IV.

CAUSAL RELATION BETWEEN ACT OR OMISSION AND DAMAGE

Tison et. al vs. Pomasin

FACTS:
Two vehicles, a tractor-trailer and a jitney, figured in a vehicular mishap along Maharlika Highway in Brgy. Agos, Polangui,
Albay, Aug. 12, 1994. Laarni Pomasin (Laarni) was driving the jitney towards the direction of Legaspi City while the tractor-
trailer, driven by Claudio Jabon (Jabon), was traversing the opposite lane going towards Naga City.

RESPONDENT’S VERSION:
Gregorio Pomasin (Gregorio), Laarni's father, was on board the jitney and seated on the passenger's side. He testified that while
the jitney was passing through a curve going downward, he saw a tractor-trailer coming from the opposite direction and
encroaching on the jitney's lane. The jitney was hit by the tractor-trailer and it was dragged further causing death and injuries to
its passengers.

PETITIONER’S VERSION:
Jabon recounted that while he was driving the tractor-trailer, he noticed a jitney on the opposite lane falling off the shoulder of
the road. Thereafter, it began running in a zigzag manner and heading towards the direction of the truck. To avoid collision,
Jabon immediately swerved the tractor-trailer to the right where it hit a tree and sacks of palay. Unfortunately, the jitney still
hit the left fender of the tractor trailer before it was thrown a few meters away. The tractor-trailer was likewise damaged.

Multiple deaths and injuries to those in the jitney resulted. Gregorio was injured and some of his other family members.
Unfortunately, his wife, daughters (among the driver Laarni), sisters and granddaughter did not survive or expired on the hospital.
On the other hand, Jabon and one of the passengers in the tractor-trailer were injured. Tison, the owner of the truck, extended
financial assistance to respondents by giving them P1,000.00 immediately after the accident and P200,000.00 to Cynthia Pomasin
(Cynthia), one of Gregorio's daughters. Cynthia, in turn, executed an Affidavit of Desistance.

On 14 November 1994, respondents filed a complaint for damages against petitioners before the RTC of Antipolo. They alleged
that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence, imprudence and carelessness of petitioners. Respondents prayed for
indemnification for the heirs of those who perished in the accident, medical and burial expenses, moral damages, exemplary
damages, loss of income, litigation expenses. Petitioners countered that it was Laarni' s negligence
which proximately caused the accident. They further claimed that Cynthia was authorized by Spouses Pomasin to enter into an
amicable settlement by executing an Affidavit of Desistance.

RTC Decision:
Ruled in favor of the Petitioner:
1. Consideration that plaintiff authorized Cynthia to settle the case amicably for P 200,000.
2. Proximate cause of the accident did not arise from the fault or negligence of defendants' driver/employee but from
plaintiff's driver. The trial court considered the testimony of Jabon regarding the incident more convincing and reliable
than that of Gregorio's, a mere passenger, whose observation and attention to the road is not as focused as that of the
driver.

CA DECISION:
Reversed the RTC Decision and ruled in favor of the Respondent:
1. It ruled that the reckless driving of Jabon caused the vehicular collision. In support of such finding. CA relied heavily on
Gregorio' s testimony that Jabon was driving the tractortrailer downward too fast and it encroached the lane of the jitney. Based
on the gravity of the impact and the damage caused to the jitney resulting in the death of some passengers, the Court of Appeals
inferred that Jabon must be speeding. It noted that the restriction in Jabon's driver's license was violated, thus, giving rise to the
presumption that he was negligent at the time of the accident. Tison (owner) was likewise held liable for
damages for his failure to prove due diligence in supervising Jabon after he was hired as driver of the truck.
2. Disregarded the Affidavit of Desistance executed by Cynthia because the latter had no written power of attorney from
respondents and that she was so confused at the time when she signed the affidavit that she did not read its content.

ISSUE:
The petition for review raises mixed questions of fact and law which lead back to the very issue litigated by the trial court: Who
is the negligent party or the party at fault?

HELD:
Petition is granted. Reversed and set aside CA. The respondent driver was negligent.
(Sorry taas ang ruling because ang facts ang magestablished for negligence)
According to Article 2176 of the Civil Code, whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there
being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. To sustain a claim based on quasidelict,
the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b) fault or negligence of defendant; and (c)
connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of defendant and the damage incurred by the plaintiff. These
requisites must be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The claimants, respondents in this case, must, therefore, establish their claim or cause of action by preponderance of evidence,
evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which is offered in opposition to it. The trial court found that
the jitney driver was negligent. We give weight to this finding greater than the opposite conclusion reached by the appellate court
that the driver of the tractor-trailer caused the vehicular collision. One reason why the trial court found credible the version of
Jabon was because his concentration as driver is more focused than that of a mere passenger.

The trial court expounded, thus: In the appreciation of the testimony of eye-witnesses, one overriding consideration is their
opportunity for observation in getting to know or actually seeing or observing the
matter they testify to. This most particularly holds true in vehicular collision or accident cases which
oftentimes happen merely momentarily or in the split of a second.

In the case of a running or travelling vehicle, especially in highway travel which doubtless involves faster speed than in ordinary
roads, the driver is concentrated on his driving continuously from moment to moment even in long trips. While in the case of a
mere passenger, he does not have to direct his attention to the safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as in fact he may converse
with other passengers and pay no attention to the driving or safe conduct of the travelling vehicle, as he may even doze off to
sleep if he wants to, rendering his opportunity for observation on the precise cause of the accident or collision or immediately
preceding thereto not as much as that of the driver whose attention is continuously focused on his driving.

The version of the driver of defendant should ordinarily be more reliable than the version of a mere passenger of Plaintiffs'
vehicle, simply because the attention of the passenger is not as much concentrated on the driving as that of the driver,
consequently the capacity for observation of the latter of the latter on the matter testified to which is the precise point of inquiry
— the proximate cause of the accident — is more reasonably reliable. Moreover, the passenger's vision is not as good as that of
the driver from the vantage point of the driver's seat especially in nighttime, thus rendering a passenger's opportunity for
observation on the
antecedent causes of the collision lesser than that of the driver.

This being so, this Court is more inclined to believe the story of defendant's driver Claudio Jabon that the jitney driven by Laarni
Pomasin fell off the shoulder of the curved road causing it to run thereafter in a zigzag manner and in the process the two vehicles
approaching each other from opposite directions at highway speed came in contact with each other, the zigzagging jeep hitting
the left fender of the truck all the way to the fuel tank, the violent impact resulting in the lighter vehicle, the jitney, being thrown
away due to the disparate size of the truck.

The appellate court labelled the trial court's rationalization as a "sweeping conjecture" and countered that Gregorio was actually
occupying the front seat of the jitney and had actually a clear view of the incident despite the fact that he was not driving. While
it is logical that a driver's attention to the road travelled is keener than that of a mere passenger, it should also be considered that
the logic will hold only if the two are similarly circumstanced, and only as a general rule, so that, it does not necessarily follow
that between the opposing testimonies of a driver and a passenger, the former is more credible. The factual setting of the event
testified on must certainly be considered.

Contrary to the observation of the Court of Appeals, the relative positions of a driver and a passenger in
a vehicle was not the only basis of analysis of the trial court. Notably, aside from Jabon's alleged vantage point to clearly observe
the incident, the trial court also took into consideration Gregorio's admission that prior to the accident, the jitney was running on
the "curving and downward" portion of the highway. The appellate court, however, took into account the other and opposite
testimony of Gregorio that it was their jitney that was going uphill and when it was about to reach a curve, he saw the incoming
truck running very fast and encroaching the jitney's lane.

We perused the transcript of stenographic notes and found that the truck was actually ascending the highway when it collided
with the descending jitney.

During the direct examination (only the highlighted part is included), Jabon narrated that the tractortrailer
was ascending at a speed of 35 to 40 kilometers per hour when he saw the jitney on the opposite lane running in a zigzag manner,
thus:

Q: Could you please tell the Court what was your speed at the time when you saw that jeepney with top-load running on a zigzag
manner?

A: I was running 35 to 40 kilometers per hour because I was ascending plain.

XXX

In that same direct examination, Jabon confirmed that he was ascending, viz.

Q: You said you were ascending towards the direction of Liboro, Camarines Sur, is that correct at the time the incident
happened?

A: Yes sir.

XXX

Upon the other hand, Gregorio, during his direct examination described the road condition where the collision took place as
"curving and downward," thus:

Q: Could you please describe the place where the incident happened in so far as the road condition is concerned?

A: The road was curving and downward.

XXX

However, on rebuttal, Gregorio turned around and stated that the jitney was going uphill when he saw the tractor-trailer running
down very fact and encroaching on their lane, to wit:

Q: Mr. Claudio Jabon, the driver of the trailer truck that collided with your owner jeepney that you were riding testified in open
Court on July 24, 1997 which I quote, 'while on my way to Liboro coming to Sorsogon I met a vehicle going on a zig-zag
direction and it even fell on the shoulder and proceeded going on its way on zig-zag direction', what can you say about this
statement of this witness?

A: We were not zigzagging but because we were going uphill and about to reach a curved (sic) we saw the on-coming vehicle
going down very fast and encroaching on our lane so our driver swerved our vehicle to the right but still we were hit by the
oncoming vehicle.

XXX

The declaration of Jabon with respect to the road condition was straightforward and consistent. The recollection of Gregorio
veered from "curving and downward" to uphill. On this point, Jabon and his testimony is more credible. The fact that the jitney
easily fell into the road shoulder, an undebated fact, supports the trial court's conclusion that the jitney was indeed going downhill
which, it may be repeated, was the original testimony of Gregorio that the road was "curving and downward." It is this
conclusion, prodded by the inconsistency of Gregorio's testimony, that gives credence to the further testimony of Jabon that the
herein respondent's jitney, "loaded with passengers with top-load" "was running in a zigzag manner."

Going downward, the jitney had the tendency to accelerate. The fall into the shoulder of the road can result in the loss of control
of the jitney, which explains why it was running in a zigzag manner before it hit the tractor-trailer. There was no showing that the
tractor-trailer was speeding. There is a preponderance of evidence that the tractor-trailer was in fact ascending. Considering its
size and the weight of the tractor-trailer, its speed could not be more than that of a fully loaded jitney which was running
downhill in a zigzagging manner. Neither can it be inferred that Jabon was negligent. In hindsight, it can be argued that Jabon
should have swerved to the right upon seeing the jitney zigzagging before it collided with the tractor-trailer. Accidents, though,
happen in an instant, and, understandably in this case, leaving the driver without sufficient time and space to maneuver a vehicle
the size of a tractor-trailer uphill and away from collision with the jitney oncoming downhill. Clearly, the negligence of
Gregorio's daughter, Laarni was the proximate cause of the accident.

We did not lose sight of the fact that at the time of the incident, Jabon was prohibited from driving the truck due to the restriction
imposed on his driver's license, i.e., restriction code 2 and 3. As a matter of fact, Jabon even asked the Land Transportation
Office to reinstate his articulated license containing restriction code which would allow him to drive a tractor-trailer. The Court
of Appeals concluded therefrom that Jabon was violating a traffic regulation at the time of the collision. Driving without a proper
license is a violation of traffic regulation.

Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, the legal presumption of negligence arises if at the time of the mishap, a person was
violating any traffic regulation. However, in Sanitary Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, we held that a causal connection
must exist between the injury received and the violation of the traffic regulation. It must be proven that the violation of the traffic
regulation was the proximate or legal cause of the injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in
whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of
the injury.

Controlling is our ruling in Añonuevo v. Court of Appeals where we reiterated that negligence per se, arising from the mere
violation of a traffic statute, need not be sufficient in itself in establishing liability for damages. The rule on negligence per se
must admit qualifications that may arise from the logical consequences of the facts leading to the mishap. The doctrine (and
Article 2185, for that matter) is undeniably useful as a judicial guide in adjudging liability, for it seeks to impute culpability
arising from the failure of the actor to perform up to a standard established by a legal fiat. But the doctrine should not be rendered
inflexible so as to deny relief when in fact there is no causal relation between the statutory violation and the injury sustained.
Presumptions in law, while convenient, are not intractable so as to forbid rebuttal rooted in fact. After all, tort law is remunerative
in spirit, aiming to provide compensation for the harm suffered by those whose interests have been invaded owing to the conduct
of other.

In the instant case, no causal connection was established between the tractortrailer driver's restrictions on his license to the
vehicular collision. Furthermore, Jabon was able to sufficiently explain that the Land Transportation Office merely erred in not
including restriction code in his license.

Ocean Builders vs. Sps. Cubacub

FACTS:
Bladimir Cubacub (Bladimir) was employed as maintenance man by petitioner company Ocean Builders Construction Corp. at its
office in Caloocan City.

On April 9, 1995, Bladimir was afflicted with chicken pox. He was thus advised by petitioner Dennis Hao (Hao), the company's
general manager, to rest for three days which he did at the company's "barracks" where he lives free of charge.

Three days later, Bladimir went about his usual chores of manning the gate of the company premises and even cleaned the
company vehicles. Later in the afternoon, however, he asked a coworker, Ignacio Silangga (Silangga), to accompany him to his
house in Capas, Tarlac so he could rest. Informed by Silangga of Bladimir's intention, Hao
gave Bladimir P1,000.00 and ordered Silangga to instead bring Bladimir to the nearest hospital. Along with co-workers Narding
and Tito Vergado, Silangga thus brought Bladimir to the Caybiga Community Hospital (Caybiga Hospital), a primarycare
hospital around one kilometer away from the office of the company.

The hospital did not allow Bladimir to leave the hospital. He was then confined, with Narding keeping watch over him. On April
13, 1995, a doctor of the hospital informed Narding that they needed to talk to Bladimir's parents, hence, on Silangga's request,
their coworkers June Matias and Joel Edrene fetched Bladimir's parents from Tarlac.

At about 8 o'clock in the evening of the same day, April 13, 1995, Bladimir's parents-respondent spouses Cubacub, with their
friend Dr. Hermes Frias (Dr. Frias), arrived at the Caybiga Hospital and transferred Bladimir to the Quezon City General Hospital
(QCGH) where he was placed in the intensive care unit and died the following day, April 14, 1995.

The death certificate issued by the QCGH recorded Bladimir's immediate cause of death as cardiorespiratory arrest and the
antecedent cause as pneumonia. On the other hand, the death certificate issued by Dr. Frias recorded the causes of death as
cardiac arrest, multiple organ system failure, septicemia and chicken pox.

ISSUES:
Whether or not Hoa’s negligence is the proximate cause of the death Bladimir.

HELD:
To successfully prosecute an action anchored on torts, three elements must be present, viz: (1) duty (2) breach (3) injury and
proximate causation. The assailed decision of the appellate court held that it was the duty of petitioners to provide adequate
medical assistance to the employees under Art. 161 of the Labor Code, failing which a breach is committed. The Implementing
Rules of the Code do not enlighten what the phrase “adequate and immediate” medical attendance means in relation to an
“emergency.” It would thus appear that the determination of what it means is left to the employer, except when a full-time
registered nurse or physician are available on-site as required, also under the Labor Code.

The Court can thus only determine whether the actions taken by petitioners when Bladimir became ill amounted to the "necessary
assistance" to ensure "adequate and immediate medical . . . attendance" to Bladimir as required under Art. 161 of the Labor Code.

As found by the trial court and borne by the records, petitioner Hao’s advice for Bladimir to, as he did, take a 3-day rest and to
later have him brought to the nearest hospital constituted "adequate and immediate medical" attendance that he is mandated,
under Art. 161, to provide to a sick employee in an emergency.
Chicken pox is self-limiting. Hao does not appear to have a medical background. He may not be thus expected to have known
that Bladimir needed to be brought to a hospital with better facilities than the Caybiga Hospital, contrary to appellate court’s
ruling.

AT ALL EVENTS, the alleged negligence of Hao cannot be considered as the proximate cause of the death of Bladimir.
Proximate cause is that which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces injury,
and without which, the result would not have occurred. An injury or damage is proximately caused by an act or failure to act,
whenever it appears from the evidence in the case that the act or omission played a substantial part in bringing about or actually
causing the injury or damage, and that the injury or damage was either a direct result or a reasonably probable consequence of the
act or omission.

Thus, the petitioners are not guilty of negligence. GRANTED.

a) DOCTRINE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE

Fernando vs. Court of Appeals

FACTS:
On November 7, 1975, Bibiano Morta, market master of the Agdao Public Market filed a requisition
request with the Chief of Property of the City Treasurer's Office for the re-emptying of the septic tank in Agdao. An invitation to
bid was issued to Aurelio Bertulano, Lito Catarsa, Feliciano Bascon, Federico Bolo and Antonio Su.er, Jr. Bascon won the bid.
On November 26, 1975 Bascon was notified and he signed the purchase order. However, before such date, specifically on
November 22, 1975, bidder Bertulano with four other companions namely Joselito Garcia, William Liagoso, Alberto Fernando
and Jose Fajardo, Jr. were found dead inside the septic tank. The bodies were removed by a fireman. One body, that of Joselito
Garcia, was taken out by his uncle, Danilo Garcia and taken to the Regional Hospital but he expired there. The City Engineer's
office investigated the case and learned that the five victim sentered the septic tank without clearance neither from it nor with the
knowledge and consent of the market master. In fact, the septic tank was found to be almost empty and the victims were
presumed to be the ones who did the re-emptying. Dr. Juan Abear of the City Health Office autopsied the bodies and in his
reports, put the cause of death of all five victims as "asphyxia" caused by the diminution of oxygen supply in the body working
below normal conditions. The lungs of the five victims burst, swelled in hemorrhagic areas and this was due to their intake of
toxic gas, which, in this case, was sulfide gas produced from the waste matter inside the septic tank. Petitioners, children of the
deceased, file a complaint for damages.

TC: Dismissed
CA: In favor of petitioners, based on social justice. CA on MR: Reversed, in favor of Davao City

ISSUE:
W/N Davao City is liable.

HELD:
No. We find no compelling reason to grant the petition. We affirm.

While it may be true that the public respondent has been remiss in its duty to re-empty the septic tank annually, such negligence
was not a continuing one. Upon learning from the report of the market master about the need to clean the septic tank of the public
toilet in Agdao Public Market, the public respondent
immediately responded by issuing invitations to bid for such service. Thereafter, it awarded the bid to the lowest bidder, Mr.
Feliciano Bascon. The public respondent, therefore, lost no time in taking up remedial measures to meet the situation. It is
likewise an undisputed fact that despite the public respondent's failure to re-empty the septic tank since 1956, people in the
market have been using the public toilet for their personal necessities but have remained unscathed.

In view of this factual milieu, it would appear that an accident such as toxic gas leakage from the septic tank is unlikely to happen
unless one removes its covers. The accident in the case at bar occurred because the victims on their own and without authority
from the public respondent opened the septic tank. Considering the nature of the task of emptying a septic tank especially one
which has not been cleaned for years, an ordinarily prudent person should undoubtedly be aware of the attendant risks. The
victims are no exception; more so with Mr. Bertulano, an old hand in this kind of service, who is presumed to know the hazards
of the job. His failure, therefore, and that of his men to take precautionary measures for their safety was the proximate cause of
the accident.

Dyteban vs. Jose Ching

FACTS:
On July 4, 1995, at around 4:45 a.m., Ortiz, with helper Romeo, was driving a Nissan van owned by petitioner Dy Teban
Trading, Inc. (“DY”) along the National Highway in Butuan City, going to Surigao City. They were delivering commercial ice to
nearby barangays and municipalities. A “Joana Paula passenger bus” was on the opposite lane towards the van. In between these
two vehicles (Nissan van and passenger bus), was a parked prime mover with a trailer, owned by private respondent Liberty
Forest, Inc (“LIBERTY INC.”).

The night before, at around 10 p.m., the prime mover with trailer, owned by private respondent Jose Ching (“CHING”) suffered a
tire blowout. The driver, private respondent Cresilito (“CRESILITO”), parked it at the shoulder of the road with the left wheels
still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder of the highway. It was not equipped with an
early warning device, composed of a triangular, collapsible reflectorized plates. To substitute this, Cresilito placed a banana trunk
with leaves on the front and
the rear portion of the prime mover to warn incoming motorists.

However, the vehicular collision happened when, in order to avoid hitting the parked prime mover occupying its lane, the
incoming passenger bus swerved to the right, onto the lane of the approaching Nissan van. Ortiz saw the approaching bus and
pumped his break slowly, swerved to the left to avoid the oncoming bus but the van hit the front of the stationary prime mover.
The passenger bus hit the rear of the prime mover. Ortiz and Catamora only suffered minor injuries. The Nissan van, however,
became inoperable as a result of the collision. With this, Dy filed a COMPLAINT FOR DAMAGES against Ching and Cresilito
with the RTC in Butuan City on October 31, 1995.

REGIONAL TRIAL COURT (RTC):

The RTC of Butuan City rendered a decision in favor of Dy. It ruled the following:
1) That, the proximate cause of the three-way vehicular collision was the improper parking of the prime mover on the
national highway and the absence of an early warning device on the vehicle;
2) That, Ching should be absolved of any liability as there is no showing that he is the manager or CEO of Liberty
although in the answer, it is admitted that he is an officer of Liberty, but it is not clarified what kind of position he is
holding, as he could be an officer as one of the members of the Board of Directors or a cashier and treasurer of the
corporation.
3) That, Liberty and Cresilito are solidarily liable to Dy for actual damages, compensatory damages,
1. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation.

COURT OF APPEALS (CA):

The CA reversed the decision. It ruled the following:
1) That, the proximate cause of the vehicular collision was the failure of the Nissan van to give way or yield to the right of
way of the passenger bus.
2) It disagreed with the RTC that the prime mover did not have an early warning device.
3) The CA accepted the claim of private respondent that Cresilito placed kerosene lighted tin cans on the front and rear of
the trailer which may act as substitute early warning device.

ISSUES:
1) Whether or not Cresilito was negligent?
2) Whether or not, improper parking of the prime mover in the national highway and its absence of an early warning
device are the proximate cause for the damages suffered by the Nissan van?

HELD:
1. YES
Negligence is defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution,
and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury. The test of negligence is
objective. The Supreme Court (SC) ruled that it measures the act or omission of the tortfeasor with that of an ordinary reasonable
person in the same situation. The test, as applied to this case, is “whether Cresilito, in parking the prime mover, used that
reasonable care and caution which an ordinary reasonable person would have used in the same situation?”

Unfortunately, as ruled by the SC, Cresilito was utterly negligent in parking the prime mover askew on the right side of the
national highway. The vehicle occupied a substantial portion of the national road on the lane of the passenger bus. It was parked
at the shoulder of the road with its left wheels still on the cemented highway and the right wheels on the sand and gravel shoulder
of the highway. It is common sense that the skewed parking of the prime mover on the national road posed a serious risk to
oncoming motorists. It was incumbent upon Cresilito to take some measures to prevent that risk, or at least minimize it.

Moreover, the SC disagreed with the CA conclusion that "it would have been dangerous and quite impossible to further park the
prime mover on the graveled shoulder of the road because the prime mover may tilt and the bulldozer may fall off." The
photographs taken after the incident show that it could have been possible for Cresilito to park the prime mover completely on
the shoulder of the national road without risk to oncoming motorists.
In the case at hand. Cresilito also failed to take proper steps to minimize the risk posed by the improperly parked prime mover.
He did not immediately inform his employer, private respondent Liberty Forest, Inc. that the prime mover suffered two tire
blowouts and that he could not have them fixed because he had only one spare tire. Instead of calling for help, he took it upon
himself to simply place banana leaves on the front and rear of the prime mover to serve as warning to oncoming motorists.
Worse, he slept on the prime mover instead of standing guard beside the vehicle. By his own account, he was sleeping on the
prime mover at the time of the collision and that he was only awakened by the impact of the Nissan van and the passenger bus on
the prime mover.

On cross-examination, Cresilito also admitted that it was his first to drive the prime mover with trailer loaded with a D-8
caterpillar bulldozer. With this, the SC ruled that Liberty Inc. was utterly negligent in allowing a novice driver, like Cresilito to
operate a vehicle, such as a truck loaded with a bulldozer, which required highly specialized driving skills. Liberty Inc. Clearly,
failed to properly supervise Cresilito in driving the prime mover. The RTC noted that Liberty Inc. also failed to keep the prime
mover in proper condition at the time of the collision. The prime mover had worn out tires. It was only equipped with one spare
tire. It was for this reason that Cresilito was unable to change the two blown out tires because he had only one spare. The
bulldozer was not even loaded properly on the prime mover, which caused the tire blowouts.

2. YES
Proximate cause is defined as that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause,
produces the injury, and without which the result would not have occurred. The damage or injury must be a natural and probable
result of the act or omission.

According to the SC, there is no exact mathematical formula to determine proximate cause. It is based upon mixed considerations
of logic, common sense, policy and precedent. The plaintiff, must, however, establish a sufficient link between the act or
omission and the damage or injury. That link must not be remote or far-fetched; otherwise, no liability will attach. The damage or
injury must be a natural and probable result of the act or omission.

In the case at hand, the SC agreed with the RTC that the damage caused to the Nissan van was a natural
and probable result of the improper parking of the prime mover with trailer. As discussed, the skewed parking of the prime mover
posed a serious risk to oncoming motorists. Cresilito failed to prevent or minimize that risk. The skewed parking of the prime
mover triggered the series of events that led to the collision, particularly the swerving of the passenger bus and the Nissan van.

Moreover, it is found that Liberty Inc. and Cresilito are liable for all damages that resulted from the
skewed parking of the prime mover. Their liability includes those damages resulting from precautionary measures taken by
another motorist in trying to avoid collision with the parked prime mover. Clearly, the passenger bus swerved to the right, onto
the lane of the Nissan van, to avoid colliding with the improperly parked prime mover. The driver of the Nissan van, Ortiz,
reacted swiftly by swerving to the left, onto the lane of the passenger bus, hitting the parked prime mover. He obviously would
not have swerved if not for the passenger bus abruptly occupying his van's lane. The passenger bus, in turn, would not have
swerved to the lane of the Nissan van if not for the prime mover improperly parked on its lane. Hence, the skewed parking is the
proximate cause of the damage to the Nissan van which are prone to mechanical breakdown on the national highway.

Also, the law, as crafted, requires vehicles to be equipped with triangular reflectorized plates. Vehicles without the required early
warning devices are ineligible for registration. Vehicle owners may also be arrested and fined for non-compliance with the law. It
is lamentable that the vehicular collision in this case could have been easily avoided by following basic traffic rules and
regulations and road safety standards.

In this case, Cresilito could have prevented the three-way vehicular collision if he had properly parked the prime mover on the
shoulder of the national road. The improper parking of vehicles, most especially along the national highways, poses a serious and
unnecessary risk to the lives and limbs of other motorists and passengers.

Bataclan vs. Medina

FACTS:
1. In this case, a bus was driven by Conrado Saylon and operated by Mariano Medina. In it was Juan Bataclan who was seated
beside and to the right of the driver.

2. While the bus was traveling from Cavite to Pasay, one of the tires burst and the vehicle fell into a canal and turned turtle. Some
passengers managed to get out of the bus; others had to be pulled out, while four passengers, including Bataclan, could not get
out from the overturned bus. There was no evidence to show that there was any
attempt to rescue the four (4) passengers still trap inside the bus. However, calls and shouts were made in the nearby
neighborhood.
3. Minutes later, came ten (10) men, one (1) of them carrying a lighted torch. As they approached the bus, a fire started due to the
gasoline leak, burning the bus, including the passengers trapped inside.

4. The widow, Salud Vda. de Bataclan, in her name and on behalf of her five minor children, filed a suit to recover from Medina
compensatory, moral, and exemplary damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P87,150. The CFI decided in favor of the
widow.

5. Both the plaintiff and the defendant appealed to the CA, but the latter referred the case to the SC because of the value involved
in the claim in the complaint.

ISSUE:
What was the proximate cause of the death of Juan and the other passengers?

HELD:
Here, the SC agreed with the trial court that the case involves a breach of contract of transportation for hire, the Medina
Transportation having undertaken to carry Bataclan safely to his destination. Our New Civil Code amply provides for the
responsibility of a common carrier to its passengers and their goods, to wit: Article 17331, 17552, 17563, 17594 and 17635.

The SC also agree that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, through his agent, the driver Saylon. There was
evidence to show that at the time of the blow out, the bus was speeding, according to one of the passengers.

There is no question that under the circumstances, the defendant carrier is liable. A satisfactory definition of proximate cause is
found in Volume 38, pages 695-696 of American jurisprudence, cited by plaintiffs-appellants in their brief. It is as follows:

. . . that cause, which, in natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and
without which the result would not have occurred.' And more comprehensively, 'the proximate legal cause is that acting first and
producing the injury, either immediately or by setting other events in motion, all constituting a natural and continuous chain of
events, each having a close causal connection with its immediate predecessor, the final event in the chain immediately effecting
the injury as a natural and probable result of the cause which first acted, under such circumstances that the person responsible for
the first event should, as an ordinary prudent and intelligent person, have reasonable ground to expect at the moment of his act or
default that an injury to some person might probably result therefrom.

The SC in the case did not hesitate to hold that the proximate cause was the overturning of the bus. The reason is that when the
vehicle turned completely on its back, the leaking of the gasoline from the tank was not unnatural or unexpected; that the coming
of the men with a lighted torch was in response to the call for help, and that because it was dark (about 2:30 in the morning), the
rescuers had to carry a light with them, and because they are from a rural area where lanterns and flashlights were not available.
In other words, the coming of the men with a torch was to be expected and was a natural sequence of the overturning of the bus,
the trapping of some of its passengers and the call for outside help.

Furthermore, the burning of the bus is also be attributed to the negligence of the carrier, through its employee. According to the
witness, the driver and the conductor were on the road walking back and forth. They should and must have known that in that
position, gasoline could and must have leaked from the tank and soaked the area in and around the bus, this aside from the fact
that gasoline can be smelt, and yet neither the driver nor the conductor exercised caution or taken steps to warn the rescuers not to
bring the lighted torch too near the bus.

Taylor vs. Manila Electric

PRINCIPLES:
Doctrine of Implied Invitation
Doctrine of Attarctive Nuisance
Contributory Negligence
Proximate cause

PARTIES:
Manila Electric (Respondent/Company) is a foreign corporation engaged in the operation of a street railway and an electric light
system in Manila. David Taylor (Petitioner) 15 years of age; had an experience working as a cabin crew in a ship; works in the
office of his father who is a mechanical engineer and mechanical draftsman.

FACTS:
One day, David and Manuel (his friend) went to the company’s premises to visit Murphy (employee) since the latter promised to
make them a cylinder for a miniature engine. Since he was not in his quarters, they wandered and found some brass fulminating
caps scattered on the ground. They took it and brought the same to Manuel’s house.
They, together with Jessie, tried to break the cap with a stone and hammer but failed, so they opened one of the caps with a knife
and finding that it was filed with a yellowish substance they lighted it with a match and explosion followed causing them injuries.
Jessie, who, when the boys proposed purring a match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and started to run away,
received a slight cut in the neck. Manuel had his hand burned and wounded, and David was struck in the face by several particles
of the metal capsule, one of which injured his right eye to such an extent as to necessitate its removal by the surgeons who were
called in to care for his wounds.

Thus, David, through his father, filed an action to recover damages against the company for the loss of eye and other injuries
suffered by David. They argued that negligence should not be attributed to David because he is merely a 15-yr old boy.

ISSUE:
Whether or not David is entitled to recover damages?

HELD:
No.
TN: Before discussing whether or not David is entitled for damages, the Court had also discussed
several jurisprudences pertaining to other doctrines relevant in torts.

Doctrine of Implied Invitation and Doctrine of Attractive Nuisance.

Taylor’s unlawful entry in the premises will not absolve the company from liability, applying the Doctrine of Implied Invitation.
Under this doctrine, leaving a tempting thing for children to play in an area where they would be likely to gather for that purpose,
may be equivalent to an invitation to them to make use of it. Because of the nature of the defendant company’s business, it is
attractive to children and would result to an implied invitation to come and enjoy the premises. The area itself had a dumping
ground of their rejected materials so according to the Court, children are curious in itself to discover the surrounding items.

In relation to this is the doctrine of attractive nuisance because in these specific premises, there are a lot of activities going on. So,
there is a higher propensity for the curious minds to go inside and see what’s going on.

Contributory Negligence
When the immediate cause of an accident resulting in an injury is the plaintiff's own act, which contributed to the principal
occurrence as one of its determining factors, he cannot recover damages for the injury.

Company is negligent but David still cannot recover; Proximate cause

But while we hold that the entry of the plaintiff upon defendant's property without defendant's express invitation or permission
would not have relieved defendant from responsibility for injuries incurred there by the plaintiff, without other fault on his part, if
such injury were attributable to the negligence of the defendant, we are of opinion that under all the circumstances of this case the
negligence of the defendant in leaving the caps exposed on its premises was not the proximate cause of the injury received by the
plaintiff, which therefore was not, properly speaking, "attributable to the negligence of the defendant," and, on the other hand, we
are satisfied that plaintiff's action in cutting open the detonating cap and putting a match to its contents was the proximate cause
of the explosion and of the resultant injuries indicted upon the plaintiff, and that the defendant, therefore, is not civilly
responsible for the injuries thus incurred.

In the case at bar, plaintiff at the time of the accident was well—grown youth of 15, more mature both mentally and physically
than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman, thirty
days after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was exceptionally well quailed to take care. The
evidence of record leaves no room for doubt that, despite his denials on the witness stands, he well knew the explosive character
of the cap with which he was amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to produce an explosion, as
described by the little girl who was present, admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the cap by the use of
electricity,
followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a hammer, and the nal success of his endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable
doubt that he had reason to anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous, in view of the fact that the little girl, 9 years of age,
who was with him at the time when he put the match to the contents of the cap, became frightened and ran away.

Sanitary Steam Laundry vs. CA

FACTS:
This case involves a collision between a Mercedes Benz panel truck (pick-up truck) of petitioner Sanitary Steam Laundry and a
Cimarron (multicab) which caused the death of 3 persons and the injuries of several others. The accident took place at the
Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on August 31, 1980. All the victims were riding in the Cimarron. One of those who died was
the driver. The Regional Trial Court of Makati found petitioner's driver to be responsible for the vehicular accident and
accordingly held petitioner liable to private respondents for P472,262.30 in damages and attorney's fees. Its decision was
affirmed in toto by the CA.

The passengers of the Cimarron were mostly employees of the Project Management Consultants, Inc. (PMCI). They visited the
construction site of a company project at Lian, Batangas. The other passengers were family and friends whom they invited to an
excursion to the beach after the visit to the construction site. The group stayed at Lian beach until 5:30 p.m., when they decided
to go back to Manila.

The Cimarron, was owned by the father of one of the employees of PMCI. At about 8:00 p.m., as it was traveling along
Aguinaldo Highway in Imus, Cavite on its way back to Manila, the Cimarron was hit on its front portion by petitioner's panel
truck which was traveling in the opposite direction. The panel truck was on its way to petitioner's plant in Dasmariñas, Cavite
after delivering some linen to the Makati Medical Center. The driver of the panel truck claimed that a jeepney in front of him
suddenly stopped. He said he stepped on the brakes to avoid hitting the jeepney and that this caused his vehicle to swerve to the
left and encroach on a portion of the opposite lane. As a result, his panel truck collided with the Cimarron on the north-bound
lane.

The driver of the Cimarron and two of his passengers died. Several of the other passengers of the Cimarron were injured and
taken to various hospitals.

CFI/RTC:
On December 4, 1980, private respondents filed this civil case for damages before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig
Branch, against petitioner. On November 23, 1990, the Regional Trial Court of Makati, to which the case was transferred
following the reorganization of the judiciary, rendered judgment for private respondents.

CA:
As already stated, the Court of Appeals, to which the decision of the trial court was appealed, affirmed the decision on January
26, 1995.

PETITIONER’S CONTENTION:
First . Petitioner contends that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty of contributory negligence and, therefore, its liability should
be mitigated, if not totally extinguished. It claims that the driver of the Cimarron was guilty or violation of traffic rules and
regulations at the time of the mishap. Hence, in accordance with Art. 2185 of the Civil Code, he was presumed to be negligent.

According to petitioner, the negligence consisted of

the following.

1. The Cimarron was overloaded because there were from 20 to 25 passengers inside when the passenger
capacity of the vehicle was only 17.
2. The front seat of the Cimarron was occupied by four adults, including the driver.
3. The Cimarron had only one headlight on (its right headlight) as its left headlight was not functioning.

Second, Petitioner asserts that the fact that its panel truck encroached on a portion of the lane of the Cimarron does not show that
its driver was negligent. Petitioner cites the case of Bayasen v. CA , which allegedly held that the sudden swerving of a vehicle
caused by its driver stepping on the brakes is not negligence per se.

Third, Petitioner likewise invokes the ruling in Mckee v. Intermediate Appellate Court , in which a driver who invaded the
opposite lane and caused a collision between his car and a truck coming from the opposite lane, was exonerated based on the
doctrine of last clear chance, which states that a person who has the last clear chance or opportunity of avoiding an accident,
notwithstanding the negligent acts of his opponent, is solely responsible for the consequences of the accident.

According to petitioner, although the driver of the panel truck was initially negligent, the driver of the Cimarron had the last
opportunity to avoid the accident. However, because of his negligence (i .e., the aforementioned violations of traffic rules and
regulations such as the use of only one headlight at night and the overcrowding at the front seat of the vehicle), he was not able to
avoid a collision with the panel truck.

ISSUE:
Is the petitioner’s contentions meritorious?

HELD:
We find the foregoing contention to be without merit.
First of all, it has not been shown how the alleged negligence of the Cimarron driver contributed to the collision between the
vehicles. Indeed, petitioner has the burden of showing a causal connection between the injury received and the violation of the
Land Transportation and Traffic Code. He must show that the violation of the statute was the proximate or legal cause of the
injury or that it substantially contributed thereto. Negligence, consisting in whole or in part, of violation of law, like any other
negligence, is without legal consequence unless it is a contributing cause of the injury. Petitioner says that "driving an overloaded
vehicle with only one functioning headlight during nighttime certainly increases the risk of accident," that because the Cimarron
had only one headlight, there was "decreased visibility," and that the tact that the vehicle was overloaded and its front seat
overcrowded "decreased [its] maneuverability," However, mere allegations such as these are not sufficient to discharge its burden
of proving clearly that such alleged negligence was the contributing cause of the injury.

Furthermore, based on the evidence in this case, there was no way either driver could have avoided the collision. The panel truck
driver's testimony is consistent with the testimonies of private respondents that the panel truck went out of control and simply
smashed into the Cimarron in which they were riding.

The foregoing testimonies show that the driver of the panel truck lost control of his vehicle and bumped the Cimarron. Hence,
even if both headlights of the Cimarron were lighted, it would have been bumped just the same because the driver of the panel
truck could not stop despite the fact that he applied the brakes.

Nor is there any basis in fact for petitioner's contention that because of overcrowding in the front seat of the Cimarron there was
"decreased maneuverability" which prevented the Cimarron driver from avoiding the panel truck. There is absolutely no basis for
this claim. There is nothing in the testimonies of the passengers of the Cimarron, particularly Charito Estolano, who was seated in
front, which suggest that the driver had no elbow room for maneuvering the vehicle.

All these point to the fact that the proximate cause of the accident was the negligence of petitioner's driver. As the trial court
noted, the swerving of petitioner's panel truck to the opposite lane could mean not only that petitioner's driver was running the
vehicle at a very high speed but that he was tailgati

Mercury Drug vs. Baking

FACTS:
Sebastian M. Baking, respondent, went to the clinic of Dr. Cesar Sy for a medical check-up. On the following day, after
undergoing an ECG, blood, and hematology examinations and urinalysis, Dr. Sy found that respondent's blood sugar and
triglyceride were above normal levels. Dr. Sy then gave respondent two medical prescriptions — Diamicron for his blood sugar
and Benalize tablets for his triglyceride. Respondent then proceeded to petitioner Mercury Drug Corporation (Alabang Branch) to
buy the prescribed medicines. However, the saleslady misread the prescription for Diamicron as a prescription for Dormicum.
Thus, what was sold to respondent was Dormicum, a potent sleeping tablet. Unaware that what was given to him was the wrong
medicine, respondent took one pill of Dormicum on three consecutive days.

On the third day (he rose again. chz) he took the medicine, respondent figured in a vehicular accident. The car he was driving
collided with the car of one Josie Peralta. Respondent fell asleep while driving. He could not remember anything about the
collision nor felt its impact. Suspecting that the tablet he took may have a bearing on his physical and mental state at the time of
the collision, respondent returned to Dr. Sy's clinic. Upon being shown the medicine, Dr. Sy was shocked to find that what was
sold to respondent was Dormicum, instead of the prescribed Diamicron.

Respondent filed a complaint for damages with the RTC.

RTC:
Decided in favor of the respondent

CA:
Affirmed the RTC

ISSUES:
1. Whether petitioner was negligent, and if so, whether such negligence was the proximate cause of respondent's accident.

2. Whether the award of moral damages, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and cost of the suit is justified.

HELD:

1.Yes, petitioner was negligent and such negligence is the proximate cause of the respondent’s accident.
To sustain a claim based on Art. 2176 of the NCC, the following requisites must concur: (a) damage suffered by the plaintiff; (b)
fault or negligence of the defendant; and, (c) connection of cause and effect between the fault or negligence of the defendant and
the damage incurred by the plaintiff.

There is no dispute that respondent suffered damages. It is generally recognized that the drugstore business is imbued with public
interest. The health and safety of the people will be put into jeopardy if drugstore employees will not exercise the highest degree
of care and diligence in selling medicines. Inasmuch as the matter of negligence is a question of fact, we defer to the findings of
the trial court affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Obviously, petitioner's employee was grossly negligent in selling to respondent
Dormicum, instead
of the prescribed Diamicron. Considering that a fatal mistake could be a matter of life and death for a buying patient, the said
employee should have been very cautious in dispensing medicines. She should have verified whether the medicine she gave
respondent was indeed the one prescribed by his physician. The care required must be commensurate with the danger involved,
and the skill employed must correspond with the superior knowledge of the business which the law demands.

Petitioner’s negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. Proximate cause is defined as any cause that produces injury in a
natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, such that the result would not have occurred
otherwise. Proximate cause is determined from the facts of each case, upon a combined consideration of logic, common sense,
policy, and precedent. Here, the vehicular accident could not have occurred had petitioner's employee been careful in reading Dr.
Sy's prescription. Without the potent effects of Dormicum, a sleeping tablet, it was unlikely that respondent would fall asleep
while driving his car, resulting in a collision.

2. Yes, but reduced moral and deleted attorney’s fees and litigation expenses.

Moral Damages
As regards the award of moral damages, we hold the same to be in order. Moral damages may be awarded whenever the
defendant's wrongful act or omission is the proximate cause of the plaintiff's physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury in the cases specified or
analogous to those provided in Article 2219 of the Civil Code. Respondent has adequately established the factual basis for the
award of moral damages when he testified that he suffered mental anguish and anxiety as a result of the accident caused by the
negligence of petitioner's employee.

There is no hard-and-fast rule in determining what would be a fair and reasonable amount of moral damages, since each case
must be governed by its own peculiar facts. However, it must be commensurate to the loss or injury suffered. Taking into
consideration the attending circumstances here, we are convinced that the amount awarded by the trial court is exorbitant. Thus,
we reduce the amount of moral damages from P250,000.00 to P50,000.00 only.

Exemplary Damages
In addition, we also deem it necessary to award exemplary damages. Article 2229 allows the grant of exemplary damages by way
of example or correction for the public good. As mentioned earlier, the drugstore business is affected with public interest.
Petitioner should have exerted utmost diligence in the selection and supervision of its employees. On the part of the employee
concerned, she should have been extremely cautious in dispensing pharmaceutical products. Due to the sensitive nature of its
business, petitioner must at all times maintain a high level of meticulousness. Therefore, an award of exemplary damages in the
amount of P25,000.00 is in order.

Attorney’s fees and litigation expenses

On the matter of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, it is settled that the reasons or grounds for
the award thereof must be set forth in the decision of the court. Since the trial court's decision did not give the basis of the award,
the same must be deleted.