TESTS FOR PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 14

A Final Draft submitted in partial fulfilment of the course

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I, 5th SEMESTER during the Academic Year
2018-2019

SUBMITTED BY:
Ankur Sharma
Roll No. - 1515
B.A LL.B

SUBMITTED TO:
Prof. Dr. Anirudha Prasad
FACULTY OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-I

AUGUST, 2018
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY, NAYAYA NAGAR,
MEETHAPUR, PATNA-800001
Table of Contents
Acknowledgement......................................................................................................................3
Declaration.................................................................................................................................4
Research Methodology...............................................................................................................5
Introduction................................................................................................................................6
ARTICLE 14 PERMITS CLASSIFICATION...........................................................................7
TESTS FOR PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATION...................................................................9
CASELAW:DALMIA'S CASE...................................................................................................11
A] Restrictions on the doctrine of pleasure..........................................................................11
B] Article 311 applies to both temporary and permanent servants.-....................................15
C] Exclusion of Art.311 (2)..................................................................................................16
D] Art. 311(3).......................................................................................................................19
Conclusions & Suggestions......................................................................................................21
Bibliography.............................................................................................................................22

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Writing a project is one of the most difficult academic challenges I have ever faced. Though
this project has been presented by me but there are many people who remained in veil, who
gave their support and helped me to complete this project.

First of all I am very grateful to my subject teacher Prof. Dr. Anirudha Prasad without the
kind support of whom and help the completion of the project would have been a herculean
task for me. He took out time from his busy schedule to help me to complete this project and
suggested me from where and how to collect data.

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DECLARATION

I hereby declare that the work reported in the BA LL.B (Hons.) Project Report entitled
“TESTS FOR PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATION UNDER ARTICLE 14” submitted at
Chanakya National Law University, Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out
under the supervision of Prof. Dr. Anirudha Prasad. I have not submitted this work elsewhere
for any other degree or diploma. I am fully responsible for the contents of my Project Report.

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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

AIMS AND OBJECTIVES

The Aims and Objectives of this project are:
1. To study the permissible classification under Article 14.
2. To study the tests for permissible classification under Article 14.

HYPOTHESES
The researcher considers the following hypothesis:
1. Article 14 permits classification but prohibits class legislation.
2. The classification must not be arbitrary , artificial or evasive.

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
For this study, primary research method was utilised. Various articles, e-articles, reports and
books from library were used extensively in framing all the data and figures in appropriate
form, essential for this study.
The method used in writing this research is primarily analytical.

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 INTRODUCTION

As observed, Article 14 is a general provision and required to be read subject to the other
provisions included within the part on Fundamental rights. Hence any law making special
provision for women (or children) under Article 15 (3) can not be challenged on the grounded
of contravention of Article 14 .[1]Similarly section 54 (4) of Representation of people Act,
1991 which confers a double advantages upon members of the scheduled costs or triber to be
returned to the general seals even though seats have been reserved for them under the
constitution, being sanctioned by Artide 15(4) can not be held to be void for contravention of
Article 14 When the constitution it self makes a classification, the charge of dlscnmtnation
cannot be leveled against such separate treatment.[2] Thus the special treatment of
Government Servant in the matter o1f their tenure [Article 310 (1 )] [3] or an order made by
the president under Article 311 (2), proviso[4], or the taxation by a state of road transport
(Entry 56, List II)[5] can not be challenged as violative of Article 14. But the special
treatment authorised by these other provisions must be kept within reasonable limits and
should not be made so excessive as to render nugatory the general equality professed to the
members of all communities by Article 14[6]. Hence the special provision for the
advancement of the backward classes or scheduled castes and tribes under Article 15 (4)[7] or
the reservation of posts for the backward classes under Article 16(4) will be unconstitutional
because of contravention of Article 14, if it is carried to an unreasonable extent.[8]

1
1. Giri Vo Dora AIR 1959 SC 1318 (1325) 2. Sainik motors vs stale of Rajsthan AIR 1961 SC 1480 (1486) 3.
Rajkishore Vs stale of U.P. AIR 1954 AII-343 4. Jagdish Vs Accountant General AIR 1958 SC 283 (Bam) 5.
Yusu! Vs state of Bombay (1954) SCR 930 6. Devadasan Vs union of India AIR 1964 SC 179 (180) 7. General
Manager Vs Ramgacharl (1962)2 SCR 286 8. Balari Vs Slate of Mysare AIR 1963 SC 949 (664)

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ARTICLE 14 PERMITS CLASSIFICATION BUT PROHIBITS CLASS
LEGISLATION

As observed from the study, what Article 14 prohibits is class legislation and not reasonable
classification for the purpose of legislation. [9] If the legislature takes care to reasonably
classify persons for legislative purposes and if it deals equally with all persons belonging to a
well defined class it is not open to charge of denial of equal protection on the ground that the
law does not apply to other persons.[ 10]

The equal protection of laws guaranteed by Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be
general in character. It does not mean that the same laws should apply to all persons. It does
not attainment or circumstances in the same position. The varying needs of different classes
of persons often requires separate treatment. From the vary nature of society there should be
different laws in different places and the legitimate controls the policy and enacts laws in the
best interest of the safety and security of the state. In fact identical treatment in unequal
circumstances would amount to inequality. So a reasonable classification is only not
permitted but is necessary if the society wants to progress and prosper.

Thus what Article 14 forbids is class-legislation but it does not forbid reasonable
classification. The classification however must not be “arbitrary ,artificial or evasive” but
must be based on some real and substantial bearing a just and reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved by the legislation. Article 14 applies where equals are treated
differently without any reasonable basis. But where equals and unequals are treated
differently, Article 14 does not apply. Class legislation  is that which makes an improper
discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of  persons  arbitrarily selected
from a large number of persons all of whom stand in the same relation to the privilege
granted that between whom and the persons not so favored no reasonable distinction or
substantial difference can be found justifying the inclusion of one and the exclusion of the
other from such privilege

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TESTS FOR PERMISSIBLE CLASSIFICATION

Fo rthe purpose of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled.

(i) That he classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things, that are grouped together from others left out of the group.
and
(ii) That the differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved
by the statute in question [11]
The classification may be founded on different basis: Such as geographical or
according to objects or occupation or the Like. What is necessary is that there must be a
nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under consideration. [1]
NEW CONCEPT OF EQUALITY: (PROTECTION AGAINST ARBITRARINESS)
In E.P. Rovappa Vs State of Tamil Nadu [2] our Hon'ble Supreme Court of India
challenged the traditional concept of equality, which was based on reasonable classification
and has laid down a new concept of equality
Bhagwati J. delivering the judgment on behalf of him self, chandrachud and Krishna
Iyer JJ propounded the new concept of equality that Equality is a dynamic Concept with
many aspects and dimensions and it can’t be cribbed ,cabined and confined within
traditional and doctrinaire limit. From a positivistic point of view equality is antithetic to
arbitrariness.
It fact equality and arbitrariness are sworn enemies: One belong to the rule of law in
a republic while the other to the whim and caprice of an absolute monarch. Where an act IS
arbitrary, it is implicit in it that is unequal both according to political logic and constitutional
law and therefore violative of Article 14.
Similarly in Menka Gandhi Vs Union of India[ 3 ] Bhagwati J. Again quoted
the new approach. He said that equality is a dynamic concept with many aspects and
dimensions and it cannot be imprisoned within traditional and doctrinair limits. Article 14
Striker at arbitrariness in state action and ensure fairness and equality of treatment. The
principle of reasonableness, which legally as well as philosophically, is an essential element
of equality or non-arbitrariness, pervade Article 14 like a brooding omnipresence.
In international Airport Authority case [ 4] Bhagwati J. reiterated the same

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principle that it must therefore now be taken to be well settled that what Article 14 Strikes at
is arbitrariness because our action that is arbitrary, must necessarily involve negation of
equality The doctrine of classification, which is involved by the Court is not paraphrase of
Article 14 nor is it the objective and end of that Article. It is merely a judicial formula for
determining whether the legislative or executive action in question is arbitrary and there
fore constituting denial of equality. If the classification is not reasonable and does not
satisfy the two conditions referred to above, the impugned legislation or executive acllon
would plainly be arbitrary and the guarantee of equality under Article 14 would be reached.

CRITICISM BY H.M. SEERVAI:

A famous jurist H.M. Seervai has criticised [1 ]this new concept of equality
propounded by the Supreme Court.
According to Seervai the old doctrine is only doctrine which brings out full
scope of "the equal protection of the laws," guaranteed to every person by Article 14, and
secondly the new doctrine is untenable for the following reasons:
(a) The new doctrine hangs in the air because it is propounded without reference to the
terms in which the granteed right to" the equal protection of the laws" is conferred.
(b) The new doctrine involves the logical fallacy of the undistributed middle or the fallacy
of simple conversion on explained.
(c) The new doctrine fails to distinguish between the violation of equality by a low, and
its violation by executive action.
(d) The new doctrine fails to analyse certain concept like "arbitrary" "law" "executive
action" or discretionary power and fails to recognise the necessity implication of numerous
Supreme Court decisions on classification.
(8) Classification In Services:
It is permissible to have classification in services based on hierarchy of posts.
pay scale, value of work, performance of duties, qualifications, responsibilities and
experience. The classification must, however have a reasonable relation to the object
sought to be achieved.[ 2]
(i) Pay Structure: Factors for fixation of pay scale
The pay structure of the employees of the Government should reflect many
other social values. The degree of skill, structure of work, experience involved, training

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required, responsibilities undertaken, mental and physical requirements, disagreeableness
of the task, hazard attendant on work and fatigue involved are some of the relevant factors
which should be taken into consideration in fixing the pay scale.[ 3 ]

(II) EQUAL PAY FOR EQUAL WORK

The Supreme Court has enforced the fundamental rights of equal pay for
equal work in effectuating the constitutional goal of equality and social justice in number of
decision[ 4]
(1) U.P. Rajya Sahakarl Bhooml Vlkas Bank Ltd. Vs Its Workmen [5]
It this case SC held that where both senior and junior groups of promotees do the
same type of work, higher wages given to one group to promotees of a particular back
date, must also be given to promottees of another group on the basis of principal of equal
pay for equal work.
(2) In Gopika Ranjan chaudhari Vs Union of India[ 6]
It has been held that payment of higher emoluments to staff of a particular unit as
against staff of other units and battalions merely on the ground that the former unit was
stationed at Head quarters would be discriminatory.
(3) In Fedration of A.I.C. & C.E. stenographers Vs union of India : [1]
S. C held that the differentiation in the pay scales of stenographers in the customs
and excise department and their counter part in the central secretariat before the report of
the Fourth pay commission was not sought to be justified on the similarity of the functional
work but on the dissimilarity of responsibility confidentiality and the relations ship with the
public.
(4) Government of A.P. Vs M. Pandurang[ 2]
S.C held that the parity of pay scale can not be granted toseniors where their juniors
in the cadre are drawing higher pay due to grant of selection grade or length of service in
the feeder cadre.
(5) In Delhi Municipal Karmachari Ekta Union Vs P.LSingh .[3]
The Supreme court relying on Daily rated casual labour employed under P & T
department Vs Union of India 7 directed the Delhi Municipal corporation to comply with the
doctrine of "equal pay for equal work" in respect of employees working as vaccinators I
mmUnisers on daily wages for more than eight years against those regularly appoint doing

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same kind of work with higher salary and wage.
(6) IN Mewa Ram Va A.I.I. Medical Science: [4]
The Supreme court said that while considering the question of application of principe I
of "equal pay for equal work" it has to be born in mind that it is open to the state to classify
employees on the basis of qualifications, duties and possibilities of posts concerned
Thus, since the hearing therapist and audiologist in All India Institute of Medical science
both render professional services and there is qualitative difference between the two on
the basis of educational qualification, the principal of equal pay for equal work can not be
invoked or applied.
(7) In State of U.P. Vs J.P. Chaurasia : [5]
It has been held that equation of posts or equation of pay must be lett to the executive
Government. It must be determined by expert bodies like pay commission. If there is any
determination by a commission or committee the court should normally accept it. The pay
commissions and pay rationalisation committee have evaluated that the section officers of
the Allahabad High Court perform onerous duties and been greater responsibilities than
bench secretaries. Thus the bench secretaries could not claim as of right the pay scale
admissible to section officers.
(28) N.F.S., N.F.C. ( physical Eduation ) Teachers Association VS. Union of India :J[6]
In this case it has been held that junior grade I Physical Training teachers do not have
required educational qualification and their nature of duty and responsibility differ from
those appointed as secondary school. Physical Instructors, they can not claim. equal pay
scale with the latter.

(9) Central Railway Staff Assoch. Va Director of Audit I Central Railway: [1]
In Ihls case II has been held Ihat Assistant Audit Officer belonging to the office of
comptroller
and auditors General of India and that working in Railway Audit deptt. Cannot be equated
with group B Officers of Indian Railways.
(10) Govt. of A. P. Vs Veera Raghveer : [2]
S C. held that when a single running pay scale is provided in a cadre the constitutional
mandate of equal pay for equal work is satisfied.
2
4. AIR 1988 SC 1291
5. (1996) 7 sec 11 6. 1988 SC 519 ..
7. AIR 1987 SC 2342 and UP Income Tax Department contingent paid staff welfare Association Vs Union of
India AIR 1988 SC 517

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(11) In Kshetriya Kishan Gramin Bank Vs O.B. Sharma : [3]
It3 has been held that he concepl of "equal pay for equal work " and the concept of parity with
some others" are two different concepts. But two classes of persons do same work under
the same employer with the same responsibility under similar working conditions the plea
that the mode of recruitment of the said classes is different form each other would not be
able to nullify the applicability of the doctrine of equal pay for equal work.
(12) In Chandigarh Administration Vs Rajini Vali :[4]
It has been said down that pay parity principal may be applied even to teachers in higher
secondary classes of private educational institutions receiving grant in aid an4d teachers of
other aided schools.
(13) IN Food Corporation of India VS Shyamal K. Chatterjee :[5]
It has been held that where casual workers doing same job which are actually work of class
IV staff are entitled to wages on par with class IV employees of Government undertaking.
(III) APPOINTMENT
(1) Union of India VS Rati Pal Saroj' (Central Govt. entitled to terminated
appointment) :[6]
It has been held that if a person accepting appointment does not join his new service, he is
not a probationary but a selectee. If a prospective employee has not joined the centra
lgovernment service after he was offered a post by the central government on the date fixed
for JOining in the appointment letter, the central Gov!. would be entilled to terminate the
appointment as the person appointed is not available to the central Governemtn within a
reasonable time of the appointment and hence he is not suitable.
(2) Ashok Kumar Vs Chairman B.S. Recruitment Board . [7]
(3) A.P. Agrawal Vs Govt. of national Capital Territory of Delhi .[8]
In these case it has been held that article 14 and 16 confer on every citizen right to
claim consideration for appointment to a post under the state. Therefore appointment of

4
1. AIR 1993 SC 2467 (Para 14)
2. (1999) 9 sec 266 ( Para 3)
3. AIR 2001 se 168 (Para 7 )
4. A.I.R. 200 se 634 ( Para 6,9,10)
5. A.I.R. 2000 3554 ( Para 7 )
6. AIR 1998 se 1117 Para 8,9
7.AIR 1996 se 976 Para 5
8.AIR 2000 se 205 Para 11. 16
9.AIR 1996 se 703 Para 7,8
10.AIR 1989 SC 1976

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the person kept in the waiting list by the respective recruitment boards to the vacancies that
has arises subsequently without notifying them for recruitment is unconstitutional.
(4) Jain Narayan Ram Vs State of U.P. (Denial of appointment improper) :[9]
Reserved quota: Candidates were duly selected for four posts against reserved
quota and they opted not to join service Denial of appointment to next four qualified
candidates standing in the merit list is improper.

(5) Sushma Gosain Vs Union of India:[10]

CASE LAW: DALMIA’S CASE

 The provisions of Article 14 of the Constitution have come up for discussion before the court in a
number of cases, namely, Chiranjit Lal Choudhuri v. The Union of India (2) , The State, of
Bombay v. F. N.Balsara(3),The state of west Bengal v. Anwar Ali Sarkar (4 ), Kathi Baning
-Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra(5) Lachmandas Kewalram Ahuja v. The State Of Bombay (6),
Qasim Razvi v. The State of Hyderabad (7) and Habeeb Mohamad v. The State of Hyderabad
(8). it is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon any lengthy discussion as to the meaning, scope
and effect of the article in question. It is now well established that while article 14 forbids class
legislation, it does not forbid reasonable classification for the purposes of legislation.

In order, however, to pass the test of permissible classification two conditions must be fulfilled,
filled namely, (i) that the classification must be founded on an intelligible differentia which
distinguishes persons or things that are grouped together (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (3) [1952]
S.C.R. 284. (5) [1952] S.C.R. 710. (7) [1953] S.C.R. 661. 297 from others left out of the group
and, (ii) that that differentia must have a rational relation to the object sought to be achieved by
the statute in question. The classification may be founded on different bases, namely,
geographical, or according to objects or occupations or the like. What is necessary is that there
'Must be a nexus between the basis of classification and the object of the Act under
consideration. It is also well established by the decisions of this Court that article 14 condemns
discrimination not only by a substantive law but also by a law of procedure.” The principle
enunciated above has been consistently adopted and applied in subsequent cases. The
decisions of this Court further establish(a) that a law may be constitutional even though it relates
to a single individual if, on account of some special circumstances or reasons applicable to him
and not applicable to others, that single individual may be treated as a class by himself;

(b) that there is always a presumption in favour of the constitutionality of an enactment and the
burden is upon him who attacks it to show that there has been a clear transgression of the
constitutional principles;

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(c) that it must be presumed that the legislature understands and correctly appreciates the need
of its own people, that its laws are directed to problems made manifest by experience and that its
discriminations are based on adequate grounds;

(d) that the legislature is free to recognise degrees of harm and may confine its restrictions to
those cases where the need is deemed to be the clearest ;

(e) that in order to sustain the presumption of constitutionality the court may take into
consideration matters of common knowledge, matters of common report, the history of the times
and may assume every state of facts which can be conceived existing at the time of legislation;

and (f)that while good faith and knowledge of the existing conditions on the part of a legislature
are to be presumed, if there is nothing on the face of the 38 298 law or the surrounding
circumstances brought to the notice of the court on which the classification may reasonably be
regarded as based, the presumption of constitutionality cannot be carried to the extent of always
holding that there must be some undisclosed and unknown reasons for subjecting certain
individuals or corporations to hostile or discriminating legislation.

The above principles will have to be constantly borne in mind by the court when it is called upon
to adjudge the constitutionality of any particular law attacked as discriminatory and -violative of
the equal protection of the laws.

A close perusal of the decisions of this Court in which the above principles have been enunciated
and applied by this Court will also show that a statute which may come up for consideration on a
question of its validity under Art. 14 of the Constitution, may be placed in one or other of the
following five classes:(i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things to whom its provisions
are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on
the face of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances known to or
brought to the notice of the court. In determining the validity or otherwise of such a statute the
court has to examine whether such classification is or can be reasonably regarded as based
upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons or things grouped together from those
left out of the group and whether such differentia has a reasonable relation to the object sought
to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to
apply only to a particular person or thing or only to a certain class of persons or things. Where
the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the
law, as it did in Chiranjitlal Chowdhri v. The Union of India (1), The State of Bombay v. F. N.

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Balsara (2), Kedar Nath (1) [1950] S.C.R. 869. (2) [1951] S.C.R. 682, 299 Bajoria v. The State of
West Bengal (1), V. M. Syed Mohammad & Company v. The State of Andhra (2) and Budhan
Choudhry v. The State of Bihar (3).

(ii)A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing or to several
individual persons or things but, no reasonable basis of classification may appear on the face of
it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge.

In such a case the court will strike down the law as an instance of naked discrimination, as it did
in Ameerunnissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum (4) and Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. The State of
Bihar (3).

(iii)A statute may not make any classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying
its provisions but may -leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify persons
or things to whom its provisions are to apply. In determining the question of the validity or
otherwise of such a statute the court will not strike down the law out of hand only because no
Classification appears on its face or because a discretion is given to the Government to make the
selection or classification but will go on to examine and ascertain if the statute has laid down any
principle or policy for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter
of the selection or classification. After such scrutiny the court will strike down the statute if it does
not lay down any principle or policy for guiding the exercise of discretion by the Government in
the matter of selection or classification, on the ground that the statute provides for the delegation
of arbitrary and uncontrolled power to the Government so as to enable it to discriminate between
persons or things similarly situate and that, therefore, the discrimination is inherent in the statute
itself. In such a case the court will strike down both the law as well as the executive action taken
under such law, as it did in State of West Bengal v. Anwar, Ali Sarkar (6), Dwarka Prasad Laxmi
Narain v. The State of Uttar Pradesh(7) (1) [1954] S.C.R. 30. (2) [1954] S.C.R. I 117. (3) [1953]
S.C.R. 44 (5) [1952] S.C.R. 284. (7) [1954] S.C.R. 803. 300 and Dhirendra Krishna Mandal v.
The Superintendent and Remembrancer of Legal Affairs (1).

(iv) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things for the purpose of applying
its provisions and may leave it to the discretion of the Government to select and classify the
persons or things to whom its provisions are to apply but may at the same time lay down a policy
or principle for the guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of such
selection or classification, the court will uphold the law as constitutional, as it did in Kathi Raning
Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (2).

(v) A statute may not make a classification of the persons or things to whom their provisions are
intended to apply and leave it to the discretion of the Government to select or classify the

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persons or things for applying those provisions according to the policy or the principle laid down
by the statute itself for guidance of the exercise of discretion by the Government in the matter of
such selection or classification. If the Government in making the selection or classification does
not proceed on or follow such policy or principle, it has been held by this Court, e. g., in Kathi
Raning Rawat v. The State of Saurashtra (2) that in such a case the executive action but not the
statute should be condemned as unconstitutional In the light of the foregoing discussions the
question at once arises: In what category does the Act or the notification impugned in these
appeals fall ? It will be apparent from its long title that the purpose of the Act is to provide for the
appointment of Commissions of Inquiry and for vesting such Commissions with certain powers.
Section 3 empowers the appropriate Government, in certain circumstances therein mentioned, to
appoint a Commission of Inquiry for the purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of
public importance and performing such functions within such time as may be specified in the
notification. It seems clear-and it has not been controverted-that on a proper construction of this
(1) [1955] 1 S.C.R. 234. (2) [1952] S.C.R. 435. 301 section, the functions the performance of
which is contemplated must be such as are ancillary to and in aid of the inquiry itself and cannot
be read as a function independent of or unconnected with such inquiry. That being the position,
as we conceive it to be, the question arises as to the scope and ambit of the power which is
conferred by it on the appropriate Government. The answer is furnished by the statute itself, for
s. 3 indicates that the appropriate Government .can appoint a Commission of Inquiry only for the
purpose of making an inquiry into any definite matter of public importance and into no other
matter. In other words the subject matter of the inquiry can only be a definite matter of public
importance. The appropriate Government, it follows, is not authorised by this section to appoint a
Commission for the purpose of holding an inquiry into any other matter. Learned Solicitor-
General, in the premises, submits that the section itself on the face of it, makes. a classification
so that this statute falls within the first category mentioned above and contends that this
classification of things is based on an intelligible differentia which has a reasonable relation to the
object sought to be achieved by it, for a definite matter of public importance may well call for an
inquiry by a Commission. In the alternative the learned Solicitor-General urges that in any case
the section itself quite clearly indicates that the policy of Parliament is to provide for the
appointment of Commissions of Inquiry to inquire into any definite matter of public importance
and that as there is no knowing when, where or how any such matter may crop up Parliament
considers it necessary or expedient to leave it to the appropriate Government to take action as
and when the appropriate moment will arrive. In the tempo of the prevailing conditions in modern
society events occur which were never foreseen and it is impossible for Parliament or any
legislature to anticipate all events or to provide for all eventualities and, therefore, it must leave
the duty of taking the necessary action to the appropriate Government.

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This delegation of authority, however, is not unguided or uncontrolled, 302 for the discretion
given to the appropriate Government to set up a Commission of Inquiry must be guided by the
policy laid down, namely, that the executive action of setting up a Commission of Inquiry must
conform to the condition of the section, that is to say, that there must exist a definite matter. of
public importance into which an inquiry is, in the opinion of the appropriate Government,
necessary or is required by a resolution in that behalf passed by the House of the People or the
Legislative Assembly of the State. If the preambles or the provisions of the statutes classed
under the first category mentioned above could be read as making a reasonable classification
satisfying the requirements of Art. 14 and if the preamble to the statute considered in the case of
Kathi Raning Rawat (1) could be construed as laying down sufficiently clearly a policy or principle
for the guidance of the executive, what objection can there be to construing s. 3 of the Act now
under our consideration as also making a reasonable classification or at any rate as declaring
with sufficient clarity the policy of Parliament and laying down a principle for the guidance of the
exercise of the powers conferred the appropriate Government so as to bring this statute at least
in the fourth category, if not also in the first category ? On the authorities, as they stand, it cannot
be said that an arbitrary and uncontrolled power has been delegated to the appropriate
Government and that, therefore, the law itself is bad.

Learned counsel for the petitioners next contends that if the Act is good in the sense that has
declared its policy and laid down some principle for the guidance of the Government in the
exercise of the power conferred on it, the appropriate Government has failed to exercise its
discretion property on the basis of a, reasonable classification.

Article 14 protects all persons from discrimination by the legislative as well as by the executive
organ of the State

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CONCLUSION
Article 14 says that State shall not deny to any person equality before the law or the equal
protection of the laws within the territory of India. Equality before law as provided in the
Article 14 of our constitution provides that no one is above the law of the land. Rule of the
Law is an inference derived from Article 14 of the constitution. The article 14 aims to
establish the “Equality of Status and Opportunity” as embodied in the Preamble of the
Constitution.
However, Article 14 does not mean that all laws must be general in character or that the same
laws should apply to all persons or that every law must have universal application This is
because all persons are not, by nature, attainment or circumstances in the same positions.
Thus, the State can treat different persons in differently if circumstances justify such
treatment. Further, the identical treatment in unequal circumstances would amount to
inequality.
Thus, there is a necessity of the “reasonable classification” for the society to progress. The
Supreme Court has maintained that Article 14 permits reasonable classification of persons,
objects, transactions by the State for the purpose of achieving specific ends that help in the
development of the society. However, Article 14 forbids “class legislation”. Class legislation
makes an improper discrimination by conferring particular privileges upon a class of
persons.
However, some argue that the extensive use of device of “reasonable classification” by State
and its approval by the Supreme Court has rendered the guarantee of ‘fair and equitable”
treatment under Article 14 illusory. Here comes the role of “Test of reasonable
classification”. The Test of Reasonable Classification says that the classification must be
based upon intelligible differentia that distinguishes persons or things that are grouped from
others that are left out of the group. This differentia must have a rational relation to the object
of classification. There should be a relation between the differentiations to the object of the
classification. If there are no such relations, the reasonable classification would fail.
For example denial of grant to a private college teaching law while giving grant to other
private colleges teaching other subjects is not permissible. However, reduction of age from
58 years to 55 years is permissible.
What article 14 forbids is discrimination by law that is treating persons similarly
circumstanced differently and treating those not similarly circumstanced in the same way or

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as has been pithily put treating equals as unequals  and unequals as equals. Article 14
prohibits hostile classification by law and is directed against discriminatory class legislation.
A legislature for the purpose of dealing with the complex problem that arise out of an infinite
variety of human relations cannot but proceed on some sort of selection or classification of
persons upon whom the legislation is to operate.
Its is well settled that Article 14 frobid classification for the purpose of legislation. It is
equally well settled that in order to meet the test of Article 14
(i) classification must be based on intelligible differentia which distinguishes persons or
things that are grouped together from those that are left out of group and (ii) the differentia
must have a rational nexus to the objects sought to be achieved by the executive or legislative
action.
Article 14 contains a guarantee of equality before law to all persons and protection to them
against discriminaon by law. It forbids class legislation.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

BOOKS:-

1. "The Constitution (Forty-Second Amendment) Act, 1976". Government of India.

Retrieved 1 December 2010.
2. Prof M P JAIN Indian Constitutional Law (LEXISNEXIS Butterworths Wadhwa
Nagpur Fifth Ed.2018)
3. Durga Das Basu’s Commentary on the Constitution of India - Volume 9, Lexis Nexis;
9th Edition 2017
4. H.K. SAHARAY The Constitution of India (Eastern Law House Kolkata 4th
Ed.2012)

CASE LAWS:-
5. People’s Union for Civil Liberties V. Union Of India
6. Union of India V. Tulsiram Patel
7. Jaswant Singh V. State of Punjab
8. U.P. Rajya Sahakarl Bhooml Vlkas Bank Ltd. Vs Its Workmen
9. Gopika Ranjan chaudhari Vs Union of India.
10. Fedration of A.I.C. & C.E. stenographers Vs union of IPandura
11. Government of A.P. Vs M. Pandurang
12. Delhi Municipal Karmachari Ekta Union Vs P.LSingh .
13. Mewa Ram Va A.I.I. Meical Science
14. State of U.P. Vs . Chaurasia
15. N.F.S., N.F.C. ( physical Eduation ) Teachers Association VS. Union of India
16. Central Railway Staff Assoch. Va Director of Audit I Central Railway: .
17. Govt. of A. P. Vs Veera Raghveer :
18. Kshetriya Kishan Gramin Bank Vs O.B. Sharma

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19. Chandigarh Administrat Vs Rajini Vali
20. Food Corporation of India VS Shyamal K. Chatterjee
21. Union of India VS Rati Pal Saroj' Ashok Kumar Vs Chairman B.S. Recruitment
Board .
22. A.P. Agrawal Vs Govt. of national Capital Territory of Delhi
23. Jain Narayan Ram Vs State of U.P.

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