TITLE: Fule vs.

Court of Appeals
CITATION: 74 SCRA 189
TOPIC: Situs of the settlement of the estate

FACTS:
Fule filed a petition for letters of administration with ex-parte motion for her appointment as
special administratrix over the estate of Amado Garcia (Amado) before the CFI of Laguna, at
Calamba, alleging that Amado died intestate who owns a property in Calamba, Laguna, leaving
real estate and personal properties, within the jurisdiction of the court, which the court granted.

Preciosa, the wife of Amado, filed an MR, contending that the appointment of Fule as special
administratrix was issued without jurisdiction since no notice of the petition for letters of
administration has been served upon all persons interested in the estate. Pending resolution on
the MR, Preciosa filed a motion to remove Fule as special administratrix.

A notice of hearing for the petition of letters was posted in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication
of general circulation in Southern Luzon.

Preciosa then later received a supplemental petition for the appointment of regular administrator
filed by Virginia modifying the original petition which was opposed for the reasons, among
others, that it attempts to confer jurisdiction on CFI Laguna, of which the court was not
possessed at the beginning because of the deficient original petition.

An opposition was filed by Preciosa on both original and supplemental petition, raising the
issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia in the estate of Amado and the
disqualification of Virginia as administratix.

The judge issued an order denying the motion to remove Virginia as special administratix,
appointed Virginia as special administratix and admitting the supplemental petition of Virginia.

Hence, Preciosa moved to dismiss the petition because (1) jurisdiction over the petition or over
the parties in interest has not been acquired by the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3)
Virginia is not a party in interest as she is not entitle to inherit from Amado. The Judge of CFI
Laguna resolved that the special administratix is granted to Virginia; regarding the issue on
jurisdiction, that it was already resolved when the court denied the MR of the appointment of
Virginia and the supplemental petition which the court admitted cured the defect of failure to
indicate the place of residence of the decedent at the time of his death; the judge further held
that Preciosa submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had waived her objections thereto by
praying to be appointed as special administratix of the estate.

Virginia presented the death certificate of Amado showing that his residence at the time of his
death was Quezon City. Virginia also testified that Amado was residing in Calamba, Laguna at
the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the

Ramirez, Gerald S. Special Commercial Law (Thursday 7:30 – 9:30 PM)

first district of Laguna. While Preciosa presented the residence certificate of decedent Amado
showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.

A special action for certiorari was filed by Preciosa before the CA, which the court rendered
judgment annulling the proceedings before the CFI Laguna for lack of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether the CA was correct in its findings that the CFI Calamba, Laguna lacks juridiction over
the matter.

RULING:
Yes.

Section 1, Rule 73, on the clause “so far as it depends on the place of residence of the
decedent, or of the location of the estate,” is in reality a matter of venue. It could not have been
intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter, because such legal provision is
contained in a law of procedure dealing merely with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing,
jurisdiction over the subject matter is another. The power or authority of the court over the
subject matter “existed and was fixed before procedure in a given cause began.”

The Court ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado was at 11 Carmel Ave.
Carmel Subd., QC, and not at Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the
residence of the decedent at the time of his death. The pieces of evidence presented would
give the Court the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue of Virginia's petition for letters
of administration was improperly laid in the CFI Calamba, Laguna. The CA had reason to hold
that in asking to substitute Virginia as special administratrix, Preciosa did not necessarily waive
her objection to the jurisidiction or venue but merely resort to practical alternative remedy to
assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement of the Rule fixing the
proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the decedent.

The term “resides” connotes ex vi termini “actual residence” as distinguished from “legal
residence or domicile.” the term “resides,” like, the terms “residing and residence, is elastic and
should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is
employed. In the application of venue statues and rules- Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised
Rules of Court is of such nature- residence rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even
where the statute uses the word “domicile” still it is construed as meaning residence and not
domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms “residence”
and “domicile” but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and
convey the same meaning as the term “inhabitant”. in other words, “resides” should be viewed
or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a
person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual
stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is personal
residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an

Ramirez, Gerald S. Special Commercial Law (Thursday 7:30 – 9:30 PM)

inhabitant in a given lace, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.

TITLE: Eusebio vs. Eusebio

CITATION: 100 Phil. 593

FACTS:
Petitioner Eugenio Eusebio filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for his appointment as
administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio. He alleged that his father, who died on
November 28, 1952, resided in Quezon City. Eugenio’s siblings, stating that they are illegitimate
children of Andres, opposed the petition and alleged that Andres was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. They prayed that the case be dismissed upon the ground that venue had
been improperly laid.

The CFI of Rizal granted Eugenio’s petition and overruled his siblings’ objection.

ISSUE:
Whether or not venue had been properly laid in Rizal.

RULING:
No.

Don Andres Eusebio up to October 29, 1952, was and had always been domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. He only bought a house and lot at 889-A Espana Extension, Quezon City
because his son, Dr. Jesus Eusebio, who treated him, resided at No. 41 P. Florentino St.,
Quezon City. Even before he was able to transfer to the house he bought, Andres suffered a
stroke and was forced to live in his son’s residence. It is well settled that “domicile is not
commonly changed by presence in a place merely for one own’s health” even if coupled with
“knowledge that one will never again be able, on account of illness, to return home. Having
resided for over seventy years in Pampanga, the presumption is that Andres retained such
domicile.

Andres had no intention of staying in Quezon City permanently. There is no direct evidence of
such intent – Andres did not manifest his desire to live in Quezon City indefinitely; Eugenio did
not testify thereon; and Dr. Jesus Eusebio was not presented to testify on the matter. Andres did
not part with, or alienate, his house in San Fernando, Pampanga. Some of his children
remained in that municipality. In the deed of sale of his house at 889 – A Espana Ext., Andres
gave San Fernando, Pampanga, as his residence. The marriage contract signed by Andres
when he was married in articulo mortis to Concepcion Villanueva two days prior to his death
stated that his residence is San Fernando, Pampanga.

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if Andres Eusebio established another domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the
following conditions are essential, namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2)
physical presence at the place chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. Although
Andres complied with the first two requisites, there is no change of domicile because the third
requisite is absent.

Anent the contention that appellants submitted themselves to the authority of the CFI of Rizal
because they introduced evidence on the residence of the decedent, it must be noted that
appellants specifically made of record that they were NOT submitting themselves to the
jurisdiction of the court, except for the purpose only of assailing the same.

The court found that the decedent was, at the time of his death, domiciled in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The Court of First Instance of Rizal had no authority, therefore, to appoint an
administrator of the estate of the deceased, the venue having been laid improperly.

COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF EUSEBIO VS. EUSEBIO AND FULE VS. COURT OF

APPEALS ON THE TOPIC OF “RESIDENCY”

TITLE: Eusebio vs Eusebio

CITATION: 100 Phil. 593

FACTS: Petitioner filed with the Court of First Instance of Quezon City for his appointment as
the administrator of the estate of his father, Andres Eusebio, who resided in Quezon City.
Respondents objected the said petition on the basis that they were the illegitimate children of
Andres and that he was domiciled in San Fernando, Pampanga. They were praying that the
case should be dismissed on the ground of improper venue. The lower court overruled the
objection and granted the petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not Andres Eusebio was domiciled in Quezon City or San Ferndando,
Pampanga.

RULING:
The Supreme Court ruled that it was not disputed that Andres Eusebio was and had always
been domiciled in San Ferndando, Pampanga where he had his home as well as some other
properties. It being apparent from the foregoing that the domicile of origin of the decedent was
San Fernando, Pampanga, where he resided for over seventy (70 years, the presumption is
that he retained such domicile, and, hence, residence, in the absence of satisfactory proof to
the contrary, for it is well-settled that "a domicile once acquired is retained until a new domicile
is gained".

Under the circumstances surrounding the case at bar, if Andres Eusebio established another
domicile, it must have been one of choice, for which the following conditions are essential,
namely: (1) capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place

Ramirez, Gerald S. Special Commercial Law (Thursday 7:30 – 9:30 PM)

chosen; and (3) intention to stay therein permanently. There was no intention on the part of
the decedent to change his domicile. Hence, at the time of his death, he was domiciled in San
Fernando, Pampanga. The CFI of Quezon City had no authority to her the petition and thus
venue was improperly laid.

TITLE: Garcia Fule vs Court of Appeals

CITATION: 165 Phil. 785

FACTS: The petitioner Virginia Fule filed a petition for letters of administration and moved ex
parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate of Amado Garcia before the
Court of First Instance of Laguna. The lower court granted the petition. Preciosa Garcia filed an
opposition raising the issues of jurisdiction, venue, lack of interest of Virginia Fule in the subject
estate and her disqualification as special administratrix. During hearing, Virginia presented
Amado’s death certificate showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City.
On her part, Preciosa presented residence certificate of the decedent for 1973 showing that
three months before his death, his residence was in Quezon City. Virginia also testified that
Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba, Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a
delegate to the 1971 Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna. Preciosa’s
opposition was denied by the lower court. On appeal, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment
annulling the proceedings before the CFI of Laguna.

ISSUE: Whether or not Amado Garcia was a resident of Quezon City or Calamba Laguna.

RULING: The Supreme Court held the term “residence” as contemplated under Section 1, Rule
73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence rather than domicile is the
significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as
meaning residence and not do-micile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the
terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words,
"resides" should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely
residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply
requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. No particular length of
time of residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.
Hence, Amado Garcia was a resident of Quezon City at the time of his death and not in
Calamba, Laguna.

SYNOPSIS:
In Eusebio vs Eusebio, residence means domicile. What is required is to establish the domicile
of choice of the decedent which must be satisfied under the following conditions, namely: (1)
capacity to choose and freedom of choice; (2) physical presence at the place chosen; and (3)

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intention to stay therein permanently. There was no intention on the part of the decedent to
change his domicile. On the other hand, in Garcia Fule vs CA, residence means inhabitant and
not the legal domicile per se. It should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning,
the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It
signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. The decedent in this case was
actually and physically residing in Quezon City at the time of his death.

TITLE: Ventura vs. Ventura

CITATION: G.R. No. L-26306, April 27, 1988

NOTE: APPELLANTS= Maria Ventura- illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio

Ventura; Miguel Ventura- brother of Maria, son of Gregorio; Juana Cardona- mother of
Maria, surviving spouse of Gregorio. APPELLEES= Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are
Gregorio’s legitimate children with his former wife, the late Paulina Sirapliciano but the
paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in his will.

FACTS:
Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the probate of his will which did not include the appellees. In
the said will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child, was named and
appointed by the testator to be the executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate. Such
will was admitted to probate.

Thereafter, Gregorio Ventura died. Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the
corresponding letters testamentary was issued in her favor. She submitted an inventory of the
estate of Gregorio Ventura. She filed her accounts of administration which was opposed by the
spouses the appellees. Oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the true
income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses.

Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura filed a motion to remove the executrix Maria Ventura
based on the following grounds: (1) that she is grossly incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously
and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the inventory; (3) that she is merely
an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the appellees; (4) that the
executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the Court
requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963; and (5) that she is
with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently performing her duties as an
executrix.

On October 5,1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered
the funds of the estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of
the Court in the matter of presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay
the real estate taxes of the estate, removed Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the
estate and appointed in her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint
administratrices of the estate.

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ISSUE:
Whether not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified.

RULING:
Yes. However, this issue has become moot and academic in view of the decision of this Court in
related cases.

Aside from the instant special proceedings, there are other civil cases involving the estate of the
deceased Gregorio Ventura. One was filed by herein appellee Gregoria Ventura against her
father, Gregorio Ventura. Later Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria Ventura. They
claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina
Simpliciano. The lower court rendered its judgment in their favor. Thereafter, Mercedes Ventura
filed a motion to annul the provisions of the will of the deceased Gregorio Ventura, which motion
was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona and later by Maria Ventura.

The trial court then annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio Ventura.
The motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by executrix Maria Ventura was
denied. Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed. The court held final and executory that appellees
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura
and his wife, Paulina Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution of
heirs made in the probated will of said deceased.

Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, “the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the
compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born
after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies
shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious,” and as a result, intestacy follows, thereby
rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and academic, This
would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

“When and to whom letters of administration granted.—If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or
a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both,
in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or
wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to
serve;”

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona
while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The
“next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution
to the decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose interest in the

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estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a
class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina
Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference
over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence,
under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be
appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the
discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.

TITLE: Villamor vs. Court of Appeals

CITATION: 162 SCRA 574

FACTS:
On July 1971, Macaria Labingisa Reyes sold a portion of 300 square meters of the lot to the
Spouses Julio and Marina and Villamor for the total amount of P21,000.00. On November 11,
1971, Macaria executed a "Deed of Option" in favor of Villamor in which the remaining 300
square meter portion (TCT No. 39934) of the lot would be sold to Villamor under certain
conditions, one of which:

That the only reason why the Spouses-vendees Julio Villamor and Marina V. Villamor,
agreed to buy the said one-half portion at the above-stated price of about P70.00 per
square meter, is because I, and my husband Roberto Reyes, have agreed to sell and
convey to them the remaining one-half portion still owned by me, whenever the need of
such sale arises, either on our part or on the part of the spouses (Julio) Villamor and
Marina V. Villamor, at the same price of P70.00 per square meter, excluding
whatever improvement may be found the thereon.

According to Macaria, when her husband, Roberto Reyes, retired in 1984, they offered to
repurchase the lot sold by them to the Villamor spouses but Marina Villamor refused and
reminded them instead that the Deed of Option, in fact, gave them the option to purchase the
remaining portion of the lot. The Villamors, on the other hand, claimed that they had expressed
their desire to purchase the remaining 300 square meter portion of the lot but the Reyeses had
been ignoring them. Thus, on July 13, 1987, after conciliation proceedings in the barangay level
failed, they filed a complaint for specific performance against the Reyeses. Trial Court decided
in favour of the Villamors, but this was reversed by the CA. Present case is a petition for review
on certiorari of the CA’s decision.

ISSUE:

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Whether or not there was a VALID Deed of Option whereby the private respondents agreed to
sell their lot to petitioners whenever the need of such sale arises, either on our part (private
respondents) or on the part of JulioVillamor and Marina Villamor.

RULING:
While the Deed of Option was valid, it already lapsed. It is of judicial notice that the price of real
estate in Metro Manila is continuously on the rise. To allow the petitioner to demand the delivery
of the property subject of this case thirteen (13) years or seventeen (17) years after the
execution of the deed at the price of only P70.00 per square meter is inequitous. For reasons
also of equity and in consideration of the fact that the private respondents have no other decent
place to live, this Court, in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction is not inclined to grant
petitioners' prayer.

COMPARATIVE REPORT

1. VENTURA VS. VENTURA

DOCTRINE:
As a general rule, the court cannot set aside the order of preference.

The rules of court provides for the order of preference in the appointment of an
administrator.Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court: “When and to whom letters of
administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are
incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall
be granted: (a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin,
requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve.”

The “next of kin” has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of
distribution to the decedent’s property. It is generally said that “the nearest of kin, whose interest
in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members
of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As
between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.

2. VILLAMOR VS. CA

The general rule that the court cannot set aside the order of preference allows for exceptions.
The order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances
of each case.

One exception as presented in the case at bar, thus: “In case the persons who have the
preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to serve, administration may
be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.”

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 - NOTHING FOLLOWS -

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