REFORMS IN THE EARLY MEIJI PERIOD (1868-1881)

The Meiji Period (1868-1912) brought about the rapid modernization of

Japanese economic, political and social institutions, which resulted in Japan
attaining the status of the leading country in Asia and a world economic and
political power by the 20th century. During the first half of the Meiji Period,
from 1868 to 1880, the Meiji leaders instituted numerous reforms to achieve
domestic stability, promote industrialization, improve education and establish
an effective government structure, including the promulgation of a
Constitution in 1889.

The Meiji Restoration was a little more than a coup d’etat. A relatively small
band of insurgents had toppled the Tokugawa bakufu and stated their intent
to restore direct imperial rule, but this was not likely to occur. Political
contenders at that time feared that the rebels from Satsuma and Choshu
would simply form a new bakufu and use the name of the emperor to rule
from a narrow base of power. The alternatives facing the new government
were either to maintain feudalism, shifting the hegemony from the Tokugawa
to some other clan, or form a coalition of clans or to establish a centralized
state. The foundations upon which the new government rested, the merchant
capitalist class, the lower samurai and the former clan bureaucrats, were
factors which guaranteed that the government would chose to centralize its
authority in order to form a modern nation-state. Right from the start, the
new regime resolutely set about uprooting the old concepts of government.

The new government anxiously looked to consolidate its power in early 1868.
The important statement of their strategy and aims was the Charter Oath or
the Five-article Oath, issued in the name of the Emperor on March 14, 1868. It
was an expression of the anti-feudal aspirations of the people, envisaging the
need for consulting public opinion and the administration of affairs for the
benefit of the nation and the encouragement of foreign knowledge. The text of
the Charter Oath was as follows:

“By this oath we set up as our main aim the establishment of the national weal
on a broad basis and the framing of a constitution and laws.
1. Deliberative assemblies shall be widely established and all matters
decided by public discussion
2. All classes, high and low, shall unite in vigorously carrying out the
administration of affairs of state

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 3. The common people, no less than the civil and military officials, shall each
be allowed to pursue their own calling so that there may be no discontent
4. Evil customs of the past shall be broken off and everything based upon the
just laws of Nature.
5. Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the
foundations of imperial rule.”

Implicit in the Charter Oath was an end to exclusive political rule by the
bakufu and a move towards more democratic participation in government. As
the new regime’s legitimacy increased over time, additional long-range goals
were articulated apart from the Charter Oath. One frequently proclaimed aim
was to safeguard Japan’s national sovereignty and prevent further foreign
encroachment. Another oft-stated motive was the simply expressed, boldly
unequivocal determination to become a great and respected country, equal to
the most advanced nations in the world. These overarching motives of
national independence and future greatness inspired a host of complementary
missions - to revise the unequal treaties and remove Japan from semi-colonial
status, to foster national unity, and to sweep away the problems of the past in
order to build strength and wealth. The goals of the early reforms in the Meiji
period can be encompassed in the slogan of building a ‘rich country, strong
army’ (fukoku kyohei) in Japan.

However, first it was important to create a centralized political structure that

would permit the new leaders to exercise authority effectively throughout the
country. So, in 1868, the eleven-article Constitution known as the Seitaisho
was promulgated, according to which all authority was vested in the Dajokan
or the Grand Council of State. The Dajokan proved to be a very efficient form
of revolutionary government; it wore the badge of tradition while
concentrating all power in the hands of a small number of men who could
implement their policies through their own ministries. In 1871 the Council
was replaced by a tripartite set of ministries of the Centre, Left and Right,
further subdivided into various functional ministries (Finance, Foreign Affairs,
Public Works and Home Affairs). In 1885 this system was changed when the
Meiji leaders inaugurated a cabinet system along European lines. At the head
of the government was a Prime Minister, who presided over the several
ministries. In the early years, the ministerial staff was recruited mainly by
personal connections from the rank of Satsuma and Choshu samurai and their
allies. In 1887, a system of Civil Service examinations began to fill in the ranks
of the ministries of the state.

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By 1868, top leaders of the new provisional government such as Kido Koin of
Choshu and Saigo Takamori of Satsuma decided that the politically
fragmented system of domains had to be overhauled. The objective was to set
up a centralized state structure geared towards modernizing Japan in an
effective manner. For this, the centre had to extend its authority over nearly
280 still-independent daimyo domains. The first step in this regard was taken
in 1869, when the government announced that it would accept the return of
registers from all daimyo (Hanseki-hokan). By this, the government deprived
the daimyo of their traditional autonomy and substantially increased its
ability to control administrative policy, although it permitted the lords to stay
on as ‘imperial governors’ with handsome salaries. As the patrons of many of
the coup planners, however, these men were guaranteed respect and a voice
in the new order if they wished. Nonetheless, the ‘return of lands’ established
the principle that all lands and people were subject to the Emperor’s rule.

Having bought off potential opposition leaders and built support in key
domains with their measures, in August 1871, by an imperial edict, the
domains were abolished and in their place 302 prefectures or ken (soon
reduced to 72 and later to 48) and 3 administrative cities (fu), each under the
jurisdiction of a new governor appointed by a Dajokan, were created. The idea
was to end administrative localism. The central government would now
collect taxes from the domain lands. The daimyo were ordered to move to
Tokyo and domain armies were also disbanded.

The abolition of the domains was accompanied by a large payoff to the daimyo
themselves. They were granted permanent yearly salaries equivalent to
roughly 10% of their former domain’s annual tax revenue. The daimyo were
simultaneously relieved of all the costs of governing. The government
assumed the responsibility for paying samurai stipends, which immediately
accounted for almost one-third of the central government’s expenditures.
Later in 1873, the Dajokan offered to give fixed-term interest-bearing
government bonds to ex-samurai who surrendered their stipends, and three
years later it made the exchange obligatory for all.

The daimyo and the great bulk of the samurai in all the domains, including
those who had engineered the restoration, were scarcely prepared to see their
domains swallowed up into a new and more centralized form of government,
but this is precisely what the new leaders achieved in an amazingly short time,

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and with great enhancement of their own power. This surprising turn of
events was possible only because of three factors - the leaders saw clearly the
need for a fully centralized government if Japan were successfully to resist the
West; they were themselves already in control of the domains whose military
power underlay the imperial government; and the other domains had no basis
for unified action and, although unclear as to what was happening, were eager
not to be left out in the great reshuffle of political power that was obviously
underway.

But the Meiji leaders realized that these reforms were mostly makeshift. The
whole samurai class had come to be well-educated and wanted a degree of
participation in the government. Thus, 1873 onwards, the emergence of
political interest groups and parties demanding people’s rights gained
strength. However, it was not before 1886 that actual work of drafting a
constitution and its supporting legislation got underway. Finally, in 1889, the
Constitution of the Empire of Japan (the Meiji Constitution) was drafted. This
was to last as the fundamental law until 1947.

Among the other implications of the fundamental changes in the early Meiji
period were great social changes. The dominance of the daimyo and samurai
classes in the social sphere was challenged. The earlier four classes of
samurai, peasant, artisan and merchant were done away with. There were no
hindrances to social mobility. Privileges were withdrawn and all came to be
seen as equal by the state. Class restrictions on professional fields of activity
were abolished in 1869 and the next year commoners were permitted to
assume family names.

The samurai were still distinguished from commoners, but their separate
classification carried no legal privileges. Some of the abler samurai became
officials in the new government, but most lost their functional positions in
society when the domains were abolished and the military was turned from a
closed class profession into a mass conscript system. Their pride was further
hurt when they lost their distinctive badge of prestige. In 1871 they were
permitted to discard the long and short swords they traditionally wore, and in
1876 they were ordered to do so. Another serious blow was their loss of
economic privilege. Even before 1868 most had eked out only an
impoverished existence on their small stipends. In 1873, the government
offered the poorer samurai the option of a final lump-sum payment, and in
1876 it commuted all samurai stipends into government bonds. On average,

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the samurai received only 264 yen apiece, roughly half the value of their
already reduced stipends. Further loss of status came in 1869, when the large
number of samurai ranks were reduced to two, upper samurai (shizoku) and
lower samurai (sotsu). In 1872 a large portion of the lower samurai were
reclassified as commoners (heimin), although they retained their stipends for
a moment. It should still be remembered however that in spite of all these
changes, there was a definite continuity as the leading bureaucrats and
administrators continued to be from the old dominant classes, including those
clans who had assisted in the ouster of the Tokugawa Shogunate.

These swift social and economic changes naturally were not accomplished
without considerable turmoil. Some capable and enterprising persons were
able to find enticing new opportunities, but most people found it difficult to
adjust. A large proportion of the big urban merchant firms, accustomed to
privileged patronage from the Shogunate and domains, went bankrupt. Many
peasants were bitterly opposed to the fixed monetary tax and to conscription,
which was defined as a “blood tax”. Peasant uprisings, which had doubled in
number during the troubled last years of the Shogunate, became even more
frequent after 1868, rising to a crescendo in 1873 following the conscription
law. But disaffection among former samurai was, of course, a much more
serious threat and a matter of far greater concern to the new leaders than
urban unrest or peasant disturbances. They made special efforts to settle
indigent samurai on new lands as farmers or to absorb them into the
government, the military, and the new industries.

However, the violence and resistance was much less as compared to other
European nations. There were a number of reasons for this. Firstly, the
daimyo who had assisted in the downfall of the Tokugawas were determined
to ensure the success of the regime. And most daimyo also realized that
resistance would only cause civil strife, which they wanted to avoid. At the
same time, the majority of the daimyo was in debt and welcomed the idea of
shifting this burden to the government. Another factor in favour of the new
government was that the payment of stipends was free of any political
obligations and as such served as pensions. This was a comfortable economic
settlement, which made the transition easier.

The influence of Western ideas was crucial in the period of early reforms.
Western ideas had been entering Japan since the time of the Shogunate, which
had sent seven missions to the United States and Europe till 1868. After 1868,

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however, the floodgates to Western knowledge opened wide. Within a decade,
several hundred Japanese were studying in the United States and Europe and
an even greater number of foreigners lived in Japan as experts on political
administration, medical practices, legal philosophies, technological advances
and the education system. By the 1870s the Meiji oligarchs had begun to
search for ideas and prototypes that might guide their efforts to achieve the
Meiji dream of national independence and domestic peace and prosperity.
Many Meiji leaders looked to the West for lessons about how to organize
political institutions, create economic wealth, and foster social harmony.
Others were fascinated by the political vitality, military invincibility and
science and technology of Western nations. The intense interest in the West
shared by the nation’s leaders some of its most influential private citizens
begot an era of ‘bunmei kaika’, which literally means civilization and
enlightenment.

The influence of this was seen most in the area of education, where the Meiji
government instituted a new system of education influenced by Western ideas
and bunmei kaika. This was one way in which the government tried to create
an atmosphere favourable to the acceptance of the fundamental and profound
changes that were taking place. The new leaders clearly saw that an
organized, system of education was a fundamental aspect of a modernized
society and as early as 1871 created a Ministry of Education to develop such a
system. The Confucian-oriented domain schools for the samurai and the so-
called “temple schools”, where commoners learned to read and write, all
withered away. The only exceptions were the Shogunal schools. The
disappearance of most of the earlier schools left the government free to
develop a new and modernized system of education. It never had to contend
with the entrenched relationship between religion and education that existed
in most Western countries. It was thus able to put into practice Western
concepts of a uniform, government-operated educational system more fully
than was possible in much of the West itself in the 19th century.

The focus was now on the promotion of self-reliance. Observation of European

and American societies convinced leaders such as Kido Koin that mass
schooling, like mass conscription, was a fundamental source of the economic
and military power of the West. At the outset the government announced that
schools were to encourage practical learning as well as independent thinking.
Under the influence of men like Fukuzawa, Mori Arinori (1847-1889) the

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centralized French system was somewhat decentralized and remodeled along
American lines.

The Ministry of Education, which had been set up in 1871, at first adopted a
highly centralized system of education along French lines. Sixteen months of
schooling were made compulsory for children of both sexes. Compulsory
education was extended to three years in 1880 and to six years in 1907. The
elementary schools were to be financed by a 10% local surcharge to the
national property tax. However, in the 1870s, angry taxpayers reacted to this
compulsory schooling and rioted. The passive resistance of simply not going
to school was widespread and as late as 1886, only 46 per cent of the children
of statutory school age were in school. But eventually, as with serving in the
military, attending school became a well-accepted obligation of the Emperor’s
subjects. By the end of the 19th century, rates of elementary school attendance
reached 90% or more and by 1905 the figure had risen to 95%.

Liberalization of education was also fostered by the rapid development of a

great number of private schools founded by missionaries. Such Christian
schools were particularly important in the field of secondary education for
girls, which was somewhat neglected by the government. There were also
many secular private schools many of which became in time distinguished
universities.

A shift back toward a more centralized, authoritarian educational system

came in the 1880’s and reached its height in 1890 with the Imperial Rescript
on Education. This brief document, which made only passing reference to
education itself, showed the revived influence of Confucian ideology in its
stress on harmony and loyalty to the throne. Its central concept of mass
indoctrination through formal education was an entirely modern emphasis.
Part of the new educational policy was a desirable return to Japanese and
Chinese literature, history, and thought, to balance the hitherto almost
exclusive concern with Western subjects. Other aspects of the new policy
were an increasing emphasis on indoctrination in education, standardization
of the curriculum, and increased government control over private educational
institutions, especially at the lower levels. The government school system was
expanded and their prestige over the private schools was enhancement. As a
result, private elementary and secondary schools shrank to relative
insignificance.

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The Confucian “University” in Edo, the medical school, and the language pro-
grams at the Institute for the Study of Barbarian Books were united in 1869
into a single government institution. The non-Western aspects of the cur-
riculum were dropped in 1871, and in 1877 the school was renamed Tokyo
University, under which name it has remained ever since the pinnacle of the
Japanese educational system. The Tokyo University was reorganized into a
genuine multi-faculty university in 1886 and became the principal training
center for future government officials. Until 1893 its graduates were accepted
directly into government service without examination. Other government
universities, thereafter known as Imperial Universities, were added— Kyoto
in 1897, Tohoku (in Sendai) in 1907, Kyushu (in Fukuoka) in 1910, Hokkaido
(in Sapporo) in 1918, and others later.

The unchallenged prestige of the government institutions, which had the

lowest tuition rates, made Japanese education more egalitarian than schools
of Western countries. The system was open to all who had the desire and
ability to make use of it and became the chief device for selecting the leaders
of the nation. As a result, a society which had only shortly before been
organized along strictly hereditary feudal lines became within a generation or
two less class-bound than England or many other European countries. The
system, however, had serious drawbacks too. It was so carefully tailored to fit
the needs of the state, as these were envisioned by its leaders, that it did not
adequately meet all the educational needs of Japanese society as it developed.
Women's higher education, for example, grew up largely outside the official
educational structure, and the rapid growth of private universities showed
that there was a greater demand in Japanese society for higher education than
that deemed adequate by the government. There was also a cramping
conformity and a possibility of uniform indoctrination that were to prove
extremely damaging to Japan in the long run.

The leaders in Tokyo saw clearly that military strength was a crucial factor
not only for the central government’s control over the nation, but also in the
effort to defend Japan from the West. At the time of its victory over the
Shogunate, the new government had only a few small volunteer units under
its direct control and had been forced to rely on the support of domain armies,
principally those of Choshu and Satsuma. A much larger and more centrally
controlled military was an obvious necessity. So, in 1871 the government
formed an Imperial Force of ten thousand men drawn from the domain armies
of Satsuma, Choshu and Tosa, trained along French lines. Then, in 1872, it

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divided the Ministry of Military Affairs into army and navy ministries. The
new navy was made up of ships from the Shogunate fleet and from the various
domains but was largely officered by men from Satsuma, who were to
dominate it for the next several decades. Meanwhile the new army came
under the leadership of men from Choshu, particularly Yamagata Aritomo
(1838-1922).

The most important military innovation, however, came with the issuance on
January 10, 1873, of a conscription law, carefully prepared by Yamagata, who
soon thereafter became Army Minister. Beginning at the age of twenty, all
men, regardless of social background, were made liable for three years of
active military service followed by four in the reserves. Like the French model,
there were some exemptions, for household heads, criminals, the physically
unfit, students and teachers in many prescribed schools, and government
officials. It also allowed people to buy their way out for a huge fee of 270 yen.
The idea was to establish a modern army based on universal conscription,
inspired by the Prussian and French conscript armies. Also conscription could
mobilize the energies of the people behind the state and forge ties of loyalty
between the government and its citizenry. Socially, the conscription was
another step in disfranchising the samurai estate and creating a society based
on equality of opportunity, and militarily it vastly strengthened the regime’s
authority by creating a force capable of providing internal security. Thus, by
the mid-1890s Japan’s military was strong enough to move from the task of
keeping order at home to that of imposing its will overseas.

In 1878, the Imperial Army General Staff Office, created after the Prussian
model of the Generalstab, was established directly under the Emperor and
was given broad powers for military planning and strategy. An Imperial
Rescript of 1882 called for unquestioning loyalty to the Emperor by the new
armed forces and asserted that commands from superior officers were
equivalent to commands from the emperor himself. Top-ranking military
leaders were given direct access to the Emperor and the authority to transmit
his pronouncements directly to the troops. The sympathetic relationship
between conscripts and officers, particularly junior officers who were drawn
mostly from the peasantry, tended to draw the military closer to the people. In
time, most people came to look more for guidance in national matters to
military commanders than to political leaders.

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The Japanese reformed their legal institutions along Occidental lines, to win
acceptance with the West. Legal renovation was also fundamental to
technological modernization and was necessitated by the abolition of the old
class structure and other great changes taking place.

Western concepts of individual rather than family ownership of property

were adopted, although for purposes of formal registration of the population,
the law continued to recognize the old extended family, or “house”, consisting
of a patriarch and those of his descendants and collateral relatives who had
not legally established a new “house”. Concepts of legal rights, as opposed to
the traditional emphasis on social obligation, came to permeate the new laws.
The structure and procedures of the courts were made to conform to those of
the West, and torture as an accepted legal practice was abolished in 1876. But
some innovations, such as the prohibition of prostitution and mixed bathing,
which were adopted simply to placate Western prejudices, proved ineffective
and were subsequently abandoned.

Most of the legal reforms ware instituted piecemeal and a thorough re-
codification of the laws proved a difficult and slow task. Drafts, drawn up
largely under French influence, were submitted in 1881 and again in 1888. A
complete code, revised largely on the basis of German legal precedent, finally
went into effect in 1896.

To conclude, The historical legacy from Tokugawa society did not permit a
social transformation from taking place from below through democratic or
mass revolutionary process, but only from above autocratically. The new
structure was built from the top downwards, upon the ruins of the old.
However, the Meiji government was able to achieve a remarkable degree of
success in a relatively short span of time. In fact, Japanese modernization
stands out as the only historical instance of transformative ‘modern’
processes initiated and completed by a sovereign Asian country. It laid the
foundation for the further development of Japan, especially anticipating the
trends in the political and economic spheres of life.

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