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Reverse QMRA for Pseudomonas aeruginosa in Premise

Plumbing to Inform Risk Management


Kara Dean 1 and Jade Mitchell, Ph.D. 2
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Abstract: Pseudomonas aeruginosa is an opportunistic pathogen that can grow and proliferate in biofilms in premise plumbing systems and
is capable of causing infections through the ocular, inhalation, and dermal routes of exposure. When the pathogen colonizes showerheads and
faucets, there is risk of exposure to contaminated water through the ocular route during hand and face-washing events and the inhalation route
during showering events. P. aeruginosa can cause an infection of the lungs, a more severe risk for immunocompromised individuals, and is
one of the main causes of bacterial keratitis. A reverse quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) was completed to determine the
threshold concentrations of P. aeruginosa associated with the US Environmental Protection Agency’s maximum allowable risk for water-
borne pathogens of 1 infection in 10,000 persons per year. The ocular exposure route poses a more significant risk of infection to the average
user at the tap, as indicated by the median threshold concentrations of 6.04×1011 , 0.92, and 37 colony forming units (CFU) per liter for the
showering, face-washing, and handwashing events, respectively. The reverse QMRA methodology followed in this analysis provides dis-
tributions of concentrations of concern that will aid decision makers in prioritizing mitigation strategies and monitoring plans for premise
plumbing systems. DOI: 10.1061/(ASCE)EE.1943-7870.0001641. © 2019 American Society of Civil Engineers.
Author keywords: P. aeruginosa; Premise plumbing; Risk assessment; Threshold levels.

Introduction (Trautmann et al. 2005). The biofilm allows the bacterium to be


more resistant to disinfectants, antibiotics, and other antagonizing
Pseudomonas aeruginosa is an opportunistic pathogen that poses factors (Bédard et al. 2016; Moritz et al. 2010). The presence
a significant threat to the immunocompromised population. of P. aeruginosa in tap water has been strongly associated with the
P. aeruginosa causes community-acquired and hospital-acquired colonization of the faucets, drains, sinks, and showerheads (Bédard
infections, including folliculitis, keratitis, bacteremia, soft tissue et al. 2016; Trautmann et al. 2005). The colonization of these point-
and wound infections, urinary tract infections, and pneumonia of-use fixtures facilitates exposure through several different routes.
(Driscoll et al. 2007; Kerr and Snelling 2009). It has been identified Aerosolization from the fixture-head allows for an inhalation ex-
as the second most frequent cause of hospital-acquired, healthcare- posure that could result in a respiratory infection. Direct application
associated, and ventilator-associated pneumonia (Driscoll et al. of contaminated water on the skin or eyes could result in dermal
2007; Falkinham 2015; Sadikot et al. 2005). For immunocompro- and ocular infections.
mised hosts, P. aeruginosa is considered the most important patho- A quantitative microbial risk assessment (QMRA) is used to
gen in patients with primary and acquired immunodeficiencies
estimate the risk of infection from exposure to microorganisms
(Driscoll et al. 2007). Patients with cystic fibrosis are especially
in diverse environments (Haas et al. 2014). It is a widely accepted
susceptible, given that P. aeruginosa is the leading cause of pneu-
framework for water safety guidelines to support public health.
monia, causing chronic lung infection and an increase in morbidity
QMRA is used to establish design criteria for treatment plants
and mortality rates (Streeter and Katouli 2016). The bacterium is
and to establish monitoring plans (National Research Council
also the leading cause of bacterial keratitis, affecting individuals
2006). Currently, P. aeruginosa is not on the EPA’s contaminant can-
after eye surgery, people with ocular disease, and contact lens wear-
ers (Streeter and Katouli 2016). didate lists and it is not currently monitored or regulated (USEPA
The types of infections caused by P. aeruginosa are diverse 1998, 2005, 2009, 2016). However, it is important for water man-
and its ubiquitous nature makes its management a clear concern for agers and building operators to know what concentrations of
hospitals and communities alike. Sources of known exposure in- P. aeruginosa warrant immediate action and management when
clude hot tubs, swimming pools, colonized medical equipment, detected in tap water. Though treatment guidelines for pathogens
and tap water. The bacterium thrives in moist environments and in water are generally based on the ingestion route of exposure, the
it commonly lives and grows in biofilms in plumbing systems concentration level of concern may likely vary based on the expo-
sure pathway of concern.
1
Graduate Student, Dept. of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, This study aims to determine the threshold concentrations of
Michigan State Univ., 524 S. Shaw Ln., East Lansing, MI 48823. ORCID: P. aeruginosa in tap water that warrant risk management using
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-6295-5580. Email: deankara@msu.edu a reverse QMRA framework for the ocular and inhalation exposure
2
Professor, Dept. of Biosystems and Agricultural Engineering, routes under three different scenarios: a showering, face-washing,
Michigan State Univ., 524 S. Shaw Ln., East Lansing, MI 48823 (corre- and handwashing event. The conclusions drawn from these reverse
sponding author). Email: jade@msu.edu
QMRAs will determine threshold levels of P. aeruginosa that
Note. This manuscript was submitted on March 15, 2019; approved on
June 25, 2019; published online on December 19, 2019. Discussion period should be monitored for and controlled. Applying this type of mod-
open until May 19, 2020; separate discussions must be submitted for eling to engineered water systems can help identify pathogens
individual papers. This paper is part of the Journal of Environmental of priority and help risk managers properly allocate funds for mon-
Engineering, © ASCE, ISSN 0733-9372. itoring, sampling, and treatment procedures.

© ASCE 04019120-1 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


Methods literature, and as such it was assumed to be 100% to ensure a
conservative estimate of risk. The mortality rate for community-
QMRA Framework acquired pneumonia due to P. aeruginosa was assumed to be
the same for the P. aeruginosa infection in previously healthy indi-
This study takes an accepted risk threshold and calculates the viduals that were exposed to heavily contaminated aerosols, i.e., a
quantity of pathogens in the water that would cause this level rate of 33% (Sadikot et al. 2005). Based on these assumptions, the
of risk across a specific exposure pathway, thus reversing the es- risk of infection of 1 in 10,000 corresponded to an estimated risk of
tablished QMRA framework (Haas et al. 2014). Such a modeling 3.33 deaths per 100,000 persons annually via the inhalation route of
approach was previously described and published for a showering exposure. Due to the continuously varying nature of the multihit
exposure scenario that predicted Legionella densities of concern dose-response function shown in Eq. (4), the exposure dose was
in shower air, water, and in-premise plumbing biofilms associated calculated using integration techniques
with target deposited doses of Legionella in the alveolar region
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(Schoen and Ashbolt 2011). This study utilizes the EPA’s maxi- PðdÞ ¼ Γðkmin ; d × kÞ ð4Þ
mum allowable risk for microbial contaminants in water of 1 in-
fection per 10,000 persons per year (Macler and Regli 1993;
O’Toole et al. 2015). The motivation for this risk assessment is Corneal Dose-Response Model
to inform future monitoring and sampling protocols for managers Previously published dose-response models for the ocular route
of drinking water distribution networks. Thus, the risk threshold of of exposure are available on the QMRA wiki (Tamrakar 2013).
1 infection in 10,000 persons per year is transformed into an aver- The recommended dose-response model was developed by fit-
age daily risk to give water and building managers the information ting the dose-response data from a study using P. aeruginosa—
needed to protect the health of their consumers. To transform the contaminated contact lenses to inoculate the eyes of New Zealand
average yearly risk, PðdÞannual , into a daily risk, PðdÞdaily , Eq. (1) rabbits in order to produce keratitis as the health endpoint. The
was used with the assumption that the exposures occur each day of best-fitting model was a beta-Poisson with an α of 0.19 and an
the year. It is assumed that the different daily exposures are N 50 of 18,500 CFU. This was the model selected and applied in
independent and identical, a simplification justified for low risks this analysis because the exposure route was relevant to the path-
(World Health Organization 2017). ways explored and the endpoint measured corresponds to infection
as the response. Eq. (3) was rearranged to solve for exposure dose,
PðdÞannual ¼ 1 − ð1 − PðdÞdaily Þ365 ð1Þ ED , as shown in Eq. (5). The daily risk of infection, PðdÞ, that
was calculated from Eq. (1) was directly substituted into Eq. (5)
For each exposure, a dose-response model was used to calculate to determine ED .
the exposure dose associated with the average daily risk of infec-
−1 N 50
tion. Two of the most commonly fit dose-response models are the ED ¼ ½ð1 − PðdÞÞ α − 1 1 ð5Þ
exponential and beta-Poisson. Eq. (2) is the exponential model, 2 −1
α

where PðdÞ is the probability of response at dose d, and the single


parameter k represents the probability that a single organism
Exposure Assessment
survives to initiate the observed response.
To determine the concentrations in the water responsible for the
PðdÞ ¼ 1 − e−kd ð2Þ calculated exposure doses, detailed exposure assessments were
constructed for a showering, face-washing, and handwashing event
Eq. (3) is the approximate form of the beta-Poisson dose-
in a typical residence setting. The showering exposure models an
response model. The two parameters are the N 50 , which represents
average adult over the age of 21 that showers once a day for a year.
the dose at which 50% of the exposed population succumbs to the
The face-washing exposure assesses the risk of the average adult
adverse health effect (infection, illness, or death), and the shape
washing their face with their eyes partially open, once a day for a
parameter α (Haas et al. 2014). The concentration in the bulk water
year. Finally, the handwashing event specifically addresses the sce-
that would result in this exposure dose was then determined
nario when the average adult washes their hands and afterwards
through the detailed exposure assessment described below.
inserts or removes their contacts, two times a day for a year.
   −α
d 1
PðdÞ ¼ 1 − 1 þ × ð2 − 1Þ
α ð3Þ Showering Event
N 50
The inhalation exposure in a showering event is described by
Eq. (6). The exposure dose (ED ) is a function of the concentration
in the water (Cw ) in CFU/L multiplied by a partitioning coefficient
Dose Response (PC) in L=m3 to estimate the concentration of the pathogens aero-
solized. The quantity of pathogens in the lungs to initiate infection
Inhalation Dose-Response Model is determined by the inhalation rate (IR) in m3 =min, time of
An inhalation dose-response model with death as an endpoint re- the showering event (T) in minutes, the fraction of aerosols of a
sponse was recently developed, and the multihit dose-response respirable size (FRA ), and the retention rate (RR) (i.e. the percent
model [Eq. (4)] from that analysis was used in this study (Dean deposited in the alveolar region). To accommodate this QMRA in
2019). The multihit dose-response model has parameters: k is equal reverse, these variables are rearranged into Eq. (7) in order to cal-
to 4.12×10−6 ; kmin is equal to 11; and N 50 is equal to 2,588,047 culate Cw, the concentration in the bulk water responsible for a risk
CFU, where N 50 corresponds to LD50 for the lethal endpoint. In level of 1 infection in 10,000 persons.
order to use this dose-response model to estimate the dose corre-
sponding to the EPA’s standard of 1 infection in 10,000 persons, it ED ¼ Cw × PC × IR × T × FRA × RR ð6Þ
was necessary to apply a morbidity rate, the probability of illness
given infection, and a mortality rate, the probability of death given ED
Cw ¼ ð7Þ
illness. A documented morbidity rate was not found in the PC × IR × T × FRA × RR

© ASCE 04019120-2 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


Face-Washing Event necessary to make several educated assumptions based on the data
The parameters needed to calculate the concentration in the water available.
(Cw ) in CFU/L for the face-washing event include: the flow rate of In addition to the peer-reviewed resources found in the litera-
the faucet (FR) in L/min, the time for the face-washing event (T) in ture, the Exposure Factors Handbook and the Residential End
minutes, the portion of water applied to the face (Pw ), the surface Use Study were also used to create distributions for some of the
area of the face (FSA ) and ocular region (OSA ) in cm2 , and the por- aforementioned parameters (USEPA 2011; Deoreo et al. 2016).
tion of eye left exposed during the event (PE ). Thus, the concen- The reported water usage patterns in a newly renovated and moni-
tration in the water for the face-washing event was calculated by tored residential home were also used to corroborate the parameters
transforming Eq. (8) into Eq. (9). determined for flow and duration of usage events (i.e., showering,
face washing, etc.) in this study (Salehi et al. 2018). After param-
FR × T × PW
ED ¼ × OSA × PE × CW ð8Þ eters were determined, Oracle Crystal Ball was used to create dis-
FSA tributions for the input parameters to account for variability and
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uncertainty. The dose-response models, parameters, and distributions


ED × FSA
CW ¼ ð9Þ listed in Tables 2–4 were used to forecast the concentrations of
FR × T × PW × OSA × PO P. aeruginosa in the water resulting in the targeted risk thresholds
for each scenario. Crystal Ball was run with a Monte Carlo sampling
method, 10,000 trials, and a seed of 999. A sensitivity analysis was
Handwashing to Eye Touch Event
completed for each scenario, with the Spearman rank correlation
For the handwashing scenario, the exposure dose could be calcu-
coefficient used to identify the input model parameters with the
lated based on the concentration on the hands (CH ) in CFU=cm2 ,
greatest contribution of variability and uncertainty in the calculated
the size of the fingertip (FT) in cm2 , the transfer efficiency from
dependent variable, i.e., the final concentrations in the bulk water.
fingertip to eye (T F ), and the number of transfers in a day (T E ), as
shown in Eq. (10). In addition, the removal of transferable bacteria
from the hands if hand drying occurred after the washing event was Results
accounted for with a drying efficiency (D). The concentration on
the hands (CH ) was calculated with Eq. (11), where the concentra-
tion in the water (Cw) in CFU/L was multiplied by the transfer rate Exposure Dose
of bacteria from water to hands (T WH ) in ðCFU=cm2 Þ=ðCFU=LÞ Independent and identical daily risks were calculated using Eq. (1)
and by the percent form of the log reduction that occurred from based on the annual risk of 1 infection in 10,000 persons. For the
the use of bland or antimicrobial soap during the handwashing showering exposure, the average exposure dose was determined to
event (RD). Rearranging Eqs. (10) and (11) to solve for CW results be 302,750 CFU for a daily risk of infection of 2.74 in 10,000,000
in Eq. (12). persons and an annual risk of infection of 1 in 10,000 persons. For
the corneal exposure route for both the face-washing and hand-
ED ¼ CH × FT × T F × T E × D ð10Þ
washing analyses, the exposure dose was calculated to be 7.14 ×
10−4 CFU. The annual risk of infection, daily risk of infection, and
CH ¼ CW × T WH × 10−RD ð11Þ
exposure dose for all three scenarios are shown in Table 1.
ED
CW ¼ ð12Þ
T WH × 10−RD × FT × T F × T E × D Exposure Assessment

Showering Event
Chattopadhyay et al. (2017) conducted a study using a shower-
Computation
ing apparatus to determine the partitioning coefficients (PC) for
To parameterize the inhalation exposure model, a systematic liter- Brevundimonas diminuta and P. aeruginosa for varying water tem-
ature review was conducted using the databases Web of Science, peratures. For this study, the PC chosen was from the trials con-
PubMed, and Google Scholar with keywords such as inhalation, ducted at 37°C because this most closely approximates the average
P. aeruginosa, risk assessment, exposure dose, showering event, warm shower water temperature. The study used tap water spiked
respiratory infection, tap water, opportunistic pathogen, respirable with two different initial concentrations of pathogens in the water
aerosols, and deposition. The same databases were used with the (109 and 1010 CFU) resulting in two different partitioning coeffi-
face-washing and handwashing exposures but with keywords such cients. In the analysis herein, one value was set as a minimum and
as corneal exposure, P. aeruginosa, risk assessment, eye infection, the other as a maximum in a uniform distribution. The same study
keratitis, face-washing event, time spent face washing, tap water, also calculated the quantity of pathogens that were of a respirable
faucet flow rate, face surface area, ocular surface area, handwash- size in these showering events (Chattopadhyay et al. 2017). This
ing, transfer efficiency, contact lens, and washing efficiency. To the value ranged from 96.3 to 99.7% for the P. aeruginosa experi-
knowledge of these researchers, this is one of the first facewashing ments, which was used to develop a uniform distribution to
risk assessments (Rodriguez-Alvarez et al. 2015). Thus, it was describe variability and uncertainty in FRA .

Table 1. Exposure doses associated with an annual risk level of 10−4


Exposure route Annual risk of infection Daily risk of infection Daily risk of deatha Exposure dose (CFU)
Showering 1.00 × 10−4 2.74 × 10−7 9.04 × 10−8 302,750
Face-washing 1.00 × 10−4 2.74 × 10−7 n=a 7.14 × 10−4
Handwashing 1.00 × 10−4 2.74 × 10−7 n=a 7.14 × 10−4
a
Daily risk of death only calculated for inhalation route of exposure because only the inhalation dose-response model had death as an endpoint of response.

© ASCE 04019120-3 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


Table 2. Inhalation exposure model parameters and distributions
Parameter Average Distribution References
Mortality rate 0.33 Point estimate Sadikot et al. (2005) and
Hatchette et al. (2000)
Dose response, k parameter 4.12 × 10−6 Point estimate Dean (2019)
Dose response, kmin parameter 11 Point estimate Dean (2019)
Partitioning coefficient, PC (L=m3 ) 1.07 × 10−5 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 4.56 × 10−6 ; maximum ¼ 1.69 × 10−6 Chattopadhyay et al. (2017)
Inhalation rate, IR (m3 =min) 0.013 Triangular∶ minimum ¼ 0.0042; likeliest ¼ 0.013; maximum ¼ 0.017 Hines et al. (2014) and
USEPA (2011)
Respirable fraction of aerosols, FRA 0.98 Uniform∶minimum ¼ 0.963; maximum ¼ 0.997 Chattopadhyay et al. (2017)
Deposition in alveolar region, RR 0.39 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 0.34; maximum ¼ 0.44 USEPA (2004)
Shower time, T (min) 12.4 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 7.8; maximum ¼ 17 USEPA (2011) and Deoreo
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et al. (2016)

The inhalation rate, IR, was represented with a triangular dis- Eq. (9). The face-washing event time was based off of a study
tribution using values from the Exposure Factors Handbook assessing water end uses in the United Arab Emirates that reported
(USEPA 2011). The likeliest value was the mean inhalation rate an average face-washing time of 0.87 min (Chowdhury et al. 2015).
for adults over the age of 21 performing an activity with a light To account for the uncertainty associated with this value, a triangu-
intensity, and the maximum was the 95th percentile value for this lar distribution was used with 0.87 min as the most likely value and
same group. The minimum value of 0.0042 m3 =min was the mean an assumed minimum and maximum of 15 s and 1 min, respec-
inhalation rate for adults with a sedentary/passive activity level, to tively. The faucet flow rate was also reported in the study as an
account for the population that shower without any increase in in- average of 4 L=min. A study of fixture use and water quality in
halation rate (USEPA 2011). It should be noted that although based a residential green building observed average faucet flow rates from
on adults, the average inhalation rate for a child also falls within 2.1 to 6.3 L=min (Salehi et al. 2018). This range was used as a
this range. When considering shower duration, a uniform distribu- uniform distribution for faucet flow rates because it encompasses
tion was applied ranging from 7.8 min as reported by the Residen- the 4 L=min reported in the United Arab Emirates water end use
tial End Use Study (2016) to 17 min as reported by the Exposure study, as well as the average flow rate of 0.9 gallons=min or about
Factors Handbook (USEPA 2011; Deoreo et al. 2016). Finally, for 3.4 L=min reported in a study of high-efficiency new homes
the quantity deposited in the alveolar region (RR), values reported (Deoreo et al. 2011, 2016).
in a study analyzing lung deposition fractions in the alveolar re- With the faucet flow rate and the length of the face-washing
gions for particles sized 1, 3, and 5 μm were used as a uniform event, the total volume of water used was calculated. However,
distribution and are shown in Table 2 (USEPA 2004). a large portion of the water used while face washing is wasted,
Using the inhalation dose-response model and the exposure and not directly applied to the face. This quantity of unused water
equations and parameters shown in Table 2, a median concentration was estimated based on a study of ablution and different faucet
in the bulk water was estimated to be 6.04 × 1011 CFU=L. The types. With a tap with mechanical knobs, 47% of the tap water
mean, median, and 95% confidence interval are listed in Table 6. was wasted during ablution (Zaied 2017). The facial surface area
A histogram of the distribution of plausible log concentrations was estimated to be between 300 and 450 cm2 (Yoon and Lee
determined for this scenario is shown in Fig. 1. 2016). Of that total surface area, the ocular region was assumed
Face-Washing Event to be on average 1–3 cm2 (Sotoyama et al. 1995). Finally, it
Once the mean exposure dose was calculated to be 7.18 × 10−4 was assumed that during a face-washing event, a person’s eye could
CFU, the concentration of P. aeruginosa was calculated with possibly be open 0 to 25% of the way, leading to the introduction of
water into the eye. The uncertainty associated with this range was
represented with a uniform distribution. Any larger quantity of ex-
posed eye (i.e. an eye wash event) would result in a greater risk of
infection and a lower critical concentration of P. aeruginosa in the
water causing that risk.
Using the corneal dose response model and the parameters
in Table 3, it was determined that an annual risk of 1 infection
in 10,000 persons corresponds to a median concentration of
0.92 CFU=L of P. aeruginosa in the tap water. The mean, median,
and 95% confidence interval for the exposure dose and pathogen
concentration are listed in Table 6. Fig. 2 represents the histogram
of log concentration values in the water that result in 1 infection in
10,000 persons annually.

Handwashing to Eye Touch Event


The concentration on the hand after exposure to contaminated
water was modeled using the results from a study of E. coli trans-
ferred from recycled washing machine water to hands (O’Toole
Fig. 1. Natural log concentrations of P. aeruginosa in the bulk water et al. 2009). O’Toole et al. (2009) reported the percentage of
resulting in a risk of infection from a showering exposure greater than
E. coli transferred from the washing machine in CFU to the surface
the EPA-mandated acceptable level generated from 10,000 iterations of
of the hand in CFU=cm2 . Using the volume of water known to fill
the model.
the washing machine (69 L) and the surface area of the swabbed

© ASCE 04019120-4 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


Table 3. Face-washing exposure scenario parameters and distributions
Parameter Value Distribution Source
Dose response, α 0.19 Point estimate Tamrakar (2013)
Dose response, N 50 18,500 Point estimate Tamrakar (2013)
Face wash duration, T (min) 0.87 Triangular∶ minimum ¼ 0.25; likeliest ¼ 0.87; maximum ¼ 1 Chowdhury et al. (2015);
Assumption
Faucet flow rate (L=min), FR 4.2 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 2.1; maximum ¼ 6.3 Salehi et al. (2018)
Portion of water applied to face, PW 0.53 Point estimate Zaied (2017)
Face surface area (cm2 ), FA 375 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 300; maximum ¼ 450 Yoon and Lee (2016)
Ocular surface area (cm2 ), OA 2.0 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 1.0; maximum ¼ 3.0 Sotoyama et al. (1995)
Exposed portion of eye, PE 0.125 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 0.0; maximum ¼ 0.25 Assumption
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Table 5. Handwashing exposure scenarios and final concentrations


Scenario Concentration in water (CFU/L)
Soap type Drying 2.50% Mean Median 97.50%
1 1 1
No No 1.71 × 10 4.40 × 10 3.65 × 10 1.16 × 102
Bland No 2.26 × 103 7.72 × 103 6.17 × 103 2.25 × 104
Antimicrobial No 1.46 × 103 4.03 × 103 3.32 × 103 1.08 × 104
No Yes 3.99 × 101 1.04 × 102 8.58 × 101 2.73 × 102
Bland Yes 5.32 × 103 1.82 × 104 1.45 × 104 5.35 × 104
Antimicrobial Yes 3.42 × 103 9.49 × 103 7.82 × 103 2.55 × 104

2 and 8 s, and the most conservative reduction in translocated


bacteria (55%–60%) would occur.
This scenario also took into account the removal of the pathogen
based on the use of soap. A study that analyzed the log reduction of
Fig. 2. Natural log concentrations of P. aeruginosa in the bulk water E. coli when bland or antimicrobial soap was used in a handwash-
resulting in a risk of infection from a face-washing exposure greater ing event was evaluated to represent potential P. aeruginosa
than the EPA-mandated acceptable level generated from 10,000 itera- removal (Jensen et al. 2017). The range of CFU log reductions
tions of the model. for both kinds of soap are shown in Table 4 with triangular distri-
butions. Fingertip surface area (FT) and transfer efficiency from
fingertip to eye (T E ) were found from a study analyzing influenza
infection risk from four exposure pathways, including contami-
hand (30 cm2 ), this percentage was transformed into a transfer rate nated hands touching facial membranes (Nicas and Jones 2009).
from CFU=L to CFU=cm2 . The resulting transfer rates, T WH , are Nicas and Jones (2009) assumed that the transfer efficiency from
reported in Table 4 with the units ðCFU=cm2 Þ=ðCFU=LÞ. The 95% fingertip to lips of 35% was the same for fingertip to eye (Nicas
confidence interval of these rates was represented with a triangular and Jones 2009; Rusin et al. 2002). This study makes the same
distribution. To model the effect of drying the hands before touch- assumption. The number of transfers in a day was assumed to
ing the eye, a percent reduction in translocated bacteria was applied be two, given that the act of handwashing and immediately touch-
based on the reduction of E. coli from towel drying after a hand- ing the eye after is likely most common for contact lens wearers and
washing event. After 2–8 s of hand drying, Patrick et al. (1997) it is expected the contacts are inserted and removed each day.
reported only 40%–45% of the initial bacteria amount being trans- Based on the preceding assumptions and behaviors, concentra-
located from the washed hands to simulated skin material. The re- tions of concern in the water were calculated for six separate sce-
duction in bacteria transferred to other surfaces like food or utilities narios involving handwashing. These concentrations and scenarios
was even greater (Patrick et al. 1997). This study assumed that if the are shown in Table 5. For the no soap and no drying scenario, a
hand washer dried their hands, the drying time would last between median concentration of 37 CFU=L could result in an annual risk

Table 4. Handwashing exposure parameters and distributions


Parameter Value Distribution Source
Dose response, α 0.19 Point estimate Tamrakar (2013)
Dose response, N 50 18,500 Point estimate Tamrakar (2013)
Transfer efficiency from fingertip to eye, 35 Point estimate Nicas and Jones (2009)
T E (%) and Rusin et al. (2002)
Fingertip surface area, FT (cm2 ) 2 Point estimate Nicas and Jones (2009)
Number Of Transfers per day, T F 2 Point estimate Assumption
Bland soap log CFU reduction, RD 2.22 Triangular∶ minimum ¼ 1.91; 50% ¼ 2.22; maximum ¼ 2.54 Jensen et al. (2017)
Antimicrobial soap log CFU reduction, RD 1.94 Triangular∶ minimum ¼ 1.83; 50% ¼ 1.94; maximum ¼ 2.10 Jensen et al. (2017)
Transfer rate from water to hand, T WH (%) 0.000854 Triangular∶ 2.5% ¼ 0.00021; 50% ¼ 0.000854; 97.5% ¼ 0.00345 O’toole et al. (2009)
Bacteria remaining after drying, D (%) 42.5 Uniform∶ minimum ¼ 40; maximum ¼ 45 Patrick et al. (1997)

© ASCE 04019120-5 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


Table 6. Summary results of exposure assessments for all three scenarios
Concentration in the bulk water (CFU/L)
Exposure route Exposure dose (CFU) 2.50% Mean Median 97.50%
11 11 11
Showering-inhalation 302,750 2.55 × 10 7.13 × 10 6.04 × 10 1.81 × 1012
Face-washing–corneal 7.14 × 10−4 3.73 × 10−1 1.10 × 100 9.20 × 10−1 2.78 × 100
Handwashing–corneal 7.14 × 10−4 1.71 × 101 4.40 × 101 3.65 × 101 1.16 × 102
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Fig. 4. Sensitivity analysis of the showering exposure route.


Fig. 3. Natural log concentrations of P. aeruginosa in the bulk water
that result in a risk of infection from a handwashing exposure (no soap
or drying) greater than the EPA-mandated acceptable level generated
from 10,000 iterations of the model.

of infection of 1 in 10,000. If the handwasher used bland soap and


dried afterwards, the median concentration in the water could be as
high as 14,500 CFU=L before the risk threshold was met. Because
a highly conservative, health-protective level of concern may be
desirable in the absence of consumer behavior, the results from the
no soap/no drying scenario were selected for comparison and re-
ported in Table 6. Fig. 3 represents the histogram of log concen-
tration values for the no soap/no drying scenario.

Sensitivity Analysis
A sensitivity analysis was completed for each exposure scenario to
Fig. 5. Sensitivity analysis of the face-washing exposure.
determine the uncertainty associated with each parameter in the re-
verse QMRA using the 10,000 Monte Carlo iterations. Spearman
rank correlation coefficients were used to identify which parame-
ters had the most influence on calculated threshold concentrations while drying, and the log reductions from soap use. For all scenar-
in the bulk water. The results of the sensitivity analysis for the ios, the transfer rate for bacteria from water to hand had the greatest
showering exposure are shown in Fig. 4. The partitioning coeffi- influence on the concentration in the water as shown in Fig. 6. For
cient had the highest Spearman rank correlation coefficient with the main scenario of concern, no soap used and hands undried, the
a value of −0.71. The shower time and inhalation rate were also transfer rate had a correlation coefficient of −1.00. The uncertainty
important predictive factors for risk, with correlation coefficients in the threshold concentration in the model is completely dependent
of −0.44 and −0.49. on the uncertainty associated with the quantity of pathogens trans-
For the face-washing scenario, the sensitivity analysis identified ferred to the hands as expected. As the quantity of pathogens trans-
the faucet flow rate as the most sensitive factor for estimating ferred from the water to the hand increases, the concentration in
the pathogen concentration in the water using the reverse QMRA the water responsible for an annual risk of 1 infection in 10,000
model, with a correlation coefficient of −0.59. The ocular surface persons decreases.
area and face wash time were the next most influential parameters
with values of −0.58 and −0.47, respectively. This is shown
in Fig. 5. Discussion
Finally, the handwashing exposure had distributions applied
to the parameters involved in calculating the quantity of bacteria The results of this study indicate that for a showering exposure,
transferred from water to hand, the quantity of bacteria removed a median concentration of 6.04 × 1011 CFU=L would result in

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J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


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Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis of the handwashing exposure.

1 infection in 10,000 persons per year. However, for the face- independent and identical risks resulting in an annual risk of 1 in-
washing and handwashing exposures, median concentrations of fection in 10,000 persons. It is not expected that P. aeruginosa is
0.92 and 37 CFU=L, respectively, could result in 1 eye infection present in the bulk water of premise plumbing systems at these con-
in 10,000 persons per year. The concentration level that needs centrations consistently; instead, because the pathogen is known to
to be monitored thus highly depends on the exposure route of con- reside in biofilms, it is more likely that the concentrations in the
cern. In a showering event, there are losses associated with each bulk water are fluctuating from lower to higher concentrations
step across the exposure pathway (i.e. aerosolization, inhalation, when sloughing events occur. The concentrations suggested in this
deposition) and this allows for a much higher concentration in study should thus be compared to the average of a series of samples
the water that may not result in significant risk. In addition, the taken over time, with the aim of capturing these fluctuations to an-
dose-response model for the inhalation route of exposure to alyze the average risk. The feasibility of monitoring and sampling
P. aeruginosa is a multihit model that estimates de minimis risks for P. aeruginosa at the levels determined in this study are
at lower concentrations and has a very high LD50 of 2,588,047 CFU challenged by the episodic nature of biofilm release, detection
(Dean 2019). The face-washing and handwashing exposures in- limits, time requirement, and expense. Effective management of
volve bacterium being directly applied to the eye, and this requires P. aeruginosa in drinking water requires a better understanding
a much lower concentration in the water to result in the same level of both the baseline concentrations in the bulk water and the
of risk. The beta-Poisson dose-response model for the corneal potential intermittent high concentrations associated with biofilm
route of infection when compared to the multihit model estimates detachment.
greater risk at lower concentrations and has an N 50 of 18,500 CFU This study was the first inhalation risk assessment for
(Tamrakar 2013). P. aeruginosa, which expands the understanding of the most sig-
The concentrations that could result in an annual risk of 1 in- nificant exposure pathway and risks for immunocompromised pop-
fection in 10,000 persons for the face-washing and handwashing ulations. Previous risks assessments for P. aeruginosa were limited
scenarios are more likely to occur than those for the showering by a lack of applicable dose-response data. As with all risk assess-
based on published monitoring studies, but may not be consistently ment, there are several limitations that should be addressed. The
prevalent. Groundwater surveys in Kansas, Oregon, Virginia, dose-response model developed for the inhalation exposure was
and Washington detected P. aeruginosa in 22 groundwater sources based on death as an endpoint of response, requiring mortality
in densities ranging from 1 to 2,300 organisms per 100 ml and morbidity rates to estimate the risk of infection (Dean 2019).
(Allen and Geldreich 1975; Mena and Gerba 2009). A study of While death is the most stable endpoint for modeling dose re-
tap water in Greece detected P. aeruginosa in 9% of samples at sponse, there is variability and uncertainty associated with the mor-
a mean concentration of 7 CFU/100 mL (Mena and Gerba 2009; bidity and mortality rates across the population. The showering
Papapetropoulou et al. 1994). However, the presence of P. aerugi- event was analyzed based on a healthy individual’s response to
nosa in the tap water is strongly correlated with point-of-use bio- the doses of P. aeruginosa in the water. For immunocompromised
film colonization, and when neonatal units in Northern Ireland individuals, the population primarily affected by the pathogen, it is
assessed the presence of P. aeruginosa in different tap assemblies, expected that a much lower concentration in the water would result
P. aeruginosa was detected in 14% of the components and some in 1 infection in 10,000 persons per year. Potential approaches to
were colonized with up to 2.2 × 107 CFU (Bédard et al. 2016; address this irreducible uncertainty could be to apply the 95th per-
Mena and Gerba 2009; Walker et al. 2014). centile of the parameter estimates to the dose-response model and
The concentrations of P. aeruginosa in the bulk water deter- to use the recorded mortality or morbidity rates for the immuno-
mined in this study are calculated based on an assumption of daily compromised. However, these methods may not be applicable in

© ASCE 04019120-7 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


this situation, because the dose-response curve for the immuno- dryness (Huang et al. 2012; Patrick et al. 1997). A sensitivity analy-
compromised population exposed to P. aeruginosa via the inhala- sis identified the transfer rate of bacteria from water to hand as hav-
tion route is expected to be shaped differently than the curve for the ing the greatest influence on risk of infection. Depending on the
immunocompetent. Excluding the dose-response parameters, the scenario, the transfer rate had a correlation coefficient between
sensitivity analysis identified the main variables affecting the result −0.86 and −1.00. For the no soap/no drying scenario, the uncer-
of the exposure assessment for the showering scenario, i.e., the tainty in the concentration in the water was entirely dependent on
partitioning coefficient, the inhalation rate, and the time spent the uncertainty of the transfer rate.
showering. The partitioning coefficient had the greatest influence A limitation of this analysis is that the model used to calculate
and this was expected considering it is assumed to be highly var- the transfer of P. aeruginosa from water to hand is based on the
iable with type of showerhead, flow rate, water quality, contaminant transfer of E. coli from recycled washing machine water to hands.
characteristics, etc. (Chattopadhyay et al. 2017). It is therefore dif- Any future studies further investigating the transfer of bacteria or
ficult to further refine the uncertainty in estimates of PC without specifically P. aeruginosa from water to skin should be incorpo-
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specific future experimentation for different scenarios based on the rated into the model, because it has a strong influence on the
influential factors described (Chattopadhyay et al. 2017). The model results. Additionally, the study used to model the transfer of
inhalation rate and time spent showering are inherently variable val- P. aeruginosa from water to skin addressed the transfer that occurs
ues across the population and additional information is unlikely to in stagnant water (O’Toole et al. 2009). Future studies of running
reduce model uncertainty associated with these values. water would better capture the transfer that occurs during a hand-
Several assumptions were made in the face-washing risk assess- washing event. Finally, the log reductions from bland and antimi-
ment in the absence of previous existing work. The results of the crobial soap removal were based on the removal of E. coli during a
assessment indicated that a person washing their face with a 0%– handwashing event. Like P. aeruginosa, E. coli is a rod-shaped,
25% exposed ocular surface area on average could have a risk of gram-negative bacterium and the nonpathogenic strain chosen
infection of 10−4 per year when the concentration in the water is as by Jensen et al. (2017) was selected because it is a well-established
low as 0.92 CFU=L. This risk would logically increase if a greater surrogate for bacteria that may be transferred to the hands when
portion of the eye was left open and decrease the more the eye was handling raw foods. In the absence of data for the effects of soap
kept closed. This dependence is reflected in the sensitivity analysis use on P. aeruginosa reduction specifically, reductions based on
because the ocular surface area is the parameter with the second E. coli were used as a surrogate in this analysis.
greatest effect on the concentration in the water. The smaller the With further experiments and data collection, the threshold
eye, the lower the exposed ocular surface area and the lower the concentrations proposed in this study can be further refined. The
quantity of water entering the eye during the face-washing event current results are based on the state of science in understanding
to initiate infection. The quantity of water wasted and not applied the parameters impacting risks in these scenarios. The results pro-
to the face during a face-washing event was estimated in this analy- vide critical information to individuals responsible for monitoring
sis based on an ablution study, because ablution from taps is a re- pathogen levels in drinking water, especially when a population
peated daily activity that includes washing the face. However known to be immunocompromised is in consideration for cases like
ablution also includes washing other parts of the body and thus this nursing homes or hospitals. This analysis indicates that monitoring
was only assumed to be a similar representation of water loss in face of P. aeruginosa within premise plumbing systems needs to be
washing. Other variables with a strong influence on the risk assess- completed to better understand its presence in bulk water and its
ment were the time spent face washing and the faucet flow rate. growth within biofilms. Future research needs to address how to
These two parameters were used to calculate the expected portion limit biofilm and pathogen growth to prevent the possible occur-
of water the eye is exposed to and as such, if these variables de- rence of concentrations of pathogens that threaten human health.
crease, so does the risk of infection. The faucet flow rate is variable The risk assessments completed in this study need to be further
across the population but based on fixture type. The time spent expanded upon to capture the risks associated with other popula-
face washing is inherently variable across the population and though tions including the elderly and immunocompromised. The eco-
the estimate could be refined with additional studies, the contribu- nomic burden of infections in persons aged ≥65 years from
tion of uncertainty in the risk assessment is unlikely to change. three opportunistic pathogens, including P. aeruginosa, was esti-
Finally, an exposure scenario in which an individual that washed mated to be on average $0.6 billion per year from 1991 to 2006 in
their hands and immediately touched their eye was assessed. Not reimbursed payments to hospitals (Naumova et al. 2016). The in-
only is this action common for contact lens wearers, but an obser- formation provided by this study and future risk assessments can be
vational study of students performing office work saw the average used by decision makers to perform risk-benefit analyses and select
individual touch their eyes about 2.5 times per hour (Nicas and Best risk management strategies.
2008; Nicas and Jones 2009). This assessment found that if a per-
son washed their hands without soap and allowed residual water to
remain on their hands before touching their eye, a concentration of Conclusion
37 CFU=L in the water could result in a risk of infection of 10−4 .
However, if the faucet user had washed with bland soap and dried The results of this study provide threshold concentrations of
their hands afterwards, a concentration of 14,500 CFU=L would be concern for P. aeruginosa in premise plumbing systems when con-
needed to have the same level of risk. A person not completely sidering showering, handwashing, and face-washing exposure sce-
drying their hands is a plausible scenario as observed in a study narios. P. aeruginosa is an opportunistic pathogen that can cause
of bacterial transfer after handwashing where the drying habits a variety of infections including pneumonia and bacterial keratitis.
of male and females in washrooms were recorded. Male washroom It is ubiquitous and known to thrive in the biofilms of premise
users dried their hands for an average of 3.5 s with cloth towels and plumbing systems, making monitoring protocols incredibly impor-
17 s under hot air dryers compared to female users that spent on tant for risk managers to appropriately protect human health.
average 5.2 and 13.3 s with the cloth and air dryers, respectively. The lowest range of concentrations responsible for an annual risk
The study determined that 5 s with cloth towels would achieve only of 1 infection in 10,000 persons was from the face-washing
85% dryness and 20 s using an air dryer would achieve only 70% scenario, with a 95% confidence interval of 0.37–2.78 CFU=L.

© ASCE 04019120-8 J. Environ. Eng.

J. Environ. Eng., 2020, 146(3): 04019120


This range supports monitoring studies that are needed within Kerr, K. G., and A. M. Snelling. 2009. “Pseudomonas aeruginosa: A for-
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All data, models, and code generated or used during the study viron. Health 213 (3): 190–197. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijheh.2010.05
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