North American Philosophical Publications

Individual Essences
Author(s): Michael Losonsky
Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Jul., 1987), pp. 253-260
Published by: University of Illinois Press on behalf of the North American Philosophical
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 24, Number 3, July 1987

INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES
Michael Losonsky

? LTHOUGH not very reputable, individual (with a proper name or a demonstrative, for exam?
** essences play a role in a variety of contempor to a individual.
ple) particular Ordinary properties
rary metaphysical issues. They have been used in such as being red and round are pure. Impure prop?
modal semantics to account for "transworld iden? erties can be expressed only with predicates that
tity"1 as well as the possibility that there are objects make direct or essential reference to particular indi?
that in fact do not exist, without resorting to the viduals, e.g. being identical with that red ball or
hypothesis that there are merely possible individu? descending from Leibniz. Thus in some sense these
als.2 They have been used to defend the Identity properties "incorporate" individuals. So pure indi?
of Indiscernibles and the view that individuals are vidual essences necessarily characterize an indi?
mere bundles of properties.3 They have been used vidual without making a reference to an individual,
to account for the knowledge we have of ourselves while impure individual essences need to make
and other persons.4 Historically, philosophers have reference to an individual. Paradigm examples of
used individual essences to individuate objects in impure individual essences are haecceities, such
space andtime (for example Duns Scotus), and as the properties being identical with that red ball
recently they have been used as principles of indi or being Leibniz.
viduation for events.5 Finally, individual essences I will focus on impure individual essences. It is
have been used in theories of sense and reference generally accepted that pure properties do not
for singular terms.6 Exactly why they remain so necessarily characterize individuals, and I do not
controversial despite their usefulness is an wish to quarrel with this accepted belief here.8
interesting question. I suspect that their disrepute Moreover, the philosophers that work with indi?
is due to something other than an argument against vidual essences have impure essences inmind, and
their existence. Nevertheless, I wish to respond to so Iwish to look at arguments against these impure
four major criticisms of individual essences to be entities.
found in the writings of D. M. Armstrong, Roderick There are two kinds of impure individual
Chisholm, and Michael Loux. essences. The first kind contains essences that
incorporate objects that also exemplify the essences
I in which they are incorporated. Haecceities belong
to this group. For instance, Leibniz exemplifies
First we need to characterize individual essences. and is incorporated in the property being Leibniz.
An individual essence is a property that can be The other kind of essence, which has been called
exemplified, that cannot be exemplified by more a "relational essence,"9 only incorporates objects
than one object, and whatever individual that do not also exemplify the essence. The prop?
exemplifies it must exemplify it if the individual erties being the human being that grows from that
exists. In short, we will say that an individual zygote in suitable environments (referring to a par?
essence is a property that necessarily characterizes ticular fertilized egg) or being the table made from
a single individual. that particular chunk of wood according to a cer?
Individual essences can be either pure or impure tain plan P are examples of such essences.10 The
Thereis no agreement on how to charac?
properties. individuals these properties involve?the zygote or
terize this distinction, but the intuition is clear.7 the wood?do not exemplify the essence in which
Pure properties can be expressed with predicates they are incorporated.
that do not involve direct or essential reference This distinction between the two types of impure

253

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 254 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

individual essences is important since, as we will than one object, and their corresponding predicates
see below, major arguments against impure always involve direct or essential reference to par?
essences fail because they do not take relational ticular individuals.
essences into account. Unfortunately, Armstrong argues for neither (A)
Before turning to these arguments, I wish to nor (B), so we need to speculate about
why they
point out that the sort of arguments I will consider seem obvious to him.
are general arguments that aim at showing that I think the motivation for the first principle is to
there are no impure essences. I will not consider be found in the puzzle that is at the source of
arguments which attempt to prove that certain con? Armstrong's philosophical project. His project is
ceptions of impure essences are faulty. In particu? to answer the "One over Many" problem:
lar, Iwill not consider arguments for the claim that same property can belong
The to different things.
origins are not essential.11 However, to forestall or
there can be identical in
...Apparently, something
accommodate some of these objections, the fol?
things which are not identical. Things are one at the
lowing may be said about origins. First, although same time they are many. How is this possible?[15]
the zygote is the result of a fusion of two gametes,
it does not follow that the organism that develops His answer is that "the apparent situation is the
out ofthe zygote also in those two real situation." A property is a repeatable entity
originates
gametes. Once the gametes fuse, they cease to wholly present in every object that exemplifies it.
exist, and the organism develops out of the zygote, Distinct balls are both red because both have the
not the two gametes. identical
property: being red.
Second, the zygote consists of matter (its pro? So Armstrong is inclined to restrict properties to
teins, acids, etc.) as well as a "plan," namely its those that can be exemplified by many things
because those are the only properties he needs to
genetic code. With this matter and plan, the zygote
(in a suitable will an solve his fundamental metaphysical problem. To
environment) generate
that will have the necessary material as answer Armstrong, then, we need only to point to
organism
well as the plan for continuing the growth generated problems he does not consider and that motivate
the introduction of properties that are not exempli
by the zygote.
Third, an artifact also originates inmaterial struc? fiable by many things.
tured according to a plan. The artifact is built for One such problem arises in the metaphysics of
a certain purpose, it is given certain dimensions, modality. As already mentioned, individual
and it has a certain structure (e.g., this piece of essences have been introduced to solve the fol?
wood is for the drawer, that piece for the top). The lowing problem. It is not the case that there exist
dimensions and structure of the artifact certain objects (e.g. Earth's second moon) but it
purpose,
are all part of its plan. With these remarks inmind, is possible that those objects exist. How can we
let's turn to the arguments account for this fact without assuming that there
against impure
essences.12 are merely possible objects, that is, objects that
exist but are not actual? Individual essences allow
II one to give an elegant answer: In such cases what
actually exists is an individual essence that is not
D. M. Armstrong individual exemplified, although it could be exemplified.
rejects impure
essences because: Another problem-complex, which may be
dubbed the "problem of dynamic unity," is the sort
(A) It is logically possible that the class of particulars of problem that motivated Leibniz to postulate sub?
which exemplify a property be an infinite class.[13] stantial forms, or "active principles of unity."16 One
(B) If a predicate involves essential reference to an
example of this sort of problem is this. The very
individual, it cannot have a corresponding prop? same individual has many distinct properties, but
erty.[14]
all these properties have a dynamic unity. What
Impure essences cannot be exemplified by more unifies these properties is not just the fact that they

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 INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES 255

are all exemplified by one object, but also that if a property corresponds to this predicate, the prop?
there seems to be some underlying property or erty incorporates that individual. (2) But a property
causal principle that either determines that the cannot incorporate an individual. (3) Therefore, if
object exemplifies all these properties, or at least a predicate involves essential reference to an indi?
makes it physically possible that it exemplifies vidual, it does not have a corresponding property.
these properties. For example, an object's changes This line of reasoning does appear very plausible,
over time are not merely a sequence of properties but its plausibility depends on a literal reading of
that are unified only by the fact that they are all "incorporates" in the second premise. If by "incor?
exemplified by the same object, but the unfolding porates" we mean "be a constituent or proper part
of this sequence appears to be determined or at of," then it is true that a property cannot incorporate
least made physically possible by some underlying an individual. If an individual has a property, that
power of the object. Something about the object property is wholly present in the individual. So if
gives it the power to change the way it does. the property revolving around the sun has the sun
Another example of this problem is this. What as a constituent part, then the sun is wholly present
gives an object the power to remain identical in Earth as well as all the other planets revolving
through all its changes? That an object remains around the sun, which is absurd.
identical through changes appears not as a static However, if we read "incorporates" literally,
fact, but as a dynamic feature of the object. For there is no obvious reason for accepting premise
example, suppose an organism exemplifies P* and (1). Why should we suppose that if a predicate
not-P at time t, and exemplifies P and not-P* at involves a singular term that directly refers to an
H-l. So from time Mo r+1 it changes, although individual, then its corresponding property also has
it remains identical. But in order to be identical, that individual as a constituent part? Predicates and
the organism must not only persist from t to i+1, properties are distinct things, and there is no con?
but it must persist through that particular change. tradiction in supposing that a predicate involves
For instance, itmust not disintegrate because it is direct reference to an individual although the cor?
changing into an object that exemplifies P and not responding property does not contain that indi?
P*. But that it persist through this change and vidual as a constituent.17
remains identical appears to be a manifestation of But if we reject this literal reading of "incorpo?
a power of the object. What gives this organism rates," then in what interesting sense does an
the power to remain identical through all its impure property, including impure essences, incor?
changes? porate an individual? A preliminary answer is this:
I suggest that individual essences offer the best A property, P, incorporates an individual, x, just
solution to the problem of dynamic unity. Indi? in case there is a relation, R, and necessarily some
viduals have individual essences, and these are individual, y, exemplifies P only on the condition
active principles that give an object the power to that y stands in relation R to x.is But this is only a
change as it does during its lifetime, as well as the preliminary answer because it does not tell us what
power to remain identical through these changes. it is that an individual has when it has an impure
Before we say more about these powers, let's turn property. What is it that is wholly present in the
to Armstrong's second reason for rejecting object when it has an impure property, particularly
essences. an impure essence?
To answer this question it is useful to turn to
Ill Armstrong's most powerful and interesting princi?
ple:
What motivates his second reason, namely that If a particular has a property, that property must endow
a predicate that involves essential reference to an
the particular with some specific causal power, or if
individual does not have a corresponding property, the property is causally idle, then itmust at least be
is the following line of reasoning. (1) If a predicate an intelligible hypothesis that the property should
involves essential reference to an individual, then endow particulars with some causal powers.[19]

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 256 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

So if an impure property is a property, it gives the structed, the table will continue to exist beyond the
object a specific causal power to be related to the moment the table is completed, and by being made
object the property "incorporates." For instance, if out of that particular chunk of wood in a certain
revolving around the sun is a property, Earth must way, it has the power to persist in its space past
have a specific causal power to revolve around the the moment of its actual completion. Third, it will
sun in particular. have the powers of that particular chunk of wood,
Can impure essences satisfy this requirement? e.g., the powers of its particular pitch and moisture
Armstrong uses it to eliminate the properties of content, its particular grain, shades of color,
existence or self-identity, and it could with some density, etc. These features of the wood together
plausibility be used against essences. What causal with its structure and dimensions also give the table
powers do I have in virtue of the property being the powers to withstand certain pressures, reflect
me, that I do not get from the other properties I and absorb light in certain ways, absorb paint and
exemplify? This is a difficult question to answer varnish in certain ways, and in general give it the
and without an answer this principle does appear power to respond in particular ways in different
to rule out haecceities. However, this principle does environments.
not affect all impure essences. Some relational We can now see howimpure essences can be
essences endow their objects with specific causal active principles of unity. An individual's origins
powers. endow it with the power to change in certain ways
Consider the essence being the human being that and to remain identical through its changes. The
grows from Alpha in suitable environments, where property that underlies a human being's changes is
Alpha is the particular zygote out of which I grew. the property of growing from a particular zygote.
The causal power I have in virtue of this property The zygote's genetic structure together with how
is the ability to grow from Alpha, and to grow this structure is duplicated in the matter generated
according to the genetic structure of that zygote. by this structure determines or at least makes phys?
My having the property of growing from a par? ically possible all the changes a human goes
ticular fertilized egg gives me the power to grow through. This property also gives the human the
from that egg, and not another one, and relate to power to remain identical through its changes. A
my environment in a certain way. This power is human has the power to remain identical because
shared with the zygote. I have the power to grow it has material endowed with the power to
out of Alpha and it has the power to generate me, exemplify all its properties, and it gets that material
but those powers are distinct. Even after Alpha's and power from the fact that it is growing from a
powers cease, growth continues, and the power I particular zygote. The human's genetic structure
have to grow out of Alpha is not just the power to and how it is passed along, together with the mate?
begin growing in Alpha, but also to continue grow? rial of this structure, gives the human the physical
ing. capability to remain identical as it is undergoing
The essence being the table made from that chunk its changes. The table's origins also give it dynamic
of wood according to certain plan P, also endows unity. That the table was made out of that chunk
its object with specific causal powers. A table with of wood in a certain manner gives it certain powers
this property is the result or end of a particular that determine how itwill change in different envi?
causal process, namely the constructing ofthat par? ronments. Also the particular chunk of wood as
ticular table, and as such the table has certain pow? well as its structure and dimensions give the table
ers. First, the table is potential during this construc? the power to remain identical through the specific
tion process and becomes actual as a result of it, changes it undergoes. For example, its wood, struc?
and so it has the power of being potential and ture and dimensions keep it from disintegrating as
becoming actual during this process, which is just it is transported from where it is completed on the
the power to be constructed by this particular proc? assembly-line to its storage place.
ess, in the same way an organism has the power So Armstrong's principle that properties must
to grow out of its zygote.20 Second, once con come with causal powers does not undermine

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 INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES 257

impure essences. Instead, I find that this principle plant this morning). It clearly is possible that
helps us to begin forming a clearer conception of nothing exemplifies this
impure property. So if
their nature. Chisholm's principle rules out all impure proper?
ties, then being the plant that grows from this bulb
IV in suitable environments could not be such that
something conceives of it while nothing
Roderick Chisholm, who endorsed impure indi? exemplifies it. But
clearly this is possible. This
vidual essences in Person and Object, rejects them particular tulip bulb is before me and I am thinking
in his recent book The First Per son.2X He rejects about the flower that will grow from it. I am con?
them, and all other impure properties, on the basis ceiving the impure property being the plant that
of this principle: grows from this in suitable environments. But sup?
pose that nothing will ever exemplify it (for exam?
Consider any property (other than the property of con?
ple, my daughter will dig up the bulb and throw it
ceiving and what it entails): If the property is possibly
such that nothing exemplifies it, then it is possibly away), then nothing exemplifies this impure prop?
such that (a) nothing exemplifies is and (b) something erty although something conceives of it.
conceives of it. [22] So Chisholm's principle does not rule out rela?
tional essences. In fact, it does not even rule out
He immediately adds: "This principle implies that ordinary impure properties that are exemplifiable
no property is such that it can be conceived only by more than one individual, for example being
by reference to a contingent thing." Properties that descended from Pope John Paul II. John Paul II
can be conceived only by reference to a contingent so nothing
presumably does not have descendants,
thing are impure properties. What Chisholm has in
exemplifies this property; but I am now conceiving
mind is that a purported property such as being
it, a property that can be conceived of only by
identical with Leibniz is ruled out because it does reference to a contingent individual.
not seem possible that something conceives of this In summary, Chisholm's principle does not rule
property while nothing exemplifies it. When out a property that can be conceived of only by
Leibniz does not exist, it seems that nothing can reference to a contingent that does not
thing
conceive of a property that can be conceived of that The bulb mentioned
exemplify property. tulip
only by reference to Leibniz.23 above does not exemplify the essence being the
It is not the case that Chisholm's principle plant that grows from this bulb in suitable environ?
implies that no property is such that it can be con? ments, and John Paul II does not exemplify the
ceived of only by reference to a contingent thing. descended John
impure property being from Pope
First, it is not obvious that it rules out haecceities. Paul II. At best, Chisholm's principle implies that
If there were an omniscient being with knowledge no property is such that it can be conceived only
of all possibilities, then, it seems, such a being to a contingent
by reference thing that also
could conceive of the property being identical with that property, that is, at best it rules
exemplifies
Leibniz even when Leibniz does not exist. Such a out haecceities.
being would conceive of this property without the
existence of Leibniz when deciding whether or not V
anything should exemplify it, and deciding that
nothing should exemplify it. The most compelling reason for rejecting impure
But even if we deny that there could be such an essences is that it is not clear how they should be
omniscient being and grant that Chisholm's prin? analyzed. We can find this reason in Chisholm's
ciple rules out haecceities, it still is not the case First Person, as well as Michael Loux's Substance
and Attribute. Chisholm writes:
that his principle implies that there are no impure
properties. Consider the relational essence being But if I can grasp my individual essence, then I ought
the plant that grows from this bulb in suitable envi? also to be able to single out in it those features that
ronments (referring to a particular bulb I intend to are unique to it. If being identical with me is my

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 258 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

individual essence and being identical with you is of being the table made from that chunk of wood
yours, then, presumably, each analyses into person to certain plan P is a particular chunk
according
hood and something else as well?one something in of wood. Of course, often it will be difficult to
my case and another in yours?but I haven't the fain?
specify the individuating component of a relational
test idea what this something else might be.[24]
essence because itwill not be clear what the relevant
Loux, who does not deny the existence of impure relational essence is. For instance, it is not clear
individual essences, also wonders about what the to me what a relational essence of Earth or a par?
individuating component of an impure essence ticular molecule might be. But in general we can
be. He writes:
might say that the individuating component of a relational
essence is the individual or group of individuals
Individual essences enable the ontologist to clarify the
notion of a substance only if it is possible for him to that the essence "incorporates."

identify in non-trivial terms the uniquely individuating With this inmind, I suggest that the individuating
component in virtue of which the individual component of being identical with me that distin?
essences.. .differ. But it is unclear that this is possible. it from other haecceities is a relational
guishes
What, for example, is it to exemplify the attribute of essence. What is it to be me? One unique, essential
being identical with Socrates! Presumably, it is to be
a living substance of a certain kind?a human being;
feature I have ismy biological origin in a particular
fertilized egg. This distinguishes me from you, Soc?
but, of course, there has to be more here, some
rates and every other individual that exists or might
uniquely individuating feature in virtue of which being
identical with Socrates is an attribute distinct from have existed. So, an individuating component of
being identical with Plato.... It is difficult, however, my haecceity is the relational essence being the
to see how we can identify this additional component human being that grows from Alpha in suitable
except in the most blatantly circular terms?as the environments. This does not mean that my haec?
attribute of being identical with Socrates. [25]
ceity is identical with this relational essence or that
I do not have other relational essences. All this
This request for an analysis of haecceities may be
means is that this relational essence is one indi?
resisted by taking them to be simple, unanalyzable
viduating component of my haecceity. The other
properties.26 There is no individuating component
of being identical with Socrates', what does the components of my haecceity, I suggest, are all the
other necessary attributes I have.27
individuating is the haecceity itself, not one of its
I think that it behooves us More generally, I suggest that every individual
components. However,
to accept this challenge. Without an answer to this has at least one relational essence, and that this
as essence is an individuating component of this indi?
challenge, it is too easy to dismiss haecceities
and unintelligible. In any case, I think vidual's haecceity. Now, I do not know whether
mysterious
or not the origins of individuals will always provide
there is something intelligible and informative that
us with relational essences, but I think that the
can be said about the individuating components of
haecceities. metaphysical hypothesis that every individual has
unique and essential origins is worthy of investiga?
Before I suggest what this component might be,
note that although Loux and Chisholm seem to tion. The origins of objects play a major role in

think that their challenge covers all individual the explanations of the natural and social sciences,
in fact if affects only haecceities. It is and if this metaphysical hypothesis turns out to be
essences,
clear what the individuating defensible, we will be able not only to understand
reasonably compo?
nents are of many relational essences. For example, why genetic explanations are so common, but also
the individuating component of being the human why they can be legitimate. If origins are unique
that grows from Alpha in suitable environ? and essential, then successful genetic explanations
being
ments is a particular zygote, namely the one from will tell us something about the natures of the indi?
which I developed. The individuating component viduals around us.

Xavier University Received June 11, 1986

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 INDIVIDUAL ESSENCES 259

NOTES

1. Roderick Chisholm, "Identity Through Possible Worlds: Some Questions," Nous, vol. 1 (1967), pp. 1-8, and David Kaplan,
"Transworld Heir Lines," inMichael Loux (ed.), The Possible and the Actual (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1979),pp. 88-109.

2. Alvin Plantinga, "Actualism and Possible Worlds," Theoria, vol. 42 (1976), pp. 139-160.

3. Baruch Brody, Identity and Essence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980); Alfred North Whitehead and Bertrand

Russell, Principia Mathematica, Vol. I, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1957), p. 57; and Nicholas Wolterstorff,

"Bergmann's Constituent Ontology," Nous, vol. 3 (1970), pp. 109-134.

4. Roderick Chisholm, Person and Object: A Metaphysical Study (La Salle: Open Court Press, 1976), pp. 36-37 and 174.

5. Lawrence B. Lombard, "Events and the Essentiality of Time," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 12 (1982), pp. 1-17.

6. Alvin Plantinga, The Nature of Necessity (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1974), p. 70ff, and "The Boethian Compromise," American

Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 15 (1978), pp. 129-138. Also Michael Lockwood, "On Predicating Proper Names," Philosophical
Review, vol. 84 (1975), pp. 471-498; and my "Idealism, Cataclysms and the Facts of Reference," Australasian Journal of
Philosophy, vol. 61 (1983), pp. 68-77.

7. See Loux, Substance and Attribute (Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1978), p. 133; Nathan U. Salmon, Essence and Reference (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1981), p. 19ff; or Alan McMichael, "A Problem for Actualism about Possible Worlds," Philosophical
Review, vol. 92 (1983), pp. 49-66, for some different ways of characterizing this distinction. The most adequate characterization
is Loux's.

8. For a recent statement of this point see Robert M. Adams, "Actualism and Thisness," Synthese, vol. 49 (1981), pp. 3-42.

9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. For a discussion of the original literature on the necessity of origins see Salmon, op cit., pp. 193-216. The formulation of
the artifactual essence is due to Salmon, p. 21 Of. An example of an essence for a natural, inorganic individual is being the granitic
rock that crystallized from that volume of magma.
11. W. R. Carter, "Salmon on Artifact Origins and Lost Possibilities," Philosophical Review, vol. 92 (1983), pp. 223-31; R.
Elliot and A. Gallois, "Would It Have Been Me (Against the Necessity of Origins)," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol.
62 (1984), pp. 292-93; M. S. Price, "On the Non-Necessity of Origin," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 12 (1982), pp.
33-45; H. Sarkar, "Origins and Identities," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 60 (1982), pp. 140-51; J. Tlumak, "On

Origins and Identities," Australasian Journal of Philosophy, vol. 62 (1984), pp. 169-73; and T. Scaltsas, "Identity, Origin and

Spatio-temporal Continuity," Philosophy, vol. 56 (1981), pp. 394-402.

12. These remarks do not resolve the major problem for the necessity of origins, namely that this view is faced with this choice:
Either an object must originate in exactly the same bit of matter as the bit from which it actually originated, or, it is possible that
an object originates in distinct but sufficiently matter. The first alternative seems "inflexible," while the other leads
overlapping
to paradoxes that can be resolved only by weakening certain modal principles. (See Salmon, op cit., p. 229-52 as well as his

"Impossible Worlds," Analysis, vol. 44 (1984), pp. 114-17.) Suffice it to say here that I incline towards the first alternative, and
that whether or not it is inflexible on how the material out of which an object is individuated.
depends originates
13. Universals and Scientific Realism, Vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1980), p. 93.
14. Ibid., Vol. II, pp. 15 and 78. In fact, for Armstrong a predicate that involves essential reference to an individual "cannot
even be aprima facie case of a universal" (Ibid., p. 15).

15. Ibid., Vol. I, pp. 11-12.

16. Leibniz, Correspondence with Arnauld, IX and XIII-XIV. See Ian Hacking, "Individual Substance," in H. G. Frankfurt (ed.),
Leibniz: A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City: Anchor Books, 1972), pp. 137-53.

17. For a similar point see Plantinga's response to Kit Fine in J. E. Tomberlin and P. van (eds.), Alvin
Inwagen Plantinga
(Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1985), p. 338.
18. Loux, Substance and Attribute, op cit., p. 133.

19. Armstrong, op cit., Vol. II, p. 11. Also, What is a Law of Nature? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983),p. 83.
20. One might also say that the table is the end or goal of this particular construction process and thus it has the power of a final
cause of this process.

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 260 AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL QUARTERLY

21. First Person: An Essay on Reference and Intentionality of Minnesota Press, 1981).
(Minneapolis: University
22. Ibid., p. 7.
23. This argument is echoed in Alan McMichael, op cit., p. 60. See my response, "No Problem for Actualism," Philosophical
Review, vol. 95 (1986), pp. 95-97.

24. First Person, op cit., p. 16.

25. Substance and Attribute, op cit., p. 177.

26. This is true of Adams as well as Plantinga. See Adams, "Primitive Thisness and Primitive Identity," Journal of Philosophy,
vol. 76 (1979), pp. 5-26; Plantinga in Tomberlin and van Inwagen, op cit., pp. 339-40.

27. For a brief argument why haecceities cannot be identified with relational essences, see Adams, "Actualism and Thisness,"

op cit., p. 5.

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