Case Assigned to: Dennis Lazobert Castro

Case No: 4
Case Topic: Constitutionality of Section 13 of Act No. 3071 (Vacation Leave for Pregnant
Women)
Case: Pomar v. Fajardo
Case No.: G.R. No. L-22008
Date of Decision: November 3, 1924
Ponente: Johnson, J.

Facts:
Macaria Fajardo was an employee of La Flor de la Isabela, a Tobacco factory. She was granted a
vacation leave, by reason of her pregnancy, which commenced on the 16th of July 1923.
According to Fajardo, during that time, she was not given the salary due her in violation of the
provisions of Act No. 3071. Fajardo filed a criminal complaint based on Section 13 and 15 of
said Act against the manager of the tobacco Factory, Julio Pomar, herein defendant. The latter, on
the other hand, claims that the facts in the complaint did not constitute an offense and further
alleges that the aforementioned provisions of Act No. 3071 was unconstitutional. Section 13, Act
No. 3071 provides that, “Every person, firm or corporation owning or managing a factory, shop
or place of labor of any description shall be obliged to grant to any woman employed by it as
laborer who may be pregnant, thirty days vacation with pay before and another thirty days after
confinement: Provided, That the employer shall not discharge such laborer without just cause,
under the penalty of being required to pay to her wages equivalent to the total of two months
counting from the day of her discharge.” Section 15 of the same Act provides for the penalty of
any violation of section 13. The latter was enacted by the legislature in the exercise of its
supposed Police Power with the purpose of safeguarding the health of pregnant women laborers
in "factory, shop or place of labor of any description," and of insuring to them, to a certain
extent, reasonable support for one month before and one month after their delivery. The trial
court rendered a decision in favor of plaintiff, sentencing the defendant to pay the fine of fifty
pesos and in case of insolvency, to suffer subsidiary imprisonment. Hence, the case was raised to
the Court of Appeals which affirmed the former decision.

Issue:
Whether or not Section 13 of Act No. 3071 is unconstitutional.

Whether or not the promulgation of the questioned provision was a valid exercise of Police
Power.

Held:
The Supreme Court declared Section 13 of Act No. 3071 to be unconstitutional for being
violative or restrictive of the right of the people to freely enter into contracts for their affairs. It
has been decided several times, that the right to contract about one's affairs is a part of the liberty
of the individual, protected by the "due process of law" clause of the constitution. The
contracting parties may establish any agreements, terms, and conditions they may deem
advisable, provided they are not contrary to law, morals or public policy

The police power of the state is a very broad and expanding power. The police power may
encompass every law for the restraint and punishment of crimes, for the preservation of the
public peace, health, and morals. But that power cannot grow faster than the fundamental law of
the state, nor transcend or violate the express inhibition of the constitution. The Police Power is
subject to and is controlled by the paramount authority of the constitution of the state, and will
not be permitted to violate rights secured or guaranteed by the latter.