SPECPRO Ignacio v.

Reyes

DOCTRINE:
1. A "final" judgment or order is appealable, while an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal
except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
2. Jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to
the estate. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality.
FACTS:
Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate. She executed a lease contract over several parcels
of land in Baguio City with the authority of the intestate court (Pasig RTC).
Upon claims that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties and leased
the same to the other parties without their conformity, the Reyeses filed an action for annulment of contract and
partition of the estate with the Baguio RTC alleging that their predecessors in interest were co-owners of the
properties leased.
The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the possible
distribution of the subject properties upon finding that Teresa indeed had accountabilities.
The Reyeses filed a motion before the intestate court (Pasig RTC) praying for the issuance of an order allowing
the distribution of the shares in the co-owned and the partition of the Baguio properties. The motion was denied by
the intestate court claiming exclusive jurisdiction since the property is part of the intestate proceedings of Florencio
Sr.
The CA reversed the decision of Pasig RTC and ordered Baguio RTC to partition the property. Upon denial of her
MR, Teresa filed a Review on Certiorari before the SC. She argues that there is an appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy since there was no grave abuse of discretion to speak of.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Review on Certiorari is proper rather than Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
2. Nature of probate court
RULING:
1. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction, or when
there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals exercising
quasi-judicial functions. In this case, the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy depended on
 whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. A "final" judgment or order is
appealable, while an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only as part of an appeal that
may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The assailed RTC Pasig Orders which denied respondents' motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and co-
owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory as it was not a final determination of their alleged co-
ownership and the intestate court merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-
owned with the Florencio Sr. estate. The remedy is to be based on this RTC of Pasig order since the CA’s decision on
the controversy is not final as it only remanded the case of partition to Baguio RTC contrary to the exclusive jurisdiction
claimed by Pasig RTC . Therefore, the decision is not a proper subject of Review on Certiorari, but of Special Action
for Certiorari under Rule 65
2. Jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination
of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is alleged to belong to
the estate. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the
probate court cannot resolve with finality.
Exceptions : First, the probate court may provisionally pass upon in an intestate or a testate proceeding the question of
inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of a piece of property without prejudice to the final determination of
ownership in a separate action. Second, if the interested parties are all heirs to the estate, or the question is one of
collation or advancement, or the parties consent to the assumption of jurisdiction by the probate court and the rights of
third parties are not impaired, then the probate court is competent to resolve issues on ownership. Verily, its jurisdiction
extends to matters incidental or collateral to the settlement and distribution of the estate, such as the determination of the
status of each heir and whether the property in the inventory is conjugal or exclusive property of the deceased spouse.

The intestate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it asserted jurisdiction over the subject properties since its
jurisdiction relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate of deceased persons. Any decision that
the intestate court would render on the title of the properties would at best be merely provisional in character, and would
yield to a final determination in a separate action.|||

Note: This case was previously assigned under ejectment/resolution of ownership in ejectment, that’s why I only
discussed the special proceedings part.
1. A "final" judgment or order is appealable, while an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except
only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
2. Jurisdiction of the trial court as an intestate court is special and limited as it relates only to matters having to do
with the probate of the will and/or settlement of the estate of deceased persons, but does not extend to the
determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings. This is true whether or not the property is
alleged to belong to the estate. In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an
extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality.
FACTS:
Teresa became the administratrix of the Florencio Sr. estate. She executed a lease contract over several
parcels of land in Baguio City with the authority of the intestate court (Pasig RTC).
Upon claims that Teresa misrepresented that the Florencio Sr. estate is the sole owner of the properties
and leased the same to the other parties without their conformity, the Reyeses filed an action for
annulment of contract and partition of the estate with the Baguio RTC alleging that their predecessors in
interest were co-owners of the properties leased.
The Baguio RTC manifested that it shall await a Request Order from the intestate court regarding the
possible distribution of the subject properties upon finding that Teresa indeed had accountabilities.
The Reyeses filed a motion before the intestate court (Pasig RTC) praying for the issuance of an order allowing
the distribution of the shares in the co-owned and the partition of the Baguio properties. The motion was
denied by the intestate court claiming exclusive jurisdiction since the property is part of the
intestate proceedings of Florencio Sr.
The CA reversed the decision of Pasig RTC and ordered Baguio RTC to partition the property. Upon denial
of her MR, Teresa filed a Review on Certiorari before the SC. She argues that there is an appeal or other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy since there was no grave abuse of discretion to speak of.
ISSUES:
1. W/N Review on Certiorari is proper rather than Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
2. Nature of probate court
RULING:
1. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 is valid only when the question involved is an error of jurisdiction,
or when there is grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the court or tribunals
exercising quasi-judicial functions. In this case, the propriety of the special civil action for certiorari as a remedy
depended on whether the assailed orders of the RTC were final or interlocutory in nature. A "final"
judgment or order is appealable, while an "interlocutory" order may not be questioned on appeal except only
as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.
The assailed RTC Pasig Orders which denied respondents' motion to allow the distribution of the estate's and
co-owners' shares in the subject properties were interlocutory as it was not a final determination of their alleged
co-ownership and the intestate court merely asserted its jurisdiction over the properties which were allegedly co-
owned with the Florencio Sr. estate. The remedy is to be based on this RTC of Pasig order since the CA’s decision

Intestate Estate of Rodriguez v. Rodriguez

Leica v. Longa

Republic v. Tipay

THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, V. VIRGIE (VIRGEL) L. TIPAY, RESPONDENT.

G.R. No. 209527, February 14, 2018

DOCTRINE:

Substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings — effectively limiting the
application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors.

FACTS:

In a petition dated February 13, 2009, Virgel sought the correction of several entries in his birth certificate. Virgel alleged
that these entries are erroneous, and sought the correction of his birth certificate as follows: (a) his gender, from
"FEMALE" to "MALE;" (b) his first name, from "VIRGIE" to "VIRGEL;" and (c) his month and date of birth to "FEBRUARY
25, 1976."

The RTC rendered its Decision, granting Virgel's petition. From this decision, the Republic filed a Notice of Appeal. The
Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) argued that the change of Virgel's name from Virgie should
have been made through a proceeding under Rule 103, and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. This argument was
premised on the assumption that the summary procedure under Rule 108 is confined to the correction of clerical or
innocuous errors, which excludes one's name or date of birth. Since the petition lodged with the RTC was not filed
pursuant to Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the Republic asserted that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the
case. The Republic appealled this decision which the CA denied.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court governs the procedure for the correction of substantial changes in the civil
registry.

RULING:

Yes. It is true that initially, the changes that may be corrected under the summary procedure of Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court are clerical or harmless errors. Errors that affect the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a person, are
considered substantial errors that were beyond the purview of the rule.

Jurisprudence on this matter later developed, giving room for the correction of substantial errors. The Court ultimately
recognized that substantial or controversial alterations in the civil registry are allowable in an action filed under Rule 108
of the Rules of Court, as long as the issues are properly threshed out in appropriate adversarial proceedings — effectively
limiting the application of the summary procedure to the correction of clerical or innocuous errors. The Court's ruling in
Republic v. Valencia, explained the adversarial procedure to be followed in correcting substantial errors in this wise: This
Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corrected and the true facts
established provided the parties aggrieved by the error avail themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding.

Evidently, the Republic incorrectly argued that the petition for correction under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is limited to
changes in entries containing harmless and innocuous errors. The cited cases in the petition were already superseded by
much later jurisprudence. Most importantly, with the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9048 in 2001, the local civil
registrars, or the Consul General as the case may be, are now authorized to correct clerical or typographical errors in the
civil registry, or make changes in the first name or nickname, without need of a judicial order. This law provided an
administrative recourse for the correction of clerical or typographical errors, essentially leaving the substantial corrections
in the civil registry to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

Republic v. Gallo

Doctrine: By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing
documents presented. Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used.
Facts: Respondent Michelle Soriano Gallo's (Gallo) filed a Petition for Correction of Entry of her Certificate of Live Birth.
Gallo alleged that has never been known as "Michael Soriano Gallo." She has always been female. Her parents, married
on May 23, 1981, have never changed their names. For her, in her petition before the Regional Trial Court, her Certificate
of Live Birth contained errors, which should be corrected. For her, she was not changing the name that was given to her;
she was merely correcting its entry. Gallo prayed before the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan City, Isabela for the correction
of her name from "Michael" to "Michelle" and of her biological sex from "Male" to "Female" under Rule 1086 of the Rules
of Court. In addition, Gallo asked for the inclusion of her middle name, "Soriano"; her mother's middle name, "Angangan";
her father's middle name, "Balingao"; and her parent's marriage date, May 23, 1981, in her Certificate of Live Birth, as
these were not recorded. As proof, she attached to her petition copies of her diploma, voter's certification, official
transcript of records, medical certificate, mother's birth certificate, and parents' marriage certificate.
The Regional Trial Court granted the petition. It lent credence to the documents Gallo presented and found that the
corrections she sought were "harmless and innocuous." It concluded that there was a necessity to correct Gallo's
Certificate of Live Birth and applied Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The Office of the Solicitor General appealed, alleging
that the applicable rule should be Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for Petitions for Change of Name. It argued that Gallo did
not comply with the jurisdictional requirements under Rule 103 because the title of her Petition and the published Order
did not state her official name, "Michael Gallo." Furthermore, the published Order was also defective for not stating the
cause of the change of name. The Court of Appeals, denied the Office of the Solicitor General's appeal. The Republic,
through the Office of the Solicitor General filed the present Petition via Rule 45 under the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
Petitioner argues that "only clerical, spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised"
in petitions for correction under Rule 108. Thus, the correction must only be for a patently misspelled name. As "Michael"
could not have been the result of misspelling "Michelle," petitioner contends that the case should fall under Rule 103 for it
contemplates a substantial change. Petitioner holds that since the applicable rule is Rule 103, Gallo was not able to
comply with the jurisdictional requirements for a change of name under Section 2 of this Rule. It also argues that the use
of a different name is not a reasonable ground to change name under Rule 103. Finally, petitioner insists that Gallo failed
to exhaust administrative remedies and observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction as Republic Act No. 9048 allegedly
now governs the change of first name, superseding the civil registrar's jurisdiction over the matter. Respondent Gallo, in
her Comment, counters that the issue of whether or not the petitioned corrections are innocuous or clerical is a factual
issue, which is improper in a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. In any case, she argues that the corrections
are clerical; hence, the applicable rule is Rule 108 and not Rule 103, with the requirements of an adversarial proceeding
properly satisfied. Lastly, she contends that petitioner has waived its right to invoke the doctrines of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction when it failed to file a motion to dismiss before the Regional Trial Court
and only raised these issues before this Court.

Issue: Whether or not the Republic of the Philippines raised a question of fact in alleging that the change sought by
 Michelle Soriano Gallo is substantive and not a mere correction of error?

Ruling: This court finds for the respondent. Hers was a Petition to correct the entry in the Civil Registry. Republic Act No.
10172 defines a clerical or typographical error as a recorded mistake, "which is visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding." Thus: Section 2. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean: "Clerical or
typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth,
mistake in the entry of day and month in the date of birth or the sex of the person or the like, which is visible to the eyes or
obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, or status of the petitioner.
By qualifying the definition of a clerical, typographical error as a mistake "visible to the eyes or obvious to the
understanding," the law recognizes that there is a factual determination made after reference to and evaluation of existing
documents presented. Thus, corrections may be made even though the error is not typographical if it is "obvious to the
understanding," even if there is no proof that the name or circumstance in the birth certificate was ever used. This Court
agrees with the Regional Trial Court's determination, concurred in by the Court of Appeals, that this case involves the
correction of a mere error. As these are findings of fact, this Court is bound by the lower court's' findings.

CRIMPRO People v. Antido

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROMEO ANTIDO

G.R. No. 208651, March 14, 2018

DOCTRINE: Upon accused-appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished
inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of
the civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.

FACTS: In a Resolution1 dated April 7, 2014, the Court affirmed the Decision2 dated December 7, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 04602 finding accused-appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a. Romeo Antigo y
Lantayan alias "Jon-Jon" (accused-appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the pertinent portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Court ADOPTS the findings of fact and conclusions of law in the December 7, 2012 Decision of the
CA in CA G.R. CR-HC No. 04602 and AFFIRMS said Decision finding accused appellant Romeo Antido y Lantayan a.k.a.
Romeo Antigo yLantayan alias "Jon-Jon" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape punishable under
paragraph 1 of Article 266-A in relation to paragraph 5 of Article 266-B, under RA 8353. Accordingly, he is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay private complainant the following amounts: (a) P75,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (b) P75,000.00 as moral damages; and (c) P30,000.00 as exemplary damages, consistent with existing
jurisprudence.3
However, it appears that before the promulgation of the said Resolution, accused-appellant had already died on
December 28, 2013, as evidenced by his Certificate of Death.
As will be explained hereunder, there is a need to reconsider and set aside the April 7, 2014 Resolution and enter a new
one dismissing the criminal case against accused-appellant.
Under prevailing law and jurisprudence, accused-appellant's death prior to his final conviction by the Court renders
dismissible the criminal cases against him. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that criminal liability is totally
extinguished by the death of the accused, to wit:
Article 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished
only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment[.]

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability is extinguished upon death of the accused.

HELD: Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability,
based solely thereon. the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil
liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives
notwithstanding the death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. an
action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule
111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based
as explained above. Private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction. upon accused-
appellant's death pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a
defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of the civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action.
Evangelista vs Screens Inc
G.R. No. 211564, November 20, 2017

DOCTRINE: In BP 22 cases, the action for the corresponding civil obligation is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
The criminal action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file
such civil action separately shall be allowed or recognized Section 119 of the NIL, however, stated that a negotiable
instrument like a check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of
money.

Facts:
Evangelista obtained a loan from respondent which issued two checks. As security for the payment of the loan,
Evangelista gave two open-dated checks. Petitioner then was charged with BP 22 filed with the MeTC. The court then
acquitted the petitioner of the criminal charges for failing to prove the third element of BP 22 by the prosecution. However,
the court also held that Evangelista be declared liable for the corresponding civil obligation. Ruling on the civil aspect of
the cases, the court held that while Evangelista admitted to having issued and delivered the checks to Gotauco and to
having fully paid the amounts indicated therein, no evidence of payment was presented. It further held that the creditor’s
possession of the instrument of credit was sufficient evidence that the debt claimed had not yet been paid. In the end,
Evangelista was declared liable for the corresponding civil obligation.
Evangelista then filed a timely Notice of Appeal before the RTC. The RTC then dismissed the appeal and affirmed the
MeTC decision in toto. Evangelista the filed a petition for review before the CA. Petitioner contends that the lower court
erred in ordering the accused to pay his alleged civil obligation to private complainant. In particular, he argues that the
court did not consider the prosecution’s failure to prove his civil liability to respondent, and that any civil liability there
might have been was already extinguished and/or barred by prescription

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is still liable for the total amount of P1.5 million indicated in the two checks

Held: No.
In BP 22 cases, the action for the corresponding civil obligation is deemed instituted with the criminal action. The criminal
action for violation of BP 22 necessarily includes the corresponding civil action, and no reservation to file such civil action
separately shall be allowed or recognized Section 119 of the NIL, however, stated that a negotiable instrument like a
check may be discharged by any other act which will discharge a simple contract for the payment of money. Therefore, a
check is subject to prescription of actions upon a written contract as provided for under Article 1144 of the Civil Code.
Barring any extrajudicial or judicial demand that may toll the 10-year prescription period and any evidence which may
indicate any other time when the obligation to pay is due, the cause of action based on a check is reckoned from the date
indicated on the check. If the check is undated, however, as in the present petition, the cause of action is reckoned from
the date of the issuance of the check. This is so because regardless of the omission of the date indicated on the check,
Section 17 of the NIL instructs that an undated check is presumed dated as of the time of its issuance. Given the
foregoing, the cause of action on the checks has become stake, hence, time-barred. No written extrajudicial or judicial
demand was shown to have been made within 10 years which could have tolled the period. Prescription has indeed set
in.It is a settled rule that the creditor’s possession of the evidence of debt is proof that the debt has not been discharged
by payment. It is likewise an established tenet that a negotiable instrument is only a substitute for money and not money,
and the delivery of such an instrument does not, by itself, operate as payment. The failure to encash the checks within a
reasonable time after issue, or more than 10 years in this instance, not only results in the checks becoming state but also
in the obligation to pay being deemed fulfilled by operation of law. The delivery of the checks, despite the subsequent
failure to encash them within a period of 10 years or more, had the effect of payment. Petitioner is considered discharged
from his obligation to pay and can no longer be pronounced civilly liable for the amounts indicated thereon.

Chiang v. PLDT

Extra Excel International vs Cajigal

A.M. No. RTJ-18-2523 (Formerly OCA I.P.I No. 14-4353-RTJ)
June 06, 2018

DOCTRINE:
Bail hearing is necessary even if the prosecution does not interpose any objection or leaves the application for bail to the
sound discretion of the court.

FACTS:

This is an administrative complaint filed by complainant Extra Excel International Philippines, Inc. against respondent
Judge Afable E. Cajigal, relative to a Criminal Case for qualified theft filed by complainant. The criminal case was raffled
to Branch 96 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City with respondent as Presiding Judge.

After the filing the Information, respondent Judge did not set the case for arraignment nor issue a warrant of arrest;
instead, he granted the accused's Motion for Preliminary Investigation and Motion to Defer Further Proceedings.
Meanwhile, there being no resolution on the preliminary investigation despite the lapse of the 60-day period, and pursuant
to A.M. No. 11-6-10-SC which mandates the accused's arraignment upon the lapse of the 60-day period, complainant filed
a Motion to Set Case for Arraignment. The City Prosecution Office resolved to affirm the earlier finding of probable cause.

Complainant filed a Motion for Issuance of Hold Departure Order, which motion remains unresolved. Meanwhile, the
accused filed an Omnibus Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause, Recall of Warrant of Arrest, and
Deferment of Proceedings, thereby prompting complainant to file a Comment/Opposition and a Motion for Inhibition.

Respondent Judge eventually arraigned the accused. However, instead of ordering the accused's commitment, and
despite the offense being nonbailable, respondent Judge allowed the accused to go home. The accused filed a Petition
for Bail. During the bail hearing, respondent Judge found the filing thereof premature and issued a warrant of arrest
against the accused. However, instead of committing the accused to jail, he was instead detained at the Criminal
Investigation and Detention Unit of Central Police District, Camp Karingal, Quezon City. Thereafter, respondent Judge
scheduled the bail hearing despite manifestation by complainant's counsel of his unavailability on the scheduled date.
Respondent Judge issued an Order granting the bail petition and denying the motion for inhibition.

ISSUE:
Is respondent Judge guilty of gross ignorance of the law?

RULING:
Yes. Basic is the principle that upon setting a case for arraignment, the accused must have either been in the custody of
the law or out on bail. Another basic principle is that the judge must conduct his own personal evaluation of the facts and
circumstances which gave rise to the indictment, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court and Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

In the present case, respondent Judge should not have waited for the accused to file an omnibus motion for a judicial
determination of probable cause. As this Court held in Leviste v. Hon. Alameda, "[t]o move the court to conduct a judicial
determination of probable cause is a mere superfluity, for with or without such motion, the judge is duty-bound to
personally evaluate the resolution of the public prosecutor and the supporting evidence." Thus, the failure of respondent
Judge to comply with this fundamental precept constituted gross ignorance of the law and procedure. His failure to heed
this precept resulted in the said accused's arraignment, without the accused in custody of the law.

In addition, respondent Judge's failure to conduct a hearing on accused's Petition for Bail constitutes gross ignorance of
the law. It is axiomatic that a bail hearing is a must, despite the prosecution's lack of objection to the same. In any event,
whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, a hearing for a petition for bail is required in order for the court to consider
the guidelines set forth in Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court in fixing the amount of bail.

Revilla, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

G. R. No. 218232
July 24, 2018
Carpio, J.:

DOCTRINE:

The grant or denial of bail in an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, such as plunder, hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. This requires the conduct of bail hearings where the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong, subject to the right of the defense to cross-
examine witnesses and introduce evidence in its own rebuttal.

FACTS:

Petitioners Revilla, Cambe and Napoles, among others, were charged with the crime of Plunder under Section 2 of R. A.
No. 7080 by the office of the Ombudsman in the Sandiganbayan. They filed their respective petitions for bail but were
denied. Hence, these petitions for certiorari assailing the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying their petitions and
alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Revilla Jr., however, withdrew his petition for certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
denying petitioners’ application for admission to bail despite the fact that the evidence on record do not show a clear and
strong evidence of guilt for the crime of plunder.

HELD:

NO. During the bail hearings, both parties were afforded opportunities to offer their evidence. The prosecution presented
nine witnesses and documentary evidence to prove the strong evidence of guilt of the accused. The defense likewise
introduced evidence in its own rebuttal and cross-examined the witnesses presented by the prosecution. Only after both
parties rested their case that the Sandiganbayan issued its Resolution, which contains the summary of the prosecution's
evidence. The summary of the prosecution's evidence shows the basis for the Sandiganbayan's discretion to deny bail to
Cambe and Napoles.

Accordingly, there is no basis for the allegation of Cambe that the Sandiganbayan Resolutions were based on mere
presumptions and inferences. On the other hand, the Sandiganbayan considered the entire record of evidence in finding
strong evidence of guilt.

For purposes of bail, as held in the case of People v. Cabral that: "[b]y judicial discretion, the law mandates the
determination of whether proof is evident or the presumption of guilt is strong. 'Proof evident' or 'Evident proof' in this
connection has been held to mean clear, strong evidence which leads a well-guarded dispassionate judgment to the
conclusion that the offense has been committed as charged, that accused is the guilty agent, and that he will probably be
punished capitally if the law is administered. 'Presumption great' exists when the circumstances testified to are such that
the inference of guilt naturally to be drawn therefrom is strong, clear, and convincing to an unbiased judgment and
excludes all reasonable probability of any other conclusion." The weight of evidence necessary for bail purposes is not
proof beyond reasonable doubt, but strong evidence of guilt, or "proof evident," or "presumption great." A finding of "proof
evident" or "presumption great" is not inconsistent with the determination of strong evidence of guilt, contrary to Cambe's
argument.

Furthermore, "[e]ven though there is a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of accused, if on an examination of the entire
record the presumption is great that accused is guilty of a capital offense, bail should be refused." Accordingly, an
examination of the entire record - totality of evidence - is necessary to determine whether there is strong evidence of guilt,
for purposes of granting or denying bail to the accused.

Macapagal.Arroyo v. People
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo v. People of the Philippines and the Sandiganbayan
G.R. no. 220598
April 18, 2017

Benigno R. Aguas v. Sandiganbayan

G.R. No. 220593
April 18, 2017
J. Bersamin

DOCTRINE:
The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not only a new
and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such, every acquittal
becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With the acquittal
being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the Constitutional
prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the petitioners to a
second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

FACTS:
Former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, along with several directors and officers of the Philippine Charity
Sweepstakes Office, and former officials of the Commission on Audit were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the
crime of plunder pursuant to RA 7080, as amended by RA 7659, for committing the offense in relation to their respective
offices and taking undue advantage of their respective official positions, authority, relationships, connections or influence,
conniving, conspiring and confederating with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally amass,
accumulate and/or acquire, directly or indirectly, ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount or total value of Php
365,997,915.00, more or less, through any or a combination or a series of overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or
means, for instance “raiding the public treasury by withdrawing and receiving, in several instances, the above-mentioned
amount from the Confidential/Intelligence Fund from PCSO's accounts, and/or unlawfully transferring or conveying the
same into their possession and control through irregularly issued disbursement vouchers and fictitious expenditures.”

All filed their petitions for bail which were granted except for GMA and Aguas due to strong evidence of guilt. Trial ensued.
After the prosecution rested its case, petitioners filed their respective demurrers to evidence but Sandiganbayan denied
such on the ground that there existed sufficient evidence that they conspired to commit plunder. Both petitioners assailed
the validity of denial via separate petitions of certiorari, stating that the Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of
discretion. Their petitions were then consolidated.

On July 19, 2016, the Court promulgated its decision, disposing:

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petitions for certiorari; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the resolutions issued in
Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 by the Sandiganbayan on April 6, 2015 and September 10, 2015; GRANTS the
petitioners' respective demurrers to evidence; DISMISSES Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners
GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO and BENIGNO AGUAS for insufficiency of evidence; ORDERS the immediate release
from detention of said petitioners; and MAKES no pronouncements on costs of suit.

On August 3, 2016, the State, through the Office of the Ombudsman, moved for the reconsideration of the decision,
stating that: [a] giving due course to the petitions for certiorari action assailing an interlocutory order denying demurrer to
evidence violates section 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, which provides that an order denying the demurrer to
evidence, shall not be reviewable by appeal or by certiorari before judgment, and [b] requiring additional elements in the
prosecution of plunder, not fully taking into account the evidence presented, and disregarding the conspiracy between
petitioners all violate the State’s right to due process of law.

Petitioners point out that the State miserably failed to prove the corpus delicti of plunder; that the Court correctly required
the identification of the main plunderer as well as personal benefit on the part of the raider of the public treasury to enable
the successful prosecution of the crime of plunder; that the State did not prove the conspiracy that justified her inclusion in
the charge; that to sustain the case for malversation against her, in lieu of plunder, would violate her right to be informed
of the accusation against her because the information did not necessarily include the crime of malversation; and that even
if the information did so, the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy already barred the re-opening of the case
for that purpose.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court violated sec. 23, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court
2. Whether or not granting the motion for reconsideration would be equivalent to double jeopardy

RULING:
1. No. Notwithstanding the interlocutory character and effect of the denial of the demurrers to evidence, the petitioners
as the accused could avail themselves of the remedy of certiorari when the denial was tainted with grave abuse of
discretion. [T]he Sandiganbayan as the trial court was guilty of grave abuse of discretion when it capriciously denied the
demurrers to evidence despite the absence of competent and sufficient evidence to sustain the indictment for plunder,
and despite the absence of the factual bases to expect a guilty verdict.

2. Yes. The constitutional prohibition against placing a person under double jeopardy for the same offense bars not
only a new and independent prosecution but also an appeal in the same action after jeopardy had attached. As such,
every acquittal becomes final immediately upon promulgation and cannot be recalled for correction or amendment. With
the acquittal being immediately final, granting the State's motion for reconsideration in this case would violate the
Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because it would effectively reopen the prosecution and subject the
petitioners to a second jeopardy despite their acquittal.

It is cogent to remind in this regard that the Constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy provides to the accused
three related protections, specifically: protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal;
protection against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and protection against multiple
punishments for the same offense. Petitioners insist that the consideration and granting of the motion for reconsideration
of the State can amount to a violation of the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy because their acquittal
under the decision was a prior jeopardy within the context of Section 21, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution,
to wit:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

The insistence of the petitioners is fully warranted. Indeed, the consideration and the granting of the motion for
reconsideration of the State will amount to the violation of the constitutional guarantee against double jeopardy.

The Court's consequential dismissal of Criminal Case No. SB-12-CRM-0174 as to the petitioners for insufficiency of
evidence amounted to their acquittal of the crime of plunder charged against them

People vs Dominguez

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. ROGER DOMINGUEZ

G.R. No. 229420å, February 19, 2018

Doctrine: The death of the state witness prior to trial proper will not automatically render his testimony during the
discharge proceeding inadmissible

Facts: Venson Evangelista, a car salesman, was abducted in Cubao, Quezon City by a group of men later pinpointed as
the respondents herein. Evangelista's charred remains were discovered the following day in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija. In connection with the incident, Mendiola and Parulan voluntarily surrendered to the PNP and executed extrajudicial
confessions identifying respondents Roger and Raymond Dominguez as the masterminds behind the killing. This led to
the filing before the Quezon City RTC of an Information against Mendiola and the respondents.

A hearing was conducted on the prosecution's motion that Mendiola be discharged as an accused to become a state
witness. On the said date, Mendiola gave his testimony and was cross-examined by the counsel for the defense.
Nevertheless, the defense manifested that the cross-examination was limited only to the incident of discharge, and that
their party reserved the right to a more lengthy cross-examination during the prosecution's presentation of the evidence in
chief. The prosecution's motion was granted. Thereafter, by a surprise turn of events, Mendiola was found dead. The RTC
then required the parties to submit their respective position papers on whether or not Mendiola's testimony during the
discharge proceeding should be admitted as part of the prosecution's evidence in chief despite his failure to testify during
the trial proper prior to his death.

The RTC issued an Order directing that the testimony of Mendiola be stricken off the records. According to the trial court,
Mendiola's testimony was offered only for the purpose of substantiating the motion for him to be discharged as a state
witness, and does not yet constitute evidence in chief. Thus, the defense counsel limited his questions during cross-
examination to only those matters relating to Mendiola's qualifications to become a state witness and expressly reserved
the right to continue the cross-examination during trial proper. The issue was elevated to the CA but the appellate court
dismissed the petition.

Issue: Whether or not the testimony of Mendiola should be stricken off the records

Ruling: NO. The rule is explicit that the testimony of the witness during the discharge proceeding will only be inadmissible
if the court denies the motion to discharge the accused as a state witness. However, the motion hearing in this case had
already concluded and the motion for discharge, approved. Thus, whatever transpired during the hearing is already
automatically deemed part of the records and admissible in evidence pursuant to the rule.

Mendiola's testimony was not incomplete. The contents of his lengthy narration were more than sufficient to establish his
possession of all the necessary qualifications, and none of the disqualifications to be eligible as a state witness.
Respondent raised that Section 18, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court makes it mandatory that the state witness be
presented during trial proper and that, otherwise, his failure to do so would render his testimony inadmissible. On this
point, Miranda, the RTC and the CA are mistaken in their interpretation of the rule

True, the provision requires the accused to testify again during trial proper after he qualifies as a state witness. However,
noncompliance therewith would only prevent the order of discharge from operating as an acquittal; it does not speak of
any penalty to the effect of rendering all the testimonies of the state witness during the discharge proceeding inadmissible.
On the contrary, the testimonies and admissions of a state witness during the discharge proceedings may be admitted as
evidence to impute criminal liability against him should he fail or refuse to testify in accordance with his sworn statement
constituting the basis for the discharge, militating against the claim of inadmissibility.

People vs Alejandro

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. LINO ALEJANDRO

G.R. No. 223099, January 11, 2018

Doctrine: Despite the RTC's error and misapprehension of facts, it still had no power to rectify such mistake as said
acquittal had attained finality after valid promulgation. The error committed by the RTC cannot be validly recalled without
transgressing the accused’s right against double jeopardy.

Facts: Accused was charged with two counts of rape, of a 12-year old minor, AAA. Upon arraignment, accused-appellant
entered a plea of not guilty and trial ensued.

During trial, AAA testified that accused followed her, grabbed her, and brought her to the back of a school. There,
accused removed AAA's shorts and t-shirt, laid on top of her, and inserted his penis into her vagina. Two months later,
accused went inside AAA's house through a window one night, undressed himself and AAA, and inserted his penis inside
her vagina. On both occasions, accused threatened to kill AAA if she told anybody what had happened.

AAA eventually told her mother, BBB, about the incident. BBB brought her to the Municipal Health Office where she was
examined by Dr. CCC. Dr. CCC testified that she found, among others, deep, healed, old and superficial lacerations in the
hymen of AAA and concluded that these indicated positive sexual intercourse.

Accused, through his counsel, manifested in open court that he would no longer present any evidence for the defense and
submitted the case for decision. The RTC promulgated a Decision acquitting the accused. On the same day, however, the
RTC recalled the said decision because there were Orders that were inadvertently placed in the record involving the same
accused but different private complainant, XXX, which if considered will result in a different verdict. The Court erroneously
declared in its Decision that private complainant AAA did not testify in Court. When in truth and in fact said private
complainant took the witness stand.

Accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and
can neither be withdrawn nor modified, because to do so would place an accused in double jeopardy. The RTC denied
the motion and thereafter convicted the accused. Accused appealed to the CA but it dismissed the appeal.

Issue: Whether or not the error committed by the RTC can be validly recalled without transgressing the accused-
appellant's right against double jeopardy

Ruling: NO. In our jurisdiction, We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. The 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of the accused against double jeopardy. Here, all the elements
were present. There was a valid information for two counts of rape over which the RTC had jurisdiction and to which the
accused-appellant entered a plea of not guilty. After the trial, a judgment of acquittal was thereafter rendered and
promulgated. What is peculiar in this case is that a judgment of acquittal was rendered based on the mistaken notion that
the private complainant failed to testify; allegedly because of the mix-up of orders with a different case involving the same
accused-appellant. This, however, does not change the fact that a judgment of acquittal had already been promulgated.
Indeed, a judgment of acquittal, whether ordered by the trial or the appellate court, is final, unappealable, and immediately
executory upon its promulgation.

Navaja V. De Castro

Doctrine: The rule on continuous offenses is applicable for violations of special penal laws under Article 10 of the
RPC and can be tried under one information provided that there is a single criminal design despite the different dates of
commission.

Facts: The present case occurred during the pendency of a preliminary investigation based on a complaint for
falsification filed by DKT Philippines in the Office of the prosecutor-Bohol, Tagbiliran City (OPP-Bohol) against its Regional
Sales Manager Ana Lou Navaja, where one Marilyn Magsigay, DKT's material witness, was subpoenaed to appear before
the said Office in order to clarify the alleged official receipts falsified. However, Ms. Magsigay failed to attend because she
was notified by Noel Navaja on 9 March 2004, Ana's husband, that her presence was no longer required but a mere
submission of a signed affidavit will do. Hence, Ms. Magsigay signed the pre-made affidavit presented by the defendant's
counsel on 15 March and was allegedly notarized in Cebu City, which resulted in the OPP-Bohol's dismissal of the
complaint since the said affidavit heavily supported Ana's counter-affidavit. Countering, DKT's counsel to file two counts of
obstruction of justice under PD 1829 after discovering the misrepresentation of Noel and their defense counsel on two
separate dates, where two informations were filed in MCTC-Jagna and MCTC-Tagbiliran. Answering, a motion to quash
was filed by Noel since both cases arose from the same facts and formed a single criminal intent to obstruct the
preliminary investigation which ultimately violated his right to double jeopardy. Eventually, the MCTC-Jagna denied the
motion and ruled that the charge filed in their jurisdiction was for violation of section 1(a) of the said law, while the other
charge filed in the MCTC Tagbiliran City was for violation of section 1(f) which are independent offenses from each other.
Thereafter, the RTC affirmed the assailed decision on certiorari which was further affirmed by the Court of Appeals based
on the same reasoning.

Issue: Whether or not Noel Navaja can be tried for 2 separate Informations of obstruction of justice before two
different courts without violating double jeopardy
Ruling: No. The Supreme Court ruled that while the Informations pertain to acts that were done days apart and in
different locations, Noel should only be charged and held liable for a single violation of PD 1829 because the alleged acts,
albeit separate, were motivated by a single criminal impulse - that is, to obstruct or impede the preliminary investigation,
which was eventually dismissed by the OPP-Bohol. The foregoing conclusion is premised on the principle of delito
continuado (continuous offense), which envisages a single crime committed through a series of acts arising from one
criminal intent or resolution. Particularly, the court ruled that the concept of a continuous offense has been
jurisprudentially applied to crimes penalized by special laws and is further justified under Article 10 of the RPC where legal
principles under the said law are applicable to special penal laws. Lastly, the present case does not fit the People vs.
Regis doctrine where separate Informations can be filed despite being a similar offense since it is separated by a different
criminal objective and proved by separate dates of commission. In this case, the dates of commission of the offenses
were immaterial since the criminal design or objective is the same which is to obstruct the preliminary investigation of
DKT's complaint. hence, the information for obstruction of justice filed before the MCTC-Jagna must be dismissed for
being a violation to the right to double jeopardy.

Personal Collectiob Direct Selling Inc vs Carandang

PERSONAL COLLECTION DIRECT SELLING, INC. vs. TERESITA L. CARANDANG

G.R. No. 206958;November 8, 2017
LEONEN, J.

DOCTRINE: Judges must act with cautious discernment and faithfully exercise their judicial discretion when dismissing
cases for lack of probable cause. An order granting the withdrawal of an information based on the prosecutor's findings of
lack of probable cause must show that the judge did not rely solely on the prosecution's conclusions but had
independently evaluated the evidence on record and the merits of the case.

Facts: Carandang was charged with committing estafa while Personal Collection was the private offended party.
Personal Collection filed a Complaint-Affidavit for estafa with unfaithfulness and/or abuse of confidence against
Carandang before the City Prosecutor of QC for her failure to liquidate the cash advances she received in trust from
Petitioner. After the preliminary investigation, Assistant City Prosecutor filed an Information against Carandang.
Carandang filed a Motion for Reinvestigation, alleging that she did not appear during the preliminary investigation
because she did not receive any subpoena. RTC granted her Motion. The OCP recommended that the complaint against
Carandang be dismissed. The Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw Information for lack of probable cause, which was
granted by the RTC. Hence, petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA arguing that the RTC acted with grave
abuse of discretion when it issued the Orders granting the Motion to Withdraw Information. The CA denied the Petition.
Hence, the petitioner filed an appeal via Rule 45 before the SC.
Personal Collection argued that the trial court failed to make its own evaluation of the merits of the case and only relied on
Prosecutor Aquiatan-Morales' recommendation that there was no probable cause to charge Carandang with estafa.

Issues: 1) Whether or not the Information be withdrawn after it was filed in Court?
2) Whether or not the petitioner deprived of due process when it was allegedly not given opportunity to be heard on
respondent’s Motion to Release Cash Bond
3) Is Petition for Certiorari a proper remedy to an order granting withdrawal of Information

Ruling:1) YES. When an information is filed in court, the court acquires jurisdiction over the case and has the authority to
determine, among others, whether or not the case should be dismissed. The court is "the best and sole judge of what to
do with the case before it."
Judges must act with cautious discernment when asked to dismiss cases on the ground of the absence of probable cause
to support the withdrawal or dismissal of an information. While the accused is constitutionally given a guarantee of
presumption of innocence, there is also the concern for the right to due process of the prosecution.
The order granting the withdrawal of an information must state the judge's assessment of the evidence and reasons in
resolving the motion. It must clearly show why the court's earlier assessment of probable cause was erroneous, The court
should not merely accept the prosecution's findings and conclusions. Its independent judicial discretion in allowing the
information to be withdrawn must not only be implied but must be palpable in its order.
In the case at bar, the trial court did not gravely abuse its discretion when it reversed its earlier finding of probable cause.
The earlier finding was about the issuance of the arrest warrant, in which the trial court evaluated the prosecutor's
Resolution and its attached documents. It was during the reinvestigation that respondent was able to present her defense
against the allegations in the complaint. Clearly, the additional evidence adduced prompted the prosecutor's reversal of its
initial finding of probable cause. It was also this additional evidence that formed the basis of the trial court's evaluation that
there was now a lack of probable cause sufficient to withdraw the information. There being insufficient evidence showing
that the trial court erred in finding a lack of probable cause, the grant of the withdrawal of the information must be upheld.

2) NO. Rule 114, Section 22 of the Rules of Court provides the guidelines for the cancellation of bail. Among the instances
when bail is deemed automatically cancelled is when the case is dismissed. In the case at bar, petitioner's right to due
process was not violated when it was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard on the Motion to Release Cash Bond.
No notice or hearing was necessary, since the bail was automatically cancelled upon the dismissal of the case.
Petitioner's hypothetical objections to the Motion to Release Cash Bond would have been superfluous and unnecessary
since the release of the cash bond to respondent was already warranted under the Rules.
Cu vs Ventura
LYDIA CU vs. TRINIDAD VENTURA
G.R. No. 224567; September 26, 2018

DOCTRINE:
If there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, or if there is an acquittal of the accused, it is only the OSG that
may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. The rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that
the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People and not the petitioners who are mere complaining
witnesses.

FACTS:
Petitioner filed a Complaint-Affidavit for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22) against respondent before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City. Eventually, the Office of the City Prosecutor found probable cause and
an Information was filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Quezon City against respondent for violation of
BP 22.
After trial on the merits, the MeTC found the respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of BP
22.Respondent filed a Notice of Appeal and the Regional Trial Court (RTC) reversed and set aside the decision of the
MeTC
Meanwhile, petitioner, through her counsel, filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the RTC. On July
20, 2015, she filed her Petition for Review under Rule 42 with the CA.
The CA, in its Resolution dated December 11, 2015, dismissed the appeal. According to the CA, in criminal actions
brought before the Court of Appeals, or the Supreme Court, the authority to represent the State is solely vested in the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA.
ISSUE: Whether or not the private complainant can file a Petition for Review under Rule 42.
RULING: NO.
The CA dismissed petitioner's Petition for Review under Rule 42 of the Rules of Court because she is not the proper
party to appeal in a criminal case. It ruled that in criminal cases or proceedings, only the Solicitor General may bring
or defend actions on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, or represent the People or State. The two exceptions
are: (1) when there is denial of due process of law to the prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the
case to the prejudice of the State and the private offended party, and (2) when the private offended party questions
the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court. 17
Again, jurisprudence holds that if there is a dismissal of a criminal case by the trial court, or if there is an acquittal of
the accused, it is only the OSG that may bring an appeal on the criminal aspect representing the People. 25 The
 rationale therefor is rooted in the principle that the party affected by the dismissal of the criminal action is the People
and not the petitioners who are mere complaining witnesses. 26 For this reason, the People are deemed as the real
parties-in-interest in the criminal case and, therefore, only the OSG can represent them in criminal proceedings
pending in the CA or in this Court. 27 In view of the corollary principle that every action must be prosecuted or
defended in the name of the real party-in-interest who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or
by the party entitled to the avails of the suit, 28 an appeal of the criminal case not filed by the People as represented
by the OSG is perforce dismissible. The private complainant or the offended party may, however, file an appeal
without the intervention of the OSG, but only insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned.29 He may also
file a special civil action for certiorari even without the intervention of the OSG, but only to the end of preserving his
interest in the civil aspect of the case. 30 Hence, Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
is DENIED.

Mayor Corpus, Jr. v. Pamular,

G.R. No. 186403,
[September 5, 2018])

Doctrine: An allegation of conspiracy to add a new accused without changing the prosecution's theory that the accused
willfully shot the victim is merely a formal amendment. However, the rule provides that only formal amendments not
prejudicial to the rights of the accused are allowed after plea. The test of whether an accused is prejudiced by an
amendment is to determine whether a defense under the original information will still be available even after the
amendment is made and if any evidence that an accused might have would remain applicable even in the amended
information.
This Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 assails the February 26, 2009 Order and Warrant of Arrest issued
by Judge Pamular. The assailed Order granted the prosecution's Motion to Amend the Original Information for murder
filed against Samonte to include Mayor Corpus as his co-accused in the crime charged. Furthermore, it directed the
issuance of a warrant of arrest against Corpus.
Facts: Carlito samonte was accused for the murder of Angelito Espinosa. Accused allegedly shot Espinosa with an
unlicensed firearm which directly caused his death. Upon arraignment, Samonte admitted the killing but pleaded self-
defense. An affidavit was submitted by the wife of the deceased alleging that Corpus was the one who instructed
Samonte to kill Angelito. Samonte and Corpus jointly filed a Petition for Review before the Department of Justice. They
also filed a Manifestation and Motion dated with the Regional Trial Court, asking it to desist from acting further on the
Amended Information in view of the Petition for Review filed with the Department of Justice. Despite said motion Judge
Pamular issued Warrant of arrest against Samonte and Corpus. direct recourse before this Court, through a Petition for
Certiorari under Rule 65 with a prayer for an immediate issuance of a temporary restraining order, was filed by Corpus
and Samonte they also alleged that since the filing of Certiorari under Rule 65 the arraignment is deemed suspended.
||
Issues:
1. Whether or not the arraignment of petitioner may proceed after the lapse of the maximum 60-day period
suspension provided for under Rule 116, Section 11 (c)
2. Whether or not respondent Judge has personally determined, through evaluation of the Prosecutor's report
and supporting documents, the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest against petitioner
Amado Corpus, Jr.
|||
Held:

1. YES, Rule 116, Section 11 pertains to a suspension of an arraignment in case of a pending petition for
review before the Department of Justice. It does not suspend the execution of a warrant of arrest for the purpose
of acquiring jurisdiction over the person of an accused.
Judge Pamular denied Corpus' motion to defer or suspend arraignment and further proceedings. Petitioners
claim that he should have suspended action on the issuance of a warrant considering the pendency of their Petition
for Review before the Department of Justice,
Rule 116, Section 11 of the provides for the grounds for suspension of arraignment. Upon motion by the
proper party, the arraignment shall be suspended in case of a pending petition for review of the prosecutor's
resolution filed before the Department of Justice.
Petitioners filed a Manifestation and Motion dated February 9, 2009 before the Regional Trial Court, informing
it about their pending Petition for Review of the Prosecutor's January 26, 2009 Resolution before the Department of
Justice. Thus, respondent judge committed an error when he denied petitioners' motion to suspend the arraignment of
 Corpus because of the pendency of their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice.
However, this Court's rule merely requires a maximum 60-day period of suspension counted from the filing of
a petition with the reviewing office. Consequently, therefore, after the expiration of the 60-day period, "the trial court is
bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment."
Petitioners jointly filed their Petition for Review before the Department of Justice on February 9, 2009. Thus,
the 60-day period has already lapsed since April 10, 2009. Hence, respondent judge can now continue with the
arraignment and further proceedings with regard to petitioner Corpus.
||2. YES, As held in the case of Crespo v. Mogul,
The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the
case as [to] its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although
the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he
cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it.
The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the
fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done
was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the
investigation.|||
Hence, when a Regional Trial Court has already determined that probable cause exists for the issuance of a warrant of
arrest, like in this case, jurisdiction is already with the Regional Trial Court. Therefore, it can proceed in conducting further
proceedings on the amended information and on the issuance of a warrant despite the pendency of a Petition for Review
before the Department of Justice.|

Tumagan vs Kairuz
G.R. No. 198124. September 12, 2018.
JOHN CARY TUMAGAN, ALAM HALIL, and BOT PADILLA, petitioners, vs. MARIAM K. KAIRUZ, respondent

DOCTRINE: An indispensable party is a party in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action and
who shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. The presence of indispensable parties is necessary to vest the court
with jurisdiction.

FACTS: Mariam K. Kairuz alleged that she had been in actual and physical possession of a 5.2-hectare
property located at Tadiangan, Tuba, Benguet until May 28, 2007. She alleged that in the afternoon of May 28, 2007,
petitioners John Cary Tumagan, Alam Hali, and Bot Padilla conspired with each other and took possession of the
property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threat, and stealth with the aid of armed men. After forcibly gaining
entry into the property, petitioners then padlocked its three gates, posted armed men, and excluded Mariam from the
property. Mariam likewise sought the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction (WPI) against petitioners.

In their answer, petitioners averred that Mariam could not bring the present action for forcible entry because she
was never the sole owner or possessor of the property. Petitioners claimed that the property is a good source of potable
water and is publicly known as Kairuz Spring. During his lifetime, Laurence, in his own capacity and as attorney-in-fact
for his sisters, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement . Unfortunately, upon Mariam's assumption of the truck water
business as well as Lexber Subdivision water service, she started to commit actions in conflict with the best interest of
BIRI, such as: (a) she opposed the required transfer of the BSMWC water permit to BIRI before the National Water
Resources Board; (b) she intervened in the case filed by Baguio Water District against BIRI, weakening BIRI's position;
(c) she filed a complaint before the RTC of Angeles City questioning the Deed of Assignment of the BSMWC shares
executed by the Kairuz family in favor of BIRI; and (d) she asked the barangay officials at Tadiangan, Tuba and
Sangguniang Bayan Members of Tuba to deny BIRI's offer to service the water requirements of Tuba residents. This
prompted BIRI's shareholders to write Mariam regarding her default on the provisions of the MOA, warning her that
unless appropriate remedies are fulfilled, the MOA will be terminated. Mariam refused to receive the registered mail
sent by BIRI and ignored their official communications, choosing instead to file the present ejectment complaint against
petitioners. Furthermore, petitioners claimed that contrary to Mariam's allegations, on May 28, 2007, BIRI, as a
corporation and owner of the spring property, merely exercised its legal right to prevent unauthorized persons from
entering its property. The deployment of licensed security guards was intended to secure its property and prevent
forcible entry into the area, specifically by people who are "persona non-grata" to the company.

On March 9, 2009, the MCTC dismissed the case due to Mariam's failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable
party

On appeal, the RTC upheld the MCTC's dismissal of the case. It ruled that since petitioners were able to
establish that they acted as mere employees or agents of BIRI, the issue of possession cannot be resolved without the
court first acquiring jurisdiction over BIRI.

On December 21, 2010, the CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision.It ruled that the MCTC
erred in dismissing Mariam's complaint because of a technical rule of failure to implead an indispensable party, BIRI. It
pointed out that Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court provides that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a
ground for the dismissal of an action. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable either by
order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action. If the party refuses to implead
the indispensable party despite order of the court, then the latter may dismiss the complaint/petition for the plaintiff's
failure to comply therewith.

Hence, this petition for review where petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred in: (1) reversing the Decisions
of the MCTC and the RTC dismissing the complaint for failure to implead BIRI, an indispensable party; (2) agreeing with
Mariam's baseless claim of possession; and (3) not finding that the issues are intra-corporate in nature which should be
best resolved before the RTC in Angeles City.

ISSUE: WON MCTC has acquire jurisdiction over the case.

HELD: Thus, the supreme court agree with petitioners that while the case purports to be one for forcible entry
filed by Mariam against BIRI's employees and contractors in their individual capacities, the true nature of the
controversy is an intra-corporate dispute between BIRI and its shareholder, Mariam, regarding the management of, and
access to, the corporate property subject of the MOA. We therefore find that the MCTC never acquired jurisdiction over
the ejectment case filed by Mariam. Based on the MOA, the Kairuzes own 30% of the outstanding capital stock of BIRI.
This, however, does not make Mariam a co-owner of the property of BIRI, including the property subject of this case.
Shareholders are in no legal sense the owners of corporate property, which is owned by the corporation as a distinct
legal person.

At most, Mariam's interest as a shareholder is purely inchoate, or in sheer expectancy of a right, in the
management of the corporation and to share in its profits, and in its properties and assets on dissolution after payment
of the corporate debts and obligations.

In sum, what appears on record as the true nature of the controversy is that of a shareholder seeking relief from
the court to contest the management's decision to: (1) post guards to secure the premises of the corporate property; (2)
padlock the premises; and (3) deny her access to the same on May 28, 2007 due to her alleged default on the
provisions of the MOA.Moreover, the CA erred in characterizing the action as an ejectment case filed by a co-owner
who was illegally deprived of her right to possess the property by the presence of armed men.
People v. Bringcula
PEOPLE v. JOSELITO BRINGCULA Y FERNANDEZ
GR No. 226400, Jan 24, 2018

Doctrine: Any objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person
of an accused must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived.

Facts:
Herein Private Petitioner AAA alleged that on the night of May 2, 2011 as she was sleeping inside her house, she was
awakened when a man wearing a mask touched her shoulder and poked a firearm at her neck. The man told her that it
was a robbery and that she should keep quiet or else he would kill her. She was able to recognize the voice of the man to
be that of appellant Bringcula. She was hogtied by Bringcula and after taking some of her valuables, Bringcula ordered
her to lie on her back and pulled her pajama and underwear and raped her. When Bringcula left, she awakened her niece
and told her to shout for some help. The Barangay Captain, Kagawad and some neighbors arrived at AAA's house and
when they asked who the culprit was, she opted not to immediately disclose appellant's identity. Later in the morning,
AAA went to the police station to report the incident and submitted herself for a medical examination where she also
disclosed the identity of Bringcula. Bringcula, on the other hand denied the allegations and interposed alibi as a defense
and alleged that he was sleeping in his own house during the time of the incident. The RTC and CA ruled in favor of AAA.
Bringcula questions such decision alleging that AAA did not disclose the violation committed against her person
immediately after the incident and he also questions the validity of his warrantless arrest for the first time on appeal.

Issue: Whether or not Defendant may still question the validity of his arrest

Ruling:

The Supreme Court held that appellant is already estopped from questioning the validity of his arrest because it was
never raised prior to his having entered a plea of not guilty. Moreover, the rule is that an accused is estopped from
assailing the legality of his arrest if he failed to move to quash the information against him before his arraignment. Any
objection involving the arrest or the procedure in the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of an accused
must be made before he enters his plea, otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. Even in the instances not allowed by
law, a warrantless arrest is not a jurisdictional defect, and objection thereto is waived where the person arrested submits
to arraignment without objection. The subsequent filing of the charges and the issuance of the corresponding warrant of
arrest against a person illegally detained will cure the defect of that detention.

Duque v. Yu
Duque V. Yu
GR No: 226130, February 19, 2018
J:, Velasco Jr:

Doctrine: Once a party serves a request for admission as to the truth of any material and relevant matter of fact, the party
to whom such request is served has 15 days within which to file a sworn statement answering it. In case of failure to do
so, each of the matters of which admission is requested shall be deemed admitted. This rule, however, admits of an
exception, that is, when the party to whom such request for admission is served had already controverted the matters
subject of such request in an earlier pleading. Otherwise stated, if the matters in a request for admission have already
been admitted or denied in previous pleadings by the requested party, the latter cannot be compelled to admit or deny
them anew.

FACTS:
Spouses Duque were the lawful owners of a certain lot located in Cebu. Spouses Duque allegedly executed a Deed of
Donation over their daughter, herein respondent Delia Capacio. Delia Capacio thereafter sold it to respondent Spouses
Yu. With that, Spouses Duque lodged a verified complaint for Declaration to nullify the said Deed of Donation.

Respondent Capacio, answered that the signature in the Deed of Donation was falsified but she did not know the author
thereof. Respondents Spouses, on the other hand, refuted Spouses Duque’s personality and raised prescription as their
defense.

During the trial, a Motion for Admission by Adverse Party was filed by Spouses Yu requesting to admission certain
documents such as the Real Estate Mortgage, Deed of Donation, Contract of Lease and Deed of Absolute Sale. However,
they failed to do so.

The RTC ruled that they were deemed to have admitted the same. During the trial, instead of presenting their evidence,
 Spouses Yu moved for demurrer of evidence in view of the said pronouncement which was granted and dismissed the
complaint. The Court of Appeal also affirmed the said decision. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the denial to answer for the request for admission has the effect of admitting the same?

HELD:
No. While it is true that failure to answer with the request for admission has the effect of admitting the matters in the
allegations of the complaint, it admits some exceptions. The exception is when the party to whom such request for
admission is served had already controverted the matters subject of such request in an earlier pleading.

In the case at bar, the matters and documents being requested to be admitted have already been denied and
controverted in the previous Verified Complaint for Declaration of Non existence and Nullity of the Deed of Donation. In
fact, the forgery committed was the very essence of that complain, where it was alleged that being a forged document, the
same is invalid and without force and legal effect. Petitioners, therefore, need not reply to the request for admission. Thus,
they cannot be deemed admitted to have admitted the Deed of Donation’s genuineness and authenticity for the failure to
respond thereto.

EVID People vs. Ramirez

Doctrine: “Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of
guilt."1 Resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. "Circumstantial
evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from
the evidence established."
As extensively discussed in People v. Modesto:

“The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. From all the circumstances, there should be a
combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course o.f things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.”

Facts: That sometime in the year 1989, Province of Cagayan, the accused GIL RAMIREZ, father of the private
complainant "AAA," held and let the private complainant inhale a substance causing her to lose her consciousness and
that thereafter, the accused, with lewd design, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie, and succeeded in
having sexual intercourse with the private complainant "AAA," who was then a minor being only a seven-year old girl.
For several years, "AAA" just suffered in silence because of fear for her own life as well as that of her family.

On May 23, 2005, Dr. Annabelle Soliman y Lopez (Dr. Soliman) conducted the medical examination of "AAA." Dr. Soliman
described the hymen of "AAA" as anular, thick, wide and estrogenized. Dr. Soliman added that there was a possibility that
"AAA" could had no injury even after sexual intercourse.

Issues: Whether or not the Gil Ramirez is guilty.

Ruling 1: "Direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only basis from which a court may draw its finding of
guilt." Resort to circumstantial evidence is sanctioned by Rule 133, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. "Circumstantial
evidence is defined as that which indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference which the fact-finder draws from
the evidence established."
As extensively discussed in People v. Modesto:

“The circumstances proved should constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion which
points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. From all the circumstances, there should be a
combination of evidence which in the ordinary and natural course o.f things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to his
guilt.”

As reflected in the assailed CA Decision, the conclusion finding appellant's guilt for rape was anchored on the following
circumstantial evidence: "(1) "AAA" was sleeping in their house; (2) "AAA" was awakened when [appellant] forced [her] to
smell a substance that caused her to lose consciousness; (3) "AAA" positively identified [appellant] as the only person she
saw before she lost consciousness; (4) upon regaining consciousness. there was blood on "AAA's" shorts; (5) "AAA's"
panty was also reversed; and, (6) "AAA" felt pain in her vagina."
To the mind of the Court, these circumstances did not establish with certainty the guilt of appellant as to convince beyond
reasonable doubt that the crime of rape was in fact committed or that he was the perpetrator of the offense charged.
The circumstances relied upon by the CA in its assailed Decision failed to sufficiently link appellant to the crime. What is
extant on record is that the allegation of sexual molestation on "AAA" by appellant was anchored principally on
presumption. But in criminal cases, "speculation and probabilities cannot take the place of proof required to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. Suspicion, no matter how strong, must not sway judgment.
In fine, the prosecution failed to discharge the onus of prima facie proving appellant's guilt of the crime of rape beyond
reasonable doubt. Thus, to still consider appellant's defense would be an exercise in futility.
Tortona v. Gregorio

Doctine 1: Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise wide latitude
of discretion in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking in to consideration factual circumstances of the case.
Doctrine 2: As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and
the burden of proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the
instrument itself reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison
between the alleged forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized
upon to have been forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a
definitive comparison which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the
document under controversy cannot produce reliable results.

Facts: It was alleged in this case by the petitioners (Heirs of Rufina) that the thumb marks of their mother Rufina Casimiro
was forged to be able to sell a certain property. However it was also stated by them that their mother was illiterate, not
even knowing how to write her own name. It was also alleged that she only affixed her thumb mark on documents, and
whenever she did so, she was always assisted by at least one (1) of her children. They assert that if the sales to Rafaela
(Sister of Rufina) were genuine, they should have known about them.

Issues: 1.) Whether or not the Thumb marks of Rufina were genuine. 2.) How was the forgery established?

Ruling 1: No, the marks were not genuine. With the aid of an expert witness, they contrasted Rufina's apparent thumb
marks on the Deed of Absolute Sale with specimen thumb marks on authentic documents. They demonstrated disparities
that lead to no other conclusion than that the thumb marks on the contentious Deed of Absolute Sale are forged. The
opinion of the expert may not be arbitrarily rejected; it is to be considered by the court in view of all the facts and
circumstances in the case and when common knowledge utterly fails, the expert opinion may be given controlling effect.
Testimonies of expert witnesses are not absolutely binding on courts. However, courts exercise wide latitude of discretion
in giving weight to expert testimonies, taking in to consideration factual circumstances of the case.

Ruling 2: Here, petitioners submitted for comparison three (3) standard documents bearing the genuine thumbmarks of
Rufina: (1) Kasulatan sa Bilihan ng Lote (Exhibit "F"); (2) Kasulatang Paghahati sa Labas ng Hukuman na may Lakip na
Bilihan ng Lupa (Exhibit "G"); and (3) the Residence Certificate of Rufina (Exhibit "H"). 67 After examination, Gomez
submitted to the Regional Trial Court his Technical Investigation/Identification Report FP Case No. 2000-182 dated July
13, 2000:
RESULT OF EXAMINATION: After having a thorough examination, comparison and analysis, questioned thumbmarks
mentioned in item nos. 5A and 5B are found not identical with the standard thumbmarks mentioned in item nos. 5C, 5D,
and 5E.
OPINION: In view of the foregoing result of the examination, questioned thumbmark mentioned in item nos. 5A and 5B
were not impressed by Rufina Casimiro. 68
This Report could not be any clearer. The questioned thumbmarks on the Deed of Absolute Sale do not belong to Rufina.
The questioned thumbmarks were of the "circle type" while the genuine thumbmarks of Rufina were of the "loop type.
As a rule, forgery cannot be presumed and must be proved by clear, positive and convincing evidence and the burden of
proof lies on the party alleging forgery. The best evidence of a forged signature in an instrument is the instrument itself
reflecting the alleged forged signature. The fact of forgery can only be established by a comparison between the alleged
forged signature and the authentic and genuine signature of the person whose signature is theorized upon to have been
forged. Without the original document containing the alleged forged signature, one cannot make a definitive comparison
which would establish forgery. A comparison based on a mere xerox copy or reproduction of the document under
controversy cannot produce reliable results.

People vs Corpus

Doctrine:
An intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court."He or she can be a
witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is
coherent, it is admissible in court.

Facts:
The assailed Decision affirmed the Regional Trial Court's ruling that Allan was guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four (4)
counts of Simple Rape of AAA, a mental retardate (intellectually disabled) with a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8)
months.

Dr. Rachel Acosta testified that she had examined AAA's mental status including her "mental, behavioral and emotional
conditions and her manner of communicati[on]." She found that AAA had a "mild degree of mental retardation" and an
Intelligence Quotient of 70.44.

Although AAA was already 19 years old at the time of examination, her mental age was that of a child aged five (5) to
seven (7) years
AAA testified: "Iniyot nak, sir." (He had sex with me, sir.) She attested that when she was 13 years old, Allan had sex with
her on four (4) occasions, each of which he gave her money.

Allan denied the accusations and insisted that all the charges against him were merely fabricated by AAA's father, FFF.He
allegedly sacked FFF as a truck driver in his sand and gravel business in 2001 for allowing his son to drive the truck that
led to an accident.

The trial court ruled that AANs testimony was "categorical, straight forward and credible." Since it was already established
that the victim was intellectually disabled,it would be unlikely for her to fabricate the accusations against Allan.

As confirmed by Dr. Acosta, AAA's degree of honesty was great. Considering her mental age, she did not know how to
decipher right from wrong. Thus, her simple recount of events showed her "honesty and naivet[e]."

In his appeal, Allan insisted that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt because the records were bereft of any
credible proof indicating that he raped AAA four (4) times. AAA failed to testify when and where she was raped as she
was not oriented with place, date, and time.Allan insists that he could not have impregnated AAA because, as she has
testified, she was raped when she was 13 years old but her first menstrual period was when she was 14 years
old.Allegedly, AAA was inconsistent in her testimony because when she was interviewed, she did not know who raped
her. Despite this, however, the trial court still relied on AAA's testimony.

Issue: Whether AAA is capacitated to testify.

Held:
To qualify as a witness, the basic test is "whether he [or she] can perceive and, perceiving, can make known his [or her]
perception to others."128 Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides:

Section 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. - Except as provided in the next succeeding section, all persons who can
perceive, and perceiving, can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.

....

Section 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity. -The following persons cannot be witnesses:

(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination, is such that they are incapable of
intelligently making known their perception to others;

(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are
examined and of relating them truthfully.

Therefore, an intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court. "He or she can
be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If an intellectually disabled victim's testimony
is coherent, it is admissible in court.

Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness stand. A person with low Intelligence
Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making known his or her perception to others.

Given that AAA's qualification as a witness is already settled, AAA's mental state also does not prevent her from being a
credible witness.

The credibility as a witness of an intellectually disabled person is upheld provided that she is capable and consistent in
narrating her experience. The competence and credibility of mentally deficient rape victims as witnesses have been
upheld by this Court where it is shown that they can communicate their ordeal capably and consistently. Rather than
undermine the gravity of the complainant's accusations, it even lends greater credence to her testimony, that, someone as
feeble-minded and guileless could speak so tenaciously and explicitly on the details of the rape if she has not in fact
suffered such crime at the hands of the accused.

Furthermore, Dr. Acosta explicitly stated that "[AAA's] degree of honesty is great" despite her condition.

[AAA's] degree of honesty is "great" because, with her mental age, she does not know what is right or wrong. Indeed, in
light of her mental state, [AAA's] simple narration of what happened to her is indicative of her honesty and naivet[e].

People vs. Ramirez

Conchav. People
[G.R. No. 208114. October 3, 2018.]
MELKY CONCHA and ROMEO MANAGUELOD, petitioners, vs. PEOPLE
OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent . DECISION
LEONEN, J p:
DOCTRINE
An out-of-court identification such as a police show-up inadmissible if it is tainted with improper suggestions by police
officers.
COURT FLOW
Supreme Court : Petitioners Melky Concha and Romeo Managuelod are ACQUITTED for reasonable doubt. They are
ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless confined for any other lawful cause, by Petition for Review on
Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
Court of Appeal and Regional Trial Court: finding Melky Concha (Concha) and Romeo Managuelod (Managuelod) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of carnapping.

FACTS OF THE CASE

VERSION OF THE POLICE AND PROSECUTOR
That on or about the 15th day of February, 2006, in the municipality of Tumauini, Isabela, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, conspiring, confeder[at]ing together and helping one another,
armed with assorted firearms, and by means of force and intimidation, that is by pointing their firearms towards Michael
Macutay who was the driver and in possession of a Honda Wave 100 cc motorcycle owned by one Eugenio Cacho, and at
gunpoint, did then and there, willfully and feloniously, take, steal and bring away the said Honda Wave 100 cc motorcycle
bearing Plate No. BI- 8085 valued at PhP44,000.00 against the will and consent to (sic) the said Mic[ha]el Macutay, to the
damage and prejudice of the said owner, in the aforesaid amount of PhP44,000.00.

VERSION OF THE ACCUSED

Concha testified that on February 19, 2006, at around 10:00 a.m., he was walking alone on his way home from the field
when police officers in a van stopped him near a bridge at the highway.
They told him to board the van and invited him to Cabagan Police Station. On the way to Cabagan, they met some
Tumauini police officers. When they reached Cabagan Police Station, they locked him inside a cell and intimidated him to
sign a document. Despite not knowing what was written in the document, he signed it for fear that the police would pour
hot water on him. After a few minutes, the police also detained Managuelod in the cell. From February 19, 2006 to
February 22, 2006, Concha was detained at Cabagan Police Station. On February 22, 2006, Concha was transferred to
the Provincial Jail. Concha claimed that he came to know Managuelod only when they were already detained at the
Provincial Jail.
Concha denied involvement in the carnapping. He asserted that Macutay could not have identified him as he could not
recall that Macutay went to Cabagan Police
Managuelod also denied being involved in the crime. Like Concha, he averred that Macutay could not have identified him
considering that "he did not see the person of Michael Macutay on February 21, 2006, when he was brought together with
his companions to the Provincial Jail where they were detained.”

REBUTTAL OF THE POLICE

On rebuttal, SPO4 Anapi denied striking Concha with the vehicle plate and mauling him. He likewise denied assaulting,
boxing, or mauling Managuelod during the police lineup. He contended that Concha and Managuelod's allegations could
not have happened since he was not inside the police station then and the police were trained to conduct investigations,
not maul persons.

Regional Trial Court rendered a Joint Decision finding both Concha and Managuelod guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
carnapping.

Court of Appeals did not give merit to Concha's and Managuelod's defense of alibi considering that they did not present
any testimonial or documentary evidence that could have corroborated their claims.

ISSUE:

1. WHETHER OR NOT THE SUPREME COURT CAN REVIEW THE OUT-OF-COURT IDENTIFICATION OF
MELKY CONCHA AND ROMEO MANAGUELOD
2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS MELKY CONCHA AND ROMEO MANAGUELOD ARE GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF CARNAPPING

(1) HELD: YES, It is a settled doctrine that this Court will only entertain questions of law in a Petition for Review on
Certiorari . Under Rule 45, Section 1 of the Rules of Court:
Admittedly, petitioners raise questions of fact in their Petition for Review on Certiorari. They want this Court to examine
the validity of the out-of-court identification conducted by the police — the main reason why they were found guilty of
carnapping.
A careful scrutiny of the records shows that both the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals misapprehended the
facts of this case. This Court hereby takes cognizance of their Petition.

(2) HELD: NO, Before the prosecution concerns itself with the existence of the elements of a crime, it must first discharge
the burden of proving that an accused is correctly identified. In People v. Arapok , this Court held:
The out-of-court identification of petitioners could have been disregarded altogether since it was not shown that they were
assisted by counsel. However, this Court recognizes that the "probative weight of an in-court identification is largely
dependent upon an out-of-court identification." Thus, it is necessary to determine if the conduct of the latter is above
suspicion.

First, Macutay failed to provide descriptions of his attackers when he reported the incident to the police.
Despite insisting that the place was illuminated at the time of the carnapping and claiming that he was able to observe his
assailants when he hid after jumping from the edge of the road, Macutay did not describe them as to their height, skin
color, clothes, or any distinguishing mark that could have made them stand out.
Without any of these descriptions, any group of four (4) men is susceptible of being identified as the perpetrators.

Second, Macutay was admittedly scared and confused, which reduced his degree of attention. His disorientation was
apparent when he gave his watch, wallet, and even his t-shirt to his assailants as soon as he heard "holdup." He did not
even wait for them to tell him what they needed from him.

Third, it was not shown how certain Macutay was in his identification of petitioners. Without any prior description, the basis
of his identification is questionable. It also remains uncertain whether the t-shirt that petitioner Concha wore during the
police show-up was the same t-shirt that Macutay gave to his assailants, since he failed to describe that piece of clothing
in his report before the police.

Finally, the out-of-court identification was tainted with improper suggestion. To reiterate, the police in Cabagan Police
Station showed Macutay only four (4) persons to be identified. The testimony of SPO4 Anapi provided:
In People v. Gamer , this Court stressed:
[I]t is not merely any identification which would suffice for conviction of the accused. It must be positive identification made
by a credible witness or witnesses, in order to attain the level of acceptability and credibility to sustain moral certainty
concerning the person of the offender.

We find that the out-of-court identification of accused-appellant, which is a show-up, falls short of "totality of
circumstances" test. Specifically, there was no prior description given by the witness to the police at any time after the
incident; and we cannot discount the possibility that the police may have influenced the identification under the
circumstances by which accused- appellant was presented to him.
Tabuada v. Tabuada
G.R. No. 196510 (September 12, 2018)
SOFIA TABUADA, NOVEE YAP, MA. LORETA NADAL, and GLADYS EVIDENTE, petitioners,
vs.
ELEANOR TABUADA, JULIETA TRABUCO, LAURETA REDONDO, and SPS. BERNAN CERTEZA & ELEANOR D.
CERTEZA, respondents.
BERSAMIN, J p:

DOCTRINE:
Competent proof of a legal relationship is not limited to documentary evidence. Object and testimonial evidence may be
admitted for the same purpose. Indeed, the relationship may be established by all the relevant facts and circumstances
that constitute a preponderance of evidence.

FACTS:
On January 27, 2005, the petitioners commenced a complaint before the RTC against respondents. Summons and the
copy of the complaint and its annexes, were served by personal and substituted service on the respondents at their
respective stated addresses. For failure of the respondents to file their answers within the reglementary period, the
petitioners filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default and for Judgment Based on Complaint. Spouses Certeza wrote
to the RTC to manifest they were expressing the intention to file their answer. The RTC denied the Motion to Admit
Answer , and declared Eleanor Tabuada, Trabuco and Redondo in default. It likewise declared the Spouses Certeza in
default for failure to file their answer. The respondents submitted their Motion to Set Aside Order of Default , which the
petitioners opposed. The RTC denied the same.

At the ex parte hearing the petitioners presented Sofia Tabuada to testify before the RTC that her late husband was
Simeon Tabuada, the son of Loreta Tabuada and the brother-in-law of defendant Eleanor Tabuada; that her co-plaintiffs
were her daughters; that defendant Julieta Trabuco was the daughter of Eleanor Tabuada while Laureta Redondo was the
latter's neighbor; that Loreta Tabuada had died on April 16, 1990 while her husband had died on July 18, 1997; that she
received the notice sent by the Spouses Certeza regarding their land, known as Lot 4272-B-2, located at Barangay Tacas,
Jaro, Iloilo City that her husband had inherited from his mother, Loreta Tabuada, and where they were residing, informing
them that the land had been mortgaged to them (Spouses Certeza).

The RTC rendered judgment in favor of the petitioners. The respondents appealed.

The CA reversing and setting aside the judgment of the RTC, and dismissing the complaint.
The CA noted that the death certificate the petitioners presented was not an authenticated copy on security paper issued
by the National Statistics Office (now Philippine Statistics Authority); and that the name of the deceased on the death
certificate (Loreta Yulo Tabuada) did not match the name of the registered title holder (Loreta H. Tabuada). It pointed out
that the "discrepancy is material as it puts in issue the real identity of the Loreta H. Tabuada who the plaintiffs claim is
their predecessor-in-interest and the person whose name appears in the death certificate as Loreta Yulo Tabuada.
Consequently this inconsistency puts in doubt the plaintiffs-appellees' ownership over Lot No. 4272-B-2. The CA thereby
underscored that the petitioners did not prove Sofia Tabuada's legal relationship with the late Loreta Tabuada because
she did not present documentary evidence thereof.

ISSUE:
WON the CA seriously err in reversing the RTC considering that there was ample evidence competently establishing the
relationship of plaintiff Sofia Tabuada to the late Loreta Tabuada

HELD: YES
RATIO DECIDENDI: The legal relationship of Sofia Tabuada with deceased Loreta Tabuada was established by
preponderance of evidence.
Although documentary evidence may be preferable as proof of a legal relationship, other evidence of the relationship that
are competent and relevant may not be excluded. The preponderance of evidence, the rule that is applicable in civil
cases, is also known as the greater weight of evidence. There is a preponderance of evidence when the trier of facts is
led to find that the existence of the contested fact is more probable than its nonexistence. In short, the rule requires the
consideration of all the facts and circumstances of the cases, regardless of whether they are object, documentary, or
testimonial.

The mere discrepancy — as perceived by the CA — between the name of the deceased entered in the death certificate
(Loreta Yulo Tabuada) and the name of the titleholder (Loreta H. Tabuada) did not necessarily belie or disprove the legal
relationship between Sofia Tabuada and the late Loreta Tabuada.

Also on record was the petitioners' being in the actual possession of Lot No. 4272-B-2, which they had been using as the
site for their family residence. Such established circumstances indicated that the deceased Loreta Yulo Tabuada and
titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada could only be one and the same person. Moreover, even the Spouses Certeza were aware
that respondents Eleanor Tabuada and Tabuco were the relatives of Sofia Tabuada; and that the respective families of
Eleanor Tabuada, Tabuco and Sofia Tabuada actually resided on the same lot.

Verily, the facts and circumstances sufficiently and competently affirmed the legal relationship between Sofia Tabuada
and the late titleholder Loreta H. Tabuada.

Planteras Jr. v. People

G.R. 238889, October 3, 2018

DOCTRINE:
A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator. There is no requirement in our
jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any
fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

FACTS:
P/S Int. Audie Villacin directed the elements of the Regional Investigation Detective Division (RIDM) to conduct
surveillance operations at xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, about the alleged trafficking in persons and sexual exploitation being
committed at the said place. Reports came in that pimps were indeed offering the sexual services of young girls to various
customers at the entrance/exit door of the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, owned by petitioner and his wife, Christina Planteras.
Subsequently, an entrapment operation was conducted on April 28, 2009 by members of the Regional Special
Investigation Unit, the Carbon Police Station, barangay tanods, and representatives from the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD). At the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes were approached by
Marichu Tawi who offered girls for sexual favors for the price of P300.00 each. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes, along with
three (3) girls, namely, BBB, CCC, DOD, then went upstairs. PO3 Dumaguit requested the services of one more girl from
Tawi. At that time, Buhisan arrived and joined the on-going negotiation. Tawi left and when she returned, she brought with
her a young girl, AAA. Petitioner was behind the reception counter when the said negotiation took place and appeared to
be listening to the said transaction. PO3 Dumaguit and PO1 Llanes chose three (3) girls, one of whom was AAA, and then
handed over the marked money (P900.00) to Buhisan. The police officers also gave P200.00 as "tip" for Tawi. After that,
PO3 Dumaguit executed the pre-arranged signal, a "missed call" on the rest of the team. When the rest of the team
arrived at the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge, PO3 Dumaguit announced that they are police officers and immediately thereafter,
Buhisan, Tawi, petitioner and his wife, Christina, were arrested. PO3 Dumaguit retrieved the marked money from Buhisan,
and Tawi then handed it over to PO2 Almohallas. Consequently, the police officers brought the persons arrested to their
office and turned over the girls who were exploited to the DSWD. Thus, two informations were filed against the Planters,
together with his co-accused, for qualified trafficking and promoting trafficking in persons. They were convicted by the
RTC based on the Planteras and his co-accused, after their motion for reconsideration was denied by the RTC, elevated
the case to the CA. Eventually, the CA denied their appeals and affirmed their convictions. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court of Appeals misapprehended the facts of the case which resulted to its erroneous conclusion that
through circumstantial evidence the prosecution has sufficiently established the guild of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt

HELD:
No. The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, still convicted petitioner of the crime charged against him based on circumstantial
evidence and the credibility of the testimonies of the witnesses presented by the prosecution.

Direct evidence and circumstantial evidence are classifications of evidence with legal consequences.

The difference between direct evidence and circumstantial evidence involves the relationship of the fact inferred to the
facts that constitute the offense. Their difference does not relate to the probative value of the evidence.

Direct evidence proves a challenged fact without drawing any inference.Circumstantial evidence, on the other hand,
"indirectly proves a fact in issue, such that the fact-finder must draw an inference or reason from circumstantial evidence."

The probative value of direct evidence is generally neither greater than nor superior to circumstantial evidence. The Rules
of Court do not distinguish between "direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a
fact may be inferred."The same quantum of evidence is still required. Courts must be convinced that the accused is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.

A number of circumstantial evidence may be so credible to establish a fact from which it may be inferred, beyond
reasonable doubt, that the elements of a crime exist and that the accused is its perpetrator.There is no requirement in our
jurisdiction that only direct evidence may convict. After all, evidence is always a matter of reasonable inference from any
fact that may be proven by the prosecution provided the inference is logical and beyond reasonable doubt.

Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to sustain a
conviction based on circumstantial evidence:
Section 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. - Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a)There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt may all be established by circumstantial
evidence.The circumstances must be considered as a whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the
conclusion that the accused authored the crime.

The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding of guilt is a qualitative test not a
quantitative one.The proven circumstances must be "consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the
accused is guilty, and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational
hypothesis except that of guilt."

Admittedly, Antonio Jr. owns and manages the xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge which is engaged in the business of renting out rooms
to lodgers/transients. It was issued a Mayor's Business Permit and a Sanitary Permit. The evidence has established that
the pimps and prostitutes who hang around at the premises or sidewalk outside xxxxxxxxxxx Lodge bring and engage
their customers in sexual intercourse at the said lodge. The customer pays Php50.00 per hour. The payment is received
by Antonio Jr. who stays at the counter or, at times, by his wife Christina. This goes on night after night, various
prostitutes, different customers. Antonio Jr. cannot feign ignorance because he is always there. He sees it when the
negotiation or transaction takes place between the pimp, the prostitute and the customer. Definitely, he knew that the
lodge was being used for prostitution or trafficking in persons and he allowed it. Yet, the most damning evidence against
Antonio Jr. was the testimony of AAA that at one time he requested her to accommodate a customer for sex.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the negotiation between Marlyn, Marichu and the girls, on the one hand, and the poseur customers
(police), on the other, for the use of the girls for sexual intercourse happened in the Lodge, right in the presence of
Antonio Jr. Thus, he knew it. If he did not approve of it or that it be done at the lodge, he could have easily told them to go
somewhere else. That he did nothing about it only means that he acquiesced and consented to it as he has been wont to
do.
Of the foregoing circumstances, We agree with the Trial Court that the most telling is accused-appellant Planteras' own
act of pimping in a not so distant past AAA herself. This occasion was vividly narrated by AAA on the stand. This
circumstance further leads to the logical inference that accused-appellant Planteras knows AAA and her trade. With
accused appellant Planteras being only 1.5 m. from where the indecent proposal was taking place among PO3 Dumaguit
and PO1 Llanes, on one hand, and accused-appellants Buhisan and Tawi, on the other, the presence of AAA herself,
accused-appellant Planteras' feigned ignorance of the real nature of the transaction taxes credulity too much.
The totality of these circumstances constitutes an unbroken chain leading to the inescapable conclusion that accused-
appellant Planteras, through his acts and omissions, knew that the transaction happening within his hearing distance is for
prostitution, and he knowingly permitted the use of his establishment therefor.

We, therefore, find, as did the Trial Court, that the prosecution has, through testimonial, documentary, and object
evidence, overwhelmingly proved the elements of Promoting Trafficking in Persons with moral certainty against accused-
appellant Plateras.

Eizmendi v. Fernandez
G.R. No. 215280, September 05, 2018

DOCTRINE: Here, res judicata does not apply because there is no identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs sought
between the complaint subject of Valle Verde and the complaint subject of this case. First, while the defendants in the
complaints subject of Valle Verde [Commercial Case No. 13- 190) and of this case [Commercial Case No. 13-202] are the
very same individual petitioners, the plaintiff in the former case is VVCCI, whereas the plaintiff in this case is Fernandez
as plaintiff and proprietary member in good standing of VVCCI. The Law of the case does not apply as well. It has been
defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal, and it does not have the finality of res judicata.

FACTS: On November 28, 2013, Fernandez filed a Complaint for Invalidation of Corporate Acts and Resolutions with
Application for Writ of Preliminary Injunction against the individual petitioners, who allegedly constituted themselves as
new members of the Board of Directors (BOD) of Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. (VVCCI) , despite lack of quorum during
the annual members' meeting on February 23, 2013. Fernandez asserted that since petitioners were not validly
constituted as the new BOD in place of the hold-over BOD of VVCCI, they had no legal authority to act as such BOD, to
find him guilty and to suspend him. In an Urgent Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents dated January
10, 2014, Fernandez cited Rule 27 of the Rules of Court and requested the VVCCI, as owner and custodian of corporate
documents, to produce them and allow him to copy the following matters in connection with the hearing of his application
for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.: 1. The original of the Stock and Transfer Book and all cancelled
Membership Fee Certificates of the VVCCI. 2. The original of the Certificate of Incorporation of VVCCI 3. The original of
the Directors' Certificate To By-laws 4. The original of the By-Laws of VVCCI 5. The original of the Certificate of Filing of
By-Laws of VVCCI 6. The original of the duly-signed "Resolution Increasing the Corporation's Membership Certificates To
Two Thousand (2000), all under pain of sanctions under Rule 29 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the Urgent
Motion or Request for Production/Copying of Documents. The trial court ruled that the case is not an election contest
since it was filed way beyond the reglementary period under the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate
Controversies for election contests to be brought to court, considering that the only issue that remains to be resolved is
with respect to whether due process was observed in suspending Fernandez. The CA reversed the RTC, and directed the
judge to allow presentation of evidence in connection with the election of the members of the BOD of VVCCI that was
conducted during its annual members' meeting on February 23, 2013.

ISSUE: WON the final resolution in Valle Verde Country Club, Inc. v. Eizmendi, et al., G.R. No. 209120 dated October 14,
2013 bars Fernandez's complaint

RULING: YES, on the ground of stare decisis but not on res judicata or "the law of the case". Here, res judicata does not
apply because there is no identity of parties, causes of action and reliefs sought between the complaint subject of Valle
Verde and the complaint subject of this case. First, while the defendants in the complaints subject of Valle Verde
[Commercial Case No. 13- 190) and of this case [Commercial Case No. 13-202] are the very same individual petitioners,
the plaintiff in the former case is VVCCI, whereas the plaintiff in this case is Fernandez as plaintiff and proprietary member
in good standing of VVCCI. The absence of identity of parties is underscored in Valle Verde where the Court upheld the
dismissal of the complaint because Valle Verde had no cause of action and was not the real party-in-interest. Second, the
causes of action of the complaint subject of Valle Verde is distinct from that subject of this case. In Valle Verde, the cause
of action is the individual petitioners' misrepresentation that they were elected as new members of the BOD and the
Officers of VVCCI for 2013 to 2014, due to the claim that there was no quorum during the February 23, 2013 annual
meeting. In this case, the cause of action is the invalidation of corporate acts of VVCCI on the ground of lack of authority
of the individual petitioners, as members of the BOD, to suspend the club membership of Fernandez, and the lack of due
process which attended his suspension. Third, there is also a stark contrast between the reliefs sought in the complaint
subject of Valle Verde and that subject of this case. In Valle Verde, VVCCI sought to enjoin the individual petitioners from
misrepresenting themselves to be members of the BOD and Officers of the Club. In this case, Fernandez seeks to
invalidate the claims of said individual petitioners to the office of BOD of VVCCI and to nullify the annual members'
meeting of February 23, 2013, as well as the subsequent board meetings conducted by the individual petitioners,
including all resolutions and measures approved thereat relative to his suspension. It is the principle of stare decisis et
non quieta movere [stand by the decision and disturb not what is settled] that applies to this case, but only to the extent
that Valle Verde held that (1) if the allegations and prayers in the complaint raise the issues of validation of proxies, and
the manner and validity of elections, such as the nullification of election was unlawfully conducted due to lack of quorum,
then such complaint falls under the definition of election contest under the Interim Rules; and (2) the real parties-in-
interest in an election contest are the contenders, and not the corporation. Based on the factual antecedents of Valle
Verde, it appears that the RTC erred in citing the violation of the 15-day reglementary period under the Interim Rules as a
ground to dismiss the complaint of VVCCI. Petition for review on certiorari is therefore GRANTED. The Order issued by
the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 158, on January 28, 2014 in Commercial Case No. 13-202, insofar as it did
not allow any evidence to be presented relating to the February 23, 2013 elections of the Board of Directors of Valle
Verde Country Club, Inc. and the subsequent resolution of the trial court dated February 3, 2014, are hereby
REINSTATED.

Logan v. Velasco

Lara’s Gift and Decor’s Inc. v. PNB General Insurers Co. and UCPB General Insurance Co. Inc

Doctrine: The Judicial Affidavit Rule and the Guidelines on Pre-Trial do not totally proscribe the submission of additional
evidence even after trial had already commenced.

Facts:
Petitioner Lara's Gifts and Decors, Inc. (LGDI) is engaged in the business of manufacturing, selling, and exporting various
handicraft items and decorative products. It leased buildings/warehouses, particularly Buildings R1, R2, R3, R4, Y2, Y3,
Y4, and Y4 Annex, from J.Y. & Sons Realty Co., Inc., located at JY & Sons Compound, Philippine Veterans Center,
Taguig City, for its business operations. The warehouses leased also served as production and storage areas of its goods
and stocks.

The handicraft products, raw materials, and machineries and equipment of petitioner were insured against fire and other
allied risks with respondent PNB General Insurers Co., Inc. (PNB Gen) in the total amount of P582,000,000 covering the
period of February 19, 2007 (4:00 p.m.) to February 18, 2008 (4:00p.m.). The insurance policy, which is in the nature of
an "open policy," was covered by Fire Insurance Policy No. FI-NIL-HO- 0018666, wherein PNB Gen assumed 55% of the
total amount insured. Meanwhile, respondent UCPB General Insurance Co., Inc. (UCPB), as co insurer, assumed the
remaining 45% through Fire Insurance Policy No. HOF07D-FLS072788. The policy was subsequently increased to
P717,000,000, pursuant to Policy Endorsement No. FI-NIL HO20070005944A.

On February 19, 2008, approximately four hours before the policy was about to expire, a fire broke out and razed
Buildings Y2, Y3, and Y4 of the JY & Sons Compound. Petitioner immediately claimed from the respondents for the loss
and damage of its insured properties.

Resultantly, petitioner filed a Complaint for Specific Performance and Damages against respondents before the Makati
City RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 11-238. The case was raffled to Branch 62 of the trial court.

In its Notice of Pre-Trial Conference, the RTC directed the parties to submit their respective pre-trial briefs, accompanied
by the documents or exhibits intended to be presented, at least three days before the scheduled Pre-Trial Conference. It
also contained a stern warning that "no evidence shall be allowed to be presented and offered during the trial in support of
a party's evidence-in-chief other than those that had been earlier identified and pre-marked during the pre-trial, except if
allowed by the Court for good cause shown."

During the Pre-Trial Conference, both parties made admissions and proposed stipulations of facts and issues to simplify
the course of the trial. On account of the voluminous documentary exhibits to be presented, identified, and marked, the
parties allotted six meetings/conferences just for the pre-marking of exhibits.

After the termination of the Pre-Trial Conference, the RTC issued a Pre-Trial Order dated September 12, 2013, in which
the parties were given the opportunity to amend or correct any errors found therein within five days from receipt thereof. In
the same Order, all the parties made a reservation for the presentation of additional documentary exhibits in the course of
the trial.

The parties filed their respective Motions to Amend/Correct Pre-Trial Order. None of the parties, however, sought to
amend the Pre-Trial Order for the purpose of submitting additional judicial affidavits of witnesses or the admission of
additional documentary exhibits not presented and pre marked during the Pre-Trial Conference.

Trial on the merits ensued on November 7, 2013. Among the witnesses presented by petitioner are Gina Servita (Servita)
and Luis Raymond Villafuerte (Mr. Villafuerte). Servita testified on cross examination that she was able to reconstitute,
collect, and/or collate and keep in her possession copies of several commercial documents consisting of purported
Purchase Orders (POs), Sales Invoices (Sis), and Delivery Receipts (DRs) (collectively, the Questioned Documents),
months after the fire broke out. Mr. Villafuerte, meanwhile, testified on his involvement and participation in the
management and operations of petitioner corporation. He further admitted, however, that he had divested his full interest
in the management and operations of the company to devote his time as Governor of Camarines Sur from 2004 to 2013.
As such, his participation in the business was reduced to a mere advisor of his wife, Mrs. Lara Maria Villafuerte (Mrs.
Villafuerte), petitioner corporation's president, who is likewise slated to testify.

During the continuation of Mr. Villafuerte's cross-examination on July 10, 2014, petitioner furnished respondents with a
copy of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte dated July 9, 2014 (the 1st Supplemental Judicial
Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte was filed during the Pre-Trial for the re-marking of exhibits). PNB Gen, through a Motion to
Expunge, sought to strike from the records the said 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villauferte and all
documents attached thereto for alleged violation of Administrative Matter No. 12-8-8-SC, otherwise known as the "Judicial
Affidavit Rule" (JA Rule) and A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC,10 or the Guidelines to be Observed by Trial Court Judges and Clerks
of Court in the Conduct of Pre-Trial and Use of Deposition-Discovery Measures (Guidelines on Pre-Trial). UCPB filed its
Manifestation and Motion,11 adopting in toto PNB Gen's Motion. The twin Motions were set to be heard on September 19,
2014.

On September 18, 2014, or a day prior to the hearing of the Motion to Expunge, the re-direct examination of Mr.
Villafuerte continued. During the trial, petitioner's counsel produced the Questioned Documents in open court and asked
Mr. Villafuerte to identify those documents, seeking to introduce and mark them as exhibits. Respondents immediately
objected in open court to the introduction and presentation of the Questioned Documents on the grounds that they were
neither touched upon nor covered by the witness' cross-examination, and that the same were being introduced for the first
time at this late stage of proceeding, without giving the parties opportunity to verify their relevance and authenticity. They
argued that since these documents were not presented, identified, marked, and even compared with the originals during
the Pre-Trial Conference, they should be excluded pursuant to the Guidelines on Pre-Trial and JA Rule. The documents
are further alleged to be the same documents subject of the respondents' twin Motions to Expunge, i.e., the same
Questioned Documents which were never presented, marked, or compared during the various Pre-Trial Conferences of
the case, or were never presented to the insurers and adjusters early on.

On September 18, 2014, the RTC issued an Order overruling the objections of respondents and allowing petitioner to
propound questions relating to the Questioned Documents, without prejudice to the hearing on the motions to expunge
the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte.

ssue:

The sole issue for the resolution of the Court is whether or not the CA erred in disallowing the introduction of additional
documentary exhibits during trial and the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit of Mrs. Villafuerte.

Held:

No. The CA did not err in disallowing the introduction of additional documentary exhibits during the trial. The admission of
the 2nd Supplemental JIudicial Affidavit, We reiterate the requirements laid down in Sec. 2 of the JA Rule that the parties
must file with the court and serve on the adverse party the Judicial Affidavits of their witnesses not later than five days
before pre-trial or preliminary conference. While the belated submission of evidence is not totally disallowed, it is still, to
reiterate, subject to several conditions, which petitioner failed to comply with. Specifically, the records are bereft of any
justification, or "good cause," for the filing of the 2nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit during trial instead of during the pre-
trial. Petitioner merely filed and served the affidavit during the hearing on July 10, 2014, without any accompanying motion
setting forth any explanation and valid reason for the delay. Further, whether denominated as merely "supplemental," the
fact that the affidavit introduces evidence not previously marked and identified during pre-trial qualifies it as new evidence.

Nevertheless, the Court is constrained to rule that the 2 nd Supplemental Judicial Affidavit was properly admitted in
evidence by the trial court. As can be gleaned from Page 64 of the Pre-Trial Order, both parties reserved the right to
present additional evidence, thus all the parties made a reservation for the presentation of additional documentary exhibits
in the course of the trial. Clearly, the foregoing reservation is tantamount to a waiver of the application of Secs. 2 and 10 of
the JA Rule. That respondents waived their right to object to petitioner's introduction of additional evidence is further
reinforced by their counsel's manifestation during the hearing on November 21, 2013.