G.R. No.
L-15853             lawful wedlock between her and
July 27, 1960
FERNANDO AQUINO, petitioner,  At the trial, the attorney's
vs.
CONCHITA DELIZO, respondent.
GUTIERREZ DAVID, J.:
This is a petition
for certiorari  to review a
decision of the Court of
Appeals affirming that of the
Court of First Instance of
Rizal which dismissed
petitioner's complaint for
annulment of his marriage with
respondent Conchita Delizo.
The dismissed complaint, which
was filed on September 6,
1955, was based on the ground
of fraud, it being alleged,
among other things, that
defendant Conchita Delizo,
herein respondent, at the date
of her marriage to plaintiff,
herein petitioner Fernando
Aquino, on December 27, 1954,
concealed from the latter that
fact that she was pregnant by
another man, and sometime in
April, 1955, or about four
months after their marriage,
gave birth to a child. In her
answer, defendant claimed that
the child was conceived out of
Page 1 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
birth and delivery of the
the plaintiff.
for both parties appeared and
the court a quo  ordered
Assistant Provincial Fiscal
Jose Goco to represent the
State in the proceedings to
prevent collusion. Only the
plaintiff however, testified
and the only documentary
evidence presented was the
marriage contract between the
parties. Defendant neither
appeared nor presented any
evidence despite the
reservation made by her
counsel that he would present
evidence on a later date.
On June 16, 1956, the trial
court — noting that no birth
certificate was presented to
show that the child was born
within 180 days after the
marriage between the parties,
and holding that concealment
of pregnancy as alleged by the
plaintiff does not constitute
such fraud sa would annul a
marriage — dismissed the
complaint. Through a verified
"petition to reopen for
reception of additional
evidence", plaintiff tried to
present the certificates of
child born of the defendant on
April 26, 1955, which
documents, according to him,
he had failed to secure
earlier and produce before the
trial court thru excusable
negligence. The petition,
however, was denied.
On appeal to the Court of
Appeals, that court held that
there has been excusable
neglect in plaintiff's
inability to present the proof
of the child's birth, through
her birth certificate, and for
that reason the court a
quo  erred in denying the
motion for reception of
additional evidence. On the
theory, however, that it was
not impossible for plaintiff
and defendant to have had
sexual intercourse during
their engagement so that the
child could be their own, and
finding unbelievable
plaintiff's claim that he did
not notice or even suspect
that defendant was pregnant
when he married her, the
appellate court, nevertheless,
affirmed the dismissal of the
complaint.
On March 17, 1959, plaintiff
filed a motion praying that
the decision be reconsidered,
or, if such reconsideration be
denied, that the case be
remanded to the lower court
for new trial. In support of
the motion, plaintiff attached
as annexes thereof the
following documents:
1. Affidavit of Cesar Aquino
(Annex A) (defendant's
brother-in-law and plaintiff's
brother, with whom defendant
was living at the time
plaintiff met, courted and
married her, and with whom
defendant has begotten two
more children, aside from her
first born, in common-law
relationship) admitting that
he is the father of
defendant's first born,
Catherine Bess Aquino, and
that he and defendant hid her
pregnancy from plaintiff at
the time of plaintiff's
marriage to defendant;
2. Affidavit of defendant,
Conchita Delizo (Annex "B")
admitting her pregnancy by
Cesar Aquino, her brother-in-
law and plaintiff's own
brother, at the time of her
marriage to plaintiff and her
Page 2 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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having hidden this fact from
plaintiff before and up to the
time of their marriage;
3. Affidavit of Albert Powell
(Annex "C") stating that he
knew Cesar Aquino and
defendant lived together as
husband and wife before
December 27, 1954, the date of
plaintiff's marriage to
defendant;
4. Birth Certificate of
defendant's first born,
Catherine Bess Aquino showing
her date of birth to be April
26, 1955;
5. Birth Certificate (Annex
"D") of Carolle Ann Aquino,
the second child of defendant
with Cesar Aquino, her
brother-in-law;
6. Birth Certificate (Annex
"E") of Chris Charibel Aquino,
the third child of Cesar
Aquino and defendant; and
7. Pictures of defendant
showing her natural plumpness
as early as 1952 to as late as
November, 1954, the November,
1954 photo itself does not
show defendant's pregnancy
which must have been almost
four months old at the time
the picture was taken.
Acting upon the motion, the
Court of Appeals ordered the
defendant Conchita Delizo and
Assistant Provincial Fiscal of
Rizal, who was representing
the Government, to answer the
motion for reconsideration,
and deferred action on the
prayer for new trial until
after the case is disposed of.
As both the defendant and the
fiscal failed to file an
answer, and stating that it
"does not believe the veracity
of the contents of the motion
and its annexes", the Court of
Appeals, on August 6, 1959,
denied the motion. From that
order, the plaintiff brought
the case to this Court thru
the present petition
for certiorari.
After going over the record of
the case, we find that the
dismissal of plaintiff's
complaint cannot be sustained.
Under the new Civil Code,
concealment by the wife of the
fact that at the time of the
marriage, she was pregnant by
a man other than her husband
constitutes fraud and is
ground for annulment of
marriage. (Art. 85, par. (4)
in relation to Art. 86, par.
(3). In the case of Buccat vs.
Buccat (72 Phil., 19) cited in
the decision sought to be
reviewed, which was also an
action for the annulment of
marriage on the ground of
fraud, plaintiff's claim that
he did not even suspect the
pregnancy of the defendant was
held to be unbelievable, it
having been proven that the
latter was already in an
advanced stage of pregnancy
(7th month) at the time of
their marriage. That
pronouncement, however, cannot
apply to the case at bar. Here
the defendant wife was alleged
to be only more than four
months pregnant at the time of
her marriage to plaintiff. At
that stage, we are not
prepared to say that her
pregnancy was readily
apparent, especially since she
was "naturally plump" or fat
as alleged by plaintiff.
According to medical
authorities, even on the 5th
month of pregnancy, the
enlargement of a woman's
abdomen is still below the
umbilicus, that is to say, the
enlargement is limited to the
Page 3 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
lower part of the abdomen so
that it is hardly noticeable
and may, if noticed, be
attributed only to fat
formation on the lower part of
the abdomen. It is only on the
6th month of pregnancy that
the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen reaches a height above
the umbilicus, making the
roundness of the abdomen more
general and apparent. (See
Lull, Clinical Obstetrics, p.
122) If, as claimed by
plaintiff, defendant is
"naturally plump", he could
hardly be expected to know,
merely by looking, whether or
not she was pregnant at the
time of their marriage more so
because she must have
attempted to conceal the true
state of affairs. Even
physicians and surgeons, with
the aid of the woman herself
who shows and gives her
subjective and objective
symptoms, can only claim
positive diagnosis of
pregnancy in 33% at five
months. and 50% at six months.
(XI Cyclopedia of Medicine,
Surgery, etc. Pregnancy, p.
10).
The appellate court also said
that it was not impossible for
plaintiff and defendant to
have had sexual intercourse
before they got married and
therefore the child could be
their own. This statement,
however, is purely conjectural
and finds no support or
justification in the record.
Upon the other hand, the
evidence sought to be
introduced at the new trial,
taken together with what has
already been adduced would, in
our opinion, be sufficient to
sustain the fraud alleged by
plaintiff. The Court of
Appeals should, therefore, not
have denied the motion praying
for new trial simply because
defendant failed to file her
answer thereto. Such failure
of the defendant cannot be
taken as evidence of
collusion, especially since a
provincial fiscal has been
ordered of represent the
Government precisely to
prevent such collusion. As to
the veracity of the contents
of the motion and its annexes,
the same can best be
determined only after hearing
evidence. In the circumstance,
we think that justice would be
better served if a new trial
were ordered.
Wherefore, the decision
complained of is set aside and
the case remanded to the court
a quo for new trial. Without
costs.

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MARRIAGE
G.R. No. 109975      February
9, 2001
REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES, petitioner,  on April 21, 1982.3 Their birth
vs.
ERLINDA MATIAS
DAGDAG, respondent.
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is
the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals dated April 22, 1993,
in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378, which
affirmed the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of
Olongapo City in Civil Case
No. 380-0-90 declaring the
marriage of Erlinda Matias
Dagdag and Avelino Dagdag void
under Article 36 of the Family
Code.
On September 7, 1975, Erlinda
Matias, 16 years old, married
Avelino Parangan Dagdag, 20
years old, at the Iglesia
Filipina Independent Church in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija.2 The
marriage certificate was
issued by the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of the
Municipality of Cuyapo, Nueva
Ecija, on October 20, 1988.
Page 5 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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Erlinda and Avelino begot two
children, namely: Avelyn M.
Dagdag, born on January 16,
1978; and Eden M. Dagdag, born
certificates were issued by
the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality
of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija, also
on October 20, 1988.
Erlinda and Avelino lived in a
house in District 8, Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija, located at the
back of the house of their in-
laws.4 A week after the
wedding, Avelino started
leaving his family without
explanation. He would
disappear for months, suddenly
reappear for a few months,
then disappear again. During
the times when he was with his
family, he indulged in
drinking sprees with friends
and would return home drunk.
He would force his wife to
submit to sexual intercourse
and if she refused, he would
inflict physical injuries on
her.5
On October 1993, he left his
family again and that was the
last they heard from him.
Erlinda was constrained to
look for a job in Olongapo
City as a manicurist to
support herself and her
children. Finally, Erlinda
learned that Avelino was
imprisoned for some crime,6 and
that he escaped from jail on
October 22, 1985.7 A
certification therefor dated
February 14, 1990, was issued
by Jail Warden Orlando S.
Limon. Avelino remains at-
large to date.
On July 3, 1990, Erlinda filed
with the Regional Trial Court
of Olongapo City a petition
for judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage on the
ground of psychological
incapacity under Article 36 of
the Family Code.8 Since Avelino
could not be located, summons
was served by publication in
the Olongapo News, a newspaper
of general circulation, on
September 3, 10, and 17,
1990.9 Subsequently, a hearing
was conducted to establish
jurisdictional facts.
Thereafter, on December 17,
1990, the date set for
presentation of evidence, only
Erlinda and her counsel
appeared. Erlinda testified
and presented her sister-in-
law, Virginia Dagdag, as her
only witness.
Virginia testified that she is
married to the brother of
Avelino. She and her husband
live in Olongapo City but they
spend their vacations at the
house of Avelino's parents in
Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija. She
testified that Erlinda and
Avelino always quarrelled, and
that Avelino never stayed for
long at the couple's house.
She knew that Avelino had been
gone for a long time now, and
that she pitied Erlinda and
the children.10
Thereafter, Erlinda rested her
case. The trial court issued
an Order giving the
investigating prosecutor until
January 2, 1991, to manifest
in writing whether or not he
would present controverting
evidence, and stating that
should he fail to file said
manifestation, the case would
be deemed submitted for
decision.
In compliance with the Order,
the investigating prosecutor
conducted an investigation and
found that there was no
collusion between the parties.
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However, he intended to
intervene in the case to avoid
fabrication of evidence.11
On December 27, 1990, without
waiting for the investigating
prosecutor's manifestation
dated December 5, 1990, the
trial court rendered a
decision12 declaring the
marriage of Erlinda and
Avelino void under Article 36
of the Family Code, disposing
thus:
"WHEREFORE, and viewed from
the foregoing considerations,
the Court hereby declares the
marriage celebrated at Cuyapo,
Nueva Ecija between Erlinda
Matias and Avelino Dagdag on 7
September 1975 to be null and
void.
The Local Civil Registrar
of Cuyapo, Nueva Ecija is
hereby ordered to enter
into his Book of Marriage
this declaration after
this decision shall have
become final and
executory .
SO ORDERED."
On January 29, 1991, the
investigating prosecutor filed
a Motion to Set Aside Judgment
on the ground that the
decision was prematurely
rendered since he was given
until January 2, 1991 to
manifest whether he was
presenting controverting
evidence.
The Office of the Solicitor
General likewise filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision on the ground
that the same is not in
accordance with the evidence
and the law. After requiring
Erlinda to comment, the trial
court denied the Motion for
Reconsideration in an Order
dated August 21, 1991 as
follows:13
"This resolves the Motion for
Reconsideration of the
Decision of this Honorable
Court dated December 27, 1990
filed by the Solicitor-
General. The observation of
the movant is to the effect
that 'Mere alcoholism and
abusiveness are not enough to
show psychological incapacity.
Nor is abandonment. These are
common in marriage. There must
be showing that these traits,
stemmed from psychological
incapacity existing at the
time of celebration of the
marriage.’
In the case at bar, the
abandonment is prolonged as
the husband left his wife and
children since 1983. The
defendant, while in jail
escaped and whose present
whereabouts are unknown. He
failed to support his family
for the same period of time,
actuations clearly indicative
of the failure of the husband
to comply with the essential
marital obligations of
marriage defined and
enumerated under Article 68 of
the Family Code. These
findings of facts are
uncontroverted. 1âwphi1.nêt
Defendant's character traits,
by their nature, existed at
the time of marriage and
became manifest only after the
marriage. In rerum natura,
these traits are
manifestations of lack of
marital responsibility and
appear now to be incurable.
Nothing can be graver since
the family members are now
left to fend for themselves.
Contrary to the opinion of the
Solicitor-General, these are
not common in marriage.
Page 7 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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Let it be said that the
provisions of Article 36 of
the New Family Code, to
assuage the sensibilities of
the more numerous church, is a
substitute for divorce (See:
Sempio Diy, New Family Code,
p. 36) in order to dissolve
marriages that exist only in
name.
WHEREFORE, and the foregoing
considered, the motion for
Reconsideration aforecited is
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED"
The Solicitor General appealed
to the Court of Appeals,
raising the sole assignment of
error that:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN
DECLARING APPELLEE'S MARRIAGE
TO A VELINO DAGDAG NULL AND
VOID ON THE GROUND OF
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY OF
THE LATTER, PURSUANT TO
ARTICLE 36 OF THE FAMILY CODE,
THE PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
OF THE NATURE CONTEMPLATED BY
THE LAW NOT HAVING BEEN PROVEN
TO EXIST.14
On April 22, 1993, the Court
of Appeals rendered a
decision15 affirming the
decision of the trial court,
disposing thus:
"Avelino Dagdag is
psychologically incapacitated
not only because he failed to
perform the duties and
obligations of a married
person but because he is
emotionally immature and
irresponsible, an alcoholic,
and a criminal. Necessarily,
the plaintiff is now endowed
with the right to seek the
judicial declaration of
nullity of their marriage
under Article 36 of the Family
Code. Defendant's constant
non-fulfillment of any of such
obligations is continously
(sic) destroying the integrity
or wholeness of his marriage
with the plaintiff. (Pineda,
The Family Code of the
Philippines Annotated, 1992
Ed., p. 46)."16
Hence, the present petition
for review ,17 filed by the
Solicitor General.
The Solicitor General contends
that the alleged psychological
incapacity of Avelino Dagdag
is not of the nature
contemplated by Article 36 of
the Family Code. According to
him, the Court of Appeals made
an erroneous and incorrect
interpretation of the phrase
"psychological incapacity" and
an incorrect application
thereof to the facts of the
case. Respondent, in her
Comment, insists that the
facts constituting
psychological incapacity were
proven by preponderance of
evidence during trial.
At issue is whether or not the
trial court and the Court of
Appeals correctly declared the
marriage as null and void
under Article 36 of the Family
Code, on the ground that the
husband suffers from
psychological incapacity as he
is emotionally immature and
irresponsible, a habitual
alcoholic, and a fugitive from
justice.
Article 36 of the Family Code
provides -
"A marriage contracted by any
party who, at the time of the
celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential
marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be
Page 8 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after
its solemnization."
Whether or not psychological
incapacity exists in a given
case calling for annulment of
a marriage, depends crucially,
more than in any field of the
law, on the facts of the case.
Each case must be judged, not
on the basis ofa
priori  assumptions,
predilections or
generalizations but according
to its own facts. In regard to
psychological incapacity as a
ground for annulment of
marriage, it is trite to say
that no case is on "all fours"
with another case. The trial
judge must take pains in
examining the factual milieu
and the appellate court must,
as much as possible, avoid
substituting its own judgment
for that of the trial court.18
In Republic v. Court of
Appeals and Molina,19  the Court
laid down the following
GUIDELINES in the
interpretation and application
of Article 36 of the Family
Code:
"(1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the
family. x x x
(2) The root cause  of the
psychological incapacity must
be: (a) medically or
clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts
and (d) clearly explained in
the decision. Article 36 of
the Family Code requires that
the incapacity must be
psychological - not physical,
although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person
could not have known the
obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit
the application of the
provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis (Salita vs.
Magtolis,  233 SCRA 100, June
13, 1994), nevertheless such
root cause must be identified
as a psychological illness and
its incapacitating nature
fully explained. Expert
evidence may be given by
qualified psychiatrists and
clinical psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at "the
time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was
existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do's." The
manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent
or incurable.  Such
incurability may be absolute
or even relative only in
regard to the other spouse,
not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same
Page 9 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
sex. Furthermore, such
incapacity must be relevant to
the assumption of marriage
obligations, not necessarily
to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of
a profession or employment in
a job. Hence, a pediatrician
may be effective in diagnosing
illnesses of children and
prescribing medicine to cure
them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to
procreate, bear and raise
his/her own children as an
essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must
be grave  enough to bring about
the disability of the party to
assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root  causes. The illness
must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less in will.
In other words, there is a
natal or supervening disabling
factor in the person, an
adverse integral element in
the personality structure that
effectively incapacitates the
person from really accepting
and thereby complying with the
obligations essential to
marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code20as
regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code21 in
regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x
(8) The trial court must order
the prosecuting attorney or
fiscal and the Solicitor
General to appear as counsel
for the state. No decision
shall be handed down unless
the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be
quoted in the decision,
briefly stating therein his
reasons for his agreement or
opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The
Solicitor-General, along with
the prosecuting attorney,
shall submit to the court such
certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the
case is deemed submitted for
resolution of the court. The
Solicitor-General shall
discharge the equivalent
function of the defensor
vinculicontemplated under
Canon 1095."22
Taking into consideration
these guidelines, it is
evident that Erlinda failed to
comply with the above-
mentioned evidentiary
requirements. Erlinda failed
to comply with guideline No. 2
which requires that the root
cause  of psychological
incapacity must be medically
or clinically identified and
sufficiently proven by
experts, since no psychiatrist
or medical doctor testified as
to the alleged psychological
incapacity of her husband.
Further, the allegation that
the husband is a fugitive from
Page 10 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
justice was not sufficiently (Art. II, Sec. 12, Art. XV,
proven. In fact, the crime for Secs. 1-2) Thus, any doubt
which he was arrested was not should be resolved in favor of
even alleged. The the validity of the marriage.
investigating prosecutor was (citing Republic of the
likewise not given an Philippines v. Court of
opportunity to present Appeals, supra.  )"24
controverting evidence since
the trial court's decision was WHEREFORE, the present
prematurely rendered. petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision of the Court
In the case of Hernandez v. of Appeals dated April 22,
Court of Appeals,23  we affirmed 1993, in CA-G.R. CY No. 34378
the dismissal of the trial is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
court and Court of Appeals of
the petition for annulment on No pronouncement as to costs.
the ground of dearth of the
evidence presented. We further SO ORDERED.
explained therein that -
"Moreover, expert testimony
should have been presented to
establish the precise cause of
private respondent's
psychological incapacity, if
any, in order to show that it
existed at the inception of
the marriage. The burden of
proof to show the nullity of
the marriage rests upon
petitioner. The Court is
mindful of the policy of the
1987 Constitution to protect
and strengthen the family as
the basic autonomous social
institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.
G.R. No. 179620             Petitioner Manuel G. Almelor
August 26, 2008
MANUEL G.
ALMELOR, petitioner,  1989 at the Manila
vs.
THE HON. REGIONAL TRIAL COURT
OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, BRANCH 254,
and LEONIDA T.
ALMELOR, respondents.
D E C I S I O N
REYES, R.T., J.:
MARRIAGE, in its totality,
involves the spouses' right to
the community of their whole
lives. It likewise involves a
true intertwining of
personalities.1
This is a petition for review
on certiorari of the
Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) denying the
petition for annulment of
judgment and affirming in
toto the decision of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Las Piñas, Branch 254. The CA
dismissed outright the Rule 47
petition for being the wrong
remedy.
The Facts
Page 11 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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(Manuel) and respondent
Leonida Trinidad (Leonida)
were married on January 29,
Cathedral.3 Their union bore
three children: (1) Maria
Paulina Corinne, born on
October 20, 1989; (2) Napoleon
Manuel, born on August 9,
1991; and (3) Manuel Homer,
born on July 4, 1994.4 Manuel
and Leonida are both medical
practitioners, an
anesthesiologist and a
pediatrician, respectively.5
After eleven (11) years of
marriage, Leonida filed a
petition with the RTC in Las
Piñas City to annul their
marriage on the ground that
Manuel was psychologically
incapacitated to perform his
marital obligations. The case,
docketed as LP-00-0132 was
raffled off to Branch 254.
During the trial, Leonida
testified that she first met
Manuel in 1981 at the San
Lazaro Hospital where they
worked as medical student
clerks. At that time, she
regarded Manuel as a very
thoughtful person who got
along well with other people.
They soon became sweethearts.
Three years after, they got
married.6
Leonida averred that Manuel's
kind and gentle demeanor did
not last long. In the public
eye, Manuel was the picture of
a perfect husband and father.
This was not the case in his
private life. At home, Leonida
described Manuel as a harsh
disciplinarian, unreasonably
meticulous, easily angered.
Manuel's unreasonable way of
imposing discipline on their
children was the cause of
their frequent fights as a
couple.7 Leonida complained
that this was in stark
contrast to the alleged lavish
affection Manuel has for his
mother. Manuel's deep
attachment to his mother and
his dependence on her
decision-making were
incomprehensible to Leonida.8
Further adding to her woes was
his concealment to her of his
homosexuality. Her suspicions
were first aroused when she
noticed Manuel's peculiar
closeness to his male
companions. For instance, she
caught him in an indiscreet
telephone conversation
manifesting his affection for
a male caller.9She also found
several pornographic
homosexual materials in his
possession.10 Her worse fears
were confirmed when she saw
Manuel kissed another man on
the lips. The man was a
certain Dr. Nogales.11 When she
confronted Manuel, he denied
everything. At this point,
Leonida took her children and
left their conjugal abode.
Since then, Manuel stopped
giving support to their
children.12
Dr. Valentina del Fonso
Garcia, a clinical
psychologist, was presented to
prove Leonida's claim. Dr. del
Fonso Garcia testified that
she conducted evaluative
interviews and a battery of
psychiatric tests on Leonida.
She also had a one-time
interview with Manuel and
face-to-face interviews with
Ma. Paulina Corrinne (the
eldest child).13 She concluded
that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated.14Such incapacity
is marked by antecedence; it
existed even before the
Page 12 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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marriage and appeared to be
incurable.
Manuel, for his part, admitted
that he and Leonida had some
petty arguments here and
there. He, however, maintained
that their marital
relationship was generally
harmonious. The petition for
annulment filed by Leonida
came as a surprise to him.
Manuel countered that the true
cause of Leonida's hostility
against him was their
professional rivalry. It began
when he refused to heed the
memorandum15 released by Christ
the King Hospital. The
memorandum ordered him to
desist from converting his own
lying-in clinic to a primary
or secondary
hospital.16 Leonida's family
owns Christ the King Hospital
which is situated in the same
subdivision as Manuel's clinic
and residence.17 In other
words, he and her family have
competing or rival hospitals
in the same vicinity.
Manuel belied her allegation
that he was a cruel father to
their children. He denied
maltreating them. At most, he
only imposed the necessary
discipline on the children.
He also defended his show of
affection for his mother. He
said there was nothing wrong
for him to return the love and
affection of the person who
reared and looked after him
and his siblings. This is
especially apt now that his
mother is in her twilight
years.18 Manuel pointed out
that Leonida found fault in
this otherwise healthy
relationship because of her
very jealous and possessive
nature.19
This same overly jealous
behavior of Leonida drove
Manuel to avoid the company of
female friends. He wanted to
avoid any further
misunderstanding with his
wife. But, Leonida instead
conjured up stories about his
sexual preference. She also
fabricated tales about
pornographic materials found
in his possession to cast
doubt on his masculinity.20
To corroborate his version, he
presented his brother, Jesus
G. Almelor. Jesus narrated
that he usually stayed at
Manuel's house during his
weekly trips to Manila from
Iriga City. He was a witness
to the generally harmonious
relationship between his
brother Manuel and sister-in-
law, Leonida. True, they had
some quarrels typical of a
husband and wife relationship.
But there was nothing similar
to what Leonida described in
her testimony.21
Jesus further testified that
he was with his brother on the
day Leonida allegedly saw
Manuel kissed another man. He
denied that such an incident
occurred. On that particular
date,22 he and Manuel went
straight home from a trip to
Bicol. There was no other
person with them at that time,
except their driver.23
Manuel expressed his intention
to refute Dr. del Fonso
Garcia's findings by
presenting his own expert
witness. However, no
psychiatrist was presented.
RTC Disposition
By decision dated November 25,
2005, the RTC granted the
Page 13 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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petition for annulment, with b. Directing the Local Civil
the following disposition: Registrars of Las Piñas City
and Manila City to cause the
WHEREFORE, premised on the registration of the said Entry
foregoing, judgment is hereby of Judgment in their
rendered: respective Books of Marriages.
1. Declaring the marriage Upon compliance, a decree of
contracted by herein parties nullity of marriage shall be
on 29 January 1989 and all its issued.
effects under the law null and
void from the beginning; SO ORDERED.24 (Emphasis
supplied)
2. Dissolving the regime of
community property between the The trial court nullified the
same parties with forfeiture marriage, not on the ground of
of defendant's share thereon Article 36, but Article 45 of
in favor of the same parties' the Family Code. It
children whose legal custody ratiocinated:
is awarded to plaintiff with
visitorial right afforded to x x x a careful
defendant; evaluation and in-depth
analysis of the
3. Ordering the defendant to surrounding circumstances
give monthly financial support of the allegations in the
to all the children; and complaint and of the
evidence presented in
4. Pursuant to the provisions support thereof (sic)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC: reveals that in this case
(sic) there is more than
a. Directing the Branch Clerk meets the eyes (sic).
of this Court to enter this
Judgment upon its finality in Both legally and
the Book of Entry of Judgment biologically,
and to issue an Entry of homosexuality x x x is,
Judgment in accordance indeed, generally
thereto; and incompatible with hetero
 sexual marriage. This is
reason enough that in
this jurisdiction (sic)
the law recognizes
marriage as a special
contract exclusively only
between a man and a woman
x x x and thus when
homosexuality has
trespassed into marriage,
the same law provides
ample remedies to correct
the situation [Article
45(3) in relation to
Article 46(4) or Article
55, par. 6, Family Code].
This is of course in
recognition of the
biological fact that no
matter how a man cheats
himself that he is not a
homosexual and forces
himself to live a normal
heterosexual life, there
will surely come a time
when his true sexual
preference as a
homosexual shall prevail
in haunting him and thus
jeopardizing the
solidity, honor, and
welfare of his own
family.25
Manuel filed a notice of
appeal which was, however,
denied due course. Undaunted,
Page 14 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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he filed a petition for It is obvious that the
annulment of judgment with the petitioner is questioning
CA.26 the propriety of the
decision rendered by the
Manuel contended that the lower Court. But the
assailed decision was issued remedy assuming there was
in excess of the lower court's a mistake is not a
jurisdiction; that it had no Petition for Annulment of
jurisdiction to dissolve the Judgment but an ordinary
absolute community of property appeal. An error of
and forfeit his conjugal share judgment may be reversed
in favor of his children. or corrected only by
appeal.
CA Disposition
What petitioner is
On July 31, 2007, the CA ascribing is an error of
denied the petition, disposing judgment, not of
as follows: jurisdiction, which is
properly the subject of
WHEREFORE, the present an ordinary appeal.
Petition for Annulment of
Judgment is hereby In short, petitioner
DENIED. The Court admits the jurisdiction
AFFIRMS in toto the of the lower court but he
Decision (dated November claims excess in the
25, 2005) of the Regional exercise thereof.
Trial Court (Branch 254), "Excess" assuming there
in Las Piñas City, in was is not covered by
Civil Case No. LP-00- Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules
0132. No costs.27 of Civil Procedure. The
Rule refers the lack of
The CA stated that petitioner jurisdiction and not the
pursued the wrong remedy by exercise thereof.28
filing the extraordinary
remedy of petition for Issues
annulment of judgment. Said
the appellate court:
Petitioner Manuel takes the
present recourse via Rule 45,
assigning to the CA the
following errors:
I I. The stringent rules of
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
TREATING THE PETITION FOR
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT AS
A PETITION FOR REVIEW IN
VIEW OF THE IMPORTANCE OF
THE ISSUES INVOLVED AND
IN THE INTEREST OF
JUSTICE;
II
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER
DECLARING THE MARRIAGE AS
NULL AND VOID ON THE
GROUND OF PETITIONER'S
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY;
III
THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN
UPHOLDING THE DECISION OF
THE TRIAL COURT AS
REGARDS THE ORDER TO
FORFEIT THE SHARE OF
Page 15 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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PETITIONER IN HIS SHARE
OF THE CONJUGAL ASSETS.29
Our Ruling
procedures may be relaxed to
serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the
Court's exercise of equity
jurisdiction.
Generally, an appeal taken
either to the Supreme Court or
the CA by the wrong or
inappropriate mode shall be
dismissed.30 This is to prevent
the party from benefiting from
one's neglect and
mistakes. However, like most
rules, it carries certain
exceptions. After all, the
ultimate purpose of all rules
of procedures is to achieve
substantial justice as
expeditiously as possible.31
Annulment of judgment under
Rule 47 is a last remedy. It
can not be resorted to if the
ordinary remedies are
available or no longer
available through no fault of
petitioner.32 However,
in Buenaflor v. Court of
Appeals,33 this Court clarified
the proper appreciation for
technical rules of procedure,
in this wise:
Rules of procedures are
intended to promote, not to
defeat, substantial justice
and, therefore, they should
not be applied in a very rigid
and technical sense. The
exception is that while the
Rules are liberally construed,
the provisions with respect to
the rules on the manner and
periods for perfecting appeals
are strictly applied. As an
exception to the exception,
these rules have sometimes
been relaxed on equitable
considerations. Also, in some
cases the Supreme Court has
given due course to an appeal
perfected out of time where a
stringent application of the
rules would have denied it,
but only when to do so would
serve the demands of
substantial justice and in the
exercise of equity
jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court.34(Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For reasons of justice and
equity, this Court has allowed
exceptions to the stringent
rules governing appeals.35 It
has, in the past, refused to
sacrifice justice for
technicality.36
After discovering the palpable
error of his petition, Manuel
seeks the indulgence of this
Court to consider his petition
before the CA instead as a
petition for certiorari under
Rule 65.
A perusal of the said petition
reveals that Manuel imputed
grave abuse of discretion to
the lower court for annulling
his marriage on account of his
alleged homosexuality. This is
not the first time that this
Court is faced with a similar
situation. In Nerves v. Civil
Service
Commission,37 petitioner Delia
R. Nerves elevated to the CA a
Civil Service Commission (CSC)
decision suspending her for
six (6) months. The CSC ruled
Nerves, a public school
teacher, is deemed to have
already served her six-month
suspension during
the pendency of the case.
Nevertheless, she is ordered
reinstated without back wages.
On appeal, Nerves stated in
her petition, inter alia:
Page 16 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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1. This is a petition
for certiorari filed pursuant
to Article IX-A, Section 7 of
the Constitution of the
Philippines and under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court.
2. But per Supreme Court
Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 (Revised
Circular No. 1-91) petitioner
is filing the instant petition
with this Honorable Court
instead of the Supreme
Court.38(Underscoring supplied)
The CA dismissed Nerves'
petition for certiorari for
being the wrong remedy or the
inappropriate mode of
appeal.39 The CA opined that
"under the Supreme Court
Revised Administrative
Circular No. 1-95 x x x
appeals from judgments or
final orders or resolutions of
CSC is by a petition for
review."40
This Court granted Nerves
petition and held that she had
substantially complied with
the Administrative Circular.
The Court stated:
That it was erroneously
labeled as a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court is only
a minor procedural lapse, not
fatal to the appeal. x x x
More importantly, the appeal
on its face appears to be
impressed with merit. Hence,
the Court of Appeals should
have overlooked the
insubstantial defects of the
petition x x x in order to do
justice to the parties
concerned. There is, indeed,
nothing sacrosanct about
procedural rules, which should
be liberally construed in
order to promote their object
and assist the parties in
obtaining just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of
every action or proceeding. As
it has been said, where the
rigid application of the rules
would frustrate substantial
justice, or bar the
vindication of a legitimate
grievance, the courts are
justified in exempting a
particular case from the
operation of the
rules.41 (Underscoring
supplied)
Similarly, in the more recent
case of Tan v.
Dumarpa,42 petitioner Joy G.
Tan availed of a wrong remedy
by filing a petition for
review on certiorari instead
of a motion for new trial or
an ordinary appeal. In the
interest of justice, this
Court considered the
petition, pro hac vice, as a
petition forcertiorari under
Rule 65.
This Court found that based on
Tan's allegations, the trial
court prima facie committed
grave abuse of discretion in
rendering a judgment by
default. If uncorrected, it
will cause petitioner great
injustice. The Court
elucidated in this wise:
Indeed, where as here, there
is a strong showing that grave
miscarriage of justice would
result from the strict
application of the Rules, we
will not hesitate to relax the
same in the interest of
substantial
justice.43 (Underscoring
supplied)
Measured by the foregoing
yardstick, justice will be
better served by giving due
course to the present petition
and treating petitioner's CA
Page 17 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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petition as one
for certiorari under Rule 65,
considering that what is at
stake is the validity or non-
validity of a marriage.
In Salazar v. Court of
Appeals,44 citing Labad v.
University of Southeastern
Philippines, this Court
reiterated:
x x x The dismissal of appeals
on purely technical grounds is
frowned upon. While the right
to appeal is a statutory, not
a natural right, nonetheless
it is an essential part of our
judicial system and courts
should proceed with caution so
as not to deprive a party of
the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every
party-litigant has the amplest
opportunity for the proper and
just disposition of his cause,
free from the constraints of
technicalities.45
Indeed, it is far better and
more prudent for a court to
excuse a technical lapse and
afford the parties a review of
the case on the merits to
attain the ends of justice.46
Furthermore, it was the
negligence and incompetence of
Manuel's counsel that
prejudiced his right to
appeal. His counsel, Atty.
Christine Dugenio, repeatedly
availed of inappropriate
remedies. After the denial of
her notice of appeal, she
failed to move for
reconsideration or new trial
at the first instance. She
also erroneously filed a
petition for annulment of
judgment rather than pursue an
ordinary appeal.
These manifest errors were
clearly indicative of
counsel's incompetence. These
gravely worked to the
detriment of Manuel's appeal.
True it is that the negligence
of counsel binds the client.
Still, this Court has
recognized certain exceptions:
(1) where reckless or gross
negligence of counsel deprives
the client of due process of
law; (2) when its application
will result in outright
deprivation of the client's
liberty and property; or (3)
where the interest of justice
so require.47
The negligence of Manuel's
counsel falls under the
exceptions. Ultimately, the
reckless or gross negligence
of petitioner's former counsel
led to the loss of his right
to appeal. He should not be
made to suffer for his
counsel's grave mistakes.
Higher interests of justice
and equity demand that he be
allowed to ventilate his case
in a higher court.
In Apex Mining, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals,48 this Court
explained thus:
It is settled that the
negligence of counsel binds
the client. This is based on
the rule that any act
performed by a counsel within
the scope of his general or
implied authority is regarded
as an act of his client.
However, where counsel is
guilty of gross ignorance,
negligence and dereliction of
duty, which resulted in the
client's being held liable for
damages in a damage suit, the
client is deprived of his day
in court and the judgment may
be set aside on such ground.
In the instant case, higher
interests of justice and
Page 18 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
equity demand that petitioners
be allowed to present evidence
on their defense. Petitioners
may not be made to suffer for
the lawyer's mistakes. This
Court will always be disposed
to grant relief to parties
aggrieved by perfidy, fraud,
reckless inattention and
downright incompetence of
lawyers, which has the
consequence of depriving their
clients, of their day in
court.49 (Emphasis supplied)
Clearly, this Court has the
power to except a particular
case from the operation of the
rule whenever the demands of
justice require it. With more
conviction should it wield
such power in a case involving
the sacrosanct institution of
marriage. This Court is guided
with the thrust of giving a
party the fullest opportunity
to establish the merits of
one's action.50
The client was likewise spared
from counsel's negligence
in Government Service
Insurance System v. Bengson
Commercial Buildings,
Inc.51 and Ancheta v. Guersey-
Dalaygon.52 Said the Court in
Bengson:
But if under the circumstances
of the case, the rule deserts
its proper office as an aid to
justice and becomes a great
hindrance and chief enemy, its
rigors must be relaxed to
admit exceptions thereto and
to prevent a miscarriage of
justice. In other words, the
court has the power to except
a particular case from the
operation of the rule whenever
the purposes of justice
require it.53
II. Concealment of
homosexuality is the proper
ground to annul a marriage,
not homosexuality per se.
Manuel is a desperate man
determined to salvage what
remains of his marriage.
Persistent in his quest, he
fought back all the heavy
accusations of incapacity,
cruelty, and doubted
masculinity thrown at him.
The trial court declared that
Leonida's petition for nullity
had "no basis at all because
the supporting grounds relied
upon can not legally make a
case under Article 36 of the
Family Code." It went further
by citing Republic v. Molina:54
 Indeed, mere allegations
of conflicting
personalities,
irreconcilable
differences, incessant
quarrels and/or beatings,
unpredictable mood
swings, infidelities,
vices, abandonment, and
difficulty, neglect, or
failure in the
performance of some
marital obligations do
not suffice to establish
psychological
incapacity.55
If so, the lower court should
have dismissed outright the
petition for not meeting the
guidelines set in Molina. What
Leonida attempted to
demonstrate were
Manuel's homosexual
tendencies by citing overt
acts generally predominant
among homosexual
individuals.56 She wanted to
prove that the perceived
homosexuality rendered Manuel
incapable of fulfilling the
essential marital obligations.
But instead of dismissing the
petition, the trial
court nullified the marriage
between Manuel and Leonida on
Page 19 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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the ground of vitiated consent
by virtue of fraud. In support
of its conclusion, the lower
court reasoned out:
As insinuated by the State (p.
75, TSN, 15 December 2003),
when there is smoke surely
there is fire. Although
vehemently denied by
defendant, there is
preponderant evidence enough
to establish with certainty
that defendant is really a
homosexual. This is the fact
that can bededuced from the
totality of the marriage life
scenario of herein parties.
Before his marriage, defendant
knew very well that people
around him even including his
own close friends doubted his
true sexual preference (TSN,
pp. 35-36, 13 December 2000;
pp. 73-75, 15 December 2003).
After receiving many
forewarnings, plaintiff told
defendant about the rumor she
heard but defendant did not do
anything to prove to the whole
world once and for all the
truth of all his denials.
Defendant threatened to sue
those people but nothing
happened after that. There may
have been more important
matters to attend to than to
waste time and effort filing
cases against and be effected
by these people and so,
putting more premiums on
defendant's denials, plaintiff
just the same married him.
Reasons upon reasons may be
advanced to either exculpate
or nail to the cross defendant
for his act of initially
concealing his homosexuality
to plaintiff, but in the end,
only one thing is certain -
even during his marriage with
plaintiff, the smoke of doubt
about his real preference
continued and even got
thicker, reason why obviously
defendant failed to establish
a happy and solid family; and
in so failing, plaintiff and
their children became his
innocent and unwilling
victims.
Yes, there is nothing untoward
of a man if, like herein
defendant, he is meticulous
over even small details in the
house (sic) like wrongly
folded bed sheets, etc. or if
a man is more authoritative in
knowing what clothes or
jewelry shall fit his wife
(pp. 77-81, TSN, 15 December
2003); but these admissions of
defendant taken in the light
of evidence presented
apparently showing that he had
extra fondness of his male
friends (sic) to the extent
that twice on separate
occasions (pp. 4-7, TSN, 14
February 2001) he was
allegedly seen by plaintiff
kissing another man lips-to-
lips plus the homosexual
magazines and tapes likewise
allegedly discovered
underneath his bed (Exhibits
"L" and "M"), the doubt as to
his real sex identity becomes
stronger. The accusation of
plaintiff versus thereof of
defendant may be the name of
the game in this case; but the
simple reason of professional
rivalry advanced by the
defendant is certainly not
enough to justify and obscure
the question why plaintiff
should accuse him of such a
very untoward infidelity at
the expense and humiliation of
their children and family as a
whole.57
Evidently, no sufficient proof
was presented to substantiate
the allegations that Manuel is
a homosexual and that he
concealed this to Leonida at
the time of their marriage.
Page 20 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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The lower court considered the
public perception of Manuel's
sexual preference without the
corroboration of witnesses.
Also, it took cognizance of
Manuel's peculiarities and
interpreted it against his
sexuality.
Even assuming, ex gratia
argumenti, that Manuel is a
homosexual, the lower court
cannot appreciate it as a
ground to annul his marriage
with Leonida. The law is clear
- a marriage may be annulled
when the consent of either
party was obtained by
fraud,58 such as concealment of
homosexuality.59Nowhere in the
said decision was it proven by
preponderance of evidence that
Manuel was a homosexual at the
onset of his marriage and that
he deliberately hid such fact
to his wife.60 It is the
concealment of homosexuality,
and not homosexuality per se,
that vitiates the consent of
the innocent party. Such
concealment presupposes bad
faith and intent to defraud
the other party in giving
consent to the marriage.
Consent is an essential
requisite of a valid marriage.
To be valid, it must be freely
given by both parties. An
allegation of vitiated consent
must be proven by
preponderance of evidence. The
Family Code has enumerated an
exclusive list of
circumstances61 constituting
fraud. Homosexuality per se is
not among those cited, but its
concealment.
This distinction becomes more
apparent when we go over the
deliberations62 of the
Committees on the Civil Code
and Family Law, to wit:
Justice Caguioa remarked that
this ground should be
eliminated in the provision on
the grounds for legal
separation. Dean Gupit,
however, pointed out that in
Article 46, they are talking
only of "concealment," while
in the article on legal
separation, there is
actuality. Judge Diy added
that in legal separation, the
ground existed after the
marriage, while in Article 46,
the ground existed at the time
of the marriage. Justice Reyes
suggested that, for clarity,
they add the phrase "existing
at the time of the marriage"
at the end of subparagraph
(4). The Committee approved
the suggestion.63
To reiterate,
homosexuality per se is only a
ground for legal separation.
It is its concealment that
serves as a valid ground to
annul a marriage.64 Concealment
in this case is not simply a
blanket denial, but one that
is constitutive of fraud. It
is this fundamental element
that respondent failed to
prove.
In the United States,
homosexuality has been
considered as a basis for
divorce. It indicates that
questions of sexual identity
strike so deeply at one of the
basic elements of marriage,
which is the exclusive sexual
bond between the
spouses.65 In Crutcher v.
Crutcher,66 the Court held:
Unnatural practices of the
kind charged here are an
infamous indignity to the
wife, and which would make the
marriage relation so revolting
to her that it would become
impossible for her to
discharge the duties of a
Page 21 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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wife, and would defeat the
whole purpose of the relation.
In the natural course of
things, they would cause
mental suffering to the extent
of affecting her health.67
However, although there may be
similar sentiments here in the
Philippines, the legal
overtones are significantly
different. Divorce is not
recognized in the country.
Homosexuality and its alleged
incompatibility to a healthy
heterosexual life are not
sanctioned as grounds to sever
the marriage bond in our
jurisdiction. At most, it is
only a ground to separate from
bed and board.
What was proven in the
hearings a quo was a
relatively blissful marital
union for more than eleven
(11) years, which produced
three (3) children. The burden
of proof to show the nullity
of the marriage rests on
Leonida. Sadly, she failed to
discharge this onus.
The same failure to prove
fraud which purportedly
resulted to a vitiated marital
consent was found inVillanueva
v. Court of
Appeals.68 In Villanueva,
instead of proving vitiation
of consent, appellant resorted
to baseless portrayals of his
wife as a perpetrator of
fraudulent schemes. Said the
Court:
Factual findings of the Court
of Appeals, especially if they
coincide with those of the
trial court, as in the instant
case, are generally binding on
this Court. We affirm the
findings of the Court of
Appeals that petitioner freely
and voluntarily married
private respondent and that no
threats or intimidation,
duress or violence compelled
him to do so, thus -
Appellant anchored his prayer
for the annulment of his
marriage on the ground that he
did not freely consent to be
married to the appellee. He
cited several incidents that
created on his mind a
reasonable and well-grounded
fear of an imminent and grave
danger to his life and safety.
x x x
The Court is not convinced
that appellant's apprehension
of danger to his person is so
overwhelming as to deprive him
of the will to enter
voluntarily to a contract of
marriage. It is not disputed
that at the time he was
allegedly being harassed,
appellant worked as a security
guard in a bank. Given the
rudiments of self-defense, or,
at the very least, the proper
way to keep himself out of
harm's way. x x x
Appellant also invoked
fraud to annul his
marriage, as he was made
to believe by appellee
that the latter was
pregnant with his child
when they were married.
Appellant's excuse that
he could not have
impregnated the appellee
because he did not have
an erection during their
tryst is flimsy at best,
and an outright lie at
worst. The complaint is
bereft of any reference
to his inability to
copulate with the
appellee. x x x
x x x x
Page 22 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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x x x The failure to institutions against
cohabit becomes relevant desecration by fabricated
only if it arises as a evidence.71 Thus, any doubt
result of the should be resolved in favor of
perpetration of any of the validity of marriage.
the grounds for annulling
the marriage, such as III. In a valid marriage, the
lack of parental consent, husband and wife jointly
insanity, fraud, administer and enjoy their
intimidation, or undue community or conjugal
influence x x x. Since property.
the appellant failed to
justify his failure to Article 96 of the Family Code,
cohabit with the appellee on regimes of absolute
on any of these grounds, community property, provides:
the validity of his
marriage must be upheld.69 Art. 96. The
administration and
Verily, the lower court enjoyment of the
committed grave abuse of community property shall
discretion, not only by solely belong to both spouses
taking into account jointly. In case of
petitioner's homosexuality per disagreement, the
se and not its concealment, husband's decision shall
but by declaring the marriage prevail, subject to
void from its existence. recourse to the court by
the wife for a proper
This Court is mindful of the remedy, which must be
constitutional policy to availed of within five
protect and strengthen the years from the date of
family as the basicautonomous the contract implementing
social institution and such decision.
marriage as the foundation of
the family.70 The State and the In the event that one
public have vital interest in spouse is incapacitated
the maintenance and or otherwise unable to
preservation of these social participate in the
 administration of the
common properties, the
other spouse may assume
sole powers of
administration. These
powers do not include the
powers of disposition or
encumbrance without the
authority of the court or
the written consent of
the other spouse. In the
absence of such authority
or consent, the
disposition or
encumbrance shall be
void. However, the
transaction shall be
construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the
consenting spouse and the
third person, and may be
perfected as a binding
contract upon the
acceptance by the other
spouse or authorization
by the court before the
offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
A similar provision, Article
12472 prescribes joint
administration and enjoyment
in a regime of conjugal
partnership. In a valid
marriage, both spouses
exercise administration and
Page 23 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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enjoyment of the property
regime, jointly.
In the case under review, the
RTC decreed a dissolution of
the community property of
Manuel and Leonida. In the
same breath, the trial court
forfeited Manuel's share in
favor of the children.
Considering that the marriage
is upheld valid and
subsisting, the dissolution
and forfeiture of Manuel's
share in the property regime
is unwarranted. They remain
the joint administrators of
the community property.
WHEREFORE, the petition
is GRANTED. The appealed
Decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDEand the petition in the
trial court to annul the
marriage is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 174451               Mindoro, the hometown of
October 13, 2009
VERONICA CABACUNGAN
ALCAZAR, Petitioner,  did not live with petitioner
vs.
REY C. ALCAZAR, Respondent.
This Petition for Review on
Certiorari seeks to reverse
the Decision1 dated 24 May 2006
of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 84471, affirming
the Decision dated 9 June 2004
of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos City, Branch
85, in Civil Case No. 664-M-
2002, which dismissed
petitioner Veronica Cabacungan
Alcazar’s Complaint for the
annulment of her marriage to
respondent Rey C. Alcazar.
The Complaint,2 docketed as
Civil Case No. 664-M-2002, was
filed by petitioner before the
RTC on 22 August 2002.
Petitioner alleged in her
Complaint that she was married
to respondent on 11 October
2000 by Rev. Augusto G.
Pabustan (Pabustan), at the
latter’s residence. After
their wedding, petitioner and
respondent lived for five days
in San Jose, Occidental
Page 24 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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respondent’s parents.
Thereafter, the newlyweds went
back to Manila, but respondent
at the latter’s abode at
2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila. On 23
October 2000, respondent left
for Riyadh, Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, where he worked as an
upholsterer in a furniture
shop. While working in Riyadh,
respondent did not communicate
with petitioner by phone or by
letter. Petitioner tried to
call respondent for five times
but respondent never answered.
About a year and a half after
respondent left for Riyadh, a
co-teacher informed petitioner
that respondent was about to
come home to the Philippines.
Petitioner was surprised why
she was not advised by
respondent of his arrival.
Petitioner further averred in
her Complaint that when
respondent arrived in the
Philippines, the latter did
not go home to petitioner at
2601-C Jose Abad Santos
Avenue, Tondo, Manila.
Instead, respondent proceeded
to his parents’ house in San
Jose, Occidental Mindoro. Upon
learning that respondent was
in San Jose, Occidental
Mindoro, petitioner went to
see her brother-in-law in
Velasquez St., Tondo, Manila,
who claimed that he was not
aware of respondent’s
whereabouts. Petitioner
traveled to San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, where she
was informed that respondent
had been living with his
parents since his arrival in
March 2002.
Petitioner asserted that from
the time respondent arrived in
the Philippines, he never
contacted her. Thus,
petitioner concluded that
respondent was physically
incapable of consummating his
marriage with her, providing
sufficient cause for annulment
of their marriage pursuant to
paragraph 5, Article 45 of the
Family Code of the Philippines
(Family Code). There was also
no more possibility of
reconciliation between
petitioner and respondent.
Per the Sheriff’s
Return3 dated 3 October 2002, a
summons, together with a copy
of petitioner’s Complaint,
was served upon respondent on
30 September 2002.4
On 18 November 2002,
petitioner, through counsel,
filed a Motion5 to direct the
public prosecutor to conduct
an investigation of the case
pursuant to Article 48 of the
Family Code.
As respondent did not file an
Answer, the RTC issued on 27
November 2002 an
Order6 directing the public
prosecutor to conduct an
investigation to ensure that
no collusion existed between
the parties; to submit a
report thereon; and to appear
in all stages of the
proceedings to see to it that
evidence was not fabricated or
suppressed.
On 4 March 2003, Public
Prosecutrix Veronica A.V. de
Guzman (De Guzman) submitted
her Report manifesting that
she had conducted an
investigation of the case of
petitioner and respondent in
January 2003, but respondent
never participated therein.
Public Prosecutrix De Guzman
also noted that no collusion
Page 25 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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took place between the
parties, and measures were
taken to prevent suppression
of evidence between them. She
then recommended that a full-
blown trial be conducted to
determine whether
petitioner’s Complaint was
meritorious or not.
Pre-trial was held and
terminated on 20 May 2003.
On 21 May 2003, the RTC
received the Notice of
Appearance of the Solicitor
General.
Trial on the merits ensued
thereafter.
During trial, petitioner
presented herself, her mother
Lolita Cabacungan
(Cabacungan), and clinical
psychologist Nedy L. Tayag
(Tayag) as witnesses.
Petitioner first took the
witness stand and elaborated
on the allegations in her
Complaint. Cabacungan
corroborated petitioner’s
testimony.
Petitioner’s third witness,
Tayag, presented the following
psychological evaluation of
petitioner and respondent:
After meticulous scrutiny and
careful analysis of the
collected data, petitioner is
found to be free from any
underlying personality
aberration neither (sic) of
any serious psychopathological
traits, which may possibly
impede her normal functioning
(sic) of marriage. On the
other hand, the undersigned
arrived to (sic) a firm
opinion that the sudden
breakdown of marital life
between petitioner and
respondent was clearly due to
the diagnosed personality
disorder that the respondent
is harboring, making him
psychologically incapacitated
to properly assume and comply
[with] essential roles (sic)
of obligations as a married
man.
The pattern of behaviors
displayed by the respondent
satisfies the diagnostic
criteria of a disorder
clinically classified as
Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, a condition deemed
to be grave, severe, long
lasting in proportion and
incurable by any treatment.
People suffering from
Narcissistic Personality
Disorder are known to have a
pervasive pattern of
grandiosity (in fantasy or
behavior), need for
admiration, and lack of
empathy, beginning by early
adulthood and present in a
variety of contexts, as
indicated by five (or more) of
the following:
1. has a grandiose of self-
importance (e.g. exaggerates
achievements and talents,
expect to be recognized as
superior without commensurate
achievements)
2. is preoccupied with
fantasies of unlimited
success, power, brilliance,
beauty or ideal love3.
believes that he or she is
"special" and unique and can
only be understood by, or
should associate with, other
special or high status people
(institutions)
4. requires excessive
admiration
Page 26 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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5. has sense of entitlement,
i.e., unreasonable
expectations of especially
favorable treatment or
automatic compliance with his
or her expectations
6. is interpersonally
exploitative, i.e., takes
advantage of others to achieve
his or her own ends
7. lacks empathy: is unwilling
to recognize or identify with
the feelings and needs of
others
8. is often envious of others
or believes that others are
envious of him or her
9. shows arrogant, haughty
behavior or attitudes.
The root cause of
respondent’s personality
disorder can be attributed to
his early childhood years with
predisposing psychosocial
factors that influence[d] his
development. It was recounted
that respondent is the first
child of his mother’s second
family. Obviously, unhealthy
familial constellation
composed his immediate
environment in his growing up
years. Respondent had
undergone a severe longing for
attention from his father who
had been unfaithful to them
and had died early in life,
that he was left alone to fend
for the family needs. More so
that they were coping against
poverty, his caregivers failed
to validate his needs, wishes
or responses and overlooked
the love and attention he
yearned which led to develop a
pathological need for self-
object to help him maintain a
cohesive sense of self-such so
great that everything other
people offer is "consumed."
Hence, he is unable to develop
relationship with other (sic)
beyond this need. There is no
capacity for empathy sharing,
or loving others.
The psychological incapacity
of the respondent is
characterized by juridical
antecedence as it already
existed long before he entered
into marriage. Since it
already started early in life,
it is deeply engrained within
his system and becomes a[n]
integral part of his
personality structure, thereby
rendering such to be permanent
and incurable.7
Tayag concluded in the end
that:
As such, their marriage is
already beyond repair,
considering the fact that it
has long been (sic) ceased to
exist and have their different
life priorities.
Reconciliation between them is
regarded to be (sic). The
essential obligations of love,
trust, respect, fidelity,
authentic cohabitation as
husband and wife, mutual help
and support, and commitment,
did not and will no lon[g]er
exist between them. With due
consideration of the above-
mentioned findings, the
undersigned recommends, the
declaration of nullity of
marriage between petitioner
and respondent.8
On 18 February 2004,
petitioner filed her Formal
Offer of Evidence. Public
Prosecutrix Myrna S. Lagrosa
(Lagrosa), who replaced Public
Prosecutrix De Guzman,
interposed no objection to the
admission of petitioner’s
evidence and manifested that
she would no longer present
evidence for the State.
Page 27 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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On 9 June 2004, the RTC
rendered its Decision denying
petitioner’s Complaint for
annulment of her marriage to
respondent, holding in
substance that:
In the case at bar, the Court
finds that the acts of the
respondent in not
communicating with petitioner
and not living with the latter
the moment he returned home
from Saudi Arabia despite
their marriage do (sic) not
lead to a conclusion of
psychological incapacity on
his part. There is absolutely
no showing that his "defects"
were already present at the
inception of their marriage or
that these are incurable.
That being the case, the Court
resolves to deny the instant
petition.
WHEREFORE, premises
considered, the Petition for
Annulment of Marriage is
hereby DENIED.9
Petitioner filed a Motion for
Reconsideration10 but it was
denied by the RTC in an
Order11 dated 19 August 2004.
Aggrieved, petitioner filed an
appeal with the Court of
Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CV No. 84471. In a
Decision12 dated 24 May 2006,
the Court of Appeals affirmed
the RTC Decision dated 9 June
2004. The Court of Appeals
ruled that the RTC did not err
in finding that petitioner
failed to prove respondent’s
psychological incapacity.
Other than petitioner’s bare
allegations, no other evidence
was presented to prove
respondent’s personality
disorder that made him
completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of
the marital state. Citing
Republic v. Court of
Appeals,13 the appellate court
ruled that the evidence should
be able to establish that at
least one of the spouses was
mentally or physically ill to
such an extent that said
person could not have known
the marital obligations to be
assumed; or knowing the
marital obligations, could not
have validly assumed the same.
At most, respondent’s
abandonment of petitioner
could be a ground for legal
separation under Article 5 of
the Family Code.1avvphi1
Petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration was denied by
the Court of Appeals in a
Resolution14 dated 28 August
2008.
Hence, this Petition raising
the sole issue of:
WHETHER OR NOT, AS DEFINED BY
THE LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE,
RESPONDENT IS PSYCHOLOGICALLY
INCAPACITATED TO PERFORM THE
ESSENTIAL MARITAL OBLIGATONS.15
At the outset, it must be
noted that the Complaint
originally filed by petitioner
before the RTC was for
annulment of marriage based on
Article 45, paragraph 5 of the
Family Code, which reads:
ART. 45. A marriage may be
annulled for any of the
following causes, existing at
the time of the marriage:
x x x x
(5) That either party was
physically incapable of
consummating the marriage with
the other, and such incapacity
continues and appears to be
incurable; x x x.
Page 28 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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Article 45(5) of the Family
Code refers to lack of power
to copulate.16 Incapacity to
consummate denotes the
permanent inability on the
part of the spouses to perform
the complete act of sexual
intercourse.17 Non-consummation
of a marriage may be on the
part of the husband or of the
wife and may be caused by a
physical or structural defect
in the anatomy of one of the
parties or it may be due to
chronic illness and
inhibitions or fears arising
in whole or in part from
psychophysical conditions. It
may be caused by psychogenic
causes, where such mental
block or disturbance has the
result of making the spouse
physically incapable of
performing the marriage act.18
No evidence was presented in
the case at bar to establish
that respondent was in any way
physically incapable to
consummate his marriage with
petitioner. Petitioner even
admitted during her cross-
examination that she and
respondent had sexual
intercourse after their
wedding and before respondent
left for abroad. There
obviously being no physical
incapacity on respondent’s
part, then, there is no ground
for annulling petitioner’s
marriage to respondent.
Petitioner’s Complaint was,
therefore, rightfully
dismissed.
One curious thing, though,
caught this Court’s
attention. As can be gleaned
from the evidence presented by
petitioner and the
observations of the RTC and
the Court of Appeals, it
appears that petitioner was
actually seeking the
declaration of nullity of her
marriage to respondent based
on the latter’s psychological
incapacity to comply with his
marital obligations of
marriage under Article 36 of
the Family Code.
Petitioner attributes the
filing of the erroneous
Complaint before the RTC to
her former counsel’s mistake
or gross ignorance.19 But even
said reason cannot save
petitioner’s Complaint from
dismissal. It is settled in
this jurisdiction that the
client is bound by the acts,
even mistakes, of the counsel
in the realm of procedural
technique.20 Although this rule
is not a hard and fast one and
admits of exceptions, such as
where the mistake of counsel
is so gross, palpable and
inexcusable as to result in
the violation of his client’s
substantive rights,21petitioner
failed to convince us that
such exceptional circumstances
exist herein.
Assuming for the sake of
argument that we can treat the
Complaint as one for
declaration of nullity based
on Article 36 of the Family
Code, we will still dismiss
the Complaint for lack of
merit, consistent with the
evidence presented by
petitioner during the trial.
Article 36 of the Family Code
provides:
ART. 36. A marriage contracted
by any party who, at the time
of the celebration, was
psychologically incapacitated
to comply with the essential
marital obligations of
marriage, shall likewise be
void even if such incapacity
becomes manifest only after
its solemnization.
Page 29 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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In Santos v. Court of
Appeals,22 the Court declared
that "psychological
incapacity" under Article 36
of the Family Code is not
meant to comprehend all
possible cases of psychoses.
It should refer, rather, to no
less than amental (not
physical) incapacity that
causes a party to be truly
incognitive of the basic
marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties
to the marriage. Psychological
incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity,
(b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability.23
The Court laid down the
guidelines in resolving
petitions for declaration of
nullity of marriage, based on
Article 36 of the Family Code,
in Republic v. Court of
Appeals,24 to wit:
(1) The burden of proof to
show the nullity of the
marriage belongs to the
plaintiff. Any doubt should be
resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of
the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This
is rooted in the fact that
both our Constitution and our
laws cherish the validity of
marriage and unity of the
family. Thus, our Constitution
devotes an entire Article on
the Family, recognizing it "as
the foundation of the nation."
It decrees marriage as legally
"inviolable," thereby
protecting it from dissolution
at the whim of the parties.
Both the family and marriage
are to be "protected" by the
state.
The Family Code echoes this
constitutional edict on
marriage and the family and
emphasizes their permanence,
inviolability and solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the
psychological incapacity must
be a) medically or clinically
identified, b) alleged in the
complaint, c) sufficiently
proven by experts and d)
clearly explained in the
decision. Article 36 of the
Family Code requires that the
incapacity must be
psychological – not physical,
although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be
physical. The evidence must
convince the court that the
parties, or one of them, was
mentally or psychically ill to
such an extent that the person
could not have known the
obligations he was assuming,
or knowing them, could not
have given valid assumption
thereof. Although no example
of such incapacity need be
given here so as not to limit
the application of the
provision under the principle
ofejusdem generis,
nevertheless such root cause
must be identified as a
psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully
explained. Expert evidence may
be given by qualified
psychiatrists and clinical
psychologists.
(3) The incapacity must be
proven to be existing at the
"time of the celebration" of
the marriage. The evidence
must show that the illness was
existing when the parties
exchanged their "I do’s." The
manifestation of the illness
need not be perceivable at
such time, but the illness
itself must have attached at
such moment, or prior thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also
be shown to be medically or
Page 30 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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clinically permanent or
incurable. Such incurability
may be absolute or even
relative only in regard to the
other spouse, not necessarily
absolutely against everyone of
the same sex. Furthermore,
such incapacity must be
relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not
necessarily to those not
related to marriage, like the
exercise of a profession or
employment in a job. Hence, a
pediatrician may be effective
in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing
medicine to cure them but may
not be psychologically
capacitated to procreate, bear
and raise his/her own children
as an essential obligation of
marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave
enough to bring about the
disability of the party to
assume the essential
obligations of marriage. Thus,
"mild characteriological
peculiarities, mood changes,
occasional emotional
outbursts" cannot be accepted
as root causes. The illness
must be shown as downright
incapacity or inability, not a
refusal, neglect or
difficulty, much less ill
will. In other words, there is
a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral
element in the personality
structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from
really accepting and thereby
complying with the obligations
essential to marriage.
(6) The essential marital
obligations must be those
embraced by Articles 68 up to
71 of the Family Code as
regards the husband and wife
as well as Articles 220, 221
and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their
children. Such non-complied
marital obligation(s) must
also be stated in the
petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of
the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by
the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the
Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not
controlling or decisive,
should be given great respect
by our courts. x x x.
Being accordingly guided by
the aforequoted pronouncements
in Republic v. Court of
Appeals, we scrutinized the
totality of evidence presented
by petitioner and found that
the same was not enough to
sustain a finding that
respondent was psychologically
incapacitated.
Petitioner’s evidence,
particularly her and her
mother’s testimonies, merely
established that respondent
left petitioner soon after
their wedding to work in Saudi
Arabia; that when respondent
returned to the Philippines a
year and a half later, he
directly went to live with his
parents in San Jose,
Occidental Mindoro, and not
with petitioner in Tondo,
Manila; and that respondent
also did not contact
petitioner at all since
leaving for abroad. These
testimonies though do not give
us much insight into
respondent’s psychological
state.
Tayag’s psychological report
leaves much to be desired and
hardly helps petitioner’s
cause. It must be noted that
Page 31 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
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Tayag was not able to
personally examine respondent.
Respondent did not appear for
examination despite Tayag’s
invitation.25 Tayag, in
evaluating respondent’s
psychological state, had to
rely on information provided
by petitioner. Hence, we
expect Tayag to have been more
prudent and thorough in her
evaluation of respondent’s
psychological condition, since
her source of information,
namely, petitioner, was hardly
impartial.
Tayag concluded in her report
that respondent was suffering
from Narcissistic Personality
Disorder, traceable to the
latter’s experiences during
his childhood. Yet, the report
is totally bereft of the basis
for the said conclusion. Tayag
did not particularly describe
the "pattern of behavior" that
showed that respondent indeed
had a Narcissistic Personality
Disorder. Tayag likewise
failed to explain how such a
personality disorder made
respondent psychologically
incapacitated to perform his
obligations as a husband. We
emphasize that the burden
falls upon petitioner, not
just to prove that respondent
suffers from a psychological
disorder, but also that such
psychological disorder renders
him "truly incognitive of the
basic marital covenants that
concomitantly must be assumed
and discharged by the parties
to the
marriage."26 Psychological
incapacity must be more than
just a "difficulty," a
"refusal," or a "neglect" in
the performance of some
marital obligations.
In this instance, we have been
allowed, through the evidence
adduced, to peek into
petitioner’s marital life
and, as a result, we perceive
a simple case of a married
couple being apart too long,
becoming strangers to each
other, with the husband
falling out of love and
distancing or detaching
himself as much as possible
from his wife.
To be tired and give up on
one’s situation and on one’s
spouse are not necessarily
signs of psychological
illness; neither can falling
out of love be so labeled.
When these happen, the remedy
for some is to cut the marital
knot to allow the parties to
go their separate ways. This
simple remedy, however, is not
available to us under our
laws. Ours is a limited remedy
that addresses only a very
specific situation – a
relationship where no marriage
could have validly been
concluded because the parties;
or where one of them, by
reason of a grave and
incurable psychological
illness existing when the
marriage was celebrated, did
not appreciate the obligations
of marital life and, thus,
could not have validly entered
into a marriage.271avvphi1
An unsatisfactory marriage is
not a null and void marriage.
As we stated in Marcos v.
Marcos28]:
Article 36 of the Family Code,
we stress, is not to be
confused with a divorce law
that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefor
manifest themselves. It refers
to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party
even before the celebration of
the marriage. It is a malady
so grave and so permanent as
Page 32 PFR ACRTICLE 40 | FAMILY CODE | NULLITY OF PREVIOUS
MARRIAGE
to deprive one of awareness of
the duties and
responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond one is about
to assume. x x x.
Resultantly, we have held in
the past that mere
"irreconcilable differences"
and "conflicting
personalities" in no wise
constitute psychological
incapacity.29
As a last-ditch effort to have
her marriage to respondent
declared null, petitioner
pleads abandonment by and
sexual infidelity of
respondent. In a Manifestation
and Motion30 dated 21 August
2007 filed before us,
petitioner claims that she was
informed by one Jacinto
Fordonez, who is residing in
the same barangay as
respondent in Occidental
Mindoro, that respondent is
living-in with another woman
named "Sally."
Sexual infidelity, per se,
however, does not constitute
psychological incapacity
within the contemplation of
the Family Code. Again,
petitioner must be able to
establish that respondent’s
unfaithfulness is a
manifestation of a disordered
personality, which makes him
completely unable to discharge
the essential obligations of
the marital state.31
It remains settled that the
State has a high stake in the
preservation of marriage
rooted in its recognition of
the sanctity of married life
and its mission to protect and
strengthen the family as a
basic autonomous social
institution. Hence, any doubt
should be resolved in favor of
the existence and continuation
of the marriage and against
its dissolution and
nullity.32 Presumption is
always in favor of the
validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro
matrimonio.33 In the case at
bar, petitioner failed to
persuade us that respondent’s
failure to communicate with
petitioner since leaving for
Saudi Arabia to work, and to
live with petitioner after
returning to the country, are
grave psychological maladies
that are keeping him from
knowing and/or complying with
the essential obligations of
marriage.

We are not downplaying

petitioner’s frustration and
misery in finding herself
shackled, so to speak, to a
marriage that is no longer
working. Regrettably, there
are situations like this one,
where neither law nor society
can provide the specific
answers to every individual
problem.34

WHEREFORE, the Petition is

DENIED. The 24 May 2006
Decision and 28 August 2008
Resolution of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84471, which affirmed the 9
June 2004 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of
Malolos City, Branch 85,
dismissing petitioner Veronica
Cabacungan Alcazar’s
Complaint in Civil Case No.
664-M-2002, are AFFIRMED. No
costs.SO ORDERED.

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