Crimlaw Digests Leonen

SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW
PENNED BY J. LEONEN (2014-2019)
JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ

G.R. No. 208007, 2 April 2014
FACTS:
The case is a review of the decision of the CA in the conviction of an accused-appellant

for statutory rape under Article 266-A which carries a sentence of reclusion perpetua. 10 yr. old
AAA was on her way home from school when her “Uncle Rod”, a family friend of AAA, called
to her and invited her in his house. Accused Rodrigo had carnal knowledge of AAA and then
gave her five pesos (Php5.00) afterwards. When she came back to school, she was asked why
she was late and when she said she came from Uncle Rod. Her teacher brought her to the
principal and they inspected her underwear and saw that it was wet and her private organ was
swelling. AAA was brought to the hospital and the incident was reported to the police. The
RTC found Rodrigo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of statutory rape and imposed the penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Rodrigo appealed to CA, contending that AAA’s testimony fell short of
the quantum of evidence required and AAA did not cry for help when her family’s house was
just nearby, which caused reasonable doubt.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused
appellant was guilty of statutory rape under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
HELD:
Yes. As shown in her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in clear and categorical
manner the ordeal of what happened to her. As a child victim who has taken significant risks in
coming to court, her testimony deserves full weight and credence. This was supported by the
testimonies of her teachers whose concern for her led to the discovery of the crime. The medical
certificate presented in court, together with the testimonies of the physicians, is consistent with
the finding that she was sexually abused. Accused’s argument that AAA’s failure to cry out for
help shows reasonable doubt does not hold water, as his moral ascendancy as over AAA will
create a fear of her Uncle Rod. In any case, whether she cried for help is immaterial in a charge
for statutory rape since the law presumes that such a victim, on account of tender age, does not
and cannot have a will of her own.
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SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW PENNED BY J. LEONEN
2013-2019
PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.
G.R. No. 196735, 5 May 2014
FACTS:
Seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity (“Sigma Rho”) were eating lunch at the
Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of
them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from
his injuries. An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity (“Scintilla Juris”). The information reads:
That on or about the 8th day of December 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines,
the above-named accused, wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise, conspiring,
confederating with other persons whose true names, identities and whereabouts have
not as yet been ascertained, and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, and with evident premeditation, taking advantage of superior
strength, armed with baseball bats, lead pipes, and cutters, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of DENNIS F. VENTURINA, by then and there hitting him on the head and
clubbing him on different parts of his body thereby inflicting upon him serious and
mortal injuries which were the direct and immediate cause of his death, to the damage
and prejudice of the heirs of said DENNIS F. VENTURINA.
Separate informations were also filed against them for the attempted murder of Sigma
Rho members. The trial court rendered its decision finding several members of Scintilla Juris
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused’s right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against them were violated when the prosecution included the phrase “wearing
masks and/or other forms of disguise” in the information since the prosecution were presenting
evidence that not all accused were wearing masks or that their masks fell off.
HELD:
No. The inclusion of the phrase "wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the
information does not violate their constitutional rights. In People v. Wilson Lab-eo, this court has
stated that:
The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment
properly. . . . The purpose is to allow the accused to fully prepare for his defense,
precluding surprises during the trial.
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Every aggravating circumstance being alleged must be stated in the information. Failure
to state an aggravating circumstance, even if duly proven at trial, will not be appreciated as
such. It was, therefore, incumbent on the prosecution to state the aggravating circumstance of
"wearing masks and/or other forms of disguise" in the information in order for all the evidence,
introduced to that effect, to be admissible by the trial court.
In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it

allows the accused to remain anonymous and unidentifiable as he carries out his crimes.
The introduction of the prosecution of testimonial evidence that tends to prove that the
accused were masked but the masks fell off does not prevent them from including disguise as
an aggravating circumstance. What is important in alleging disguise as an aggravating
circumstance is that there was a concealment of identity by the accused. The inclusion of disguise
in the information was, therefore, enough to sufficiently apprise the accused that in the
commission of the offense they were being charged with, they tried to conceal their identity.
The introduction of evidence which shows that some of the accused were not wearing
masks is also not violative of their right to be informed of their offenses.
The information charges conspiracy among the accused. Conspiracy presupposes that
"the act of one is the act of all." This would mean all the accused had been one in their plan to
conceal their identity even if there was evidence later on to prove that some of them might not
have done so.
PEOPLE V. BUCLAO
G.R. No. 208173, 11 June 2014
FACTS:
Accused Buclao was charged with two counts of rape, as defined under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1 (a) and (c) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 or the Anti-
Rape Law of 1997, in relation to R.A. No. 7610. Private complainant AAA testified that her
biological father, Buclao, called her to go inside their house. When AAA was inside, her father
closed the door and pushed her onto the bed. AAA's father pulled her pants and panties down
to her knees then he removed his pants and briefs. Next, AAA's father moved on top of her,
inserted his erect penis into her vagina, and started pumping or doing a push and pull or an up
and down motion. Her father left after the incident. However, before he left, the Buclao
threatened her that he would kill her if she told anyone about what happened. Buclao repeated
the act sometime in September 2004.
ISSUE:
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Whether the accused is guilty of two counts of rape beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
Yes. Article 266-A, paragraph (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides the elements of the
crime of rape:
Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented,
even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present. . . .
Rape is qualified when "the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is
a parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third
civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim." The elements of qualified
rape are: "(1) sexual congress; (2) with a woman; (3) done by force and without consent; . . . (4)
the victim is under eighteen years of age at the time of the rape; and (5) the offender is a parent
(whether legitimate, illegitimate or adopted) of the victim."
In this case, both the court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt
all the elements of qualified rape. AAA's recollection of the heinous acts of her father was vivid
and straightforward. She was able to positively identify the accused-appellant as her sexual
assailant. Her testimony was given in a "categorical, straightforward, spontaneous and candid
manner."
MIGUEL CIERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 181843, 14 July 2014
FACTS:
This is petition for review on certiorari of the CA decision affirming the RTC’s decision
finding the accused Miguel Ciera guilty of two (2) counts of frustrated murder when he stabbed
Gerardo Naval and Romeo Austria in the back with a knife. The RTC found that petitioner
caused the stab wounds as private complainants Naval and Austria were able to positively
identify Ciera and describe how they obtained their injuries. The RTC also ruled that although
the act was not attended by evident premeditation, there was treachery considering the length
of time it took private complainants to realize that they were stabbed. CA affirmed the finding
of treachery because the attack was so sudden and unexpected that self-defense was not
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possible. Case elevated to the SC, alleging failure of prosecution to prove beyond reasonable
doubt Ciera’s guilt and that there was no treachery and even assuming that an assault was
sudden and unexpected, there must be evidence that the mode of assault was consciously and
deliberately adopted to ensure the execution of the crime without risk to the accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not treachery is present as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction

of frustrated murder rather than frustrated homicide
HELD:
Treachery did not exist and petitioner may only be convicted of two (2) counts of
frustrated homicide. A finding of existence of treachery should be based in “clear and
convincing evidence.” Such evidence must be as conclusive as the fact of killing itself. Its
existence cannot be presumed. Any doubt as to its existence should be resolved in favor of the
accused. In this case, no evidence was presented to show that petitioner consciously adopted or
reflected on the means, method or form of attack to secure his unfair advantage. It is error for
both the trial and appellate courts not to have considered the evidence that the offended parties
were able to flee and retaliate. Upon proof of evasion and retaliation, courts must evaluate the
evidence further to ensure whether there can be reasonable doubt for this qualifying
circumstance to exist, in keeping with the presumption of innocence of the accused.
PEOPLE V. HOLGADO
G.R. No. 207992, 11 August 2014
Criminal Law; R.A. No. 9165; Chain of Custody
FACTS:
After surveillance operations, a search warrant was issued against Holgado. Acting on
the search warrant, the Pasig City Chief of Police instructed his officers to, if possible, first
conduct a buy-bust operation before actually enforcing the search warrant.
PO1 Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant,

approached accused Holgado who was then part of a drinking session. Holgado asked the
informant if he was buying drugs. The informant introduced PO1 Aure as a drug user. PO1
Aure then handed Holgado two (2) marked one hundred peso bills. Holgado asked PO1 Aure
and the informant to wait as the drugs were with his "kumpare" who was then in the restroom.
After some time, co-accused Misarez stepped out of the restroom, then handed a plastic sachet
containing a white crystalline substance to PO1 Aure. PO1 Aure examined the sachet's contents
and took out his cellphone. This was the pre-arranged signal to the other police operatives that
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the sale of drugs had been consummated. The police tried to apprehend the both accused, but
they sucseffully fled. The police, however, managed to confiscate the drug sold.
Thereafter, the search warrant was then enforced "in coordination with a barangay
official and in the presence of some media people." The search allegedly yielded several drugs
and drug paraphernalia.
ISSUE:
Whether accused Holgado and Misarez may be convicted for violation of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
No. Failure to comply with Paragraph 1, Section 21, Article II of RA 9165 implies a
concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the corpus delicti." It
"produces doubts as to the origins of the seized paraphernalia." Compliance with the chain of
custody requirement provided by Section 21, therefore, ensures the integrity of confiscated,
seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4) respects: first, the
nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of the substances or
items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the incident allegedly
causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items seized to the person/s
alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with this requirement
forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence in any manner.
In this case, the defense points out that all that the prosecution claimed, with respect to
the handling of the sachet supposedly handed by Misarez to PO1 Aure, was that PO1 Aure
supposedly marked it "RH-PA" at the scene of the buy-bust operation. While the buy-bust
operation team allegedly conducted an inventory of the seized items, it is unclear if this
inventory was limited to those seized pursuant to the enforcement of the search warrant (i.e.,
after the conduct of the buy-bust operation) or was inclusive of whatever items seized during
the buy-bust operation.
There have been claims to the effect that the search warrant was enforced "in
coordination with a barangay official and in the presence of some media people." However, this
"barangay official" and these "media people" have neither been identified nor presented as
witnesses. In any case, even if it were to be granted that these individuals took part in the events
that transpired in the evening of January 17, 2007, their participation was alleged to have been
only with respect to the enforcement of the search warrant. It did not extend to the physical
inventory and taking of photographs of the seized items arising from the buy-bust operation, as
required by Section 21. For that matter, it was not even shown that photographs of the sachet
marked as "RH-PA" were taken. Per his own testimony, PO1 Aure himself doubted if any
photograph was taken.
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The defense also points out that "PO1 Aure . . . failed to disclose who, in particular, held
the sachet of shabu from the crime scene (after it was marked) up to the police station, and
finally to the crime laboratory for the requisite chemical examination." It added that "nothing
on (sic) the records showed who, in particular, submitted/brought the specimen to the crime
laboratory for examination."
See also: People v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 205821, 1 October 2014
PEOPLE V. CHAVEZ
G.R. No. 207950, 22 September 2014
Special Complex Crime, Robbery with Homicide
FACTS:
Accused Mark Jason Chavez (“Chavez”) was charged with the crime of robbery with
homicide. Chavez stabbed Elmer Duque (“Barbie”) 21 times. Chavez, accompanied by his
mother, surrendered to the police. Chavez’s mother executed an affidavit stating that her son
did not intend to kill Barbie but merely to take his two cell phones. However, the mother did
not testify in court. Chavez was convicted of Robbery with Homicide.
ISSUE:
Is Chavez guilty of robbery with homicide?
HELD:
No. What is imperative and essential for a conviction for the crime of robbery with
homicide is for the prosecution to establish the offender's intent to take personal
property before the killing, regardless of the time when the homicide is actually carried out. In
cases when the prosecution failed to conclusively prove that homicide was committed for the
purpose of robbing the victim, no accused can be convicted of robbery with homicide.
The circumstantial evidence relied on by the lower courts, as quoted previously, do not
satisfactorily establish an original criminal design by Chavez to commit robbery. At most, the
intent to take personal property was mentioned by Chavez's mother in her statement. However,
this statement is considered as hearsay, with no evidentiary value, since Chavez's mother was
never presented as a witness during trial to testify on her statement.
An original criminal design to take personal property is also inconsistent with the
infliction of no less than 21 stab wounds in various parts of Barbie's body.
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PEOPLE V. QUINTOS
G.R. No. 199402, 12 November 2014
Rape
FACTS:
Accused Enrique Quintos was charged with rape, for sexually assaulting and having
sexual intercourse with AAA, which is intellectually disabled. Two informations were filed
against accused. Pertinent portions of which read:
A. Crim. Case No. 07-0873 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 2, in relation to Article
266-B, 9th paragraph, RPC)
That on or about the 25th day of October 2007, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit an act of sexual assault by inserting his penis into the mouth of one [AAA],
through force, threat, or intimidation, and against her will and consent, thereby debasing,
demeaning and degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity.
B. Crim. Case No. 07-0874 (Rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1, Revised Penal Code)
That on or about the 26th day of October, 2007, in the City of Las Piñas,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd design, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously by
means of force and intimidation, have carnal knowledge with one [AAA], when she is
deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious or asleep, and against her will and consent,
thereby debasing, demeaning and degrading her intrinsic worth and dignity.
Accused Quintos argued that he cannot be convicted of rape since the victim’s mental
incapacity was not alleged in the information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not victim's mental incapacity needs to be alleged in the information in

order to convict an accused of rape.
HELD:
No. The information charging accused of this crime lacked the allegation of any mental
disability on the part of AAA. This is not necessary to convict accused of the crime of rape
provided that sexual congress and mental incapacity and, therefore, the incapacity to give
consent, are proved by clear and convincing evidence.
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However, to qualify the crime of rape and increase the penalty of accused from reclusion
perpetua to death under Article 266-B in relation to Article 266- (A) (1) of the Revised Penal
Code, an allegation of the victim's intellectual disability must be alleged in the information. If
not alleged in the information, such mental incapacity may prove lack of consent but it cannot
increase the penalty to death. Neither can it be the basis of conviction for statutory rape.
In this case, the elements of sexual congress and lack of consent were sufficiently alleged
in the information. They were also clearly and conveniently determined during trial. The fact of
being mentally incapacitated was only shown to prove AAA's incapacity to give consent, not to
qualify the crime of rape.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SHIRLEY A. CASIO

G.R. No. 211465. 3 December 2014
FACTS:
Shirley Casio recruited AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of
prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for
money, profit or any other consideration, in violation of Sec. 4, par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, par.
(a), of R.A. No. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).The International Justice Mission (IJM), a
non-governmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged
in human trafficking in Cebu. They also provided the marked money for team that will be used
for entrapment. The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25 which were
adjacent to each other. Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the
rest of the police team. They were able to entrap Casio who offered the police the two girls,
AAA and BBB. Casio received the marked money from there Casio was arrested and the two
girls were rescued. During trial, AAA testified that she was born on 27 January 1991 as
supported by her birth certificate. She worked before as a house helper in Mandaue City.
However, when she stopped working as a house helper, she transferred to Cebu City. In Cebu,
she met Gee Ann who offered her to worked in a disco club. She agreed since she needed
money for his father. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that
there were more customers in that area. There she was able to meet Casio who gave her
customers and was paid Php 400 for every customer who chose her. The RTC Cebu found
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt. CA affirmed the findings.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering
that there were no prior surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the
operation;
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2. Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that
AAA admitted that she works as a prostitute.
HELD:
1. Yes, the entrapment operation was valid. Prior surveillance is not a prerequisite
for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, as ruled in People v. Padua. However,
the police carry out its entrapment operations, as long as the rights of the accused have not been
violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. This flexibility is even
more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims
may at times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.
2. Yes. Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB to be trafficked, the SC

affirms the text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence molding their
character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The
evidence and the law compelled the SC to affirm the conviction of the accused.
RICHARD RICALDE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 211002, 21 January 2015
FACTS:
On 30 January 2002, XXX requested his mother to pick up Ricalde at McDonald’s Bel-
Air, Sta. Rosa at past 8:00 p.m. Ricalde, then 31 years old, is a distant relative and textmate of
XXX, then 10 years old. After dinner, XXX’s mother told Ricalde to spend the night at their
house as it was late. He slept on the sofa while XXX slept in the living room floor. It was around
2:00 a.m. when XXX awoke as "he felt pain in his anus and stomach and something inserted in
his anus." He saw that Ricalde "fondled his penis." When Ricalde returned to the sofa, XXX ran
toward his mother’s room to tell her what happened. He also told his mother that Ricalde
played with his sexual organ. XXX’s mother then filed a case of rape through sexual assault
against Ricalde.
Ricalde denied the allegations against him and claimed that: (a) there were no physical
signs or external signs of recent trauma; or any trace of spermatozoa XXX’s anus; (b) XXX did
not categorically say that a penis was inserted into his anal orifice, or that he saw a penis or any
object being inserted into his anal orifice; and (c) XXX’s inconsistent testimony raises reasonable
doubt on his guilt.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Ricalde is guilty of the crime of rape through sexual assault

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2. Whether Ricalde should be penalized under Article III, Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610
HELD:
1. Yes. The prosecution established beyond reasonable doubt all elements of the crime of rape
through sexual assault under Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code.
Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also known as "instrument or object
rape," "gender-free rape," or "homosexual rape." the gravamen of rape through sexual assault is
"the insertion of the penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or
object, into another person’s genital or anal orifice."
In this case, Ricalde highlighted the alleged inconsistencies in XXX’s testimony fails,
however this court emphasized the full weight and credit they give to testimonies of child
victims, considering their youth and immaturity, such that inconsistencies are generally badges
of truth and sincerity. Since XXX then was only 10 years old, he had no reason to concoct any lie
against Ricalde. Moreover, Ricalde’s reliance on the medico-legal’s finding lacks merit since the
absence of spermatozoa in XXX’s anal orifice does not negate the possibility of an erection and
penetration. The Court also pointed out corroborative character of expert testimony, and the
possibility of convictions for rape based on the victim’s credible lone testimony. Thus, the Court
affirmed the conviction of the lower courts.
2. Yes. The Court modified the penalty imposed by the lower court to the penalty under R.A.
No. 7610 considering that at the time of the commission of the crime, XXX was still a child.
The fact that XXX was only 10 years old when the incident happened was established by
his birth certificate, and this was admitted by the defense. Since his age of 10 years old was
alleged in the Information, the higher penalty under R.A. No. 7610, applies in this case.
Rape is rape. Rape of a child is clearly, definitely, and universally child abuse. Having sex
with a 10-year-old is child abuse and is punished by a special law (R.A. No. 7610). It is a
progression from the Revised Penal Code to provide greater protection for children. Justice
Velasco suggests that this is not so. He anchors his view on his interpretation that R.A. No. 7610
requires a showing that apart from the actual coerced sexual act on the 10-year-old, the child
must also be exploited by prostitution or by other sexual acts. This view is inaccurate on
grounds of verba legis and ratione legis.
ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

GR 204644, 11 February 2015
FACTS:
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Rebecca Agbulos (“Agbulos”) is a jeweler. Dorie Cruz-Abadilla (“Abadilla”) and
Agbulos entered into several transactions for the sale of jewelry. In all these transactions,
Angelita Cruz Benito (“Benito”) accompanied Agbulos. Agbulos received pieces of jewelry from
Abadilla and agreed that Agbulos would return the pieces of jewelry in the afternoon should
Agbulos fail to sell them. Agbulos then issued Abadilla a check for the value of the jewelry
received. Agbulos, upon receiving the third batch of jewelry from Abadilla, issued a check in
the amount of Php453,000.00. Agbulos likewise gave the owner’s copy of the TCT 438259, upon
the request of Abadilla.
Upon verification with the Land Registration Authority (LRA), the certificate of title
given by Agbulos turned out to be spurious. Abadilla then deposited the checks Agbulos issued
to her, and all were dishonored by reason of "closed account." Abadilla then tried to locate
Agbulos, but Agbulos could no longer be found.
After several months, Abadilla learned that the pieces of jewelry were pawned under the
name “Linda Chua”. Upon verification, she learned that the "Linda Chua" who pawned her
jewelry was Benito. Hence, Agbulos and Benito were charged with estafa punished under
Article 315, paragraph l(b) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Benito insists that the prosecution
failed to prove her alleged conspiracy with Agbulos to commit estafa, and maintains that
Agbulos alone transacted with Abadilla.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Benito should be liable for estafa
HELD:
No. There is no proof of Benito's direct participation in the commission of the crime
charged. Neither is there proof beyond reasonable doubt of her conspiracy with Agbulos.
Under Article 8 of the RPC, "a conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Proof of conspiracy
may be direct or circumstantial. So long as the evidence presented show a "common design or
purpose" to commit the crime, all of the accused shall be held equally liable as co-principals
even if one or more of them did not participate in all the details of the execution of the crime.
For this reason, the fact of conspiracy "must be proven on the same quantum of evidence as the
felony subject of the agreement of the parties," that is, proof beyond reasonable doubt.
As testified to by Abadilla, only Agbulos received the pieces of jewelry from her, and
Benito was merely "present during the negotiation." Even assuming that Benito accompanied
Agbulos, this does not prove that Benito received any jewelry from Abadilla. Moreover, when
Agbulos failed to return the jewelry in the afternoon she received on June 9, 14, and 16, 1994,
she was already presumed to have misappropriated the jewelry, for which there is no more
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need to present any act to prove the misappropriation. Consequently, the estafa had already
been consummated when "Linda Chua" allegedly pawned the jewelry on June 17, 1994. Benito,
who was allegedly "Linda Chua," cannot be held criminally liable with Agbulos. "There can be
no ex post facto conspiracy to do that which has already been done and consummated."
PEOPLE V. RODRIGO CASACOP

G.R. 208685, 9 March 2015
FACTS:
POl Rommel Bautista (“POl Bautista”), together with Chief Intelligence Officer SPO1
Alvin Glorioso, other police officers, and two (2) assets, conducted a buy-bust operation in
Cuyab, San Pedro, Laguna against Rodrigo Casacop Y De Castro (“Casacop”). The buy-bust
operation was based on "information they received that Casacop was engaged in the sale of
illegal drugs." After the arranged transaction, the poseur-buyer raised his right hand; this was
their pre-arranged signal. The police officers headed towards Casacop but he tried to escape.
They gave chase and were able to apprehend him. Casacop was apprised of his constitutional
rights. The small heat-sealed plastic sachet, which the police suspected to contain
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), "was marked and sent to the Crime Laboratory for
examination."
For his part, Casacop claims that he was asleep when someone banged on their door.
Thinking that he might be arrested for failing to report to his parole officer, he jumped out of a
window but was eventually arrested by POl Bautista. His wife corroborated his story and
testified that her husband did not sell any shabu on July 24, 2002.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the guilt of Casacop was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite
the non-observance of the required procedure in handling the seized item.
2. Whether the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty is
sufficient to defeat the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused-appellant.
HELD:
1. No. Failure to observe the chain of custody required under Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 or failure to sufficiently explain the reason for non-observance of the chain of custody
creates reasonable doubt as to the integrity of the corpus delicti .
In dangerous drugs cases, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Thus, it is
imperative that the integrity of the seized dangerous drug be preserved. Section 21 of R.A. No.
9165 provides for the manner by which law enforcement officers should handle seized items in
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dangerous drugs cases. However, strict compliance with the chain of custody requirement is not
always the case.
Here, from the start of the buy-bust operation, there was failure to observe the chain of
custody. From the time the transaction took place to the time accused-appellant was arrested,
there is nothing on record to show how the integrity of the seized item was preserved. It was
merely alleged that Casacop was arrested and was apprised of his constitutional rights. Next,
POl Bautista wrote "BOTE" on the marked money after it was confiscated from accused-
appellant. He then gave the marked money to SPO1 Alvin Glorioso while the asset gave POl
Bautista a "small heat sealed transparent sachet of shabu. The prosecution did not, at the very
least, identify the person who turned the seized sachet over to the Philippine National Police
Crime Laboratory when it was submitted for examination. 73 Hence, there is another break in the
chain of custody. This leads us to doubt whether the corpus delicti was established.
Non-presentation of the poseur-buyer also defeats the case of the plaintiff-appellee. The
testimony of the poseur-buyer is not "merely corroborative of the apprehending officers-
eyewitnesses' testimonies. The poseur-buyer had personal knowledge of the transaction since
he conducted the actual transaction. PO1 Bautista was merely an observer from several meters
away. Further, the amount involved is so small that the reason for not presenting the poseur-
buyer does not square with such a miniscule amount.’
Other requirements provided under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 were not complied with.
No inventory was conducted, and the records of this case do not show that the seized items
were photographed.
2. No. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot

prevail over the presumption of innocence of Casacop. It is not enough to convince this court
that the non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was justified. In People v. Ong:
To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper

procedures were undertaken in effecting the buy-bust operation, it is incumbent upon
the courts to make sure that the details of the operation are clearly and adequately laid
out through relevant, material and competent evidence. For, the courts could not merely
rely on but must apply with studied restraint the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty by law enforcement agents.
Thus, the Decision of the lower court is reversed and Casacop is acquitted for the failure
of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCELINO OLOVERIO

GR 211159, 18 March 2015
FACTS:
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On 2 October 2003, at around 3:00 p.m., Rudipico Pogay (Pogay) and Dominador
Panday (Panday) saw Rodulfo Gulane walking about five (5) meters away from them with
Oloverio trailing behind him. Oloverio allegedly tapped Gulane’s right shoulder and hacked
him on the chest and extremities with a bolo until Gulane collapsed on the ground. Oloverio
then allegedly took Gulane’s money from his pocket. Pogay heard Oloverio shouting the words,
"Patay na ang datu sa Brgy. San Pablo!" ("The rich man in San Pablo is already dead!") Gulane
managed to tell Oloverio, "Man luba ka man, Ling?" ("Ling, why did you stab me?") After, Gulane
died. Panday proceeded to inform Gulane’s family of the incident.
Gulane allegedly attempted to draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his
own bolo. They grappled with it, and eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which
resulted in the latter’s death. Accompanied by a barangay tanod, Oloverio went to the municipal
hall to surrender to the authorities. He admitted that he stabbed Gulane because he could no
longer bear the insulting remarks against him.
Olovario was convicted for murder. The RTC of Palompon, Leyte ruled that the
mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation was not present in this case since it could
not co-exist with the presence of treachery. The only mitigating circumstance it found present
was of voluntary surrender.
ISSUES:
Whether or not Oloverio is guilty for the crime of murder
HELD:
No, Oloverio is guilty only of homicide under Article 249 of the RPC and is entitled to
the mitigating circumstances of passion and obfuscation and of voluntary surrender.
Murder is the act of killing a person under the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code. In this case, the intent to kill was established not only by the number of
stab wounds found on Gulane’s body, but also in Oloverio’s own admission that he stabbed
Gulane. However, the presence of treachery has not been sufficiently established.
For treachery to be appreciated, the following elements must be proven: (a) the
employment of means of execution that gives the person attacked no opportunity to defend
himself or retaliate, and (b) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. As
a rule, a sudden attack by the assailant, whether frontally or from behind, is treachery if such
mode of attack was coolly and deliberately adopted by him with the purpose of depriving the
victim of a chance to either fight or retreat.
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The rule does not apply in this case. The mere suddenness of an attack should not be the
sole basis in finding treachery. There must be evidence to show that the accused deliberately or
consciously adopted the means of execution to ensure its success. Here, at the time of the
incident, Gulane was already 83 years old. Oloverio was standing behind him. He already had
the advantage of surprise with Gulane’s back turned. Gulane’s advanced age and position
would have ensured his death as it would have prevented him from being able to retaliate.
Instead, Oloverio tapped Gulane on the shoulder as if to call his attention. He waited until
Gulane was facing him before he started stabbing. Since treachery has not been proven, the
crime is merely homicide.
On the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation
The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present considering that

Oloverio was able to prove the following elements: (a) that there be an act, both unlawful and
sufficient to produce such condition of mind; and (b) that said act which produced the
obfuscation was not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of
time, during which the perpetrator might recover his normal equanimity.
To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be

examined on a case-to-case basis. In this case, Gulane enjoyed an economic ascendancy over
Oloverio, a mere barangay tanod Gulane not only threatened to molest Oloverio’s daughter but
also accused him in public of having incestuous relations with his mother. Gulane was said to
have insulted accused-appelant in full view of his immediate superior, the barangay captain.
Both victim and accused-appellant lived in the small locality of Palompon, Leyte. As with any
small town, it was a place where a person’s degrading remarks against another could be made
the measure of the latter’s character. Gulane’s insults would have been taken into serious
consideration by the town’s residents because of his wealth and stature in the community.
On the penalty
As regards the penalty, the lower courts both considered voluntary surrender as a
mitigating circumstance. Considering that there are two mitigating circumstances in Oloverio’s
favor, the imposable penalty must be that which is next lower to that prescribed by law,
pursuant to Article 64(5) of the ROC. Thus, the imposable penalty is prision mayor. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, accused-appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment, the minimum of which should be within the range of prision correccional and the
maximum of which should be within the range of prision mayor.
Based on the records, accused-appellant was put under preventive imprisonment

pending his conviction by the trial court. In accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code, the time undergone by Oloverio under preventive imprisonment shall be credited to his
service of sentence, provided that he has given his written conformity to abide by the
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners.
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NICO MACAYAN, JR. V. PEOPLE
GR 175842, 18 March 2015
FACTS:
Private complainant Annie Jao (“Jao”) is the owner of Lanero Garments. Jao hired Nico
Macayan, Jr. (“Macayan”) as a sample cutter, and to undertake materials purchasing. In 2001,
Macayan allegedly threatened Jao that her family would be harmed and/or kidnapped if she did
not give him Php200,000.00. The following day, Macayan allegedly called Jao to reiterate his
threat and to specify the time and place — 16 February 2001, sometime between 6:00 and 7:00
p.m. at McDonald’s Banawe Branch — in which the 200,000.00 should be handed to him. Jao
claimed that she was sure it was Macayan speaking to her, as the person on the phone
addressed her as "Madam," which was how he customarily called her.
Macayan arrived at the agreed venue at about 9:00 p.m. He saw Angel, Jao’s secretary,
standing outside McDonald’s. He approached Angel, who then accompanied him inside and
led him to a four-seat corner table. He was surprised to see Jao present. Jao then brought out of
her bag a piece of paper indicating that Macayan received the settlement amount for the illegal
dismissal case. Macayan signed this as he was of the understanding that this was necessary to
the settlement. Jao then pulled out a white envelope, handed it to Macayan, and told him to
count its contents. While counting the contents, a flash bulb went on somewhere to his right.
Then, a man who claimed to be an NBI operative struck a blow on the right side of Macayan’s
face and told him, "Tatanga-tanga ka. Pupunta ka rito ng walang kasama, ikaw ngayon ang me kaso."
ISSUE:
Whether Macayan is guilty of Robbery
HELD:
No. There being serious doubt on the whether Jao was actually threatened or
intimidated at the time she specified, there is thus serious doubt on the existence of the fourth
requisite of robbery.
Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code provides for who are guilty of robbery.
Accordingly, the following elements must be established to sustain a conviction for robbery: 1)
there is a taking of personal property [i.e., unlawful taking]; 2) the personal property belongs to
another; 3) the taking is with animus lucrandi [i.e., intent to gain]; and 4) the taking is with
violence against or intimidation of persons or with force upon things.
The "bone of contention" centers on the elements of unlawful taking and of violence
against or intimidation of persons. This is precisely Macayan’s contention: that he neither
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intimidated nor threatened Jao, and that he could not have unlawfully taken money from her on
account of any act of intimidation and/or threats made by him.
The resolution of this case hinges on whether Jao was indeed threatened and/or
intimidated by Macayan into giving him money, that is, whether he extorted money from Jao .
As pointed out by Macayan and acknowledged by the prosecution, Jao never saw it proper to
warn her family, more specifically, her husband, of the threat of being kidnapped. Nevertheless,
she supposedly perceived Macayan’s alleged threat as being of such a serious nature that she
must not only report the matter to the National Bureau of Investigation, but also entreat its
officers to conduct an entrapment operation.
MARASIGAN V. FUENTES
G.R. No. 201310, 11 January 2016
Murder; Conspiracy; Stages of Commission
FACTS:
While he was walking on his way home, Marasigan felt someone throw an object at him
from behind. A witness, Pablo, confirmed with Marasigan that it was Fuentes who threw an
object at him. While he and Pablo were speaking, Fuentes reappeared with Calilan and Lindo,
as well as with another unidentified individual. Fuentes suddenly punched Marasigan on the
face. Calilan and Lindo also hit him. Fuentes picked up a stone and attempted to hit Marasigan's
head with it. Marasigan parried the stone with his hand. Lindo and Calilan took hold of each of
Marasigan's arms. Several more men who were in Fuentes' home joined in the assault.
After conducting preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

(OPP) found probable cause for charging Fuentes and Calilan with less serious physical injuries.
He reasoned that there were no qualifying circumstances to support a charge for murder.
Aggrieved, Marasigan filed a Petition for Review with the DOJ. He argued that the medical
findings made on him as well as the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength
justified prosecution for frustrated murder.
In the Resolution, Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla partially granted Marasigan’s

Petition for Review and ordered the OPP to file informations for attempted murder against
Fuentes, Calilan, and Lindo
ISSUE:
Whether or not Fuentes, Calilan, Lindo should be charged of attempted murder. -
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HELD:
YES. Preliminary investigation ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial
or be released. It inquires only into the existence of probable cause: a matter which rests on
likelihood rather than on certainty. It relies on common sense rather than on clear and
convincing evidence.
The fact that petitioner was successful in blocking the blow with his hand does not, in
and of itself, mean that respondents could not have possibly killed him. It does not negate any
homicidal intent. It remains that respondent Fuentes attempted to hit petitioner on the head
with a hollow block while Calilan and Lindo made efforts to restrain petitioner.There is also
reasonable basis for appreciating how the attack on petitioner was made with respondents
taking advantage of their numerical superiority.
It is apparent that respondents acted out of a common design and, thus, in conspiracy.
Direct proof of conspiracy is not imperative and that conspiracy may be inferred from acts of
the perpetrators. A perpetrator’s act of holding the victim’s hand while another perpetrator is
striking a blow is indicative of conspiracy.
The essential elements of an attempted felony are: (1) the offender commences the
commission of the felony directly by overt acts; (2) he does not perform all the acts of execution
which should produce the felony; (3) the offender's act be not stopped by his own spontaneous
desistance; and (4) the non-performance of all acts of execution was due to cause or accident
other than his spontaneous desistance.
The first requisite of an attempted felony consists of two elements, namely: (1) That there
be external acts; (2) Such external acts have direct connection with the crime intended to be
committed. Respondents coordinated in assaulting Marasigan and that this assault culminated
in efforts to hit his head with a hollow block. Had respondents been successful, they could have
dealt any number of blows on petitioner. Each of these could have been fatal, or, even if not
individually so, could have, in combination, been fatal.
LESCANO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 214490, 13 January 2016
FACTS:
Howard Lescarno was charged with the crime of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under
R.A. No. 9165. Lescano was caught of selling 1 sachet and 4 grams of marijuana through a buy
bust operation. The RTC found Lescano guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. The CA affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Lescano appealed the decision
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contending that his guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt since the requisites of
Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 was not complied with.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there has been a compliance with the requisites of Section 21 of RA No.
9165 so as to warrant petitioner’s conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
No. The elements that must be established to sustain convictions for illegal sale of
dangerous drugs are settled. In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
following elements must first be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and
(2) the presentation in court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence.
Compliance with the chain of custody requirement provided by Section 21, ensures the
integrity of confiscated, seized, and/or surrendered drugs and/or drug paraphernalia in four (4)
respects: first, the nature of the substances or items seized; second, the quantity (e.g., weight) of
the substances or items seized; third, the relation of the substances or items seized to the
incident allegedly causing their seizure; and fourth, the relation of the substances or items
seized to the person/s alleged to have been in possession of or peddling them. Compliance with
this requirement forecloses opportunities for planting, contaminating, or tampering of evidence
in any manner.
With the integrity of the corpus delicti of the crime for which petitioner was charged is
cast in doubt, it follows that there is no basis for finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt.
See also: People v. Caiz, G.R. No. 215340, July 13, 2016;
VITANGCOL V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 207406, 13 January 2016
FACTS:
On 4 December 1994, Norberto married Alice G. Eduardo (Alice). After some time, Alice
eventually discovered that Norberto was previously married to a certain Gina M. Gaerlan
(Gina) on 17 July 1987, as shown by a marriage contract registered with the National Statistics
Office. Alice subsequently filed a criminal Complaint for bigamy against Norberto.
Norberto argues that the first element of bigamy is absent in this case. He presented as
evidence a Certification from the Office of the Civil Registrar of Imus, Cavite, which states that
the Office has no record of the marriage license allegedly issued in his favor and his first wife,
Gina. He argues that with no proof of existence of an essential requisite of marriage—the
marriage license—the prosecution fails to establish the legality of his first marriage. In addition,
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Norberto claims that the legal dissolution of the first marriage is not an element of the crime of
bigamy.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Norberto should be held liable for bigamy.
HELD:
Yes. For an accused to be convicted of Bigamy under Article 349 of the RPC, the
prosecution must prove that: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2) the first marriage has
not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse could not yet
be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) he contracts a second or subsequent
marriage; and (4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity
Assuming that petitioner’s first marriage was solemnized without a marriage license,
petitioner remains liable for bigamy. Petitioner’s first marriage was not judicially declared void.
Nor was his first wife Gina judicially declared presumptively dead under the Civil Code.
Petitioner was still legally married to Gina when he married Alice.
PEOPLE V. CRISTY DIMAANO

G.R. No. 174481, 10 February 2016
Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of

the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act may be excused so long as the identity of the dangerous drugs
is proved beyond reasonable doubt and the chain of custody is established with moral certainty.
FACTS:
In an Information, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged Dimaano
with violating Section 5 in relation to section 26 of R.A. No. 9165. Non-Uniformed Personnel
Bilugot was detailed as frisker at the initial check-in departure area of the Manila Domestic
Airport Terminal 1. At around 3:45 am, a woman arrived and was frisked by NUP Bilugot.
Bilugot felt a hard object bulging near the woman’s buttocks. When asked what the object was
the woman said that it was a sanitary napkin explaining that she was having her monthly
period. Suspicious, NUP Bilugot requested the woman to accompany her to the ladies’ room.
SPO2 Ragadio accompanied them. A plastic sachet with white crystalline substance similar to
tawas was found. NUP Bilugot turned over the plastic sachet to SPO2 Ragadio which NUP
Bilugot placed inside a plastic bag. Together with NUP Bilugot, SPO2 Ragadio brought
Dimaano to the Intelligence and Investigation Office of the Philippine Center for Aviation and
Security. According to SPO2 Ragadio, he and NUP Bilugot wrote their respective initials,
"RBR" and "FSB," on the two sachets. NUP Bilugot then returned to her post at the initial
check-in area.
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Investigators detailed at the Philippine Center for Aviation and Security examined the
contents of the two (2) plastic sachets. One sachet contained three (3) smaller sachets while the
other contained four (4). Thirty minutes later, three investigators from the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency arrived to collect the specimen and placed their initials on the two
plastic sachets. They then brought Dimaano to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency
office at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.
Waiving her right to testify in court, Dimaano instead filed a memorandum and
argued that the prosecution failed to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. She
specifically alluded to the conflicting testimonies of NUP Bilugot and SPO2 Ragadio as to the
number of sachets allegedly obtained from her person.
The trial court found that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
Dimaano attempted to transport methamphetamine hydrochloride, a dangerous drug. On the
discrepancy in NUP Bilugot's and SPO2 Ragadio's testimonies as to the number of sachets
obtained from Dimaano, the trial court explained that "the chain of custody nevertheless
remained unbroken because immediately after NUP Bilugot seized the 'shabu' from Dimaano,
NUP Bilugot immediately turned over the same to SPO2 Ragadio who was just outside the
door of the ladies’ comfort room.”
ISSUE:
Whether there was a break in the chain of custody, thus the accused must be acquitted.
HELD:
No. Despite the discrepancy in the testimonies as to the number of sachets obtained
from accused-appellant, there is evidence that NUP Bilugot marked two plastic sachets. Police
Inspector Tecson, the Forensic Chemist who subjected the specimen to chemical analysis,
reported that he received two plastic sachets marked with "FSB," "RDR," and "RSA.” NUP
Bilugot may not have remembered the contents of the sachet she seized from accused-
appellant. Still, "witnesses are not expected to remember every single detail of an incident
with perfect or total recall." Thus, the prosecution successfully established the identity of
the corpus delicti. In addition, the chain of custody was unbroken. Both NUP Bilugot and SPO2
Ragadio testified that after NUP Bilugot seized the specimen, she immediately endorsed it to
SPO2 Ragadio. SPO2 Ragadio then turned over the two plastic sachets to investigators
detailed at the Philippine Center for Aviation and Security.
MATALAM V. PEOPLE
G.R. Nos. 221849-50, 14 April 2016
Crimes mala in se presuppose that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do
so, while crimes mala prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent
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FACTS:
The Office of the Ombudsman charged Datu Guimid P. Matalam, Regional Secretary of
the DAR-ARMM for non-remittance of accounts to the GSIS and PAG-IBIG Fund under Section
52(g) of R.A. 8921, otherwise known as the GSIS Act of 1997 and Section 1, Rule XIII of the IRR
of R.A. 7742. Matalam was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty. Matalam’s co-accused, Lawi
and Unte, were arraigned and they separately pleaded not guilty. The Prosecution presented
both documentary and testimonial evidence for both criminal cases. According to the
Prosecution, Matalam, Lawi, and Unte were the officers involved in the collection and
remittance of accounts to the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund and, thus, were accountable for the non-
remittance. Matalam and his co-accused failed and/or refused to remit the required
contributions without justifiable cause despite repeated demands. Matalam, for his part,
presented both testimonial and documentary evidence. He claimed that his co-accused Lawi
and Unte were responsible for remitting the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund government
contributions. The Sandiganbayan found Matalam guilty of the crimes charged.
ISSUE:
Whether petitioner Datu Guimid P. Matalam is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of non-
remittance of the employer's share of the GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums.
HELD:
Yes. Indeed, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is criminally

punishable. When an act is malum prohibitum, "[i]t is the commission of that act as defined by
the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the provision has
been violated.” The general rule is that acts punished under a special law are malum prohibitum.
"An act which is declared malum prohibitum, malice or criminal intent is completely immaterial."
In contrast, crimes mala in se concern inherently immoral acts. Crimes mala in se presuppose
that the person who did the felonious act had criminal intent to do so, while crimes mala
prohibita do not require knowledge or criminal intent.
The non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is malum prohibitum. What
the relevant laws punish is the failure, refusal, or delay without lawful or justifiable cause in
remitting or paying the required contributions or accounts.
LOPEZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 212186, 29 June 2016
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Perez purchased a carabao, evidenced by a Certificate of Transfer of Large Cattle. Perez
tied his carabao to a tree inside the property of a Constancio. Perez then discovered that the
carabao was missing.
Lopez allegedly went to Constancio’s property untied the carabao and told Alderete to
bring the carabao to Boy Platan. Alderete, not knowing whether the carabao was owned by
Lopez, followed Lopez's instructions. The trial court found Lopez guilty of cattle-rustling.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lopez is guilty of cattle-rustling.
HELD:
NO. The elements of cattle-rustling are: (1) large cattle is taken; (2) it belongs to
another; (3) the taking is done without the consent of the owner or raiser; (4) the taking is done
by any means, method or scheme; (5) the taking is done with or without intent to gain; and (6)
the taking is accomplished with or without violence or intimidation against persons or force
upon things.
The prosecution failed to prove one of the elements of cattle-rustling, specifically, that
the lost carabao of Perez is the same carabao allegedly stolen by petitioner. The carabao
transported by petitioner and Alderete was not sufficiently proven to be the same carabao
owned by Perez.
PEOPLE V. PUSING
G.R. No. 208009 (Resolution), 11 July 2016
FACTS:
Pusing allegedly went on top of AAA, put his penis in her mouth, mashed her breasts,
kissed her on the lips, licked her vagina, and inserted his penis into her genital. BBB was
prodded by Pusing's neighbor to take AAA in his custody because Pusing allegedly did
something to her. Alarmed, BBB took AAA to his house in Manila, where she revealed the rape
to BBB and his wife. It was revealed that AAA was about 14 years old at the time of rape.
Pusing testified that when AAA lived with him, he treated her as his adopted daughter; he
could not have committed rape against her. He did not know that she was suffering from any
intellectual disability. RTC found Pusing guilty.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Pusing is guilty of qualified rape and of child abuse.
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HELD:
YES. Rape is qualified for the first charge as accused-appellant committed it with the
following aggravating/qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B(6)(1) and (10): (1) When the
victim is under 18 years of age and the offender is a ... guardian ... or the common law spouse of
the parent of the victim; and (2) When the offender knew of the mental disability ... of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the crime.
R.A. No. 7610 provides that those who commit the act of lascivious conduct with a child
or subject to other sexual abuse; provided, that when the victim is under 12 years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act
No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the case may
be.
PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.

G.R. No. 196735 (Resolution), 3 August 2016
FACTS:
While 7 members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch near the Main Library of
the UP, Diliman, they were suddenly attacked with baseball bats and lead pipes by men
believed to be members of Scintilla Juris Fraternity. The victims were brought to the UP
Infirmary while the attackers fled. Dennis Venturina died. An autopsy was conducted on his
cadaver and the medico-legal concluded that Venturina died of traumatic head injuries.
An information for murder was filed against 12 members of the Scintilla Juris fraternity
with the RTC. In 2002, the trial court rendered its decision with the findings that only 5 of the 12
accused were guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were
sentenced to, among other penalties, the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Because one of the penalties meted out was reclusion perpetua, the case was brought to
the SC on automatic appeal. However, due to the amendment of the Rules, the case was
remanded to CA. CA affirmed the decision of the RTC, but downgraded the attempted murder
case to slight physical injuries.
ISSUE:
Whether or not CA is correct in modifying the offense.
HELD:
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No. During the pendency of the appeal, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9346, which
prohibited courts from imposing the death penalty. In view thereof, the CA modified the
imposable penalty from death to reclusion perpetua. CA also disagreed with the trial court's
finding that accused-appellants were likewise guilty of attempted murder with regards Lachica,
Mangrobang, Jr., and Gaston. CA modified the offense to slight physical injuries.
CA’s modification of the offense from attempted murder to slight physical injuries was
reversed. The liabilities arose from a single incident where the intent to kill was already evident
from the first swing of the bat, and that intent was shared by all when the presence of
conspiracy was proven.
According to Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of RPC, attempted murder is

punishable by prision mayor. Slight physical injuries, on the other hand, is punishable by arresto
menor. The CA, in modifying the offenses with regard to victims Lachica, Gaston, and
Mangrobang, Jr., lowered some of the imposable penalties.
The amendments introduced in the Amended Rules to Govern Review of Death Penalty
Cases still stand even if, as this Court has previously mentioned, "death penalty cases are no
longer operational." As the death penalty was abolished during the pendency of the appeal
before the Court of Appeals, the highest penalty the Court of Appeals could impose was
reclusion perpetua.
TUANO Y HERNANDEZ V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 205871 (Resolution), 28 September 2016
FACTS:
Accused Ruel Tuano y Hernandez was charged with violation of Article II, Section 11(3)
of R.A. No. 9165 for having in his possession one (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet with
0.064 grams of shabu. RTC convicted accused. On appeal, the CA affirmed in toto the ruling of
RTC. A letter was received from the Bureau of Corrections informing SC that accused died,
prior to the issuance of SC’s Resolution.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the criminal liability was extinguished? YES
HELD:
Considering accused's death pending appeal extinguishes his criminal liability and civil
liability ex delicto, the criminal action must be dismissed since there is no longer a defendant to
stand as the accused.
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Therefore, when accused died during the pendency of his appeal and prior to this
Court's Resolution, his criminal liability has already been extinguished. From that point on, the
criminal action had no defendant upon which the action is based.
DICHAVES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

G.R. Nos. 206310-11, 7 December 2016
FACTS:
The first complaint accuses Jaime Dichaves and William Gatchalian of direct bribery,
indirect bribery, corruption of public officials, violations of P.D. No. 46 and R.A. No. 6713, and
plunder under R.A. No. 7080, in connection with the "Jose Velarde" account of former President
Estrada. The second complaint accuses Jaime Dichaves; then President and General Manager of
the GSIS, Federico "Ping" Pascual; then President and Chairman of the SSS, Carlos "Chuckie"
Arellano; and Belle Corporation Vice Chairman and Director Willy Ng Ocier, among others, of
violating R.A. No. 6713, Section 3 (a), (e), (g), and (i) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, and plunder
under R.A. No. 7080.
While the preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being

conducted, Dichaves was nowhere to be found in the Philippines. Ombudsman found probable
cause to also indict Dichaves for plunder. Warrant of arrest was issued against Dichaves, but he
could not be located as he had already slipped out of the country. Dichaves was indicted for
conspiring with the former President in amassing ill-gotten wealth through profits and
commissions from the purchase of Belle Corporation shares by the Government Service
Insurance System and the Social Security System.
ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder.
HELD:
No. A person's rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of

procedural law. These rights are statutory, not constitutional. It is the filing of a complaint or
information in court that initiates a criminal action and carries with it all the accompanying
rights of an accused. Only when a person stands trial may he or she demand “the right to
confront and cross-examine his accusers.” This right cannot apply to petitioner, who has yet to
be arraigned and face trial as he left the country at the time he was initially charged with
plunder.
When he slipped out of the Philippines, petitioner was able to avert the implementation
of the initial warrant of arrest against him. His disappearance meant that he could not cross-
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examine the witnesses at the time of Estrada's plunder trial. Petitioner cannot conveniently
impute this fault on the Ombudsman now, more than a decade later. It is injustice, not to
mention a grave error, to attribute to the Ombudsman the dire consequences of petitioner's own
actions.
Thus, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of

evidence is premature for petitioner to raise. The public prosecutor is not bound by the
technical rules on evidence. The executive finding of probable cause requires only substantial
evidence, not absolute certainty of guilt.
TORRES V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 206627, 18 January 2017
FACTS:
Van Clifford Torres was charged with other acts of child abuse under Section 10(a) of
R.A. No. 7610 for allegedly hitting AAA, a 14 year-old minor, with a wet t-shirt three (3)
times. The Regional Trial Court convicted Torres, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Torres’ act constituted child abuse.
HELD:
Although not every instance of laying of hands on the child constitutes child abuse,
petitioner's intention to debase, degrade, and demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child
can be inferred from the manner in which he committed the act complained of.
To note, petitioner used a wet t-shirt to whip the child not just once but three (3) times.
Common sense and human experience would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as
the neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of pain, especially so if it was done
several times. There is also reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force. Otherwise,
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AAA would not have fallen down the stairs at the third strike. AAA would likewise not have
sustained a contusion.
Indeed, if the only intention of petitioner were to discipline AAA and stop him from
interfering, he could have resorted to other less violent means. Instead of reprimanding AAA or
walking away, petitioner chose to hit the latter.
Petitioner is liable for other acts of child abuse under Article VI, Section 10(a) of R.A. No.
7610, which provides that "a person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period."
Petitioner's act of whipping AAA on the neck with a wet t-shirt is an act that debases,
degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child. It is a form of cruelty. Being
smacked several times in a public place is a humiliating and traumatizing experience for all
persons regardless of age. Petitioner, as an adult, should have exercised restraint and self-
control rather than retaliate against a 14-year-old child.
Please See Also: Lucido v. People, G.R. No. 217764, 7 August 2017.
PEOPLE V. JAAFAR
G.R. No. 219829, 18 January 2017
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not fatal to the
prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the existence of a ground
that justifies departure from the general rule.
FACTS:
In an Information, accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong (Jaafar) and Ahmad

Gani y Idjirani (Gani) were charged with violation of R.A. No. 9165. According to the
prosecution, at 8:00 a.m. on September 10, 2009, a male civilian informant reported to Chief of
Police, Police Superintendent Alberto Capacio Larubis (Chief Larubis) that a certain "Mana" was
selling methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) at the port area barangay located just beside
the police station. Mana was later identified as Jaafar, who sold shabu between 12:00 m.n. and
4:00 a.m. to facilitate the sale of the drug and evade arrest. Jaafar allegedly peddled shabu in his
house.
Accordingly, a buy-bust team was formed, and on September 11, 2009, the buy-bust
team left the police station at 1:45 a.m. and went to Jaafar's house. Jaafar met PO1 Look and the
informant at the door of his house and asked them if they were buying shabu. PO1 Look
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answered in the affirmative and gave Jaafar a marked ₱500.00 bill. Jaafar called for Gani inside
the house. Gani came out and handed Jaafar a sachet containing shabu. Jaafar gave the sachet to
PO1 Look, who immediately lit a cigarette-the pre-arranged signal agreed upon by the buy-bust
team. The police officers rushed to arrest Jaafar, but he managed to escape. Jaafar threw away
the marked P500.00 bill as he ran. Eventually, the arresting officers caught up with him 30
meters away from his house.
Immediately after the arrest, PO1 Look marked the confiscated sachet of shabu with his
initials. He then turned over the sachet and the marked ₱500.00 bill to their team leader, SPO4
Morales. The buy-bust team brought Jaafar and Gani to the police station for investigation.
Chief Larubis prepared a letter-request addressed to forensic chemist Melvin Manuel for the
examination of the contents of the sachet. Upon examination, the contents tested positive for
methamphetamine hydrochloride.
In its Decision dated May 15, 2012, the Regional Trial Court convicted Jaafar for
violation of Article II, Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165. However, it acquitted Gani for insufficiency of
evidence. Jaafar filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals and raised the following errors: (1)
the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the arresting team
violated the chain of custody rule under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
The Court of Appeals ruled that although the sachet of shabu was not formally offered
in evidence during trial, it was nevertheless identified by PO1 Look and the forensic chemist.
Being part of their direct testimonies, the shabu formed part of the records of the case. Hence,
the Court of Appeals ruled that the Regional Trial Court did not err in considering the shabu as
evidence. The Court of Appeals also agreed with the Regional Trial Court with regard to the
alleged violation of the chain of custody rule. Although there was a departure in the procedure
mandated under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, the Court of Appeals ruled that it did not
automatically render the confiscated drugs inadmissible since the integrity of the seized shabu
had been kept intact.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the guilt of accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt
despite the non-observance of the required procedure under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted Jaafar. The Supreme Court further held that in all
prosecutions for violations of R.A. No. 9165, the corpus delicti is the dangerous drug itself. Its
existence is essential to a judgment of conviction. Hence, the identity of the dangerous drug
must be clearly established. It is imperative, therefore, that the drugs allegedly seized from the
accused are the very same objects tested in the laboratory and offered in court as evidence. The
chain of custody, as a method of authentication, ensures that unnecessary doubts involving the
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identity of seized drugs are removed. Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 provides the manner by which
law enforcement officers should handle seized dangerous drugs.
While it may be true that non-compliance with Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165 is not fatal to
the prosecution's case provided that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officers, this exception will only be triggered by the
existence of a ground that justifies departure from the general rule.
This Court finds that the prosecution failed to show any justifiable reason that would
warrant non-compliance with the mandatory requirements in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
Although the buy-bust team marked and conducted a physical inventory of the seized sachet of
shabu, the records do not show that the seized sachet had been photographed.
Furthermore, there is absolutely no evidence to show that the physical inventory was
done in the presence of accused-appellant or his representative, representatives from the media
and the Department of Justice, and an elected public official.
See also: People v. Segundo, G.R. No. 205614, 26 July 2017; People v. Saragena; G.R. No.
210677, 23 August 2017.
RAMON AMPARO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 204990. 22 February 2017
Robbery by a band
FACTS:
Ignacio testified that he was riding a jeepney when two (2) men boarded the jeepney.
One of them sat beside him, pointed a knife at him and declared a hold-up. He was ordered to
take his necklace off and hand over his mobile phone. A warning shot was fired by the police
causing the robbers to be rattled and drop their knives on the jeepney bench. Four (4) men, later
identified as Alcubar, Guarino, Salmeo, and Amparo, were arrested. Ignacio identified Alcubar
as the man who poked a knife at him, and Guarino as the one who announced the hold-up. He
also identified Salmeo and Amparo as the ones who sat in the front seat beside the driver. He
admitted that he did not know what Salmeo and Amparo were doing at the time of the incident.
However, he testified that he saw them place their knives on the jeepney bench when the police
fired the warning shot.
ISSUE:
Whether the crime of robbery with a band was committed.

HELD:
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Yes. Even if the crime is committed by several malefactors in a motor vehicle on a public
highway, the crime is still classified as robbery in band, not highway robbery or brigandage
under Presidential Decree No. 532. It is highway robbery only when it can be proven that the
malefactors primarily organized themselves for the purpose of committing that crime. In this
instance, the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner was guilty
of robbery in band.
GRANADA, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184092. 22 February 2017
Conspiracy; R.A. 3019
FACTS:
The Special Audit Report disclosed that the various school forms and construction
materials purchased by the Department of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of
Education) Division Office of Davao for the Elementary School Building Program were priced
above the prevailing market prices, leading to a loss of Php613,755.36 due to overpricing. The
auditors recommended the refund of the excess amount, and the filing of a criminal or
administrative action against the public officials who participated in the transactions. The
Ombudsman found sufficient evidence to indict several DECS officials for violation of R.A. No.
3019. The Sandiganbayan ruled that the prosecution was able to prove the guilt of petitioners
ISSUES:
1. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved conspiracy.

2. Whether private persons may be held liable as conspirators with public officers.
HELD:
1. Yes. The series of acts of the accused in signing all the documents to effect the release of
the funds for the purchase of construction supplies and materials spelled nothing but
conspiracy. The signatures of all the accused appearing in the documents indicate
accused's common design in achieving their one goal to the damage and prejudice of the
government.
2. Yes. Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted and if
found guilty, be held liable for the pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. No. 3019, as
amended. This supports the "policy of the anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public
officers and private persons alike [which constitute] graft or corrupt practices act or
which may lead thereto."
DAAYATA V. PEOPLE
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G.R. No. 205745, 8 March 2017.
The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the moral
certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. While not per
se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire version of events, they
nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its own merits.
FACTS:
In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and

Bregido Malacat, Jr. (Malacat) were charged with frustrated murder. According to the
prosecution, on December 16, 1995, at about 6:00 p.m., Bahian went to the house of Kagawad
Abalde. Bahian recounted to Kagawad Abalde a violent altercation between him and the
petitioners in the course of a basketball game earlier that afternoon. Bahian claimed that Salisi
had committed a foul against him, making him fall to the ground. In response, he threatened
Salisi, telling him that "he would just get even with him." Malacat heard his threat and
positioned himself to punch Bahian. Bahian, however, dodged the blow. Daayata then came,
pointing a gun at Bahian. Bahian then backed off and pleaded that they should not fight as they
were friends. Kagawad Abalde advised Bahian to bring the matter to the attention of Barangay
Captain Y afiez.
Accordingly, the following morning, Bahian and Kagawad Abalde made their way to
Barangay Captain Yafiez' house. While on their way, they were blocked by petitioners. Daayata
hit Bahian on the left part of his chest. Bahian staggered and fell onto a parked jeep. Salisi then
hit Bahian with a stone on the left side of his forehead, causing Bahian to fall to the
ground. While Bahian was lying prostrate on the ground, petitioners boxed and kicked
Bahian. Daayata then poked a gun at Bahian, Malacat unsheathed a bolo, and Salisi wielded an
iron bar. Barangay Captain Yafiez rushed to the scene. There, Bahian lay on the ground as
Kagawad Abalde tried to ward off his attackers. Barangay Captain Yafiez shouted to petitioners
to stop. Shortly after, they retreated. Barangay Captain Yafiez and Kagawad Abalde then
brought Bahian to Barangay Captain Yafiez' house, and later to Cagayan de Oro City Hospital.
Upon examination, Dr. Arreza made the following findings on Bahian: "depressed fracture,
open frontal bone, left." Bahian was noted to have possibly died, if not for the timely medical
intervention. Dr. Mata subsequently performed surgery on Bahian.
The defense offered a different version of events. Apart from the three petitioners, it
offered the testimonies of Delfin Yafiez (Delfin), Rodolfo Yafiez (Rodolfo), Danzon Daayata
(Danzon) and Rosemarie Daayata (Rosemarie ). All three (3) petitioners claimed that it was not
until an hour after the incident that Barangay Captain Yafiez arrived. They also acknowledged
that an altercation did take place during a basketball game the day before, or on December 16,
1995. They added however, that in the evening of December 16, while they were on their way
home, Bahian waited for them to pass by his house, where he challenged them to a
fight. Defense witness Rodolfo allegedly pacified Bahian.
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In its Decision dated April 24, 2003, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 37, Cagayan de Oro
City found petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder. On appeal, the
Court of Appeals sustained the Regional Trial Court's conclusions. Following the denial of their
Motion for Reconsideration, petitioners filed the present Petition, where they insist on their
version of events. They emphasize several factual details and maintain that they did not initiate
an assault on Bahian. They assert that Bahian sustained the injury on his forehead through his
own fault; thus, they could not be held liable for acting with intent to kill Bahian.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioners are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court acquitted the petitioners. As the Court of Appeals has pointed
out, it is true that the prosecution has sought to extenuate the weight of Bahian's admission by
having him explain that he only lied to Dr. Mata because otherwise, "he would not have been
admitted to the hospital and his injury would have not been operated on." However, even this
extenuating explanation does not completely diminish the significance of his admission.
As the same excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination indicated, nobody intimated to

Bahian that he would not have been operated on if his injury arose from a violent altercation.
Confronted with this detail, Bahian never offered a direct response, and instead appeared to
have evaded the question. He merely reiterated that, "Yes, I told a lie because I wanted to be
operated." Thus, the defense's revelation that Bahian's alleged lie was not predicated on a
rational basis stands unrefuted.
Moreover, in the present Petition, the defense points out the curious parallelism
between, on the one hand, the admission or otherwise lie made by Bahian to Dr. Mata, and on
the other hand, the defense's main contention that Bahian sustained a head injury through his
own fault.
There is no showing that petitioners knew that complainant told his doctor that he hit
his head on the edge of the concrete pavement. They came to know of it only when they heard
him admit it on cross-examination. And yet, that's exactly what they have always been asserting
right from the very start, even during the preliminary investigation, or long before they heard
him say it on the witness stand. It is too much of a coincidence that petitioners and the
complainant should say exactly the same thing, that he hit his head on the edge of the concrete
pavement - unless it is true.
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Finally, several witnesses - both from the defense and the prosecution - have belied the
prosecution's claim that petitioners Daayata, Malacat, and Salisi wielded a gun, a bolo and an
iron bar, respectively.
The details pointed out by the defense reveal how the prosecution failed to establish the
moral certainty and conscientious satisfaction that attends proof of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. While not per se demonstrating the veracity and blamelessness of the defense's entire
version of events, they nevertheless disclose how the prosecution's case is unable to stand on its
own merits. They cast doubt on whether the complainant and his companion were actually
stopped in their tracks to be assaulted, and support the possibility that they may have instead
deliberately intended to bring themselves to Vicente's house to provoke or challenge one (1) of
the petitioners.
They also cast doubt on whether the complainant was relentlessly assaulted, with the
specific purpose of ending his life; whether the ostensible fatal blow was dealt to complainant
by one (1) of the petitioners or was dealt upon him by his own violent imprudence; and
whether petitioners had actually brandished implements for maiming and killing. Not only do
these doubts persist, details disclosed by the prosecution itself - taken together with how the
defense accounted for the events of December 16 and 17, 1995 - demonstrate the dubiety of the
prosecution's claims.
Velasquez v. People
G.R. No. 195021, 15 March 2017
FACTS:
The spouses Jesus and Ana Del Mundo (Del Mundo Spouses) left their home to sleep
in their nipa hut, which was about 100 meters away. Arriving at the nipa hut, the Del Mundo
Spouses saw Ampong Ocumen (“Ampong”) and Nora Castillo (Nora) having sex. Jesus Del
Mundo (Jesus) shouted invectives at Ampong and Nora, who both scampered away. Jesus
decided to pursue Ampong and Nora, while Ana Del Mundo (Ana) left to fetch their son, who
was then elsewhere. Jesus went to the house of Ampong's aunt, but neither Ampong nor Nora
was there. He began making his way back home when he was blocked by Ampong and his
fellow accused.
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Petitioner Nicolas Velasquez hit the left side of Jesus' forehead with a stone. Petitioner
Victor Velasquezalso hit Jesus' left eyebrow with a stone. Felix Caballeda did the same,
hitting Jesus above his left ear. Accused Sonny struck Jesus with a bamboo, hitting him at the
back, below his right shoulder. Ampong punched Jesus on his left cheek. The accused then left
Jesus on the ground, bloodied. Jesus crawled and hid behind blades of grass, fearing that the
accused might return. He then got up and staggered his way back to their house.
Petitioners Velasquez (Victor), along with four (4) others - Caballeda, Jojo Del Mundo
(Jojo), Sonny Boy Velasquez (Sonny), and Ampong - were charged with attempted murder
under Article 248.
The Regional Tnal Court found petitioners and Felix Caballeda guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of attempted murder. On petitioners' and Caballeda's appeal, the Court of
Appeals found that petitioners and Caballeda were only liable for serious physical injuries
because "first, intent to kill was not attendant inasmuch as the accused-appellants, despite
their superiority in numbers and strength, left the victim alive and, second, none of [the]
injuries or wounds inflicted upon the victim was fatal." The Court of Appeals thus modified
the sentence imposed on petitioners and Caballeda.
ISSUE:
Whether there was sufficient evidence to prove that justifying circumstances existed.
HELD:
To successfully invoke self-defense, an accused must establish: "(1) unlawful

aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means employed to
prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the
person resorting to self-defense." Defense of a relative under Article 11 (2) of the Revised
Penal Code requires the same first two (2) requisites as self-defense and, in lieu of the third "in
case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the defense had
no part therein."
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We find petitioners' claims of self-defense and defense of their relative, Mercedes, to be
sorely wanting.
Petitioners' entire defense rests on proof that it was Jesus who initiated an assault by
barging into the premises of petitioners' residences, hacking Victor's door, and threatening
physical harm upon petitioners and their companions. That is, that unlawful aggression
originated from Jesus.
Contrary to what a successful averment of self-defense or defense of a relative

requires, petitioners offered nothing more than a self-serving, uncorroborated claim that Jesus
appeared out of nowhere to go berserk in the vicinity of their homes. They failed to present
independent and credible proof to back up their assertions. The Regional Trial Court noted
that it was highly dubious that Jesus would go all the way to petitioners' residences to initiate
an attack for no apparent reason.
The remainder of petitioners' recollection of events strains credulity. They claim that
Jesus launched an assault despite the presence of at least seven (7) antagonists: petitioners,
Mercedes, and the four (4) other accused. They further assert that Jesus persisted on his
assault despite being outnumbered, and also despite their and their co-accused's bodily efforts
to restrain Jesus. His persistence was supposedly so likely to harm them that, to neutralize
him, they had no other recourse but to hit him on the head with stones for at least three (3)
times, and to hit him on the back with a bamboo rod, aside from dealing him with less severe
blows.
Even if it were to be granted that Jesus was the initial aggressor, the beating dealt to
him by petitioners and their co-accused was still glaringly in excess of what would have
sufficed to neutralize him. It was far from a reasonably necessary means to repel his supposed
aggression. Petitioners thereby fail in satisfying the second requisite of self-defense and of
defense of a relative.
PEOPLE V. AMBATANG
G.R. No. 205855, 29 March 2017.
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It is well settled that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the accused is entitled
to greater weight than their denials and alibis.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant King Rex Ambatang (Ambatang) was charged with the murder of 60-
year-old Ely Vidal (Ely).
According to the prosecution, on October 17, 2002, at around 10:30 p.m., Jennifer Vidal
Mateo (Jennifer) was at the kitchen of their house in Taguig with her cousins when she heard a
barrage of stones hurled at their house. She peeked out of the window and saw Ambatang
standing outside with a certain "Loui." Melody Vidal Navarro (Melody) immediately called
barangay tanods, who then immediately went to Ambatang's house, just across the Vidals'
house. While Ambatang's mother, Nicepura Ambatang, was speaking to a tanod, another tanod,
Romeo Acaba (Acaba), saw Ambatang sharpening a knife in their kitchen. Suddenly, Ambatang
was nowhere to be found and appeared to have sneaked past the tanods before running
towards the Vidals' house. Later, Ambatang was on top of Ely and was stabbing him repeatedly
with a kitchen knife. Ambatang ran away but was apprehended by the tanods. The victim was
pronounced dead on arrival at Pasig Provincial Hospital.
Jennifer and Acaba testified that they personally saw the killing. Ely's wife, Carmelita
Vidal (Carmelita), testified that after her husband was stabbed, the victim was able to get near
her, embrace her, and tell her, "Si King Rex sinaksak ako ng sinaksak."
In his defense, Ambatang claimed that he was at AMA Computer Leaming Center on
October 17, 2002 from 3:00 p.m. to 8:00 p.m., and did not get home until 9:30 p.m. He stated that
while he was doing the laundry, barangay tanods went to their house looking for a person
named Louie. He then heard a noise from a commotion outside his house. His mother and sister
went out and instructed him to stay in the sala with his girlfriend, Gina Canapi. Minutes later,
he went out to see his friend Rey Lobo (Lobo), who lived roughly eight to ten meters from their
house. Lobo was not there, but he was able to speak to a certain Rael for a few seconds. He then
left Lobo's house and was arrested by the barangay tanods on his way home.
In support of Ambatang's testimony, his mother and his girlfriend both testified that
Ambatang was inside the house when the stabbing occurred.
In the Decision dated April 5, 2010, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 163, Pasig City
found Ambatang guilty of murder, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellant is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder.
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HELD:
Yes. The testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are sufficient to convict the accused-
appellant.
The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals made definitive findings that
Jennifer and Acaba made positive, unequivocal, and categorical identifications of accused-
appellant as the person who stabbed the deceased Vidal. As against these, accused-appellant
offered denial and alibi as defenses, which jurisprudence has long considered weak and
unreliable. As noted by the Court of Appeals:
Accused-appellant also offered alibi as a defense. He asserts that he was at home

when the stabbing incident happened. We reiterate once more the oft-repeated rule that
the defense of alibi is worthless in the face of positive identification. Thus:
It is well settled that positive identification by the prosecution witnesses of the

accused as perpetrators of the crime is entitled to greater weight than their denials and
alibis.
True, accused-appellant's alibi was corroborated by Gina Canapi and Nicepura

Ambatang. However, an alibi, especially when corroborated mainly by relatives and
friends of the accused, is held by this Court with extreme suspicion for it is easy to
fabricate and concoct.
Furthermore, for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove not only
that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that it
was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.
The excuse must be so airtight that it would admit of no exception. Where there is the
least possibility of accused-appellant's presence at the crime scene, as in this case, the alibi
will not hold water.
Accused-appellant assails the supposed inconsistencies in the statements of Jennifer and

Acaba, that is, their statements on how accused-appellant left his residence and stabbed Vidal,
and on the specific number of times that they saw Vidal get stabbed by accused-appellant.
These inconsistencies, however, are too minor. They are ultimately ineffectual in absolving
accused-appellant of liability. In People v. Bagaua:
We have time and again said that a few discrepancies and inconsistencies in the
testimonies of witnesses referring to minor details and not actually touching upon the
central fact of the crime do not impair the credibility of the witnesses. Instead of
weakening their testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen their credibility
because they discount the possibility of their being rehearsed.
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Regardless of Jennifer and Acaba's supposed discrepancies on how accused-appellant
left his residence to stab Vidal and the exact number of times they saw him stab Vidal, what
ultimately matters is that they witnessed how accused-appellant stabbed Vidal.
PEOPLE V. ENTRAMPAS
G.R. No. 212161, 29 March 2017.
When a woman, especially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to show that rape was committed.
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Juanito Entrampas (Entrampas) and BBB were common-law spouses.

AAA, BBB's daughter from a previous relationship, lived with them. Entrampas, then 50 years
old, was a farmer who tilled a rice field half a kilometer away from their home. BBB collected
shrimps and shells for a living, and would usually be at sea or by the beach from 4:00 p.m. to
7:00 p.m. AAA was still in elementary school.
Sometime in February 2003, at about 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived from school to cook for her
family. She was interrupted by Entrampas and was asked to go to the room upstairs. The 11-
year old girl obeyed. "Once in the room, [Entrampas] forced AAA to lie down on the floor[.]"
She was warned by accused-appellant that if she shouted he would kill her. She was also
warned that if she told her mother about what he was about to do, he would kill them.
Entrampas took off the child's panty, undressed himself, and inserted his penis into her vagina.
AAA felt pain as he penetrated her. Her vagina bled. She cried and pleaded him to stop. As he
consummated the act, she noticed a knife on the wall within his reach. She became more fearful.
After satisfying himself, he again warned the child that he would kill her arid her mother if she
informed anyone about the incident. She was left in the room sobbing.
The incident occurred again a week later in February 2003. Entrampas told AAA to lie
down, penetrated her vagina, and then left her. AAA stayed in the room upstairs, crying, until
her mother came home at 10:00 p.m. Over the following months, Entrampas repeatedly raped
AAA, who, out of fear, remained silent.
In July 2003, BBB observed some changes in her daughter's body. AAA's breasts had
swollen, she had lost her appetite, and she was always sleeping. By September 2003, AAA's
belly had become noticeably bigger. She was brought to the dispensary where her urine test
was submitted for analysis. AAA's pregnancy test yielded positive. Fearing for her life, AAA
refused to reveal the identity of the father of her child. Neighbors suspected that Entrampas got
her pregnant. BBB asked Entrampas, who, according to BBB, admitted that he was the father of
AAA's child.
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On September 8, 2003, Entrampas and BBB went to BBB's brother, CCC, "to confess the
crime he had committed against AAA." Entrampas allegedly felt remorseful and told CCC to
kill him to avenge AAA. CCC immediately reported the matter to the police.
Before the Regional Trial Court, Entrampas was charged with two (2) counts of qualified
rape under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353 (Anti-Rape Law of 1997).
Two (2) separate informations were then filed against him.
On December 6, 2008, the Regional Trial Court found the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of two (2) counts of statutory rape, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Entrampas is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for two (2) counts of
statutory rape.
HELD:
Yes, the Supreme Court affirmed Entrampas’ conviction.
A careful examination of the records shows that there is nothing that would warrant a
reversal of the Decisions of the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals. "[W]hen a
woman, especially a minor, says that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is necessary
to show that rape was committed."
Settled is the rule that "factual findings of the trial court and its evaluation of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to great respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal, unless the trial court is shown to have overlooked, misapprehended, or
misapplied any fact or circumstance of weight and substance."
On the two (2) charges of qualified rape, AAA clearly and consistently communicated
how accused-appellant threatened and forced her into having sexual congress with him.
Accused-appellant's acts amounted to statutory rape through carnal knowledge under Article
266-A(l )(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Accused-appellant also committed the
crime with the aggravating/qualifying circumstance that he was the common-law spouse of
AAA's mother pursuant to Article 266-B (1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
As to the circumstances qualifying rape, the prosecution established that the victim was
less than 12 years old when the incident happened in February 2003, and that the offender was
her guardian. AAA's Certificate of Live Birth proved her minority. AAA was accused-
appellant's foster daughter. AAA and her mother, who was accused-appellant's former live-in
partner, resided with accused-appellant in his house. In September 2003, Dr. Bagaporo
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administered AANs pregnancy test and found her to be with child. AAA gave birth on
November 3, 2003, within nine (9) months from the date of the first rape in February 2003.
Meanwhile, CCC averred that accused-appellant admitted the crime to him, after which
CCC reported the incident to the barangay captain and then to the police. As against these
details and testimonies, all that accused-appellant offered in defense were denials and alibis,
which jurisprudence has long considered weak and unreliable.
The Regional Trial Court, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly found that the
testimonies of AAA, BBB, CCC, and Dr. Bagaporo corroborated each other and supported the
physical evidence. There was no showing that the witnesses for the prosecution had ill motives
to testify against accused-appellant. Their testimonies are, therefore, accorded full faith and
credence.
See also: People of the Philippines v. Divinagracia, Sr., G.R. No. 207765. 26 July 2017; People
v. Austria, G.R. No. 210568, 8 November 2017;
PEOPLE V. GACUSAN
G.R. No. 207776, 26 April 2017
FACTS:
George Gacusan (“Gacusan”) was BBB's common-law partner. At the onset of their
relationship, BBB moved in to Gacusan's house. When BBB died, she left AAA, her minor
daughter, an orphan. AAA opted to stay with Gacusan "as life was harder living with her
grandmother than with her stepfather." When BBB died, AAA began sleeping beside Gacusan
because of her fear of ghosts. Gacusan repeatedly raped AAA, who was 15 years old at the time.
Gacusan was convicted of simple rape by the trial court. The CA affirmed the trial court’s
decision.
Gacusan claims that the employment of force, threat, or intimidation under Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code was not satisfactorily proven by the prosecution. He insists that only
when the offended party is either under twelve (12) years of age or is demented that the
elements of force, threat or intimidation may be dispensed with. Since it was admitted that
AAA was already fifteen (15) years old at the time of the alleged rape, the prosecution should
have proven that the incident was accompanied by force, threat, or intimidation. Gacusan also
asserts that he was unarmed and AAA just "let him do what he wanted."
ISSUE:
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Whether Gacusan's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt despite the alleged failure of
the prosecution to prove that Gacusan employed force, threat, or intimidation in raping AAA.
HELD:
"[D]ifferent people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard
form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful
experience." One person may react aggressively, while another may show cold indifference.
Also, it is improper to judge the actions of children who are victims of traumatic experiences
"by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature people."
Furthermore, a victim should never be blemished for her lack of resistance to any crime
especially as heinous as rape. Neither the failure to shout nor the failure to resist the act equate
to a victim's voluntary submission to Gacusan’s lust. The testimony of AAA reveals that the
reason she did not shout during the alleged rape was that she was afraid of losing a family. It is
reasonable to assume that she was terrified of losing someone who provided her support after
losing her biological mother. She testified that she could not find comfort from her
grandmother.
Recent cases reiterate that moral ascendancy replaces violence or intimidation in rape

committed by a close-kin. Gacusan had moral ascendancy over AAA. In this case, therefore, the
issue regarding the need to prove actual force or intimidation becomes superfluous since it was
already established that Gacusan was the common-law partner of AAA's deceased mother.
Furthermore, apart from Gacusan's moral ascendancy over AAA, it is apparent that he also
had physical advantage over her. Given all these reasons, AAA was left without any other
choice but to succumb to Gacusan's sordid acts.
CRUZ V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 210266, 7 June 2017.
To successfully sustain a conviction for possession and use of a counterfeit access device, the
prosecution must present not only the access device but also any evidence that proves that the access
device is counterfeit.
FACTS:
Cruz was charged with violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 8484 otherwise
known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998. According to the prosecution, on April 18,
2006, at around 7:30 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase two (2) bottles of Calvin Klein
perfume worth US$96.00 from Duty Free Philippines Fiesta Mall. Danilo Wong (Wong), the
cashier at the Perfume Section, testified that Cruz paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa
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credit card. The transaction was approved, although Wong doubted the validity of the credit
card since the number at the back was not aligned.
At around 8:00 p.m., Cruz allegedly tried to purchase a pair of Ferragamo shoes worth
US$363.00. Ana Margarita Lim (Lim), the cashier on duty, facilitated the sales transaction. Cruz
paid for the purchase using a Citibank Visa credit card bearing the name "Gerry Santos," with
credit card number 4539 7207 8677 7008. When Lim asked for Cruz's Duty Free shopping card,
Cruz presented a shopping card with the name of "Rodolfo Garcia." Lim asked for another
identification card, and Cruz gave her a driver's license bearing the name "Gerry Santos."
Lim proceeded to the mall's Electronic Section to swipe the credit card for approval. The
card was approved, but she noticed that the last four (4) digits of the card were not properly
embossed and its validity date started in November 2006. She called Citibank to verify the
credit card. Upon verification, Citibank informed Lim that the credit card was counterfeit and
that the real Gerry Santos was the Head of Citibank's Fraud Risk Management Division. Lim
was advised to transfer the matter to the Security Department.
After the prosecution formally offered their evidence, Cruz filed a Demurrer to Evidence
asserting that the credit card was inadmissible since it was presented and offered by the
prosecution in violation of A.M. No. 03-1- 09-SC because it was not marked during the pre-trial
conference.
On August 6, 2009, the trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and stated that the
credit card receipts were properly identified by the witnesses. The trial court also stated that the
alleged counterfeit credit card was offered in evidence by the prosecution.
On May 5, 2010, the trial court rendered its Judgment finding Cruz guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of Section 9(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 8484 in Criminal Case Nos. 06-
04 79 and 06-0480, when he used a counterfeit access device to purchase a pair of shoes worth
US$363.00. However, it acquitted Cruz in Criminal Case No. 06-0481 upon finding that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of using a counterfeit access
device to purchase two (2) bottles of perfume worth US$96.00.
Aggrieved, Cruz appealed to the Court of Appeals. On July 4, 2013, the Court of
Appeals rendered the Decision denying the appeal and upholding Cruz's conviction. Cruz
moved for reconsideration, but the Motion was denied in the Resolution dated November 26,
2013.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Cruz is guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime charged.
HELD:
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Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Cruz’ conviction.
R.A. No. 8484, otherwise known as the Access Devices Regulation Act of 1998, defines
an access device as: any card, plate, code, account number, electronic serial number, personal
identification number, or other telecommunications service, equipment, or instrumental
identifier, or other means of account access that can be used to obtain money, good, services, or
any other thing of value or to initiate a transfer of funds (other than a transfer originated solely
by paper instrument). Since a credit card is "any card, plate, coupon book, or other credit device
existing for the purpose of obtaining money, goods, property, labor or services or anything of
value on credit," it is considered an access device. Section 9(a) and (e) make the possession and
use of a counterfeit access device as "access device fraud" that is punishable by law
A counterfeit access device is "any access device that is counterfeit, fictitious, altered, or
forged, or an identifiable component of an access device or counterfeit access device." Under
Section 9(a) and (e) of R.A. No. 8484, the possession and use of an access device is not illegal.
Rather, what is prohibited is the possession and use of a counterfeit access device. Therefore,
the corpus delicti of the crime is not merely the access device, but also any evidence that proves
that it is counterfeit.
Petitioner was found in possession of Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207 8677
7008, which bore the name "Gerry Santos." He used the same credit card to purchase Ferragamo
shoes worth US$363.00 at Duty Free Fiesta Mall. Citibank Visa credit card number 4539 7207
8677 7008 was later proven to be a counterfeit access device.
People v. Armodia
G.R. No. 210654, 7 June 2017
FACTS:
Accused-appellant Pablo Luad Armodia (“accused-appellant”) and his wife, BBB, had
three (3) children, the oldest of whom was AAA. AAA was raped by her father, accused-
appellant, twice.
Accused-appellant was charged with two (2) counts of rape of a minor under two (2)
separate informations. He pleaded "not guilty" to the rape charges. On October 21, 2003, the
State moved for leave to amend the informations and add the phrase, "being the father of the
victim."
On November 7, 2003, the RTC denied the State's motion, ruling that the requested
amendment was substantial and prejudicial to accused-appellant's right to be informed of the
charges against him. On July 25, 2011, the Regional Trial Court convicted accused-appellant of
two (2) counts of simple rape. The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the Regional
Trial Court's Decision.
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ISSUE:
a. Whether accused-appellant was proven beyond reasonable doubt to be guilty of

rape; and
b. Whether the accused is guilty of two (2) counts of simple rape.
HELD:
Accused-appellant committed two (2) counts of simple rape, not qualified rape.
The crime of qualified rape under Article 266-B(1) 48 of the Revised Penal Code
consists of the twin circumstances of the victim's minority and her relationship to the
perpetrator, both of which must concur and must be alleged in the information. It is
immaterial whether the relationship was proven during trial if that was not specifically
pleaded for in the information.
The CA and the RTC found that accused-appellant's relationship with AAA was not
duly alleged in the informations. Thus, his relationship with the victim cannot qualify the
crimes of rape. Ruling otherwise would deprive him of his constitutional right to be informed
of the nature and cause of accusation against him.
People v. Avancena
G.R. No. 200512, 7 June 2017
FACTS:
Rizaldo Policarpio (“Rizaldo”), while in his car, noticed a vehicle tailing him.
Rizaldo decided to head to the nearest police precinct. Upon alighting from his vehicle,
accused-appellant Elmer Avancena (“Avancena”) called his name and alighted from the
vehicle tailing Rizaldo. Avancena told Rizaldo that his companion noticed that Rizaldo
received illegal drugs. Rizaldo denied Avancena's accusations. Avancena instructed Rizaldo
that they should board Rizaldo's vehicle because Avancena was going to introduce him to the
group's team leader, Tony Abalo (“Abalo”). After Rizaldo boarded, more companions of
Avancena boarded the vehicle and told Rizaldo to move over to the passenger's side. Rizaldo
could not complain because Avancena had a gun. He moved to the passenger's side but was
surprised when another person, later identified as Taytay, opened the passenger's side door,
boarded the vehicle, and handcuffed him.
Avancena drove to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot on Adriatico
Street, Malate, Manila. Upon arriving, Rizaldo's handcuffs were removed and he was boarded
on the Isuzu Crosswind. He was handcuffed again.
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Upon arriving at the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency parking lot, Avancena told
Rizaldo that they would release him if his father would pay them Phpl50,000.00. Rizaldo
replied that his father, Alfonso (“Alfonso”), did not have that amount of money.
Alfonso brought a borrowed amount of P5,000.00 to the Philippine Drug Enforcement

Agency, which was taken by Avancena.
The RTC later found Avancena, Popioco, and Taytay (“accused-appellants”) guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping with serious illegal detention and robbery. CA
affirmed the decision.
ISSUE:
Whether accused-appellants are guilty beyond reasonable doubt of kidnapping and

serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code and robbery under
Article 294(5) of the Revised Penal Code.
HELD:
In kidnapping for ransom, the prosecution must be able to establish the following
elements: "[first,] the accused was a private person; [second,] he [or she] kidnapped or
detained or in any manner deprived another of his or her liberty; [third,] the kidnapping or
detention was illegal; and [fourth,] the victim was kidnapped or detained for ransom."
In order to prove kidnapping, the prosecution must establish that the victim was
"forcefully transported, locked up or restrained." It must be proven that the accused intended
"to deprive the victim of his liberty." The act of handcuffing Rizaldo and physically harming
him to prevent escape falls under this definition. Accused-appellants, however, claim that
Rizaldo was not kidnapped because he voluntarily went with the accused-appellants.
"[T]he fact that the victim voluntarily went with the accused [does] not remove the
element of deprivation of liberty [if] the victim went with the accused on a false inducement
without which the victim would not have done so." Rizaldo would not have gone with the
accused-appellants had they not misrepresented themselves as Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency agents who allegedly caught him selling illegal drugs.
Accused-appellants, however, were also charged with robbery under Article 294(5) of
the Revised Penal Code. The elements of simple robbery are "a) that there is personal property
belonging to another; b) that there is unlawful taking of that property; c) that the taking is
with intent to gain; and d) that there is violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things."
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Rizaldo's ordeal did not end with his release from captivity. Accused-appellant
Avancena also demanded the payment of Phpl50,000.00 from Rizaldo’s father, Alfonso.
Marked money was prepared and placed in a plastic bag.
In this instance, there was a taking of personal property belonging to Alfonso by

means of intimidation. "Taking is considered complete from the moment the offender gains
possession of the thing, even if [the offender] has no opportunity to dispose of the
[thing]." The marked money was recovered from the accused-appellants when they were
arrested, which proves that they were able to gain possession of Alfonso's money.
Considering the weight of evidence presented by the prosecution, accused-appellants

are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery under Article 294(5) of the Revised
Penal Code. The proper penalty is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor medium.
People v. Corpuz
G.R. No. 208013, 3 July 2017
FACTS:
The assailed Decision affirmed the RTC’s ruling that Allan was guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of Simple Rape of AAA, a mental retardate (intellectually
disabled) with a mental age of five (5) years and eight (8) months. AAA also became pregnant.
ISSUE:
Whether Allan's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt.
HELD:
To warrant a rape conviction under Article 266-A, it should be shown that "a man had
carnal knowledge with a woman, or a person sexually assaulted another, under any of the
following circumstances: a) Through force, threat, or intimidation; b) When the offended
party is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; c) By means of fraudulent machination
or grave abuse of authority; and d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age
or is demented, even though none of the circumstances mentioned above be present."
In this case, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA were clearly established by
the victim's testimony. Apart from identifying her offender, AAA was also able to recount the
sordid acts committed against her. Moreover, the sexual congresses between Allan and AAA
was corroborated by the Medico Legal Certificate issued by Dr. Araos-Liberato which showed
the presence of healed hymenal lacerations.
Healed or fresh hymenal lacerations "are the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration."
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The gravamen of rape under Article 266-A (1) is carnal knowledge of "a woman
against her will or without her consent." Undoubtedly, sexual intercourse with an
intellectually disabled person is rape since proof of force or intimidation becomes needless as
the victim is incapable of giving consent to the act.
AAA's intellectual disability was undisputed and well substantiated by the

testimonies of Tablizo and Dr. Acosta. AAA was 14 years old when her neuropsychiatric
examination revealed that her Intelligence Quotient was 42 and her level of intelligence was
equal to Moderate Mental Retardation. Also, she had a mental age of a five (5)-year-and-eight
(8)-month-old child. AAA underwent another mental status examination with Dr. Acosta
before being presented as a witness. The examination revealed that she had a "mild degree of
mental retardation." AAA "belonged to sub-average intellectual with an IQ of 70." Although
AAA was already 19 years old at that time, her mental age was that of a child aged five (5) to
seven (7) years.
For this reason, Allan's acts amounted to rape under Article 266-A 1 (d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.
If a woman above 12 years old has a mental age of a child below 12, the accused
remains liable for rape even if the victim acceded to the sordid acts. The reason behind the
rule "is simply that if sexual intercourse with a victim under twelve years of age is rape, it
must thereby follow that carnal knowledge of a woman whose mental age is that of a child
below twelve years should likewise be constitutive of rape."
Notwithstanding AAA's intellectual disability, she is qualified to take the witness

stand. A person with low Intelligence Quotient may still perceive and is capable of making
known his or her perception to others.
AAA's mental state also does not prevent her from being a credible witness. An
intellectually disabled person is not, solely by this reason, ineligible from testifying in court.
"He or she can be a witness, depending on his or her ability to relate what he or she knows." If
an intellectually disabled victim's testimony is coherent, it is admissible in court.
In sustaining a conviction for rape, "the victim's testimony must be clear and free from
contradictions." This is indispensable because in this kind of offenses, "conviction or acquittal
virtually depends entirely on the credibility of the complainant's narration since usually, only
the participants can testify as to its occurrence.
Generally, the issue in rape cases involves credibility. As "regards the credibility of
witnesses, th[is] Court usually defers to the findings of the trial court, absent a strong and
cogent reason to disregard [them]."
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Discrepancies pertaining to "minor details and not in actuality touching upon the
central fact of the crime" do not prejudice AAA's credibility. Thus, "[i]nstead of weakening
[her] testimonies, such inconsistencies tend to strengthen [her] credibility because they
discount the possibility of their being rehearsed."
Furthermore, Allan's defense of denial cannot overcome AAA's positive identification

of the accused. A denial is "inherently weak and crumbles in the light of positive declarations
of truthful witnesses who testified on affirmative matters that appellant was at the scene of the
crime and was the victim's assailant."
Please See Also: Bacerra v. People, G.R. No. 204544, 3 July 2017; People v. Dimapilit, G.R. No.
210802, 9 August 2017; People v. Ordona, G.R. No. 227863, 20 September 2017; People v. Tayaban,
G.R. No. 207666, 22 November 2017; People v. Joseph San Jose, G.R. No. 206916, 3 July 2017.
BACERRA V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 204544, 3 July 2017
FACTS:
At about 1:00 a.m., Alfredo Melegrito was roused from sleep by the sound of stones
hitting his house. Alfredo peered through the jalousie window of his home, and recognized
his neighbor and co-worker, Marlon Bacerra (“Bacerra”). Bacerra threw stones at Alfredo's
house while saying, "[V]ulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now." Bacerra then left.
Troubled by Bacerra's threat, Alfredo waited for him to return. Alfredo sat down
beside the window. At around 4:00a.m., he heard dogs barking outside. Alfredo looked out
the window and saw Bacerra walking towards their nipa hut, which was located around 10
meters from their house. Bacerra paced in front of the nipa hut and shook it. Moments later,
Alfredo saw the nipa hut burning.
Bacerra was charged with violation of Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1613. The
RTC found Bacerra guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. The CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision.
ISSUES:
a. Whether petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt based on the
circumstantial evidence adduced during trial; and
b. Whether the mitigating circumstances of intoxication and voluntary surrender

may properly be appreciated in this case to reduce the imposable penalty.
HELD:
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Petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of arson. Rule 113, Section 4 of the Rules
on Evidence provides three (3) requisites that should be established to sustain a conviction
based on circumstantial evidence: (a) There is more than one circumstance; (b) The facts from
which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances
is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
The commission of a crime, the identity of the perpetrator, and the finding of guilt
may all be established by circumstantial evidence. The circumstances must be considered as a
whole and should create an unbroken chain leading to the conclusion that the accused
authored the crime.
The determination of whether circumstantial evidence is sufficient to support a finding

of guilt is a qualitative test not a quantitative one. The proven circumstances must be
"consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at
the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other
rational hypothesis except that of guilt."
In this case, no one saw petitioner actually set fire to the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the
prosecution has established multiple circumstances, which, after being considered in their
entirety, support the conclusion that petitioner is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of simple
arson.
First, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner stoned private
complainant's house and threatened to bum him. Private complainant testified that he saw
petitioner throwing stones at his house and heard petitioner say, "okinam nga Lakay Fred,
puuran kayo tad ta!" (Vulva of your mother, Old Fred, I'll bum you now.) Petitioner's threats
were also heard by private complainant's son and grandchildren.
Second, the evidence was credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner returned a
few hours later and made his way to private complainant's nipa hut. Private complainant
testified that at 4:00 a.m., he saw petitioner pass by their house and walk towards their nipa
hut. This was corroborated by private complainant's son who testified that he saw petitioner
standing in front of the nipa hut moments before it was burned.
Third, the evidence was also credible and sufficient to prove that petitioner was in
close proximity to the nipa hut before it caught fire. Private complainant testified that he saw
petitioner walk to and fro in front of the nipa hut and shake its posts just before it caught fire.
Private complainant's son likewise saw petitioner standing at the side of the nipa hut before it
was burned.
The stoning incident and the burning incident cannot be taken and analyzed
separately. Instead, they must be viewed and considered as a whole. Circumstantial evidence
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is like a "tapestry made up of strands which create a pattern when interwoven." Each strand
cannot be plucked out and scrutinized individually because it only forms part of the entire
picture. The events that transpired prior to the burning incident cannot be disregarded.
Petitioner's threat to bum occurred when he stoned private complainant's house.
There is no other reasonable version of the events which can be held with reasonable
certainty. Private complainant could have actually seen petitioner bum the nipa hut by
stepping outside of his house. However, behavioral responses of individuals confronted with
strange, startling, or frightful experiences vary. Where there is a perceived threat or danger to
survival, some may fight, others might escape. Private complainant's act of remaining inside
his house during the incident is not contrary to human behavior. It cannot affect his credibility
as a witness.
There is no sufficient evidence in this case that would show that petitioner was
intoxicated at the time of the commission of the crime. For intoxication to be appreciated as a
mitigating circumstance, the intoxication of the accused must neither be "habitual [n]or
subsequent to the plan to commit [a] felony." Moreover, it must be shown that the mental
faculties and willpower of the accused were impaired in such a way that would diminish the
accused's capacity to understand the wrongful nature of his or her acts. The bare assertion
that one is inebriated at the time of the commission of the crime is insufficient. There must be
proof of the fact of intoxication and the effect of intoxication on the accused.
A considerable amount of time had lapsed from petitioner's drinking spree up to the
burning of the nipa hut within which he could have regained control of his actions. Hence,
intoxication cannot be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance in this case.
Neither can voluntary surrender be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance.
Voluntary surrender, as a mitigating circumstance, requires an element of spontaneity.

The accused's act of surrendering to the authorities must have been impelled by the
acknowledgment of guilt or a desire to "save the authorities the trouble and expense that may
be incurred for his [or her] search and capture."
Based on the evidence on record, there is no showing that petitioner's act of submitting
his person to the authorities was motivated by an acknowledgement of his guilt.
Mariano v. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 224102, 26 July 2017
FACTS:
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The Regional Trial Court found petitioner Ryan Mariano (Mariano) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal
Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the justifying circumstance of defense of a stranger should be

appreciated in this case.
HELD:
An attack showing the aggressor's intention is enough to consider that unlawful

aggression was committed. Thus, the attack on Pamela should have been considered as
unlawful aggression for purposes of invoking the justifying circumstance of defense of a
stranger.
The state of mind of the accused during the alleged act of self-defense or defense of a
stranger must be considered in determining whether a person's means of repelling an aggressor
were reasonable.
Here, although the offended party was drunk, and therefore, was not able to land his
blows, his attacks were incessant. He had already attacked three (3) other persons—two (2)
minors as well as petitioner's common-law wife—and was still belligerent. While it may be true
that Pamela, Pia, and Yuki had already gone inside the house at the time of the stabbing, it then
appeared to the petitioner that there was no other reasonable means to protect his family except
to commit the acts alleged. It is unreasonable for courts to demand conduct that could only have
been discovered with hindsight and absent the stress caused by the threats that the petitioner
actually faced.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. ABENIR BRUSOLA

G.R. No. 210615. 26 July 2017
FACTS:
In the Information, appellant Abenir was charged with the killing of his wife, Delia
Brusola as follows, that accused, being the husband of DELIA BRUSOLA, with intent to kill and
with the use of ball hammer, feloniously hit his said wife, with the said ball hammer on her
head, thereby causing fatal injury to the latter which directly caused her death. For his defense,
appellant claimed that on the night of the incident, Abenir came home. While he was preparing
things, Delia went outside. She appeared to be waiting for somebody. After taking a bath, she
fixed her face. When Abenir asked if Delia was going somewhere, she said it was none of his
business. Abenir went to the bathroom for his personal effects. While inside, he heard people
talking outside and looked out through a crack in the plywood wall. He saw a man and a
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woman kiss and identified the woman as Delia, who told the man, "Huwag muna ngayon,
nandiyan pa siya." The man embraced her, and groped her breast and private parts. Abenir
picked up the maso, went outside, and approached them, who were surprised to see him.
Abenir attacked the man who used Delia as a shield and pushed her toward Abenir. He
asserted that he planned to attack the man whom he saw was with his wife but accidentally hit
Delia instead.
ISSUE:
Whether or not appellant is guilty of parricide.
HELD:
Yes. Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide.
Here, there was no dispute as to the relationship between the accused-appellant and the victim.
As for the act of killing, their daughter Joanne clearly testified that she suddenly saw her father
hit the head of her mother with a small mallet. Joanne's straightforward and candid narration of
the incident is regarded as positive and credible evidence, sufficient to convict the accused.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS. OPINIANO

G.R. No. 181474. 26 July 2017
FACTS:
An information was filed charging Lumayag and Dela Cruz of robbery with homicide.
Accused pleaded not guilty. The RTC considered the following circumstances sufficient to
prove the culpability of the appellant: (1) That Jerry dela Cruz was caught albeit by chance by
Caloocan City policemen while carrying a heavy bag which when opened yielded reams of
Marlboro cigarettes and cash in coins and bills, among others; (2) The fact that dela Cruz' leg
had fresh bloodstains and a 9-inch Kris found in his person. His immediate story to the police
led to the discovery of the dead bodies of the Santos couple in their residence; (3) That articles
such as the cigarettes and bills in different denominations were among those taken from the
victims' house; the bloodstains found on some bills corresponded to the blood types of Eladio
and Leonor Santos; (4) That the pair of earrings which fell from the underwear of Diony
Opiniano when under investigation at the police station belonged to the old woman and among
those missing from her room; and (5) That the two paper wrappers found in Lumayag's pants
bore the initial HE for Honorata Estrella, the daughter of the Santoses who herself used to wrap
the coins in the store and would add her initials prior to bringing them to the bank for deposit.
RTC found Opiniano and Lumayag guilty as principals of robbery with homicide and imposed
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Opiniano appealed the RTC’s decision to the CA, which
affirmed the RTC ruling.
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ISSUE:
Whether or not there is sufficiency of evidence to convict the appellants of robbery with
homicide.
HELD:
Yes. The eyewitness account of Dela Cruz, corroborated by the testimony and findings
of Dr. Arizala and Forensic Biologist Buan, suces to convict accused-appellant Opiniano of the
crime charged. The Regional Trial Court aptly gave credence to Dela Cruz's "graphic account of
what transpired . . . that fateful night of November 29, 1997." The RTC determined Lumayag as
the lead man, "who hatched the plan to rob the couple," along with appellant as his co-
conspirator. As a rule, findings of the trial court on the credibility of a witness will generally not
be disturbed on appeal as it was the trial court which had the opportunity to observe the
demeanor of the witness during trial. Here, there is no showing that the Regional Trial Court
overlooked or arbitrarily disregarded facts and circumstances of significance to the case.
PEOPLE V. NUÑEZ
G.R. No. 209342, 4 October 2017.
To convict an accused, it is not sufficient for the prosecution to present a positive identification
by a witness during trial due to the frailty of human memory. It must also show that the identified person
matches the original description made by that witness when initially reporting the crime. The unbiased
character of the process of identification by witnesses must likewise be shown.
FACTS:
In an Information, George Marciales (Marciales), Orly Nabia (Nabia), Paul Pobre

(Pobre), and a certain alias "Jun'' (Jun) were charged with robbery with homicide, under Article
294(1) of the Revised Penal Code.
Prosecution witness Cruz's testimony recounted that in the evening of June 22, 2000, she
was working as an attendant at the Caltex gasoline station mentioned in the Information. She
was then sitting near the gasoline pumps with her co-employees, the deceased Byron G.
Dimatulac (Dimatulac) and prosecution witness Pierez. They noticed that the station's office
was being held up. There were two (2) persons poking guns at and asking for money from the
deceased Alex Diaz (Diaz) and Felix Regencia (Regencia). Regencia handed the money to one
(1) of the robbers while the other robber reached for a can of oil. Regencia considered this as
enough of a distraction to put up a fight. Regencia and Diaz grappled with the robbers. In the
scuffle, Diaz shouted. At the sound of this, two (2) men ran to the office. The first was identified
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to be Marciales and the second, according to Cruz, was Nunez. Dimatulac also ran to the office
to assist Regencia and Oiaz. Marciales then shot Dimatulac while Nunez shot Diaz.
Nuñez testified in his own defense and recalled the circumstances of his apprehension.
He stated that when he was apprehended on July 2, 2006, he was on his way to his aunt's fish
store where he was helping since 1999 when a man approached him. He was then dragged and
mauled. With his face covered, he was boarded on a vehicle and brought to Camp Vicente Lim
in Laguna. He further claimed that on June 22, 2000, he was in Muzon, Taytay, Rizal with his
aunt at her fish store until about 5:00 p.m. before going home. At home, his aunt's son fetched
him to get pails from the store and bring them to his aunt's house.
On February 24, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision finding Nunez guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, which was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals. The occurrence of the robbery occasioned by the killing of Regencia, Diaz, and
Dimatulac is no longer in issue as it has been established in the original proceedings which
resulted in the conviction of Marciales and Nabia.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Crisente Pepaño Nuñez is the same person, earlier
identified as Paul Pobre, who acted in conspiracy with Marciales and Nabia.
HELD:
No. The Supreme Court ruled in the negative, and acquitted accused-appellant Crisente
Pepano Nuñez.
Jurisprudence recognizes that eyewitness identification is affected by "normal human

fallibilities and suggestive influences." People v. Teehankee, Jr. introduced in this jurisdiction the
totality of circumstances test: (1) the witness' opportunity to view the criminal at the time of the
crime; (2) the witness' degree of attention at that time; (3) the accuracy of any prior description
given by the witness; (4) the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the identification;
(5) the length of time between the crime and the identification; and, (6) the suggestiveness of the
identification procedure.
A witness' credibility is ascertained by considering the first two factors, i.e., the witness'
opportunity to view the malefactor at the time of the crime and the witness' degree of attention
at that time, based on conditions of visibility and the extent of time, little and fleeting as it may
have been, for the witness to be exposed to the perpetrators, peruse their features, and ascertain
their identity.
The totality of circumstances test also requires a consideration of the length of time
between the crime and the identification made by the witness. "It is by now a well established
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fact that people are less accurate and complete in their eyewitness accounts after a long
retention interval than after a short one."
Applying these standards, this Court finds the identification made by prosecution
witnesses Cruz and Perez unreliable. First and most glaringly, Cruz had previously admitted to
not remembering the appearance of the fourth robber, the same person she would later claim
with supposed certainty as Nuñez. In the original testimony she made in Marciales and Nabia's
trial in 2002, she admitted to her inability to identify the fourth robber Second, by the time Cruz
and Perez stood at the witness stand and identified Nuñez, roughly eight (8) years had passed
since the robbery incident. Third, as the People's Appellee's Brief concedes, witnesses'
identification of Nunez did not come until after he had been arrested. In fact, it was not until the
occasion of his arraigmnent, Nuñez was the sole object of identification, in an identification
process that had all but pinned him as the perpetrator.
Nunez's identification, therefore, fails to withstand the rigors of the totality of

circumstances test. First, the witnesses failed to even give any prior description of him. Second,
a prosecution witness failed to exhibit even the slightest degree of certainty when originally
given the chance to identify him as the supposed fourth robber. Third, a significantly long
amount of time had lapsed since the criminal incident; the original witness' statement that none
of his features were seen as to enable his identification; and the positive identification made of
him when the case was re-opened. And finally, his presentation for identification before and
during trial was peculiarly, even worrisomely, suggestive as to practically induce in
prosecution witnesses the belief that he, to the exclusion of any other person, must have been
the supposed fourth robber.
These deficiencies and the doubts over Cruz's and Perez's opportunity to peruse the
fourth robber's features and their degree of attentiveness during the crime clearly show that this
case does not manage to satisfy even one (1) of the six (6) factors that impel consideration under
the totality of circumstances test.
LUCIDO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 217764, 7 August 2017
FACTS:
AAA was placed by her parents in the custody of their neighbor Lucido, AAA was
eight (8) years old at that time. During AAA's stay with Lucido, the child suffered repeated
physical abuse in the latter's hands, which included strangulation, beating, pinching, and
touching of her sex organ by Lucido. AAA was also threatened by Lucido that she would be
stabbed if she tells anyone about what was being done to her.
One of Lucido's neighbors, Hinampas, noticed the abrasions on AAA's neck and
observed that she was limping as she walked. The child then related that she was choked and
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beaten on her leg by Lucido. AAA's parents learned of her plight, prompting FFF to go to
Lucido's residence and take AAA back with the help of a barangay tanod.
The Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision, convicting Lucido of child abuse. Court
of Appeals affirmed Lucido's conviction, but modified the penalty imposed.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the crime committed was only
slight physical injuries and not a violation of R.A. No. 7610.
HELD:
Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes four (4) distinct offenses, i.e. (a) child abuse, (b)
child cruelty, (c) child exploitation, and (d) being responsible for conditions prejudicial to the
child's development. As correctly ruled by the Court of Appeals, the element that the acts
must be prejudicial to the child's development pertains only to the fourth offense.
Here, AAA was maltreated by petitioner through repeated acts of strangulation,

pinching, and beating. These are clearly extreme measures of punishment not commensurate
with the discipline of an eight (8)-year-old child. Discipline is a loving response that seeks the
positive welfare of a child. Petitioner's actions are diametrically opposite. They are abusive,
causing not only physical injuries as evidenced by the physical marks on different parts of
AAA's body and the weakness of her left knee upon walking, but also emotional trauma on
her.
R.A. No. 7610 is a measure geared to provide a strong deterrence against child abuse
and exploitation and to give a special protection to children from all forms of neglect, abuse,
cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to their development. It must be
stressed that the crime under R.A. No. 7610 is malum prohibitum. Hence, the intent to debase,
degrade, or demean the minor is not the defining mark. Any act of punishment that debases,
degrades, and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child constitutes the offense.
PEOPLE V. FRANCICA
G.R. No. 208625, 6 September 2017
FACTS:
Sometime in March 2004, Ramon Francia (“Francia”) started acting and touching
inappropriately AAA, his eleven (11) year-old neighbor, by licking her breasts and inserting his
penis into her vagina. Francia would sometimes give AAA money after he touched her. The
RTC found Francia guilty of three (3) counts of statutory rape and meted out the penalty
of reclusion perpetua for each count. The RTC’s findings were affirmed by the Court of
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Appeals. For his defense, Francia denied that he had sex with AAA and claimed that he was
only set up by AAA’s family to be the fall guy after he found out that AAA had a relationship
with her uncle.
ISSUE:
Whether the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Francica was
guilty of statutory rape as defined under Article 266-A(l)(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by R.A. No. 8353, in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
HELD:
Statutory rape is committed when (1) the offended party is under 12 years of age and (2)
the accused has carnal knowledge of her, regardless of whether there was force, threat or
intimidation; or whether the victim was deprived of reason or consciousness; or whether it was
done through fraud or grave abuse of authority. It is enough that the age of the victim is proven
and that there was sexual intercourse.
The first element that the offended party is under 12 years of age was not disputed by
the defense. What only needs to be proven, therefore, is whether AAA and Francica had sexual
intercourse.
The second element or the accused’s carnal knowledge was established through
evidence. As shown by her testimony, AAA was able to narrate in a straightforward and
categorical manner what transpired between her and Francica. In a long line of cases, the
Supreme Court has given full weight and credence to the testimony of child victims, holding
that their "[y]outh and immaturity are generally badges of truth and sincerity."
Compared to AAA's candid and categorical testimony, Francia's defense of denial must
fail. Imbo v. People emphasized that the self-serving defense of denial falters against the "positive
identification by, and straightforward narration of the victim." The Supreme Court has likewise
repeatedly held that the lone yet credible testimony of the offended party is sufficient to
establish the guilt of the accused.
Francica's defense that he was merely set up to become the fall guy so that AAA's family
can hide her sexual relationship with her uncle is not worthy of belief. Additionally, Francica's
expose is primarily hearsay in character since it was supposedly relayed to him by AAA's aunt
Nora, who was not presented as a witness before the trial court to corroborate his testimony.
Thus, the Supreme Court concurred with the trial court when it held that "[t]he 'secret' is too
specious a motive for one to file not only one but three serious charges of rape against the
accused."
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Despite the absence of the medico-legal officer as a witness, the presence of healed
lacerations corroborates AAA's testimony as it "is the best physical evidence of forcible
defloration." It is well-established that "[p]hysical evidence is evidence of the highest order. It
speaks more eloquently than a hundred witnesses." The physical evidence of the healed
lacerations in AAA's vagina strongly corroborates her testimony that she was sexually abused
by Francia. Beyond reasonable doubt, Francia took advantage of AAA's youth and naivete to
repeatedly sexually abuse her.
PEOPLE V. ORDONA
G.R. No. 227863, 20 September 2017
FACTS:
Pedrito Ordona (“accused-appellant Ordona”) approached Hubay with a stainless

knife, called his attention by saying "Pare," and suddenly stabbed him in the left shoulder.
Ordona was charged of murder punished under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
Whether or not accused-appellant Ordona is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

murder.
HELD:
The Supreme Court affirms accused-appellant Pedrito Ordona's conviction. For evident
premeditation to qualify the killing of a person to the crime of murder, the following must be
established by the prosecution "with equal certainty as the criminal act itself." It is
indispensable for the prosecution to establish "how and when the plan to kill was hatched or
how much time had elapsed before it was carried out."In this regard, evident premeditation
cannot be appreciated as a qualifying circumstance in the present case. The prosecution failed
to establish the time when accused-appellant resolved to kill Hubay. There is no evidence on
record to show the moment accused-appellant hatched his plan.
However, accused-appellant is still liable for murder. The killing was attended with
the qualifying circumstance of treachery.
The essence of treachery, as stated in Abadies, is "the swift and unexpected attack on
the unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on his part." Two (2) requisites must be
established by the prosecution, namely: "(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in
a position to defend himself [or herself], and (2) that the offender consciously adopted the
particular means, method or form of attack employed by him [or her]."
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Both elements are present in this case. Hubay, who was then unarmed, was casually
outside of his residence when accused-appellant suddenly stabbed him. There was no
opportunity for Hubay to retaliate or to parry accused-appellant's attack. The facts also
establish that accused appellant consciously and deliberately adopted the mode of attack.
Accused appellant lurked outside Hubay's residence and waited for him to appear. When
Hubay emerged from the house, accused-appellant called him "Pare" while walking towards
him with a bladed, weapon and immediately stabbed him. Although the attack was frontal, it
was done suddenly and unexpectedly. A frontal attack, when made suddenly, leaving the
victim without any means of defense, is treacherous. The second stabbing also indicates
treachery. At the time, Hubay was already wounded and was unprepared to put up a defense.
APARENTE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 205695, 27 September 2017
FACTS:
Two (2) police officers were patrolling the area of Barangay Pantok, Binangonan, Rizal,
when they say two (2) men, one of whom was Jesus Aparente (“Aparente”), in an alley. They
saw the other man hand Aparente a small plastic sachet. Aparente inspected the same and
flicked it against the light from a street light. When the the police officers approached, the two
(2) men fled, and only Aparente was caught. Aparente was told to open his hands, from which
the police officers found a small sachet with white crystalline substance. They arrested ahim
and confiscated the same.
Upon their arrival at the Binagonan Police Station, the sachet was marked by the police
investigator with Aparente’s initials. It was submitted to the Philippine national Crime
Laboratory at Camp Crame where the Forensic Chemical Officer reported that its contents
tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.
The RTC found Aparente guilty of violating Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, otherwise
known as the “Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.” The CA affirmed this Decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the circumstances of Aparente’s warantless arrest violated his constitutional

rights; and
2. Whether the failure to explain the lack of inventory and photographing at the place of
Aparente’s arrest or at the nearest police station negates the evidentiary value of the
allegedly seized narcotics.
HELD:
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The search and arrest of Aparente was valid. Where a warrantless search precedes a
warrantless arrest, but was conducted substantially contemporaneous with it, the issue to be
resolved is whether or not the police had probable cause for the arrest when the search was
made. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless search may be valid, if these two
(2) acts were substantially contemporaneous, and if there was probable cause to arrest.
Probable cause may be in the form of overt acts which show that a crime had been, was
being, or was about to be committed. Thus, a warrantless arrest that precedes a warrantless
search may be valid
In this case, the arrest and the search were substantially contemporaneous. Thus, what
must be evaluated is whether or not the arresting officers had probable cause for Aparente’s
arrest when they made the search.
Here, the arresting officers saw a man hand petitioner a small plastic sachet, which
petitioner then inspected by flicking it against the light of a lamp post in an alley. Upon the
officers' approach, these two (2) men fled. These overt acts and circumstances were observed
personally by the arresting officers and, taken together, constitute reasonable suspicion that
these two (2) men were violating R.A. No. 9165, Thus, that the search preceded the arrest does
not render invalid the search and arrest of Aparente.
There was a failure by the police officers to explain non-compliance with the requisites
of R.A. No. 9165 for the handling of dangerous drugs after its seizure and confiscation. It
appears from the record that the seized drugs were not marked by the apprehending team but
by an investigating officer at the police station, an act which is not in accordance with R.A. No.
9165. Further, no justifiable reason for this was presented by the prosecution.
The Supreme Court stresses that where miniscule amounts of drugs are involved, trial
courts should require more exacting compliance with the requirements under Section 21 of R.A.
No. 9165. Consequently, the trial court and the Court of Appeals should have considered the
failure of the apprehending team to mark the seized drugs immediately after seizure and
confiscation. They should also have considered that it was the investigating officer at the police
station who marked the same and not the arresting officers. The failure of the prosecution to
address this issue and to provide a justifiable reason for this are enough to cast a shadow of
doubt on the integrity of the operation. Thus, the Supreme Court acquitted Aparente.
Please See Also: People v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 208471, 2 August 2017; People v. Pangan, G.R. No.
206965, 29 November 2017; People v. Delia Saunar, G.R. No. 207396, 9 August 2017.
ESCOBAR V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 205576, 20 November 2017
FACTS:
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Commission on Audit State Auditor IV Helen M. Cailing (Auditor Cailing), the Team
Leader of a Special Audit Team in Sarangani Province, discovered irregularities in Sarangani
Province's grant of financial assistance, violating COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27,
1996.
The Sandiganbayan found petitioners Perla C. Maglinte (“Maglinte”), Eugene L.

Alzate (“Alzate”), together with Amelia Carmela C. Zoleta (“Zoleta”), guilty of the crime of
estafa through falsification of public documents, and petitioners Miguel D. Escobar
(“Escobar”), Vivencia S. Telesforo (“Telesforo”), and Cesar M. Cagang (“Cagang”), guilty of
malversation. The Sandiganbayan found that the documents had been falsified which led to
the disbursement of public funds, supposedly to be given as financial assistance for the
Malungon Market Vendors Association, which neither prepared the documents nor received
the financial assistance. It found that all the accused were public officers at the time material
to the case and that Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang had custody of the funds which
constituted the source of the financial assistance granted to the Malungon Market Vendors
Association. The Sandiganbayan also held that petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang
approved the disbursement voucher despite the fact that it lacked the documentation required
under COA Circular No. 96-003 dated February 27, 1996
ISSUES:
a. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting petitioners Eugene L.

Alzate and Perla C. Maglinte of estafa through conspiracy;
b. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in not applying the case of Arias v.
Sandiganbayan to find that petitioner Miguel D. Escobar properly relied on good
faith that his subordinates would perform their functions in accordance with the
law;
c. Whether or not the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner Eugene L. Alzate due process
when it denied his motion for new trial and did not allow his presentation of
additional witnesses based on technicalities;
d. Fourth, whether or not petitioners Miguel D. Escobar and Vivencia S. Telesforo are
accountable public officers; and
e. Fifth, whether or not the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Miguel D. Escobar,

Eugene L. Alzate, Perla C. Maglinte, Cesar M. Cagang, and Vivencia S. Telesforo
based primarily on the testimony of participants in the commission of the crime.
HELD:
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The Sandiganbayan did not err in convicting petitioners of estafa through conspiracy.
The elements of the crime were proved. That the documents were falsified was amply
established by the evidence. The documents were falsified before the disbursement, which
was allowed based on the falsified documents.
The conspiracy among petitioners Alzate, Maglinte, and co-accused Zoleta to commit
the crime was also sufficiently established. Under the Revised Penal Code, there is a
conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a
felony and decide to commit it." It is also well established that conspiracy may be inferred.
The records amply support the conclusion that petitioner Maglinte conspired in the scheme in
ways in addition to the instruction regarding the CDF of then Congressman
Chiongbian. Gadian's testimony also shows that petitioner Maglinte checked and reviewed
the falsified documents, then accompanied witness Gadian to bring the falsified documents to
the office of the Vice Governor, and that after the disbursed check was signed by Cagang, it
was brought to Maglinte's office.
As for Zoleta, the prosecution established that she regularly instructed Gadian to make
fictitious documents and that she directed Gadian and Tangan to falsify the documents. She
gave instructions throughout the process of obtaining the disbursed cash, such as directing
that the amounts to be given to the other officials or "suso" be doubled for faster processing of
the disbursement. She reviewed the falsified documents before they were given to
Maglinte. She instructed Tangan to accompany a dummy payee to receive and encash the
disbursed check. Once the cash was obtained, Zoleta received it from Gadian.
The foregoing is sufficient to establish the participation of petitioners Alzate and

Maglinte in the conspiracy.
Where there are circumstances that should have alerted heads of offices to exercise
more diligence in the performance of their duties, they cannot escape liability by claiming
that they relied on good faith on the submissions of their subordinates. In such cases, the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan does not apply.
Here, there were discrepancies in the voucher and the check, which should have
prodded petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang to examine the supporting documents for
the fund disbursement. Thus, as properly held by the Sandiganbayan, Arias is not applicable,
and petitioners Escobar, Telesforo, and Cagang were properly found guilty of malversation
through negligence.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the essence of due process is an
opportunity to be heard.
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As pointed out by respondent, petitioner Alzate had four (4) years to prepare to
present evidence, yet he only asked for the opportunity to present additional evidence via a
motion for reconsideration after the Sandiganbayan had already admitted all the formal offers
of evidence of the accused. Petitioners do not refute the foregoing circumstances and fail to
establish that petitioner Alzate was not afforded ample opportunity to be heard. Thus, the
claim that the Sandiganbayan violated his constitutional right to due process has no legal or
factual basis and must be rejected.
The Local Government Code provides that local officials, other than those considered
accountable officers by reason of their duties, may be held accountable for local government
funds. Thus, local government officials, such as petitioners Escobar and Telesforo, may
become accountable officers by reason of their participation in the application of public funds.
Petitioners claim that to be accountable officers, they must receive and acquire custody
or control over government funds or property by reason of their office and they must be
required to account for them. Thus, only the Provincial Treasurer is an accountable officer
over the funds disbursed under the Local Government Code. However, this argument is
unmeritorious. In Zoleta v. Sandiganbayan, the Supreme Court applied Section 340 of the Local
Government Code and held officials whose signatures were necessary for disbursement of
funds as accountable officers.
In this case, as in Zoleta, as part of standard procedure, it was required that petitioner
Telesforo certify that the supporting documents were complete, and that petitioner Escobar
sign them before a check could be approved for disbursement. Thus, as in Zoleta, petitioners
Escobar and Telesforo are accountable officers.
The issue of the credibility of witnesses Gadian and Tangan are matters of evidence,
not proper for a petition for review on certiorari. Well aware of the possibility that the
testimonies of Gadian and Tangan would be impugned, the Sandiganbayan took it upon itself
to exercise extreme caution in evaluating them. Petitioners have not presented any cogent
reason to reverse the Sandiganbayan's appreciation of Gadian's and Tangan's testimonies.
PEOPLE V. BALAO
G.R. No. 207805, 22 November 2017.
The testimony of a single eyewitness to a crime, even if uncorroborated, produces a conviction

beyond reasonable doubt as long as it is credible and positive. A considerable lapse of time between the
commission of the offense and the identification of the accused in open court, by itself, would be
insufficient to overturn a finding of guilt.
FACTS:
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In the Information dated February 8, 2001, Balao was charged of murder. The case was
initially archived on November 29, 2001 but was revived on January 21, 2003, upon Balao's
apprehension. During arraignment, Balao pleaded not guilty. On June 3, 2003, the case was
provisionally dismissed due to the repeated absence of the prosecution's material witnesses.
Balao was then released. Eight (8) days later, the case was revived upon motion of the
prosecution. Trial on the merits ensued.
Christopher, a brother of victim Wilfredo Villaranda (Wilfredo), narrated that at around

7:00 p.m. on April 9, 1991, he and his friend were walking along Tejeron Street near Don
Mariano Marcos High School in Sta. Ana, Manila. Roberto "Obet" Espejo (Espejo) suddenly
came out of nowhere, poked him with an arrow, and then left.
The next day, Christopher chanced upon Espejo in front of Don Mariano Marcos High
School. Christopher asked Espejo why he poked him the previous night to which Espejo
replied, "Wala kang pakialam, gago ka. " This enraged Christopher. A fistfight ensued between
them, Espejo lost and threatened Christopher by saying, "Isusumbong kita kay Cesar Balao."
Christopher brushed off Espejo's threat and decided to go home.
At around 11:45 a.m. of the same day, Francisco was in front of Don Mariano Marcos
High School. He narrated that he saw Wilfredo on a bicycle, engaged in a conversation with
Espejo and a certain Purong. While the three (3) were chatting, Balao suddenly appeared behind
Wilfredo and stabbed him in the chest with a fan knife. Wilfredo was immediately rushed to
Trinity General Hospital. However, he was pronounced dead on arrival. On the other hand,
Balao interposed the defense of alibi.
On October 12, 2010, the Regional Trial Court rendered a Decision, finding Balao guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of murder. Balao filed his Notice of Appeal on November 10, 2010. In
its Decision dated October 31, 2012, the Court of Appeals affirmed Balao's conviction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Balao is guilty beyond reasonable of murder.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court affirmed Balao’s conviction.
Francisco, the sole eyewitness, was familiar with accused-appellant and knew accused-
appellant's identity and reputation even before the stabbing incident took place. First, although
Francisco did not know accused-appellant's name, Francisco knew accused-appellant's
identity. The identification of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime is regarded as more
important than ascertaining the name of the accused. For instance, in People v. Catipon, this
Court held that confusion in the perpetrator's name, by itself, would be insufficient to overturn
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the positive identification made by a credible witness. Second, when he testified in court,
Francisco affirmed without hesitation that it was accused-appellant who stabbed Wilfredo in
the chest.
Moreover, Francisco's testimony is bolstered by the autopsy report, which stated that
Wilfredo died from a "stab wound, located on the upper inner quadrant of the chest, right side,"
which was caused by "a single-bladed sharp pointed instrument." This is consistent with
Francisco's eyewitness account that Wilfredo was stabbed in the chest with a fan knife.
Although Francisco stated that he disliked accused-appellant for being a notorious

troublemaker in their community, this does not conclusively establish that he was animated by
ill-motives in testifying against accused-appellant. The presumption then is that Francisco
testified in good faith. Therefore, his testimony should be "entitled to full weight and credit.
PEOPLE V. CASTRO
G.R. No. 211053, 29 November 2017.
For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of means of
execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or retaliate; and (2) the
means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted.
FACTS:
In an Amended Information dated December 1, 1998, Manuel D. Osir (Osir), Orozco,

Maturan, and Castro were charged with the crime of murder. Eyewitness Susan Lalona (Lalona)
testified that on the evening of November 15, 1998, she was at Murillo's Restaurant, Magallanes
Street, Surigao City with her friend and herein victim, Julius Joshua Mata (Mata). They were the
only customers at that time.
Later, Orozco, Osir, Castro, and Maturan, apparently drunk, entered and occupied the
table in front of Lalona and Mata. Shortly after they ordered beer, Orozco approached Mata
from behind and stabbed him twice with a small bolo. Mata shouted that he was stabbed.
Lalona grabbed Orozco and wrestled with him, but he pushed her back. When Mata tried to run
out, the rest of the accused caught him. While Maturan and Osir held Mata's arms, Castro
stabbed him in the chest. The four (4) accused continued stabbing Mata and ran away when
Lalona shouted for help. Lalona took Mata to the Caraga Regional Hospital on a tricycle, but
Mata was pronounced dead on arrival.
In its October 7, 2010 Decision, the Regional Trial Court found Maturan, Orozco, and
accused-appellant Castro guilty of the crime of murder. In its November 28, 2013 Decision, the
Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the Regional Trial Court. Thus, Castro filed a Notice
of Appeal with the Court of Appeals. He insists that the qualifying circumstance of treachery
should not have been applied to all the accused. There was no clear and convincing evidence
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proving the existence of conspiracy. Considering that there was no conspiracy, accused-
appellant should be liable only for the consequences of his individual acts and not for any
treachery employed by the other accused.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the crime was attended by treachery, and committed in conspiracy.
HELD:
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld Castro’s conviction.
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons,
employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to
insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended
party might make. For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the
employment of means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend
themselves or retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously
adopted.
The circumstances proved by the prosecution amply show that treachery attended the
killing of Mata. As above-stated, Mata was completely helpless. His hands were held by two
other persons while he was stabbed. To make matters worse, four persons, who were armed
with knives, ganged-up on Mata. Certainly, Mata was completely deprived of any prerogative
to defend himself or to retaliate. Contrary to accused-appellant's contention, the finding of
treachery was not based only on Orozco's act of swiftly stabbing Mata from behind. As
observed by the Court of Appeals, Mata was helpless against a group of persons with knives,
who ganged up on him and held his hands while stabbing him.
There is likewise no sufficient ground to overturn the finding of conspiracy. The

prosecution proved the common purpose of all the accused, a concert of action, and a
community of interest. The finding of conspiracy was based on the fact that Orozco delivered
the initial stabs to Mata's back and that the others chased, held down, and continued attacking
him when he attempted to escape. This finding was based on overt acts by all the accused,
which were determined to be concerted actions.
PEOPLE V. MEJARES
G.R. No. 225735, 10 January 2018.
FACTS:
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Accused Mejares worked as a domestic servant of complainant Gavino. One day,
accused Mejares supposedly received an urgent call from a certain Nancy, who introduced
herself as Gavino’s secretary. Accused Mejares claimed that Nancy instructed her to destroy
Gavino’s drawer, take the cash and the valuables there, and thereafter bring them to Baclaran
because Gavino met an accident. When she got to Baclaran, she met an unknown lady and gave
the bag with the cash and jewelry inside it. Accused Mejares was charged with the crime of
qualified theft of articles worth P1,056,308.00. She was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
and was sentenced to reclusion perpetua.
Accused Mejares claims that she was just a victim of dugo-dugo gang, and had no intent
to gain.
ISSUES:
1. Whether accused Mejares is guilty of qualified theft.

2. Whether the court imposed the correct penalty.
HELD:
1. Accused Mejares is guilty of qualified theft.
The following elements of qualified theft are present in this case: (a) Taking of personal
property; (b) That the said property belongs to another; (c)That the said taking be done with
intent to gain; (d) That it be done without the owner's consent; (e) That it be accomplished
without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of force upon things; and (f)
That it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
It is clear from the established facts that accused Mejares opened the drawer in the
masters' bedroom and took away the cash and valuables it contained. Therefore, the burden is
on the defense to prove that intent to gain was absent despite actual taking of her employer's
valuables. This conclusion has the following bases: first, the surreptitious way accused handled
the incoming calls; second, her failure to heed the warnings of persons around her; third, her
inability to make use of the opportunities available to verify the alleged vehicular accident
where her mistress figured in.
2. The court imposed the wrong penalty.
Since the penalty in theft is dependent on the value of stolen personal properties, the
valuation should be based on the value proven during trial, and not merely on the Information
or uncorroborated testimonies presented by the prosecution.
Given that the value of the stolen personal properties in this case was not determined by
reliable evidence independent of the prosecution's uncorroborated testimonies, the penalty
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should be the minimum penalty under Article 309(6) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by
Section 81 of R.A. No. 10951, which is arresto mayor.
However, since this is qualified theft, accused Mejares must be meted a penalty two (2)
degrees higher, i.e., prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods with a range of
two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day to six (6) years. Also applying the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, where there are no modifying circumstances and the minimum of the
indeterminate penalty is computed from the full range of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prision correccional in its minimum period and the maximum of the indeterminate penalty
is reckoned from the medium of prision correccional in its medium and maximum period, accused-
appellant must only suffer a minimum indeterminate penalty of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor to a maximum of three (3) years, six (6) months, and twenty-one (21)
days of prision correccional
PEOPLE V. UDANG
G.R. No. 210161, 10 January 2018
FACTS:
AAA, who was then 12 years old, drank alcoholic beverages with the children of
accused Udang, and became intoxicated. She later realized that she was being carried by Udang
into a dark room, where he laid, undressed and kissed her. Accused Udang went on top of her
and then inserted his penis into her vagina. A year later, AAA, who was then 13 years old, had
some drinks in accused Udang’s house. When she felt sleepy, AAA went into one of the rooms.
Accused Udang followed her and went on top of her, undressed her, and inserted his penis into
her vagina until he ejaculated.
Accused Udang was charged with two (2) counts of child abuse under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7610, in relation to Article 266-A of the RPC. Udang was convicted only of 2 counts of rape
by the RTC. The RTC ruled that accused Udang may not be also convicted for child abuse
because it would violate his right against double jeopardy.
ISSUE:
Whether accused Udang may be convicted of Child Abuse and Rape without violating
his right against double jeopardy.
HELD:
YES. Accused Udang may be convicted of Child Abuse and Rape without violating his
right against double jeopardy because these crimes are separate and with distinct elements.
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For there to be double jeopardy, (a) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the
second; (b) the first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and (c) a second jeopardy is for the
same offense as that in the first.
The provisions of rape and sexual abuse are two (2) separate crimes with distinct
elements. The "force, threat, or intimidation" or deprivation of reason or unconsciousness
required in Article 266-A(1) of the Revised Penal Code is not the same as the "coercion or
influence" required in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Consent is immaterial in the crime of sexual
abuse because mere act of having sexual intercourse with a child subjected to sexual abuse is
already punishable by law. However, consent exonerates an accused from a rape charge. Thus,
an accused may be prosecuted for rape and sexual abuse for the same act without violating
his/her right against double jeopardy.
PEOPLE V. QUE
G.R. No. 212994, 31 January 2018
FACTS:
Accused Que was charged with violation of Sections 5 and 11 of R.A. No. 9165, for
illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs, particularly, shabu. During the trial, the
prosecution established that acting on the tip of an informant, P/C Insp. Muksan organized a
buy-bust operation with PO3 Lim as poseur-buyer. During the operation, the informant
introduced PO3 Lim to Que. PO3 Lim then told Que that he intended to purchase P100.00 worth
of shabu. Que then handed him shabu inside a plastic cellophane. In turn, PO3 Lim handed Que
the marked P100.00 bill and gave the pre-arranged signal to have Que arrested.
After the arrest, the marked bill and another sachet of shabu were recovered from Que.
Que was then brought to the police station where the sachets of shabu and the marked bill were
turned over to the investigator, SPO4 Tubo), who then marked these items with his initials.
Thereafter, P/C Insp. Diestro recounted their office's receipt of a request for laboratory
examination of the contents of two (2) plastic sachets.The RTC convicted accused Que of the
crimes charged.
ISSUE:
Whether the rule on chain of custody was sufficiently complied with to support the
verdict of conviction.
HELD:
The case was tainted with grave violations of Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended. The following are the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as amended:
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As regards the items seized and subjected to marking, the law requires the performance
of two (2) actions: physical inventory and photographing. Section 21(1) is specific as to when
and where these actions must be done. As to when, it must be "immediately after seizure and
confiscation." As to where, it depends on whether the seizure was supported by a search
warrant. If a search warrant was served, the physical inventory and photographing must be
done at the exact same place that the search warrant is served. In case of warrantless seizures,
these actions must be done "at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the
apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable."
Moreover, Section 21(1) requires at least three (3) persons to be present during the
physical inventory and photographing. These persons are: first, the accused or the person/s
from whom the items were seized; second, an elected public official; and third, a representative
of the National Prosecution Service. There are, however, alternatives to the first and the third.
As to the first (i.e., the accused or the person/s from whom items were seized), there are two (2)
alternatives: first, his or her representative; and second, his or her counsel. As to the
representative of the National Prosecution Service, a representative of the media may be present
in his or her place.
In this case, however, there is no showing that a proper inventory and taking of pictures
was done by the apprehending officers. The marking of the sachets of shabu supposedly
obtained from accused-appellant was conducted at a police station without accused-appellant,
or any person representing him, around. There was not even a third person, whose presence
was required by Section 21(1) prior to its amendment — "a representative from the media and
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official."
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SANCHEZ

G.R. No. 216014, 14 March 2018
Accused Sanchez was charged with violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act for illegal sale and possession of dangerous drugs.
During trial, the prosecution established that IO1 Diocampo, the apprehending officer,
marked the items with "1KCD" and "2KCD" in the presence of accused Sanchez. This testimony
was corroborated by IO1 Riñopa. The inventory of the items was done in the presence of
Punong Barangay Mendoza and Department of Justice representative Magnaye. IO1 Diocampo
then personally brought the seized items to the PNP Crime Laboratory where the items tested
positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride. However, it appears that the testimonies as to
where the inventory contradict. One apprehending officer claims that the shabu was
inventoried in the barangay hall, while the other one claims that the inventory was done in the
place of arrest.
ISSUE:
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Whether the prosecution sufficiently established the integrity of the corpus delicti,
thereby supporting the conviction of accused Sanchez
HELD:
Yes. The prosecution demonstrated that the discrepancy on the testimonies of the
apprehending officers did not affect the integrity or evidentiary value of the corpus delicti.
The apprehending officers more than substantially complied with the chain of custody rule
under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, which, before amendment by R.A. No. 10640, provided:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately
after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of
the accused or the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice (DOJ),
and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof;
(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, the same shall
be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination;
(3) A certification of the forensic laboratory examination results, which shall be done under oath
by the forensic laboratory examiner, shall be issued within twenty-four (24) hours after the
receipt of the subject item/s: Provided, That when the volume of the dangerous drugs, plant
sources of dangerous drugs, and controlled precursors and essential chemicals does not allow the
completion of testing within the time frame, a partial laboratory examination report shall be
provisionally issued stating therein the quantities of dangerous drugs still to be examined by the
forensic laboratory: Provided, however, That a final certification shall be issued on the completed
forensic laboratory examination on the same within the next twenty-four (24) hours[.]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. BERNIE CONCEPCION

G.R. No. 214886, 4 April 2018
FACTS:
AAA lived with her common-law husband with accused Concepcion in a house. One
day, when AAA arrived in the house to look for someone to help her bring the sack of rice she
brought, Concepcion intercepted her in the garage, threatened her with a knife, and dragged
her in his room. Concepcion inserted his hand and penis in her vagina.
Shortly after, the police came. Concepcion demanded that the rapists of his girlfriend
Peralta be produced. The police then produced three (3) men. Concepcion told the police to
bring Peralta and her father, which they did. When Peralta arrived, Concepcion refused to
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release AAA unless Peralta admitted that she had been raped. Concepcion inserted his penis
again in AAA’s vagina.
Shortly after, the Mayor Ostrea came which interrupted the rape. Mayor Ostrea then
demanded Concepcion to release AAA, but to no avail. To prevent people from entering the
house, Concepcion installed electric wires on the door. The police arrived and forcibly entered
his room, and rescued AAA.
He was charged with 2 counts of rape, and Serious Illegal Detention. He was convicted
of one (1) count of rape and Serious Illegal Detention. The Court of Appeals, however, modified
the decision, and held Concepcion guilty of the two (2) counts of rape. He was, however,
acquitted of the crime of Serious Illegal Detention on the ground that the abduction was
absorbed in the rape.
ISSUE:
Whether Concepcion’s act of detaining AAA is absorbed by his rape conviction
HELD:
No. The facts as found by the lower courts show that after raping AAA, Concepcion
continued to detain her and refused to release her even after raping her. Thus, although the
initial abduction of AAA may have been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention
of AAA after the rape cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention continued
after the rape had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.
However, accused is only guilty of Slight Illegal Detention, with the following elements:
(a) that the offender is a private individual; (b) That he kidnaps or detains another, or m any
other manner deprives him of his liberty; (c) That the act of kidnapping or detention is illegal;
and (d) that the crime is committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances
enumerated in Art. 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of slight illegal detention are all present. Concepcion is a private
individual. After raping AAA, he continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty.
Concepcion also installed electrical wires around the room to electrocute anyone who might
attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his supposed demands were met. The
detention was illegal and not attended by the circumstances that would render it serious illegal
detention. Thus, he is guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention.
ABUBAKAR v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 202408, 27 June 2018
FACTS:
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After the creation of ARMM, the national government earmarked P615,000,000.00 for the
implementation of regional and provincial infrastructure projects. A portion of the funds was
then transferred to DPWH-ARMM.
The audit of the infrastructure projects showed that: (a) there had been an overpayment
amounting to P17,684,000.00; (b) there were advance payments totaling P14,400,000.00 given to
nine (9) contractors for the procurement of aggregate sub-base course in violation of Section
88(l) of Presidential Decree No. 1445; (c) there had been several bidding irregularities such as
lack of detailed engineering surveys; and (d) there had been an unnecessary engineering survey
on the Cotabato-Lanao Road.
Abubakar, Baraguir and Guiano were charged with 21 Informations for violation of Sec.
3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, or the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The Sandiganbayan convicted
accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin of nine (9) counts of violation of
Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 for facilitating the advance payment for the procurement of sub-
base aggregates. The Sandiganbayan concluded that the disbursement was an advance payment
and declared it illegal because there were no documents to prove that the items were actually
delivered.
ISSUE:
Whether accused are guilty of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
HELD:
Yes. Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes "any undue
injury to any party, including the Government" or gives "any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
Baraguir and Guiani gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to several contractors by
allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the scheduled public bidding. The
certificates of mobilization, which were issued at least one (1) week before the date of public
bidding, categorically identified specific corporations as contractors for some portions of the
Awang-Nuro Road and Cotabato-Lanao Road Projects.
The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled public bidding and of
allowing the advanced deployment of their equipment through the issuance of certificates of
mobilization are glaring irregularities in the bidding procedure that engender suspicion of
favoritism and partiality towards the seven (7) contractors. These irregularities create a
reasonable, if not conclusive, presumption that the concerned public officials had no intention
of complying with the rules on public bidding and that the results were already predetermined.
Although accused concede that contractors can only commence work after they receive a notice
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to proceed, there is no justifiable reason why contractors should be allowed to deploy their
equipment in advance considering that it would defeat the very purpose of competitive public
bidding. Benefits derived from this practice, if any, would certainly not redound to the
government.
MARIA C. OSORIO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 207711, 2 July 2018
FACTS:
Accused Osorio is an agent of PhilAm Life. Complainant Gabriel availed Philam Life's
Tri-Life Plan and Excelife Gold Package through accused Osorio. Gabriel consistently paid the
quarterly premiums from February 2001 to November 2001. Osorio offered Gabriel an
investment opportunity with Philam Life Fund Management. The proposed investment would
be placed under a time deposit scheme and would earn 20% annually. Osorio informed Gabriel
that the proceeds of her investment may be channeled to pay for her insurance premiums.
Enticed by the offer, Gabriel tendered P200,000.00 to Osorio, who in tum issued Philam Life
receipts.
A few months later, Gabriel discovered that her insurance policies had lapsed due to
non-payment of premiums. Meanwhile, Gabriel received a letter from Philippine Money
Investment Asset Management (PMIAM), thanking her for investing in the company.
Gabriel confronted Osorio on why her investment was diverted to PMIAM. Osorio
explained that PMIAM investments would yield a higher rate of return. Displeased with what
had happened, Gabriel asked for a refund of her initial investment. The RTC found Osorio
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code.
ISSUE:
What crime did Osorio commit?
HELD:
Osorio is guilty of Other Deceits, not Estafa under Article 315, par. 2(a).
In sustaining a conviction under Article 315, par. 2(a) of the RPC, the following elements
must concur: (a) [T]hat there must be a false pretense or fraudulent representation as to his
power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions; (b)
that such false pretense or fraudulent representation was made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (c) that the offended party relied on the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means and was induced to part with his money or
property; and (d) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
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In this case, while there is no proof that Osorio used a fictitious name or pretended to
possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit, agency, or business in soliciting
private complainant's money, petitioner should nevertheless be held criminally liable for
misrepresenting to Gabriel that the latter's money would be invested in Philam Life Fund
Management and that its proceeds may be utilized to pay for private complainant's insurance
premiums.
All the elements of Article 318 of the Revised Penal Code are present in this case. Osorio,
in soliciting private complainant's money, falsely represented that it would be invested in
Philam Life and that its proceeds would be used to pay for Gabriel’s insurance premiums. This
false representation is what induced Gabriel to part with her funds and disregard the payment
of her insurance premiums. Since Osorio deviated from what was originally agreed upon by
placing the investment in another company, Gabriel’s insurance policies lapsed.
AQUINO V. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 217349, 7 November 2018
FACTS:
Accused Aquino was charged with violations of R.A. No. 8239, otherwise known as the
Philippine Passport Act: (a) 3 counts of violation of Section 19, par. b(1) for making false
statements in her passport application; and (b) 4 counts of violation of Section 19, par. c (1),
forging her marriage and birth certificates, and driver’s licenses, and used the same for her U.S.
Visa application. She was convicted by the RTC.
ISSUE:
Whether accused Aquino is guilty of the crimes charged against him.
ISSUE:
YES. The RTC correctly found accused Aquino guilty beyond reasonable doubt of four
(4) counts of violation of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 of R.A. No. 8239, and not paragraph (c)2 as
found by the Court of Appeals.
The elements of Section 19, paragraph (c)1 are:
1. The accused forged, counterfeited, mutilated, or altered any passport or travel document
or any passport validly issued, which has become void by the occurrence of any
condition prescribed by law; and
2. The accused used, uses, or attempts to use, or furnishes to another for use such false,
forged, counterfeited, mutilated or altered passport or travel document or any passport
validly issued which has become void by the occurrence of any condition prescribed by
law.
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All the elements are present. As correctly found by the lower courts, the evidence proved
beyond reasonable doubt that accused Aquino submitted false supporting documents in her
passport application and in the passport applications of Kim Mariel Cruz Aquino and Leonore
Coleen Cruz Aquino. She then used the fraudulently obtained passports and false supporting
documents to apply for their United States visas.
CHRISTINE FERNANDEZ V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 217542, 21 November 2018
FACTS:
Accused Fernandez is the stepmother of AAA and BBB. BBB said that Fernandez
pinched her stomach, crimped her ears with pliers, and hit her back with a bamboo stick,
causing her to vomit blood. Fernandez also ordered her to lie down, then kicked her in the
stomach, and hit her eyes with rubber slippers. Fernandez then dragged her by the hair and
spun her around like a helicopter. Fernandez also scalded BBB with a cooking pot. She also
banged AAA’s head on the floor several times, and hit him on the nape and back with a broom
until the broom broke.
The RTC convicted accused Fernandez with two (2) counts of committing child abuse in
violation of Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610.
ISSUE:
Whether accused is guilty of violating Section 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610
HELD:
YES. Records show that the minors suffered physical injuries in accused Fernandez’
hands. The Regional Trial Court's "evaluation of the facts and evidence is utterly sufficient in
substance to support [petitioner's] conviction. Under Article I, Section 3 of the law, child abuse
may be committed through the following:
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the child which includes
any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a human being;
Article VI, Section 10(a) of the same law further provides:
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Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. -
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or
be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the child's development including those covered
by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
Section 2 of the IRR on the Reporting and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases provides
the following definition of terms:
(a) "Child Abuse" refers to the infliction of physical or psychological injury, cruelty to, or neglect,
sexual abuse or exploitation of a child;
(b)"Cruelty" refers to any act by word or deed which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Discipline administered by a parent or legal
guardian to a child does not constitute cruelty provided it is reasonable in manner and moderate
in degree and does not constitute physical or psychological injury as defined herein;
(c)"Physical injury" includes but is not limited to lacerations, fractured bones, burns, internal
injuries, severe injury or serious bodily harm suffered by a child.
ROEL R. DEGAMO V. OMBUDSMAN AND MARIO L. RELAMPAGOS

G.R. No. 212416, 5 December 2018
FACTS:
Due to the damage caused by the typhoon Sendong and earthquake in 2012, the
NDRRMC requested to DBM the release of P961,550,000.00 to the Negros Oriental province to
finance its rehabilitation.
The DBM, through its Regional Office No. VII, issued Special Allotment Release Order No.
ROVII-12-0009202, which covered the approved amount. It also issued a Notice of Cash
Allocation worth P480,775,000.00, or 50% of the approved sum. Then DBM Secretary Abad
ordered accused Relampagos to withdraw released funds. Thereafter, accused Relampagos
issued his letter-advise, informing Degamo that the DBM is withdrawing the amount, and
ordered that the provincial government to return and deposit the released amount.
Thus, Degamo filed with the Ombudsman a complaint for Usurpation of Authority or
Official Functions, alleging that Relampagos falsely posed himself to have been authorized by
President Aquino and usurped the authority of the Executive Secretary. The Ombudsman
dismissed the complaint for lack of probable cause.
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ISSUE:
Whether there is probable cause to prosecute Relampagos for Usurpation of Authority
HELD:
No. The punishable act in usurpation of authority is false and knowing representation,
i.e. the malicious misrepresentation as an agent, officer, or representative of the government.
Relampagos did not maliciously misrepresent himself as an agent, officer, or

representative of the government. He is a public official himself, the DBM Undersecretary for
Operations, whom the Ombudsman had found to have signed the letter in his own name and
under the words, "By Authority of the Secretary." Clearly, the facts presented by Degamo do not
constitute the crime of usurpation of authority.
Moreover, Degamo’s argument that Relampagos’ power does not include revoking,
canceling, or suspending what has been approved by the President is wrong. It appears that
Relampagos was acting on behalf of DBM Secretary Abad, upon the instructions of the
President. Under the doctrine of qualified political agency, department secretaries may act for
and on behalf of the President on matters where the President is required to exercise authority
in their respective departments.
PEOPLE V. NADY MAGALLANO, JR.

G.R. No. 220721, 10 December 2018.
FACTS:
Accused Magallano and Tapar were charged with murder under 248 of the Revised
Penal Code. During the trial, the prosecution witness Pineda testified that at around 1:00 a.m.,
while he was at home sleeping beside his wife he heard loud voices outside which roused him
from sleep. He then heard a woman shout, "Romy, bakit mo s[i]ya sinasaktan, inaano ba kayo?"
Pineda peeked through his window and saw two (2) men, whom he later identified as
Magallano and Tapar, ganging up on Batongbakal who was by then lying on the ground. He
testified that he saw Magallano repeatedly strike Batongbakal with a "dos por dos," while Tapar
watched.
As Magallano was hitting Batongbakal, a woman suddenly bolted from the fray.
Magallano and Tapar then jumped inside a tricycle and chased the woman. By then, a still-
conscious Batongbakal began to crawl slowly towards a gate. Magallano and Tapar returned
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after a few minutes carrying several stones, each about a volleyball's size. Magallano threw the
stones on Batongbakal's head and body, while Tapar prevented him from crawling away.
The RTC convicted accused Magallano and Tapar of murder, ruling that treachery
qualified the killing to murder.
ISSUE:
Whether accused Magallano and Tapar are guilty of Murder
HELD:
No. The prosecution did not prove treachery as alleged in the information. Accused
Magallano and Tapar are however guilty of homicide.
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on the unarmed victim
without the slightest provocation on his part. It further provided that two (2) conditions must
be established by the prosecution for a killing to be properly qualified by treachery to murder:
(1) that at the time of the attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) that
the offender consciously adopted the particular means, method, or form of attack employed by
him.
The prosecution failed to show the presence of treachery as a qualifying circumstance.

The prosecution’s witness’ testimony began when accused Magallano and Tapar were in the
middle of mauling the victim, and there was no testimony to prove that the victim did not
provoke them or expect their attack. The prosecution did not present evidence that would show
that accused Magallano and Tapar reflected on and decided on the form of their attack to secure
an unfair advantage over the victim. Even when accused Magallano and Tapar returned after
chasing the screaming woman and hit the crawling victim with rocks, treachery is still absent.
This is because the second attack was not a surprise, as shown by the victim's attempt to go back
to the safety of his own house.
PEOPLE V. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. 217978, 30 January 2019
Qualified human trafficking
FACTS:
During an entrapment operation in 2009, PO1 Nemenzo and PO1 Llanes ordered beers
and waited for the pimps. Two (2) women approached them and introduced themselves as
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AAA and BBB, both minors. Upon hearing that they would need two (2) more girls, another
woman approached them and introduced herself as Nancy, who was later identified as
Ramirez. Ramirez told the police officers that she could provide the girls. Then, BBB and
Ramirez left, and after a while, returned with two (2) more girls. They agreed that each girl
would cost P600.00 as payment for sexual services. Ramirez instructed BBB to receive the
money from the men.
After they left the bar, the police officers introduced themselves to AAA and BBB. BBB
pointed to Ramirez as her pimp.
Ramirez was charged with and convicted of violation of Section 4(e) of R.A. No. 9208. As
her defense during trial and on appeal, Ramirez alleged it was BBB who negotiated with the
poseur customers about the girls' prices and received the supposed payment for sexual
services. She posits that the advanced payment made to BBB was “contrary to human nature
and natural course of events” since no sexual activity had occurred yet. She insists that she was
in the area just to watch a live band.
ISSUE:
a. Whether the consent of AAA and BBB is a defense in a case for qualified human
trafficking.
b. Whether sexual intercourse is an element of the crime of qualified human trafficking.
HELD:
a. The victim's consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive
means employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive,
abusive, or deceptive means, a minor's consent is not given out of his or her own free
will. Ramirez hired children to engage in prostitution, taking advantage of their
vulnerability as minors. AAA's and BBB's acquiescence to the illicit transactions cannot
be considered as a valid defense.
b. The crime is considered consummated even if no sexual intercourse had taken place
since the mere transaction consummates the crime.
PEOPLE V. ROYOL
G.R. No. 224297, 13 February 2019
Failure to comply with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165
FACTS:
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During a buy-bust operation, PO2 Baquiran exchanged the marked money for half a
brick of marijuana from the accused. Thereafter, accused was arrested and brought to the Tarlac
Provincial Office where the brick marijuana was supposedly marked. PO2 Baquiran then
personally brought the marijuana to the Tarlac Provincial Crime Laboratory Office, where, upon
examination by Police Inspector Jebie C. Timario, it tested positive for marijuana. Accused was
convicted of illegal sale of drugs under Section 5, R.A. No. 9165.
ISSUE:
Whether the provisions of Section 21, R.A. No. 9165 on chain of custody of dangerous
drugs were complied with.
HELD:
No. There is no semblance of compliance with Section 21(1). All the prosecution has to
support its assertions on the integrity of the marijuana that was allegedly obtained from
accused-appellant is its bare claim that it was marked at the Tarlac Provincial Police Office.
Neither PO2 Baquiran nor Inspector Silva testified on the conduct of a proper inventory and
photographing. The prosecution's claims are sorely lacking in accounting how the marijuana
was actually marked, including the safety measures undertaken by police officers.
Worse, the prosecution failed to account for the presence of even just one (1) of the
persons required by Section 21(1) to be present during the inventory and photographing. There
was no elected public official. Neither was there a representative of the National Prosecution
Service nor was there a media representative. The prosecution did not even maintain that
accused-appellant himself was present.
The customary presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot

suffice to support a conviction in this case. A presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty is made in the context of an existing rule of law or statute authorizing the
performance of an act or duty or prescribing a procedure in the performance thereof. The
presumption applies when nothing in the record suggests that the law enforcers deviated from
the standard conduct of official duty required by law; where the official act is irregular on its
face, the presumption cannot arise. In light of the flagrant lapses we noted, the lower courts
were obviously wrong when they relied on the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty.
See also: People of the Philippines v. Dela Cruz, G.R. No. 229053, 17 July 2019; People of the
Philippines v. Merando, G.R. No. 232620, 5 August 2019; Veriño v. People, G.R. No. 225710, 19
June 2019; People v. Acub, G.R. No. 220456, 10 June 2019; People v. Ternida, G.R. No.
212626, 3 June 2019; People v. Comoso, G.R. No. 227497, 10 April 2019; People v. Ameril G.R.
No. 222192, 13 March 2019; and Regalado v. People, G.R. No. 216632, 13 March 2019.
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REYNES v. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. No. 223405, 20 February 2019
Illegal exactions under Article 213 (2) of the Revised Penal Code
FACTS:
Reynes alleged that Barangay Captain Amores collected increased monthly garbage
collection fees amounting to P2,000.00, even without any ordinance or statute, or any other
regulation authorizing its collection, and despite the City of Lapu-Lapu already collecting its
own garbage fees.
Reynes explained that, prior to the material incidents in this case, the Barangay had been
collecting P1,000.00 monthly as garbage collection fee. In his subsequent Reply to Barangay
Captain Amores and Kagawad Hontiveros' Joint Counter-Affidavit, Reynes annexed a copy of
Official Receipt No. 2827422 dated January 31, 2011, acknowledging a total of P3,000.00
collected as "garbage collection fee for the month (sic) of Jan to March 2011." He noted in his
Complaint that the resort's garbage was segregated and deposited on Tongo Road, outside the
resort's premises and there collected twice a week.
When Barangay Captain Amores ordered that the fee be increased to P2,000.00, while
reducing the frequency of garbage collection to once a week, Reynes questioned the increase.
He pointed out that no ordinance, statute, or regulation authorized it. However, Barangay
Captain Amores never gave an explanation in response; instead, on 27 July 2011, she ordered
the cessation of the collection of the resort's garbage.
Reynes filed a complaint for illegal exactions under Article 213 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code against Amores with the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman dismissed the complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether Amores should be held criminally liable for illegal exactions
HELD:
Yes. Liability under Article 213(2) ensues when the following elements are
demonstrated: (a) he offender is a public officer who is "entrusted with the collection of taxes,
licenses, fees and other imposts;” and (b) he or she engages in any of the three (3) specified acts
or omissions under Article 213(2), specifically: (i) demanding, directly or indirectly, the
payment of sums different from or larger than those authorized by law; (ii) failing voluntarily to
issue a receipt, as provided by law, for any sum of money collected by him officially; or (iii)
collecting or receiving, directly or indirectly, by way of payment or otherwise, things or objects
of a nature different from that provided by law.
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The first element is present since, as punong barangay, private respondent Amores was
chief executive of a local government unit. She was head of Barangay Marigondon,
administered it, and oversaw the discharge of all its functions. It was her duty to “enforce laws
and regulations relating to pollution control and protection of the environment, and ensure the
delivery of basic services as mandated under Section 17 of [the Local Government]
Code.” Among these basic services are “services and facilities related to general hygiene and
sanitation, beautification, and solid waste collection.”
The second element is established by Amores’ admission of Reynes' intermittent

delivery of sums in multiples of P2,000.00. While Amores claimed that the delivered sums do
not correspond to compulsory charges, but to voluntary contributions, her admission is
concedes that Reynes delivered the money, and that Reynes’ delivery and the Barangay's
concomitant receipt were not on account of an enabling ordinance or regulation.
TUPAZ v. OMBUDSMAN
G.R. NO. 212491-92, 6 March 2019
Gross inexcusable negligence sufficient to warrant a
conviction for violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019,
as amended
FACTS:
Tupaz stated that her mother, Hubahib, was the registered owner of a parcel of land in
Northern Samar, covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 15609. Since its issuance in
1971, she added, a duplicate has always been in the possession of their family—initially by
Hubahib and, upon her demise, by her heirs. On 17 April 2011, private respondent Atty. Abella,
the Register of Deeds of Northern Samar, cancelled OCT No. 15609, and issued transfer
certificate of titles to Genaro, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Macrina.
According to Tupaz, the cancellation of OCT No. 15609 was anchored on the following:
1. A document labeled as the owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15609 but which Tupaz
argued was "materially and essentially different"from the copy on file with the
Register of Deeds and the genuine owner's duplicate copy in her family's custody;
2. A Certificate Authorizing Registration supposedly issued by the Bureau of Internal

Revenue, which indicated that no capital gains tax was paid despite the property
being a more than 100,000- square meter commercial land with zonal valuation of
P400.00 per square meter as of 2002. The same certificate indicated that only
P2,655.00 in documentary stamp taxes and P100.00 for the certification fee were paid;
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3. A 1972 Deed of Conveyance, which was never annotated onto OCT No. 15609, and
which had surfaced only in 2011, bearing a forgery of Hubahib's signature; and
4. A subdivision plan that was made without the participation of or notice to Tupaz or
her co-heirs/owners.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for the Visayas dismissed dismissed Tupaz’s
complaint. Tupaz filed a petition for certiorari questioning the Ombudsman’s dismissal of the
complaint.
ISSUE:
Whether Atty. Abella should be held criminally liable for violation of Section 3(e), R.A.
No. 3019, as amended.
HELD:
Yes. Atty. Abella's official acts of canceling OCT No. 15609, and issuing in its stead
transfer certificates of title in the name of Genaro, appear to be attended, at the very least, by
gross inexcusable negligence. Here, the evidence strongly suggests that private respondent
Abella's actions fell miserably short of the standards apropos to his office. While he did not act
with private respondent Macrina out of a shared malevolent design, he nonetheless relied on
manifestly defective and tellingly suspicious documents that private respondent Macrina (or
persons acting under and for her) presented.
The following were considered by the court as circumstances which should have
prompted Atty. Abella to deny the request for cancellation of OCT No. 15609: (a) the owner's
duplicate of OCT No. 15609 that was presented to him consists of only two (2) pages while the
original thereof, which was on file in his own office, consisted of four (4) pages; (b) all possible
markings of the nature and origin of the alleged owner’s duplicate title were torn off; (c) the
duplicate of OCT No. 15609 presented to Abella had holes and tears exactly where these pieces
of information would have been indicated, even as the remainder of the informational portions
of the title remained intact; (d) there were apparent irregularities in the Certificate Authorizing
Registration; and (e) the Deed of Conveyance, though dated 1972, was presented for registration
only after 39 years and only after the death of Hubahib, the purported seller.
As things stand, the evidence weighs far more heavily in favor of petitioner's cause.
Even granting that he did not act with a deliberately malevolent design, he still appears to have
acted with grossly inexcusable negligence that he practically evaded his duties as a registrar of
deeds. Private respondent Abella was equipped with skills and training to identify irregularities
in property registration. More important, it was his solemn duty to not facilitate registrations
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attended by manifest aberrations. The palpable defects of the documents presented to him
should have prompted him to desist with the cancellation of the OCT.
PEOPLE v. LINA NOAH

G.R. NO. 228880, 6 March 2019
Transportation of illegal drugs; compliance with Section 21, R.A. No. 9165
FACTS:
Lina Noah, a Kenyan national, arrived in NAIA Terminal 1 and approached Lane 5 of
the Customs Arrival Area. She was asked to present her passport and Baggage Declaration.
Customs Examiner Landicho then asked Noah to open her luggage. Landicho noticed
that while the smaller bag inside Noah’s luggage was empty, its flap was hard and thick and its
sidings were suspiciously padded and had tampered stitches. Noting that it was odd for such a
bag to be hard, Landicho asked Noah to follow him to the exclusion room for further
examination of her luggage.
In the exclusion room, Landicho examined the bag before the accused and several
government officers. The inspection revealed seven (7) rectangular packages, wrapped in
vacuum-sealed aluminum foil, on which Landicho affixed his initials and signature. Thereafter,
Landicho prepared in inventory report as witnessed by, among others, a public prosecutor, a
barangay councilor and a media representative of the airport. Landicho then turned over the
Inventory Report, along with Noah's personal belongings, to the Philippine Drug Enforcement
Agency and Customs Task Force (PDEA).
In Noah's presence, PDEA’s Special Agent I Noble and Landicho inspected the luggage
and found hidden compartments which contained compressed foil packs if shabu. Before
Noah's arrest, Special Agent I Noble asked her if she could understand English. When she said
yes, he apprised her of her Miranda rights.
Agent Adrian Fajardo, a member of the PDEA’s Special Enforcement Service, testified
that he brought the seized items to Forensic Chemist Ariane Arcos for proper documentation
and laboratory examinations. The test results showed that the seized items contained shabu,
with a confirmatory test yielding the same outcome.
ISSUE:
Whether Noah can be held criminally liable for transaportation of illegal drugs
punishable under Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165.
HELD:
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Yes. The prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that accused appellant was
indeed transporting the illegal drugs. In the ordinary course of business, check-in officers attach
airline bag tags to the owner's check-in luggage at the airport of origin. As appreciated by both
the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the luggage had a bag tag attached to its handle clearly
bearing the name “Lina Achieng Noah.” Accused-appellant exercised control and took
possession of the luggage and its corresponding claim stub. Since the act of transporting illegal
drugs is malum prohibitum, proof of ownership and intent are not essential elements of the crime.
Accused-appellant was apprehended inside the airport upon her arrival from Ethiopia
to Manila via Dubai. Shabu was found in her possession, contained in seven (7) packs of
vacuum-sealed aluminum foil and concealed in a laptop bag inside her luggage. This satisfies
the elements of the crime because she was found transporting illegal drugs to the Philippines.
The chain of custody was also established by the prosecution. The four links of chain of
custody of evidence were proven: (1) Landicho seized and marked the shabu obtained from
accused-appellant; (2) he turned them over to Agent Fajardo; (3) Agent Fajardo delivered them
to Forensic Chemist Arcos; and (4) from the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency, the drugs
were presented in court.
CONSTANTINO v. PEOPLE
G.R. No. 225696, 8 April 2019
FACTS:
The last will and testament of Severino Cabales states that it was supposedly executed in
the presence of the following instrumental witnesses: Rosalinda Cu, Dr. Eliezer Asuncion, Mary
Balintona and Dr. Justino Balintona. However, at the time of the execution of the will, Dr.
Asuncion was not present. The will was notarized by Atty. Constantino.
Addressing the absence of Dr. Asuncion, whose name was indicated as an instrumental
witness, Atty. Constantino assured Cabales’ son that only three (3) witnesses were needed for
the document. He then allegedly instructed Cabales’ son to leave the document as it was and
"not make any erasures or crossing-out on it [in] order not to make it dirty." Atty. Constantino
took a copy of the document and gave the other two (2) to Severino. On his way out, Atty.
Constantino alleged that Cabales’ son took his copy of the document, telling him that Dr.
Asuncion had already arrived. Sometime later, Saliganan returned the copy, but Atty.
Constantino stated that he did not check if Dr. Asuncion had signed it.
During trial, Dr. Asuncion testified that he actually signed Cabales’ last will and
testament after it was notarized by Atty. Constantino.
ISSUE:
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Whether Atty. Constantino should be held criminally liable for falsification of public
document for his failure to delete Dr. Asuncion's name in the Joint Acknowledgment of
Cabales’ last will upon notarization.
HELD:
No. At the time petitioner notarized the Last Will and Testament, only three (3)
witnesses had signed it. There is no finding, however, that Atty. Constantino had falsified the
participation of the three (3) witnesses who attested and subscribed to its due execution. It
likewise found that Dr. Asuncion signed the document, and that Atty. Constantino seemed
unaware that Dr. Asuncion later signed the document. Dr. Asuncion also admitted that his
signature was genuine and that he was aware of what he was signing.
Since Dr. Asuncion did not sign the Joint Acknowledgment before it was notarized, he
cannot be considered as having attested and subscribed to its due execution at the time of its
notarization. Thus, when Atty. Constantino certified that the persons who attested and
subscribed to the document were present before him, there could have been no falsity. It was
not petitioner who made it appear that Dr. Asuncion participated in the execution of the Joint
Acknowledgment, but Dr. Asuncion himself. Atty. Constantino, therefore, must be acquitted.
SANTIAGO, JR. Y SANTOS V. PEOPLE

G.R. No. 213760, 1 July 2019
FACTS:
On 26 and 27 September 2011, TV5 segment producer Espenida and his crew went to
Plaza Morga and Moriones in Tondo, Manila to investigate the alleged prostitution operations
in the area. They had earlier designated a confidential asset, alias “Romeo David” (“David”) to
pose as a customer and transact with the alleged pimps for a night with a minor. During the
transaction, the pimps, Reynaldo Santiago, Jr. y Santos (“Santiago”), Ramil Castillo y Merano
(“Castillo “) and Rebecca Legazpi y Adriano (“Adriano”) allegedly asked for 500.00. Espenida,
who was onboard a TV5 vehicle located about a hundred meters away from where David and
the pimps were, heard the transaction through the microphone.
Accordingly, on 29 September 2011, Espenida and his crew filed a Complaint before the
Regional Police Intelligence Operations Unit, Regional Intelligence Division, Camp Bagong
Diwa, reporting about the rampant human trafficking in Plaza Morga and Plaza Moriones.
Police cooperatives thereafter conducted and entrapment operation in said areas. Thereafter, at
around 11:00 p.m., the team and David arrived at Plaza Morga. After surveying the area, David
pointed to the pimps, who, upon seeing the police ran away but were eventually caught and
arrested. After the arrest, the team proceeded to the hotel where the trafficked person, AAA,
had been waiting.
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In its Decision dated 15 May 2012, the Regional Trial Court convicted Santiago of
committing trafficking in persons punished under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 9208, also known as
the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act.” Santiago was sentenced to 20 years of imprisonment and
was fined Php1,000,000.00. Thereafter, Santiago’s conviction was affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.
In the proceedings before the Supreme Court, Santiago questioned the prosecution’s
failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt as David did not testify, raising doubts on
whether he truly offered AAA to him. Santiago also pointed out that AAA testified that she did
not receive the alleged consideration for the transaction, dispelling the claim that he was
engaged in trafficking.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Santiago is guilty of human trafficking.
HELD:
Yes, Santiago is guilty of the crime of human trafficking.
Considering that the offense was committed on 30 September 2011, the original
provisions of R.A. No. 9208 apply. Under said law, the crime of trafficking in persons is defined
as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position,
taking advantage of the vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose
of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.”
In this case, the Regional Trial Court correctly convicted Santiago for violation of Section
4(a) of R.A. No. 9208, as the Information sufficiently averred that: (a) Santiago committed an act
of qualified trafficking in persons by offering AAA to David for sex or exploitation; (b) said act
was done for a fee; and (c0) for prostitution, exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage.
To be sure, the trafficked person’s consent cannot be used as a valid defense. Neither is
the testimony of the confidential informant indispensable in the crime of trafficking in persons.
Instead, it is sufficient is that the accused has lured, enticed, or engaged its victims or
transported them for the established purpose of exploitation, which was sufficiently shown by
the trafficked person’s testimony alone. With this sufficiently established in this case, there is no
question that Santiago may be held liable for the crime of human trafficking.
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PEOPLE V. PALEMA Y VARGAS
G.R. No. 228000, 10 July 2019.
FACTS:
On 10 November 2007, accused Ronald Palema y Vargas (Palema) Rufel Palmea y

Bautista (Palmea), Lyndon Saldua y Quezon (Saldua) and Virgo Grengia (Grengia) conspired
and confederated with each other, with intent to gain, by means of violence against and
intimidation of persons, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take and steal
the Nokia N70 cellular phone of Enicasio Depante y Rosales (Depante), without consent. On the
occasion and by reason of said robbery, accused stabbed Depante to death.
On arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial on the
merits ensued.
During trial, evidence for the prosecution revealed that around 11:00 p.m. on 10
November 2007, Depante, his common-law spouse, his son and stepdaughter were sitting on
the benches of the Calamba Town Plaza. Thereafter, three men who were later identified as
Palema, Palmea and Manzanero approached Depante.
Suddenly, Palema punched Depante in an attempt to grab his phone. Palema

simultaneously pulled out a knife and tried to stab him in the abdomen, but was warded off by
Jamie, making him drop his knife. Once he retrieved his knife, Palema stabbed Depante on the
right thigh, causing him to fall on the ground.
Seated on the bench near Depante, Erickson, the latter’s son stood and tried to help his
father, but Ladra stopped him. When he resisted, Ladra attempted to stab him, but he was able
to evade the attack and immediately look for a weapon. Upon reaching his father, however, he
saw that Depante had already collapsed from the stab wounds. Erickson brought his father to
the Calamba Medical Center, but he later died from blood loss.
Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court convicted Palema, Palmea, Saldua and Grengia. The Trial
Court, on the other hand, acquitted Marqueses for the prosecution’s failure to present evidence
that he participated in committing the crime. Thus, Palema, Palmea, Saldua and Grengia
appealed their conviction, stating, among others, that the prosecution failed to establish the
existence of conspiracy in committing the offense.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Trial Court erred in convicting Palema, Palmea, Saldua and Grengia
for the crime of robbery with homicide;
2. Whether or not the acquittal of Marqueses is proper.
HELD:
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1. Yes, the trial court properly convicted Palema, Palmea, Saldua and Grengia for
the crime of robbery with homicide.
Robbery with homicide is a special complex crime punished under Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code. It is perpetrated when, by reason or on the occasion of robbery, homicide
is committed. To hold a person liable for this crime, the prosecution must establish the
following elements with proof beyond reasonable doubt: (a) the taking of personal property
with violence or intimidation against persons; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the
taking was done with animo lucrandi; and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason
thereof, homicide was committed.
Nevertheless, it must be stressed that in robbery with homicide, the offender's original
intent must be the commission of robbery. The killing is merely incidental and subsidiary.
However, when the offender's "original criminal design does not clearly comprehend robbery,
but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a minor incident of the homicide, the
criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive of two offenses and not of a single complex
offense. "In convicting accused, the Regional Trial Court gave credence to the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, who recounted that the accused men were the ones who had
simultaneously assaulted Depante. Based on their testimonies, Manzanero and accused-
appellants Palema and Palmea all approached Enicasio and took his cellphone. When Enicasio
tried to fight back, Palema stabbed him, causing him to fall. Immediately after, the other
accused joined the fray and beat Depante.
It is clear that accused-appellants' primary objective was to rob Depante. But, by reason
or on the occasion of the robbery, Depante was stabbed and died as a result. Hence, they are
clearly liable for the crime of robbery with homicide.
2. Marqueses’ acquittal was not proper.
It is a basic principle in criminal law that a notice of appeal throws the entire case open
for review. Once an appeal is accepted by this Court, it will have "the authority to review
matters not specifically raised or assigned as errors by the parties, if their consideration is
necessary in arriving at a just resolution of the case.’
Here, the Regional Trial Court acquitted Marqueses after having found no evidence of
his participation in the crime charged. However, a perusal of the records shows that Marqueses
was never arraigned. It bears noting that Marqueses was never arrested and remained at large.
Without evidence of Marqueses' arraignment, the Regional Trial Court had no authority to
order his acquittal. All proceedings against him before the Regional Trial Court are deemed
void.
DE GUZMAN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

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G.R. No. 240475, 24 July 2019
FACTS:
In an Information, De Guzman was charged with illegal possession of a firearm, or of
violating R.A. No. 10591, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act.
On arraignment, De Guzman pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Thereafter, trial
ensued, where the prosecution presented its sole witness Senior Police Officer 1 Ador Estera
(SPO1 Estera), who testified as follows:
At around 4:00 p.m. on 22 October 2014, he and nine (9) other police officers were on
patrol along Taft Avenue, Libertad, Pasay City. As they were approaching the White House
Market, they noticed that people were running away from it. They went to investigate and saw
a revolver-wielding man, whom they later identified as De Guzman, shouting as though
quarreling with someone. They rushed to De Guzman and introduced themselves as police
officers. SPO1 Estera told De Guzman to put down the gun, to which he complied. After picking
up the gun, SPO1 Estera asked De Guzman if he had a license to possess it, but De Guzman
kept mum. SPO1 Estera then handcuffed and frisked De Guzman, discovering in his possession
a sachet of suspected shabu.
SPO1 Estera then brought De Guzman to the Pasay City Police Station and referred him
to SPO3 Allan V. Valdez (SPO3 Valdez) for further investigation. In SPO3 Valdez's presence,
SPO1 Estera marked the revolver with De Guzman's initials, "JAD-1." It was then that the officer
found four (4) live ammunition rounds, which he marked as "JAD-2" to "JAD-5." He also
marked the sachet of suspected shabu as "JAD." SPO1 Estera then turned the seized items over
to SPO3 Valdez.
The defense alleged an entirely different version of events. It emphasized, first, that De
Guzman was arrested on 21 October 2014, not 22 October 2014. It then explained that on 21
October 2014, De Guzman and his sister, Jessica, were dressing chicken to sell at the public
market. While they were taking a break at around 4:00 p.m., 10 men in civilian clothes arrived,
as though looking for something. Among them, SPO1 Estera, as De Guzman later identified,
approached De Guzman and asked him why he had knives. De Guzman replied that he used
them for dressing chickens to be sold at the public market. SPO1 Estera then asked De Guzman
if they had a mayor's permit, to which De Guzman replied that since they merely operated a
small business, they did not obtain such a permit.
Calling De Guzman's reply "bastos," an angry SPO1 Estera pulled out his gun and
pointed it at him. At gunpoint, De Guzman begged SPO1 Estera for forgiveness. However,
SPO1 Estera took De Guzman's knives and ordered him to lie on his stomach. He then frisked
De Guzman, but he found nothing. As SPO1 Estera's companions arrived, SPO1 Estera told
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them that he was arresting De Guzman for having the knives in his possession. De Guzman was
then brought to the Pasay City Police Station.
There, SPO1 Estera allegedly demanded P300,000.00 from De Guzman lest he be

charged with illegal possession of a firearm and illegal possession of dangerous drugs. Unable
to produce the amount demanded by SPO1 Estera, De Guzman was formally charged with the
threatened offenses.
In its Decision dated 1 March 2017, the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City convicted De
Guzman. According to it, the presentation during trial of a .38 caliber revolver and ammunition,
coupled with SPO1 Estera's identification of them as the same items obtained from De Guzman,
established the elements for conviction of the charge of illegal possession of a firearm. It added
that, in any case, De Guzman himself admitted to not having a license to own, possess, or carry
a .38 caliber revolver or ammunition.
Aggrieved, De Guzman appealed before the Court of Appeals, maintain that the gun
and ammunition presented against him were merely "planted evidence." The Court of Appeals,
however, simply sustained the Trial Court’s conviction of De Guzman.
ISSUE:
Whether or not petitioner Jonathan De Guzman y Aguilar is guilty beyond reasonable

doubt of violating R.A. No. 10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation
Act.
HELD:
It was serious error for the Court of Appeals to affirm petitioner's conviction. Proof
beyond reasonable doubt is imperative to sustain a conviction in criminal cases.
This requisite quantum of proof is borne by the constitutional imperative of due process.
It is also in keeping with the presumption of innocence of an accused until the contrary is
proved. While proof beyond reasonable doubt does not demand absolute, impeccable, and
infallible certainty, it still requires moral certainty.
To sustain convictions for illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution must show two
(2) essential elements: (1) that the firearm subject of the offense exists; and (2) that the accused
who possessed or owned that firearm had no corresponding license for it, which it failed to do
in this case.
Proving its version of events beyond reasonable doubt made it necessary for the
prosecution to present evidence that not only trumped that of the defense, but even addressed
all the glaring loopholes in its own claims. It was, therefore, inadequate for it to have relied on
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the single testimony of the police officer whose credibility had been put into question not only
with respect to the veracity and accuracy of his version of events leading to petitioner's arrest,
but even with respect to a supposed prior vendetta against petitioner, and an attempt to extort
from him. It was the prosecution's duty to show that its version of events deserves credence, the
inadequacies of SPO1 Estera notwithstanding. It abandoned the chance to discharge this duty
when it declined to present other witnesses to buttress the claims of its single, grossly flawed
witness.
People v. ZZZ
G.R. No. 228828, 24 July 2019
FACTS:
In an October 14, 1996 Information, ZZZ was charged with the crime of rape with
homicide. Upon arraignment, ZZZ pleaded not guilty to the crime charged and trial ensued.
Thereafter, the Regional Trial Court, in its 4 March 2013, found ZZZ guilty of the crime
charged, adopting the report of the social worker that he acted with discernment, stating that
the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution proved ZZZ’s guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. The Regional Trial Court likewise held that there was moral certainty that ZZZ
perpetrated the crime since he had been the last person seen with AAA before she disappeared,
and he fled and hid his identity when he learned that he was a suspect.
While ZZZ appealed, his conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in its
Decision dated 29 February 2016.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution

sufficiently convicted ZZZ of the crime of Rape with Homicide.
2. Whether or not ZZZ acted with discernment.
HELD:
1. It is settled that the commission of the crime of rape may be proven not only by
direct evidence, but also by circumstantial evidence. In fact, in the absence of direct evidence,
resort to circumstantial evidence is usually necessary in proving the commission of rape. This is
because rape "is generally unwitnessed and very often only the victim is left to testify for [him
or] herself. It becomes even more difficult when the complex crime of rape with homicide is
committed because the victim could no longer testify."
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In convicting the accused, the trial court and the Court of Appeals considered the
following circumstantial evidence in convicting accused-appellant: (1) BBB testified seeing him
dragging AAA to the school on the night of the incident; (2) accused-appellant's brother, YYY,
testified going home with him and AAA, but accused-appellant asked him to leave them
behind; (3) after AAA's body had been found, accused-appellant fled town and hid his identity
using an alias; and (4) the post-mortem examination conducted by Dr. Mejia and Dr. Bandonill
confirmed that the cause of AAA's death was a traumatic cerebral contusion, while the dried
blood from her vagina was caused by a tear inside the genital area. These pieces of evidence
confirm the existence of the elements of the special complex crime of rape with homicide,
namely: (a) the appellant had carnal knowledge of a woman; (b) carnal knowledge of a woman
was achieved by means of force, threat or intimidation; and (c) by reason or on occasion of such
carnal knowledge by means of force, threat or intimidation, the appellant killed a woman.
Hence, it is clear that the evidence presented by the prosecution, though circumstantial, are
sufficient to warrant ZZZ’s conviction.
2. The Supreme Court defined discernment as the "mental capacity of a minor to

fully appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act."
In this case, ZZZ acted with discernment, as shown by the following: (a) he perpetrated
the crime in a dark and isolated place; (b) after knowing that he had been tagged as the suspect,
he evaded authorities by fleeing to Tarlac and concealing his identity; (c) as confirmed by the
social worker assigned to him, he knew and understood the consequences of his acts; and (d)
Dr. Bandonill concluded that AAA was raped by means of force, as evidenced by the contusions
all over her body and by the tear from her vaginal area. Undeniably, these facts confirm that
ZZZ committed the crime with an understanding of its depravity and consequences. He must
therefore suffer the full brunt of the penalty of the crime.
DE GUZMAN V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 224742, 7 August 2019
FACTS:
On 8 April 1994, Prudencio De Guzman (Prudencio) and Arlene De Guzman (Arlene)

were married before Branch 106 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Their marriage was
solemnized by Judge Julieto P. Tabiolo, with Marriage License No. 1031606 issued on 6 April
1994. However, Prudencio abandoned his wife and children in 2007.
In December 2009, a friend informed Arlene that Prudencio contracted a second

marriage with a certain Jean Basan (Basan) on 17 December 2009 at the Immaculate Church in
Las Pinas City. On 8 January 2010, Arlene went to the Immaculate Church and confirmed that
Prudencio had indeed married Basan. Arlene secured a copy of Prudencio and Basan's marriage
contract at the City Civil Registrar's Office. Arlene then filed before the Office of the City
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Prosecutor a Complaint against Prudencio for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal
Code.
On arraignment, Prudencio pleaded not guilty to the crime charged Trial on the merits
then ensued. In his defense, Prudencio argued that his marriage with Arlene was void because
the copy of their Marriage Contract, which was secured from the National Statistics Office, did
not bear the solemnizing officer's signature.
In its 13 March 2012 Decision, the trial court did not give weight to Prudencio's defense.
It explained that such discrepancy was inadvertent, as it found that a copy of the same Marriage
Contract in the Local Civil Registrar bore the solemnizing officer's signature. Moreover,
marriage photos, along with Prudencio's own admission in his Counter-Affidavit, were enough
evidence for the trial court to find that Prudencio and Arlene were married.[16]The trial court
concluded that Prudencio could not unilaterally declare that his marriage with Arlene was void
as only courts have the power to do so.
The trial court ruled that the prosecution was able to show that all the elements of
bigamy were present:(1) the marriage between the appellant and the private complainant is still
existing; (2) the same has not been legally declared to be dissolved; (3) appellant contracted a
subsequent marriage with a certain Jean Basan while his first marriage with the private
complainant is still subsisting; and (4) the second marriage has all the essential requisites for its
validity.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Prudencio is guilty of Bigamy.
HELD:
The law provides that a judicial declaration of nullity is indispensable for the purposes
of remarriage.
Prudencio cannot claim to have been in good faith in assuming that there was no legal
impediment for him to remarry based merely on the National Statistics Office's issuance of a
Certificate of No Marriage Record. Based on Prudencio and Arlene's Marriage Certificate, along
with the photos of the wedding ceremony, they were married on April 8, 1994. Consequently,
the Certificate of No Marriage Record is not enough for Prudencio to assume that his previous
marriage with Arlene has been voided. Thus, his subsequent remarriage to Basan rendered him
liable for Bigamy.
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SURVEY OF CASES IN CRIMINAL LAW

PENNED BY J. LEONEN (2014-2019)

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. RODRIGO GUTIEREZ

The case is a review of the decision of the CA in the conviction of an accused-appellant

The test of sufficiency of Information is whether it enables a person of common

In criminal cases, disguise is an aggravating circumstance because, like nighttime, it

Article 266-A. Rape: When and How Committed. — Rape is committed:

a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;

MIGUEL CIERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether or not treachery is present as a qualifying circumstance to sustain a conviction

Criminal Law; R.A. No. 9165; Chain of Custody

PO1 Aure, acting as poseur-buyer and accompanied by the police informant,

Special Complex Crime, Robbery with Homicide

Is Chavez guilty of robbery with homicide?

Whether or not victim's mental incapacity needs to be alleged in the information in

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. SHIRLEY A. CASIO

2. Yes. Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB to be trafficked, the SC

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2015

RICHARD RICALDE V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

1. Whether Ricalde is guilty of the crime of rape through sexual assault

ANGELITA CRUZ BENITO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether or not Benito should be liable for estafa

PEOPLE V. RODRIGO CASACOP

2. No. The presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties cannot

To determine whether there was a valid entrapment or whether proper

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. MARCELINO OLOVERIO

Whether or not Oloverio is guilty for the crime of murder

On the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation

The mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation is present considering that

To appreciate passion and obfuscation as a mitigating circumstance, the facts must be

Based on the records, accused-appellant was put under preventive imprisonment

Whether Macayan is guilty of Robbery

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2016

Murder; Conspiracy; Stages of Commission

After conducting preliminary investigation, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor

In the Resolution, Undersecretary Malenab-Hornilla partially granted Marasigan’s

Whether or not Fuentes, Calilan, Lindo should be charged of attempted murder. -

PEOPLE V. CRISTY DIMAANO

Inconsistencies in the testimonies of prosecution witnesses in cases involving violations of

Yes. Indeed, non-remittance of GSIS and Pag-IBIG Fund premiums is criminally

Whether or not Lopez is guilty of cattle-rustling.

PEOPLE V. FELICIANO, JR.

Whether or not CA is correct in modifying the offense.

According to Article 248 in relation to Article 51 of RPC, attempted murder is

TUANO Y HERNANDEZ V. PEOPLE

Whether or not the criminal liability was extinguished? YES

DICHAVES V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

While the preliminary investigation proceedings in these complaints were being

Whether there is probable cause to charge petitioner with plunder.

No. A person's rights in a preliminary investigation are subject to the limitations of

Thus, at the stage of preliminary investigation, the question on the admissibility of

JANUARY TO DECEMBER 2017

G.R. No. 206627, 18 January 2017

Whether or not Torres’ act constituted child abuse.

In an Information, accused-appellant Monir Jaafar y Tambuyong (Jaafar) and Ahmad

RAMON AMPARO V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Whether the crime of robbery with a band was committed.

GRANADA, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

Conspiracy; R.A. 3019

1. Whether the prosecution sufficiently proved conspiracy.

In an Information, petitioners Capistrano Daayata (Daayata), Dexter Salisi (Salisi), and

As the same excerpt from Bahian's cross-examination indicated, nobody intimated to