testimony or by involving him
in material or serious contradiction (U.S. v. Lozada, 18
Phil. 90; De los Reyes v. Leonardo, 57 Phil. 407; U.S. v.
Pala, 26 Phil. 127). Serious contradictions in a witness’
testimony constitute a grave challenge to his veracity
(People v. Kali, supra).
For the testimony of a witness to merit credit, it is
indispensable that it be not incompatible with his other
statements made on other occasions concerning the same
fact (People v. Capua, 47 O.G. 3516; People v. Ramos, 41
SCRA 19). A witness who changes his name and
statements, like a chameleon that changes its color. does
not inspire confidence. and when his testimony is likewise
incompatible with his conduct immediately after the crime
in question, it has little probative value (People v. Go Lee,
L-2462, March 6, 1950, 48 O.G. 5997). Inconsistency in the
accounts by two alleged eyewitness of the incident cannot
but create doubt as to their

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truthfulness and sincerity (People v. Lacsamana, 35 SCRA

312).
Exceptions:

a. Where contradictions are natural concomitants to

human limitations.—Where the contradictions are
natural concomitants to human limitations and
were elicited in the course of a long and extensive
cross-examination, such contradictions on minor
matters are not sufficient to destroy the effectivity
of the witness’ testimony. As the sun, although
appearing to us as the greatest miracle in the
universe, is not spotless, human beings cannot
absolutely be free from faults. This is true even
with the choicest paragons of the human species
(People v. Ordonio, L-1774, Dec. 14,1948).

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Time has an unfortunate tendency to obliterate

occurrences from a witness’ memory and recollections are
apt to be blurred (Montalban v. Maximo, L-22997, March
15, 1968).

b. Where contradiction is overcome by the probable

nature of the witness’ story.—It is true that
witnesses may be impeached by evidence that they
have made at other times—statements inconsistent
with their present testimony. But this character of
evidence, which is introduced for the purpose of
impeaching the witnesses, is not conclusive. It may
be overcome by the probable nature of the story the
witnesses may tell on the trial of the case, their
seeing and knowing the matters concerning which
they testified, and, if from all the circumstances
the court is satisfied that the statements of such
witness are true, it has the right to accept them
(U.S. v. Lazaro, 34 Phil. 871).
c. Contradiction of aged and ignorant witnesses.—
Aged and ignorant witnesses usually contradict
themselves in a long series of tedious questions on
cross-examination, and their testimony must not be
discredited for that reason alone, especially if the
principal point has been corroborated by other facts
contained in the record (People v. Limbo, 49 Phil.
94). To the same effect is the following observation
in People v. Provo: “Well settled is the rule that
inconsistencies and contradictions incurred by an
illiterate witness in the course of a lengthy
examination will not affect the credibility of her
testimony.”

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d. Contradiction in details by confusion, excitement,

and fright.—On this point the Tribunal in People
vs. Escosura (82 Phil. 41) made this observation:
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“The contradictions pointed out in the witnesses’

statements are of the nature that would not tend to
impair their credibility. They were details which,
in the confusion, excitement and fright the horrible
incidents brought about, could very well have
impressed the witnesses in different manners or
escaped the attention of some but not of the others
. . . Far from being evidence of falsehood, these
contradictions constitute a demonstration of good
faith and a confirmation of the truth of the
appellant’s participation”.
e. Where discrepancies refer to minor details.—Where
the discrepancies or contradictions of a witness’
testimony are more apparent than real, and they
refer to minor details, the same do not affect the
merits of the case. Instead of adversely affecting
the credibility and weight of said testimony, they
tend to bolster up the same, for experience has
time and again shown that persons who witness
the same occurrence seldom, if ever, have identical
impressions about the details thereof (People v.
Otto, L-29651, Jan. 31, 1973, 49 SCRA 306, 315–
316).

Witnesses’ testimony need not be considered incredible

because the witnesses differ as to certain details, where it
is apparent that some of the questions were not
understood and because witnesses react differently as to
what they see and hear depending upon their situation
and state of mind, furthermore, absolute uniformity in
details is a badge of untruthfulness (People vs. Pascual, L-
4801, June 30, 1953).
In Maravilla v. Maravilla (L-23225, Feb. 27, 1971, 37
SCRA 672), it was also held that the variation in the
expressions used by a witness is the best evidence that he
was being candid and careful, and it is a clear badge of
truthfulness rather than the reverse.

f. Where contradictions are satisfactorily explained.—

The theory that a witness’ previous testimony is
false, simply because he subsequently declared it to
be so, is as illogical as it is dangerous. Merely
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because a witness says that what he had declared

is false and that what he now says is true, is not

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sufficient ground for concluding that the previous

testimony is false. No such reasoning has ever
crystallized into a rule of credibility. The rule is
that a witness may be impeached by a previous
contradictory statement (Sec. 16, Rule 132); not
that a previous statement is presumed to be false
merely because a witness now says that the same
is not true. The jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court has always been otherwise, i.e., that
contradictory testimony given subsequently does
not necessarily discredit the previous testimony if
the contradictions are satisfactorily explained.
(U.S. v. Magtibay, 17 Phil. 417; U.S. vs. Briones, 28
Phil. 362; U.S. v. Dasiip, 26 Phil. 503; U.S. v.
Lazaro, 34 Phil. 871). It was also held that if a
previous confession of an accused were to be
rejected simply because the latter subsequently
makes another confession, all that an accused
would do to acquit himself would be to make
another confession out of harmony with the
previous one (U.S. v. Acasio, 37 Phil. 70). Similarly,
it would be a dangerous rule for courts to reject
testimonies solemnly taken before courts of justice
simply because the witnesses who had given them
later on change their mind for one reason or
another, for such rule would make solemn trials a
mockery and place the investigation of truth at the
mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. (People v. Ubiña,
et al., 97 Phil. 525).

A contradiction may be explained by the fact that an

affidavit will not always disclose the whole facts, and will
oftentimes and without design incorrectly describe,
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without the deponent detecting it, some of the occurrences,

narrated and being taken ex parte, and is almost always
incomplete and often inaccurate, sometimes from partial
suggestions, and sometimes from the want of suggestions
and inquiries, without the aid of which the witness may
be unable to recall the connected collateral circumstances
necessary for the correction of the first suggestions of his
memory, and for his accurate recollection of all that
belongs to the subject (People v. Tan, 89 Phil. 337). Cited
in People v. Tiongson, L-29569, Oct. 30, 1972, 47 SCRA
279, 284).
2. Question relating to character,—A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he has been called
by showing that his general reputation for truth, honesty,
or
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integrity is bad (U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127). However,

evidence of the good character of a witness is not
admissible until such character has been impeached (Sec.
17, Rule 132, Revised Rules of Court).
3. Evidence of falsehood or perjury.—Deliberate and
studied perjury on the part of an accused, even on nonvital
particulars, can mean troubled and uneasy conscience and
an endeavor to cover up incriminating facts. Subterfuge is
not a resort of defendants who have nothing to hide
(People v. Llaneta, et al., 86 Phil. 219).
The presumption that the witness will declare the
truth ceases as soon as it manifestly appears that he is
capable of perjury. Faith in a witness’ testimony cannot
be partial or fractional; where any material fact rests on
his testimony, the degree of credit due to him must be
ascertained, and according to the result his testimony is to
be credited or rejected (Starkie, Evidence, Vol. I, p. 583;
Wigmore on Evidence, Vol. III, 3rd ed., p. 675).
But the principle of falsus in uno falsus in omnibus is
not an absolute one, and it is perfectly reasonable to

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believe the testimony of a witness with respect to some

facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People v.
Dasig, et al., 49 O.G. No. 8, p. 3338). In People vs. Keller,
46 O.G. No. 7, pp. 3222–3223, the following excerpt was
quoted with approval by the Court of Appeals from 1
Moore on Facts, p. 23:

“Triers of facts are not bound to believe all that any witness has
said; they may accept some portions of his testimony and reject
other portions, according to what seems to them, upon other facts
and circumstances, to be the truth . . . Even when witnesses are
found to have deliberately falsified in some material particulars,
the jury are not required to reject the whole of their
uncorroborated testimony, but may credit such portions as they
deem worthy of belief” (People v. Li Bun Juan, et al., L-11077,
Aug. 23, 1966, 17 SCRA 934, 945). 945).

4. Exaggeration.—Exaggerations or fantastic details in the

testimony of a witness may be fatal to his credibility
(People v. Elizaga, 86 Phil. 365). But the witnesses’
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exaggerated statements on other matters should not

preclude the acceptance of such of their evidence as is
relieved from any sign of falsehood (People vs. Refuerzo, 82
Phil. 576, 580).
5. Grievance.—The story of a witness with a grievance,
like the testimony of a discharged servant or employee,
must be taken with extreme caution (Moore on Facts, Vol.
2, p. 1253).

§ 5. Laying Foundation for Impeachment

For the purpose of clarifying the practice in respect to the

proper mode of proceeding where a party wishes to get
before the court contradictory statements made by a
witness who is testifying for the adversary party a few
words may be given. For instance, if the attorney for the
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accused had information that a certain witness, say Pedro

Gonzales, had made and signed a sworn statement before
the fiscal materially different from that given in his
testimony before the court, it was incumbent upon the
attorney when cross-examining said witness to direct his
attention to the discrepancy and to ask him if he did not
make such and such statement before the fiscal or if he did
not there make a statement different from that delivered
in court. If the witness admits the making of such
contradictory statements, the accused has the right to
prove that the witness did make such statement; and if
the fiscal should refuse upon due notice to produce the
document, secondary evidence of the contents thereof
would be admissible. This process of cross-examining a
witness upon the point of prior contradictory statements
is called in the practice of the American courts “laying a
predicate” for the introduction of contradictory statements.
It is almost universally accepted that unless a ground is
thus laid upon cross-examination, evidence of
contradictory statements are not admissible to impeach a
witness; though undoubtedly the matter is to a large
extent in the discretion of the court. (People v. Badilla, 48
Phil. 733–734).
To the same effect is the following ruling:

“The alleged discrepancies between the witnesses’ testimony in

the case at bar and their testimony in another case can not be
entertained. We do not have before us the latter testimony except

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counsel’s summary of it in his brief in the case mentioned.

Moreover, granting the alleged contradictions, the statements in
the other case can not serve as basis for impeaching the
witnesses’ veracity unless their attention was directed to the
discrepancies and they were given an opportunity to explain
them. This has not been done.” (People v. Escosura, 82 Phil. 41,
45).

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In impeaching a witness by showing that he has made

statements in writing inconsistent with his testimony, it is
sufficient if the writing is shown to him and full
opportunity is given him to examine it before answering
any question concerning the same; and it is not essential
that the statement be read or related to him orally unless
he so requests (People v. Somonte, 48 Phil. 894, 48 J.F.
943). However, if the previous statements of a witness are
offered as evidence of admission and not merely to
impeach him, there is no need of laying a predicate
(Ysmael & Co. v. Hasmin, 50 Phil. 132).

________________

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