New Routes To Power: Towards A Typology of Power Mediation

Review of International Studies (2011), 37, 1169–1190 2010 British International Studies Association
doi:10.1017/S0260210510001002 First published online 1 Sep 2010
New routes to power: towards a typology of

power mediation
LUKE HEEMSBERGEN AND ASAF SINIVER*
Abstract. This article is concerned with a particular debate in mediation literature, revolving
around the merit and necessity of power as a strategy employed by third parties in their
efforts to negotiate a successful resolution to conflict. We argue that by subscribing to a
one-dimensional spectrum of pure-to-power mediation, students of mediation have neglected
the development of how power is conceptualised and operates within the changing dynamics
of conflict and its mediation.
We therefore seek to redefine the concept of power mediation to project a closer fit
between conflicting parties’ understanding of their situation and the methods, aims and
motivations of their mediators. Breaking away from the existing pure-power spectrum, we
propose a heuristic framework that includes four distinct types of power mediation, defined
here as real, made, critical and structural power. The contribution of our heuristic model is
threefold. First, it assists us in asking the most basic question of social science research, ‘of
what is this a case’, which in turn ought to lead to a more sophisticated observation of
mediation instances. Concurrently, through the frame of ‘power’, it establishes common
understanding of observable phenomena that makes the study of mediation more accessible
to the wider audience beyond students of our modest literature. Finally, the synthesis of
epistemological and ontological inquiry of conflict and power with the established
International Relations (IR) approaches of realism(s), constructivism, critical discourse and
structuralism, allows respective real, made, critical and structural types of mediation power
to be tested.
Luke Heemsbergen is a doctoral candidate in the School of Culture & Communication,

University of Melbourne.
Asaf Siniver is Lecturer in International Security, Department of Political Science and

International Studies, University of Birmingham.
This article examines the ‘dissensus’ in mediation literature and speculates on the
reality of multiple aims, methods and expectations that embody modern inter-
national mediation. Mediation is one of the oldest forms of conflict management
and has been used extensively by states and non-state actors since the beginning of
human conflict. While definitions of approaches to mediation vary, there is little
dispute over its prevalence in International Relations (IR) and its importance to
the promotion of peace and security in the world’s most troubled regions.
* A previous version of this article was presented at the Eight International Comparative Studies
Section of the International Studies Association, Paris (14–15 June, 2008). The authors wish to
thank the anonymous reviewers of RIS for their extremely valuable comments on earlier drafts.
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1170 Luke Heemsbergen and Asaf Siniver
Mediation has proved to be the most popular form of conflict management

between 1945–2003, present in nearly 60 per cent of international and intrastate
disputes, while nearly half of all post-Cold War crises were mediated by third
parties.1 Research on mediation is extremely diverse and draws on studies in
political science, sociology, psychology, as well as economics and labour disputes.
However despite the diversity of approaches, mediation can be commonly
understood as a process undertaken by a third party to facilitate an agreement
between disputing parties. In the field of international relations, Princen describes
mediators as ‘third parties who intercede for the purpose of influencing or
facilitating the settlement of a dispute but who do not impose a solution. They are
actors with incentives to be involved but without direct interests in the disputed
issues’.2 Over the years students of mediation have offered a plethora of definitions
and classifications for the purpose of untangling the complex process of mediation.
Why do mediators mediate, and why do the disputing parties seek the assistance
of third parties? What conditions are necessary for successful mediation, and how
should success be measured? How do we know if a conflict is ripe for resolution,
and what strategies can mediators employ during the various phases of the conflict?
These are important questions that have been addressed copiously in the literature,
though the answers they generate are far from consensual.
The article is concerned with a particular debate in mediation literature,
revolving around the merit and necessity of power as a legitimate strategy
employed by third parties in their efforts to negotiate a successful resolution. Power
as defined in this debate centres on the leverage that the mediator can exert on the
disputants in order to move them towards a compromise, by using a wide range
of manipulative or even arguably, coercive tactics, such as the offering of incentives
or tacit ultimatums. The mediator’s power base usually derives from the
organisation he or she represents or from the reputation or status carried by the
individual mediator.3 Power can be used positively (carrots) or negatively (sticks),
and can be of material (economic or military aid) or immaterial (psychological or
moral pressure) in nature.
The issue of a mediator’s leverage over the disputants is therefore central to our
understanding of the nature of the bargaining process between the parties.
According to Jeffery Rubin, a mediator may enjoy up to six different bases of
power: (1) reward power, which enables the mediator to offer the disputants side
payments in exchange for changes in behaviour; (2) coercive power, which relies on
threats and sanctions in order to change disputants’ behaviour; (3) expert power,
which derives from the mediator’s knowledge and expertise on relevant issues;
(4) legitimate power, based on legal authority or international law; (5) referent
power, which stems from the relationship between the mediator and the disputants
and, (6) informational power, which positions the mediator as a message carrier
between the disputants. In reality these sources of power may be used differently
1
J. Bercovitch and J. Fretter, Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to
2003 (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2004), p. 29; K. C. Beardsley et al., ‘Mediation Style and Crisis
Outcomes’, Journal of Conflict Resolution, 50:1 (2006), p. 59.
2
T. Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992),
p. 3.
3
D. G. Pruitt, ‘Mediator Behavior and Success in Negotiation’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in
International Mediation (Hampshire: Palgrave MacMillan, 2002), p. 51.
New routes to power 1171
by different mediators at various points of the mediation process, though Rubin

concedes that in any case ‘some sort of influence must be exercised successfully’.4
In a similar fashion to Rubin, Zartman and Touval5 suggest five possible
sources of power which the mediator may dip into in order to put the disputants
on the path to reconciliation. These are: (1) persuasion, the ability to convince the
disputants that an alternative course of action is preferable to the status quo; (2)
extraction, the ability to persuade the disputants to produce an attractive position;
(3) termination, the ability to withdraw from the entire mediation process – this
should not be exercised too often, due to the risk of credibility loss on behalf of
the mediator; (4) deprivation, the ability to withhold resources from one or both
parties and, (5) gratification, the ability to provide incentives to one party or both.
This is not to say, however, that mediators who do not have access to these bases
of power are less effective. What matters here is the fit between the expectations
of the disputants from the mediator, and the latter’s ability to deliver. Thus if the
purpose of mediation is simply to provide good offices, then there is little need for
the mediator to resort to deprivation or gratification. While these taxonomies are
analytically useful, this concept of power provides only limited interrogation of the
underlying assumptions upon which it is premised, and does not provide sufficient
consideration of the broader theoretical context in which sources of mediation
influence operate. Stated differently, it is necessary to establish explicit links
between the mediator’s utilisation of specific sources of power and underlying
perceptions of politics and the nature of human interaction.
Kleiboer correctly observes that the notion of leverage ‘makes for fuzzy
conceptualizations, and research produces contradictory results concerning its
importance for successful mediation outcome’,6 while Kriesberg concurs that the
question of power in mediation is a ‘matter of dissensus’.7 For some, like
Bercovitch and Rubin, Touval, and Beardsley et al., power is an essential
ingredient – indeed the ‘centrepiece of mediation’, according to Carnevale.8 For
others, including Burton and Duke (1990), Moore (1986) and Slim (1992) the
exercise of power may be detrimental for the prospects of a lasting peaceful
resolution.9 These different outlooks on the role of power in mediation stem from
associated assumptions about trust, impartiality and the motivations behind the
4
J. Rubin, ‘International Mediation in Context’, in J. Bercovitch and J. Z. Rubin (eds), Mediation in
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (New York: St Martin’s Press,
1992), p. 254.
5
I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, ‘International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era’, in Chester A.
Crocker and Fen O. Hampson (eds), Managing Global Chaos (Washington, DC: United States
Institute of Peace, 1996), pp. 445–61.
6
M. Kleiboer, ‘Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation’, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, 40:2 (1996), p. 371.
7
L. Kriesberg, ‘The Development of the Conflict Resolution Field’, in I. W. Zartman and L.
Rasmussen (eds), Peacekeeping in International Conflict: Methods & Techniques (Washington, DC:
US Institute of Peace, 1997), p. 65.
8
J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin (eds), Mediation in International Relations (London: Macmillan, 1992);
S. Touval, The Peace Brokers: Mediators in the Arab–Israeli Conflict, 1948–1979 (Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1982); Beardsley et al., ‘Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes’; P.
Carnevale, ‘Mediating from Strength’, in J. Bercovitch (ed.), Studies in International Mediation:
Essays in Honor of Jeffrey Z. Rubin (London: Palgrave-MacMillan), p. 33.
9
J. Burton and F. Dukes, Conflict: Practices, Settlement, and Resolution (London: Macmillan, 1990);
C. Moore, The Mediation Process: Practical Strategies for Resolving Conflict (San Francisco CA:
Jossey-Bass, 1986); R. Slim, ‘Small State Mediation in International Relations: The Algerian
Mediation of the Iranian Hostage Crisis’, in J. Bercovitch and J. Rubin (eds), Mediation in
decision of the mediator and the disputants to enter the bargaining process.
Accordingly it is possible to discern between two bookends in the literature – those
who advocate a ‘power’ approach to mediation, and those who emphasise a ‘pure’
form of intervention. This useful distinction between low power-low stake and high
power-high stake mediators was made more than a decade ago by Smith,10 who
suggests that in essence, the power debate is a matter of expectations. We expect,
indeed choose, ‘power’ mediators because they can tap into a rich pool of resources
and strategies in attempting to reach a resolution. The expectation from ‘pure’
mediators, on the other hand, is that they position themselves in between the
parties and use mainly communicative tactics to push toward an agreement.
While these rhetorical debates often provide us with persuasive arguments
about the linkage between degrees of exercised power and expected mediation
outcomes, they rarely concern themselves with the concept of power in mediation
itself. Eager to produce empirical or normative justifications for either a ‘power’ or
‘pure’ types of mediation, students of the field rarely stop to decipher the
ontological and epistemological assumptions inherent their concept of power
mediation.
Accordingly it is the task of this article to redefine the concept of power
mediation so it projects a closer fit between both conflicting parties’ and mediators’
understanding of their situation, methods, aims and motivations of action.
Breaking away from the existing pure-power spectrum, we propose a heuristic
framework which entails a typology of four distinct ‘routes’ to power mediation,
defined here as real, made, critical and structural. These types are intrinsically
linked to established paradigms of thought in the field of international relations,
and based on the sociological work of Burell and Morgan and Kleiboer and t’Hart,
enable us to provide a more nuanced model which is aware of different ontological
and epistemological inferences present in each of these four possible ‘routes’ to
mediation power.11
We therefore suggest that neo-realism propels real power mediators to focus on
leverage, de-escalation and self-interest; (Wendtian) constructivism informs made
power mediators about the recalculation of perceptions and the possibility of
positive sum gains in the mediation process; structuralism explains how structural
power mediators work for the purpose of managing empire and maintaining the
systemic status quo; and finally idealist approaches to IR are at the base of critical
power mediation, typically characterised by an altruistic imperative to make the
world a better place. The contribution of our heuristic model is threefold. First, it
assists us in asking the most basic question of social science research, ‘of what is
this a case’, which in turn ought to lead to a more sophisticated observation of
mediation instances. Second, through the frame of ‘power’, it establishes common
understanding of observable phenomena that makes the study of mediation more
accessible to a wider audience beyond the students of this modest literature, while
International Relations: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management (New York: St. Martin’s Press),
pp. 216–31.
10
J. D. Smith, ‘Mediator Impartiality: Banishing the Chimera’, Journal of Peace Research, 31:4 (1994),
pp. 445–50.
11
G. Burrell and G. Morgan, ‘Sociological Paradigms and Organisational Analysis: Elements of the
Sociology of Corporate Life (London: Heinemann, 1979); M. Kleiboer and P. t’Hart, ‘Time to Talk?
Multiple Perspectives on Timing in International Mediation’, Cooperation and Conflict, 30:4 (1995),
pp. 307–48.
theoretically grounding mediation literature’s cacophony of known types, sources

and forces. Finally, the synthesis of epistemological and ontological inquiry of
conflict and power with established IR approaches, allows real, made, critical and
structural types of mediation power to be applied in policy and practice.
The following discussion consists of four parts. First, we provide the necessary
conceptual background by discussing the relevant mediation literature that
addresses known points on the pure-power spectrum. Second, we add intellectual
depth to the construct of mediation by problematising pure and power mediation
on dimensions of their respective ontological and epistemological roots. Third, a
synthesis of our philosophical findings to the aforementioned approaches to IR,
namely realism(s), constructivism, critical discourse and structuralism, produces a
new framework of power mediation that consists of real, structural, made and
critical routes to mediation power. We conclude by offering empirical observations
of mediation instances in the Arab-Israeli conflict, and put forth likely incidents in
which each mode was accepted by the disputants. We suggest that ultimately, these
alternative routes to mediation power will be adopted based on their perceived
likelihood of delivering an acceptable outcome. Importantly, we use the heuristic
not to treat these conceptual forms as competing or vying for recognition as the
important operation of mediation in a particular situation. Instead, we urge
scholars to see how the typology captures different and interrelated routes in which
mediators can be accepted by disputants to facilitate interactions between them.
More than a reshuffling of scholars’ ontological and epistemological deck for its
own sake, we argue that the new typology of power mediation can help interpret
how disputants perceive, diagnose and react to their conflicts and resolution
therein. Specifically, circumspect policy towards disputants who perceive identity as
the source of conflict, and demand a specific type of mediator power vis-à-vis
disputants perceiving bargaining failure as the source of conflict, and thus require
another type of mediator power is possible. We would suggest that both scholars
and practitioners would be in disservice if insistent on using only the power of
what one might call traditional leverage when an alternative such as critical power
is expected and therefore required.
The pure-power spectrum
Although perpetuated in the literature beforehand, the distinction between pure

and power forms of mediation was made explicit by Fisher and Keashley, and has
recently been revived in the quantitative context by Rauchhaus.12 Pure mediation
commonly involves attempts to ‘facilitate a negotiated settlement [. . .] and uses
reasoning, persuasion, the control of information, and the suggestion of alterna-
tives’, whereas power mediation ‘includes the use of leverage or coercion by the
third party in the form of promised rewards or threatened punishments. In a very
real sense, the third party becomes a member of a negotiating triad and bargains
12
R. Fisher and L. Keashley, ‘The Potential Complementarity of Mediation and Consultation within
a Contingency Model of Third Party Intervention’, Journal of Peace Research, 28:1 (1991),
pp. 29–42; R. Rauchhaus, ‘Asymetric Information, Mediation, and Conflict Management’, World
Politics, 58:2 (2006), pp. 207–41.
with each party, using carrots and sticks, to move them toward a settlement’.13 In
his study of bias and impartiality in mediation, James Smith draws on this
distinction to suggest that rather than asking whether impartiality is conducive to
successful mediation, we should study the fit between impartiality and specific types
of mediation. Thus a ‘power’ mediator may use his or her bias as leverage for
success, whereas for ‘pure’ mediators impartiality is necessary for the development
of trust and confidence between the disputants and the mediator. Smith concludes
that neither approach to mediation is more valid than the other, since ‘when both
pure and power mediators become involved in conflicts, both will face certain
obstacles’.14 Understanding mediation as a dynamic and evolutionary process with
relation to the changing nature of conflict is essential here. When a conflict reaches
‘polarisation’ (to use Fisher and Keashley’s terminology), pure mediation is
desirable, but as conflict becomes ‘destructive’, more active intervention or
‘mediation with muscle’ is required to curb escalation.15
Understanding the difference between pure and power forms of mediation is
important not least because they also inform our conceptualisation of mediation
success and failure. For the pure mediator, success may be defined as the
facilitation of communication between the disputants, or a change in motivation to
negotiate.16 For the power-savvy mediator on the other hand, achievements of this
sort may be labelled as ‘pre-mediation’ or conciliation, and success is therefore
understood as the conclusion of a tangible agreement.17 Conversely, purists will
classify some forms of power mediation as ‘coercive intervention’ which exists
outside the legitimate strategies of mediation.18 Thus the issue at hand is not
merely definitional but a metatheoretical debate which penetrates into the
normative assumptions that are essential for our understanding of pure and power
approaches to mediation and the framing of success and failure.
Beyond the simple ability to move the disputants toward an agreement, power
also implies indirect interest in the conflict on behalf of the mediator. Princen19
makes the useful distinction between neutral and principal mediators, depending on
their respective stakes in the conflict. Accordingly neutral mediators intervene for
seemingly altruistic reasons. They have no real interest in the peculiarities of the
conflict, or indeed its outcome, and tend to have little resources to bring to the
table. Thus by concentrating on providing good offices and facilitating channels of
communication they offer a ‘pure’ form of mediation, free from manipulation and
the rewarding or withdrawing of incentives to the parties. Their legitimacy may
stem from their reputation as ‘peacemakers’ (like Norway in the Middle East and
the Caucasus) or their consensual position in society (like the Pope in the Beagle
Channel dispute between Chile and Argentina). On the other hand principal
13
Fisher and Keashley, ‘The Potential Complementarity of Mediation’, p. 33.
14
Smith, ‘Mediator Impartiality’, p. 448.
15
J. Bercovitch and A. Houston, ‘The Study of International Mediation: Theoretical Issues and
Empirical Evidence’, J. Bercovitch (ed.), Resolving International Conflicts (Boulder CO: Lynne
Rienner, 2000), p. 177; Fisher and Keashley, ‘The Potential Complementarity of Mediation’.
16
J. Egeland, ‘The Oslo Accord: Multiparty Mediation through the Norwegian Channel’, in C.
Crocker et al. (eds), Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World (Washington DC: US
Institute of Peace Press, 1999), pp. 537–46.
17
Fisher and Keashley, ‘The Potential Complementarity of Mediation’, p. 33.
18
Touval, The Peace Brokers, p. 275.
19
Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict.
mediators are less modest both in their motivation to mediate and the resources
they bring to the negotiation table. The most obvious example here is the active
involvement of successive American administrations in the Middle East peace
Process. The frequent mediation efforts by US representatives are driven mostly by
a strategic interest in the region, circumspect of any ongoing or emerging crises.
However rather than being deterred by this type of power mediation, American
intervention is generally welcomed by the parties as it carries with it the prospect
of rewards and incentives for cooperation, that pure, or neutral mediators cannot
offer. The mediator’s indirect interest in the conflict therefore may serve as an
important determinant of the mediator’s exercise of power.
Other determinants of the approach to mediation are environmental factors.
Among these are the effects of Western versus non-Western cultures. Eastern or
non-Western mediators generally value harmonious approaches to mediation, but
they are also prone to use power tactics due to the nature of a traditional,
status-conscious society.20 On the other hand, Western mediators may be less
inclined to resort to manipulative and coercive tactics of mediation because they
are perceived as not wholly legitimate in the context of a liberal egalitarian
society.21 Note that the seemingly exceptional case of US coercive mediation in the
Middle East during the Kissinger era took place in a non-Western environment,
where at least one party (Egypt) was conscious of the merit of power in mediation.
Indeed Murray suggests that the concept of power is not alien to Egyptian
negotiators.22
Another important environmental factor may involve the mediator’s assessment
of the likelihood of success within the constraints of time and space.23 The prospect
of failure, much like the hangman’s noose, wonderfully focuses the minds of
mediators (and disputants alike), and may result in more active and forceful tactics
of mediation.
In an attempt to quantify success, a recent study by Beardsley et al. utilises a
common typology in the literature of mediation styles, that of facilitation,
formulation and manipulation.24 Drawing on empirical data from the International
Crisis Behaviour Project, Beardsley and his colleagues contend that each of the
three mediation styles has a distinct impact on the outcome of mediated crises.
Thus a manipulative style of mediation (understood here as power mediation) has
the strongest effect on the likelihood of reaching a formal agreement and crisis
abatement. This is not to say that facilitative or formulative (pure) styles of
mediation are less effective. Indeed they can be useful in reducing tensions for the
long-term. That Beardsley et al. drop another point on the power-pure spectrum
confirms not only the relevance of different mediation ‘types’, but also the need to
increase the depth of the concept of mediation from the single set of bookends
developed by Smith.
20
D. Baine and D. Sawatzky, ‘Mediation Methods as an Adjunct to Counselling Couples’,
International Journal for the Advancement of Counseling, 15:4 (1992), pp. 273–84.
21
J. Wall and J. Stark, ‘North American Conflict Management’, in K. Leung and D. Tjosvold (eds),
Conflict Management in the Asian Pacific (New York: John Wiley, 1998), pp. 303–34.
22
J. Murray, ‘The Cairo Stories: Some Reflections on Conflict Resolution in Egypt’, Negotiation
Journal, 13:1 (1997), pp. 39–60.
23
T. Milburn and P. Isaac, ‘Prospect Theory: Implications for International Mediation’, Peace and
Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology, 1:4 (1995), pp. 333–42.
24
Beardsley, et al., ‘Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes’, pp. 58–86.
A shift away from pure-power duality
By studying mediation ‘styles’ along a pure-power spectrum, and labelling each end
as disparate (albeit valid) approaches, Smith identifies, but glosses over important
differences in how conflicts are analysed and reacted to. Exploring layers of
assumption behind this one-dimensional duality will allow a more nuanced
discussion of what mediation is an instance of and reconceptualise the dimensions
of power in mediation. Distinct differences in aim, method and motivation found in
pure and power styles of mediation highlight important philosophical divides that
can be extrapolated through to the study of politics writ large. We shall now try
to identify those ontological and epistemological assumptions within the ‘power’
and ‘pure’ styles of mediation on multidimensional spectra concerning the nature
of conflict and the constraints of reality, before linking these assumptions back to
contemporary approaches of IR.
First, it is relevant to point out similar dualities to that mentioned by Smith in
the wider literatures of conflict management and resolution, multiparty negotia-
tions and general diplomacy. Writing on conflict management in Northern Ireland,
Bloomfield25 identifies two divergent approaches to the troubles; one deals with
settlement brought about by power induced de-escalation of violence to a point
that is agreeable by the parties involved, while the other emphasises resolution of
causal factors. From the latter approach, to ease the long-term tensions in conflicts
(mediated or not), merely manipulating power structures to some sort of livable
stasis will not suffice in and of itself. Indeed a ‘pure’ approach to conflict resolution
is seen to compete with conflict management. With regard to multiparty negotia-
tions, Crocker et al. identify a divergence of what they label structuralist and
social-psychological paradigms of mediation. The former looks to objective
problem-solving, ‘mutually acceptable’ to both parties, while the latter focuses on
collaborative learning and resolution via changing (of) perceptions.26 Again,
Smith’s pure and power spectrum can be generalised from respective methods and
aims found in psychosocial change or bargained compromise. Past the strict
discipline of mediation, this same delineation can be overlaid to Track I and Track
II diplomacy. In the latter, unofficial channels of communication can create levels
of interaction and opportunities for compromise not available to official diplomatic
tracks focused on alleviating conflict through state-to-state bargaining.27 Finally,
one can infer a similar duality running through Bush’s attempt to connect the
practice and theory of negotiation with the language of ‘top down’ and ‘bottom up’
approaches used to describe practitioner methods observed in the diplomatic
experiences of David Malone, Harold Saunders, and Jan Eliasson.28
Observing reoccurring dualities similar to those of pure and power mediation,
may be evidence of the disparate philosophical approach different mediators
assume and parties may or may not accept. Deeper than procedural differences, the
25
D. Bloomfield, Peacemaking Strategies in Northern Ireland: Building Complementarity in Conflict
Management Theory (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1997).
26
Crocker et al., Herding Cats, p. 24.
27
H. Saunders, ‘Prenegotiation and Circum-negotiation: Arenas of the Peace Process’, in C. Crocker
et al. (eds), Managing Global Chaos (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 1996),
p. 426.
28
R. Bush, ‘Realizing the Potential of International Conflict Work: Connections between Practice and
Theory’, Negotiation Journal, 19:1 (2003), pp. 97–103.
evidence suggests a substantive difference in both aims and motivations of

mediation. Aims of mediators (and disputants) are influenced by what they think
conflict is and their motivations influenced via what they think conflict does. In
other words, the philosophies underpinning pure and power mediation grow from
different epistemologies and ontologies. Karin Aggestam among others provides a
cogent trace of the above dualities to assumptions of ontology and epistemology.29
For Aggestam, how power and pure styles of mediation (or ‘manipulation-power
[and] communication-facilitation’ styles in her words), conceptualise the origin and
nature of conflict, is directly reflected in their mediation techniques, aims and
measurements of success. For those Track II, ‘social-psychological’ descriptions, an
ontology of conflict as opportunity for change brings techniques aimed at
subjective, relational understanding of viewpoints and party concerns. Aims are to
understand, from the bottom up, the causal factors that lead to conflict between
parties and constitute new positions. Rather than identify and compensate via
bargaining, they wish to modify both parties understanding and identification with
the conflict itself. Success then rests on the cornerstone of constructing a shift in
the subjective perception of parties’ relations to each other. Power savvy
mediation-based techniques on the other hand, feature the concept of leverage and
rational reciprocity. Success can include brokering a compromise through divvying
gains and threats between parties until a reasonable stasis is tenable.
Mediator motivations are played out on a second philosophical axis, divided by
rational explanation on one hand, and more subjective descriptions on the other:
students of mediation seem caught up in the larger positivist/post-positivist debate
of international relations theory.30 ‘Positivist’ mediators aim to correct unbalanced
appropriations and relationships through incentive of (non-direct) gains from
dissuading conflict to either maintain larger order of power structures or affect
relative gains within that zero sum order. ‘Post-positivist’ mediation aims to shift
perceptions of the conflict to create a change of relations for internal or external
goals. It is motivated to create gains from the status quo – create change and
positive sum games from situations that were previously defined as intractable.
These different combinations of motivations, goals – and subsequently, perceived
effectiveness – encapsulate divergent philosophical assumptions that pure and
power styles of mediation identify but gloss over.
Thus, James Smith’s ironic play on the phrase ‘Banishing the Chimera’ in his
1994 study of mediator impartiality, attempts to accept a ‘both and’ approach,
valuing both the rational power processes and the subjective pure processes of
mediation. However, a more substantive appraisal of both is required to facilitate
not only the traditional identification of those circumstances ‘ripe’ for mediation,
but more so, how to approach what mediation is itself an instance of and how to
find measures of available success. Thus, problematising pure and power media-
tion opens for analysis larger casual beliefs, normative claims and the very
conceptual mechanisms assumed within each style of mediation on axes of
ontology and epistemology, which influence if not define mediation aims, methods
and motivations.
29
K. Aggestam, ‘Mediating Asymmetrical Conflict’, Mediterranean Politics, 7:1 (2002), pp. 69–91.
30
S. Smith, ‘Singing Our World into Existence: International Relations Theory and September 11’,
International Studies Quarterly, 48:3 (2004), pp. 499–515.

!

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Figure 1.
The added ontological and epistemological dimensions explored above – and

flattened to pure and power mediation – are artfully dealt with in the heuristic
employed by Kleiboer and t’Hart (henceforth KtH) to study mediation timing and
success. KtH provide a cogent framework with which to ‘generate coherent
theoretical positions’ with regard to mediation and international relations. They
employ a matrix based on Burell and Morgan’s sociological inquiry to elicit claims
that mediation may consist of three additional ‘distinct interpretive frameworks’,31
based on the two divergent philosophical axes discussed above. Adding to the
traditional rational brokerage model of ‘power’ mediation, KtH explain the
frameworks to stem from spectra that dispute both the nature of society (and by
extension, conflict) and philosophy of science. On one spectrum, there is rationalist
thought, perpetuating the observable reality of positivism set against a subjectivist
epistemology of post-positivism. Second, KtH differentiate on an ‘order-change’
dimension of conflict analysis, that delineates conflict as a challenge to order or
conversely as an opportunity for change. From these two axes, four ‘styles’ of
mediation are deducted. The three conceptual departures from the conventional
31
Kleiboer and Hart, ‘Time to Talk?’, p. 312.
view of power brokerage mediation are labeled, mediation as: Re-aligning

Perceptions, Re-establishing Social Relationships and as Domination.32
By refining KtH’s work, we can move to a more nuanced representation of
mediatory options with regard to underlying political assumptions, while describing
these options in terms of power and political utility. This approach may allow
some clarity to the exercise of attempting to fit seemingly diverse sources of
mediator power, or leverage, across the one-dimensional spectrum of Smith.
Significantly, this exercise may also help predict situations where certain types/
powers of mediation will be appreciated by the parties in conflict and thus, more
readily lead to effective mediation. Examples of where (and how) each idealised
route empowers mediation will be explored after a survey of all four. It should be
noted that the forthcoming ‘ideal types’ of option and situation, in the Weberian
sense, are somewhat unreal constructs designed to ‘penetrate to the real casual
interrelationships’33 and hope to hypothesise more accurate directions past pure
and power styles. Importantly, we do not draw conclusions from a static ‘referent
object’ of mediation as an analytical end point. Instead we seek to re-examine the
concept of mediation itself, by asking ‘of what is this an instance’ in relation to
assumptions of ontology and epistemology present in common IR theories.
To link mediation to politics and specifically the discipline of international
relations, we must also consider that ‘instance of’ which real politik considers the
most important. While KtH used the above matrix to focus temporal considera-
tions of mediation to their proto-theories, we relate modified ‘proto-theories’ to
what defines the political: power. Of course, projects to define and explain power
in international politics offer a similar cacophony within the interdisciplinary
debates on mediation.
For (neo-)realists, the power equation is quite simple: power defined in
traditional terms is, as Kim Nossal argues, ‘the ability to prevail in a conflict of
interests with someone else [. . .] Power is thus always and necessarily highly
negative, at least for the one being prevailed against’.34 Not surprisingly, a similar
debate to pure and power mediation appears in discussions on power, with the
critique of such hard realist assumptions. Joseph Nye, promoting more positive
power within a rational world, famously defined ‘soft power’ as ‘the ability to
achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than
coercion’.35 Although scholars such as Nossal concede that soft power can change
the definition of adversarial interests and by definition, can eliminate that conflict
of interest, they do not see it useful to define such as power as adequate descriptors
for these concepts already exist in persuasion and inducement. For the realist then,
power is manifested in the ability to make decisions with force or its threat.36
However, a second dimension of how to think about power lies not only within
making decisions, but also in setting the agenda. Much a response to Mills’ ‘elite’37
and Dahl’s ‘pluralist’ representations, this second dimension is relevant to soft
32
Ibid., p. 338.
33
R. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (Princeton,
Princeton University Press, 1984), p. 70.
34
K. Nossal, ‘Foreign Policy for Wimps’, Ottawa Citizen (23 April 1998), p. 19.
35
J. Nye, Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power (New York: Basic Books, 1990),
p. 12.
36
R. Dahl, Who Governs? (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1961).
37
C. Mills, The Power Elite (New York: Oxford University Press, 1956).
power’s ability to persuade and influence. Moreover, additional conceptual insights

are found in Lukes’38 ‘radical view’ of three-dimensional power, which adequately
described repression and response not only at the end of bayonets or repressive
diktats, but in structural constraints of the oppressed’s own making – a process
Giddens would later identify with structuration, while Robert Cox interpreted less
optimistically in neo-Gramscian terms.39 Within debates on structure, agency,
influence and coercion, explanations of power have succumbed to the great debate
of subjectivity that spans from power in politics to the essence of mediation. Power
then, as a concept, holds similar philosophical assumption structures to those
encountered when asking what mediation is an instance of.
Calling out these conceptual assumptions, Barnett and Duval’s taxonomy of
power in international politics proposes a related mechanism of deciphering power
to our inquiry of mediation.40 They premise that Carr’s41 wedding of realism to
power has led realism’s theoretical rivals to neglect the development of how power
is conceptualised and operates within their own theories. Filling the conceptual
gaps, they identify different types of power in those social relations that constitute
relationship and identity from those that let static actors interact, and a further
delineation between direct relations (compelling another to do something he/she
would not otherwise do) and a more ‘distant’ or diffuse power, which is found in
both the rules of institutions and more radical discursive accounts of knowledge
structures and (neo-)historical materialism.
Without explicitly referencing the debates at hand, Barnett and Duval have
identified epistemological and ontological divides within social science. Social
relations that are constitutive rather than merely interactive speak to a post-
positivist epistemological understanding versus the objective reality, while direct
and diffuse power can be linked to more normative statements regarding social
relations’ ability to manage or resolve questions of hierarchy or change within
power and conflict. Although these axes do not precisely overlay KtH’s heuristic,
nor our realignment to dimensions of mediation power, discussion on the multiple
conceptions of power highlights the utility of asking the question ‘of what is this
an instance’ and thus best influences its outcome.
A typology of power mediation
We now turn to focus our analysis on relating the assumptions behind the KtH
models with specific IR theory to synthesise concepts of mediation power. We
propose a heuristic framework composed of four ideal concepts of power
mediation with their related aims, processes, and motivations that can be
delineated as:
38
S. Lukes, Power: A Radical View (London: MacMillan, 1974).
39
A. Giddens, The Constitution of Society (Berkeley: The University of California Press, 1984); R. Cox,
‘Social Forces, States and World Orders’, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 10:2 (1981),
pp. 126–55.
40
M. Barnett and R. Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, International Organization, 59:1: (2005),
pp. 39–75.
41
E. Carr, What is History? (London: Penguin, 1961).
Figure 2.
– ‘real power’, which focuses on leverage, de-escalation and self interest,

– ‘made power’, which changes perceptions and uses leverage for positive gains,
– ‘critical power’, which emancipates sectors of humanity for the unabashed
‘public interest’, and lastly,
– ‘structural power’, which manages empire and maintains the current order of
the larger system.
The conventional power brokerage view of mediation as described by KtH is
largely congruent with Smith’s power style and fits on the positivist side of the
ontological divide. More importantly however, are the normative assumptions
present. First, the endemic nature of conflict means conflicts cannot be easily
resolved, and therefore, the ‘maximum feasible form of conflict management
reduces the intensity of the conflict below escalation thresholds’. Barnett and Duval
would label this an instance of ‘compulsory’ power that is direct and focused on
the interactions of the specific actors/parties to mediation.42 Under this rubric, and
in accordance with Smith, mediators need not be and rarely are impartial, while
42
Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, p. 39.
they are usually powerful.43 Indeed, in endemic conflict, the most important tool
for a mediator becomes what can be termed real power, or leverage via the
proverbial sticks and carrots. In the mediation literature, mediators using what
Carnevale might identify as strategic resources or real power to influence situations
of indirect interest explains not only real actions, but describes realist conceptions
of conflict. Thus, we may be able to predict in which situations real power will be
appreciated by the parties involved, and can achieve results.
The next mediator option clearly falls outside Smith’s pure/power dimension.
Related to both the ideational purity and material power mediation, those
mediators utilising what we call here made power make their efforts from a
neo-realist milieu, but attempt to shape perceptions in, and ‘sense making’ of
conflicts.44 Although Kleiboer and t’Hart shy from the term constructivism in their
analysis, Wendtian links are clear.45 Interestingly, Kleiboer’s subsequent study
steers further away from the constructive approach, instead opting for the rather
generic ‘problem solving’ concept of mediation.46 Still, a similar ontology, if not
epistemology to constructivism can easily be fleshed out from what KtH formally
title ‘Mediation as Re-aligning Perceptions’.47 From our perspective, that ‘made
power’ mediators should possess leverage but not be perceived as overtly partial for
reasons of trust via psychological empathy and identification is not surprising.
Pushing KtH’s prototheory to be more in line with the (neo-)realist tendencies of
Wendt while helping ground claims of mediation literature, we argue that
mediators invoking ‘made power’, in addition to self help, are more concerned with
what Thomas Princen terms ‘private interests’ such as enhancing prestige or
extracting relative gains from one of the disputants, than ‘public interests’ such as
peace, stability and order for the larger community ‘for its own sake’. Our
distinction disambiguates Princen’s concept of the ‘neutral mediator’ who seem-
ingly becomes involved in conflict mediation for an array of reasons, ranging from
the desire to see agreement reached, peace realised, efficiencies gained, through to
the need to improve self image or burnish reputations as peace makers or
statesmen, or even religious and philosophical reasons.48
The distinction is also conceptually important as public interests, or commenc-
ing mediation for its own sake, makes a normative statement on the importance of
a ‘more humane world society’ and implies motivation of ‘changing social
relationships’ in KtH’s language.49 Thus, in its third conceptual iteration,
mediation (and conflict) is seen in a critical light, as an opportunity for social
change, which should not be mitigated by traditional power structures. Smith’s
pure style of mediation is largely in line with this iteration of mediator who ‘should
be a skilful neutral actor with no stake in the conflict’ other than more humane
world society.50 However, our conception of ‘critical power’ mediation further
develops impartiality past Smith’s assertion that not having a ‘stake in the
43
44
Ibid., p. 323.
45
The epistemological ‘double dipping’ of constructivist approaches such as Wendt’s are noted as in
some ways restricting this ‘approach’ from being credited as political theory.
46
M. Kleiboer, The Multiple Realities of International Mediation (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998).
47
48
Princen, Intermediaries in International Conflict, p. 50.
49
Kleiboer and Hart, ‘Time to Talk?’, pp. 337–8.
50
Ibid., p. 329.
outcome’ is a ‘measure of impartiality’,51 and Princen’s subtractive description of

the neutral mediator. First, there is clearly a normative critical ‘stake in the
outcome’ if one views conflict as a transformative emancipatory process rather
than a shuffling of hierarchy. Staking opportunity within conflict holds moral,
critical, discursive power, and therefore acknowledges the importance of imparti-
ality. This is in line with Zartman’s realisation that ‘moral authority’ can be a
major source of strength in mediation.52 Second, critical power mediators are
normatively attached to Princen’s ‘public interests’ and do not mediate out of
‘private interests’ nor flip back and forth indefinitely. Importantly, this critical
normative authority is not present in all mediators – nor is it necessary in
management of situations where conflict is conceptualised as endemic and coercion
is deemed necessary to satisfy goals of indirect interest, or maintaining the larger
system. Indeed, for these ‘critical power’ mediators, the essence of power is
‘productive’, moving away from structures per se, to systems of signification and
meaning, and to networks of social forces perpetually shaping one another.53
Finally, looking to the last KtH-based type, takes mediation as ‘an instance of’
domination, where the powerful act to prevent shuffling of the larger international
political/economic structure. Mediators can include powerful states and inter-
national institutions. Back to objective reality based in gains, treasure and materiel,
the fulcrum of mediator leverage in this case is administered via parties’ desire to
remain part of the world system and the mediator’s structural power to allow them
to do so. Conceptualising this type of mediation power, it can be argued that within
structural power mediation, parties may not have a choice in accepting mediation
terms as the context for mediation and any negotiation may actually be created,
controlled and concluded by the mediator. Although KtH point to the obvious
structural IR approaches such as Dependency and World Systems Theories, struc-
tural power may be present outside of their strict Marxian constraints.
Students of historical materialists bordering on the ideational explanations such
as Gill, Cox and other (neo-)Gramscians might also explain international media-
tion in terms of structural appeasement. Further, in regards to power, Barnett and
Duval identify the structure of global capitalism as substantially determinative of
the capacities and resources of its actors. From their perspective, while power exists
in coercion and institutional arrangements (and possibly emancipatory morality),
to understand the workings of the global capitalist economy requires recognition
of the constitutive structure of global production relations.54
For current students of IR theory, the value of our discrete types of power
mediation is notable in even basic exploratory rubrics of the discipline. Applying the
perspective of an atomistic prisoner’s dilemma ‘game’, as first developed by the
RAND Corporation and Nash,55 in order to dissuade parties from ‘cheating’ by
exacerbating the conflict or maintaining the status quo stalemate, an impartial
mediator utilising critical power has distinct advantages to other routes of power
mediation, as well as more the ambiguous pure and power types. Critical power not
51
Smith, ‘Mediator Impartiality’, p. 446.
52
I. W. Zartman, ‘The Unfinished Agenda: Negotiating Internal Conflicts’, in R. Licklider (ed.),
Stopping the Killing (New York: New York University Press, 1993).
53
Barnett and Duvall, ‘Power in International Politics’, p. 55.
54
Ibid., p. 54.
55
J. Nash, ‘The Bargaining Problem’, Econometrica, 18:2 (1950), pp. 155–62
only provides ‘perfect information’ with respect to the game, but also ensures a
normative stake in the conflict that strives for the ‘win-win’ outcome of the game
matrix: critical power ensures progressing the ‘public good’ rather than progressing
the mediator’s own private interests, which might easily lead to suboptimal outcomes
of the game.56 These suboptimal outcomes are a valid possibility when dealing with
neutral and pure mediators, whose incentives, motivations and assumptions on what
conflict is may interfere with the game – or even the definition of wining.57
Our typology of power mediation can also be applied to conflicts defined by,
or perceived through, power asymmetries. First, building on Copeland’s study of
major wars, if a state’s waning power is seen as a variable contributing to conflict,
the state may welcome the methods of a mediator with the structural power to
uphold the current system and the state’s position in it.58 Conversely, through
Krasner’s lens, a rising state, cognisant of how carrots (and sticks) could influence
its assent, may respond best to real power mediation.59 This noted disconnect
between the rise and fall of nations may in fact preclude mediation from becoming
an acceptable option in resolving conflicts perceived as such by the paired parties
involved. However, in either asymmetrical power situation, a partial mediator
employing routes of real or structural power has a better chance of affecting
influence over the stronger state in a conflict than the weaker state could hope for
by itself or with an impartial mediator relying on critical power. Bias may then be
as much a marker of underlying epistemological and ontological assumptions as it
is predicted through more traditional relational connections (trade, culture,
history). A question to answer becomes not if the mediator is biased, but how one
becomes so. The above two constructs of international relations and multidimen-
sional power seem to provide preliminary evidence of improved explanations of
success compared to canonical pure and power positions. In short, with a typology
of power mediation, epistemological and ontological nuances of conflict are
accounted for and can be responded to in kind. Importantly, that even disputants
using mediation for ‘devious objectives’ forward their perceived interests and define
success via the mediator. Observing and reacting to past and present behaviour and
circumstance that suggest certain ontological and epistemological stances would
benefit mediator acceptability and capability.
As shown in the revised axis of Figure 3, each of the four types discussed is
based on unique ontological and epistemological assumptions, aligned to a major
IR theory, and conceptualised through power. These routes to power mediation
and the options they afford provide improved conceptual depth to the original line
56
The complexity of two-level game however, offers different incentives and logics. In the language of
Robert Putnam, looking at ‘acceptability sets’ and the ever-important win set, it can be argued that
real or structural dimensions can significantly shift acceptability sets by exerting influence on the
second, ‘ratifying layer’ of parties undertaking negotiations. This ratifying layer can be accounted for
by the practical possibilities of legislation and policy formed through domestic constraints. Thus,
keeping the domestic win set small, but shifted to be within the shared international acceptability set
provides optimal bargaining positions. In other words, leverage can re-position a specific pareto
acceptable outcome (that is, maximum gains without incurring more loss) at both layers that was
previously unavailable. See R. Putnam, ‘Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level
Games’, International Organization, 42:3 (1988), pp. 427–60.
57
O. Richmond, ‘Devious Objectives and the Disputants’ View of International Mediation: A
Theoretical Framework’, Journal of Peace Research, 35:6 (1998), pp. 707–22.
58
D. Copeland, The Origins of Major Wars (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 2000).
59
S. Krasner, International Regimes (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983).

Figure 3.
of Smith’s one dimensional spectrum of pure and power mediation. Visualising the
conceptual power(s) of mediation as shown allows comparison of the epistemo-
logical and ontological assumptions beneath so-called pure and power mediation.
We build from KtH’s own heuristic to channel answers ‘of what is this an instance’
through a multi-dimensional, but conceptually aligned subject of political inquiry:
Power Mediation. Our resultant typology presents not only a more nuanced basis
from which to understand mediator action, motivation and bias of success, but also
a platform from which better-informed mediation theory can be applied to
practice. Specifically, as will be explored below, our typology is applicable in
mediation practice vis-à-vis disputants’ perceptions, actions and the requirements
for and definitions of success.
Conclusion: The four types of power mediation in the Arab-Israeli conflict
Moving to the application of the typology of power mediation, we aim to find

those situations in international relations where the distinct mediation powers are
accessible and agreeable to parties seeking third party mediation. Building on

Barnett and Duval’s view on power in politics, we expect that different forms of
mediation power will have different domains of application, illuminating ways in
which mediators can affect the ability of actors to control their fates. In his study
of nationalist rivalries, Barry Posen remarks on the explanatory power of the
‘security dilemma’ in adding to the inevitability of conflict, ‘if outsiders wish to
understand and perhaps reduce the odds of conflict, they must asses the local
groups’ strategic view of their situation.’.60 This strategic view of what groups
define as their situation – what they believe their conflict is an instance of – could
be a crucial factor in determining how mediation power(s) are agreed upon as able
to alleviate or as necessary, resolve conflict. Returning to Smith’s claim that there
are certain situations where certain types of mediation are best suited, we shall now
examine the practical implications of our heuristic by applying each of the four
types of mediation power to distinct phases in third party mediation in the
Arab-Israeli conflict.
We argue that the main utility of this study lies beyond the advancement of a
heuristic framework to the study of power mediation. The ontological and
epistemological positions postulated here are not merely derived from competing
intellectual stances; rather they are directly linked to the very perceptions of the
actors in the conflict. The way in which actors perceive the causes of conflict
informs their chosen type of mediation. Whereas some scholars61 argue that there
is only one type of power mediation – commonly depicted as the traditional use
of carrots and sticks – we advance that all mediators have ample power,
understood as and expressed through the abovementioned typology.
When this typology is applied to the experience of third party mediation
throughout the various phases of the Arab-Israeli conflict, it is evident that
mediators are indeed cognisant of their choices of mediation. The record of
mediation here suggests that the abundance of approaches to conflict management
and resolution, and the resultant mediation strategies, can be successfully linked to
the mediator’s ontological and epistemological stances on the causes of conflict and
desired routes to bring to its resolution. These stances frame the mediator’s
behaviour, almost independently of ongoing patterns of bargaining between the
disputants, and can therefore account for the degree of effectiveness of a given
mediation process. The wider the gap is between the mediator’s own construction
of the nature of the conflict, and the actual necessities of the disputants to the
conflict, the less likely we are to see the convergence of expectations and attitudes
between the mediator and the disputants. We argue that for a mediator to be
accepted by the disputing parties and to perform its role effectively, not only does
the mediator need to be aware of its own ontological and epistemological positions,
but there must also be a close fit between these positions (as derived from our
typology) and the expectations of the disputants. American efforts to mediate peace
between Israel and her Arab neighbours have historically taken the form of real
power. Here Henry Kissinger’s step-by-step diplomacy is an obvious case in points.
His successful deployment of the coercive and reward-based powers in mediating
60
B. Posen, ‘The Security Dilemma and Ethnic Conflict’, Survival, 35:1 (1993), p. 43.
61
See for example Carnevale, ‘Mediating from Strength’; Smith, ‘Mediator Impartiality’; Touval, The
Peace Brokers.
agreements between Israel and Egypt and Syria in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom
Kippur War has not only led to de-escalation of hostilities between the disputants,
but has also stabilised the system at large. Other examples of such application of
real power may include President’s Carter’s unprecedented aid packages to Israel
and Egypt during the 1978 Camp David negotiations, and President George H. W.
Bush’s uncompromising stance on the issue of Israel’s settlements policy.62
At the same time however, American mediation may also be conceptualised as
encompassing structuralist power, meaning mediation as the utilisation of tools to
hold on to power and to maintain or reshape the current order of the larger
system. Thus Kissinger’s efforts to de-escalate tensions in the Middle East must
also be understood as part of an American strategy to ensure the steady flow of
Arab oil to the West in the aftermath of the 1973 oil embargo, as well as
permanently relegating the Soviets to the sidelines of Middle East diplomacy by
making the US the first-choice mediator for both Israelis and Arabs.63 The same
can be argued for Secretary of State James Baker’s frantic efforts to persuade (but
not coerce) all sides to the conflict to attend the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991.
Against the background of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the
Cold War, the US was presented with a propitious opportunity to reshape
international order and position itself as a truly consensual honest broker, accepted
by all parties to the conflict. It is thus readily apparent that our typology does not
necessitate the mediator to align itself with one strand of mediation power. Indeed
in complex and protracted environments of bargaining such as the Arab-Israeli
conflict, the mediator’s stance on the issues may be informed by an amalgamation
of ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of conflict and the
approach to its resolution. Thus it is the mediator’s adaptability and ability to
habitually reconsider its position which may dictate its very relevance to the
disputants and to any future agreements. Accordingly the diminishing role of the
UN in mediating Arab-Israeli peace post-1967 cannot only be attributed to the
rising power of the US as the principal mediator in the conflict, particularly
following the Yom Kippur War. Concurrently it was the organisation’s failure to
adequately respond to the new contours of the conflict, which, following Israel’s
occupation of Jordanian, Egyptian and Syrian lands in the Six Day War, were now
defined primarily as territorial rather than ideological-political. The leveraging of
interests and calibrating of perceptions had to be readjusted in order to secure
Israeli withdrawal in exchange for Arab recognition of the Jewish state, thus calling
into question established views on the sources of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and
indeed the methods necessary to bring to its resolution. The UN’s inability to offer
Israel tangible alternatives to territory, or a saving face alternative to the Arabs for
recognising Israel, had gradually led to its redundancy.
Made power mediation largely combines aspects of critical and real power
modes by providing real gains for disputants who are desperate to escape a hurting
stalemate,64 but need not be associated with manipulative or coercive zero sum
62
S. Segev, ‘The Arab-Israeli Conflict under President Bush’, in M. Bose and R. Perotti (eds), From
Cold War to New World Order: The Foreign Policy of George H.W. Bush (Santa Barbara, CA:
Greenwood Press, 2002), pp. 113–36; A Siniver, ‘Power, Impartiality and Timing: Three Hypotheses
on Third Party Mediation in the Middle East’, Political Studies, 54:4 (2006), pp. 806–26.
63
Siniver, ‘Power, Impartiality and Timing’, p. 816.
64
I. W. Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments’, The Global
methods, and indeed is less concerned with relative cost-benefit calculations. Here
the emphasis is on changing motivations and perceptions by offering a problem-
solving approach. A prime case in point here is Dr. Ralph Bunche’s successful
efforts to end the first Arab-Israeli War in 1948–1949. By shifting away from
previous efforts to offer a comprehensive solution to the problem, the UN mediator
had changed the nature of the bargaining process by negotiating separate armistice
agreements between Israel and Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan. Most impor-
tantly, Bunche succeeded in redefining the solution as a series of limited bilateral
agreements rather than a single comprehensive peace treaty, without having to
compromise his position as an honest broker or resorting to coercive tactics to
enhance parochial interests.65 As noted above, this approach as espoused by the
UN would become wholly irrelevant in the more complex, post-1967 environment
of Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian peace negotiations.
Finally, critical modes of mediation power stem from (at least notionally)
egalitarian and idealistic concepts of public interests. There is little attention here
to the system at large and power here is understood as a facilitator of social
networks. Accordingly, the efforts of the Norwegian government, in conjunction
with a small Oslo-based Think Tank in the early 1990s, demonstrate the
effectiveness of such approach. Impartiality and informational bases of power were
crucial here to the success of the secret talks between the Israeli and Palestinian
camps. Most importantly, the mediators understood their role well as that of a
facilitator offering good offices, which had made the bargaining process between
the disputants normatively transparent and free of triad manipulation structures.66
Crucially, the Norwegians had succeeded where President Carter had initially
failed. Carter’s first efforts to bring about Israeli-Egyptian peace rested on his
self-perceived image as the honest broker and the complete seclusion of the talks
away from the prying eyes of the media and domestic constituencies. However it
was only when Carter resorted to more manipulative tactics (such as threatening
to lay the blame for failure with Egyptian President Sadat) and the offer of
generous military and economic aid packages that he managed to bring the parties
to sign an agreement.67 Conversely, the Norwegians knew their limitations as
mediators and applied this knowledge as an alternative type of power mediation,
creating a route that was attractive to both parties. The policy lesson from these
cases is clear – no matter how hard a real power mediator may try to conceal his
resources, once they have been deployed successfully in previous mediation
processes (as in the case of Kissinger), the parties will tend to respond favourably
to future mediation efforts only if such resources are displayed again.
In assessing the relative advantages and weaknesses of each of the four types
of power mediation, at least in relation to the Arab-Israeli conflict it does not seem
that one is more closely linked to mediation success (or acceptance) than others.
What matters is the close fit between the ontological and epistemological stances
which inform the mediator in its approach, and the expectations of the disputants
Review of Ethnopolitics, 1:1 (2001), pp. 8–18.

65
P. Carnevale and D. Choi, ‘Culture in the Mediation of International Disputes’, International Journal
of Psychology, 35:2 (2000), pp. 105–10; Touval, The Peace Brokers.
66
Aggestam, ‘Mediating Asymmetrical Conflict’; Pruitt, ‘Mediator Behavior and Success in Negotia-
tion’
67
Siniver, ‘Power, Impartiality and Timing’.
at the outset of the mediation process. Where some types seem to compliment each
other (as noted above, for example real and structural), the differences between the
four types are nevertheless substantial enough to preclude an all-encompassing
approach to peacemaking which would bring together all four types of power
mediation. Mediators may be required at times to reassess their positions and
amend their stances and expenditures of power either due to external or contextual
pressures, as witnessed in changing American approaches to the conflict during and
after the Cold War, or as a result of internal changes which then affect the
promulgation of public policies towards the conflict (as witnessed by the process of
European integration and the so-far unsuccessful efforts to implement a consistent
and coherent approach to the management and resolution of the conflict between
Israelis and Palestinians). Indeed the later case demonstrates the pitfalls of
imposing a unitary approach when the ontological and epistemological outlooks on
peace and conflict are spread between 27 member states.
In a similar fashion, the case of the Quartet represents a germane lesson on the
utilisation of these four types of power mediation. At least notionally, the Quartet
illustrates multiparty mediation which encompasses the four types of mediation
power which together equip its members with what Rubin understands as the full
six bases of power. Each of the Quartet members – the UN, the EU, the US and
Russia – have different bases of power which are relevant to previous and current
efforts to bring about just and lasting peace to the Middle East. Accordingly the
UN may provide international legitimacy to the process, whereas previous and
existing relationships of the members with the disputants provide for the creation
of effective social networks. Expert, reward, coercive and informational bases of
power can also be found in the composition of the Quartet. Projecting to our
heuristic of mediation power, one can identify the ubiquitous real power present in
the American position, which cannot be detached from its own interests in the
wider context (structuralist), whereas the UN provides a more critical power
approach to mediation, emphasising the emancipatory, global interest in the
resolution of the conflict. Russia, the least active member of the Quartet clearly has
its own interests in mind which may be linked to restoring its relevance in
international diplomacy (structuralist), whereas the EU’s extensive list of economic
and political policies towards the region (including the European Neighbourhood
Policy and a series of bilateral agreements with Israel and the Palestinian
Authority), may serve as useful alternative tools to change perceptions and affect
motivations to compromise (made power).
The numerous manifestations of the Arab-Israeli conflict help to further
substantiate the argument that while some form of power is necessary for effective
mediation, it may take different routes even within a seemingly constant environ-
ment. It must be added that in reality, those four types of power mediation may
overlap depending on the circumstances, or indeed may be deployed interchange-
ably by the same mediator. This contextual analysis paints an effective survey of
interpreting political situations that may be well served by epistemologically and
ontologically aware mediation responses, identified in patterns of real, made,
critical and structural powers. Further study of the applicability of these concepts
may provide for interesting research cases, as well as projects on how to interpret
parties’ conceptions of the conflicts they are part of. Querying future disputants
and mediators understanding of the nature of conflict, and the importance they
give to the subjective/objective dimension of their own current conflict could lead
to empirical measurement of resolution to epistemological and ontological distance
between both disputants and their mediators.
We thus have reframed yet held to Zartman and Touval’s comment that, a
mediator’s acceptance ‘depends entirely on its likelihood (potential power) of
producing an outcome acceptable to both sides’.68 Our approach may provide
more sophisticated dimensions than a pure-to-power mediation spectrum, while
relating the world of political power more accurately to canonical mediator options
and explaining how the parties involved may conceptualise their expectations of the
mediator and the process of mediation more generally, from its initiation to its
conclusion.
68
I. W. Zartman and S. Touval, ‘International Mediation in the Post-Cold War Era’, p. 446.

New Routes To Power: Towards A Typology of Power Mediation

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Review of International Studies (2011), 37, 1169–1190 2010 British International Studies Association

doi:10.1017/S0260210510001002 First published online 1 Sep 2010