Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

A.C. No. 10548 December 10, 2014

CAROLINE CASTANEDA JIMENEZ, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. EDGAR B. FRANCISCO, Respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This refers to the Resolutions of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Board of Governors (IBP-BOG), dated
January 3, 20131 and March 22, 2014,2 adopting and approving the findings of the Commission on Bar Discipline
(CBD) which found Atty. Edgar 8. Francisco (Alty Francisco) administratively liable for multiple violations of the Code
of Professional Responsibility (CPR) and recommended the penalty of suspension of one (1) year from the practice
of law.

On September 6, 2007, the CBD received a complaint, dated July 14, 2007, 3 filed by Caroline Castañeda Jimenez
(complainant)against Atty. Francisco for multiple violations of the CPR. On October 24, 2007, Atty. Francisco filed
his Answer.4 On June 26, 2009, the mandatory conference was held and terminated. Only the counsel for Atty.
Francisco appeared. The notice of the said conference addressed to complainant was returned with the notation
"unknown at the given address." No new address was provided by the complainant. Both parties wererequired to
submit their respective position papers. For this purpose, Atty. Francisco adopted his Answer. The Antecedents

Mario Crespo, otherwise known as Mark Jimenez (Jimenez), filed a complaint for estafa against complainant, her
sister Rosemarie Flaminiano, Marcel Crespo, Geraldine Antonio, Brenda Heffron, Magdalena Cunanan, and Isabel
Gonzalez.5 The said complaint was docketed as IS No. 074314 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City.
Jimenez alleged that he was the true and beneficial owner of the shares of stock in Clarion Realty and Development
Corporation (Clarion), which was incorporated specifically for the purpose of purchasing a residential house located
in Forbes Park, Makati City (Forbes property). The incorporators and original stockholders of Clarion were as
follows:

Thomas K. Chua - ₱500,000.00

Teresita C. Alsua - ₱500,000.00

Myla Villanueva - ₱249,998.00

Edgar B. Francisco - ₱1.00

Soledad Gamat - ₱1.00

Simultaneous with the drafting of Clarion’s Articles of Incorporation, the above-named stockholders, except for Myla
Villanueva (Myla), executed a deed of assignment of their respective shares in favor of complainant, who was then
Jimenez’s common-law partner.Clarion’s total capitalization was only ₱5,000,000.00. Thus, in order to achieve its
purpose of purchasing the Forbes property, Clarion simulated a loan from the complainant in the amount of
₱80,750,000.00. Thereafter, Clarion purchased the Forbes property in the amount of ₱117,000,000.00 from
Gerardo Contreras. To effect the sale, Myla handed a check in the said amount which was funded entirely by
Jimenez. The sale, however, was undervalued. In the deed of sale, it was made to appear that the Forbes property
was purchased for ₱78,000,000.00 only. Further, the money used as the purchase price was not reflected in the
books of Clarion.
On July 19, 2001, Thomas Chua and Teresita Alsua assigned their shares in Clarion to Jimenez by virtue of a deed
of trust. On the other hand, Myla’s 249,997 shares were transferred to complainant based on a deed of assignment.
The remaining one (1) share was transferred to Ma. Carolina C. Crespo. These transactions appeared in Clarion’s
General Information Sheet (GIS)filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Resultantly, the
subscribed shares of Clarion were as follows:

Mark Jimenez - P 500,000.00

Caroline Jimenez - P 749,997.00

Ma. Carolina C. Crespo - P 1.00

Edgar B. Francisco - P 1.00

Soledad Gamat - P 1.00

On November 5, 2002, Jimenez transferred all his shares to complainant by another deed of assignment, making
her the holder of Clarion shares amounting to ₱1,249,997.00.

According to Jimenez’s complaint, while he was in prison in the United States in 2004, he learned from Atty.
Francisco that his son, Marcel Crespo (Marcel), approached the complainant and threatened her, claiming that the
United States Internal Revenue Service (IRS)was about to go after their properties. Marcel succeeded in persuading
complainant to transfer her nominal shares in Clarion to Geraldine Antonio, through another deed of assignment.
Again, this was reflected in Clarion’s GIS for the year 2004.

Thereafter, Jimenez was informed by Atty. Francisco that, through fraudulent means, complainant and her co-
respondents in the estafa case, put the Forbes property for sale sometimein August 2004. The said property was
eventually sold to Philmetro Southwest Enterprise Inc. (Philmetro)for the amount of ₱118,000,000.00 without
Jimenez’s knowledge. This sale was again undervalued at ₱78,000.000.00 per the deed of sale. Atty. Francisco
relayed to Jimenez that he was the one who received the payment for the sale of the Forbes property and that he
handed all the proceeds thereof to Rosemarie Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

Jimenez’s complaint for estafa was based on complainant’s alleged participation in the fraudulent means in selling
the Forbes property which was acquired by Clarion with Jimenez’s money. Complainant was duty bound to remit all
the proceeds of the sale to Jimenez as the true and beneficial owner. Complainant and her co-respondents,
however, misappropriated and converted the fundsfor their personal use and benefit.

In support of Jimenez’s complaint for estafa, Atty. Francisco executed an affidavit reiterating its factual
averments.6 A perusal of this affidavit likewise would show the following claims and admissions, among other things,
of Atty. Francisco:

1. Sometime in August 2004, complainant called him, asking for assistance in the documentation of the sale
of the Forbes property owned by Clarion. Atty. Francisco asked her if she had secured permission from
Mark Jimenez and complainant answered in the affirmative.

2. The Board of Directors of Clarion issued a resolution authorizing him to negotiate the sale of the property.

3. For purposes of the sale, he opened an account with Security Bank, San Francisco Del Monte branch.
When the cash payment was deposited, he withdrew the amount and handed the same to Rosemarie
Flaminiano in the presence of complainant.

4. All transfers of shares were caused without any consideration. The transfer taxes, however, were paid.

5. When Mark Jimenez returned to the Philippines, he was able to confirm that the sale of the Forbes
property was without his knowledge and approval. The proceeds of the sale had already been farmed out to
different corporations established by complainant and her sister.
 6. The frequent changes in stockholdings were premeditated in order to steal the money of Mark Jimenez.

The Complaint

Complainant was shocked upon reading the allegations in the complaint for estafa filed by Jimenez against her. She
felt even more betrayed when she read the affidavit of Atty. Francisco, on whom she relied as her personal lawyer
and Clarion’s corporate counsel and secretary of Clarion. This prompted her to file a disciplinary case against Atty.
Francisco for representing conflicting interests. According to her, she usually conferred with Atty. Francisco
regarding the legal implications of Clarion’s transactions. More significantly, the principal documents relative to the
sale and transfer of Clarion’s property were all prepared and drafted by Atty. Francisco or the members of his law
office.7 Atty. Francisco was the one who actively participated in the transactions involving the sale of the Forbes
property. Without admitting the truth of the allegations in his affidavit, complainant argued that its execution clearly
betrayed the trust and confidence she reposed on him as a lawyer. For this reason, complainant prayed for the
disbarment of Atty. Francisco.

The Respondent’s Position

In his Answer,8 Atty. Francisco replied that Jimenez initially engaged his services in 1998 for the incorporation of
Clarion for the purpose of purchasing a residential house in Forbes Park, where he intended to live with his long-
time partner, the complainant; that the original incorporators and stockholders of Clarion held their respective shares
in trust for Jimenez; that the subsequent changes in the ownership of Clarion shareholdings were also pursuant to
Jimenez’s orders; and that as the corporate secretary and legal counsel of Clarion, he prepared all the legal
documentation togive effect to the said transfers and, ultimately, to the purchase of the Forbes property.

Atty. Francisco further stated that sometime in 2004, Jimenez was imprisoned in the United States for excessive
contributions to the Democratic Party; that during this time, Jimenez’s son, Marcel, and the complainant, asked him
again to changethe ownership of Clarion shares in order to avoid the attachment of Jimenez’s properties in a tax
evasion case; that he acceded to the request on the belief that this was in accordance with Jimenez’s wishes; and
that as a result, almost 100% of Clarion’s ownership was transferred in the name of Geraldine Antonio.

Atty. Francisco also claimed that, thereafter, complainant tasked him to talk to prospective buyers and to negotiate
the sale of the Forbes property until it was sold for ₱118,000,000.00; that Marcel and complainant led him to believe
that Jimenez had knowledge of the sale as they were in constant communication with him; that all these
representations, however, turned out to be false when Jimenez returned tothe Philippines and discovered that the
proceeds of the sale were coursed through other corporations set up by complainant and her sister; that Jimenez
likewise learned of the successive sale of his other properties, including Meridian Telekoms Inc., by the members of
his family; and that this led to the filing of the estafa case against the complainant and the others. As a witness to
the fraud committed against Jimenez, Atty. Francisco executed the affidavit narrating the facts and circumstances
surrounding the said transactions.

Atty. Francisco mainly argued thathe violated neither the rule on disclosures of privileged communication nor the
proscription against representing conflicting interests, on the ground that complainant was not his client. He was the
lawyer of Jimenez and the legal counsel of Clarion, but never of the complainant. He might have assisted her in
some matters, but these were all under the notion that Jimenez had given him authority to do so. Further, though he
acted as legal counsel for Clarion, no attorney-client relationship between him and complainant was formed, as a
corporation has a separate and distinct personality from its shareholders. While he admitted that the legal
documentation for the transfer of shares and the sale of the Forbes property were prepared by him and notarized by
the members of his law firm, he averred that these acts were performed in his capacity as the corporate secretary
and legal counsel ofClarion, and not as a lawyer of complainant. Therefore, he served no conflicting interests
because it was not a "former client" and a "subsequent client" who were the opposing parties in litigation.

He opined that assuming that complainant was indeed his client, the rule on privileged communication does not
apply to his case. Here, complainant failed to allege, muchless prove, the requisites for the application of the
privilege. When Atty. Francisco denied being her lawyer, the complainant should have established, by clear and
convincing evidence, that a lawyer-client relationship indeed existed between them. Complainant failed to do this.

Arguing that the execution of his affidavit in the estafa case was but a truthful narration of facts by a witness, Atty.
Francisco cited Gonzaga v. Cañete,9 where the Court ruled that "the fact that one of the witnesses for the defendant
had been formerly the lawyer for the defendant in this suit was no ground for rejecting his testimony." In this case,
he merely attested to the fraudulent acts of complainant, in the course of which, he defended and served Jimenez
as a client. This was likewise pursuant to the rule that unlawful and illegal motives and purposes were not covered
by the privilege. It was just unfortunate that he fell for the ploy of complainant.

The Findings of the Investigating Commissioner

In the Commissioner’s Report,10 dated November 7, 2011, the Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Jose I. dela Rama,
Jr. (Investigating Commissioner),found Atty. Francisco guilty of violations of the CPR and recommended that he be
suspended for one (1) year from the practice of law. Initially, the Investigating Commissioner noted that the
subsequent affidavit of desistance executed by Jimenez in the estafa case did not affect the investigation conducted
by the CBD as it was not an ordinary court which accepted compromises or withdrawals of cases. After weighing on
the claims of the parties, the Investigating Commissioner concluded that nothing in the records would show that a
lawyer-client relationship existed between Atty. Francisco and Jimenez.11 The circumstances would show that Atty.
Francisco was an original incorporator and shareholder of Clarion. He was also the legal counsel and corporate
secretary of the said corporation, the articles of incorporation of which did not include Jimenez as an original
incorporator. He became a stockholder only in 2001, when Jimenez acquired shares from Thomas Chua and
Teresita Alsua. Jimenez’s participation in Clarion affairs again stopped when he assigned the entirety of his shares
in favor of complainant.

Granting that Jimenez really owned 100% of Clarion as alluded to by Atty. Francisco, the report stated that it would
appear that the latter permitted misrepresentations as to Clarion’s ownership to be reported to the SEC through its
GIS. The Investigating Commissioner also pointed out Atty. Francisco’s clear admission that the transfer of shares
within Clarion were "without any consideration," ran counter to the deeds of assignment that he again admittedly
executed as corporate counsel. Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan and undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property, which displayed his unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and
deceitful conduct in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. Further, when he executed the affidavit containing allegations
against the interest of Clarion and complainant, the Investigating Commissioner held that Atty. Francisco violated
the rule on privileged communication and engaged in an act that constituted representation of conflicting interests in
violation of Canons 15 and 21 of the CPR.

In its January 3, 2013 Resolution,12 the IBP-BOG adopted and approved, in toto, the findings and recommendation
of the CBD against Atty. Francisco.

The respondent received a copy of the said resolution on March 26, 2013 and moved for its reconsideration.13

Atty. Francisco appealed to the compassion of the IBP-BOG, reasoning out that the penalty of suspension of one (1)
year is too severe considering that in his more than three decades of practice, he had never been involved in any
act that would warrant the imposition of disciplinary action upon him. It was only in 2007, when his client, Jimenez,
experienced a difficult crisis involving his children and common-law partner that he experienced a major upheaval in
his professional life. He apologized for his not being too circumspect in dealing with the relatives of Jimenez.

As to the charges against him, Atty. Francisco reiterated that his participation in the execution of the documents
pertaining to the sale of the Forbes property were all connected to his capacity as Clarion’s corporate secretary and
legal counsel, not to mention his ties with his client and friend, Jimenez. He admitted that he owed fidelity to Clarion
and Jimenez, but denied that this duty extended to the incorporators and shareholders of Clarion. Thus, when
complainant sought advice in her capacity as a shareholder in Clarion, no fiduciary duty arose on his part. In his own
words, Atty. Francisco insisted that "Carol is not Clarion and vice versa." 14

Attached to Atty. Francisco’s motion for reconsideration was an affidavit executed by Jimenez, stating that he had
retained the legal services of Atty. Francisco since 1999. Espousing Atty. Francisco’s defenses, Jimenez asserted
that Atty. Francisco’s law firm was in charge of all the companies he owned in the Philippines.He directed Atty.
Francisco to execute all the documentation to show his ownership of these companies, including Clarion. These
documents were in the possession of complainant for safekeeping. When Jimenez ran for Congress in 2001,Atty.
Francisco personally assisted him in the filing ofhis certificate of candidacy and the proceedings before the electoral
tribunals. While he was in prison in the United States, it was Atty. Francisco who visited and told him that his
children, Myla and Marcel, were then facilitating the sale of one of his companies, Meridian Telekoms, Inc., without
his knowledge. He asked Atty. Francisco to keep quiet about his children’s betrayal and to wait until he could go
home. When he filed the criminal cases against his children and complainant, the latter even filed a frivolous
kidnapping case against Atty. Francisco. According to Jimenez, the people who committed crimes against him were
now exhausting all possible means to keep Atty. Francisco silent and to prevent the latter from performing his duties
as a lawyer.

In its March 22, 2014 Resolution,15 the IBP-BOG denied the respondent’s motion for reconsideration.

No petition for review was filed with the Court.

The Court’s Ruling

Violations of Canons 1 and 10

of the CPR and the Lawyer’s Oath

Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 of the CPR provide:

CANON 1 – A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.0 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

Canon 1 clearly mandates the obedience of every lawyer to laws and legal processes. To the best of his ability, a
lawyer is expected to respect and abide by the law and, thus, avoid any act or omission that is contrary thereto. A
lawyer’s personal deference to the law not only speaks of his character but it also inspires respect and obedience
tothe law, on the part of the public.

Rule 1.0, on the other hand, states the norm of conduct to be observed by all lawyers.

Any act or omission that is contraryto, or prohibited or unauthorized by, or in defiance of, disobedient to, or
disregards the law is "unlawful." "Unlawful" conduct does not necessarily imply the element of criminality although
the concept is broad enough to include such element.16 To be "dishonest" means the disposition to lie, cheat,
deceive, defraud or betray; be unworthy; lacking in integrity, honesty, probity, integrity in principle, fairness and
straight forwardness17 while conduct that is "deceitful" means the proclivity for fraudulent and deceptive
misrepresentation, artifice or device that is used upon another who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon.18

Membership in the legal profession is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in law, but also known to
possess good moral character. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach, inorder to promote the public’s faith in the legal profession. 19 "To say that lawyers must at all times
uphold and respect the law is to state the obvious, but such statement can never be over emphasized. Considering
that, of all classes and professions, [lawyers are] most sacredly bound to uphold the law, it is imperative that they
live by the law."20

When Atty. Francisco was admitted to the Bar, he also took an oath to "obey the laws," "do no falsehood," and
conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and discretion.21

In the facts obtaining in this case, Atty. Francisco clearly violated the canons and his sworn duty. He is guilty of
engaging in dishonest and deceitful conduct when he admitted to having allowed his corporate client, Clarion, to
actively misrepresent to the SEC, the significant matters regarding its corporate purpose and subsequently, its
corporate shareholdings. In the documents submitted to the SEC, such as the deeds of assignment and the GIS,
Atty. Francisco, in his professional capacity, feigned the validity of these transfers of shares, making it appear that
these were done for consideration when, in fact, the said transactions were fictitious, albeit upon the alleged orders
of Jimenez. The Investigating Commissioner was correct in pointing out that this ran counter to the deeds of
assignment which he executed as corporate counsel. In his long practice as corporate counsel, it is indeed safe to
assume that Atty. Francisco is knowledgeable in the law on contracts, corporation law and the rules enforced by the
SEC. As corporate secretary of Clarion, it was his duty and obligation to register valid transfers of stocks.
Nonetheless, he chose to advance the interests of his clientele with patent disregard of his duties as a lawyer.
Worse, Atty. Francisco admitted to have simulated the loan entered into by Clarion and to have undervalued the
consideration of the effected sale of the Forbes property. He permitted this fraudulent ruse to cheat the government
of taxes. Unquestionably, therefore, Atty. Francisco participated in a series of grave legal infractions and was
content to have granted the requests of the persons involved.

Despite assertions that these were in accordance to Jimenez’s wishes, or pursuant to complainant’s
misrepresentations, the Court cannot turn a blind eye on Atty. Francisco’s act of drafting, or at the very least,
permitting untruthful statements to be embodied in public documents. If the Court allows this highly irregular practice
for the specious reason that lawyers are constrained to obey their clients’ flawed scheming and machinations, the
Court would, in effect, sanction wrongdoing and falsity. This would undermine the role of lawyers as officers of the
court.

Time and again, the Court has reminded lawyers that their support for the cause of their clients should never be
attained at the expense of truth and justice. While a lawyer owes absolute fidelity to the cause of his client, full
devotion to his genuine interest, and warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his rights, as well as the exertion
of his utmost learning and ability, he must do so only within the bounds of the law. It needs to be emphasized that
the lawyer's fidelity to his client must not be pursued at the expense of truth and justice, and mustbe held within the
bounds of reason and common sense. His responsibility to protect and advance the interests of his client does not
warranta course of action propelled by ill motives and malicious intentions. 22

In the same vein, Atty. Francisco’s admissions show that he lacks candor regarding his dealings. Canon 10 of the
CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court." Corollary thereto, Rule 10.0 of the
CPR provides that "a lawyer shall do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court, nor shall he mislead or
allow the Court to be misled by an artifice." Lawyers are officers of the court, called upon to assist in the
administration of justice. They act as vanguards of our legal system, protecting and upholding truth and the rule
oflaw. They are expected to act with honesty in all their dealings, especially with the court. 23

From the foregoing, Atty. Francisco clearly violated his duties as a lawyer embodied in the CPR, namely, to avoid
dishonest and deceitful conduct, (Rule 1.01, Canon 1) and to actwith candor, fairness and good faith (Rule 10.01,
Canon 10). Also, Atty. Franciso desecrated his solemn oath not to do any falsehood nor consent to the doing of the
same.

Rule on Conflicting Interests and

Disclosure of Privileged
Communication

With respect to Atty. Francisco’s alleged representation of conflicting interests and disclosure of privileged
communication, the Court deviates from the findings of the IBP-BOG.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the CPR provides that, "[a] lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written
consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts."24 "The relationship between a lawyer and his/her
client should ideallybe imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality
that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an
unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential
information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer,
for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions withthe client.
Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard isto avoid representing conflicting interests…" 25 Thus, even if lucrative fees
offered by prospective clients are at stake, a lawyer must decline professional employment if the same would trigger
a violation of the prohibition against conflict of interest.

In Quiambao v. Bamba,26 the Court discussed the application of the rule on conflict of interest in this wise:

In broad terms, lawyers are deemed to represent conflicting interests when, in behalf of one client, it is their duty to
contend for that which duty to another client requires them to oppose. Developments in jurisprudence have
particularized various tests to determine whether a lawyer’s conduct lies within this proscription. One test is whether
a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that
claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in
arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule.
Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full
discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or
double-dealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the
new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous
employment.

The proscription against representation of conflicting interest applies to a situation where the opposing parties are
present clients in the same actionor in an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the lawyer would not be called
upon to contend for one client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the other client, or that there would be no
occasion to use the confidential information acquired from one to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated. It is enough that the opposing parties in one case, one of whom would lose the suit, are
present clients and the nature or conditions of the lawyer’s respective retainers with each of them would affect the
performance of the duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.

From the foregoing, it is obvious that the rule on conflict of interests presupposes a lawyer-client relationship. The
purpose of the rule is precisely to protect the fiduciary nature of the ties between an attorney and his client.
Conversely, a lawyer may not be precluded from accepting and representing other clients on the ground of conflict
of interests, if the lawyer-client relationship does not exist in favor of a party in the first place.

In determining whether or not Atty. Francisco violated the rule on conflict of interests, a scrutiny of the parties’
submissions with the IBP reveals that the complainant failed to establish that she was a client of Atty. Francisco.

First, complainant’s claim of being Atty. Francisco’s client remains unsubstantiated, considering its detailed
refutation. All that the complaint alleged was that Atty. Francisco was Clarion’s legal counsel and that complainant
sought advice and requested documentation of several transfers of shares and the sale of the Forbes property. This
was only successful in showing that Atty. Francisco, indeed, drafted the documents pertaining to the transaction and
that he was retained as legal counsel of Clarion. There was no detailed explanation as to how she supposedly
engaged the services of Atty. Francisco as her personal counsel and as to what and how she communicated with
the latter anent the dealings she had entered into. With the complaint lacking in this regard, the unrebutted answer
made by Atty. Francisco, accompanied with a detailed narrative of his engagement as counsel of Jimenez and
Clarion, would have to prevail.

Second, there is a stark disparity inthe amount of narrative details presented by the parties. Atty. Francisco’s claim
thathe was the counsel of Clarion and Jimenez, and not of the complainant, was clearly established in a sworn
statement executed by Jimenez himself. Complainant’s evidence pales in comparison with her claims of being the
client of Atty. Francisco couched in general terms that lacked particularity of circumstances.

Third, noteworthy is the fact that complainant opted not to file a reply to Atty. Francisco’s answer. This could have
given her opportunity to present evidence showing their professional relationship. She also failed to appear during
the mandatory conference with the IBP-CBD without even updating her residential address on record. Her
participation in the investigation of the case apparently ended at its filing.

In suspension or disbarment proceedings, lawyers enjoy the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof
rests upon the complainant to clearly prove the allegations in the complaint by preponderant evidence.
Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section 1 of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses’ manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying, the nature of the facts towhich they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses’ interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in
the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.27

Markedly, Atty. Francisco could have prevented his entanglement with this fiasco among the members of Jimenez’s
family by taking an upfront and candid stance in dealing with Jimenez’s children and complainant. He could have
been staunch in reminding the latter that his tasks were performed in his capacity as legal counsel for Clarion and
Jimenez. Be that as it may, Atty. Francisco’s indiscretion does not detract the Court from finding that the totality of
evidence presented by the complainant miserably failed to discharge the burden of proving that Atty. Francisco was
her lawyer. At most, he served as the legal counsel of Clarion and, based on the affirmation presented, of Jimenez.
Suffice it to say, complainant failed to establish that Atty. Francisco committed a violation of the rule on conflict of
interests.

Consequently, the rule on lawyer-client privilege does not apply. In Mercado v. Vitriolo,28 the Court elucidated on the
factors essential to establish the existence of the said privilege, viz:

In fine, the factors are as follows:

(1) There exists an attorney-client relationship, or a prospective attorney-client relationship, and it is by reason of
this relationship that the client made the communication.

Matters disclosed by a prospective client to a lawyer are protected by the rule on privileged communication even if
the prospective client does not thereafter retain the lawyer or the latter declines the employment. The reason for this
is to make the prospective client free to discuss whatever he wishes with the lawyer without fear that what he tells
the lawyer will be divulged or used against him, and for the lawyer to be equally free to obtain information from the
prospective client. xxx

(2) The client made the communication in confidence.

The mere relation of attorney and client does not raise a presumption of confidentiality. The client must intend the
communication to be confidential.

A confidential communication refers to information transmitted by voluntary act of disclosure between attorney and
client in confidence and by means which, so far as the client is aware, discloses the information to no third person
other than one reasonably necessary for the transmission of the information or the accomplishment of the purpose
for which it was given.

Our jurisprudence on the matter rests on quiescent ground. Thus, a compromise agreement prepared by a lawyer
pursuant to the instruction of his client and delivered to the opposing party, an offer and counter-offer for settlement,
or a document given by a client to his counsel not in his professional capacity, are not privileged communications,
the element of confidentiality not being present.

(3) The legal advice must be sought from the attorney in his professional capacity.

The communication made by a client to his attorney must not be intended for mere information, but for the purpose
of seeking legal advice from his attorney as to his rights or obligations. The communication must have been
transmitted by a client to his attorney for the purpose of seeking legal advice.

If the client seeks an accounting service, or business or personal assistance, and not legal advice, the privilege
does not attach to a communication disclosed for such purpose.

[Emphases supplied]

Considering these factors in the case at bench, the Court holds that the evidence on record fails to demonstrate the
claims of complainant. As discussed, the complainant failed to establish the professional relationship between her
and Atty. Francisco. The records are further bereft of any indication that the "advice" regarding the sale of the
Forbes property was given to Atty. Francisco in confidence. Neither was there a demonstration of what she had
communicated to Atty. Francisco nor a recital of circumstances under which the confidential communication was
relayed. All that complaint alleged in her complainant was that "she sought legal advice from respondent in various
occasions."29 Considering that complainant failed to attend the hearings at the IBP, there was no testimony as to the
specific confidential information allegedly divulged by Atty. Francisco without her consent. It is, therefore, difficult, if
not impossible, to determine if there was any violation of the rule on privileged communication. As held in Mercado,
such confidential information is a crucial link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged communication
between attorney and client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney-client privilege.30 It cannot be gainsaid
then that complainant, who has the burden of proving that the privilege applies, failed in this regard.
 The Penalty

A member of the Bar may be penalized, even disbarred or suspended from his office as an attorney, for violating of
the lawyer’s oath and/or for breaching the ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the CPR, 31 for the practice of
law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who
possess good moral character.32 The appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the exercise of sound
judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.33

Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, a member of the Bar may be disbarred or suspended on
any of the following grounds: (1) deceit; (2) malpractice or other gross misconduct in office; (3) grossly immoral
conduct; (4) conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; (5) violation of the lawyer's oath; (6) willful disobedience
of any lawful order of a superior court; and (7) willful appearance as an attorney for a party without authority. A
lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for misconduct, whether in his professional or private capacity, which shows
him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor, or unworthy to continue as an officer of
the court.

While the Court finds no violation of the rule on conflict of interests and disclosure of privileged communication, the
acts of Atty. Francisco, in actively and passively allowing Clarion tomake untruthful representations to the SEC and
in other public documents, still constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney, for which a
suspension from the practice of law for six (6) months is warranted.

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Atty. Edgar B. Francisco GUILTY of violation of Canons 1 and 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility for which he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months,
effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a STERN WARNING that a commission of the same or similar offense in
the future will result in the imposition of a more severe penalty.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Edgar B. Francisco and furnished to the Office of the
Clerk of Court, the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, and all courts in the Philippines,
for their information and guidance.

Atty. Francisco is DIRECTED to inform the Court of the date of his receipt of this Decision so that the Court can
determine the reckoning point when his suspension shall take effect.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 378 March 30, 1962

JOSE G. MEJIA and EMILIA N. ABRERA, complainants,

vs.
FRANCISCO S. REYES, respondent.

PADILLA, J.:

This is a disbarment proceedings against attorney Francisco S. Reyes for malpractice.

On 27 September 1947, Francisco S. Reyes, a practicing lawyer, was appointed bank attorney and notary public for
the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank (Exhibit H), as follows:

Atty. Francisco S. Reyes

Baguio City, Mt. Province
(Thru: The Manager, Phil. National Bank
Baguio Branch) .

Sir:

Please be advised that you are hereby appointed as Bank Attorney and Notary Public of our Baguio Branch,
effective September 19, 1947, and as such you are to perform the following: .

1) To ratify documents covering bank transactions;

2) To represent the Bank in cases filed in the local courts when, in the opinion of the Government
Corporation Counsel, there is a necessity for an attorney for the purpose; and

3) To give legal advise on ordinary routinary matters to our Branch Manager thereat and sign
collection letters when so requested by the latter.

It is understood that you shall receive no regular compensation from the Bank but that you will be allowed to
collect fees authorized by the Notarial Law when ratifying documents and 5% of the amount of judgment in
cases where your appearance for the Bank is requested, if and when actually collected, which fees,
however, may be changed as circumstances may warrant. Furthermore, it is also understood that under this
appoinment,you are not entitled to any other form of compensation or privileges accorded to regularly
appointed employees of this Bank.

Yours very truly, .

(Sgd.) V. CARMONA
President

I AGREE:
(Sgd.) FRANCISCO S. REYES

In June 1955 while still holding such position his professional services were engaged by Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N.
Abrera, residents of Baguio City, to bring an action in court against the Philippine National Bank and the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation (now the Development Bank of the Philippines) as successor-in-interest of the
defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank for the cancellation of a mortgage on a parcel of land situated in Baguio City
recorded on their certificate of title No. 2499 (civil No. 532). On 28 June 1955 a complaint, signed by Attorney
Francisco S. Reyes for the law firm of Reyes and Cabato, was filed in the Court of First Instance of Baguio against
the two banks, praying that the sum in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 paid on 27 October 1944 by Jose G. Mejia
and Emilia N. Abrera to the Agricultural and Industrial Bank and received by the Philippines National Bank, Baguio
Branch, to pay the balance of real estate mortgage loan, be credited by the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation as
successor-in-interest of the defunct Agricultural and Industrial Bank and that the mortgage annotated on transfer
certificate of title No. 2499 be cancelled (Exhibit A). After trial, on 4 August 1956 the Court rendered judgment
declaring valid the payment in Japanese war notes of P2,693.53 on 27 October 1944 but crediting only the sum of
P67.34, Philippine currency, the equivalent value of P2,693.53 under the Ballantyne Schedule (Exhibit 8). On 31
August 1956 the Reyes and Cabato law firm filed a motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 9) and the Philippine National
Bank on 5 September 1956 (Exhibit 10), to which on 15 September 1956 the former filed a written objection (Exhibit
11). On 15 September 1956 the Court denied both motion for reconsideration (Exhibit 12). No appeal was taken by
either party.

In this administrative proceedings, the complainants Jose G. Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera allege that they had desired
to take an appeal from the judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Baguio but did not, upon the
respondent's advice; that thereafter for the first time they learned that the respondent was counsel and notary public
of the Baguio Branch of the Philippine National Bank; that his representing them against the Philippine National
Bank, in whose Baguio Branch he was bank attorney and notary public, without revealing to them such connection
with the Bank, constitutes malpractice; and pray this Court to disbar him.

In his answer filed on 2 March 1959 respondent Francisco S. Reyes avers that after a conference among the
complainants, attorney Federico L. Cabato and himself, they agreed not to appeal the judgment rendered by the
Court and, instead, to take advantage of the provisions of Republic Act No. 1286 that condoned interests accruing
on debts to the Government provided that the principal was paid on or before 31 December 1956; that all the time
he was handling their case the complainants knew his professional connection with the Baguio Branch of the
Philippine National Bank; that he worked hard with attorney Cabato on their case, for which he was paid by them a
meager sum of P90 as attorney fees; that he is not guilty of malpractice, because he was not a retainer lawyer of the
Philippine National Bank but represented it only in collection cases where he was paid 5% of any amount collected;
that the malpractice charge is just to harrass, embarrass and force him to pay the complainants' debt to the
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation; and praysthat the complaint be dismissed..

On 4 March 1959 the Court referred the administrative case to the City Attorney of Baguio for investigation, report
and recommendation. After conducting the investigation during which the parties presented their evidence, on 23
March 1960, Sixto A. Domondo, City Attorney of Baguio, rendered a report finding the respondent guilty of
malpractice and recommending reprimand.. 1äwphï1 .ñët

Lawyers are prohibited from representing conflicting interests in a case (Cantorne vs. Ducusin, 57 Phil. 23 and In re:
De la Rosa, 27 Phil. 258). The respondent's act of appearing and acting as counsel for the complainantsJose G.
Mejia and Emilia N. Abrera in the civil case against the Philippine National Bank, that had appointed him bank
attorney and notary public, constitutes malpractice. However, it does not appear satisfactorily proventhat during the
pendency of their case the complaints did not know of the respondents connection with the bank as attorney and
notary public. On the other hand, it appears that notwithstanding the letter dated 21 July 1955 written by Mr. L.D.
Herrera, manager of the BaguioBranch, quoting a part of a previous letter sent to him (Herrera) by attorney Ramon
B. de los Reyes, chief legal counsel of the Philippine National Bank, stating that —

We note that the complaint is signed by our Bank Attorney and Notary Public, Atty. Francisco S. Reyes, in
behalf of the Law Office of Reyes and Cabato. Needless to say, it is unethical for Atty. Reyes, who is
presently the attorney of the Bank, to represent the plaintiffs here whose interest are diametrically opposed
to those of the Bank. As this is certainly embarrassing both for Atty. Reyes and for the Bank, it is requested
that you please take this matter with Atty. Reyes with the end in view of advising him to desist from
representing the plaintiffs in this case, otherwise, we will be compelled, much to our regret, to recommend
severance of his official connection with this Bank,.

which shows that the Philippine National Bank knew that the respondent was appearing as counsel for the
complainants, yet it did not revoke or cancel his appointment as bank attorney and notary public; that in the civil
case the respondent did not appear as counsel for the Bank which was represented by attorneys Ramon B. de los
Reyes and Nemesio P. Libunao; that no appeal was taken from the judgment rendered by the Court of First
Instance of Baguio, because the complainants had chosen to pay the principal of their loan on or before 31
December 1956 in order that the interests thereon be condoned as provided for in Republic Act No. 1286 (Exhibits
13 to 17); and that the respondent was deeply devoted to his duties as counsel for the complainants and collected a
very small attorney's fees of P90, the malpractice committed by the respondent is not so serious. He is just
admonished and warned not to repeat it.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 115439-41 July 16, 1997

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, MANSUETO V. HONRADA, CEFERINO S. PAREDES, JR. and GENEROSO
S. SANSAET, respondents.

REGALADO, J.:

Through the special civil action for certiorari at bar, petitioner seeks the annulment of the resolution of respondent
Sandiganbayan, promulgated on December 22, 1993, which denied petitioner's motion for the discharge of
respondent Generoso S. Sansaet to be utilized as a state witness, and its resolution of March 7, 1994 denying the
motion for reconsideration of its preceding disposition.1

The records show that during the dates material to this case, respondent Honrada was the Clerk of Court and Acting
Stenographer of the First Municipal Circuit Trial Court, San Francisco-Bunawan-Rosario in Agusan del Sur.
Respondent Paredes was successively the Provincial Attorney of Agusan del Sur, then Governor of the same
province, and is at present a Congressman. Respondent Sansaet was a practicing attorney who served as counsel
for Paredes in several instances pertinent to the criminal charges involved in the present recourse.

The same records also represent that sometime in 1976, respondent Paredes applied for a free patent over Lot No.
3097-A, Pls-67 of the Rosario Public Land Subdivision Survey. His application was approved and, pursuant to a free
patent granted to him, an original certificate of title was issued in his favor for that lot which is situated in
the poblacion of San Francisco, Agusan del Sur.

However, in 1985, the Director of Lands filed an action2 for the cancellation of respondent Paredes' patent and
certificate of title since the land had been designated and reserved as a school site in the aforementioned
subdivision survey. The trial court rendered judgment3 nullifying said patent and title after finding that respondent
Paredes had obtained the same through fraudulent misrepresentations in his application. Pertinently, respondent
Sansaet served as counsel of Paredes in that civil case.4

Consequent to the foregoing judgment of the trial court, upon the subsequent complaint of the Sangguniang Bayan
and the preliminary investigation conducted thereon, an information for perjury5 was filed against respondent
Paredes in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.6 On November 27, 1985, the Provincial Fiscal was, however, directed
by the Deputy Minister of Justice to move for the dismissal of the case on the ground inter alia of prescription, hence
the proceedings were terminated.7 In this criminal case, respondent Paredes was likewise represented by
respondent Sansaet as counsel.

Nonetheless, respondent Sansaet was thereafter haled before the Tanodbayan for preliminary investigation on the
charge that, by using his former position as Provincial Attorney to influence and induce the Bureau of Lands officials
to favorably act on his application for free patent, he had violated Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended. For the third time, respondent Sansaet was Paredes' counsel of record therein.

On August 29, 1988, the Tanodbayan, issued a resolution8 recommending the criminal prosecution of respondent
Paredes. Atty. Sansaet, as counsel for his aforenamed co-respondent, moved for reconsideration and, because of
its legal significance in this case, we quote some of his allegations in that motion:
 . . . respondent had been charged already by the complainants before the Municipal Circuit Court of
San Francisco, Agusan del Sur, went to jail on detention in 1984 under the same set of facts and the
same evidence . . . but said case after arraignment, was ordered dismissed by the court upon
recommendation of the Department of Justice. Copy of the dismissal order, certificate of
arraignment and the recommendation of the Department of Justice are hereto attached for ready
reference; thus the filing of this case will be a case of double jeopardy for respondent herein . .
. 9 (Emphasis supplied.)

A criminal case was subsequently filed with the Sandiganbayan 10 charging respondent Paredes with a violation of
Section 3 (a) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. However, a motion to quash filed by the defense was later
granted in respondent court's resolution of August 1, 1991 11 and the case was dismissed on the ground of
prescription.

On January 23, 1990, one Teofilo Gelacio, a taxpayer who had initiated the perjury and graft charges against
respondent Paredes, sent a letter to the Ombudsman seeking the investigation of the three respondents herein for
falsification of public documents. 12 He claimed that respondent Honrada, in conspiracy with his herein co-
respondents, simulated and certified as true copies certain documents purporting to be a notice of arraignment,
dated July 1, 1985, and transcripts of stenographic notes supposedly taken during the arraignment of Paredes on
the perjury charge. 13 These falsified documents were annexed to respondent Paredes' motion for reconsideration of
the Tanodbayan resolution for the filing of a graft charge against him, in order to support his contention that the
same would constitute double jeopardy.

In support of his claim, Gelacio attached to his letter a certification that no notice of arraignment was ever received
by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Agusan del Sur in connection with that perjury case; and a certification of
Presiding Judge Ciriaco Ariño that said perjury case in his court did not reach the arraignment stage since action
thereon was suspended pending the review of the case by the Department of Justice. 14

Respondents filed their respective counter-affidavits, but Sansaet subsequently discarded and repudiated the
submissions he had made in his counter-affidavit. In a so-called Affidavit of Explanations and
Rectifications, 15 respondent Sansaet revealed that Paredes contrived to have the graft case under preliminary
investigation dismissed on the ground of double jeopardy by making it appear that the perjury case had been
dismissed by the trial court after he had been arraigned therein.

For that purpose, the documents which were later filed by respondent Sansaet in the preliminary investigation were
prepared and falsified by his co-respondents in this case in the house of respondent Paredes. To evade
responsibility for his own participation in the scheme, he claimed that he did so upon the instigation and inducement
of respondent Paredes. This was intended to pave the way for his discharge as a government witness in the
consolidated cases, as in fact a motion therefor was filed by the prosecution pursuant to their agreement.

Withal, in a resolution 16 dated February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman approved the filing of falsification charges
against all the herein private respondents. The proposal for the discharge of respondent Sansaet as a state witness
was rejected by the Ombudsman on this evaluative legal position:

. . . Taking his explanation, it is difficult to believe that a lawyer of his stature, in the absence of
deliberate intent to conspire, would be unwittingly induced by another to commit a crime. As counsel
for the accused in those criminal cases, Atty. Sansaet had control over the case theory and the
evidence which the defense was going to present. Moreover, the testimony or confession of Atty.
Sansaet falls under the mantle of privileged communication between the lawyer and his client which
may be objected to, if presented in the trial.

The Ombudsman refused to reconsider that resolution 17 and, ostensibly to forestall any further controversy, he
decided to file separate informations for falsification of public documents against each of the herein respondents.
Thus, three criminal cases, 18 each of which named one of the three private respondents here as the accused
therein, were filed in the graft court. However, the same were consolidated for joint trial in the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan.

As stated at the outset, a motion was filed by the People on July 27, 1993 for the discharge of respondent Sansaet
as a state witness. It was submitted that all the requisites therefor, as provided in Section 9, Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court, were satisfied insofar as respondent Sansaet was concerned. The basic postulate was that, except for the
eyewitness testimony of respondent Sansaet, there was no other direct evidence to prove the confabulated
falsification of documents by respondents Honrada and Paredes.

Unfortunately for the prosecution, respondent Sandiganbayan, hewing to the theory of the attorney-client privilege
adverted to by the Ombudsman and invoked by the two other private respondents in their opposition to the
prosecution's motion, resolved to deny the desired discharge on this ratiocination:

From the evidence adduced, the opposition was able to establish that client and lawyer relationship
existed between Atty. Sansaet and Ceferino Paredes, Jr., before, during and after the period alleged
in the information. In view of such relationship, the facts surrounding the case, and other confidential
matter must have been disclosed by accused Paredes, as client, to accused Sansaet, as his lawyer
in his professional capacity. Therefore, the testimony of Atty. Sansaet on the facts surrounding the
offense charged in the information is privileged. 19

Reconsideration of said resolution having been likewise denied, 20 the controversy was elevated to this Court by the
prosecution in an original action for the issuance of the extraordinary writ of certiorari against respondent
Sandiganbayan.

The principal issues on which the resolution of the petition at bar actually turns are therefore (1) whether or not the
projected testimony of respondent Sansaet, as proposed state witness, is barred by the attorney-client privilege; and
(2) whether or not, as a consequence thereof, he is eligible for discharge to testify as a particeps criminis.

As already stated, respondent Sandiganbayan ruled that due to the lawyer-client relationship which existed between
herein respondents Paredes and Sansaet during the relevant periods, the facts surrounding the case and other
confidential matters must have been disclosed by respondent Paredes, as client, to respondent Sansaet, as his
lawyer. Accordingly, it found "no reason to discuss it further since Atty. Sansaet cannot be presented as a witness
against accused Ceferino S. Paredes, Jr. without the latter's consent." 21

The Court is of a contrary persuasion. The attorney-client privilege cannot apply in these cases, as the facts thereof
and actuations of both respondents therein constitute an exception to the rule. For a clearer understanding of that
evidential rule, we will first sweep aside some distracting mental cobwebs in these cases.

1. It may correctly be assumed that there was a confidential communication made by Paredes to Sansaet in
connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 17791-93 for falsification before respondent court, and this may reasonably be
expected since Paredes was the accused and Sansaet his counsel therein. Indeed, the fact that Sansaet was called
to witness the preparation of the falsified documents by Paredes and Honrada was as eloquent a communication, if
not more, than verbal statements being made to him by Paredes as to the fact and purpose of such falsification. It is
significant that the evidentiary rule on this point has always referred to "any communication," without distinction or
qualification. 22

In the American jurisdiction from which our present evidential rule was taken, there is no particular mode by which a
confidential communication shall be made by a client to his attorney. The privilege is not confined to verbal or written
communications made by the client to his attorney but extends as well to information communicated by the client to
the attorney by other means. 23

Nor can it be pretended that during the entire process, considering their past and existing relations as counsel and
client and, further, in view of the purpose for which such falsified documents were prepared, no word at all passed
between Paredes and Sansaet on the subject matter of that criminal act. The clincher for this conclusion is the
undisputed fact that said documents were thereafter filed by Sansaet in behalf of Paredes as annexes to the motion
for reconsideration in the preliminary investigation of the graft case before the Tanodbayan. 24 Also, the acts and
words of the parties during the period when the documents were being falsified were necessarily confidential since
Paredes would not have invited Sansaet to his house and allowed him to witness the same except under conditions
of secrecy and confidence.

2. It is postulated that despite such complicity of Sansaet at the instance of Paredes in the criminal act for which the
latter stands charged, a distinction must be made between confidential communications relating to past crimes
already committed, and future crimes intended to be committed, by the client. Corollarily, it is admitted that the
announced intention of a client to commit a crime is not included within the confidences which his attorney is bound
to respect. Respondent court appears, however, to believe that in the instant case it is dealing with a past crime,
and that respondent Sansaet is set to testify on alleged criminal acts of respondents Paredes and Honrada that
have already been committed and consummated.

The Court reprobates the last assumption which is flawed by a somewhat inaccurate basis. It is true that by now,
insofar as the falsifications to be testified to in respondent court are concerned, those crimes were necessarily
committed in the past. But for the application of the attorney-client privilege, however, the period to be considered is
the date when the privileged communication was made by the client to the attorney in relation to either a crime
committed in the past or with respect to a crime intended to be committed in the future. In other words, if the client
seeks his lawyer's advice with respect to a crime that the former has theretofore committed, he is given the
protection of a virtual confessional seal which the attorney-client privilege declares cannot be broken by the attorney
without the client's consent. The same privileged confidentiality, however, does not attach with regard to a crime
which a client intends to commit thereafter or in the future and for purposes of which he seeks the lawyer's advice.

Statements and communications regarding the commission of a crime already committed, made by a party who
committed it, to an attorney, consulted as such, are privileged communications. Contrarily, the unbroken stream of
judicial dicta is to the effect that communications between attorney and client having to do with the
client's contemplated criminal acts, or in aid or furtherance thereof, are not covered by the cloak of
privileges ordinarily existing in reference to communications between attorney and client. 25 (Emphases supplied.)

3. In the present cases, the testimony sought to be elicited from Sansate as state witness are the communications
made to him by physical acts and/or accompanying words of Parades at the time he and Honrada, either with the
active or passive participation of Sansaet, were about to falsify, or in the process of falsifying, the documents which
were later filed in the Tanodbayan by Sansaet and culminated in the criminal charges now pending in respondent
Sandiganbayan. Clearly, therefore, the confidential communications thus made by Paredes to Sansaet were for
purposes of and in reference to the crime of falsification which had not yet been committed in the past by Paredes
but which he, in confederacy with his present co-respondents, later committed. Having been made for purposes of
a future offense, those communications are outside the pale of the attorney-client privilege.

4. Furthermore, Sansaet was himself a conspirator in the commission of that crime of falsification which he, Paredes
and Honrada concocted and foisted upon the authorities. It is well settled that in order that a communication
between a lawyer and his client may be privileged, it must be for a lawful purpose or in furtherance of a lawful end.
The existence of an unlawful purpose prevents the privilege from attaching. 26 In fact, it has also been pointed out to
the Court that the "prosecution of the honorable relation of attorney and client will not be permitted under the guise
of privilege, and every communication made to an attorney by a client for a criminal purpose is a conspiracy or
attempt at a conspiracy which is not only lawful to divulge, but which the attorney under certain circumstances may
be bound to disclose at once in the interest of justice." 27

It is evident, therefore, that it was error for respondent Sandiganbayan to insist that such unlawful communications
intended for an illegal purpose contrived by conspirators are nonetheless covered by the so-called mantle of
privilege. To prevent a conniving counsel from revealing the genesis of a crime which was later committed pursuant
to a conspiracy, because of the objection thereto of his conspiring client, would be one of the worst travesties in the
rules of evidence and practice in the noble profession of law.

II

On the foregoing premises, we now proceed to the consequential inquiry as to whether respondent Sansaet
qualifies, as a particeps criminis, for discharge from the criminal prosecution in order to testify for the State.
Parenthetically, respondent court, having arrived at a contrary conclusion on the preceding issue, did not pass upon
this second aspect and the relief sought by the prosecution which are now submitted for our resolution in the petition
at bar. We shall, however, first dispose likewise of some ancillary questions requiring preludial clarification.

1. The fact that respondent Sandiganbayan did not fully pass upon the query as to whether or not respondent
Sansaet was qualified to be a state witness need not prevent this Court from resolving that issue as prayed for by
petitioner. Where the determinative facts and evidence have been submitted to this Court such that it is in a position
to finally resolve the dispute, it will be in the pursuance of the ends of justice and the expeditious administration
thereof to resolve the case on the merits, instead of remanding it to the trial court. 28
2. A reservation is raised over the fact that the three private respondents here stand charged in three separate
informations. It will be recalled that in its resolution of February 24, 1992, the Ombudsman recommended the filing
of criminal charges for falsification of public documents against all the respondents herein. That resolution was
affirmed but, reportedly in order to obviate further controversy, one information was filed against each of the three
respondents here, resulting in three informations for the same acts of falsification.

This technicality was, however, sufficiently explained away during the deliberations in this case by the following
discussion thereof by Mr. Justice Davide, to wit:

Assuming no substantive impediment exists to block Sansaet's discharge as state witness, he can,
nevertheless, be discharged even if indicted under a separate information. I suppose the three cases
were consolidated for joint trial since they were all raffled to the Second Division of the
Sandiganbayan. Section 2, Rule XV of the Revised Rules of the Sandiganbayan allows
consolidation in only one Division of cases arising from the same incident or series of incidents, or
involving common questions of law and fact. Accordingly, for all legal intents and purposes, Sansaet
stood as co-accused and he could be discharged as state witness. It is of no moment that he was
charged separately from his co-accused. While Section 9 of Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure uses the word jointly, which was absent in the old provision, the consolidated and joint
trial has the effect of making the three accused co-accused or joint defendants, especially
considering that they are charged for the same offense. In criminal law, persons indicted for the
same offense and tried together are called joint defendants.

As likewise submitted therefor by Mr. Justice Francisco along the same vein, there having been a consolidation of
the three cases, the several actions lost their separate identities and became a single action in which a single
judgment is rendered, the same as if the different causes of action involved had originally been joined in a single
action. 29

Indeed, the former provision of the Rules referring to the situation "(w)hen two or more persons are charged with the
commission of a certain offense" was too broad and indefinite; hence the word "joint" was added to indicate the
identity of the charge and the fact that the accused are all together charged therewith substantially in the same
manner in point of commission and time. The word "joint" means "common to two or more," as "involving the united
activity of two or more," or "done or produced by two or more working together," or "shared by or affecting two or
more. 30 Had it been intended that all the accused should always be indicted in one and the same information, the
Rules could have said so with facility, but it did not so require in consideration of the circumstances obtaining in the
present case and the problems that may arise from amending the information. After all, the purpose of the Rule can
be achieved by consolidation of the cases as an alternative mode.

2. We have earlier held that Sansaet was a conspirator in the crime of falsification, and the rule is that since in a
conspiracy the act of one is the act of all, the same penalty shall be imposed on all members of the conspiracy.
Now, one of the requirements for a state witness is that he "does not appear to be the most guilty." 31 not that he
must be the least guilty 32 as is so often erroneously framed or submitted. The query would then be whether an
accused who was held guilty by reason of membership in a conspiracy is eligible to be a state witness.

To be sure, in People vs. Ramirez, et al. 33 we find this obiter:

It appears that Apolonio Bagispas was the real mastermind. It is believable that he persuaded the
others to rob Paterno, not to kill him for a promised fee. Although he did not actually commit any of
the stabbings, it was a mistake to discharge Bagispas as a state witness. All the perpetrators of the
offense, including him, were bound in a conspiracy that made them equally guilty.

However, prior thereto, in People vs. Roxas, et al., 34 two conspirators charged with five others in three separate
informations for multiple murder were discharged and used as state witnesses against their confederates.
Subsequent thereto, in Lugtu, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 35 one of the co-conspirators was discharged from
the information charging him and two others with the crime of estafa. The trial court found that he was not the most
guilty as, being a poor and ignorant man, he was easily convinced by his two co-accused to open the account with
the bank and which led to the commission of the crime.
On appeal, this Court held that the finding of respondent appellate court that Lugtu was just as guilty as his co-
accused, and should not be discharged as he did not appear to be not the most guilty, is untenable. In other words,
the Court took into account the gravity or nature of the acts committed by the accused to be discharged compared to
those of his co-accused, and not merely the fact that in law the same or equal penalty is imposable on all of them.

Eventually, what was just somehow assumed but not explicity articulated found expression in People vs. Ocimar, et
al., 36 which we quote in extenso:

Ocimar contends that in the case at bar Bermudez does not satisfy the conditions for the discharge of a co-accused
to become a state witness. He argues that no accused in a conspiracy can lawfully be discharged and utilized as a
state witness, for not one of them could satisfy the requisite of appearing not to be the most guilty. Appellant asserts
that since accused Bermudez was part of the conspiracy, he is equally guilty as the others.

We do not agree. First, there is absolute necessity for the testimony of Bermudez. For, despite the presentation of
four (4) other witnesses, none of them could positively identify the accused except Bermudez who was one of those
who pulled the highway heist which resulted not only in the loss of cash, jewelry and other valuables, but even the
life of Capt. Cañeba, Jr. It was in fact the testimony of Bermudez that clinched the case for the prosecution. Second,
without his testimony, no other direct evidence was available for the prosecution to prove the elements of the crime.
Third, his testimony could be, as indeed it was, substantially corroborated in its material points as indicated by the
trial court in its well-reasoned decision. Fourth, he does not appear to be the most guilty. As the evidence reveals,
he was only invited to a drinking party without having any prior knowledge of the plot to stage a highway robbery.
But even assuming that he later became part of the conspiracy, he does not appear to be the most guilty. What the
law prohibits is that the most guilty will be set free while his co-accused who are less guilty will be sent to jail. And by
"most guilty" we mean the highest degree of culpability in terms of participation in the commission of the offense and
not necessarily the severity of the penalty imposed. While all the accused may be given the same penalty by reason
of conspiracy, yet one may be considered least guilty if We take into account his degree of participation in the
perpetration of the offense. Fifth, there is no evidence that he has at any time been convicted of any offense
involving moral turpitude.

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, We agree with the observations of the Solicitor General that the rule on the discharge of an
accused to be utilized as state witness clearly looks at his actual and individual participation in the
commission of the crime, which may or may not have been perpetrated in conspiracy with the other
accused. Since Bermudez was not individually responsible for the killing committed on the occasion
of the robbery except by reason of conspiracy, it cannot be said then that Bermudez appears to be
the most guilty. Hence, his discharge to be a witness for the government is clearly warranted.
(Emphasis ours.)

The rule of equality in the penalty to be imposed upon conspirators found guilty of a criminal offense is
based on the concurrence of criminal intent in their minds and translated into concerted physical action
although of varying acts or degrees of depravity. Since the Revised Penal Code is based on the classical
school of thought, it is the identity of the mens rea which is considered the predominant consideration and,
therefore, warrants the imposition of the same penalty on the consequential theory that the act of one is
thereby the act of all.

Also, this is an affair of substantive law which should not be equated with the procedural rule on the
discharge of particeps criminis. This adjective device is based on other considerations, such as the need for
giving immunity to one of them in order that not all shall escape, and the judicial experience that the candid
admission of an accused regarding his participation is a guaranty that he will testify truthfully. For those
reasons, the Rules provide for certain qualifying criteria which, again, are based on judicial experience
distilled into a judgmental policy.

III

The Court is reasonably convinced, and so holds, that the other requisites for the discharge of respondent Sansaet
as a state witness are present and should have been favorably appreciated by the Sandiganbayan.
Respondent Sansaet is the only cooperative eyewitness to the actual commission of the falsification charged in the
criminal cases pending before respondent court, and the prosecution is faced with the formidable task of
establishing the guilt of the two other co-respondents who steadfastly deny the charge and stoutly protest their
innocence. There is thus no other direct evidence available for the prosecution of the case, hence there is absolute
necessity for the testimony of Sansaet whose discharge is sought precisely for that purpose. Said respondent has
indicated his conformity thereto and has, for the purposes required by the Rules, detailed the substance of his
projected testimony in his Affidavit of Explanation and Rectifications.

His testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points by reputable witnesses, identified in the basic
petition with a digest of their prospective testimonies, as follows: Judge Ciriaco C. Ariño, Municipal Circuit Trial
Court in San Francisco, Agusan del Sur; Provincial Prosecutor and Deputized Ombudsman Prosecutor Claudio A.
Nistal; Teofilo Gelacio, private complainant who initiated the criminal cases through his letter-complaint; Alberto
Juvilan of the Sangguniang Bayan of San Fernando, Agusan del Sur, who participated in the resolution asking their
Provincial Governor to file the appropriate case against respondent Paredes, and Francisco Macalit, who obtained
the certification of non-arraignment from Judge Ariño.

On the final requirement of the Rules, it does not appear that respondent Sansaet has at any time been convicted of
any offense involving moral turpitude. Thus, with the confluence of all the requirements for the discharge of this
respondent, both the Special Prosecutor and the Solicitor General strongly urge and propose that he be allowed to
testify as a state witness.

This Court is not unaware of the doctrinal rule that, on this procedural aspect, the prosecution may propose but it is
for the trial court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, to determine the merits of the proposal and make the
corresponding disposition. It must be emphasized, however, that such discretion should have been exercised, and
the disposition taken on a holistic view of all the facts and issues herein discussed, and not merely on the sole issue
of the applicability of the attorney-client privilege.

This change of heart and direction respondent Sandiganbayan eventually assumed, after the retirement of two
members of its Second Division 37 and
the reconstitution thereof. In an inversely anticlimactic Manifestation and Comment 38 dated June 14, 1995, as
required by this Court in its resolution on December 5, 1994, the chairman and new members thereof 39 declared:

4) That the questioned Resolutions of December 22, 1993 and March 7, 1994 upon which the
Petition for Certiorari filed by the prosecution are based, was penned by Associate Justice Narciso
T. Atienza and concurred in by the undersigned and Associate Justice Augusto M. Amores;

5) That while the legal issues involved had been already discussed and passed upon by the Second
Division in the aforesaid Resolution, however, after going over the arguments submitted by the
Solicitor-General and re-assessing Our position on the matter, We respectfully beg leave of the
Honorable Supreme Court to manifest that We are amenable to setting aside the questioned
Resolutions and to grant the prosecution's motion to discharge accused Generoso Sansaet as state
witness, upon authority of the Honorable Supreme Court for the issuance of the proper Resolution to
that effect within fifteen (15) days from notice thereof.

WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is hereby granted SETTING ASIDE the impunged resolutions and
ORDERING that the present reliefs sought in these cases by petitioner be allowed and given due course by
respondent Sandiganbayan.

SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 396 July 31, 1964

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE DISBARMENT OF ATTORNEY EDUARDO M. TUASON. EMILIO
C. STA. MARIA, petitioner.

PAREDES, J.:

Sometime in June, 1955, respondent Atty. Eduardo M. Tuason represented petitioner Emilio C. Sta. Maria. and his
two partners Andres Guanzon and Fausto E. Chincuanco in prosecuting Civil Case No. 894, CFI of Pampanga,
entitled "Fausto E. Chincuanco, et al. v. Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo, et al", a collection case involving a promissory
note of P50,000.00. Defendant Enriqueta M. de Hidalgo was declared in default, and the Court rendered judgment
on October 8, 1955, ordering the defendant de Hidalgo to pay: —

(a) Plaintiffs the sum of P30,000.00 with interests thereon at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from
June 18, 1955, the date of the filing of the complaint, until the same shall have been fully paid, plus the sum
of P3,500.00 as plaintiffs' attorney's fees;

(b) Plaintiff Andres A. Guanzon the other sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for the injury caused to him in
his credit standing; and

(c) Plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco another sum of P3,000.00 as compensation for the injury caused to him in
his credit standing.

On December 9, 1955, a writ of execution was issued. Sufficient amount of money to satisfy the judgment, came
into the hands of the Provincial Sheriff of Pampanga. Respondent Tuason, on September 10, 1958, obtained from
the Sheriff, the amount of P22,930.64, which he (Tuason) applied in the following manner: (1) P10,000.00 for his
alleged attorney's fees; (2) P1,648.00 to supposed expenses of litigation, which he claimed to have advanced in the
prosecution of the case; and (3) the balance of P11,282.64, to plaintiff Fausto E. Chincuanco, his uncle.

Petitioner claims that respondent Tuason deprived him of his lawful share in the judgment which was P25,511.62;
that respondent was not entitled to P10,000.00 as attorney's fees because even the lower court awarded him only
P3,500.00; that the foregoing acts were done, without the prior knowledge and consent of petitioner.

Upon finding that the respondent withdrew the P22,930.64 from the Office of the Provincial Sheriff, complainant Sta.
Maria repaired to the office of Atty. Tuason and demanded the amount to be turned over to him, or to the Sheriff for
proper disposition by the Court; that upon failure of respondent to comply with any of the two things, contempt
proceedings were instituted against respondent Tuason. In view, however, of the claim of Tuason that he gave the
money to Guanzon and Chincuanco, petitioner filed with the CFI of Pampanga, Civil Case No. 1704, against said
Tuason, Guanzon and Chincuanco, for collection of his rightful share in the judgment in Civil Case No. 894.

Respondent, in his Answer, admitted having received the amounts in question from the Sheriff of Pampanga, and
disbursed the same in the manner stated by petitioner, but he denied that he obtained and disbursed the amounts,
without the knowledge and consent of the petitioner; the truth of the matter being that he was given full authority by
petitioner's partners (Guanzon and Chincuanco) to receive P10,000.00 for his services; that the two were the ones
who engaged his services in the prosecution of Civil Case No. 894, for their own behalf and in behalf of petitioner
himself; that he delivered the balance of the amount, to Chincuanco, who was the one who had actually retained his
services and who took charge of liquidating the accounts with his partners.
The matter was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General who made the following findings and
recommendations:

The foregoing evidence presented by the parties involves two issues, namely; (1) Whether the respondent
was in connivance with Fausto Chincuanco and Andres Guanzon in delivering to them the full amount of
P22,930.64 and thereby deprived the petitioner from getting his rightful share in the liquidation of assets of
the partnership and (2) whether the respondent was guilty of malpractice and gross misconduct in
withholding the amount of P10,000 as his attorney's fees and also the amount of P1,648 as alleged
expenses in the litigation.

The complainant in this case contends that the respondent committed malpractice in delivering the proceeds
of the judgment money to Fausto Chincuanco, his uncle, and Andres Guanzon, his close business associate
(p. 17, tsn, July 10, 1961; p. 6, rec.).

As to the first issue, the petitioner claims that he was unable to collect his rightful share in the liquidation of
the funds of the partnership as agreed upon by the partners (Exh. E, pp. 3-4, tsn, June 15, 1960) for which
reason, he had to file a civil case against his partners. He attributes this failure mainly to the respondent who
delivered the judgment money to Chincuanco, his partner, who disposed of the whole amount in the manner
already indicated earlier. While it is true that Fausto Chincuanco and Guanzon, the latter being the general
manager from the Sheriff (Exh. C, p. 14, rec.), there is no clear evidence presented to show that the
respondent connived with either Chincuanco or Guanzon on delivering the judgment money to them for the
purpose of depriving the complainant of his rightful share in the partnership. What the respondent did in this
case was to deliver the judgment money to the partnership through Chincuanco and Guanzons the latter
being the general manager. The proper action for the complainant was to demand his share from Guanzon,
the managing partner, or from Chincuanco, the other partner. This he did by filing a complaint in the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga (see Civil Case No. 1704, Exh. 2). In this case Atty. Eduardo Tuason, the herein
respondent, was included as defendant. A contempt proceeding was also filed by complainant, citing Atty.
Tuason and the Sheriff of Pampanga as respondents. It appears, however, that an amicable settlement was
finally agreed upon by the parties in this civil case resulting in a compromise agreement, duly approved by
the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, wherein the plaintiff waived all his claim against his other partners.
In said compromise agreement the plaintiff also agreed not to proceed with the contempt case he filed
against Atty. Tuason and the Sheriff of Pampanga (Exhs. 2, 3 and 5, folder of exhibits).

The issue, therefore, revolves more on the division of the partnership assets rather than on the right of the
complainant to compel the respondent to turn over to him part of the judgment money which respondent
applied as his attorney's fees and reimbursement for his expenses in connection with the litigation he
handled for the partners. Under the foregoing circumstances, the undersigned investigator is of the opinion
that the respondent Tuason has not committed any act that will constitute malpractice or gross misconduct
in office.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.1äwphï 1.ñët

As to the second issue, there is no dispute that the respondent collected the amount of P10,000 as
attorney's fees for a collection suit in the amount of P50,000.00 based on a promissory note. It appears that
since the defendant was declared in default, the case was terminated after one brief hearing. The
respondent also collected P1,648 as alleged expenses incurred in connection with the litigation. No
satisfactory evidence, however, was presented to show that the respondent actually spent that amount. On
the other hand, there was the undisputed evidence which shows that the case represented by the
respondent was terminated with one brief hearing after the defendant was declared in default. There is,
likewise, no dispute that said attorney's fees and litigation expenses were deducted from the judgment
money collected by the respondent from the Sheriff of Pampanga. This act of the respondent seems to be
irregular, if not suspicious, considering his close relationship with Mr. Chincuanco. Notwithstanding the
opinion of Mr. Guanzon, the amount of P10,000 for attorney's fees is, to our mind, also unreasonable under
the circumstances. It is to be noted in this connection that the respondent himself alleged in the complaint he
filed for the partnership that "the plaintiffs will incur for attorney's fees and expenses of the litigation P6,000"
(u 9, Rec.).
 Moreover, the circumstances of the case show that the respondent took advantage of the fact that he was a
nephew of Fausto Chincuanco and a close associate of Andres Guanzon in collecting his lawyer's fees.
Even at the time that the respondent was already representing the partnership, the complainant inquired
from Chincuanco about the respondent's fees. In reply Chincuanco said that he (Sta. Maria) should not
worry about it because the respondent is a nephew of his. On this assurance, the complainant could be said
to have assumed that the respondent would not collect an excessive amount, much less take advantage of
his relationship with one of the partners by retaining the funds, considering that the case was one of a
simple collection based on a promissory note. The act of the respondent in collecting P10,000 for attorney's
fees and alleged expenses he incurred in the litigation, aggravated the burden of the complainant who
claims that he was not given his due share in the distribution of the assets of the partnership as his two
partners were already in possession of the money. While it is true that the partners of the complainant
apparently acceded to the respondent's acts, it cannot be denied that the latter acted with indiscretion,
induced by his close relationship with Chincuanco to the prejudice of the complainant. In effect, respondent's
act constituted a retention of the funds of his client, an act of professional indiscretion bordering on
misbehaviour.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by
this Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts.
1äwphï 1.ñët

It may be stated, however, that the respondent may have felt justified in his acts, since they were done with
apparent acquiescence of his clients, Fausto Chincuanco and Andres Guanzon. Moreover, an amicable
settlement of all the suits filed by the herein complainant resulted in a compromise agreement, whereby the
complainant waived any and all claims against his partners and the respondent arising from the transactions
which are the subject matter of the controversy, as well as from the incidents thereof (Exh. 2, folder of
exhibits). While it may be said that this compromise agreement may not affect the misconduct of the
respondent as a member of the bar, at least, it cannot be denied that the complainant has, in effect,
condoned respondent's acts.

RECOMMENDATION

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully recommended that instead of a more severe penalty which
he would otherwise deserve, the respondent be reprimanded for professional indiscretion, with the warning
that a more severe penalty be imposed for a repetition of same or similar acts.

The report of the Solicitor General was duly set for hearing, by this Court. Respondent excepted from the
recommendation which called for the imposition of a reprimand. Respondent points out that the findings of the
Solicitor General did not warrant his recommendation, since he found that respondent "has not committed any act
that will constitute malpractice or gross misconduct in office." Respondent also claims that the filing of different
proceedings against him was simply intended to harass and embarrass him, because of petitioner's dissatisfaction
over the disposition by his partners, of the award in Civil Case No. 894.

After an overall consideration of the facts and circumstances surrounding the case, We find that the findings and
conclusions of the Solicitor General are supported by the evidence of record. The fact that the respondent has
placed his private and personal interest over and above that of his clients constitutes a breach of a lawyer's oath, to
say the least. Call it professional indiscretion or any other name, but the cold fact remains that the act, as found by
the Solicitor General, is not conducive to a healthy growth of the legal profession. The respondent is hereby
admonished that a repetition of similar acts will merit more drastic action.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts.
1äwphï1. ñët