Hastings Center

Wiley

Can Science and Ethics Be Reconnected?

Author(s): Stephen Toulmin
Source: The Hastings Center Report, Vol. 9, No. 3 (Jun., 1979), pp. 27-34
Published by: Hastings Center
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 THEFRAYEDLINKS
REESTABLISHING
Can Science and Ethics
by STEPHENTOULMIN
A literatureon
nyone familiarwith the contemporary
the philosophicalfoundationsof ethics-say, from John
Rawls's Theory of Justice (1972) up to Alan Donagan's
Theoryof Morality (1977) and Ronald Dworkin'sTaking
Rights Seriously (1977)-will know how little attention
suchbooksgive to "science," or at least to "thenaturaland
social sciences," as they are conceived of at the present
time in the English-speakingworld.l
The questionis, "How far does this lack of attentionre-
flect some immutableverities aboutthe essential relations
between science and ethics? And how far is it, rather, a
temporary-even, transient-fact about their actual rela-
tion in ourown day?"At othertimes, certainly,both "sci-
ence" and "ethics"have been conceived of in otherways,
and their interactionshave been both more obvious and
morevigorous.By recognizinghow those interactionshave
beenminimizedover the last 100or 150 years, we shouldbe
able to recognizealso how they might be reestablishedand
reactivated.Even to agree on that diagnosis would be to
achievesomethingsubstantial.The argumentsin this paper
will thereforebe partlyhistoricaland partlydiagnostic.
The Purist View of Science
Froma strictphilosophicalpoint of view, all attemptsto
insulatethe sciences from ethics can easily be undercut.
This is true whetherour focus of discussionis intellectual,
sociological,or psychological:the basic conceptsof the sci-
ences, the institutionsand collective conductof the scien-
tific profession, or the personal motives of individual
scientists.
As to the concept of science: so long as we restrictour-
selves to the physicochemicalsciences, our basic notions
and hypotheses (e.g., hadron, field gradient, and amino
acid)may haveno obviousevaluativeimplications.But the
physiological,to say nothingof the psychologicaland so-
cial sciences, employ whole families of concepts, for in-
stance,thoseassociatedwith functionalityandadaptedness,
and their cognates, which raise evaluative issues directly,
both within the relevant scientific theories and in their
broaderimplications.2
STEPHENTOULMIN,Ph.D., is a member of the Committee on Social
Thought at the University of Chicago. This article will appear in Vol-
umeIV of the series, "TheFoundationsof Ethics and Its Relationshipto
Science," edited by H. TristramEngelhardt,Jr. and Daniel Callahan,
to be published by The Hastings Center. The series is supportedby a
grantfrom the National Endowmentfor the Humanities.
The Hastings Center
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I I III I II
Be Reconnected?
As to the scientificprofession:the codes of good intellec-
tual practice, and the criteriaof professionaljudgment in
the sciences, may once upon a time have looked to the
needs of effective inquiry alone, rather than to broader
"ethical"considerations.But it is by now no longer possi-
ble to drawso clear or sharpa line betweenthe intellectual
demandsof good science and the ethical demandsof the
good life. The increasinglyclose links between basic sci-
ence andits practicalapplicationsexpose workingscientists
more andmore to ethicalproblemsand public accountabil-
ity of sorts that are commonplacein service professions
suchas medicineandlaw.3 A strongcase can also be made
for seeing the professionalenterprisesof naturalscience as
creating,and even defining, certainbasic ethical modes of
life andconducthavingtheirown characteristicvirtues, du-
ties, and obligations.4
Finally, as to the individualmotives thatoperatefor sci-
entistsin theirwork:thoughthe "ideal"springof actionfor
scientificinquirymay be a purerespectfor the rationalityof
the inquiryitself, such a "purerespect"is at best an aspira-
tion, and a moral aspirationat that. Furthermore,it is
somethingthatcan be developedin the courseof any indi-
vidual's lifetime, only as a somewhat refined productof
moraleducation.5
Yet, despitethese powerfulobjections,the notion thatthe
intellectualactivitiesof science are carriedon at a level that
sets them, if not above, then at any rate beside and on a par
with the moral law, continuesto have its charms;and we
must try to understandits seductive power. One potent
source, I suggest, has been scientists' fear of relativism.
Duringa periodwhen explorationand anthropologywere
encouraginga sense of pluralism in humanaffairs, and so
generatinga kind of moralrelativismand subjectivismthat
put the very foundationsof ethics in doubt,* it was under-
standablethat scientistsshould have resistedthe intrusion
of ethics into the business of science; and that, in return,
*Indiscussion, Paul Ramseyqueriedwhetherthe naturalsciences have in fact
been affected by the debate about subjectivismand relativismcarriedon within
philosophy over the last fifty or one hundredyears. That, of course, would be
highlyquestionable.The point of my presentargumentis that the recognitionof
anthropologicaldiversity led, by around 1800, to a widespreadsense-not by
any meansconfinedto philosophers-that ethical beliefs andpracticesvary arbi-
trarilyfrom cultureto culture. Earlierin the eighteenthcentury it had still been
possible for Voltaireto declare, "Thereis only one morality,as there is only one
geometry";but, from 1800 on, culturalrelativismbecame a force to reckonwith
in general thinkingabout ethical matters. The correspondingdoubts about "ob-
jectivity" in naturalscience did not become serious until the present century:
first, following the collapse of the classical Newtonian/Euclideansynthesis on
which Kanthadrested his case, and more recentlywith the widespreadadoption
of Thomas Kuhn's theory of "paradigms"as justifying a similar diversity in
"views of Nature."
27
they should have insisted that the concerns of science-
unlike those of ethics-were entirely objective, and in no
sense "mattersof taste or feeling." Furthermore,the fact
that scientificissues could plausiblybe depicted as public
and intersubjective(rational)made it possible, also, to de-
fine the intellectualdemandsof the scientificlife in a sim-
ilarlyobjectiveway. So, both the collective conductof the
scientificprofessionand the personalchoices of individual
scientists were apparentlyfreed from the existential ar-
bitrarinessand ambiguityof the ethical realm.
At this point, it might have been better if philosophers
andscientistsalikehad emphasizedthe similaritiesbetween
science and ethics, and had used the "rationalobjectivity"
of science as a model in seekingto reestablishthe claimsof
moralobjectivity,as well. The argumentthatethical issues
are, in theirown properways, as public andintersubjective
as scientific issues (and so equally "rational")was thus
abandonedtoo quickly and lightly. But many scientists,
lackingany sense of joint intellectualresponsibilityand in-
terest with the moral philosophers,were happy enough to
disown relativism in science and bolt for cover on their
own. For so long as relativismand subjectivismremained
viable options in philosophicalethics, most scientists un-
derstandablyfelt that it was more importantto emphasize
the distinctivelyintellectual-and so, presumably,"value-
neutral"-characterof theirown enterprises.Providedthey
could preservethe autonomyof the scientific community
against all outsiders, they did not mind letting the moral
philosopherssink or swim by themselves.
By now, however, the "rationality"of science-the ob-
jectivity of scientificissues, the autonomyof the scientific
professions, and the categorical claims of the scientific
life-can no longerbe used to differentiatescience entirely
from the rest of thoughtand morality. We are faced, on
every level, not by a hard and fast distinction,but by a
spectrum.
* The basic conceptsof the sciences rangealong a spec-
trum from the effectively "value-free" to the irre-
trievably"value-laden";
* The goals of the scientific enterpriserange along a
spectrumfrom a purely abstractinterestin theoretical
speculationsto a directconcernwith humangood and
ill;
* The professionalresponsibilitiesof the scientificcom-
munityrangealong a spectrumfrom the strictlyinter-
nal and intellectualto the most public and practical.
Nonetheless,as recentlyas the 1930s, when I firstacquired
my ideas about "science," the most characteristicmarkof
the scientificattitudeand the scientifictask was to select as
one's preferredcenterof attentionthe purest,the most intel-
lectual,the most autonomous,andthe least ethicallyimpli-
cated extremeon each of these differentspectrums.
No doubtthis "puristic"view of science was an extreme
one, and by no meansuniversallysharedby workingscien-
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tists, to say nothingof the outsidesocial commentatorswho
wroteaboutthe scientific scene. Yet it is a view that had,
and continuesto have, great attractionsfor many profes-
sional scientists. Since "rationalobjectivity" is an indis-
pensablepartof the scientificmission, and the intrusionof
"values"into science had come to be regardedas incom-
patible with such objectivity, all concern with values (or
otherarbitrary,personalpreferences)had to be foresworn
in the higher interestof rationality.Certainly,the profes-
sionalinstitutionsof science tendedto be organizedon this
basis. The membershipsof scientific academies, for in-
stance,have for the last 75 or 100 years been increasingly
recruitedon the basis of the narrowlydefined intellectual
contributionsof candidatesalone,* withoutregardto their
social perceptiveness, ethical sensitivity, or political
wisdom. Indeed, the puristicview is still powerfultoday:
consider,for instance,ArthurKantrowitz'scurrentpropos-
als for a Science Court,whose duty wouldbe to pronounce
on the "factualimplications"of science and technologyfor
issues of publicpolicy, withoutreferenceto the "values"at
stake in each case.6
Accordingly,the purismof the views about science into
which I was initiatedwas not merely a featureof the par-
ticularcultureand time of my youth: one more local and
temporarycharacteristic(so to say) of the factual, unemo-
tional, antiphilosophical,class-structured,and role-ori-
entedattitudesof the English professionalclasses between
the two world wars. In part,the natureof that culturemay
have accentuatedthe larger tendencytowardpurism. Per-
haps, if I had grown up in the United States ratherthan
Britain(or even in Britainthirtyyears later) I would have
acquireddifferent views, both about science itself, and
aboutits ethical significance.Certainly,there have not al-
ways been the kinds of barriersbetween ethics and science
thatI grew up with; nor need there always be such barriers
in the future. Still, I seriously doubt whetherthis attitude
was solely a local and temporaryoddity of twentieth-cen-
tury English upper-middle-classlife and social structure.
For many of the considerationsadvanced to explain and
justify scientific purism have a force that carries them
across nationalboundaries.These considerations-the in-
tellectualreactionagainstethical relativism,the collective
desirefor professionalautonomy,the personalcharmsof an
ethicallyunambiguouslife plan-may have been felt with a
special strengthin the Englandof my youth, but they were
by no means confinedto it.
The Professionalizationof Science
What deeper explanationshould we look for, then, to
accountfor the emergenceof this puristicview of science?
*Evenin thesecondhalfof thenineteenth century,it wasstill acceptedas a
matterof commonformthata poetsuchasAlfredTennysonshouldbe a Fellow
of theRoyalSociety,andsit on important RoyalSocietycommittees.There-
strictionof membership in NationalAcademiesof Scienceto expert,full-time
workingscientistsis thuslargelya twentieth-century
development.
Hastings CenterReport,June 1979
 Grantedthat, by the earlytwentiethcentury,relativismand
subjectivismwere beginning to pose an implicit threatto
the objectivityof science as well as to ethics, how was it
that scientists perceived and defined their own collective
interestsand self-image so clearly?How did they come to
supposethatthey could see science as capableof being the
strongholdof reasonby itself and on its own, in contradis-
tinctionto ethics, which had seeminglybeen unmaskedas
the playthingof emotion?
In part,thesequestionsare issues for the historyof ideas:
in part, they will carryus deeper into the sociology and
philosophyof science. Certainly,the distinctionbetweenan
objective science and a subjective ethics may be traced
backat least as far as the scientificpositivismof Comte, in
the early nineteenthcentury;and the same contrasthelped
to encouragethe revival of scientificpositivism in Vienna
in the 1920s.But why was scientificpositivismitself able to
carryconvictionfrom the early nineteenthcenturyon, in a
way thatit hadnot doneearlier?At this point, we shouldgo
behindthe historyof ideas, and considerthese changes in
"ideas"againsttheirlargerhumanbackground.
For our presentpurposes,I believe, the crucialdevelop-
ment in the history of nineteenth-century science was the
establishmentof distinct scientificdisciplines, professions
androles: that is, the processby which individual,sharply
delimited special sciences began to crystallize from the
largerand less-definedmatrixof eighteenth-century natural
philosophy.As a result of this change, scientific workers
dividedthemselvesup into new and self-organizedcollec-
tivities, and acquireda collective consciousness of their
specializedintellectualtasks, as contrastedwith the broader
concernsof philosophical,literary,and theologicaldiscus-
sion moregenerally.In this way, it at last became possible
to definethe new individualrole of "scientist."(This famil-
iar word was coined as recently as 1840 by William
Whewell, on the modelof the mucholder term"artist,"for
his Presidentialaddressto the British Association for the
Advancementof Science.)
In all these respects, scientificroles and writings,organi-
zations and arguments dating from before 1830 differ
sharplyfrom anythingto be foundafteraround1890. In the
handsof the most distinguishedeighteenth-centuryauthors,
scientificissues were always expandinginto, and merging
with, broaderintellectualquestions. In the writings of a
JohnRay or a JosephPriestley,the doors between science,
ethics, and religionare alwaysopen. "And why not?"they
wouldhave asked;"for naturalphilosophymust surelyem-
bracewithinitself, not just mathematicaland experimental
philosophy, but also naturaltheology and naturalmoral-
ity." (Their sentimentswere also those of Isaac Newton
himself, for whom "to discourseof God" from a study of
His Creation "does certainly belong to naturalphiloso-
phy."7) Indeed,it took a series of deliberateand collective
decisions to restrictthe scope of scientific debate before
these largerissues of philosophyand theology were effec-
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tively excluded from the professionaldebate about scien-
tific issues. One such example was the resolutionadopted
by the Geological Society of London in 1807 to exclude
from its Proceedingsall argumentsaboutthe origin, antiq-
uity, and creationof the earth,as being merely speculative,
and to confine the Proceedingsto papers based on direct
observationsof the earth'scrust.8This is simply one early
illustrationof a trendthat rapidlybecame general. During
the rest of the nineteenthcentury,the intellectualconcerns
of the differentspecial sciences were identifiedanddefined
in progressivelysharperterms, settingthem apartfrom the
broaderinterestsof philosophers,theologians,and the gen-
eral readingpublic.
At this point, it would be helpfulto develop a fuller un-
derstandingof the mannerin which naturalphilosophy, as
conceivedin the seventeenthand eighteenthcenturies,fell
apartinto its component elements, and the sciences (and
scientists)were led to set up shopon theirown. Even as late
as the 1820s, JosephTownsend could still presentsignifi-
cant contributionsto geological science in the guise of an
argumentvindicatingThe Veracityof Moses as an Histo-
rian.9By the end of the century,Biblical historyand geo-
chronology had become entirely distinct disciplines,
pursuedby quite separatecommunitiesof scholars. Yet,
even in this case, the transitionsinvolved were protracted,
hard-fought,and painful. Similarly, one major reason for
the hostile receptionthat greetedDarwin's Origin of Spe-
cies was the threatit seemingly posed to the traditionalas-
sociation between natural history and sacred history.
Acknowledginga presentationcopy of the book, Darwin's
teacher Adam Sedgwick expressed sorrow and alarm at
Darwin's disregard of the "essential link" between the
moraland materialorderof the world. If naturalhistorians
no longer showed us how the hand of the Creatorwas ex-
emplifiedin the living creaturesthat were His handiwork,
how then could the human race be expected to retain its
confidencein divine wisdom and providence?
In addition, it would be helpful to have more detailed
studies of the institutionalchanges during the nineteenth
centuryby the leading scientific academies and societies
that had originallybeen founded from 1650 on. How did
they move from being general associations of scholars,
clerics, andgentlemento being specializedorganizationsof
professionalexperts, with a narrowlydefined scope and
strictentrancequalifications?Before 1830, the Royal Soci-
ety of Londonwas still largely an associationfor the gen-
eral discussion of issues in natural philosophy. By the
1890s, it had become the mode to pursue, not just art for
art'ssake, but also science for science's sake:even, electri-
cal theoryfor electricaltheory'ssake, organicchemistryfor
organicchemistry'ssake, botanicaltaxonomyfor botanical
taxonomy'ssake. This was so because, by 1890, the self-
defining disciplines and autonomous professions with
which we are familiartoday-each of them devotedto the
special aims of one or anotherscience-had finally estab-
29
lished an existence independentof each other.
Once again, however, these institutionalchangesdid not
come automaticallyor easily. On the contrary,the intellec-
tual and institutionalclaims of the special sciences faced
continuedresistancefrom the churchesand elsewhere. So
the collectiveexperience,interests,and self-perceptionsof,
for example, cell physiologists, historical geologists, and
electromagnetictheorists led them to defend their newly
won territorieswith some real jealousy, to act protectively
towardthe intellectualgoals of theirdisciplines,and to res-
ist any countermovesaimed at reabsorbingthem into some
largersystemof philosophyor theology. ErnstHaeckel, the
Germanzoologist and a leaderof the GermanMonisticAl-
liance, is an interestingfigure in this respect. He was per-
hapsthe lastrepresentativeof the oldertradition,comprised
of scientistswho could maintainan acceptablebalancebe-
tween generalismand specialism, combining genuine ex-
pertisein a restrictedfield of study with a talentfor larger-
scale philosophicalsynthesis and exposition.
In short,if we are to understandhow science came to part
companyfrom the foundationsof ethics, we need to focus
attentionon the history of scientific specialization.It was
the developmentof specializationand professionalization
thatwas responsiblefor excluding ethical issues from the
foundationsof science, and so, though inadvertently,de-
stroyedmost of the links between science and the founda-
tions of ethics, as well. During the hundredor so years
beginningaround1840, the concepts and methods, collec-
tive organization,and individualroles of science were pro-
gressively sharpenedand defined, in ways designed to
insulatetruly "scientific"issues and investigationsfrom all
externaldistractions.So defined, the task of "positivesci-
ence" was to reveal how andin what respects,regardlessof
whetherwe like them or not, discoverableregularities,con-
nections, and mechanismsare manifest in, or responsible
for, the phenomenaof the naturalworld.
This "positive"programfor science was sometimesasso-
ciated, but was never identical, with the philosophyof sci-
entific positivism. It rested on a number of significant
assumptions,which are worth spelling out here.
A scientificpictureof the world differs radicallyfrom a
metaphysico-religiouspicture. The former is realistically
confinedto demonstrablefacts aboutthe naturalworld:the
latterembedsthose demonstrablefacts withina largercon-
ceptualsystem, structuredaccordingto prejudicesthat are
(from the scientific standpoint)arbitrary,externallymoti-
vated, and presumablywish-fulfilling.
A realistic view of the naturalworld is one that is kept
free of irrelevantpreferencesand evaluations, and so de-
picts Natureas it is, "whetherwe like it or not."
If scientificwork is to be effectivelyorganizedand prose-
cuted, questionsof "demonstrablefact" must be investi-
gated quite separatelyfrom all arbitrary,external, wish-
fulfillingnotions. Only in this way can we carry forward
the technical inquiries of science proper, without being
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sidetrackedinto fruitless and inconclusive debates about
rival values or Weltanschauungento which individualsci-
entists may happen (like anyone else) to be attractedfor
personalreasons,externalto science, butwhich arenot part
of the collective agendaof science.
Thus, the deeperreasonsfor definingthe scope and pro-
cedures of the special sciences in ways that keep ethical
issues out of their foundationswere connected with the
basic methodological program of the moder scientific
movement.In particular,they reflect the steps which have
been taken over the last 100 years to give institutionalex-
pressionto the maximsandambitionsof the foundersof the
Royal Society, throughthe professionalizationof the scien-
tific enterprise.Given the care and effort that the commu-
nity of professional scientists has taken in this way to
insulatethe foundationsof science from ethics, we should
not thereforebe surprisedif they have madeit thatmuchthe
harderto preserve clear and significant connections be-
tween science and the foundationsof ethics, as well.
Philosophical Justifications for Separating
Ethics and Science
My argument*is aimedat showinghow naturalscientists
workedto keep ethicalconsiderationsand preferencesfrom
operatingwithin "the foundationsof science"; so that, for
instance,the tests for decidingwhetherone scientifictheory
or conceptwas "better"or "worse"thanits rivals, fromthe
scientificpoint of view, should be wholly divorced from
issues aboutwhatwas ethically"better"or "worse." It was
a matterof great importancefor scientists to be able to
make the choice between alternativetheories or concepts
turnsolely on "objective"or "factual"considerations:they
hoped to avoid having to face the question whether one
theoryor concept is morallypreferableto, or more objec-
tionablethan, rival theoriesor concepts. (Can this divorce
be preservedabsolutelyin psychiatry,for example?May it
notbe legitimateto raisemoralobjectionsto one or another
theoreticalformulationin the psychiatric field? Leaving
aside all questionsabout theirother rightsand wrongs, we
may still approveof ThomasSzasz's argumentsfor simply
raisingthatissue.)
Thatkindof value neutralityis, of course, quite compati-
ble with particularscientists adopting all sorts of ethical
views and positions on their own responsibility.It is even
compatiblewith one rathermore general, collective view:
namely, that we must begin by drawing a sharp line be-
tweenmattersof pureor real science andmattersof applied
science or-more precisely-of technology, after which it
will become clear that questionsof ethical desirabilitycan
*Againstthisbackground, it will be easierto analyzeanddealwiththepoints
of differencebetweenmy own positionin this paperandLorenGraham's,as
presented in his commentaryon my argument. ForProfessorGrahamclaimsto
finda farlivelierandhealthierinteractionbetweenscienceandethicsduringthe
lasthundred yearsthanI hereallow.Yeton closerexamination (I believe)even
hisbestandmostcarefullyexpandedexample-thatof the Englishastrophysi-
cistandcosmologist,A.S. Eddington-willbe foundto supportmy conclusion.
Hastings Center Report,June 1979
arise only in the latter, technological area. (To put it
crudely, anatomy is value-free, clinical medicine value-
laden.) Above all, it is compatiblewith all sorts of philo-
sophicaldiscussions, as professionalscientists seek to ra-
tionalize or justify their particularethical positions, and
squaretheirpersonalviews aboutethics with their scientific
interestsand methodologies.
Thatis what seems to me to be happeningin most of the
cases thatLorenGrahamdiscusses in his commentary(see
pp. 35-39). His exemplary scientists are not people who
went out of their way to bring ethical considerationsinto
theirscientificwork, to the detrimentof the intellectualde-
tachmentat which professionalscientistshad aimed for so
long. Rather, they were people with idiosyncraticviews
aboutthe philosophicalrelevanceof science to ethics, and
vice versa. And, interestinglyenough, several of them are
people whose philosophicalpositions are ones thatjustify
divorcingscience from other realms of experience.
In this respect, ArthurEddington in Britain resembles
PierreDuhem in France.Duhemcombineda scientific ex-
pertisein the field of thermodynamicswith a religiouscom-
mitmentto RomanCatholicism.He was anxiousnot merely
to avoid, butactuallyto prevent,any conflictbetweenthose
two partsof his thinking.So, he adoptedearly in his career
a "phenomenalist"attitudetoward scientific theories and
ideas. In his view, it is not the businessof scientiststo aim
at discoveringthe natureof reality, but only to formulate
mathematicalschematismscapable in practiceof "saving
the phenomena":this postureallowedhim to reserveques-
tions aboutrealityto the pronouncementsof the metaphysi-
cians and theologians. For instance: when J.J. Thomson
firstarguedfor the existenceof "electrons"less than1/1000
as massiveas the lightestchemicalatoms, Duhem was very
scornful.To publishspeculativeargumentsof that sortwas
to takethe pretensionsof the atomisticmannerof talkingfar
moreseriouslythanthey deserved. (Thermodynamicswas,
of course, almost totally "phenomenalistic"in its methods
of analysis.)And he went on to pursuehis learnedandclas-
sic researchesinto the history of astronomy-researches
whose motto might well have been, Osiander was right.
Finally,he publishedan essay in which he made his under-
lying programentirelyclear, with the revealingtitle, Physi-
que dun Croyant, or The Physics of a Believer.
Both DuhemandEddingtonwerethus seekingto provide
philosophicaljustificationsfor keeping science and ethics,
or science and theology, at arm's length. Far from their
example refutingmy position, it tends only to confirm it.
Both of them were in this respect people of their time,
armedwith a programfor definingand pursuingthe proper
work of science in separationfrom ethical or religious
thought. If they differed from the majorityof their col-
leagues of the time, it was only in being more thanwholly
devout in their personal commitmentsto Catholicism or
Quakerism.But their other commitmentsplayed their part
in other areasof theirlives, not withintheir science. They
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were, in short, both professional scientists and also reli-
giously devout; not "religiously devout" in their actual
ways of thinkingabout scientific issues. And, if that is a
correctdiagnosis,they were concernedto scrutinizethe re-
lations between science and ethics only for the sake of
keeping them more securely apart.
The Limits of Positivism
In our own day, the accumulatedsuccesses of the "posi-
tive" methodologyhave carriedscience-and scientists-
up againstthe limits of thatprogram'svalidity, andin some
placesacrossthem. As a preparationfor answeringmy cen-
tralquestion-"How can we set aboutreconnectingthe sci-
ences with the foundations of ethics?"-I can usefully
beginby identifyingcertainpointsat which, duringthe last
few years, the locationof those limits has become apparent.
To begin with, the positive programfor science nor-
mally tookfor granteda sentimentalview of ethics: this
was used to justify excluding ethics-which was as-
sumedto deal withlabile and subjectivemattersof taste
orfeeling-from the systematicinvestigationof "demon-
strable facts." It was assumed, in other words, that
humanvalues, valuationsandpreferenceshave no place
withinthe world of naturethat is the scientist'sobject of
study.
Duringthe twentiethcentury,by contrast,science has ex-
pandedinto the realmsof physiology and psychology, and
in so doing has shown the limits of that assumption. As
physiology and psychology have succeeded in securing
theirown positionsas sciences, humanbeings have ceased
to be onlookers contemplatinga naturalworld to which
they themselvesare foreign and have become partsof (or
participantswithin) that world. As a result, the makeup,
operations,and activitiesof humanbeings themselveshave
becomelegitimateissues for scientificinvestigation.At the
very least, the biochemicaland physiologicalpreconditions
of normal functioning,and so of good health, can accord-
ingly be discussed nowadays as problems for science, as
well as for ethics.* With this crucial incursionby science
into the foundationsof ethics, we can recognizethatnot all
humanevaluationsmust necessarilybe regarded,from the
scientificpoint of view, as irrelevantevaluations. On the
contrary,some of the processes and phenomenastudiedby
naturalsciences carrywith them certainimmediateevalua-
tive implicationsfor the "good andill" of humanlife. With
this examplebeforeus, we are readyto takethe firststep in
*Notice, in this connection, John StuartMill's remarkearly on in Utilitari-
anism about the "goodness" of health. Health is in fact, for Mill, one of those
paradigmatic"goods" aboutwhich utilitarianquestionsdo not have to arise: it is
"desirable,"just because there would be something clearly paradoxicalabout
people's not "desiring"it. (It shouldnot have to be underlinedthat Mill was not
committingG.E. Moore's "naturalisticfallacy" by this associationof the "desir-
able" with "whatis actuallydesired":on the contrary,what Mill sees is thatany
ethical system must rest on the existence of some things that anybody may be
presumed to regard as "desirable," since they are the prerequisites-like
health-for all other potentially "good" human experiences.)
31
the directionhintedat earlierin this paper:thatof using the
"rationalobjectivity"of science as a model for reestablish-
ing the claims of moral objectivity, as well.
Giventhe increasinglyclose involvementof basic sci-
ence with its applicationsto humanwelfare, notably in
the area of medical research, it is meanwhilebecoming
clear thattheprofessionalorganizationand priorities of
scientificwork can no longer be concerned solely with
considerationsof intellectualcontentand merit, as con-
trasted with the ethical acceptabilityand social value,
either of the researchprocess itself, or of its practical
consequences.
The very existence of the bioethicsmovementgenerally,
is one indicationof this change. The work of the National
Commissionfor the Protectionof HumanSubjects,and of
institutionalreview boards to review research involving
humansubjects,is another.
This being the case, the doors between science and the
foundationsof ethics can no longerbe keptbolted from the
scientificside, as they were in the heyday of positive sci-
ence. Neitherthe disciplinaryaspectsof the sciences, their
basic concepts and intellectual methods, nor the profes-
sionalaspectsof scientificwork,the collective organization
of science, and its criteriaof professionaljudgment, can
ever again be insulatedagainstthe "extraneousand irrele-
vant" influenceof ethics, values, and preferences.
On whatconditions,then, can we set aboutreestablishing
the frayed links between science and ethics?
1. We should not attemptto reestablishthese lipks by
reviving outwornstyles of naturaltheology. The kind of
syncretisticcosmology to be foundin Teilhardde Chardin,
for example, is no improvementon its predecessors:this is
indeed an area in which "demonstrablefacts" are in real
dangerof being obscuredby a largerwish-fulfillingframe-
work of theologicalfantasies.'0Instead,we shouldembark
on a critical scientific and philosophicalreexaminationof
humanity'splace in nature,with specialreferenceto the use
of such termsas "function"and "adaptation,"by whichthe
ethicalaspects of our involvementin the naturalworld are
too easily obscured.
2. We shouldnot attemptto force the pace, and insist on
seeing ethicalsignificancein all of science, let alonerequire
that every piece of scientific investigationshould have a
demonstrablehumanrelevance.Thoughthe enthusiasmsof
the 1960s "counterculture" were intelligibleenough in their
historicalcontext, that would be going too far in the op-
posite direction, and would land us in worse troublethan
the positivistprogramitself."1Instead,we shouldpay crit-
ical attentionto the respects in which, and the points at
which, ethical issues enter into the conduct of scientific
work, includingits immediatepracticalconsequences.The
ethicalaspects of humanexperimentation,and of such en-
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terprisesas sex research, are only samples, from a much
largergroupof possible issues.
3. We should not see this renewed interactionbetween
science and ethics as threatening,or justifying, any attack
on the properautonomyof scientists withintheir own spe-
cific professionaldomains.The recentdebateaboutrecom-
binant DNA researchgeneratedrhetoricof two contrary
kinds:both from scientists who saw the whole affair as a
pretextfor outside interferencein the properaffairsof the
scientificprofessions, and from laypersonswho genuinely
believedthatthose affairswere being carriedon irresponsi-
bly.12Instead, we should reconsider, in a more selective
way, just what the properscope and limits of professional
autonomyare, and at what points scientists cross the line
separatinglegitimate professional issues from mattersof
properpublic concern, whetherpolitical or ethical.
4. We shouldnot supposethat renewingdiplomaticrela-
tions betweenscience and ethics will do anythingto throw
doubton the virtues,duties, andobligationsof the scientific
role or station.Duringthe last decade, the antiscientificex-
cesses of the radicalshave sometimesmadeit appearneces-
sary to apologize for being a scientist; and, as a reaction
against this radical rhetoric, some professional scientists
have developed, in turn, a kind of resentful truculence
towardpublicdiscussionsaboutthe ethical and politicalin-
volvements of the scientific life. Instead, we need to set
aboutunderstandingbetter, both how the line between the
narrowlyprofessionaland broadersocial responsibilitiesof
scientistsruns in the collective sphere, and also how indi-
vidual scientists can balance their obligations within the
overall demandsof a morally acceptablelife, as between
their chosen professionalroles as neurophysiologists,for
example, and the otherobligationsto which they are sub-
ject in othercapacitiesas citizens, colleagues, lovers, par-
ents, religious believers, or whatever.
Renegotiating the Connection between
Science and Ethics
I have suggestedthat changesin the social and historical
context of science could easily end the divorce of science
fromthe foundationsof ethics;and even that such changes
may, already,in fact, be underway.There is indeed some
evidencethatthis is alreadyhappening.Duringthe last few
years, the "purist"view of science-as a strictlyautono-
mous intellectualenterprise,insulatedagainstthe influence
of all merely humanneeds, wishes, and preferences-has
lost its last shredsof plausibility.Whetherwe considerthe
basic conceptsof the sciences, the collective enterprisesof
professional science, or the personal commitments and
motivations of individual scientists, we can maintain a
strictlyvalue-free (or rather,ethics-free)position only by
stickingarbitrarilyto one extremeend of a long spectrum.
HastingsCenterReport,June1979
 From that extreme point of view, the ideally scientific
investigationwould be a piece of strictlyacademicresearch
on some application-proofproject in theoreticalphysics,
conductedby a friendless and stateless bachelor of inde-
pendentmeans. Theremay have been a substantialbody of
science approximating this idea as recentlyas the 1880sand
1890s, but that is certainlynot the case any longer. On the
contrary,we can learn somethingabout the foundationsof
ethicsby reconsideringthe characterand contentof the sci-
entific enterpriseon all three levels.
1. As a collective activity, any science is of signifi-
cance for ethics on accountof the ways in which it serves
as an embodimentor exemplarof appliedrationality.In
this respect, the very objectivityof the goals at which
scientists aim, both collectively and individually, pro-
vides us with the starting point for a counterattack
againstrelativismand subjectivismin ethics, too; while
the mannerin which the sciencesthemselves,considered
as "forms of life," define individualroles, with their
own specificvirtues,can also be takenas a startingpoint
for a much broaderreconstructionof ethics.'3
2. Correspondingly,the moral characterof the scien-
tist's personalmotivation,particularlythe way in which
the Kantian"purerespectfor rationalityas such" grows
out of the wider life of affect or "inclination"-what I
have elsewhere called "the moral psychology of sci-
ence"'4-can teach us something about the nature of
personalvirtueand commitmentin otherareas of life as
well.
3. Finally, the actualcontentof the sciences is at last
contributingto a betterunderstanding of the humanlocus
withinthe naturalworld. This fact is well recognizedin
the physiologicalsciences, where the links betwennor-
mal functioningand good healthare comparativelyun-
problematic.But it is a matterof active disputein several
areasjust at this time: for example, in the conflict over
the relationsbetween social psychology and sociobiol-
ogy. And there are some otherfields in which it should
be the topic of much more active debate than it is: for
example,in connectionwiththe rivalrybetweenpsycho-
therapeuticand psychopharmacological modes of treat-
ment in psychiatry.
This done, it should not be hardto indicatethe points at
whichissues originatingin the naturalsciences can give rise
to, and grow together with, evaluative issues-and not
merelywith issues thatinvolve the values "intrinsicto" the
scientificenterpriseitself, butalso largerhumanvaluesof a
more strictlyethical kind. For as we saw the new phase of
scientificdevelopmentinto which we are now moving re-
quiresus to reinserthumanobserversinto the world of na-
ture, so that we become not merely onlookers, but also
participantsin many of the naturalphenomena and pro-
cesses thatare the subjectmatterof our scientificinvestiga-
tions. This is true across the whole spectrum of late
TheHastingsCenter
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twentieth-centuryscience: all the way from quantumme-
chanics, where Heisenberg'sPrinciple requires us to ac-
knowledge the interdependenceof the observer and the
observed,to ecology, where the conduct of humanbeings
is one crucialfactor in any causal analysisof the condition
of, say, Lake Erie, or to psychiatry, where the two-way
interactionbetweenthe psychiatristandhis client is in sharp
contrastto the one-way influenceof natureon the human
observer(butnot vice versa) presupposedin classical nine-
teenth-centuryscience.15
Recognizing the interconnectednessof human con-
duct and natural phenomena may not by itself, of
course, determinethe directionin which those inter-
connections should point us. Acknowledging the
need to establish some harmony between human
conduct and natural processes is one thing: agree-
ing on what constitutes such a harmony is another,
harder task.
One likely outcome of this novel phase of science could
well be the revivalof interestin quasi-Stoicsystems of eth-
ics andphilosophy,not to say, naturaltheology. The purist,
or positivist, conceptionof science discussed earlierhas a
certainsignificantanalogy with the Epicureanphilosophy
of late antiquity:both attemptedto justify equanimity,or
ataraxia, by pointingto the essential indifference("value
neutrality")of naturalphenomenatoward human affairs,
andvice versa. By contrast,any improvedunderstandingof
the humanlocus within the naturalworld will presumably
undercutthis assumptionof mutual indifference, and en-
couragepeople to move in a neo-Stoic direction-seeing
humanconduct as subject to ethical principles that must
harmonizewiththe principlesof the naturalworld.16 Justas
good healthand physiologicalfunctioningare intrinsically
linkedtogether,so too humanbeings can presumablycon-
tributeto, or impair,the welfareof the naturalecosystems,
or chains, within which they are links or elements.
Recognizing the interconnectednessof human conduct
andnaturalphenomenamay not by itself, of course, deter-
mine the directionin which those interconnectionsshould
point us. Acknowledgingthe need to establish some har-
monybetweenhumanconductand naturalprocessesis one
thing:agreeingon what constitutessuch a harmonyis an-
other,hardertask. Therewas, for instance, a disagreement
between ThomasHenry Huxley and his grandson,Julian,
aboutthe relationsbetweenhumanethics and organicevo-
lution.17(T.H. saw it a basic human obligation to fight
againstthe crueltyand destructivenessof naturalselection,
whereas Juliansaw the direction of human progress as a
simple continuationof the directionof organicevolution.)
WhatbothHuxleysagreedabout,however, was the need to
33
see humanethics as having a place in the world of nature,
and to arriveat a rationalunderstandingof what that is.
It was with this need in mindthatI referred,at the outset,
to such concepts as function and adaptationas requiring
particularscrutinyat the present time. For the question,
"Whatis the truefunction of human beings?", is poten-
tially as much a topic of debatetoday as it was in classical
Athens, when Plato had Socratesraise it in the Republic.
Likewise, the question, "How should our ways of acting
change, in order to become better adapted to the novel
situationsin which we are findingourselves?"is a question
that also invites answers-sometimes, overly simple an-
swers-based on a reading of contemporarybiology and
ecology. We are probablyripe for a revivalof the organic
theoryof society and the state. And, thoughthis is a topic
thatmust be taken seriously, it is also one that is going to
need to be handledwith great cautionand subtlety, if we
are to avoid the crudely conservativeemphases of earlier
versions of the theory.'8 Startingfrom where we do, the
answerswe give to such questionswill certainlyneed to be
richer and more complex than those available in Plato's
time;but, sharingPlato'squestions, we are evidentlyback
in a situationwhere our view of ethics and our view of
natureare coming back togetheragain.
To conclude: if there is one major field of discussion
withinwhich we shouldmost urgentlyrenegotiatethe rela-
tions between the sciences and the foundationsof ethics,
thathas to do with the conceptof responsibility.Thereis a
certaintensionin all the sciences of humanbehaviorat the
presenttime, which I have discussed elsewhere underthe
headingof Townes's Paradox.19In thinkingabout the be-
havior of their researchsubjects, as objects of scientific
study, psychologistsand psychiatrists,neurophysiologists
andthe rest, are inclinedto interprettheirobservationsin a
systematicallycausal manner.In thinkingabouttheirown
behavior, as psychologists, psychiatrists, neurophysiolo-
gists or whatever,they are inclinedto do so always in ra-
tional terms. They are prepared,that is, to take crediton
their own behalf for a kind of rationality-a freedom to
think, act, and write as they do for good reasons-that is
missing from their accountsof the thoughts, actions, and
expressions of their research subjects. And, since the
humancapacityto act "forgood reasons"is a basicpresup-
positionof all ethics (just as it is of any truly rationalsci-
ence) arrivingat a satisfactoryresolution of this tension
betweenthe causal and rationalway of interpretinghuman
conductis a matterof some urgency, both for science and
for the foundationsof ethics.
REFERENCES
1. The point cannot be stated quite so crisply in French or German:
Dworkin,at any rate, is certainlycontributingto Rechtswissenschaft,or
les sciences du droit. But the differences in scope and sense between
the English "science," French science, German Wissenschaft, Greek
episteme, Arabic 'ilm etc., provide too large and complex a topic to
pursuehere.
34
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2. See, for instance, my paper, "Conceptsof Function and Mech-
anism in Medicine and Medical Science," in Evaluationand Explana-
tion in the BiomedicalSciences, H.T. Engelhardt,Jr. and S.F. Spicker,
eds. (Dordrecht:1975), pp. 51-66.
3. See, for instance, my paper, "The Meaning of Professionalism,"
in Knowledge, Valueand Belief, Vol. II of "The Foundationsof Ethics
andIts Relationshipto Science," H.T. Engelhardt,Jr. and Daniel Call-
ahan,eds. (Hastings-on-Hudson,N.Y.: Instituteof Society, Ethics and
the Life Sciences, 1977), pp. 25ff.
4. Cf. AlasdairMacIntyre, "Objectivityin Moralityand Objectivity
in Science," in Morals, Science, and Sociality, Vol. III of "TheFoun-
dations of Ethics and Its Relationshipto Science," H.T. Engelhardt,
Jr., and Daniel Callahan,eds. (Hastings-on-Hudson,N.Y.: Instituteof
Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences, 1978), pp. 21-39.
5. See, for instance, my paper, "The MoralPsychology of Science,"
in Morals, Science and Sociality, pp. 48-67.
6. ArthurKantrowitz, "The Science Court Experiment:An Interim
Report,"Science, 193 (1976), pp. 653 ff.
7. Cf: John Ray, The Wisdomof God, which is an indispensable
source for the early history of botanical and zoological systematics;
JosephPriestley,Disquisitions concerningSpiritand Matter;and Isaac
Newton, particularlyhis Four Letters to Richard Bentley.
8. CharlesGillispie's fascinatingbook, Genesis and Geology (New
York:Harper& Row, 1959), is the classic source for this episode in the
relationsbetween geological science and naturaltheology.
9. See Gillispie, Genesis and Geology.
10. I have discussed this topic at greater length in an article about
Teilhardde Chardinin Commentary,39 (1965), 50 ff.
11. See for instance, my paper, "The historical backgroundto the
anti-sciencemovement," in Civilization and Science, a Ciba Founda-
tion Symposium, Amsterdam, 1972, pp. 23-32.
12. Cf. the National Academy of Science report on recombinant
DNA researchin February1977.
13. Cf. AlasdairMacIntyre,"Objectivityin Moralityand Moralityin
Science," and his forthcomingbook, Beyond Virtue.
14. Cf. Toulmin "The Moral Psychology of Science."
15. Cf. Karl Popper's striking argumentsin On Clouds and Clocks,
(St. Louis: WashingtonUniversity, 1966.)
16. It is interestingto considerArthurKoestler'sscientific writingsas
a kind of neo-Stoic reaction against the supposed Epicureanismof be-
havioristpsychology, neo-Darwinistbiology etc. See, e.g., his Janus
(Londonand New York: 1978).
17. The contributionsof both men to this topic are conveniently
printedtogetherin the book, Evolutionand Ethics 1893-1943 (London:
1947), which comprises T.H. Huxley's original Romanes Lecture to-
gether with Julian's subsequentHerbertSpencer lecture.
18. See, for instance, my paper, "Ethics and Social Functioning,"in
Science, Ethics and Medicine, Vol. I of "The Foundationsof Ethics
andIts Relationshipto Science," H.T. Engelhardt,Jr. and Daniel Call-
ahan, eds. N.Y.: Institute of Society, Ethics and the Life Sciences,
(Hastings-on-Hudson:1976), which discusses the role of physiological
analogiesin the writingsof such social theoristsas Emile Durkheimand
Talcott Parsons.
19. See my paper on "Reasons and Causes," in Explanationin the
BehaviouralSciences, R. Borger and F. Cioffi, eds. (Cambridge,Eng-
land: 1970). Hans Jonas has recently drawn my attention to similar
argumentsin his own writings:see, e.g., The Phenomenonof Life (New
York: 1966), pp. 124-25, and his earlierpaper in Social Research 20
(1953).
Correction
In the April 1979 issue of the Hastings Center Report a
printer's error resulted in the mislabeling of the columns in the
table "Comparison of Biomedical and Holistic Concepts of
Health and Disease" (p. 17). The left column should be la-
beled "Holistic Concepts" and the right column "Biomedical
Concepts."
Hastings Center Report,June 1979