INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, INC VS.

CA

GR No. 88550, 18 April 1990

FACTS

Petitioner Industrial Enterprises Inc. (IEI) was granted a coal operating contract by the Government
through the Bureau of Energy Development (BED). It was also granted a coal operating contract in the
so-called “Giporlos Area.” IEI was later advised that in line with the objective of rationalizing the
country’s coal supply-demand balance, the logical coal operator in the area would be Marinduque
Mining and Industrial Corporation (MMIC). IEI assigned and transferred to MMIC its rights in the area
but later filed an action for rescission with damages against MMIC for failure of the latter to comply with
its obligations. IEI prayed that the Energy Minister approve the return of the contract from MMIC to IEI.
Strangely enough, Mr. Jesus S. Cabarrus is the President of both IEI and MMIC. Trial Court ordered the
rescission and declared the continued efficacy of the coal contract in favor of IEI and ordered the BED to
issue its written affirmation of the contract and to give due course to IEI’s application. CA reversed the
decision and ruled that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the action considering that under PD
1206, it is the BED that has the power to decide controversies relative to the exploration, exploitation
and development of coal blocks.

ISSUE

Whether the doctrine of primary jurisdiction should apply in this case?

HELD

YES. It has been the jurisprudential trend to apply the doctrine of primary jurisdiction in many cases
involving matters that demand the special competence of administrative agencies. It may occur that the
Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which means that the matter involved is
also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its determination requires the expertise,
specialized skills and knowledge of the proper administrative bodies because technical matters or
intricate questions of facts are involved, then relief must first be obtained in an administrative
proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by the courts even though the matter is within the proper
jurisdiction of a court. Clearly, the doctrine of primary jurisdiction finds application in this case since the
question of what coal areas should be exploited and developed and which entity should be granted coal
operating contracts over said areas involves a technical determination by the BED as the administrative
agency in possession of the specialized expertise to act on the matter. The application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, however, does not call for the dismissal of the case below. It need only be
suspended until after the matters within the competence of the BED are threshed out and determined.
 QUALITRANS LIMOUSINE VS ROYAL CALSS LIMOUSINE

GR No. 79886, 22 November 1989

FACTS

1. Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc., was the grantee of a certificate of public convenience issued by the
defunct Board of Transportation to operate a "garage (tourist) air-conditioned service" from Manila t
any point in Luzon

2. A decision by the BOT amended the certificate for garage service into one for limousine tourist service
for the transportation of all outgoing passengers of the Manila International Airport

3. A Deed of Absolute Sale was executed by private respondent with Transcare, Inc., a duly licensed
limousine service operator and likewise, a holder of a certificate of public convenience.

4. By virtue of said sale, the franchise granted to Transcare, Inc. for the use of 40 units of tourist cars
was sold to private respondent.

5. On December 27, 1985, upon application filed for the approval of aforementioned sale, an Order was
issued by the Land Transportation Commission granting a provisional permit in favor of private
respondent (Annexes C and 3, CA-G.R. SP No. 10049); Annexes B and 3 CA-G.R. No. 10370-SP). The
prefatory portion thereof states: The application filed in this case is for the approval of sale made by
TRANSCARE, INC., in favor of ROYAL CLASS LIMOUSINE SERVICE of the Certificate of Public Convenience
issued in Case Nos. 81-4405 and 82-415 authorizing the operation of a TOURIST CAR (AIR-CONDITIONED)
SERVICE within the New Manila International Airport and from said place to any point in the Island of
Luzon accessible to motor vehicle traffic and vice-versa, involving the right to operate forty (40) units
authorized therein. ... (Emphasis supplied).

6. Petitioner argues that the application filed by private respondent was for the route from the "New
Manila International Airport to hotels and from said hotels to any point in Luzon accessible to vehicular
traffic and vice-versa", and not from the "New Manila International Airport ... to any point in the Island
of Luzon.”

7. Petitioner claims that respondent has been soliciting passengers from the New Manila International
Airport to transport them to any point in Luzon to the prejudice of petitioner's business. 8. Essentially,
petitioner’s main contention is that they should be the only business to be offering that particular
service.

ISSUE

WON the petitioner’s contention correct

HELD

NO, it is not.
Ratio:

Under the constitution, it is to the best interest of the public to have two or more companies in the field
to stimulate business and prevent monopolies pursuant to the constitutional mandate of equitable
distribution of opportunities, income and wealth, and regulation of competition and prohibition of
monopolies.

The Court finds it "hard to conceive how it would be for the best interests of the public" 17, to have one
line only, "and how the public would be injured by the granting of the certificate in question, for it must
be conceded that two companies in the field would stimulate the business

It is simply bellyaching to say that Royal Class had transcended the bounds of the certificate of public
convenience granted to it. What Qualitrans is plainly carping about is the threat the Royal Class'
certificate of public convenience poses on its foothold in the "limo" service business. This is
monopolism, plainly and simply, and we cannot tolerate it.

There is no merit in the claims that Royal Class has been guilty of unfair competition. For starters, its
Certificate of Public Convenience has been duly issued. The CPC cannot therefore be said to have been
acquired through duress or deceit to warrant such a charge.

Accordingly, Petitioner’s petition must be dismissed.

HOLY SPIRIT HOMEOWNERS VS SEC. DEFENSOR

GR No. 163980, 3 August 2006

FACTS

A number of presidential issuances prior to the passage of R.A. No. 9207, authorized the creation and
development of what is now known as the National Government Center (NGC).On March 5, 1972,
former President Ferdinand Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1826, reserving a parcel of land in
Constitution Hills, Quezon City, covering a little over 440 hectares as a national government site to be
known as the NGC. On August 11, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 137,
excluding 150 of the440 hectares of the reserved site from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826 and
authorizing instead the disposition of the excluded portion by direct sale to the bona fide residents
therein. In view of the rapid increase in population density in the portion excluded by Proclamation No.
137 from the coverage of Proclamation No. 1826, former President Fidel Ramos issued Proclamation No.
248 on September7, 1993, authorizing the vertical development of the excluded portion to maximize the
number of families who can effectively become beneficiaries of the government’s socialized housing
program. On May 14, 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. No. 9207. Petitioner
Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. (Association) is a homeowners association from the West Side
of the NGC. It is represented by its president, Nestorio F. Apolinario, Jr., who is a co-petitioner in his own
personal capacity and on behalf of the association. The instant petition for prohibition under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or
writ of preliminary injunction, seeks to prevent respondents from enforcing the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of Republic Act No. 9207, otherwise known as the "National Government Center (NGC)
Housing and Land Utilization Act of 2003."

ISSUE

Whether or not in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the Committee was not exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial function and should be declared null and void for being arbitrary,
capricious and whimsical.

HELD

Administrative agencies possess quasi-legislative or rule-making powers and quasi-judicial or

administrative adjudicatory powers. Quasi-legislative or rule-making power is the power to make rules
and regulations which results in delegated legislation that is within the confines of the granting statute
and the doctrine of non-delegability and separability of powers. In questioning the validity or
constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by an administrative agency, a party need not exhaust
administrative remedies before going to court. This principle, however, applies only where the act of the
administrative agency concerned was performed pursuant to its quasi-judicial function, and not when
the assailed act pertained to its rule-making or quasi-legislative power. The assailed IRR was issued
pursuant to the quasi-legislative power of the Committee expressly authorized by R.A. No. 9207.
The petition rests mainly on the theory that the assailed IRR issued by the Committee is invalid on the
ground that it is not germane to the object and purpose of the statute it seeks to implement. Where
what is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulation issued by the administrative
agency in the performance of its quasi-legislative function, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass
upon the same. Since the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the validity of the assailed IRR
issued by the Committee in the exercise of its quasi-legislative power, the judicial course to assail its
validity must follow the doctrine of hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court, Court of Appeals
and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition,
mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner
unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.