BARUT VS PEOPLE

G.R. No. 167454               September 24, 2014

Facts:

In 1995, SPO4 Vicente Ucag was coming from a picnic in Laguna and returning home to Taguig,
Metro Manila on board a passenger jeepney driven by his brother Rolando on the South Luzon
Expressway. Ucag’s wife and 16 year-old son Vincent were then riding an owner-type jeep driven by
Rico Villas on the same route. When the latter vehicle exited at the Sucat Interchange ahead of
Ucag’s passenger jeepney, Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) guards Conrado
Ancheta and Barut stopped Villas and directed him to park his vehicle at the road side. After
informing Villas that his vehicle had no headlights, Ancheta asked for his driving license, and Ancheta
issued to him a traffic violation report (TVR) ticket. Ucag requested the return of Villas’ driving license
but Ancheta refused. Ucag turned around in order to avoid further argument,and simply told Villas to
return for his driving license the next day. This apparently irked Ancheta, who dared Ucag to finish the
issue right there and then. Ancheta suddenly pulled out his .38 caliber revolver and fired it several
times, hitting Ucag on both thighs. Ucag fired back and hit Ancheta. Fabiano and Villas witnessed the
exchange of gunshots between Ucag and Ancheta.

Vincent Ucag rushed towards his father to go to his succor. Before Vincent could reach his father,
however, Barut fired at Vincent in the chest. Vincent expired while undergoing emergency surgery.

RTC in Muntinlupa City -found guilty of homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction. SC-
petition for review on certiorari. SC affrimed CA.

Issue:

finding on the supposed consistency of the testimonies of the State’s witnesses constituted a
sweeping conclusion.

Won testimonies of the State’s witnesses is suffiecient to ascertain n the guilt of thec accused

Held:

Villas and Fabiano had clearly and consistently testified that Barut had been the person who had shot
Vincent. There is positive and categorical identification.
Although the record of the trial is laid bare and open during every appeal in a criminal case, the
credibility of witnesses is a factual issue that the Court cannot disturb in this appeal. There must be
trial judge’s access to the witnesses to see if the witnesses were fidgeting and prevaricating, or were
sincere and trustworthy.

Barut adverts to the extra-judicial sworn statement that Villas gave in which he declared not
having seen Barut fire a gun. Barut contends that this declaration definitely contradicted
Villas’ court testimony and manifested that he was "not clear and convincing because he never
pointed out who [had] really shot Vincent Ucag."

Noting that neither Ucag nor Ancheta had shot Vincent, the RTC explained that the former could not
anymore fire his gun at Vincent not only because Vincent was his own son but also because he
himself had already been lying on the ground after being hit in his lower extremities; and that Ancheta
could not have fired at Vincent at all because he, too, had been already wounded and lying on the
groundand profusedly bleeding from his own gunshot wounds. The RTC further noted that the slug
extracted from the body of Vincent had come from a .38 caliber revolver, not from Ucag’s .45 caliber
firearm.

Barut’s contention did not itselfgo unnoticed by the CA, which observed that the RTC could
not take the declaration of Villas into consideration because Villas’ extra-judicial sworn
statement containing the declaration had not been offered and admitted as evidence by either
side. The CA stressed that only evidence that was formally offered and made part of the
records could be considered; and that in any event, the supposed contradiction between the
extra-judicial sworn statement and the court testimony should be resolved in favor of the
latter.

Pursuant to Section 34, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the RTC as the trial court could consider only
the evidence that had been formally offered; towards that end, the offering party must specify the
purpose for which the evidence was being offered. It is settled that courts will only consider as
evidence that which has been formally offered. x x x

A document, or any article for that matter, is not evidence when it is simply marked for identification; it
must be formally offered, and the opposing counsel given an opportunity to object to it or cross-
examine the witness called upon to prove or identify it. Judges are required to base their findings
upon the evidence offered by the parties at the trial and that the opposing party has chance to
examine the document and object to its admissibility.

Exception: The rule that only evidence formally offered before the trial court can be considered is
relaxed where two requisites concur, namely: one, the evidence was duly identified by testimony duly
recorded; and, two, the evidence was incorporated in the records of the case. The rule has no
application where the court takes judicial notice of adjudicative facts or where the trial court, in judging
the demeanor of witnesses, determines their credibility even without the offer of the demeanor as
evidence.
CRUZ-AREVALO vs. JUDGE QUERUBIN-LAYOSA

A. M. No. RTJ-06-2005             July 14, 2006

Facts:

This administrative Complaint filed by Josefina Cruz-Arevalo charges Judge Lydia Querubin-Layosa
with manifest bias and partiality and ignorance of the law relative to Civil Case. Background: Conrado
R. Cruz executed an authorization letter and a special power of attorney (SPA) in her favor to
represent him in Civil Case No. Q-03-50379 while he undergoes medical treatment in the United
States of America (USA). Notwithstanding the presentation of the authorization letter and SPA during
the pre-trial, respondent judge declared Cruz non-suited due to his absence.

Complainant also assails the order of respondent judge to exclude several paragraphs in the
Affidavit which was adopted as the direct testimony of her witness without giving her counsel a
chance to comment on the objections raised by the defendants.

She also refused to issue an order to that effect thus depriving Cruz the right to challenge her order by
way of petition for certiorari.

Complainant likewise accuses respondent judge of inaction, indifference or collusion by silence 5 with
the defendants for not acting on her Motions for Writs of Subpoena. Because of this, the undersigned
Presiding Judge deems it wise to voluntarily inhibit herself from trying the case.

DEFENSE of Judge:

1. The letter that allegedly authorizing petitioner to represent Cruz in the pre-trial of the Civil case was
defective because it was not duly notarized and authenticated. She likewise found the SPA defective
as it pertains to complainant's authority to receive Cruz's contribution to the PAG-IBIG Provident Fund
and not to represent him in the pre-trial of the civil case.

2. As regards the exclusion of several paragraphs in the Affidavit constituting as the direct testimony
of Atty. Cecilio Y. Arevalo, Jr., respondent judge points out that she gave the other party the chance to
go over the affidavit and make objections thereto like any direct testimonial evidence. She claims that
no written order is necessary as demanded by complainant's counsel because her rulings were made
in open court.
3. With regard to complainant's Motions for Writs of Subpoena Duces Tecum and Ad Testificandum,
respondent judge avers that they were not given due course because the legal fees for said motions
were unpaid and the person alleged to have possession or control of the documents sought to be
produced is not named or specified therein.

Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) found complainant's accusations unmeritorious and
recommended the dismissal. SC-affirm OCA. ---issue napud ni sguro. Walay issue sa case

Reasons of SC:

1 While non-appearance of a party may be excused if a duly authorized representative shall appear in
his behalf,14 however Cruz failed to validly constitute complainant because his authorization letter and
SPA were not respectively authenticated and specific as to its purpose.

2 As regards the exclusion of certain paragraphs in the affidavit of complainant's witness, the rule is
that evidence formally offered by a party may be admitted or excluded by the court. If a party's
offered documentary or object evidence is excluded, he may move or request that it be attached to
form part of the record of the case. If the excluded evidence is oral, he may state for the record the
name and other personal circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed testimony.
These procedures are known as offer of proof or tender of excluded evidence and are made for
purposes of appeal. If an adverse judgment is eventually rendered against the offeror, he may in his
appeal assign as error the rejection of the excluded evidence.

3 Respondent judge correctly ordered the striking out of portions in Atty. Arevalo's affidavit which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. Objections based on irrelevancy and immateriality
need no specification or explanation.

4 There is also nothing irregular when respondent [judge] did not issue an order to reflect the
objections of the defense counsel to each of the allegations in the sworn affidavit. These matters are
already reflected in the transcript of stenographic notes and are not subject to written order. Orders
resolving motions for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or those made in the
course of a hearing or trial, may properly be made orally.

5 Respondent judge was correct not to have entertained the same as the legal fees corresponding
thereto were not paid. Finally, complainant failed to present evidence to show the alleged bias of
respondent judge; mere suspicion that a judge was partial is not enough. Bare allegations of partiality
will not suffice in an absence of a clear showing that will overcome the presumption that the judge
dispensed justice without fear or favor.

PATULA vs. PEOPLE

G. R. No. 164457               April 11, 2012

In the trial of every criminal case, a judge must rigidly test the State’s evidence of guilt in order to
ensure that such evidence adheres to the basic rules of admissibility before pronouncing an accused
guilty of the crime charged upon such evidence.

Facts:

Petitioner was charged with estafa. She was then a saleswoman of Footlucker’s Chain of Stores, Inc.,
Dumaguete City, having collected and received the total sum of ₱131,286.97 from several customers
of said company under the express obligation to account for the proceeds of the sales and deliver the
collection to the said company, misapply and convert the proceeds of the sale to her own use and
benefit.

The Prosecution’s first witness was Lamberto Go, who testified that he was the branch manager. The
only other witness for the Prosecution was Karen Guivencan, whom Footlucker’s employed as its
store auditor. She declared that Go had requested her to audit petitioner after some customers had
told him that they had already paid their accounts but the office ledger had still reflected outstanding
balances for them; amounts appearing on the original copies of receipts varied from the amounts
written on the duplicate copies of the receipts marked the ledgers of petitioner’s various customers
allegedly with discrepancies as Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives, inclusive.

Petitioner’s counsel interposed that such were hearsay because the persons who had made the
entries were not themselves presented in court. RTC, stating that inasmuch as petitioner had opted
"not to present evidence for her defense" the Prosecution’s evidence remained "unrefuted and
uncontroverted. Thus, finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Estafa.
SC-acquits Patula.

Issues

1. WON the failure of the information for estafa to allege the falsification of the duplicate receipts
issued by petitioner to her customers violated petitioner’s right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation; -no

2. WON the ledgers and receipts (Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive) were admissible
as evidence of petitioner’s guilt for estafa as charged despite their not being duly authenticated -no

Ruling:

The petition is meritorious.

I- Failure of information to allege falsification did not violate petitioner’s right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation

The elements of the offense charged were as follows:

(a) received money, goods or other personal property

(b) misappropriated or converted

(c) prejudice of another;

(d) demand on the offender for the delivery or return

Petitioner misappropriated or converted the sums paid by her customers, and later falsified the
duplicates of the receipts before turning such duplicates to her employer to show that the customers
had paid less than the amounts actually reflected on the original receipts. We consider it inevitable to
conclude that the information herein completely pleaded the estafa defined and penalized under
Article 315, paragraph 1 (b), RPC. Verily, there was no necessity for the information to allege the acts
of falsification by petitioner because falsification was not an element of the estafa charged.

The accused is of the idea that because the crime charged in the [i]nformation is merely [e]stafa and
not [e]stafa [t]hru [f]alsification of documents, the prosecution could not prove falsification. Such
argumentation is not correct. Since the information charges accused only of misappropriation
pursuant to Art. 315, par. (1b) of RPC, the Court holds that there is no necessity of alleging the
falsification in the Information as it is not an element of the crime charged.

The complex crime of Estafa Through Falsification of Documents is committed when one has to falsify
certain documents to be able to obtain money or goods from another person. In other words, the
falsification is a necessary means of committing estafa. However, if the falsification is committed to
conceal the misappropriation, two separate offenses of estafa and falsification are committed.

II- Testimonial and documentary evidence, being hearsay, did not prove petitioner’s guilt beyond
reasonable doubt

III- Lack of their proper authentication rendered Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives inadmissible as
judicial evidence

Section 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court distinguishes between a public document and a private document for the purpose of
their presentation in evidence, viz:

Section 19. Classes of documents. – For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:

(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public
officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;

(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills and testaments, and

(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to be entered therein.

All other writings are private.

The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the documents may be presented
as evidence in court. A public document, by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because it
has been acknowledged before a notary public (except a notarial will) or a competent public official
with the formalities required by law, or because it is a public record of a private writing authorized by
law, is self-authenticating and requires no further authentication in order to be presented as
evidence in court.In contrast, a private document is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by
a private person without the intervention of a notary or other person legally authorized by which some
disposition or agreement is proved or set forth. a private document requires authentication.

The requirement of authentication of a private document is excused only in four instances, specifically: (a) when the document
is an ancient one within the context of Section 21,28 Rule 132 of the Rules of Court; (b) when the genuineness and authenticity
of an actionable document have not been specifically denied under oath by the adverse party;29 (c) when the genuineness and
authenticity of the document have been admitted;30 or (d) when the document is not being offered as genuine.31

There is no question that Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives were private documents because
private individuals executed or generated them for private or business purposes or uses. Considering
that none of the exhibits came under any of the four exceptions, they could not be presented and
admitted as evidence against petitioner without the Prosecution dutifully seeing to their authentication
in the manner provided in Section20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,viz:

Section 20. Proof of private documents. – Before any private document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due
execution and authenticity must be proved either:

(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.

Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.

Prosecution admitted that the document was a mere machine copy, not the original. While is true that
the original of the receipt bearing serial number FLDT96 No. 20441 was subsequently presented as
Exhibit B through Guivencan. However,the Prosecution did not establish that the signature appearing
on Exhibit B was the same signature that Go had earliersought to identify to be the signature of
petitioner (Exhibit A-1) on the machine copy (Exhibit A). Guivencan (auditor) could not honestly
identify petitioner’s signature on the receipts either because she lacked familiarity with such signature,
or because she had not seen petitioner affix her signature on the receipts
Section 22 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,which contains instructions on how to prove the genuineness of a handwriting in a
judicial proceeding, as follows:

Section 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. – The handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who
believes it to be the handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his
upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings
admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of
the judge.

If it is already clear that Go and Guivencan had not themselves seen the execution or signing of
the documents, the Prosecution surely did not authenticate Exhibits B to YY and their derivatives
conformably with the aforequoted rules. Hence, Exhibits B to YY, and their derivatives, inclusive, were
inescapably bereft of probative value as evidence.

That the Prosecution’s evidence was left uncontested because petitioner decided not to subject
Guivencan to cross-examination, and did not tender her contrary evidence was inconsequential. The
Court has to acquit petitioner for failure of the State to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.