35 People vs. Pariarca, JR PDF

11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 341
464 PREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

People vs. Pariarca, Jr.
*
G.R. No. 135457. September 29, 2000.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

JOSE PATRIARCA, JR., alias “KA DJANGO,” “CARLOS
NARRA,” alias “KA JESSIE” and TEN (10) JOHN DOES,
accused-appellant.
Political Law; Amnesty; Amnesty commonly denotes a general

pardon to rebels for their treason or other high political offenses,
or the forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another, who have offended, by some breach, the law of nations.—
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for their
treason or other high political offenses, or the forgiveness which
one sovereign grants to the subjects of another, who have
offended, by some breach, the law of nations. Amnesty looks
backward, and abolishes and puts into oblivion, the offense itself;
it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which he is
charged, that the person
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
465
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 465
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016e3740411f1591306c003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/26
released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he

had committed no offense.
Same; Same; Criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.—Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty and all its
effects.
Same; Same; Pardon; Distinction between pardon and
amnesty.—In the case of People vs. Casido, the difference
between pardon and amnesty is given: “Pardon is granted by the
Chief Executive and as such it is a private act which must be
pleaded and proved by the person pardoned, because the courts
take no notice thereof; while amnesty by Proclamation of the
Chief Executive with the concurrence of Congress, is a public act
of which the courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted
to one after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political offenses,
generally before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution
and sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and
relieves the offender from the consequences of an offense of which
he has been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the
punishment, and for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration
of the rights to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless
such rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,’ and
it ‘in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36,
Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks backward and
abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks
and obliterates the offense with which he is charged that the
person released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as
though he had committed no offense.”
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Br. 52.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Gil S. Gojol for accused-appellant.
466
466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

BUENA, J .:
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of

“Ka Django,” “Carlos Narra” and “Ka Jessie,” appeals the
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52, in Criminal Case No. 2773 entitled “People of
the Philippines versus Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias ‘Ka
Django,’ ‘Carlos Narra,’ ‘Ka Jessie,’ and 21 John Does”
convicting him of murder and sentencing him to reclusion
perpetua.
On August 16, 1990, an information for murder was
filed against Jose Patriarca, Jr., alias “Ka Django,” “Carlos
Narra,” “Ka Jessie,” et al., charging them of murder
committed as follows:
“That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00

o’clock in the evening in the Municipality of Donsol, Province of
Sorsogon, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring,
confederating and mutually helping one another, armed with
guns, forcibly took away ALFREDO AREVALO from his
residence and brought him to Sitio Abre, Mabihi, Donsol,
Sorsogon, and did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation, attack, assault and shoot ALFREDO AREVALO
thereby inflicting upon him mortal wounds, which directly caused
his death to the damage and prejudice of his legal heirs.
“CONTRARY TO LAW.”
Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged

with Murder for the killing of one Rudy de Borja and a
certain Elmer Cadag under Informations docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 2665 and 2672, respectively.
Upon arraignment on November 25, 1993, accused-
appellant, assisted by his counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the crimes charged. Joint trial of the three cases
was conducted considering the substantial identity of the
facts and circumstances of the case.
Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June

30, 1987, the accused, with ten (10) armed companions,
requested permission to rest in his house, which was
granted. They had with them a person who was hogtied.
Accused Patriarca asked that the lights in Malta’s house
be extinguished and Malto complied.
467
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 467

Around 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987,

Malto was awakened by a gunshot. When he looked out, he
saw Patriarca holding a gun and ordering the person who
was hogtied to lie down. After several minutes, Malto
heard two gunshots. He then heard the accused direct his
companions to carry away the dead man.
Nonito Malto, later on, learned that the dead man was
Alfredo Arevalo when Patriarca went back to his place,
together with the military, on March 29, 1990.
The skeletal remains of Alfredo Arevalo were recovered
in the property of a Rubuang Tolosa and were identified by
Elisa Arevalo, the mother of the victim.
The second witness for the prosecution was Elisa
Arevalo. She knew Patriarca, alias “Ka Django,” as he told
her on March 10, 1987 not to let her son join the military.
She, however, replied that they were only seeking
employment. Her son Alfredo was her companion in
attending to their farm and he was a member of the
Civilian Home Defense Force (CHDF) in their locality.
After she was informed by her tenant Alegria Moratelio
Alcantara that her son was abducted by the New People’s
Army (NPA) led by Patriarca, she reported the matter to
the military and looked for him. She was informed by the
residents of the place where the NPA passed, that they
saw her son hogtied, that her son even asked for drinking
water, and complained that he was being maltreated by
the NPA. After three days of searching, a certain Walter
Ricafort, an NPA member and a relative of hers, notified
her that her son Alfredo was killed by Jose Patriarca, Jr.
In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise

informed her of her son’s death in the hands of Ka Django.
Consequently, a Death Certificate was issued by the Local
Civil Registrar.
When the skeletal remains of a man were recovered, she
was able to identify them as belonging to her son by reason
of the briefs found in the burial site. Her son, Alfredo
Arevalo, used to print his name on the waistband of his
briefs so that it would not get lost.
The defense presented accused Jose Patriarca, Jr. and
Francisco Derla who admitted that accused is a member of
the NPA operat-
468

ing in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the

victims in the three criminal cases filed against him.
On January 20, 1998, a decision was rendered
convicting the accused and imposing the following penalty:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused

Jose Patriarca, Jr. alias Ka Django, alias Carlos Narra guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder for the death of
Alfredo Arevalo and hereby sentences him to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua with all the accessory
provided by law and to pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity to the heirs of the victim Alfredo Arevalo, without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and as regards
Crim. Case No. 2665 and Crim. Case No. 2672, for failure of the
prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, said Jose Patriarca alias Carlos Narra, Ka Django, is
hereby acquitted.
“In the service of his sentence, the accused shall be given full
credit of his period of detention.
“With cost de-oficio.
1
“SO ORDERED.”
Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the

following lone error allegedly committed by the trial court:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-

APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER, AN
OFFENSE COMMITTED IN PURSUANCE OR IN
FURTHERANCE OF REBELLION.
Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under

Proclamation No. 724 amending Proclamation No. 347,
dated March 25, 1994, entitled “Granting Amnesty to
Rebels, Insurgents, and All Other Persons Who Have or
May Have Committed Crimes Against Public Order, Other
Crimes Committed in Furtherance of Political Ends, and
Violations of the Article of War, and Creating a National
Amnesty Commission.” His application was favorably
granted by the National Amnesty Board. Attached to
appellant’s brief is the Notice of Resolution of the National
Amnesty Commission (NAC) dated November 17, 1999
which states:
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 56.
469
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 469

“Quoted below is a resolution 2 of the National Amnesty

Commission dated 22 October 1998.
‘RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683 refers to Application No. 02125
of MR. JOSE NARRA PATRIARCA filed with the Local Amnesty
Board of Legazpi City on 18 February 1997.
‘Applicant admitted joining the NPA in 1977. He served under
the Sandatahang Yunit Pampropaganda and participated in the
following armed activities:
‘a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay

Hirawon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 14 February 1986;
‘b) Encounter with elements of the Philippine Constabulary
at Barangay Godon, Donsol, Sorsogon on 15 February
1986;
‘c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay

Banwang, Gurang, Donsol, Sorsogon in 1987;
‘d) Liquidation of ELMER CADAG an alleged military
informer at Barangay Boroan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 21
March 1987, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 2672 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
‘e) Liquidation of a certain RUDY DEBORJA, a thief and
nuisance of the community, at Donsol, Sorsogon, on 09
March 1984, in which a case of Murder in Criminal Case
No. 2665 was filed against him before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
‘f) Liquidation of a certain ALEJANDRINO MILITANTE for
his misconducts at San Antonio, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 12
February 1986, in which a case of Murder in Criminal
Case No. 2664 was filed against him before the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
‘g) Liquidation of a certain ALFREDO AREVALO, a former
member of the CHDF at Sitio Abe (sic), Mabini, Donsol,
Sorsogon, on 30 June 1987, in which a case of Murder in
Criminal Case No. 2773 was filed against him before the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon;
‘h) Liquidation of one DOMINGO DONQUILLO, a barangay
captain, at Barangay Tinanogan, Donsol, Sorsogon, on 20
September 1986 in which a (sic) Criminal Case No. 2663
was filed against him.
_______________
2 Per Notice of Correction of the NAC dated March 1, 2000 the date
reflected in the Notice of Resolution of November 17, 1999 was corrected
to October 22, 1999.
470

‘After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of

the applicant, the Local Amnesty Board concluded that his
activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus

recommended on 20 May 1998 the grant of his application for
amnesty.
The Commission, in its deliberation on the application on 22
October 1999, resolved to approve the recommendation of the
Local Amnesty Board.
WHEREFORE, the application for amnesty of MR. JOSE
NARRA PATRIARCA under Proclamation No. 724 is hereby
GRANTED for rebellion constituted by the acts detailed above,
provided they were committed on or before the date he was
captured on 22 June 1988. Let a Certificate of Amnesty be issued
in his favor as soon as this Resolution becomes final. It shall
become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days from
receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration
3
is filed
with the Commission by any party within said period.’ ”
On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of

the National Amnesty Commission, wrote the following
letter to the Provincial Prosecutor of Sorsogon, Sorsogon:
“Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca”
“Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting

herewith the attached copy of RESOLUTION NO. D-99-8683
granting amnesty to JOSE N. PATRIARCA. The grantee was
accused of the following cases:
“1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the

Regional Trial Court, Branch 52, Sorsogon, Sorsogon.
“He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon,

Sorsogon.
“The purpose of this transmittal is to provide you, as the chief
prosecutor of the province, the opportunity to take whatever
action you may
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 58-59.
471
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 471

deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty

shall become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) calendar days
from receipt of this Notice, unless a Motion for Reconsideration is
filed with the Commission by any party within said period. 4
“Thank you for your continued support for the Peace Process.”
The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June

23, 2000 to the National Amnesty Commission, requested
information as to whether or not a motion for
reconsideration was filed by any 5party, and the action, if
there was any, taken by the NAC.
In his reply dated June 28, 2000, NAC Chairman
Tadiar wrote, among other things, that there6 has been no
motion for reconsideration filed by any party.
Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. was granted
amnesty under Proclamation No. 724 dated May 17, 1996.
It amended Proclamation No. 347 dated March 25, 1994.
Section 1 of Proclamation No. 724 reads thus:
“Section 1. Grant of Amnesty.—Amnesty is hereby granted to all

persons who shall apply therefor and who have or may have
committed crimes, on or before June 1, 1995, in pursuit of their
political beliefs, whether punishable under the Revised Penal
Code or special laws, including but not limited to the following:
rebellion or insurrection; coup d’etat; conspiracy and proposal to
commit rebellion, insurrection, or coup d’etat; disloyalty of public
officers or employees; inciting to rebellion or insurrection;
sedition; conspiracy to commit sedition; inciting to sedition;
illegal assembly; illegal association; direct assault; indirect
assault; resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or
agents of such person; tumults and other disturbances of public
order; unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful
utterances; alarms and scandals; illegal possession of firearms,
ammunitions, and explosives, committed in furtherance of,
incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and

insurrection; and violations of Articles 59 (desertion), 62 (absence
without leave), 67 (mutiny or sedition), 68 (failure to suppress
mutiny or sedition), 94 (various crimes), 96 (conduct unbecoming
an officer and gentleman), and 97 (general article) of the Articles
of War; Provided, That the amnesty
_______________
4 Ibid., p. 63.
5 Ibid., pp. 69-70.
6 Ibid., p. 89.
472

shall not cover crimes against chastity and other crimes for
personal ends.”
Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for

their treason or other high political offenses, or the
forgiveness which one sovereign grants to the subjects of
another,7 who have offended, by some breach, the law of
nations. Amnesty looks backward, and abolishes and puts
into oblivion, the offense itself; it so overlooks and
obliterates the offense with which he is charged, that the
person released by amnesty stands before8
the law precisely
as though he had committed no offense.
Paragraph 3 of Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that criminal liability is totally extinguished by
amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty9 and
all its effects. In the case of People vs. Casido, the
difference between pardon and amnesty is given:
“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a

private act which must be pleaded and proved by the person
pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof; while
amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with the
concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the courts
should take judicial notice. Pardon is granted to one after
conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of persons or
communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally

before or after the institution of the criminal prosecution and
sometimes after conviction. Pardon looks forward and relieves the
offender from the consequences of an offense of which he has
been convicted, that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment,
and for that reason it does ‘not work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,’ and it ‘in no case
exempts the culprit from the payment of the civil indemnity
imposed upon him by the sentence’ (Article 36, Revised Penal
Code). While amnesty looks backward and abolishes and puts
into oblivion the offense itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the
offense with which he is charged that the person released by
amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he had
committed no offense.”
_______________
7 202 SCRA 844, 867 [1991].

8 Barrioquinto, et al. vs. Fernandez, et al, 82 Phil. 642 [1949].
9 269 SCRA 360 [1997].
473
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 473

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty

upon accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. Once
granted, it is 10
binding and effective. It serves to put an end
to the appeal.
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the
decision of the Regional Trial Court at Sorsogon, Sorsogon,
Branch 52 in Griminal Case No. 2773 is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant Jose N. Patriarca, Jr. is
hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of murder. 11
Pursuant to Resolution No. D-99-8683, Criminal Case
Nos. 2663 and 2664, which are both filed in12the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 53, Sorsogon, Sorsogon, are ordered
DISMISSED. The release of Jose N. Patriarca who is
presently detained at the Provincial Jail of Sorsogon is
likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some

other legal cause.
The Director of Prisons is ordered to report within ten
(10) days his compliance with this decision;
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and

De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-appellant

acquitted. Criminal Case Nos. 2663 and 2664 ordered
dismissed.
Note.—Amnesty is the proclamation of the Chief

Executive with the concurrence of Congress and it is a
public act of which the courts should take judicial notice.
(People vs. Casido, 269 SCRA 360 [1997])
——o0o——
_______________
10 People vs. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 [1984].

11 In the decision rendered by the trial court on January 20, 1998,
accused-appellant had already been acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 2665
and 2672 for failure of the prosecution to prove accused’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
12 See letter of Judge Honesto A. Villamor of the Regional Trial Court
at Sorsogon, Sorsogon, Branch 52 dated May 31, 1999; Rollo, p. 28.
474

Amnesty and Pardon as Modes of Extinguishing Criminal
Liability Revisited
ANNOTATION
AMNESTY AND PARDON AS MODES OF

EXTINGUISHING CRIMINAL LIABILITY REVISITED
*
JULIANA C. AZARRAGA
§ 1. Definitions, p. 474
§ 2. Amnesty distinguished from pardon, p. 475
§ 3. Legal basis, p. 476
A. Constitution, p. 476
B. Statutes, p. 476
§ 4. Presidential Act of clemency not subject to judicial

review. Exceptions, p. 477
§ 5. Nature of the power of the President to grant
executive clemency, p. 478
A. Types of pardon, p. 478

B. Nature of pardon, p. 478
C. Pardon to be extended only after conviction by final
judgment, p. 478
§ 6. A review of Philippine laws on Presidential

pardons, p. 479
§ 7. Principle behind the requirement of final
conviction, p. 481
§ 8. Essence of pardon, p. 481
§ 9. Presidential clemency of pardon not limited to
criminal cases, p. 482
§ 10. Effects of pardon, p. 484
_______________
§ 1. Definitions
Amnesty is defined as an act of sovereign power granting

oblivion or pardon for a past offense, and is rarely, if ever,
exercised in favor of a single individual, and is usually
exerted in behalf of cer-
_______________
* Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City.
475
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 475

Liability Revisited
tain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have

not yet been convicted (Brown vs. Walker, 161 U.S. 602).
Pardon is an act of grace proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws which exempts
the individual on whom it is bestowed from the
punishment the law inflicts for the crime he has
committed (Reyes, The Revised Penal Code).
§ 2. Amnesty distinguished from pardon
Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is

a private act which must be pleaded and proved by the
person pardoned, because the courts take no notice thereof;
while amnesty by Proclamation of the Chief Executive with
the concurrence of Congress, is a public act of which the
courts should take judicial notice. Pardon is one granted
after conviction; while amnesty is granted to classes of
persons or communities who may be guilty of political
offenses, generally before or after the institution of the
criminal prosecution and sometimes after conviction.
Pardon looks forward and relieves the offender from the
consequences of an offense of which he has been convicted,
that is, it abolishes or forgives the punishment, and for
that reason it does “not work the restoration of the rights
to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such
rights be expressly restored by the terms of the pardon,”
and it “in no case exempts the culprit from the payment of
the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence”
(Article 36, Revised Penal Code). While amnesty looks
backward and abolishes and puts into oblivion the offense
itself, it so overlooks and obliterates the offense with which
he is charged that the person released by amnesty stands
before the law precisely as though he had committed no
offense (Barrioquinto vs. Fernandez, 82 Phil. 642 [1949]).
Pardon does not alter the fact that accused is a

recidivist, because it produces the extinction only of the
personal effects of the penalty (U.S. vs. Satelo, 28 Phil. 147
[1914]).
Amnesty makes an ex-convict no longer a recidivist
because it obliterates the last vestige of the crime (U.S. vs.
Francisco, 10 Phil. 185 [1908]).
Both do not extinguish the civil liability of the offender
(Art. 113, Revised Penal Code).
476

Liability Revisited
Examples of Presidential Proclamations granting amnesty

are Presidential Proclamation No. 51, dated January 28,
1948, by Pres. Manuel Roxas, granting amnesty to those
who collaborated with the enemy during World War II (44
O.G. 408); Proclamation No. 76, dated June 21, 1948, by
Pres. Elpidio Quirino, extending amnesty to the Huks and
PKM (Pambansang Kaisahan ng mga Magbubukid), who
committed rebellion, sedition, illegal association, etc. (44
O.G. 1794); and Proclamation No. 347, entitled Granting
Amnesty to Rebels, Insurgents, And All Other Persons
Who Have Or May Have Committed Crimes Against
Public Order, Other Crimes Committed In Furtherance of
Political Ends, and Violations Of The Articles of War, And
Creating A National Amnesty Commission, issued on
March 25, 1994.
§ 3. Legal basis
A. Constitution,
Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution provides:
“Sec. 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise

provided in this Constitution, the President may grant reprieves,
commutations and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after

conviction by final judgment.
“He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all the Members of Congress.”
B. Statutes.
Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:
“Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.—Criminal

liability is totally extinguished:
“x x x x x x
“3. By amnesty, which completely extinguishes the penalty
and all its effects.
“4. By absolute pardon,
“x x x x x x.”
477
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 477

Liability Revisited
§ 4. Presidential Act of clemency not subject to

judicial review. Exceptions
In the case of Tañada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al.,

103 Phil. 1051 (1957), the Court said:
“Elsewhere in this treatise the well-known and well-established

principle is considered that it is not within the province of the
courts to pass judgment upon the policy of legislative or executive
action. Where therefore, discretionary powers are granted by the
Constitution or by statute, the manner in which those powers are
exercised is not subject to judicial review. The courts, therefore
concern themselves only with the question as to the existence and
extent of these discretionary powers.
“As distinguished from the judicial, the legislative and
executive departments are spoken of as the political departments
of government because in very many cases their action is
necessarily dictated by considerations of public or political policy.
These considerations of public or political policy of course will not

permit the legislature to violate constitutional provisions, or the
executive to exercise authority not granted him by the
Constitution or by statute, but, within these limits, they do
permit the departments, separately or together, to recognize that
a certain set of facts exists or that a given status exists, and
these determinations, together with the consequences that flow
therefrom, may not be traversed in the courts.” (Willoughby on
the Constitution of the United States, Vol. 3, p. 1326).
x x x x x x
“What is generally meant, when it is said that a question is
political, and not judicial, is that it is a matter which is to be
exercised by the people in their primary political capacity, or that
it has been specifically delegated to some other department or
particular officer of the government, with discretionary power to
act. x x x x x x Thus, the Legislature may in its discretion
determine whether it will pass a law or submit a proposed
constitutional amendment to the people. The courts have no
judicial control over such matters, not merely because they
involve political question, but because they are matters which the
people have by the Constitution delegated to the Legislature. The
Governor may exercise the powers delegated to him, free from
judicial control, so long as he observes the laws and acts within
the limits of the power conferred. His discretionary acts cannot
be controllable, not primarily because they are of a political
nature, but because the Constitution and laws have placed the
particular matter under his control. But every officer under a
constitutional
478

Liability Revisited
government must act according to law and subject him to the

restraining and controlling power of the people, acting through
the courts, as well as through the executive or the Legislature.
One department is just as representative as the other, and the
judiciary is the department which is charged with the special
duty of determining the limitations which the law places upon all
official action. x x x x x x.”
§ 5. Nature of the power of the President to grant

executive clemency
Executive clemency is a matter within the exclusive

prerogative of the President whose decision thereon should
not be unduly insulated against any tenuous importunity.
Pardon as an act of Executive clemency.
A. Types of pardon .
1. Absolute Pardon
2. Conditional Pardon.
B. Nature of pardon .
A pardon, whether absolute or conditional, is in the nature
of a deed, for the validity of which delivery is an
indispensable requisite. Until accepted, all that may have
been done is a matter of intended favor and may be
cancelled. But once accepted by the grantee, the pardon
already delivered cannot be revoked by the authority
which granted it.
C. Pardon to be extended only after conviction by final

judgment .—
Rule:
The conviction by “final judgment” limitation under
Section 19, Article VII of the present Constitution
prohibits the grant of pardon, whether full or conditional,
to an accused during the pendency of an appeal from his
conviction by the trial court. Any application therefor, if
one is made, should not be acted upon or the process
toward its grant should not be begun unless the appeal is
withdrawn. Accordingly, the agencies or instrumentalities
of the Government concerned must require proof from the
accused that he has not appealed from his conviction or
that he has withdrawn his appeal. Such proof may be in
the form of a certification issued by
479
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 479

Liability Revisited
the trial court or the appellate court, as the case may be.
The acceptance of the pardon shall not operate as an
abandonment or waiver of the appeal, and the release of
an accused by virtue of a pardon, commutation of sentence,
or parole before the withdrawal of an appeal shall render
those responsible therefor administratively liable.
Accordingly, those in custody of the accused must not
solely rely on the pardon as a basis for the release of the
accused from confinement (People vs. Salle, Jr., 250 SCRA
581 [1995]).
Pardon extended during the pendency of an appeal or
before conviction by final judgment is void, it being in
violation of Section 19, Article VII of the Constitution
(supra ).
§ 6. A review of Philippine laws on Presidential

pardons
1. Jones Law (Philippine Autonomy Act)

Section 21 thereof provides:
“SEC. 21. That the supreme executive power shall be vested in an

executive officer, whose official title shall be The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands’ . . . He is hereby vested with
the exclusive power to grant pardons and reprieves and remit
fines and forfeitures. . . ”
2. Then came the 1935 Constitution, paragraph 6, Section

10, Article VII of which provides:
“(6) The President shall have the power to grant reprieves,

commutations, and pardons and remit fines and forfeitures, after
conviction, for all offenses, except in case of impeachment, upon
such condition and with such restrictions and limitations as he
may deem proper to impose. He shall have the power to grant
amnesty with the concurrence of Congress.”
This provision differed from the Jones Law in some

respects. Thus, in People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937), this
Court held:
“Under the Jones Law, as at common law, pardon could be

granted any time after the commission of the offense, either
before or after conviction (Vide, Constitution of the U.S., Art. II,
section 2; In re: Lontok [1922] 43 Phil. 293). The Governor-
General of the Philippines was empowered, like the President of
the United States, to pardon a person before the fact of the case
were fully brought to light. The framers of our Constitution
thought this undesirable and, following most of the State
Constitutions,
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provided that the pardoning power can only be exercised ‘after

conviction.’ ”
The requirement of after conviction operated as one of the

limitations on the pardoning power of the President, thus:
“It should be observed that there are two limitations upon the
exercise of this constitutional prerogative by the Chief Executive,
namely: (a) that the power be exercised after conviction; and (b)
that such power does not extend to cases of impeachment”
(Cristobal vs. Labrador, 71 Phil. 34, 38 [1940].
3. The 1973 Constitution went further by providing that

pardon could be granted after final conviction. Section 14
of Article IX thereof reads as follows:
“The Prime Minister may, except in cases of impeachment, grant

reprieves, commutations, and pardons, remit fines and
forfeitures, and, with the concurrence of the National Assembly,
grant amnesty.”
4. The 1981 amendments to the 1973 Constitution,

however, removed the limitation of final conviction,
thereby bringing us back to the aforementioned provision
of the Jones Law. Section II, Article VII of the 1973

Constitution, as thus amended, reads:
“The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant

reprieves, commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures,
and with the concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant
amnesty.”
But the said limitations was restored by the present

Constitution. Section 19, Article VII thereof reads as
follows:
“Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this

Constitution, the President may grant reprieves, commutations
and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the
concurrence of a majority of all Members of the Congress
(Emphasis supplied).”
Where the pardoning power is subject to the limitation of

conviction, it may be exercised at any time after conviction
even if the judgment is on appeal. It is of course entirely
different where the requirement is “final conviction,” as
mandated in the original pro-
481
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 481

Liability Revisited
vision of Section 19, Article IX of the 1973 Constitution or

“conviction by final judgment,” as presently prescribed in
Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. In such a
case, no pardon may be extended before a judgment of
conviction becomes final.
§ 7. Principle behind the requirement of final

conviction
The reason the Constitutional Commission adopted the

“conviction by final judgment” requirement, reviving in
effect the power, was, as expounded by Commissioner
Napoleon Rama, to prevent the President from exercising
executive power in derogation of the judicial power (Record
of the Constitution Commission, Vol. 2, 395).
§ 8. Essence of pardon
The very essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of

guilt and not forgetfulness. It does not erase the fact of the
commission of the crime and the conviction thereof. Pardon
frees the individual from all the penalties and legal
disabilities and restores to him all his civil rights. Unless
expressly grounded on the person’s innocence, it cannot
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair
dealing (Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr., 170 SCRA 190
[1989]).
If the pardon is based on the innocence of the
individual, it affirms his innocence and makes him a new
man and as innocent as if he had not been found guilty of
the offense charged. When a person is given pardon
because he did not truly commit the offense, the pardon
relieves the party from all punitive consequences of his
criminal act, thereby restoring to him his clean name, good
reputation and unstained character prior to the finding of
guilt (Garcia vs. Chairman, Commission on Audit, 226
SCRA 356 [1993]).
a) When judgment of conviction becomes final.
(a) When no appeal is seasonably perfected; (b) when
the accused commences to serve the sentence; (c) when the
right to appeal is expressly waived in writing, except
where the death penalty was imposed by the trial court;
and (d) when the accused applies for probation.
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b) Where the judgment of conviction is still pending

appeal, and has not therefore attained finality, executive
clemency may not be granted (People vs. Salle, Jr., supra ).
§ 9. Presidential clemency of pardon not limited to

criminal cases
In Llamas vs. Orbos, 202 SCRA 844, supra, the Court held:
We do not clearly see any valid and convincing reason
why the President cannot grant executive clemency in
administrative cases. It is Our considered view that if the
President can grant reprieves, commutations and pardons,
and remit fines and forfeitures in criminal cases, with
much more reason can she grant executive clemency in
administrative cases, which are clearly less serious than
criminal offenses.
“A number of laws impliedly or expressly recognize or support the

exercise of executive clemency in administrative cases.
Under Sec. 43 of P.D. 807, “in meritorious cases, x x x, the
President may commute or remove administrative penalties or
disabilities issued upon officers and employees, in disciplinary
cases, subject to such terms and conditions as he may impose in
the interest of the service.”
During the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, a
subject of deliberations was the proposed amendment to Article
VII, Sec. 19 which reads as follows: “However, the power to grant
executive clemency for violation of corrupt practices laws may be
limited by legislation. ” The Constitutional Commission, however,
voted to remove the amendment, since it was in derogation of the
powers of the President, x x x.
The proposal was primarily intended to prevent the President
from protecting his cronies. Manifestly, however, the Commission
preferred to trust in the discretion of Presidents and refrained
from putting additional limitations on his clemency powers (II
RECORD of the Constitutional Commission, 392, 418-419, 524-
525).
It is evident from the intent of the Constitutional Commission,
therefore, that the President’s executive clemency powers may
not be limited in terms of coverage, except as already provided in
the Constitution, that is, “no pardon, amnesty, parole, or
suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the

favorable recommendation of the COMELEC (Art. IX, C, Sec. 5,
Constitution). If those already adjudged guilty criminally in
483
VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 483

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court may be pardoned, those adjudged guilty administratively

should likewise be extended the same benefit.
In criminal cases, the quantum of evidence required to convict
an individual is beyond reasonable doubt, but the Constitution
grants to the President the power to pardon the act done by the
proved criminal and in the process exempts him from
punishment therefor. On the other hand, in administrative cases,
the quantum of evidence required is mere substantial evidence to
support a decision, not to mention that as to the admissibility of
evidence, administrative bodies are not bound by the technical
and rigid rules of admissibility prescribed in criminal cases. It
will therefore be unjust and unfair for those found guilty
administratively of some charge if the same effects of pardon or
executive clemency cannot be extended to them, even in the sense
of modifying a decision to subserve the interest of the public (p.
34, Comment of Public Respondent).
Of equal importance are the following provisions of Executive
Order No. 292, otherwise known as the Administrative Code of
1987, Section 1, Book III of which provides:
“SECTION 1. Power of Control.—The President shall have
control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He
shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
“SECTION 38. Definition of Administrative Relationships.—
Unless otherwise expressly stated in the Code or in other laws
defining the special relationships of particular agencies,
Administrative relationships shall be categorized and defined as
follows:
“(1) Supervision and Control.—Supervision and control shall
include authority to act directly whenever a specific function is
entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; direct the
performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts; review,
approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; determine priorities in the execution of plans

and programs. Unless a different meaning is explicitly provided
in the specific law governing the relationship of particular
agencies the “control” shall encompass supervision and control as
defined in this paragraph.” x x x (emphasis supplied).
e) Limitations on Power to grant executive clemency in

administrative cases .
The Court stressed, however, in the same case of
Llamas vs. Orbos, supra, that when it said the President
can grant executive clemency in administrative cases, it
refers only to all administra-
484

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tive cases in the Executive Branch, not in the Judicial or

Legislative branches of the government.
§ 10. Effects of pardon
Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code provides the effects of

pardon, to wit:
“ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.—A pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office, or the right of
suffrage, unless such rights be expressly restored by the terms of
the pardon.
“A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the
sentence.”
A pardon after serving 30 years does not remove perpetual

absolute disqualification.
Suppose a pardon is granted upon a convict undergoing
life imprisonment after serving 30 years. Is the convict
likewise pardoned from the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification which is an accessory to life
imprisonment?
No, because Article 30 is silent as to the maximum

duration of perpetual disqualification and Article 36
expressly provides that a pardon shall not work the
restoration of the right to hold public office or the right of
suffrage unless such rights be expressly restored by the
terms of the pardon. (Guevara) Reyes, The Revised Penal
Code, Book I.
——o0o——
485
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11/5/2019 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 341

464 PREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

Political Law; Amnesty; Amnesty commonly denotes a general

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 465

People vs. Pariarca, Jr.

released by amnesty stands before the law precisely as though he

APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

466 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr., with the aliases of

“That on or about the 30th day of June, 1987 at about 10:00

Accused-appellant Jose Patriarca, Jr. was also charged

Prosecution witness Nonito Malto testified that on June

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 467

Around 2:00 o’clock in the early morning of July 1, 1987,

In the municipal building, Nonito Malto likewise

468 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

ing in Donsol, Sorsogon, but denied ever abducting the

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant assigns the

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-

Accused-appellant applied for amnesty under

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 469

“Quoted below is a resolution 2 of the National Amnesty

‘a) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay

‘c) Encounter with the Philippine Army forces at Barangay

470 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

‘After a careful verification and evaluation on (sic) the claims of

activities were done in the pursuit of his political beliefs. It thus

On March 9, 2000, Hon. Alfredo F. Tadiar, Chairman of

“Notice of Amnesty Grant to Jose N. Patriarca”

“Pursuant to NAC Action No. 95-358-C, we are transmitting

“1. Murder in Criminal Case No. 2672 filed before the

“He is currently detained at the Provincial Jail, Sorsogon,

3 Rollo, pp. 58-59.

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 471

deem appropriate from receipt of this note. This grant of amnesty

The Office of the Solicitor General, in its letter dated June

“Section 1. Grant of Amnesty.—Amnesty is hereby granted to all

incident to, or in connection with the crimes of rebellion and

472 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Amnesty commonly denotes a general pardon to rebels for

“Pardon is granted by the Chief Executive and as such it is a

communities who may be guilty of political offenses, generally

7 202 SCRA 844, 867 [1991].

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 473

This Court takes judicial notice of the grant of amnesty

likewise ORDERED unless he is being detained for some

Bellosillo (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing and

Judgment reversed and set aside, accused-appellant

Note.—Amnesty is the proclamation of the Chief

10 People vs. Crisola, 128 SCRA 1 [1984].

474 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

AMNESTY AND PARDON AS MODES OF

§ 4. Presidential Act of clemency not subject to judicial

A. Types of pardon, p. 478

§ 6. A review of Philippine laws on Presidential

Amnesty is defined as an act of sovereign power granting

* Judge, Regional Trial Court, Br. 15, Roxas City.

VOL. 341, SEPTEMBER 29, 2000 475

tain classes of persons, who are subject to trial but have

§ 2. Amnesty distinguished from pardon