[CASE DIGEST] Mercury Drug and Rolando Del Rosario v.

Spouses Huang and Stephen Huang (G.R. No. 172122)

June 22, 2007

FACTS:

A sedan owned by Stephen Huang and a six-wheeler Mitsubishi truck owned by Mercury Drug Corp. and
driven by its employee Rolando del Rosario figured in an accident along C5 in Taguig, Metro Manila. As
a result, the sedan was wrecked while Stephen Huang incurred massive injuries and became paralyzed
from chest down requiring continuous medical and rehabilitation treatment. Spouses Huang, Stephen's
parents, were with him in the vehicle at the time of the accident and consequently sustained injuries.

It must be noted that at the time of the accident, Del Rosario had a Traffic Violation Receipt because
his driver’s license had been confiscated as he had been previously apprehended for reckless driving.

Before the RTC, Spouses Huang faulted Del Rosario for committing gross negligence and reckless
imprudence, and Mercury Drug for failing to exercise the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of its driver.

RTC found Del Rosario and Mercury Drug jointly and severally liable for damages. The CA upheld the
RTC's ruling. Hence, the instant appeal.  

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mercury Drug should be held liable for the negligence of its employee Del Rosario. --
YES.

HELD:

The liability of the employer under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code is direct or immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee, or a prior showing of insolvency of
such employee. It is also joint and solidary with the employee.

In selecting employees, the employer is required to examine them as to their qualifications, experience
and service records. With respect to supervision, the employer should formulate standard operating
procedures, monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for their breach. To
establish such, concrete proof, such as documentary evidence must be submitted by him.

In the instant case, Mercury Drug is jointly and solidarily liable with Del Rosario. In order to be relieved
of such liability, Mercury should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a family, both
in the selection and supervision of the employee in the performance of his duties. Mercury failed in
both respects.

Mercury Drug presented testimonial evidence on its hiring procedure. It explained that applicants are
required to take theoretical and actual driving tests, and a psychological examination.

But the SC found that the company was not able to discharge the required burden of proving that it
exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of  its employee. In fact, it was shown that Del
Rosario didn't take driving tests and psychological exams when he applied for the position of a Truck
Man. In addition, Mercury didn't present Del Rosario's NBI and police clearances. Further, the last
seminar attended by the driver occurred a long 12 years before the accident occurred. Lastly, Mercury
didn't have a backup driver for long trips. When the accident happened Del Rosario has been out on the
road for more than 13 hours.

Del Rosario drove the company’s truck without him having any license. The negligence with regard to
supervision over Mercury's employees is also emphazised by the fact that Mercury didn't impose any
sanction on Del Rosario when the latter reported to the former about the incident.

In view of the above, it is clear that Mercury didn't exercise due diligence sufficient enough for it to be
excused from liability.

GUILLANG v. RODOLFO BEDANIA, GR No. 162987, 2009-05-21

Facts:
On 25 October 1994, at about 5:45 in the afternoon, petitioner Genaro M. Guillang (Genaro)
was driving his brand new Toyota Corolla GLI sedan with conduction sticker no. 54-DFT
(car) along Emilio Aguinaldo Highway (highway) in Cavite.   Genaro, Antero Guillang
(Antero), Felipe Jurilla, Jose Dignadice (Dignadice), and Alvin Llanillo (Llanillo) had all just
left from Golden City, Dasmariñas, Cavite, and were on their way to Manila.  At the other
side of the highway,  respondent Rodolfo A. Bedania (Bedania) was driving a... ten-wheeler
Isuzu cargo truck with plate no. CAC-923 (truck) towards Tagaytay City. The truck was
owned by respondent Rodolfo de Silva (de Silva).
Along the highway and the road leading to the Orchard Golf Course, Bedania negotiated a
U-turn.  When the truck entered the opposite lane of the highway, Genaro's car hit the right
portion of the truck.  The truck dragged Genaro's car some five meters to the right of... the
road.
Antero... died due to the injuries he sustained from the collision.  The car was a total wreck
while the truck sustained minor damage.
trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners.  The trial court found Bedania grossly
negligent for recklessly maneuvering the truck by making a sudden U-turn in the highway
without due regard to traffic rules and the safety of other... motorists.
Court of Appeals rendered its decision in favor of respondents.
appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.  The complaint of the herein appellees
in Civil Case No. 95-73666 is DISMISSED, for lack of merit
Issues:
who is liable for the damages suffered by petitioners
Ruling:
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals that Genaro was negligent is not supported by the
evidence on record.  In ruling that Genaro was negligent, the Court of Appeals gave weight
and credence to Videna's testimony.   However, we find that Videna's testimony was...
inconsistent with the police records and report that he made on the day of the collision.
First, Videna testified that the car was running fast and overtook another vehicle that
already gave way to the truck.[26]  But this was not indicated in either... the report or the
police records.  Moreover, if the car was speeding, there should have been skid marks on
the road when  Genaro stepped on the brakes to avoid the collision.  But the sketch of the
accident showed no skid marks made by the car.[27]  Second, Videna testified that the
petitioners came from a drinking spree because he was able to smell liquor.[28]  But in the
report,[29] Videna indicated that the condition of Genaro was "normal." 
Videna did not indicate in the report that Genaro "had been drinking liquor" or that Genaro
"was obviously drunk."  Third, Videna testified that when he arrived at the scene, Bedania
was inside his truck.[30]  This contradicts the police records... where Videna stated that
after the collision Bedania escaped and abandoned the victims.[31]  The police records also
showed that Bedania was arrested by the police at his barracks in Anabu, Imus, Cavite and
was turned over to the police only on 26
October 1994.
In this case, the report[33] showed that the truck, while making the U-turn, failed to signal, a
violation of traffic rules.  The police records also stated that, after the collision, Bedania
escaped and abandoned the petitioners and his... truck.[34]  This is another violation of a
traffic regulation.[35] Therefore, the presumption arises that Bedania was negligent at the
time of the mishap.
The evidence presented in this case also does not support the conclusion of the Court of
Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn before the impact occurred.  If the
truck had fully made the U-turn, it should have been hit on its rear.[36]  If the truck had
already negotiated even half of the turn and is almost on the other side of the highway, then
the truck should have been hit in the middle portion of the trailer or cargo compartment. But
the evidence clearly shows, and the Court of Appeals... even declared, that the car hit the
truck's gas tank, located at the truck's right middle portion, which disproves the conclusion
of the Court of Appeals that the truck had already executed the U-turn when it was hit by the
car.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals said that the point of impact was on the lane where the car
was cruising.  Therefore, the car had every right to be on that road  and the car had the right
of way over the truck that was making a U-turn.  Clearly, the truck... encroached upon the
car's lane when it suddenly made the U-turn.
The Court of Appeals also concluded that Bedania made the U-turn at an intersection. 
Again, this is not supported by the evidence on record.  The police sketch[37] does not
indicate an intersection and only shows that there was a road leading to... the Orchard Golf
Course near the place of the collision.  Furthermore, U-turns are generally not advisable
particularly on major streets.[38]  Contrary to Videna's testimony, it is not normal for a truck
to make a U-turn on a highway.  We... agree with the trial court that if Bedania wanted to
change direction, he should seek an intersection where it is safer to maneuver the truck. 
Bedania should have also turned on his signal lights and made sure that the highway was
clear of vehicles from the opposite... direction before executing the U-turn.
Clearly, Bedania's negligence was the proximate cause of the collision which claimed the
life of Antero and injured the petitioners.
The cause of the collision is traceable to the negligent act of Bedania for if the U-turn was
executed with the proper precaution, the mishap in all probability would not have
happened.  The... sudden U-turn of the truck without signal lights posed a serious risk to
 oncoming motorists.   Bedania failed to prevent or minimize that risk.  The truck's sudden U-
turn triggered a series of events that led to the collision and, ultimately, to the death of
Antero and the injuries of petitioners.
Principles:
Under Article 2185 of the Civil Code, unless there is proof to the contrary, a person driving a
vehicle is presumed negligent if at the time of the mishap, he was violating any traffic
regulation.
Proximate cause is that which, in the natural and continuous sequence, unbroken by any
efficient, intervening cause, produces the injury, and... without which the result would not
have occurred.

Republic v. Luzon Stevedoring Corporation 21 SCRA 279, G.R.

No. L-21749 (September 29, 1967)
Facts:

1. Barge owned by Luzon Stevedoring Corporation(defendant, LSC for brevity) was being towed
down the Pasig river by tugboats belonging to the same corporation.`
2. The barge rammed against one of the wooden piles of the Nagtahan Bailey Bridge, smashing the
posts and causing the bright to list. The river, at that time, was swollen and the current swift, on
account of the heavy downpour of Manila and the surrounding provinces.
3. Republic of the Philippines (PH) sued LSC for actual and consequential damages caused by its
employees.

Issue/s:

1. Whether or not the collision of LSC’s barge with the supports or piers of the Nagtahan bridge
was in law caused by fortuitous event or force majeure.

Ruling:

1. No. Considering that the Nagtahan bridge was an immovable and stationary object and
uncontrovertibly provided with adequate openings for the passage of water craft, including
barges like of NSC’s, it is undeniable that the unusual event that the barge, exclusively controlled
by appellant, rammed the bridge supports raises a presumption of negligence on the part of
appellant or its employees manning the barge or the tugs that towed it. For in the ordinary
course of events, such a thing does not happen if proper case is used. Res ipsa loquitur.

NLS stresses the precautions (due diligence) taken by it: (1) that it assigned two of its
most powerful tugboats to tow down river its barge, and (2) that it assigned to the task
the more competent and experienced among its patrons, (3) had the towlines, engines
and equipment double-checked and inspected; (4) that it instructed its patrons to take
extra precautions. These very precautions, completely destroy the NLS’defense.

Caso fortuito or force majeure by definition, are extraordinary events not foreseeable or
avoidable, events that could not be foreseen, or which, though foreseen, were
inevitable.” It is, therefore, not enough that the event should not have been foreseen or
anticipated, as is commonly believed, but it must be one impossible to foresee or to
avoid. The more difficulty to foresee the happening is not impossibility to foresee the
same. The very measures adopted by NSC prove that the possibility of danger was not
only foreseeable, but actually foreseen, and was not caso fortuito.

LSC, knowing and appreciating the perils posed by the swollen steam and its swift
current, voluntarily entered into a situation involving obvious danger; it therefore
assured the risk, and cannot shed responsibility merely because the precautions it
adopted turned out to be insufficient.

RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al

MARCH 26, 2011  ~ VBDIAZ

RODRIGUEZ et al vs.CA et al
G.R. No. 121964
June 17, 1997
DAVIDE, JR. J.:
FACTS: A a fire broke out which razed two apartment buildings, owned by plaintiffs-
appellants Rodriguezes and partially destroying a commercial building. They filed a
case for damages against defendants-appellees Vilorias and Young. The complaint
alleged that by reason of the gross negligence and want of care of the construction
workers and employees of the defendants-appellees, the bunkhouse or workers’
quarters in the construction site caught fire spreading rapidly, burning the adjacent
buildings owned by plaintiffs-appellants.
Defendant-appellee Young, the building contractor, contended that he can not be held
responsible even if there was negligence on the part of the employees for he had
exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection and supervision of
his workers. As counterclaim, defendant-appellee Young sought for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
The Vilorias also alleged that plaintiffs-appellants had no cause of action against
them. The fire court not have been caused by gross negligence of their workers for
they did not have any worker in the construction of their building. The said
construction was being undertaken by the independent contractor, Young, who hired
and supervised his own workers. As counterclaim, they prayed for moral damages,
exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.

After trial and reception of evidence, the court a quo resolved that the fire was not
caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants-appellants.
The decision stated that plaintiffs-appellants failed to establish that the fire was the
result of defendants-appellees’ or their workers’ negligence.
The CA affirmed the trial court’s decision but the award of damages in favor of
defendants-appellees including the award of attorney’s fees are DELETED and SET
ASIDE.

ISSUE:
1. 1. WON SECTION 44, RULE 130 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR, therefore making the Fire Investigation
Report inadmissible in evidence
HELD: the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision of CA is
AFFIRMED in toto.
1.  NO, the rule is applicable; the Report admissible

Section 44 of Rule 130, which reads as follows:

Sec. 44. Entries in official records. — Entries in official records made in the

performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima facie evidence of the facts
therein stated.
Petitioners assert that the Fire Investigation Report  by an official of the Cebu City
Fire Station should have been admitted in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule
[as stated in #2 above].] The trial and appellate courts rejected this
applying Africa v. Caltex (Phil.) Inc., wherein this Court laid down the three
requisites for admissibility under the aforesaid section, viz.:
(1) that the entry was made by a police officer, or by another person especially
enjoined by law to do so;

(2) that it was made by the police officer in the performance of his duties, or by such
other person in the performance of a duty especially enjoined by law; and

(3) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him
stated, which must have been acquired by him personally or through official
information.

Elaborating on the third requisite, this Court further stated that for the statements
acquired by the public officer under the third requisite to qualify as “official
information,” it is necessary that the persons who gave the statements “not only must
have personal knowledge of the facts stated but must have the duty to give such
statements for record.”

Some confusion surrounds the issue of admissibility of the Fire Investigation Report.
The record discloses that the officer who signed the report, Fire Major Eduardo P.
Enriquez, was subpoenaed at the request of and testified in open court for
petitioners.Private respondents objected said report, for being “hearsay and
incompetent evidence.”  The trial court then denied their admission “for being
hearsay.

In light of the purposes for which the exhibits in question were offered, the trial court
erred in rejecting all of them as hearsay. Since Major Enriquez himself took the
witness stand and was available for cross-examination, the portions of the report
which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted of his perceptions and
conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary of the
statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the
Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer,
may then be considered as independently relevant statements which were gathered in
the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but not necessarily
to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:
Where, regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made
is relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence
as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement
itself may constitute a fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence
of such a fact.

When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report
and made himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report,
insofar as it proved that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was
effectively removed from the ambit of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130.
Properly understood, this section does away with the testimony in open court of the
officer who made the official record, considers the matter as an exception to the
hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in evidence
as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon
v. Barcelon. 29
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the
occasions in which the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to
declare as a witness are numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work
something is not done in which testimony is not needed from official sources. Were
there no exception for official statements, hosts of officials would be found devoting
the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses in court or delivering their
deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and the
interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence.
For these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents,
which is not extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, sec. 1631).
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will
discharge their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts
they do in discharge of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be
true under such a degree of caution as the nature and circumstances of each case may
appear to require.

It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to
testify on his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 130 would
have been ripe for determination, and this Court would have agreed with the CA that
said report was inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied.
The statements given by the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to
qualify as “official information,” there being no showing that, at the very least, they
were under a duty to give the statements for record.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (RCPI),

petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND LORETO DIONELA, respondents
No. L-44748.        August 29, 1986

Facts:

Loreto Dionela filed a complaint of damages against Radio Communiciations of the

Philippines, Inc. (RCPI) due to the telegram sent through its Manila Office to the
former, reading as follows:

176 AS JR 1215PM 9 PAID MANDALUYONG JUL 22-66 LORETO DIONELA

CABANGAN LEGASPI CITY
WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK FER
LORETO DIONELA-CABANGAN-WIRE ARRIVAL OF CHECK-PER
115 PM
SA IYO WALANG PAKINABANG DUMATING KA DIYAN-WALA-KANG PADALA
DITO KAHIT BULBUL MO

Loreto Dionela alleges that the defamatory words on the telegram sent to him wounded
his feelings, caused him undue embarrassment and affected adversely his business
because other people have come to know of said defamatory words. RCPI alleges that
the additional words in Tagalog was a private joke between the sending and receiving
operators, that they were not addressed to or intended for plaintiff and therefore did not
form part of the telegram, and that the Tagalog words are not defamatory.
The RTC ruled that the additional words are libelous for any person reading the same
would logically think that they refer to Dionela, thus RCPI was ordered to pay moral
damages in the amount of P40, 000.00. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
ruling that the company was negligent and failed to take precautionary steps to avoid
the occurrence of the humiliating incident, and the fact that a copy of the telegram is
filed among other telegrams and open to public is sufficient publication; however
reducing the amount awarded to P15, 000.00

Issue:

Whether or not the company should answer directly and primarily for the civil liability
arising from the criminal act of its employee.

Ruling:

Yes. The cause of action of the private respondent is based on Arts. 19 and 20 of the New
Civil Code, as well as on respondent’s breach of contract thru the negligence of its own
employees. By adding extraneous and libelous matters in the message sent to the private
respondent, there is a clear breach of contract; for upon payment of the fixed rate, the
company undertakes to transmit the message accurately.

In contracts, the negligence of the employee (servant) is the negligence of the employer
(master). This is the master and servant rule. As a corporation, the petitioner can act
only through its employees. Hence the acts of its employees in receiving and
transmitting messages are the acts of the petitioner. To hold that the petitioner is not
liable directly for the acts of its employees in the pursuit of petitioner’s business is to
deprive the general public availing of the services of the petitioner of an effective and
adequate remedy.

In most cases, negligence must be proved in order that plaintiff may recover. However,
since negligence may be hard to substantiate in some cases, we may apply the doctrine
of RES IPSA LOQUITUR (the thing speaks for itself), by considering the presence of
facts or circumstances surrounding the injury.
The judgment of the CA is affirmed.

LRT vs. NAVIDAD

G.R. No. 145804. February 6, 2003

FACTS:
Navidad was drunk when he entered the boarding platform of the LRT. He got into an
altercation with the SG Escartin. They had a fistfight and Navidad fell onto the tracks and
was killed when a train came and ran over him.
The Heirs of Navidad filed a complaint for damages against Escartin, the train driver,
(Roman) the LRTA, the Metro Transit Organization and Prudent Security Agency (Prudent).
The trial court found Prudent and Escartin jointly and severally liable for damages to the
heirs. The CA exonerated Prudent and instead held the LRTA and the train driver Romero
jointly and severally liable as well as removing the award for compensatory damages and
replacing it with nominal damages.

The reasoning of the CA was that a contract of carriage already existed between Navidad
and LRTA (by virtue of his havA ing purchased train tickets and the liability was caused by
the mere fact of Navidad's death after being hit by the train being managed by the LRTA
and operated by Roman. The CA also blamed LRTA for not having presented expert
evidence showing that the emergency brakes could not have stopped the train on time.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not LRTA and/or Roman is liable for the death.
(2) Whether or not Escartin and/or Prudent are liable.
(3) Whether or not nominal damages may coexist with compensatory damages.

HELD:
(1) Yes. The foundation of LRTA's liability is the contract of carriage and its obligation to
indemnify the victim arising from the breach of that contract by reason of its failure to
exercise the high diligence required of a common carrier.
(2) Fault was not established. Liability will be based on Tort under Art. 2176 of the New Civil
Code.
(3) No.  It is an established rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory
damages.

RATIO:

Liability of LRTA – Read Arts. 1755,1756, 1759 and 1763 of the New Civil Code

A common carrier is required by these above statutory provisions to use utmost diligence in
carrying passengers with due regard for all circumstances. This obligation exists not only
during the course of the trip but for so long as the passengers are within its premises where
they ought to be in pursuance to then contract of carriage.

Art. 1763 renders a common carrier liable for death of or injury to passengers (a) through
the negligence or wilful acts of its employees or (b) on account of willful acts or negligence
of other passengers or of strangers if the common carrier’s employees through theexercise
of due diligence could have prevented or stopped the act or omission. In case of such death
or injury, a carrier is presumed to have been at fault or been negligent, and by simple proof
of injury, the passenger is relieved of the duty to still establish the fault or negligence of the
carrier or of its employees and the burden shifts upon the carrier to prove that the injury is
due to an unforeseen event or to force majeure.

Liability of Security Agency – If Prudent is to be held liable, it would be for a tort under
Art. 2176 in conjunction with Art. 2180. Once the fault of the employee Escartin is
established, the employer, Prudent, would be held liable on the presumption that it did not
exercise the diligence of a good father of the family in the selection and supervision of its
employees.
Relationship between contractual and non-contractual breach – How then must the
liability of the common carrier, on the one hand, and an independent contractor, on the
other hand, be described? It would be solidary. A contractual obligation can be breached by
tort and when the same act or omission causes the injury, one resulting in culpa
contractual and the other in culpa aquiliana, Article 2194 of the Civil Code can well apply. In
fine, a liability for tort may arise even under a contract, where tort is that which breaches
the contract. Stated differently, when an act which constitutes a breach of ontract would
have itself constituted the source of a quasi-delictual liability had no contract existed
between the parties, the contract can be said to have been breached by tort, thereby
allowing the rules on tort to apply.

Nominal Damages - The award of nominal damages in addition to actual damages

is untenable. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which
has been violated or invaded by the defendant, may be vindicated or recognized, and not
for the purpose of indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him. It is an established
rule that nominal damages cannot co-exist with compensatory damages.  The award was
deleted/\.

HIDALGO ENTERPRISES v. GUILLERMO BALANDAN, GR No. L-3422, 1952-06-13

Facts:
petitioner Hidalgo Enterprises Inc. "was the owner of an ice-plant factory... were installed
two tanks full of vatar, nine feet deep, for cooling purposes of its engine.
he factory compound was... surrounded with fence, the tanks themselves were not provided
with any kind of fence or top covers. The edges of the tanks were barely a foot high from
the surface of the ground... any one could easily enter the said factory, as he pleased...
plaintiffs' son, Mario Balandan, a boy barely 6 years old, while playing... entered the
factory... to take a bath in one of said tanks;
Mario sank to the bottom of the tank... died of 'asphyxia secondary to drowning
The Court of Appeals, and the Court of First Instance of Laguna,... took the view that... an
attractive nuisance (the tanks), and neglected to adopt the necessary precautions to avoid
accident
It applied the doctrine of... attractive nuisance,
Issues:
is a swimming pool or water tank an instrumentality or appliance likely to attract little
children in play? In other words is the body of water an attractive nuisance?
Ruling:
"The attractive nuisance doctrine generally is not applicable to bodies of water, artificial as
well as natural, in the absence  of some unusual condition or artificial feature other than the
mere water and its location."
Nature has created streams, lakes and pools which attract children. Lurking in their waters
is always the danger of drowning. Against this danger children are early instructed so that
they are sufficiently presumed to know the danger; and if the owner of private... property
creates an artificial pool on his own property, merely duplicating the work of nature without
adding any new  danger,... as petitioner's tanks are not classified as attractive nuisance, the
question whether the petitioner had taken reasonable precautions becomes immaterial, and
the other issue submitted by petitioner that the parents of the boy were guilty of contributory
negligence... precluding recovery, because they left for Manila on that unlucky day leaving
their son under the care of no responsible individual needs no further discussion.

JOHN KAM BIAK Y. CHAN v. IGLESIA NI CRISTO, GR NO. 160283, 2005-10-14

Facts:
The Aringay Shell Gasoline Station is owned by the petitioner. It is located in Sta. Rita East,
Aringay, La Union, and bounded on the south by a chapel of the respondent.
The gasoline station supposedly needed additional sewerage and septic tanks for its
washrooms. In view of this, the services of Dioscoro "Ely" Yoro (Yoro), a retired general of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was procured by petitioner,... 4. Any damage within or
outside the property of the FIRST PARTY incurred during the digging shall be borne by the
SECOND PARTY;

5. In the event that valuable objects are found on the property, the same shall be
divided among the parties as follows:

FIRST PARTY - 60%

SECOND PARTY - 40%

6. In the event that valuable objects are found outside the property line during the said
digging, the same shall be divided among the parties as follows:

FIRST PARTY - 35%

SECOND PARTY - 65%
Diggings thereafter commenced. After some time, petitioner was informed by the members
of the respondent that the digging traversed and penetrated a portion of the land belonging
to the latter. The foundation of the chapel was affected as a tunnel was dug directly under it
to... the damage and prejudice of the respondent.
a Complaint[5] against petitioner and a certain Teofilo Oller, petitioner's engineer, was filed
by the respondent before the RTC, La Union
Petitioner and Oller filed an Answer with
Third-Party Complaint[6] impleading Yoro as third-party defendant.
Yoro filed an Answer to the Third-Party Complaint... the trial court promulgated its
Decision[11] holding that the diggings were not intended for the construction of sewerage
and septic tanks but were made to construct tunnels to find hidden treasure.
petitioner and Yoro solidarily liable to the respondent on a 35%-65% basis
ACTUAL DAMAGES
MORAL DAMAGES
EXEMPLARY DAMAGES... plaintiff's attorney's fees
The petitioner's appeal to the Court of Appeals, on the other hand, was given due course...
the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision denying the appeal. It affirmed the trial court but
with modifications.
Petitioner avers that no liability should attach to him by laying the blame solely on Yoro. He
argues that the MOA executed between him and Yoro is the law between them and must be
given weight by the courts
In answer to this, the respondent asserts that the MOA should not absolve petitioner from
any liability. This written contract, according to the respondent, clearly shows that the
intention of the parties therein was to search for hidden treasure.
At this juncture, it is vital to underscore the findings of the trial court and the Court of
Appeals as to what was the real intention of the petitioner and Yoro in undertaking the
excavations. The findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals on this point are in...
complete unison. Petitioner and Yoro were in quest for hidden treasure
Issues:
WHETHER OR NOT THE MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO BY THE
PETITIONER AND YORO HAS THE EFFECT OF MAKING THE LATTER SOLELY
RESPONSIBLE FOR DAMAGES TO THE RESPONDENT.
the respondent questions the drastic reduction of the exemplary damages awarded to it
Ruling:
The heavy reliance of petitioner in paragraph 4 of the MOA cited earlier cannot steer him
clear of any liability.
As a general rule, joint tortfeasors are all the persons who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who
approve of it after it is done, if done for their benefit.
Principles:
The Court of Appeals, in its Decision, held in part:
The basis of their solidarity is not the Memorandum of Agreement but the fact that they
have become joint tortfeasors. There is solidary liability only when the obligation expressly
so states, or when the law or the nature of the obligation requires... solidarity
Article 2176 of the New Civil Code provides:
ART. 2176. - Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no
pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is...
governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
Based on this provision of law, the requisites of quasi-delict are the following:
(a) there must be an act or omission;
(b) such act or omission causes damage to another;
(c) such act or commission is caused by fault or negligence; and
(d) there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties.
All the requisites are attendant in the instant case. The tortious act was the excavation
which caused damage to the respondent because it was done surreptitiously within its
premises and it may have affected the foundation of the chapel. The excavation on
respondent's premises... was caused by fault. Finally, there was no pre-existing contractual
relation between the petitioner and Yoro on the one hand, and the respondent on the other.
For the damage caused to respondent, petitioner and Yoro are jointly liable as they are joint
tortfeasors. Verily, the responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict
is solidary
Indubitably, petitioner and Yoro cooperated in committing the tort. They even had provisions
in their MOA as to how they would divide the treasure if any is found within or outside
petitioner's property line. Thus, the MOA, instead of exculpating petitioner from liability, is...
the very noose that insures that he be so declared as liable.
Besides, petitioner cannot claim that he did not know that the excavation traversed the
respondent's property. In fact, he had two (2) of his employees actually observe the
diggings
Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed by way of example or correction for the
public good
In quasi-delicts, exemplary damages may be granted if the defendant acted with gross
negligence.
By gross negligence is meant such... entire want of care as to raise a presumption that the
person in fault is conscious of the probable consequences of carelessness, and is
indifferent, or worse, to the danger of injury to person or property of others.
Surreptitiously digging under the respondent's chapel which may weaken the foundation
thereof, thereby endangering the lives and limbs of the people in worship, unquestionably
amounts to gross negligence. Not to mention the damage that may be caused to the
structure itself. The... respondent may indeed be awarded exemplary damages.
the Court feels that the amount awarded by the Court of Appeals is inadequate. The
exemplary damages must correspondingly be increased to P100,000.00.